OR

DONTSOV RESURGENT?

A comparative critique of the nationalist political platforms and activities

of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the All-Uk ai ia U io “ o oda

Bohdan Pechenyak
(Independent Scholar)
< bohdan.pechenyak@gmail.com >

A Work in Progress

Paper presented at the ASN World Convention

Columbia University, 18-20 April 2013

Please do ot ite ithout the autho s pe issio

© Bohdan Pechenyak
Contents
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................ 3
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Historical background ................................................................................................................................... 7
Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood and M. Drahomaniv .................................................................................. 7
Draho a i s politi al philosoph ............................................................................................................ 9
The First Party: URP and Ivan Franko ..................................................................................................... 13
Galician Youth before World War I ......................................................................................................... 16
The Revolutionary Student Movement in Eastern Ukraine ..................................................................... 18
‘e olutio ar Ukrai ia Part a d I depe de t Ukrai e ................................................................... 19
‘UP s Tur to ard “o ial De o ra a d the ‘esulti g Di isio .......................................................... 22
Dmytro Dontsov .......................................................................................................................................... 26
Formative Years ...................................................................................................................................... 26
Theorizi g Ukrai ia Natio alis : “tarosol s k i s Theor of the Natio ............................................... 32
Theorizing Ukrainian Nationalism: New Nationalism ............................................................................. 35
OUN s o ga ized atio alis .................................................................................................................. 42
Fascism? ...................................................................................................................................................... 49
The Social-Nationalist Movement............................................................................................................... 50
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 59

2
Abbreviations
AENM – Alliance of European National Movements
AUNR – Army of UNR
HDA – Branch State Archive (Haluzevyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv)
HUNM – Group of Ukrainian National Youth (рrupa Ukra i s ko i Natsio al o i Molodi)
LUN – Legia of Ukrainian Nationalists
OUN – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PUN – Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists (Pro id Ukra i s k kh Natsio alisti )
RSDRP – Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party (‘osi s ka “otsial-Demokratychna Robitnycha Partiya)
SBU – Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny)
SNPU – Social-National Party of Ukraine
SUNM – Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (“o uz Ukra i s ko i Natsio alist h o i Molodi)
UDKhP – Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party (Ukra i s ka De okrat h o-Khli oro s ka Parti a)
UHA – Ukrainian Galician Army (Ukra i s ka рal ts ka Ar i a)
UNDO – Ukrianian National-Democratic Union (Ukra i s ke Natsio al o-Demokratychne Obyednannia)
UNDP – Ukrainian National-Democratic Party
UNDS – Ukrianian National-Statist Union (Ukra i s k i Natsio al o-Derzhavnyi Soyuz)
UNP – Uk ai ai People s Pa t Ukra i s ka Narod a Parti a)
UNR – Uk ai ia People s ‘epu li Ukra i s ka Narod a ‘espu lika)
UNS – Ukrainian National Union (Ukra i s k i Natsio al i “o uz)
UPA – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukra i s ka Po sta s ka Ar i a)
UPNR – Ukrainian Party of National Work [Revolution] (Ukra i s ka Parti a Natsio al o i ‘o ot )
URP – Ukrainian Radical Party
USDP – Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party
RUP – Revolutionary Ukrainian Party
USDRP – Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party (Ukrainian Sotsial-Dem. Robitnycha Partiya)
USP – Ukrainian Socialist Party
USS – Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters
USSD – Ukrainian United Independent State (Ukra i s ka “o or a “a osti a Derzha a)
UVO – Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukra i s ka Vi s ko a Orha izatsi a)
ZUNR – Western-Uk ai ia People s ‘epu li Zakhidno-Ukra i s ka Narod a ‘espu lika)

3
Introduction
The inspiration for this project was essentially twofold. The initial spark that ignited the autho s interest
i the detailed histo of the Uk ai ia atio alist o e e t as last ea s A“N Co e tio . That as
the first time the author had ever heard the Uk ai ia atio alists ei g alled fas ist, the Uk ai ia
Scouting Organization Plast, to which the author had belonged for 20 years, being called
ult a atio alist, a d the entire liberation movement led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
(OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukra i s ka Po sta s ka Ar i a, UPA) being essentially
condemned as bloodthirsty war criminals. Naturally, the initial reaction was personal, subjective,
emotional and existential, but once the emotions subsided, it also became intellectual, objective, logical
and analytical. The author was able to clearly see the lack of conceptual clarity and the lack of
understanding of the entire context of the Ukrainian national movement for liberation.

The second catalyst, which actually inspired the topic of this paper, was the outcome of the October 28,
2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. A radical nationalist party, Vseukra i s ke O ed a ia (VO)
“ o oda (All-Ukrainian Union Freedom ), was able to surmount the 5% electoral barrier in the
proportional system and thus gain representation in Verkhovna Rada, Uk ai e s Pa lia e t. Svoboda is a
direct descendant of the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), a party that was formed in 1991 from
among the radical-nationalist activist circles. In 2004, SNPU was dissolved and Svoboda was formed,
with its leaders progressively attempting to distance themselves from the explicit social-nationalist
radical rhetoric. However, a mere change of its name and a more sophisticated public relations strategy
have not altered the substance of the party, as it continues to espouse the ideology of revolutionary
social-nationalism1, dating back to the interwar period, when the a ti e o effe ti e nationalism of
Dmytro Dontsov and, subsequently, the o ga ized , e olutio a nationalism of OUN were first
formulated. Moreover, Svoboda claims to be a bona fide ideological and spiritual descendant of the
preceding generations of nationalists, which certainly helps in terms of electoral success, since much of
the population (primarily in the Western Ukraine, but also in other regions, although to a much lesser
extent) holds the OUN, its leaders and its members in considerable veneration and even idolizes them as
national heroes, since many of them laid their lives down in the national liberation struggles during
World War II.

Oleh Tiah ok, the pa t s leade , se ed as MP f o to , fi st as a e e of “NPU, hi h

joined with the All-Ukrainian Political U io “tate I depe de e of Ukrai e to form Menshe Sliv
(Fewer Words) electoral bloc; and then as a Svoboda representative in the Nasha Ukrayina (Our
Ukraine) electoral bloc. Prior to the change of political branding, SNPU used a stylized Wolfsangel (see
illustration below) as their party emblem and espoused the ideology of revolutionary social-nationalism,

1
Andriy Illienko. Sotsial-natsionalizm i revoliutsiya (Social-Nationalism and Revolution). Ukrayinska Pravda
(Ukrainian Truth). March 2, 2011, Retrieved on March 19, 2013 from
http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/03/2/5976089/

4
dating back to Yaroslav Stetsko, one of the leaders in the Bandera faction within the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B). In 2004, Tyahnybok was expelled from NU parliamentary fraction for
controversial and inflammatory rhetoric with anti-Semitic and anti-Russian overtones. Since 2006, he
served as a member of the Lviv Oblast Rada (regional council) and ran for President in 2010, getting only
1.4% of the vote. Among the other prominent individuals in Svoboda to gain seats in Verkhovna Rada,
are the scandalous and provocative Iryna Farion and Yuri Mykhalchyshyn. Iryna Farion was a member of
the L i O last ‘ada since 2006 and a professor of philolog at the Natio al U i e sit L i s ka
Politekhnika (Lviv Polytechnics), a forceful advocate of Ukrainian language and culture, who frequently
causes sensational scandals due to her xenophobic and authoritarian rhetoric. Yuri Mykhalchyshyn, a
member of L viv City Council, a deputy head of political education for Lviv regional chapter of Svoboda,
and a senior researcher at L i s ka Politekh ika, is known for his inflammatory, violent and intentionally
provocative rhetoric and for his active and relentless propaganda of social-nationalism through his
websites, at rallies, in speeches and via any other means available. In 2010, he also published a booklet
Vatra. Versio . , which included the 1920 program of the German NSDAP and the 1919 program of
the Italian Fascist party, many short essays by the Nazi and proto-Nazi authors, including Joseph
Goebbels, Ernst Röhm, and Alfred Rosenberg, and his own essays and some essays by the Ukrainian
nationalist activists or literary figures interspersed among the Nazi writings.2

Wolfsangel v.1 SNPU Logo Wolfsangel v.2

Idea of the Nation

Let us look, for a moment, at the state of li e alis i toda s o ld. I o side it a fai l safe state e t
that liberalism is in decay and under attack all across the world. The reasons are manifold: the surge in
transnational terrorism of the reactionary, antimodern and ultraconservative Islamists; the rise of China,
Russia and other illiberal, corrupt, authoritarian regimes of state capitalism; the abdication of any
pretense, other than, perhaps, rhetorical, to be defending human rights and liberties by the
Euroatlanticist community, led by the Bush regime at the turn of the third millennium, and last but by no
means the least, the economic crisis of the postindustrial capitalist system driven by high-finance
speculation. Another sign is recent moderate resurgence of the radical nationalist parties in Europe –
there is virtually no European country that does not have at least one such party actively participating in
the political process, with the extremist and paramilitary right-wing organizations operating on the
margins or in the background. Partly, this points to the failure of multiculturalist policies and the
internationalist political system. And one of the defining shortcomings of multiculturalism as it is

. Neo-Nazis a d VO “ o oda . Ukra i s ka Pra da, October 27. Retrieved on April 10,
2
Voz iak, Ta as.
2013 from http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/10/27/6708115/. Also see http://www.vatra.cc,
http://www.nachtigall.lviv.ua/, http://www.mykhalchyshyn.info/.

5
practiced today is its insincere nature. It represents a mere token nod in the direction of cultural rights
in general and some of the most fundamental rights of all: that of national self-determination and the
right to culture.3

Needless to say, this may be a matter of grave concern. While the intensity, popularity and electoral
success of such radical right-wing parties vary widely, depending on the specific context, the economic
crisis and, consequently, the crisis of the European integration efforts, has certainly made it easier for
the to sell thei messianic heto i of atio al sal atio a d to pe suade people to suppo t the .
In some cases – such as Greece, fo e a ple, ith its People s U io Golde Da – these parties
represent overtly xenophobic, racist ideologies (reminiscent of the Fascist and Nazi ideologies that
emerged in the 1930s) and may even engage in violent action. While Greece is unique due to the gravity
of its e o o i isis a d the possi ilit of G e it – of leaving the euro zone and even the EU
altogether – looming especially large during 2012, all of these parties across Europe share the
p ope sit fo i tole a e to a d the othe , primarily immigrants, especially those who are Muslim.
The all fo aki g lea disti tio s et ee the eal , authe ti , ge ui e рu ga ia s,
‘o a ia s, G eeks, Da ish, “ edes, et . a d those ho do t elo g . The p ofess to e
p ote ti g , defe di g thei ou t , thei atio a d thei ide tit . Mo e ofte tha ot, this
rhetoric and these sentiments hide a profound sense of confusion (which may or may not be
unacknowledged and unconscious), an existential fear created by globalization and modernization, in
many cases (including Ukraine) compounded by the legacies of postcolonial, totalitarian imperialism,
whether of the Soviet or, more generally, of the communist and socialist regimes.

While it is impossible to predict with any significant degree of certainty what is in store for Europe and
the world at large, it is quite clear that no one can sit idly by and pretend indifferently that these socio-
political processes and cultural developments are irrelevant. These cross-cultural conflicts occur more
frequently and tend to become more dramatic, profound and fierce. Moreover, extremist factions are
present on both sides of the barricades, and they would rather resort to violence than engage in self-
reflection and cross-cultural dialogue. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to approach these situations
and conflicts with as much equanimity as possible, analyze the available evidence without prejudice,
make logical conclusions, unadulterated by gratuitous or misinformed emotion and prejudice, and
ultimately formulate appropriate, fair policies with regard to history and all the national memories
involved.

Returning to the Ukrainian context and Svoboda, it should prove fruitful to make a comparison between
the original ideas of Dmytro Dontsov and ideas and actions of the OUN leaders and members, on one
hand, and the ideas and actions of the Svoboda leaders and members, on the other. First of all, this will
allow us to avoid both unjustified vilification, usually accompanied by ungrounded blanket accusations,
and uncritical glorification, usually accompanied by blanket absolution of all sins and glowing statements
of admiration and approval. In other words, neither demonization nor idolization – both of which are,
unfortunately, all too common lately – is the way to proceed, for neither will lead us anywhere, and fast.
It is important to separate those, who actually sacrificed their lives during war, and those political, and

3
Tamir, Yael. (1993). Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

6
even military, leaders, who sent them to their death without second thought for their future or the
future of the country. Secondly, the comparison will allow us to draw useful conclusions from the
experiences of the OUN, which might contain important and portentous historical lessons for Svoboda.
Lastly, in the process of comparing these two political movements separated by a half of a century, we
may be justified in making some careful predictions with regard to the political future of Svoboda per se
and the Ukrainian nationalism at large.

Historical background

Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood and M. Drahomaniv

The efforts to raise the Uk ai ia people s atio al o s ious ess a d help it see the new dawn of
humanity, slowly spreading along with the liberal ideas of the American and the French Revolution,
began in earnest with Taras Shevchenko, a former serf with a talent for painting, whom his affluent
artist friends bought out of serfdom and who then became a prominent painter in St. Petersburg. Having
experienced the injustices of the system from the inside out, Shevchenko could not complacently enjoy
his fortune and watch his countrymen being exploited worse than cattle. He poured his frustrations,
anger, longings for national liberation and social justice into his poems, which eventually became the
foundation of the Ukrainian national narrative: in his poetry, first published in 1840 in a book entitled
Ko za , he as a le to fi d just the ight o ds to e p ess the e otio s felt ost. “i e the he
4
became known as the Great Kobzar. Along with a number of other prominent Ukrainian intellectuals of
mid-19th century, he took part in the activities of the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood.5 The members of
this brotherhood espoused progressive ideas, inspired by the works of the European democratic
socialists that reached the Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals within the Russian Empire by mid-19th
century.6 The Brotherhood members were persecuted by the imperial police forces, and Shevchenko
spent the better half of his life in exile in distant lands, as a soldier of the Tsarist army, writing his poems
and dreaming of free Ukraine. In a characteristic strike of historical irony, Shevchenko passed away the
very same year that serfdom was abolished throughout the Russian Empire – in 1861.

The efforts and thoughts of the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood were picked up and developed further by
the next generation of intellectuals, who adopted the principles of populism and in 1861 organized into
a secret society – Hromada (Community), – engaging in civic, cultural and educational program of
enlightening and raising the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people. Mykhaylo Drahomaniv, a
distinguished polymath, philosopher, economist, historian, literary critic, ethnographer, publicist and
civic activist, became the most profound influence on the future generations of intellectuals,7 and
encouraged the development of the Ukrainian political system. He became interested in socialist ideas

4
Kobzar is a vagabond musician, an itinerant bard that spread folk tales, both historical and of daily life. These
musicians played kobza, an instrument of the lute family, and were much revered by the ordinary people.
5
Named in honor of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, who brought literacy and the Cyrillic alphabet to Ukraine
6
Fedenko, Panas. (1968). Sotsializm Davniy i Novochasnyi. (Socialism Old and New). London-Paris-Munich: Our
Word, p.42.
7
Levynskyi, Volodymyr. (1918). The Origins of Ukrainian Socialism in Galicia. To o to: La o e s Wo d.

7
as a student and never throughout his life abandoned this worldview. He constantly evolved in his views
and always remained a sophisticated and complex thinker: even those authors he agreed with, such as
Proudhon, for example, he adapted to the specific Ukrainian context. In his own words,

I was always a socialist (since gymnasium, when I as gi e ‘o e t O e s a d “ai t-“i o s

works to read), but the thought never crossed my mind to transplant into our context in a
simplistic, stereotypical way any of the foreign socialist programs, least of all the Russian socialist
8
revolutionary nihilism, the anti-cultural nature of which was always repellent to me.

Drahomaniv felt a certain sense of allegiance to the Russian culture, having been born in the Russian
Empire and having been intimately familiarized with its culture. In his early years, therefore, Drahomaniv
espoused federalist views of Ukraine in a federal union of Easter European democratic societies, which,
he envisioned, would be established shortly as a result of the new transformative politics. His daring and
bold ideas were very attractive to the younger generation, and beginning with 1872-73, the student
outh sta ted fo i g lo al lu s, ofte alled D aho a i i les 9 or Moloda Hromada (Young
Community), as opposed to the Stara Hromada (Old Community), as the original founders of this
organization came to be known.

Despite espousing the internationalist perspective of socialist cooperation, Drahomaniv always

understood the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian national culture, as well as quickly realized and opposed
the tendencies to centralization and russification that were so prominent in the Russian Empire.10 After
all, the latter half of the 19th century was marked by two severely anti-Ukrainian legislative acts: the
secret Valuyev 11 Circular of 1863, by which the publication in Ukrainian language of religious,
educational literature (excluding fiction), as well as the school textbooks, was forbidden; and the Ems12
decree of 1876, signed by Tsar Alexander II, further severely limiting the use of the Ukrainian language in
literature, publishing, performing arts, and other cultural endeavors, in part to stem further
development of the Populist movement. That same year, Drahomaniv gave up his career as a university
professor, having been fired because of his views and activities, voluntarily emigrated from the Russian
Empire and settled first in Vienna and then in Geneva, where he was able to lead a prolific and
extremely active life as a publicist, public intellectual, political thinker and a founder of the Ukrainian
modern politics, independent from either the Russian or the Polish party systems. 13 In 1877,
Drahomaniv founded a Ukrainian-language journal Hromada, where in 1880 he published the first
modern Ukrainian political program (socialist, of course), which, among other things, demanded
o plete i depe de e fo the f ee asso iatio of o u ities i all of Uk ai e (in a manner of
speaking, this amounted, effectively, to Uk ai e s independence). In the meantime, in 1881 the Russian
radicals assassinated Tsar Alexander II, another wave of repression followed, and the Ukrainian national

8
Ripetskyi, op.cit.
. D aho a i ski k uzhk D aho a i Ci l es . Vil a Ukra i a [Free Ukraine], 19:47-
9
Lysyi, Volod .
51.
10
Drahomaniv, Mykhaylo. (1915). Fanciful Thoughts about the Ukrainian National Cause. Vienna: Ukrainian Party
of Socialist-Revolutionaries Publishing.
11
The Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire at the time was Pyotr Valuyev.
12
Bad Ems is a German resort town, frequented by many European royalties, including Alexander II of Russia.
. D aho a i – ash. D aho a i is ou s. Vil a Ukra i a [Free Ukraine], 25: 5-17
13
Ripetsk i, “tepa .

8
life and activism in Russian-dominated Ukraine became a victim of this repressive assault. Many decided
to join the Russian radical organizations, so as to avoid persecution, and the remaining steadfast
Ukrainophiles maintained low political profile until 1900s, rejecting the repeated calls to political activity
from Drahomaniv and preferring legal venues of cultural and educational activities.

Drahomaniv’s political philosophy

As an anarchist and ethical socialist, rather than a social-democratic or Marxist one, Drahomaniv
believed in universalism and community, but also in the ideas of liberty, equality, and human rights.
While pat ioti all suppo ti g the Uk ai ia s ight to culture and self-determination, he realized full
well the Janus-faced nature of nationalist aspirations and the potential dangers of an exclusive,
particularist worldview.14 Defi i g hi self as a itize of the o ld, a os opolita , D aho a i , i
his views, went beyond the simplistic dichotomous political spectrum of his day, with moskvofily
(russophiles) and narodovtsi (populists), at the opposite poles. Ivan Franko, the leading social and
political thinker in Galicia at the turn of the century, and a self-professed student of Drahomaniv15,
characterized his mentor with the following words:

Drahomaniv was too sober and skeptical by nature to believe in some supernatural mission given
to any particular people, and was too serious of a historian not to understand that any job,
especially an intentional reform of society, requires an expert, a master, and cannot be
accomplished through blind instinct. As a counterbalance to all manners of mysticism and
fatalism, panslavic on one hand and social-democratic on the other, he proposed a principle of
culture and education, arguing that fostering within particular individuals the principles of liberty
and respect for the rights of the others raises, and will continue to do so in an increasingly
progressive manner, the intellectual level and the ethical development of the whole mass of a
16
people. (emphases mine – BP)

Drahomaniv opposed the utopian theory of a radical and comprehensive social revolution and stressed
the process of evolution instead, with revolution per se being a momentary and local phenomenon of
this much wider process. He stressed that economic and civic affairs of a community are just as
important as the affairs of the state and a mere uprising, a revolution is not sufficient to ensure that
these affai s a e take a e of p ope l . ‘e ellio s a egi to a ake a i i i d, the a put a
e d to the old o de that had ee tho oughl u de i ed a d eake ed othe ethods, ote
D aho a i , ut to eate the e o de , espe iall i i a d e o o i , is e o d a e ellio s
apa ilities. If the e olutio a ies do ot ha e a p og a the a sta t i ple e ti g i ediatel
following the revolution, the ancient regime will return with vengeance, as history readily demonstrates.
The po e of the emerging new civic order consists not so much in the rebellion against the old order
itself, especially not in the elimination of the state authority, as in the emergence of small and large

14
Drahomaniv, op.cit.
15
‘ipetsk i, “tepa . . I a н a ko a d M kha lo D aho a i . Vil na Ukrayina, 50: 4-16.
16
Franko, Ivan. (1966. [1906]) “uspil o-polit h i pohliad M. D aho a o a. “o io-political views of M.
Drahomaniv.] in Kravtsiv, Bohdan, ed. (1966). Ivan Franko on Socialism and Marxism. Reviews and Articles, 1897-
1906. New York: Prolog. (Unless otherwise noted, all the translations of the quotes in the paper are mine.)

9
associations of people, i plo es D aho a i , i the changes of customs and thoughts of people in all
o u ities…, i a hole se ies of labors not political, but civic and economic, familial, scientific. 17

As already mentioned, Drahomaniv distrusted Russian centralism and anti-culturalism, opposing its
Machiavellian methods and approval of revolutionary terror; at the same time, he did not expect
anything from Germans or Austrians either: he was afraid of the German nationalism and imperialism –
their Drang nach Osten18 – and distrusted the Austrian government, which practically abandoned the
Ukrainians in Galicia to the mercy, or rather lack thereof, of the Polish shliakhta (gentry, aristocracy).
The efo e, D aho a i s solutio to the atio al uestio i йaste йu ope was federalism of
autonomous, sovereign, self-ruling (samostoyachi o self-sta di g, as he put it atio s i a н ee
Co o ealth. Due to these ideas, the ‘ussia e t alists du ed hi a atio alist, hile Le i
appe ded the adje ti e ou geois, arguing that he was no socialist, but a petite-bourgeois
19
ideologue. Drahomaniv addressed and rebutted both Russian and Polish pretensions for Ukrainian
lands in many of his works, notably Historical Poland and the Great-Russian Democracy. 20

One notable thing to mention is his resolute rejection of Marxism. He was never able to come to terms
with the ideas espoused by Marx and Engels and could not assimilate their thoughts into his otherwise
flexible and evolving worldview.21 He denounced Marxism both as a scientific doctrine and a social
theory, along with its reductive economic determinism and materialism that ignored the emotional,
moral and free-will aspects of a human being.22 Moreover, he observed that Marxism had a profound
effect on both Russian and Polish socialists by reaffirming their centralism, imperialism and orthodox
dogmatism directed towards continued oppression and, respectively, russification and polonization of
the Ukrainian people.23

In other words, being aware that Russian or Polish democrats were much closer in their sensibilities to
Russian or Polish imperialists than to Ukrainian democrats, Drahomaniv gradually evolved to the
autonomist position and even started entertaining separatist ideas, albeit on the theoretical, cultural
level and not yet on the level of practical politics.24 Nevertheless, his view was that it was impossible to
not be radicalized, if one were interested in the Ukrainian national idea, since there was no other
recourse to change things in the tyrannical imperial syste . Wi ked is the Uk ai ophile that has t
e o e a adi al, a d i ked is the adi al that has t e o e a Uk ai ia , he o e ote.25 His

Drahomanov, Mykhaylo. (1878). Ope i g Co e ts to рro ada . Pp. 132-33 in Bohatskyi, Pavlo. (1937).
17

Selected Works of Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Collection of Political Writings with Notes. Prague: Ukrainian
Sociological Institute (sponsored by the Ukrainian Progressive Societies in America).
18
Ge a fo d i e to a ds the East, a term coined in the 19th century to designate German expansion into
th
Slavic lands. The term became a motto of the German nationalist movement in the late 19 century, later
transformed by Hitler into the idea of Lebensraum.
. D aho a i – ash. D aho a i is ou s. Vil a Ukra i a, 25: 5-17
19
‘ipetsk i, “tepa .
20
Fedenko, Sotsializm Davniy I Novochasnyi, 45-6.
21
Levynskyi, op.cit.
22
Franko, op.cit., 247.
23
Ripetskyi, op.cit.
24
Franko, op.cit.
25
Fedenko, op.cit., 44-5.

10
thinking probably would have evolved even further, ultimately incorporating these ideas into his
practical politics and his life, had it not been ended prematurely by aneurism in 1895, at the age of 54.26

To sum up, Mykhaylo Drahomaniv may be considered – and is considered – the founding father,
ideologue and organizer of the Ukrainian version of socialism, despite the best efforts of the Soviet
p opaga dists to eha ilitate hi a d lai hi as a ‘ussia p og essi e ig , ho o side ed
Uk ai e s fate i sepa a le f o that of ‘ussia, supposedly because Ukraine was atu all d a
to a ds ‘ussia a d the othe l u io of t o peoples.27 His wide-ranging intellectual efforts, as well
as his civic leadership, encompassed socialist, liberal, democratic and other related strains of thought,
and defined the tradition of Ukrainian political thought and the makeup of the political party system for
decades to come. It is either through building on his ideas, or by reacting to them (although not
exclusively, of course), that the Ukrainian politics of the first half of the 20th century took shape. This
point is directly relevant to the thesis of this paper, as, consciously or not, current politics are also
influenced by similar themes of the Ukrainian-‘ussia elatio s, Uk ai e s st uggle to asse t itself as a
fully free, independent, sovereign nation and to shed the vestiges of all colonialisms: Polish, German
and, most importantly, Russo-Soviet.

The early obstinate federalism of Drahomaniv is explained by the fact that, realizing the weakness of the
Ukrainian national movement both in the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he was cognizant of
the fact that it will not be possible to separate from either by relying solely on own forces. Moreover,
he envisioned different paths for the Russia-dominated Ukraine and the Austria-dominated Galicia. The
latter, he thought, could already start forming a properly socialist party of peasants and workers, being
familiar with constitutional and parliamentary politics, while the former needed to first gain political
freedom and, in the meantime, the socialist ideas would have to be disseminated primarily (even
exclusively) by the literary-scientific methods.28 While in Geneva, Drahomaniv was spreading his ideas
both by relentless publishing and through his personal contacts, which he amassed during his years in
Kyiv and during his travels abroad in the early 1870s, including Western Ukraine. It was under his
influence and tutelage that the socialist movement began developing in Galicia.29 Interestingly, though,
Drahomaniv did not discuss socialism and its theories much in his letters and publications, according to
Franko30, preferring instead to emphasize the individual aspect and such virtues as sincerity, simplicity,
elia ilit i eeti g o e s o ligatio s, f a k a d fi e p essio of o e s eliefs, a d a ti g i
accordance with those beliefs.

26
рa ashi , Vse olod. . Neduha ta s e t M. D aho a o a. Ill ess a d death of M. D aho a i . Pp.
67-77 in Vasyl Simovych. (1930). Pratsi Ukra i s koho Vysokoho Pedagogichnoho Instytutu u Prazi.
Draho a i s k i ) ir k [Collected Works of the Drahomaniv Ukrainian High Pedagogical Institute in Prague],
Vol.1. Prague: Siyach.
. нi all the sta ted talki g a out M kha lo D aho a i . Vil a Ukra i a, 24: 7-18.
27
‘ipetsk i, “tepa .
28
D aho a o , “ itozo . . Os o sotsialist h kh pohliadi M kha la D aho a o aj. The нou datio s
of the Socialist Views of Mykhaylo Drahomaniv]. Vil a Ukra i a, 10: 9-19.
29
Levynskyi, op.cit., 6.
30
Franko, Ivan. (1920). Moloda Ukrayina, Chastyna Persha: Providni Ideyi I Epizody [Young Ukraine, Part 1: Leading
Ideas and Episodes . Wi ipeg: ‘us ka K ha ia, p.

11
Those were the ethical principles injected by Drahomaniv into the Galician society. Therefore, his brand
of socialism is often described as ethical socialism. In an essay that attempts to explain the socialist
views of Mykhailo Drahomaniv, his son Svitozor pointed out that since Robert Owen had first used the
o d so ialis , s ie tifi a d politi al pu li atio s had ide tified a ide a iet of diffe e t so ialis s:
utopian, scientific, national, Christian, democratic, anarchist, Soviet, and others. Svitozor wrote this
essay to defe d his fathe agai st oth the e atio alists that e e ged i the s afte the
defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution (from here onward: Nationalists) and the Soviet Marxists. Ironically,
both of these ideological g oups, although ehe e tl opposed to ea h othe , de ou ed D aho a i s
ideas, albeit for different reasons. The Nationalists decried the failures of the entire previous generation
of the national-liberation movement activists, labeling them collectivel as so ialists a d ea ti g
moving to the extreme position on the other side of the political spectrum. This will be discussed in
g eate detail elo . The Ma ists, o the othe ha d, de ou ed D aho a i as the e e of the
Ma ist e olutio , esse tiall a ou te e olutio a a d a ou geois atio alist, e ause he
advocated for autonomous and, later, independent Ukraine.31

The development of the Ukrainian socialist and liberal thought was continued by Ivan Franko, already
mentioned above, another highly distinguished and versatile thinker, writer, political activist, and civic
leader. He is often credited with formulating for the first time the clear definition of the Ukrainian
national idea.32 About Drahomaniv, he wrote:

In the person of Drahomaniv we saw and Europe recognized for the first time a new type – a conscious
йu opea a d o less o s ious Uk ai ia . It a e said that the ai od of D aho a i s iti gs …
were nothing else but an effort to explain the motives of this synthesis – of the conscious progressive
33
European identity together with the conscious Ukrainian identity.

Being a proponent of the progressive direction in the national movement, Drahomaniv – and his
disciples – supported a secular, reformist, almost a protestant vision of national rebirth and social
organization and opposed the conservative, retrograde orthodoxy of the clerical hierarchy. The former
direction led to the future prospects of Ukraine as a democratic European nation, while the latter – to
stagnation, conservation of the parochial, patriarchal society and marginalization on the periphery of
Europe.34 D aho a i s isio , al eit odified a d de eloped fu the , a e lose to ei g ealized i
the Revolution of 1917-21, but both geopolitical factors and the errors of the Ukrainian leaders defeated
those efforts, paving the way to exactly the kind of reactionary fo of ideolog , the e atio alis
of Do tso a d the OUN, agai st hi h he had a ed the Uk ai ia s i his iti gs. Toda s politi s of

31
Drahomanov, S., op.cit., 10.
Zabuzhko, Oksana. (1993). Philosophy of the Ukrainian Idea a d the йuropea Co te t: нra ko s period. Kyiv:
32

Osnovy. [З ужко, Ок . . Ф ло оф я ук а ько де та є опе ьк ко тек т: Ф а к ьк пе од.

К : О о .]
. I a н a ko a d M.D aho a i . Vil a Ukra i a, 51:
33
н a ko, I a i , uoted i ‘ipetsk i, “tepa .
22-3.
34
K uhlasho , A atoli . . “ta le ia M kha la D aho a o a do Kh st ia s ko i Tse k Uk a i i ta oho
p otesta ts k i p oekt M kha lo D aho a o s Attitude to a ds Ch istia Chu h i Uk ai e a d рis P otestant
Project.]. Ukrayina Moderna [Modern Ukraine], Issue 4-5.

12
Svoboda and certain clerical elements35 also represent a parochial and patriarchal, reactionary and anti-
modern, illiberal and antidemocratic worldview that emphasizes traditional orthodoxy.

The First Party: URP and Ivan Franko

Out of the environment of Galician young radicals, the first organized political party emerged in 1890,
with Drahomaniv as its mentor and Franko as its leader, – the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party (URP).
Here was a first Ukrainian political party standing on socialist positions, while also emphasizing the
problem of national self-definition. Yulian Ba h s k i p ese ted his a gu e ts for independence in a
form of a book, published in 1895 under the title Ukrayina Irredenta (Ukraine Unredeemed), where he
resolutely advocated for completely independent Ukraine. In describing the mechanism of imperial
decentralization and breakup, he distinguished between two alternative principles of autonomy of
territories, usually sought by the dominant groups such as Poles, and autonomy of peoples, sought by
the subjugated groups such as Ukrainians in Galicia.36 Ba h s k i s a gu e ts e e t pi al of the
ou ge ge e atio of adi als, ho o side ed D aho a i s P udho ia ideas outdated a d lea ed
towards the more fashionable at the time Marxist social democracy. They emphasized economic
determinism of the class struggle and the international cooperation of the revolutionary proletariat,
which, they argued, would necessarily drive politics and automatically define the national identity and
the need fo auto o a d i depe de e. Ba h s k i a gued that atio al state is a ou geois ideal
and therefore bourgeoisie of all nationalities in Ukraine would rise up against Russian and Poland
domination with a motto: нree, great, politi all i depe de t Ukraine, indivisible from the river Sian to
the ou tai s of Cau asus! 37

While the older generation, represented by Franko, Pavlyk, and others, also saw the social question as
the solution of the national one – through emancipation and liberation of the peasants, the Ukrainian
people would be able to consolidate their national identity – they disagreed with Marxist economic
monism, just as Drahomaniv had. They rejected the idea of the imminent conversion of the peasantry
into proletariat, which entailed abandoning all possessions and a deeply ingrained culture of husbandry
a d fa i g. Thei s as a o e atio alist positio , hi h eje ted the idea of a o ld ide o ke s
e olutio , ou d to e iole t a d dest u ti e, a d p efe ed the a of p ude t, deli erate and as
i pe a le as possi le so ialist efo s, the g ou d fo hi h eeded to e p epa ed th ough
education and enlightenment. At the sa e ti e, н a ko ote a e ie of Ba h s k i s pa phlet, i
38

hi h he a epted it as a fa t of ou politi al life, a a ifestatio of the atio al se ti e t a d

atio al o s ious ess, e p essi g hope that the uestio of politi al i depe de e will become

35
For instance, recently the Roman-Catholic Metropolitan of Lviv, archbishop Me h sla Moksh ts k i, ho had
served as an assistant to both John Paul II and Benedict XVI, in his comments about the election of the new Pope
н a is I, sa i g that the o ld is aiti g fo the e Pope to ou ageousl oppose ode is a d li e alis .
Zakordonna Gazeta, 4(406), Feb 15-28, 2013.
36 rd
Ba h s k i, Yuli a . . Ukrayina Irredenta, 3 ed. Berlin: Ukrainian Youth Publishing, p.47.
Fedenko, Panas. (1959). Ukra i s k i ‘ukh u XX “tolitti. (The Ukrainian Movement in the 20 Century). London:
37 th

Our Word, p.22.

38
Fedenko, Sotsializm Davniy I Novochasnyi, 57.

13
p o i e t a d o t e ede u til it is ealized.39 In other words, Franko, who before was inclined to
follo the D aho a i s e a ple a d ad o ate fede alis as a o e ealisti hoi e, o o e ted to
the statist positio of the ou g adi als , the e st e gthe i g thei ase.

Overall, though, in his work What is Progress?, as well as other writings, Franko criticized Marxist social
de o a fo its e essi e statis , its adle-to-g a e pate alis that ould e ge de depe de
and lead to a p iso so iet . The state of the people ould e o e a e o ous p iso of the people.
A d ho ould e its a de s? Who ould ule that state? , he o de ed. This the so ial de o ats
do t e tio e pli itl , ut hoe e it ight tu out to e, they would have such an enormous power
over the lives and destiny of millions of their compatriots, that not even the worst despots have had in
the past. 40 In other words, н a ko p es ie tl a ed agai st the possi ilit of the “o iet U io s
totalitaria s ste , hi h e e ged afte the di tato ship of the p oleta iat as esta lished
Bolshe iks, this Le i ist avant-ga de of the o ki g lass. In reality, of course, the Bolsheviks and the
progeny they spawned turned out to be nothing but a collection of opportunists and confidence men
that, i a so iet of all e uals , e a e o e e ual tha othe s, a o e latu e li i g off of the toils
of the rest in a parallel reality of their own. In some twisted sense, this was a capitalist system by other
means, hi h, ho e e , as doo ed to failu e, e ause the so ial-de o ati state of the people …
would not create any heaven on Earth, but would in the best case scenario be an obstacle to real
p og ess. 41 Franko considered Marxist social democracy to be more dangerous and a greater enemy to
the Ukrainians than even Russian despotism and censorship, because this false ideology, this
pseudo eligio filled people s souls ith e pt p o ises a d ephe e al do t i e, dist a ti g the f o
their work for the common good.42

How cruel our times are! So much distrust, hatred, antagonisms multiplies among people, that
very soon we shall have (in fact, we already have!) a formal religion, based on dogma of hatred
and class struggle. I admit, I never belonged among the faithful of that particular religion, and
always had courage, in the midst of the ridicule and mocking by its followers, to bravely carry my
flag of old sincerely human socialism, built on the ethical, widely humane education of the
people, on progress and on general dissemination of knowledge, science, criticism, human and
national liberties, and not on partisan dogmatism, not on the despotism of its leaders, not on
bureaucratic regimentation of the entire human future, and not on parliamentary fraud that
43
supposedl should lead to that ight futu e.

It is not difficult to see why Ivan Franko is so revered by the Ukrainians and is seen as the ideologue of
the national idea, on the par with Taras Shevchenko. While the latter was dubbed the Great Kobzar,
Franko was honored with a title of the Great Kameniar (Stone-crusher), based on one of his poems,

39
р tsak, Ya osla . . Molodi ‘ad kal “uspil o-Polit h o u )h tti рal h . You g ‘adi als i
the Socio-Political Life of Galicia]. Pp.71-110 in Transactions of Shevchenko Scientific Society (Works of Historical-
Philosophical Section). Vol. CCXXII: 92.
40
н a ko, I a . . “h ho take postup? What is p og ess? i K a tsi , Bohda , ed. . Ivan
Franko on Socialism and Marxism. Reviews and Articles, 1897-1906. New York: Prolog, pp. 110-113.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid., 16
43
Ibid., 14.

14
 he e he p o pts othe s to C ush this o k! , efe i g etapho i all to the pai staki g o k of
nation building towards national liberation. Ukrainian Moses and Eternal Revolutionary are some of the
other appellations that have adhered to this literary and civic giant, both of which are based on his
poetry. And indeed, Franko toiled incessantly for over 40 long years, overcoming endless obstacles and
setbacks, to bring the word of enlightenment to the Ukrainian people, similarly to Moses leading his
people through the desert.

Unlike Drahomaniv, who did not see a nation as something indispensable and vitally necessary (a more
constructivist view, one might say), Franko leaned toward a more organic sense of a nation, a somewhat
primordial point of view.44 While the former thought of the Ukrainian nation as plebeian, composed only
of peasantry, the latter expanded that view, drawing on the history of the Kyivan Rus and the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, to present a more comprehensive picture of the Ukrainian nation. 45
D aho a i did ot ha e i his spi itual a se al a otio of the atio as so ethi g o ga i ,
historically inevitable, unbroken and higher than any territorial organization, a notion which cannot be
su stituted a ki d of auto o that is ot ased o it, ote н a ko.46 We can see the
o o alit ith Ba h s k i s e phasis o the autonomy of peoples, discussed earlier. Franko points
out this contradiction between Drahomaniv and the following generations of nationalists, but rejects the
need for making unnecessary judgments about either party, each of which is partially defined by their
times and environment.47

Afte D aho a i s death i 1895, URP lost its guiding moral beacon and internal fissions started to
develop, as different groups developed their thinking in different directions.48 First, at the 1898 URP
congress, Roman Yarosevych, who was serving as an ambassador to the Austrian parliament at the time,
proposed changing the name of the party to Social-De o ati a d fo us the pa t s effo ts o
organizing the working class rather than the small land-owning peasantry, but his proposal was voted
down.49 While Franko acknowledged that Polish social-democrats, operating through the Galician
Social-Democratic Party, were trying to win the allegiance of the Ukrainian workers, he expressed
doubts that converting to social-democracy would do the radicals any good, and might even weaken
their positions.50 The , i , the U‘P s so ial-democratic (Marxist) faction split off and on September
18 , at the L i o fe e e of Uk ai ia so ial-democrats, formed its own Ukrainian Social-Democratic
th

Party (USDP), led by Mykola Hankevych, Semen Vityk, Yulia Ba h s k i, ‘o a Ya ose h, a d

others. Mykola Hankevych was its chief ideologue and based its program on the principles of revisionist
Austrian social-democracy, which adapted Marxism to the realities of contemporary life, including the

44
Motyl, Alexander J. (1999). Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities. New
York: Columbia University Press, p.84.; Brubaker, Rogers. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the
National Question in the New Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
45
н a ko, I a . . “uspil o-polit h i pohliad M. D aho a o a, i K a tsi , Bohda , ed. .
Ivan Franko on Socialism and Marxism. Reviews and Articles, 1897-1906. New York: Prolog, p.246.
46
Ibid., 256.
47
Ibid., 251.
48
Shapoval, M. (1921). Revoliutsiynyi Sotsializm na Ukrayini. [Revolutionary Socialism in Ukraine]. Vienna:
Boritesia-Poborete, p.46-7.
Fedenko, Ukra i s kyi Rukh u XX Stolitti, 77; Hrytsak, op.cit., 97-8.
49

р tsak, Molodi ‘ad kal , 100.

50

15
emergence of the middle class, the structural changes in the developed capitalist economies and the
dynamics of the ethnonational relations, for all of which Marxism did not account.

USDP, however, played a minor role in the Galician politics before the World War I started. That same
ea , the populists adi alized the e e a o iliato politi s a d the ode ate adi als, ho
were slowly moving away from the socialist positions toward more explicitly nationalist ones, joined
forces under encouragement from р ushe s k i, ho oth g oups held i high ega d. н a ko a d
se e al fo e ou g adi als , su h as Budz o s k i a d Volod Okh o h, helped p epa e
the ground and the two groups established the center-left Ukrainian National-Democratic Party (UNDP).
Essentially, UNDP became a catch-all party without any explicit ideological or class restrictions, which
undoubtedly helped it become the most massive party in Galicia, representing a wide-base political
movement that essentially became the uniting force in Galician society during the next half-century.51 In
terms of general elections, UNDP and URP both enjoyed mass membership in tens of thousands52 and
effectively formed a two-party system, with the less numerous USDP playing a minor role.53 This
tendency toward a two-party system would prove to be a defining feature of the Galician politics until
World War II, after which it was annexed to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the totalitarian
Soviet Union.

Galician Youth before World War I

During the first several years of the 20th century, an informal student organization Moloda Ukrayina
(Young Ukraine)54 was active in Galicia and Bukovyna, engaging in several prominent political initiatives
and continuing to raise the national consciousness of the Ukrainian population. It was founded in Lviv on
July 13th of 1899, at the 1st Congress of the Ukrainian students in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, at the
i itiati e of Volod “ta osol s k i, a stude t of la . A p eli i a d aft of the o ga izatio s
constitution was adopted and an ad hoc Co ittee of Te as desig ated as the o ga izatio s
leade ship i L i . Besides “ta osol s k i, the Co ittee o sisted of Ye he Kose h, Volod
Te ts k i all th ee joi ed U“DP i , Ostap р a o s k i, A ti K ushel ts k i oth U‘P ,
M kha lo рalush h s k i, Lo h Tsehel s k i oth UNDP , “e e рo uk, Teofil Mele a theo eti al
anarchist), and M. Zalitach. The membership of the organization reached as high as 1,000 students,
a o di g to Lo h Tsehel s k i s e oi s. 55 All of these students were fervent proponents of
Bachyns k i s Ukrayina Irredenta and the idea of an independent Ukrainian state. In fact, it was on July
14th of 1900, during the 2nd Congress of the Ukrainian Students that the demand for the independent
and united Ukrainian state was first articulated publicly without equivocation. The older generation was
so surprised and shocked with this boldness that the leading daily Dilo did not even mention that the

51
Stakhiv, op.cit., 74-5.
52
Op.cit., 52.
53
Op.cit., 80.
54
Although Franko used this term to refer to the movement of young Galician radicals of 1880 to 1900, this
organization has no direct relation to that movement, except in the sense of continuing the evolution of the
Ukrainian political thought towards independence and a more explicitly nationalist position.
55
“ta osol s k i, Yu i . . “hliakha p edki . I a esto s footsteps . Pp. - i Ulia a “ta osol s ka, ed.
Volod r “tarosol s k i, -1942. Vol. 210. New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society (Historical-Philosophical
Section), p.45.

16
Congress took place. In January of 1900, the Committee started publishing an eponymous journal
Moloda Ukrayina, he e Mikh o s k i s Independent Ukraine was first published, with assistance from
“ta osol s k i a d Kose h, and secretly transported back to Eastern Ukraine. The entire process was so
well conspired that not even all of the Committee members were aware of this operation.56 Since that
moment, Moloda Ukrayina started partnering with RUP in printing underground materials, and
“ta osol s k i se ed as ‘UP s нo eig Co ittee e e , hi h fit e ell ith Moloda Ukrayina s
views on uniting the Ukrainian lands. The journal also published many prominent young modernist
writers, such as Lesya Ukrayinka, members of the literary group Moloda Muza You g Muse Vas l
Pa ho s k i, “tepa Cha ets k i, M kha lo Yatski , a d othe s. I , due to fi a ial difficulties, as
well as the fact that the leading figures of Moloda Ukrayina received their diplomas and moved into the
world of professional employment and official party politics, the organization, being semi-formal from
the beginning, seized functioning. Its brave example of resolute, uncompromising civic action in defence
of Ukrainian issues, however, influenced the Galician youth for the following several decades.

It is important to note that Moloda Ukrayina also printed a review of Independent Ukraine by Stepan
To ashi s k i, a histo ia , pu li ist a d politi ia , ho ould late pa ti ipate i the ‘e olutio i the
ranks of the Ukrainian Legion of Sich Sharpshooters. In the review, he unequivocally affirmed the
dedication of Moloda Ukrayina to the ideal of i depe de t Uk ai e, hile ualif i g that the sa e
idealistic goal may take different concrete shapes, and, first and foremost, may be achieved by different
a s a d ea s. 57 He went on to distinguish between two main principles, on which various atio s
struggles for liberation had been based: historical and social. The historical principle had been used
f e ue tl to justif a atio s lai fo a pa ti ula te ito , ased o so e histo i al p e ede t of
statehood, some legal documents and so on. While history was not to be taken lightly in such instances,
o t ul p og essi e a d judi ious pe so ould ase thei politi al st uggle a d its p og a e lusi el
o histo i al t aditio , e ause su h lai s a e sus epti le to a ipulatio f audulent and
obscurantist interests, who may desire to dominate other smaller, weaker nations (examples given
include non-Hungarian nationalities in Hungary, Ukrainians in Galicia, Sudeten Germans in Czech lands).
The social principle, on the other hand, is based on the right to national self-determination and is based
o the i te ests of the idest s athes of populatio i aki g apid a d o ti uous p og ess i oth
ate ial a d spi itual de elop e t of the atio al ha a te . The so ial p i iple does ot discriminate
among nations based on some arbitrary luck of the historical draw, but represents the latest progress of
the universal humanitarian ideal. The way to achieve that ideal is through equal national rights, social
justice and intensive cultural labor. 58 While Ukraine did have a long history to lean upon,59 argued
To ashi s k i, the e e e o t o a s a out it – the social principle was preferable, because the
historical principle presented a two-edged sword to the Ukrainians, given its complicated history as a
dominated and frequently stateless nation.
56
“ta osol s k i, op.cit., 51.
57
To ashi s k i, “tepa . . ‘e ie of M.Mikh o s k i s Independent Ukraine spee h. Moloda Ukrayina, 6:
239-242. Reprinted in 1971-72 in Vil a Ukra i a, 65-66: 74-77. See p.75.
58
Op.cit., 75-6.
59
р ushe s k i ade a o u e tal o t i utio to ei fo i g this histo i al p i iple ith his - olu e рisto
of ‘us -Uk ai e, t a i g Uk ai ia histo f o K i a ‘us th ough the Gali ia -Volynian Kingdom, the
Lithuanian-‘uthe ia G a d Du h a d the Cossa k рet a ate to ode it .

17
The Revolutionary Student Movement in Eastern Ukraine
While the Galicians were forming their first party system, the Ukrainians under the Russian rule were
operating underground. In 1883, a Ukrainia stude ts i “t. Pete s u g fo ed a la desti e G oup of
, also k o as so ialist-federalists, obtaining and reading illegal publications of Ukrainian thinkers,
most of all Drahomaniv. They put together a program based on his teachings and submitted it to him for
review and critique. Drahomaniv pointed out some shortcomings, such as the repeated mentions of
nationality without explicit and clear emphasis of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, upon
which all other rights are based; and the desire to join the wider Russian revolutionary movement with
its e t alist a d statist ha a te . нede alists a e f ie ds o l ith fede alists, as D aho a i s
espo se to the latte idea. I o i all , these e o eous, i D aho a i s e es, ideas ecame firmly
established among many representatives of the socialist movement in Easter Ukraine and surfaced with
regularity throughout the first decades of 20th century.60

In 1890s, a number of new organizations appeared in and spread throughout Eastern Ukraine, although
outwardly any manifestation of Ukrainian culture was forbidden and it seemed the Ukrainian life was
still. Among the most prominent groups was the Kyiv Student Hromada (Community), which was
exposed to the ideas coming both through the Russian socialist movement and from Western Europe.
The ajo it of the stude ts, led I a “teshe ko a d La sa Kosa h, D aho a i s ie e ho ould
eventually become Lesya Ukrayinka, the most prominent female writer in the history of Ukrainian
literatu e a d a e eptio all o igi al thi ke , e e p i a il i flue ed Ma ist a d D aho a i s
international-socialist ideas.61 However, a minority went in a different direction, becoming much more
focused on the national problematic and largely avoiding the influence of socialism. Out of this
environment, a secret student society Bratstvo Tarasivtsiv (Brotherhood of Tarasivtsi) was formed in
, allegedl i Ka i , the side of Ta as “he he ko s g a e. нou stude ts f o K i 62, the original
founders of the Bratstvo, took a oath upo the g a e to sp ead a o g Uk ai ia s, a ea s
63
available, the immortal ideas of the Great Kobzar. Within a short period, many nationally conscious
students in Kyiv and other large cities like Kharkiv, Odesa, Poltava, and Lubny joined the society, as they
were dissatisfied with primarily cultural activities of Moloda Hromada and other populist Ukrainophile
organizations.

A o g these stude ts e e t o f ie ds si e thei g asiu ea s M kola Mikh o s k i a d

Volod “he et. Mikh o s k i as a illia t stude t of la a d a e e geti , passio ate ad o ate of
i depe de t Uk ai e, a idea that at the ti e as ie ed as az a d i possi le i йaste Uk ai e.

. Ukra i s ki “otsial-Demokraty ta Esery: Dosvid Peremoh ta Porazok. [Ukrainian

60
V sots k i, Oleksa d.
Social-Democrats and Esery (Socialist-Revolutionaries): Experiences of Victory and Defeat]. Kyiv: Osnovni Tsinnosti
(Core Values), p.25-6.
61
Fedenko, op.cit., p.19.; Fedenko, Sotsializm Davniy I Novochasnyi, p.189; Andriyevskyi, Viktor. (1974 [1950]).
M kola Mikh o sk i A “ket h of a “o iopoliti al Biog aph . V z ol i “hliakh [The Way to Liberation], Vol.
27(6): 589-90
62
I a L pa, M. Ba zd e ko, M. Baz ke h a d Vitali Bo o k. Op.cit., 590
63
Saltovskyi, Oleksandr. (2002). «Uk a i s ka De zha a Pohliadakh ta Di akh )as o ki Uk a i s ko i
Narodnoyi Respubliky». Ch.8 in The Conceptions of Ukrainian Statehood Throughout the History of Native Political
Thought (from origins to early XX century). Kyiv: Parapan, p.396.

18
Mikh o s k i ui kl gai ed i e o a d eputatio , a d i elati el little ti e e a e the g oup s
leade . рe as a o g the autho s of its ideologi al platfo , C edo of a ou g Uk ai ia , alo g ith
Borys Hrinchenko and Ivan Lypa, who later went on to became prominent literary figures. In 1893, this
program was published anonymously in Lviv newspaper Pravda T uth u de the title Profession de foi
of the ou g Uk ai ia s .64 Its main postulates represented an uncompromising nationalist position,
proclaiming the Ukrainians to be a separate nation that needs to e e ise its ill fo ok a d
p og ess , hi h i this ase ea t a full auto o ous, sovereign, indivisible state of the united
65

people. The importance of using Ukrainian language and establishing Ukrainian schooling was
emphasized, while the Ukrainophile movement was severely criticized for its exclusively cultural activity,
although its role in the development of the national movement was acknowledged. The statement said
that I oppositio to the Mus o ite e olutio a i te atio alis a d so ialism, our path leads along
the li es of i di idualis a d e olutio a atio alis . 66 It is also important to note that the
e lusio a otto Uk ai e fo Uk ai ia s appea s fo the fi st ti e as a politi al p i iple, late to e
picked up by Dmytro Dontsov and, through him, the nationalist movement. The program also professed
radicalism and even extremism with regard to renegade members and opponents or, as he put it,
fo eig opp esso s .67 The appearance of this motto and this latter proposition was likely influenced by
Mikhnovs kyi, whose temperament tended to be explosive and intolerant of alternative views, which
e a e ated the egati e ea tio a d the la k of a epta e of the g oup s p og a i the ide i les
of Ukrainian activists composed primarily of socialists and populists.68

Revolutionary Ukrainian Party and Independent Ukraine

At the turn of the century, in 1900, out of the fermenting medium of young students and recent
graduates, two new parties emerged on the Ukrainian political field: the Ukrainian Socialist Party (USP)
in Kyiv and Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) in Kharkiv. USP was formed through the initiative of
Bohda Ya oshe s k i a d Ma ia Mele e s k i, ho, like ost othe e e s of the pa t , a e f o
the Polish cultural background but at one point abandoned it and joined the Ukrainian national
movement. After its program was publicized, the social-democrats published their response and critique
of it, pointing out the generally undefined and vague nature of many of stated positions, and especially
the lack of emphasis on the national question and of balance between the social and the national
aspects. It argued that it was particularly important to raise national consciousness among the city
workers, who were influenced primarily by the socialist propaganda, while the obverse was required in
terms of working with the peasant population – they were quite nationally conscious and observed most
customs and traditions, but were unfamiliar with the concepts of socialism. It was important to prevent
a ultu al gap f o fo i g a d deepe i g et ee these t o g oups, othe ise the i tellige tsia

64
Kolla d, Yu i . . нo e o d to the ep i t of M kola Mikh o s k i s Independent Ukraine. In Foreign Lands:
Ukrainian Patriot, p.6.
65
Please note that full independence was not proposed by Bratstvo. Some misconceptions exist in this regard.
. M kola Mikh o s k i posthu ous e o ial . Khli oro s ka Ukra i a (Agrarian
66
“he et, “e hi .
Ukraine), Book 5: Year 1924-25. Vienna: Ukrainian Union of Agrarian-Statists, p.4-6.
67
Op.cit.
68
Op.cit.

19
will find it extremely difficult to communicate and reach out to the population as a whole.69 In 1902, USP
responded to this criticis , ostl ag eei g ith it a d la if i g its o positio . While the so ialist
activities are limited to few academic groups, we can create all the programs we want and sink deep
into our doctrines, but a party that works with wide swathes of the population and is under their
o sta t at h a ot egle t su h i po ta t issues as, fo e a ple, atio al eeds, said the
o hu e, p o isi g that U“P ould s ste ati all pa atte tio to all th ee aspe ts of opp essio :
atio al, e o o i a d politi al. Just as Drahomaniv and Franko, USP believed that addressing the
social and material needs will help people realize their national needs as well. Explicit distrust of the
Russian political circles was expressed, even of the most favorable to the Ukrainian cause Сonstitutional
Democrats ( adets , a d a desi e to see U“P s eth e i Lithua ia, Geo gia, A e ia, alo g ith othe
nationalities join together in their struggle against tsarist Russia. In 1903, USP published its mission
state e t: I depe de t de o ati Uk ai ia ‘epu li a d a so ial e olutio . 70

U“P s politi al platfo as i tuall ide ti al to ‘UP s, although it took so e ti e a d u h

uncertainty for the latter to arrive to its cohesive formulation in 1903. In February of 1900, when the
party was just being formed in Kharkiv on the basis of the Student Hromada circles, no clear ideology,
strategy or even tactical objectives existed. The aroma of the revolution was in the air and the young
activists wanted to get organized, not to miss any valuable opportunities that might arise in such
circumstances. Among the founding members of RUP were Dmytro Antonovych, Mykhailo Rusov, Levko
Matsi e h, Yu i Kolla d, Oleksa d Ko ale ko a d D t o Poz a s k i. Although Mikh o s k i as
not among those who joined, he was approached with a request to write up a political statement
su a izi g a d sket hi g out the pa t s p og a . рe o liged a d used this oppo tu it i a
propagandist manner, to further his own agenda. He wrote a speech, which he delivered in Kharkiv on
February 26, 1900, during the Shevchenko celebration organized by the Student Hromada.71 The content
of the spee h, hi h laid out Mikh o s k i s isio fo Uk ai e, as pu lished that sa e ea i L i as
I depe de t Uk ai e. 72

The speech consisted of two parts: the first part was more legalistic, proposing a certain interpretation
of the Pe e asla t eat et ee рet a Bohda Kh el ts k i a d the ‘ussia Tsa , hi h the
latter used to justify his complete annexation of Het manat, the Ukrainian state formation at the time.
Mikh o s k i a gu e t as that the t eat as si pl a ag ee e t of e ual pa t e s, he e o e side
– Ukraine – was seeking the protection of the other – Russia – from the Polish incursions. There was no
legal ground for the Russian Empire to annex Ukraine and it was an example of usurpation and tyranny.
The efo e, ‘ussia oke the te s of the t eat a d fo Uk ai e the e as o o e a d o l i di isi le

69
Op.cit., 190-192.
Fedenko, Ukra i s k i ‘ukh u XX “tolitti, 31-2.
70
71
Andriyevskyi, op.cit., 591-2.
72
Mikh o s k i, M kola. . Samostiyna Ukrayina. [Independent Ukraine]. In Foreign Lands: Ukrainian
Patriot. As Andriyevskyi (Op.cit., p.592) tells us, the first printing of the content of the speech (1,000 copies) was
pu lished as I depe de t Uk ai e i L i , ith the help f o You g Ukrai e s Volodymy “ta osol s k i a d
Yevhen Kosevych. The second printing was done in 1917 in Wentzlar, Germany by Soyuz Vyzvolennia Ukrayiny
(Union for Liberation of Ukraine). The third reprint of the 1917 edition was done in 1948 and included Yuriy
Kolla d s fo e o d. That is the editio I e used as a sou e fo this pape .

20
‘ussia Ед ая едел ая о я), but Russia as the oppressor and Ukraine as the oppressed. The
second part of the speech was a more emotive statement of goals and a call to action, to revolutionary
struggle for national, political and cultural liberation – note the absence of the social aspect – and, if
necessary, to armed combat against the ‘ussia opp esso s. This i hu a e t eat e t of us the
Russians sanctifies our hatred towards them and our moral right to kill the violator in self-defe se, he
stated at o e poi t. Mikh o s k i the tu ed to the ole of i telligentsia in making this revolutionary
st uggle possi le a d su essful, p o lai i g it to e oth i tellige tsia s ight a d dut to ake up the
populatio , fo the ope i g of the sla es e es is da ge ous to the aste s. рe lea l puts the
national li e atio ahead of the so ial, he he sa s, U til e o tai ou politi al ights a d ou
statehood, we will not be able to arrange our internal affairs to our liking, because the interests of our
aste s a e o pletel opposite to ou o i te ests. 73

Ne t, alki g the eade th ough the histo of Uk ai ia i tellige tsia, Mikh o s k i u de s o ed t o

instances of shameful weakness and betrayal: the first national elite had distanced itself from the people
by adopting in 16th and 17th centuries the dominant Polish culture and nationality, while the second
national elite, which the Ukrainian people subsequently gave birth to, renounced their Ukrainian
identity by adopting in 18th and 19th e tu ies the ‘ussia i pe ial ultu e a d atio alit . Ca e
compare war or even plague to this massive betrayal of the intelligentsia? Wars and plagues – they
do t dis i i ate a d take a a the lea ed a d the ig o a t, the poo a d the i h, hile these
betrayals took away the very blossom of the nation – its most ultu ed la e . 74 He then proclaimed
that despite this dual catastrophic blow to the health of the nation, the Ukrainians managed to create
the third wave of intelligentsia, which is no less dedicated to serving its people as the first two had been
in the egi i g. While its e olutio did ot et o e e i ea est, st essed Mikh o s k i, the seeds
had been sewn by Shevchenko, who, however, was deeply misunderstood both by his contemporaries
a d the ge e atio that follo ed. н ighte ed “he he ko s suffering and, partially, milder
pe se utio e pe ie ed his f ie ds, he ote of the Uk ai ophiles, these ge e atio s foste ed a
entire cult of fear- o ge i g, de eloped a e ti e eligio of lo alt . Mo eo e , displa i g u hea d of
servility, lack of ideas a d ideals, e t ao di a i e tia, the eje ted a e ti e se ies of outh
o e e ts, hi h stood o the Uk ai ia atio al positio s. The efo e, Mikh o s k i o luded this
line of argument by affirming the symbolical severing of any ties between the young Ukraine and the
Ukrainophiles, and, following the tradition of Bratstvo Tarasivtsiv, traced the ancestry of the former
directly to Shevchenko and his passionate poetry of liberation.75 This third wave was now entering the
struggle for its people, the st uggle that a tu lood a d e iless. A d the goal of the st uggle?

One, united, indivisible, free, independent Ukraine from the Carpathians all the way to Caucasus.
[The third wave of intelligentsia] dedicates itself to serving this great ideal and until even the
smallest patch of the Ukrainian lands is in the hands of some foreigners, the Ukrainian

73
Mikh o s k i, op.cit., 26-7.
74
Op.cit., 27.
75
Op.cit., 28.

21
 intelligentsia will not lay down its arms and all the generations of Ukrainians will continue going
76
to war. (italics mine – B.P.)

While the itali ized state e t is e a ka l si ila to the o e ade Yulia Ba h s k i i Ukrayina
Irredenta, Mikh o s k i s heto i a d a gu e tatio o t asts uite d a ati all ith the ilde a d
more restrained rhetoric of the socialists (particularly the level-headed Drahomaniv) and the radicals,
the generation of Franko, many of whom believed in the precepts of positivist epistemology and
science, and thus made conscious effort not to bring irrationality and impulsivity into their political and
scientifi thi ki g. Ba h s k i s a gu e ts e e ased o Ma ist s ie tifi so ialis a d justified
the so ial li e atio of the opp essed lasses. Mikh o s k i th o s all autio a d p ete se to s ie tifi
thinking to the wind, puts the national liberation as the foremost priority, and finishes the speech with
no reservations:

The night has been long, but the dawn is upon us, and we shall not allow the rays of other
atio s f eedo to glitte o ou hai s of sla e : e shall eak the efo e the su of
freedom rises. We are entering the historical arena for the last time, and we shall either
o e o e, o pe ish… … Let the o a ds a d the t aito s lea e, as the ha e al a s do e, a d
oss o e to the e e s side, the e is o pla e fo the a o gst us and we proclaim them to
be enemies of the Fatherland. Everyone, in the entire Ukraine, who is not with us, is against us.
Ukraine for Ukrainians … O a d! нo e ha e o od else to el upo a d the e is o easo
77
to look back! (emphasis in the original)

To su up, i his spee h Mikh o s k i dispe sed ith a dou t a d u e tai t su ou di g the
independence vs. federal autonomy question. There was no equivocation, no calculation of
o ti ge ies o hedgi g o e s ets – independent statehood was the ultimate goal, period. It is
i po ta t to pa lose atte tio to Mikh o s k i s heto i a d the a he put togethe diffe e t st ai s
of thought, the way he expressed them, because many of the features of OUN s rhetoric, ideology and
methods of action are implied Mikh o s k i s o ds a d a tio s. Of ou se, it as ot ea l as
simple and direct as I may have made it sound, – after all, almost three decades would pass before the
nationalist movement was fully organized, – but his theories did signal the emergence of a more
aggressive, resolute, determined nationalism based on sheer will, on pseudo-religious sense of a sacred
issio , a d o eadi ess to go to a le gths e essa to a hie e o e s goals. Gi e this iole t isio ,
there is little wonder that Mikh o s k i ould late de ote u h of his effo t to uildi g up the
Ukrainian military.

RUP’s Turn toward Social Democracy and the Resulting Division

It as t lo g efo e ‘UP e e s sta ted e p essi g eg et a out adopti g Independent Ukraine as
their platform. During the first few years of its activity, RUP was essentially agrarian-socialist in nature,
actively working among peasants and agricultural workers, educating them and raising their national
consciousness. This practical work confirmed the views of RUP members that the rhetoric of national
liberation alone will not suffice in raising support for their party, because common peasants and

76
Op.cit., 28-9. Also, see note 40.
77
Op.cit., 30.

22
agricultural workers viewed their national and political needs through the prism of their social and
economic wants. Therefore, the predominant orientation of the party towards socialist-revolutionary
populism was justified.

In the meantime, the leadership of the party continued to evolve in their views. Already in 1902, the
leadership held a private meeting in Ko ale ko s apa t e t, dis ussi g the eed to a a do the
positions of Independent Ukraine and start moving in the direction of social democracy. Eventually, in
1903, RUP-related periodical Haslo Motto pu lished oth a iti is of Mikh o s k i s Independent
Ukraine a d a p og a p oposal, de eloped the K i pa t o ittee a d app o ed the pa t s
Central Committee. The former acknowledged the importance of the idea of independent Ukraine,
hi h as gi e the app op iate pla e i the p og a , o side i g its p a ti al ea i g, ut
deplo ed the la k of the so ialist o ld ie a d e e o asio al a ifestatio s of atio alist
te de ies. A d the latte lea l stated that ‘UP e og ized the asi p i iples, ulti ate goals a d
tactics of the i te atio al so ial de o a , usi g as a odel the й fu t p og a of the “o ial-
78
Democratic Party of Germany.

Thus ‘UP a a do ed D aho a i s ie s fo Ma ist so ial de o a . This o e is easil e plai ed,

given the rapid rise of Marxist ideas and movements throughout Europe, including the Russian Empire.
The otio s of the lass st uggle, the o ke s state, the di tato ship of p oleta iat e e gai i g
authority and popularity, and RUP wanted to legitimize and justify its existence as a national
revolutionary party.79 As a esult of ‘UP s ha ge of ou se a d a a do e t of the p i iples of
Independent Ukraine, Mikh o s k i de ided to o ga ize his o pa t , hi h ould sta d o those
positions. In 1902, Ukrainian Narodna People s Pa t UNP) was formed and immediately organized its
pu lishi g i L i a d Che i tsi.80 Mikh o s k i old lass ate Volod “he et a d his othe s
M kola a d “e hi also joi ed the pa t , alo g ith the othe s Vas l a d р ts ko “he he ko, the
brothers Oleksandr and Serhiy Makarenko, and others. Overall, UNP never managed to gain wide
acceptance and support, and always remained a marginal party with small number of members. Its
p og a as ased o the sloga of I depe de t Uk ai ia ‘epu li of the o ki g people, worldwide
li e atio of the su jugated atio s a d li e atio of la o f o apital. Its De alogue, hi h e a e
i e sel popula , i luded all of the fa ilia Mikh o s k i s atio alist positio s, i ludi g, alo g ith
encouragements to help fellow Ukrainians and to use Ukrainian language at all times, such sentiments
as hostility to the oppressors – Poles, Russians and Hungarians, hatred towards enemies, contempt for
turncoats and renegades, and warning not to marry foreign women, make friends with the enemies, or
cooperate with the oppressors in any way.81 This withdrawal into ethnic exclusiveness and xenophobia
p esaged the futu e politi s of Do tso s a d OUN s Natio alis . Mikh o s k i s UNP had to compete
for the support of the same demographic base of peasants and workers as all the other Ukrainian
pa ties, so it adopted the so ialist heto i , as a atte of ta ti s a d ot o i tio . The pa t s
program and other publications advocated the nationalization of land in Ukraine; professed belief in the

78
Fedenko, op.cit., 25.
79
V sots k i, op.cit., 30.
80
Op.cit., 33.
81
A d i e s k i, op.cit., 600.

23
ideal of fa to ies a d pla ts o Uk ai ia te ito – to the workers, farmland – to the peasa ts ; a d
claimed to e st uggli g fo the eakup of the apitalist s ste , e ause the apitalist i depe de t
Ukraine would not be any kind of progress for the Ukrainian people, so once and for all, we announce
that ou ideal is a so ialist so iet . 82 This inconsistency and volatility, this opportunism of methods, this
willingness to compromise principles in favor of some putative tactical advantage is a characteristic that
would later also haunt the Nationalist movement.

In December of 1905, the 2nd Congress of RUP was held, at which the party was once again split by the
disag ee e t a out the atio al uestio . O e fa tio as led a fo e U“P leade M. Mele e s k i,
as well as O. Skoropys-Yoltukho s k i, Pet o Ka i ets a d Vikto Mazu e ko, ho efe ed to
the sel es as the p oleta ia ele e ts . This faction was determined to go even further with the
social-democratic evolution and proposed to merge into the wider Russian social-democratic movement
to ensure that the national question does not get in the way of the international rise of the proletariat.
However, Mykola Porsh, who had by then e o e ‘UP s ai ideologue a d Ce t al Co ittee s
83
member, supported by Symon Petliura and other party leaders, sharply opposed the idea. Due to this
disag ee e t, the o e tio tu ed i to haos a d as t p ope ly adjourned. In January,
Mele e s k i s g oup pu lished a de la atio , hi h a ou ed its se essio f o ‘UP a d alled the
e ai i g e e ship ou geois adi als, a usi g the of t i g to p e e t the de elop e t of
class consciousness among the Ukrai ia p oleta iat ith thei dis ussio s of Uk ai e s i depe de e.
The group also affirmed its intent to join the centralized Russian social-democratic movement on the
te s of auto o , thus e su i g the su ess of the Uk ai ia p oleta iat di e ti g the currents of
its o e e t i to the o o ight i e of the ‘ussia p oleta ia o e e t. “ho tl afte that,
the group was admitted to the Russian Social-Democratic Rabochaya (Labor) Party (RSDRP), the
Menshevik side, under the new name of the Ukrainian Union within RSDRP.84

Such perspective exemplifies the ideological confusion that existed at the beginning of the 20th century,
often represented by a caricature image of a young Ukrainian revolutionary carrying the Communist
Manifesto i o e po ket a d T.“he he ko s Kobzar in the other. 85 Unable to reconcile the
socioeconomic and the national aspects of the Ukrainian politics, quite a few activists simply rejected
the latter, being under a strong Russian influence. Even those who did not shrink from the continuing
battle with this difficult dilemma were often mixed up about their ultimate goals. This ideological
uncertainty would turn out to be a debilitating condition, affecting the outcome of the Revolution and
the subsequent development of the Ukrainian politics.

‘UP s tu to a d so ial de o a as o plete i De e e of , he the nd Congress (take 2)

voted to change the name of the party to Ukrainian Social-Democratic Robitnycha (Labor) Party (USDRP)
and adopted the party program that was based on the Erfurt model. Furthermore, the Congress passed

82
Fedenko, Sotsializm Davniy i Novochasnyi, 194-5.
83
I a s, V. . T a e i oko Desh ho p o “.Petliu u i Ye. Ko o al tsia . The Ma A i e sa “o e
thoughts a out “.Petliu a a d Ye. Ko o alets . Vil a Ukra i a, 5: 33-39, p.34.
84
Fedenko, op.cit., 54.
85
Lysiak-‘ud ts k i, I a . . Mizh istoriyeyu i politykoyu [Between History and Politics]: Historical and Critical
Articles on Ukrainian Sociopolitical Thought. Munich: Suchasnist, p.97.

24
a resolution on the national question that blamed national oppression for cultural, economic and
political backwardness of the oppressed nations, preventing the proletariat from appropriately
developing its class struggle. Therefore, USDRP proclaimed that, as a member of the international social-
democratic community, it would fight against injustice and oppression of any kind, including national,
and for equal rights for all nations, including their self-determination and free cultural development.
“uppo ti g Uk ai e s i depe de e i p i iple, the Co g ess also passed a esolutio seeki g atio al-
territorial autonomy, mostly due to tactical considerations.86

Regrettably, the divisio of ‘UP a e at the ost u fo tu ate o e t possi le. I , afte ‘ussia s
defeat in the Russian-Japanese war, the revolutionary ferment reached its highest point and civil unrest
started spreading throughout the Russian Empire, ultimately forcing the Tsar to make some political
concessions. This development could open the necessary window of opportunity for the Ukrainian
parties to gain some ground. However, being consumed by internecine struggle and the need to
o pete fo peasa ts allegia e ith Ukrainian Union within RSDRP, RUP-USDRP was unable to
properly prepare itself for the rapidly changing political transformations that were to come in the
following decade.87

In the meantime, the relative liberalization of the imperial regime spurred the remarkable resurgence of
the Ukrainian movement. Even before the revolution started, the strictures of the Ems decree were
loosening and the Ukrainian press started emerging again. Unfortunately, this period did not last and
was immediately followed with a reactionary repression led by the Tsarist Minister of Interior Peter
Stolypin, for whom the Ukrainian movement was one for the primary targets. In the face of all this
repression and persecution, it is remarkable that the Ukrainian revolutionary movement did not resort
to terror or similar violent tactics, given that the Russian revolutionaries were much more willing to
engage in violence. The likeliest explanation for this dearth of violence is that Draho a i s oppositio
to terror both on the grounds of ethics and political expedience influenced the entire Ukrainian society.
Recall D aho a i s idea of the evolutionary revolution – an organic social process that can be
accelerated only through education, consciousness raising, enlightenment and collective political action,
but which will degenerate and decelerate if the political movement is dominated and influenced by
groups that resort to preaching liberation and human rights by using terror against those with different
views and by operating as conspiratorial organizations. This ethical imperative would also lose its power
after the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution in 1921, and the conspiratorial form of organization,
utilizing terror as a primary tactic, would become dominant among the Nationalists during the interwar
period of 1920s and 1930s.88

To sum up, the fledling party system in Eastern Ukraine was only just starting to take shape on the eve
of World War I. Due to Tsarist repression and persecution, the Ukrainian movement was much less
developed and consolidated, in comparison with Galicia. The parties were still in the process of
formulating their programs and the supporting ideological literature, building their bases among the

86
Fedenko, op.cit., 55-6.
87
Fedenko, op.cit., 56-61.
Stakhiv, Ukra i s ki Parti i, 44-6.
88

25
population and the unions and, despite the participation in the first two sessions of Duma, were highly
inexperienced in terms of parliamentary and constitutional politics, all of which would come to play a
detrimental role during the Revolution. Another major handicap was a relative scarcity of authoritative
leaders with sufficient clout and respect to command discipline, allegiance and unify both each party
within itself, and all of them together as the Ukrainian movement. Each party was effectively led by a
constellation of prominent individuals, none of which, however, could claim seniority or priority in case
of any serious difference of opinion. This collegial decision making would affect their ability to act
quickly when the ti es alled fo it a d, hat s o se, would lead many parties to division into factions,
which ultimately parted their ways, exacerbating the discord.89 And, of course, the lingering influence of
the Russocentric worldview prevented the political leaders in Eastern Ukraine from fully committing to
independent Ukrainian politics unburdened by the reliance on the actions of their Russian counterparts.
This may have been part political calculation, but it was also part timidity and part blind ideology of
international proletarian movement, reinforced by cunning manipulations and fraudulent promises on
the part of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.90

Dmytro Dontsov

Formative Years
Around this time Dmytro Donstov emerges on the Ukrainian political scene and immediately establishes
himself as an industrious and erudite student with extraordinary intellectual capabilities, a deep and
independent thinker, and a talented publicist. Having shown remarkable precociousness and a talent for
studying, he went to St. Petersburg in 1900 to study at the university level.91 While there, he eventually
joined a circle of Ukrainian students (which at the time included Dmytro Doroshenko, the Mazurenko
othe s, V. “ado s k i, Le Matsi e h a d othe s , and started reading voraciously the most recent
publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the works of Drahomaniv, of the leaders of RUP, as
well as of European thinkers, both classics and contemporaries. This student circle formed the
Petersburg section of RUP, which transformed into USDRP shortly afterwards. In 1904, Isaak Mazepa,
another Ukrainian student, came to St. Petersburg and also joined USDRP, eventually becoming a
prominent political actor and heading one of the Ukrainian Cabinets of the UNR period. He characterized
Do sto as a lo e : he kept to himself, reading and writing a lot. At that time, as noted by Mazepa and
V. Le s k i, a o g othe s, Dontsov expressed quite orthodox Marxist views, which did not influence
the politics of the Petersburg USDRP group, because Petliura and Porsh were both revisionist
Bernsteinian socialists.92 Nevertheless, Donstov earned a reputation of a brilliant socialist publicist, so

89
Op.cit., 55-60.
. Vil a Ukra i a,
90
Le s k i, Volod . . M e o ies a out V.I. Le i . “ itze la d -
58: 34-45.
91
Da lieto a, р.V. . D.I. Do tso : The Begi i gs of Wo ld ie нo atio . Scientific Papers of the Faculty
in History of Zaporizhia National University, Vol. XXI: 138-143.
Fedenko, Panas. (1954). Isaak Mazepa: A нighter for Ukrai e s нreedo . London: Nashe Slovo (Our Word), pp.9-
92

; “os o s k i, M kha lo. . Dmytro Dontsov: A Political Portrait (Study in Ukranian Nationalism). New York:

26
much so that when the Ukranian faction in the 2nd Duma founded a newspaper Our Duma, he was
entrusted with its editorship, along with several others.93

As a result of his activism in the Ukrainian movement, Donstov was arrested in 1905 and sent to Kyiv,
where he resumed his activities and was arrested again in 1907. That time he spent 8 months at the
infa ous Luk a i s ka p iso a d de eloped a de ilitati g ill ess as a esult of the i a e atio . Afte
repeated intercessions from his family and friends, he was released in 1908, after which he immediately
es aped to L i to a oid the possi ilit of exile to Siberia. He spent the following two years in the Polish
resort of Zakopane, convalescing and gathering strength. While there, he met several prominent
intellectuals and political thinkers that had a significant influence on his own ideas. Among them was
Via hesla L p s k i, o e of the ost p ofou d a d o p ehe si e Uk ai ia politi al philosophe s of
conservatism in the early 20th century, an unwavering early proponent of independence, who later went
on to create a political-philosophical system of labor monarchism, with classocracy as its core principle
esse tiall , it a ou t to a e lighte ed a iet of o stitutio al o a h . Do sto late e ame
one of the founding members of the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party (Ukra i s ka De okrat h o-
Khli oro s ka Parti a, or UDKhP) alo g ith L p s k i, “he et a d Mikh o s k i, although
su se ue tl he e t fa e o d L p s k i s positio s, adopted fai l e t e ist ie s a d e a e a
ta get of the latte s itte iti is as a esult.

In 1909, Donstov moved to Vienna and joined the University as a law student, actively resuming his
numerous contributions to a variety of publications. He also continued to read voraciously and as widely
as possible in all of humanities, consistently increasing his erudition. Among the authors, the influence
of hose thi ki g ould a ifest itself i Do tso s futu e theo izi g a d itte o k, elo ged
94
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Fichte, Herder, Sorel, among others. His own publicist persona started to
emerge around this time. Up to that point, Donstov stood primariliy on Marxist social-democratic
positions and criticized nationalism as a bourgeois ideology, harmful to the class struggle of the
Ukrainian proletariat, with its class-transcending national idea. He also advocated for autonomous
Ukraine in a democratic Russia, combining strong anti-absolutist sentiments with a possibility of
cooperation with those elements of the Russian society and politics that viewed the political and
national aspirations of other non-Russian peoples in a favorable light. Progressively, however, these
views developed into a more explicit nationalist position and a powerful anti-Russian sentiment in his
later writings, as well as into forceful advocacy of the idea of independence L p s k i s i flue e, o
doubt, played a role here). Do sto app o ed oth of Ba h s k i s Ukraine Irredenta and even more so
of Mikh o s k i Independent Ukraine, the latter being less compromising, more forceful and direct, and
thus much more to his liking.

After having experienced the Petersburg social and political milieu, Dontsov recognized quite clearly and
early on that none of the Russian political forces, not even the revolutionary and democratic ones, were
i te ested i suppo ti g the idea of Uk ai e s i depe de e. This ealizatio e e tuall e a e one of

Trident International, p.120, note 4; Edward Bernstein was a German critic of Marxism and a fountainhead of
revisionist socialist thought.
Kvit, op.cit.; Fedenko, Ukra i s k i ‘ukh u XX st., 63.
93
94
Kvit, op.cit.

27
the cornerstones of his entire worldview and alienated him, similarly to the way the idea of
i depe de e alie ated Mikh o s k i, from the rest of the Eastern Ukrainian political system in the first
decades of the 20th e tu , do i ated the so ialists that de ided to et Uk ai e s futu e o
benevolence and success of the Russian revolutionary movement.95 This, however, did not mean that
the socialists did ot elie e i Uk ai e s i depe de e – they did – only that they prioritized political
expedience and strategic calculations over determination and uncompromising struggle.96 The former
approach was denounced as uhodovstvo o iliato politi s the proponents of the latter one,
97
implying opportunism and lack of will to gain freedom. In hindsight, there is significant merit to this
accusation, although its categorical, uncompromising and one-sided nature also points to political
opportunism, striving to strike o e s oppo e ts he the are already down and to avoid making any
attempts to understand them.

During his time in Vienna, Dontsov o asio all isited L viv, and two specific occasions are worth
mentioning. The first was in 1909, when he spoke at the inaugural I Congress of the Ukrainian Student
Union, which united the efforts of all student societies across Austria. Dontsov delivered an anticlerical
speech “ hool a d eligio , a gui g that eligio should ot e taught i s hool, as it as the opiu
fo the people. This spee h as ot i the least o igi al i the positio fo hi h it a gued, ut it
efle ts pe fe tl o Do tso s o thodo Ma is a d his philosophi al ie s of that pe iod. рe
criticized the Judeo-Christian tradition, much in the vein of the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, but also of
Nietzsche, whose influence on his thinking would become exceedingly obvious after World War I.
Religion was an enemy of the scientific, naturalistic worldview, and the churches were reactionary and
supportive of the absolutist regime. The ethics of Christianity, he argued, were deleterious to human
freedom and thinking, and should be replaced with socialist ethics. He rejected the existence of
universal ethics and argued that ethics are situational and historical, that the spiritual world of any social
unit – its social, political and ethical views – is defined by the economic role of the class to which the
given unit belongs. This economic reductionism and atheist materialism of Do sto s philosophi al
outlook in the early stages of his intellectual development remained with him even after he moved away
from socialism and materialism towards nationalism and idealism. Later, reorienting his gaze favorably
to a d eligio , Ch istia it a d the Ch istia hu hes, he lai ed that hosoe e o shipped the
so ialist idols, had to tu a a f o Ch ist. Little did he ealize that, o e sel , hosoe e tu ed
away from the socialist idols, had to start worshippi g Ch ist. In other words, he took the foundations
of the s ie tifi ate ialist thought a d o i ed it ith olu ta ist idealis , romantic mysticism and
irrational nationalism, seemingly unaware of the inherent contradictions of such an intellectual
synthesis. He always argued that this evolution in his views was in fact not an evolution at all, but a
logical refinement of one and the same worldview, his immutable philosophical stance. 98 This

95
Mazepa, Isaak. (1946). Pidstavy nashoho vidrodzhennia [The Origins of Our Rebirth]. [Location not identified]:
Prometey, pp. 151-3.
96
Fedenko, Isaak Mazepa, 11.
97
Similar type of politics in Galicia of 1890s was discussed in The Beginnings of the Party System in Galicia section
ith ega d to the e e a of app o he e t ith the Polish ad i ist atio i the Aust ia -dominated Ukraine.
98
Op.cit., 85-88.

28
eclecticism and inconsistency was characteristic of his theoretical writings, including his theory of the
new nationalism.

The second occasion was Do tso s isit to L i i , agai to speak at the II Congress of the
Ukrainian Student Union, this ti e deli e i g a spee h o the Cu e t Politi al “ituatio and Our
Tasks, hi h as p o a l his ea liest e p essio of u e ui o al hostilit to a d ‘ussia statis . At
the ti e, Ye he Ko o alets as se i g on the Board of Directors of the Student Union, elected as a
national-democratic representative earlier that year. Ko o alets had joi ed the “tude t U io
so eti e i , afte pe a e tl o i g to li e a d stud i L i , a d ose to a leade ship positio
fairly quickly due to his character – he as t e talkati e, et elia le a d depe da le, as ell as
effective and capable, all of which engendered respect in his fellow students.99 Do tso s spee h ade a
po e ful i p essio o Ko o alets , as the speake insistently advocated a peculiar form of Ukrainian
separatism from Russia as an alternative to outright independence: only that part of Ukraine that the
Austrian military would manage to free from the Russian domination was to be separated and
subsequently merged into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as the Crown Land Ukraine. This was a strange
proposal a d Ko o alets did ot feel o fo ta le ith its i pli atio s. рe a k o ledged this spee h as
a defi i g o e t i his life, i that it oth fueled his e thusias to o ti ue o ki g to a d Uk ai e s
liberation and disturbed his thinking about how far that struggle had to be taken.100

Faced with the choice between Russia and Europe, Dontsov came down forcefully on the side of Europe.
This as p o a l his g eatest diffe e e ith Mikh o s k i, ho also believed in a two-step pathway to
independence, but by way of autonomy within Russia, the possibility of which Dontsov rejected
altogether.101 Earlier in 1913, in Moder e osko fil st o (Modern Russophilia), Dontsov had laid out his
views on the harmful influence of the Russian culture on the Ukrainian one, calling for the new
orientation of the Ukrainian movement, directing the spear of his criticism toward the phenomenon he
called pro a sal st o (provincialism) or a complex of national hermaphroditism (indecisiveness between
Europe and Russia, independence and autonomy/federation).102 Such radically categorical repudiation of
the Russian culture and its i flue e o Uk ai e s de elop e t as still u k o at the ti e a d thus
resonated widely throughout the Russian, Polish, Austrian and German intellectual circles. It was met
with a variety of reactions, from deep admiration, mostly from the young generation in search of a
worldview, to caustic criticism from the democratic-li e al thi ke s o ou geois atio alists, as
Dontsov liked to call them, in a Marxist manner). The moderate criticism from Symon Petliura of USDRP
a d M kola )aliz iak of UP“‘ poi ted out that e e the so ialist i les e e guilt of this ode
‘ussophilia, a d that Do tso s lai s e e e agge ated a d o e-dimensional. In his letter to
103

Do tso , Petliu a esse tiall e hoed D aho a i s thoughts f o the latte s Fanciful Thoughts about
the Ukrainian National Cause, he he ote that hile Do tso s thoughts e e ele a t a d i isi e,
the e e p e atu e a d, ell, fa iful. We ha e a limited number of direct roads into Europe, and

99
Shakh, op.cit., 68-71.
100
Hrytsay, op.cit., 31-33.
101
“os o s k i, op.cit., 104.
102
Op.cit., 93-4.
103
“os o s k i, op.cit., 95.

29
even those that exist, look more like narrow paths, while those who could lead the masses down these
paths, a e fe … ote Petliu a, so the ‘ussia ultu e a d i flue e p ese ted the o l possi le a
of de elopi g ou atio al ultu e. 104

Drahomaniv had also predicted that when the relations between Russia and Austria became strained,
this question of separatism would emerge again. Yes, again, because during the last decade of the 19th
century, Oleksandr Ko s k i a d Volod A to o h, that famous couple of Austrophiles from
Kyiv, had entertained this idea of the Kingdom of Ukraine.105 This idea had caused a significant amount
of consternation at the time and was one of the factors that had convinced the Austrians and the Poles
to make some concessions to the Ukrainians – the e e a politi s as its esult. This ti e, it was the
Russians that had a stronger reaction, with both the leader of the Cadets Miliukov and the leader of the
Bolsheviks Le i espo di g iti all to Do tso s assault o the ‘ussia i flue e. I fa t, Do tso s
speech forced Lenin to reveal his views on the nationality question, which presaged his future
aggression towards any attempts of the non-Russian nationalities to establish their own independent
states, both during and immediately following World War I. When USDRP and Dontsov parted ways later
that year, due to their divergence on the national question, Lenin was ecstatic and connected with Lev
Yurkevych and Volod Le s k i, the pu lishe a d the edito of Dzvin (The Bell), a social-
democratic monthly that, although legal and technically non-partisan, was controlled by the leftist
faction of USDRP, led by Vynnychenko, that was gaining greater influence over the politics of the party
as a whole. Ne e theless, Le i de li ed Yu ke h s i itatio to o t i ute to Dzvin, which the former
still identified as advocating for the national question and the Menshevik positions.106 After meeting
Lenin in person in Switze la d du i g Wo ld Wa I, Le s k i oted so e i o siste ies a d ed flags
(pun intended) in the behavior of Lenin and his cronies, especially when Lenin remarked about
Le s k i s ook An Outline of the Development of the Labor Movement in Galicia ith the u t A e
ha ful ook! 107 Unfortunately, Le i s prejudice against national self-determination was not
recognized in time by the Ukrainian movement, which made it easier for the Bolsheviks to spread their
propaganda and ultimately attack Ukraine militarily when it was at its weakest, defeating its Revolution.

Do tso s spee h as a tuall a i sta e of e a ka le politi al pe eptio of the йu opea

sociopolitical conditions and of prognosis of the trajectory that the events migh take place. In reality
everything turned out quite differently, because the Ukrainian movement was not prepared to face the
challenges of the day and take political advantage of the relatively favorable window of opportunity
opened by World War I and the Russian revolutions. While the speech was a watershed moment that
marked the beginning of Do tso s divergence from the social-democratic movement, he continued to
interact with that political milieu for another year or two, because the difference between them was
primarily programmatic and did not reach the level of deep philosophical disagreements. The socialist
worldview continued to i flue e his thi ki g u til afte the Uk ai ia ‘e olutio s defeat. I he

104
Op.cit., 97.
105
Op.cit., 99.
106
Op.cit., 107- .; Pala a , р ho i . . Volod Le s k i: To a d the рisto of the Uk ai ia “o ialist
Mo e e t. Vil a Ukra i a, 57: 29-35.
. Vil a Ukra i a,
107
Le s k i, Volod . . M e o ies a out V.I. Le i . “ itze la d -
58: 34-45.

30
was still able to understand Drahomaniv and the moderate nature of the Ukrainian movement, both in
Galicia and in Eastern Ukraine. I do t a t to a use a o e. No to iti ize a o e, he said,
continuing that even a decent person could become a prisoner of the circumstances, which favored the
development of a narrow provincialist perspective. All ats see g e at ight, as his o e t
a out D aho a i s la k of politi al suppo t fo the idea of sepa ate a d independent Ukraine and
reliance on the Russian liberals and revolutionaries.108 Just a decade later, he would no longer be as
generous and mild in his opinions and expressions.

I , Do tso etu ed to L i a d fi all as a le to omplete his Juris Doctor degree,

subsequently trying to arrange a move to Kyiv, which was made impossible by the threat of the
Bolshevik invasion at the turn of 1918. In March, however, after the Peace Treaty of Brest-Lito s k
et ee the Uk ai ia People s ‘epu li Ukrayins ka Narod a ‘espu lika, UNR) and the Central
Powers had been signed, he was finally able to bring his plan to fruition and move to Kyiv. Quickly
orienting himself to the current political situation, he was disappointed by the disorder that
characterized the go e e t of the Uk ai ia Ce t al Cou il, UN‘ s pa lia e t. This i p essio as
shared by most returning emigrants: they were astonished by the lack of a definite plan and systematic
app oa h to go e i g, the go e e t s helpless ess a d the i a ility to conduct foreign affairs in a
professional manner, particularly with regard to the Germans. Therefore, Dontsov joi ed L p s k i,
“he et a d Mikh o s k i i UDKhP, because it was conservative and opposed to the socialists and the
politics of the Central Council.109 In fact, UDKhP was in the midst of planning a coup, because it was
convinced that UNR would not be able to hold on to power for much longer. In the end, UDKhP joined
its forces with рet a Pa lo “ko opads k i, who was also independently planning a coup.

In April, this united front o e th e UN‘ s go e e t. In the short-li ed рet a ate go e e t,

Dontsov became Director of the Ukrainian Telegraph Agency, part of the Press Bureau in the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. UDAP did not have much i flue e o “ko opads k i, ho as surrounded by the pro-
Russian elements, and in the very short time, the party joined the anti-het a Uk ai ia Natio al-
Statehood Union (Ukra i s k i Natsio al o-Derzhavnyi Soyuz, UNDS), which united the liberals, the
socialists and now the conservatives against the Russification of the Ukrainian State. In August, UDAP
parted ways with this group, which transformed into Ukrainian National Union (Ukra i s k i
Natsio al i “o uz, UNS), dominated by the socialists.110 In No e e , “ko opads k i a ou ed his
intent to enter into federation with Russia, at which point UNS rapidly organized its efforts and took
back the powers of the state, creating the collegial Directorate, led by Vynnychenko and Petliura. Facing
the wrath of the so ialists fo his suppo t of het a s oup, Do tso left Kyiv behind, using the helping
hand of Ye he Ko o alets to s eak out of the it u oti ed i Ja ua of 1919.111

From his brief experience with UDKhP a d “ko opads k i s go e e t i Kyiv, Dontsov took away a
strong distaste for partisan politics, a newfound appreciation for the firm Napolean-like ruling hand with
authoritarian executive powers, necessary to implement the intended policies, as well as the realization

108
“os o s k i, op.cit., 105.
109
“os o s k i, op.cit., 136-8.
110
Op.cit., 141-4.
111
Op.cit., 148-51.

31
of the peasa t s i po ta e to the the Uk ai ia o e e t s su ess. Bet ee a d , he
spent his time in Bern, Switzerland, again, as a Chief of the Ukrainian Press Bureau of the Ukrainian
diplomatic mission headed by Dr. E. Lukasevych, who was appointed earlier b рet a “ko opads k i.
After the consummate defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution and the liquidation of the Ukrainian state and
its diplo ati issio s, Do tso e e tuall ade his a to L i , a i i g the e i Ja ua of and
remaining there until the outbreak of World War II in 1939. During that period, he carries on with his
journalist and publicist activities, becoming the dominating force among the Ukranian political theorists
and publicists of the interwar period. He takes over the editing of the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk (The
Literary-Scientific Herald, fou ded р ushe s k i as the o ga of the “he he ko “ ie tifi “o iet i
1922-32 and Zahrava (The Glow) in 1923-24, followed by Vistnyk (The Herald) in 1933-39. During this
period, he also published his seminal theoretical work, Nationalism (1926), which became one of the
most influential books for the new generation of activists, particularly for the emerging Nationalist
movement s leade ship.112

Theorizing Ukrainian Nationalism: Starosol’s’kyi’s Theory of the Nation

Befo e p o idi g a su a of Do tso s Nationalism and examining its influence on the nationalism of
OUN, let s step a k and look at the general atmosphere within the Ukrainian movement in the 1920s.
Having just suffered a devastating defeat from the Bolsheviks in Eastern Ukraine and from the Poles in
Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian movement found itself at a crossroads, politically and intellectually. As
we have seen, the Ukrainian politicum was represented by different currents of political philosophy:
primarily a number of socialist and populist varieties, but also moderate and liberal-democratic,
conservative and monarchist, and even proto-nationalist and anarchist, at the margins. The national
question was a significant consideration for all parties concerned, either as a positive and ultimate goal
or as a negative and meddling side effect. Galician politics, which culminated in the Western Ukrainian
People s ‘epu li Zahidno-Ukra i s ka Narod a Respublika, ZUNR), were dominated by the moderately
conservative forces since the start. Despite the unity in its ranks, ZUNR was unable to survive the
onslaught of the neighboring nations, each with their own claim for a piece of Ukrainian lands: the
Hungarians and the Czechs for Transcarpathia, the Romanians for Bukovyna and the Poles for Galicia
a d Vol .

Staying true to the dominant vision of the united Ukraine, ZUNR tied its fate with the politics of UNR,
which was clearly dominated by the socialist circles, although the moderates and the liberals were also
represented. The unapologetically conservative forces of Eastern Ukraine, witnessing the disorder
holdi g s a i the go e e ts u de P eside t р ushe s k i a d the Ce t al Cou il, atte pted to
gain some control by staging a monarchist coup. However, having no consolidated political program,
these forces were used by the occupying powers – the German and the Russian monarchists – to
advance their own interests. The attempt to salvage UN‘ s achievements through the politics of
Directorate and, subsequently, the anarchy of Petliurite Otamanshchyna, further undermined the
autho it of UN‘ s isio . Despite the attempts of the fledgling Ukrainian military formations to save the
independent Ukrainian state, the lack of an adequately staffed, well-trained and quantitatively self-

112
Op.cit., 152-4.

32
reliant military became painfully obvious. Unfortunately, the socialist and liberal circles did not realize,
until it was too late, the importance of the established institutions, the discilpline of the rule of law
(including the police and the military), the professional civil service and the expert statesmanship. 113
Therefore, the so ialists (a vague label at best) became an easy target for the generation that
followed. Moreover, the youth was further encouraged by a number of prominent publicists opposing
the ideas of socialism and liberal democracy – Dontsov being the most prominent one, of course – to
adopt su h a edu tio ist isio a d put all of the la e o the so ialists, hile defi i g themselves as
the Natio alists. “u h pe ha t fo di hoto ous thi ki g as ha a te isti to that pe iod, as e shall
see o the e a ple of Do tso s Nationalism.

Nevertheless, there were also some moderate voices that tried to make sense of the Ukrainian
‘e olutio s defeat. Volod “ta osol s k i, a social democrat and a respected attorney, this anchor of
the Uk ai ia o e e t i Gali ia that had al a s suppo ted the idea of Uk ai e s independence and
helped organize the Ukrainian Legion of Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters (USS), was actually the first to
formulate a coherent Ukrainian nationalist theory. I , ith the help of р ushe s k i s Uk ai ia
“o iologi al I stitute i Vie a, “ta osol s k i pu lished his o k A Theory of the Nation,114 in which he
laid out his social-theoretical thinking and supported it with empirical examples from practical politics
and existing societies. His work represents an instance of clear and systematic analysis and critique of
social phenomena and of various existing sociological and, more specifically, natiological, theories, at all
times accompanied by astute methodological awareness and interdisciplinary thinking. A Theory of the
Nation avoids making one-sided, reductionist arguments and accounts for both the rational and the
irrational elements of human psychology and societies, both the rationalist and the voluntarist factors
affecting the formation of classes and nations, both the exclusiveness of national belonging and the
universality of international community of nations. Moreover, the relations between nation and such
otio s as de o a , state, ge e al ill, a e, ultu e, histo a e e a i ed i detail, ith the
conclusions providing a weak constructivist approach to theorizing nation, using Alexander Motyl s
typology.115

A nation is seen as a thoroughly modern phenomenon, called into existence primarily due to a moral
imperative of the national consciousness, albeit frequently grounded in such historical and symbolical
factors as territory, culture, language, ethnicity, and striving toward the ultimate manifestation of the
national self-determination as a sovereign democratic state. It is important to note that while the
pote tial ole of all of the listed o je ti e fa to s i the p o ess of atio s fo atio is a k o ledged,
they are clearly denied as necessary or even sufficient o ditio s fo atio s fo atio .116 Without the
deciding subjective factor – national consciousness, there will only be a people, a population within a
certain territory, with common ethnic and cultural characteristics, but not a nation.

113
Op.cit., 145.
114
“ta osol s k i, V. . Teoriya Natsiyi. [A Theory of the Nation]. Vienna: Ukrainian Sociological Institute.
P i ted i “ta osol s ka, op.cit., pp.161-324.
115
Motyl, Alexander J. (1999). Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities. New
York: Columbia University Press, p.84.
116
“ta osol s kyi, V., Teoriya Natsiyi, 171-190.

33
A complex interplay of nationality and statehood is carefully examined, with full awareness of the
contemporary circumstances of such stateless nations as Jews and Gypsies, as well as such multinational
empires as Russian and Austro-Hungarian, under domination of which the Ukrainian national movement
as gathe i g its st e gth. I his o k, “ta osol s k i e hi its i ti ate fa ilia it ith the histo of
European thought, including British liberal, German nationalist and idealist, Austrian liberal, French
liberal and nationalist philosophers, as well as contemporary political and social thinkers. His view of the
atio is ased o ‘e a s dail ple is ite a d Tönnies distinction between Gemeinschaft and
Gessellschaft – the characteristics that correspond, in very rough terms, to the nation and the state,
a gued “ta osol s k i. While the latte is ased p i a il o the i atio al, spo ta eous ill to elo g to
a community, the latter is primarily a conscious choice to organize the independent, sovereign life of this
o u it . I the e d, ho e e , “ta osol s k i ad its that these t o sides a e ot ea l as disti t as
some theoretical discussion might suggest. In reality, there is no ideal monolith of a nation-state – every
state includes national minorities to some extent, which live with some amount of tension with regard
to the dominant national culture. Rogers Brubaker did a wonderful analysis of this dynamic of
nationalizing states, national minorities and so- alled atio al ho ela ds, to hi h those i o ities
supposedly belong.117 Irredentism is one particular manifestation of this dynamic, directly relevant to
this paper – Yulia Ba h s k i s Ukrayina Irredenta should be a sufficiently symbolic piece of evidence.

A othe sho t pie e D . “ta osol s k i, written in 1915, expressing his Thoughts on Democracy,
complements his liberal nationalist theory.118 This brief essay is broken up into 8 short passages, each
only several paragraphs long, which present his musings about democracy and war. A concise summary
of each of the 8 passages follows:

1. The war has put the question of armed struggle and defense of Ukrainian national interests as the foremost
concern, but the Ukrainians should not forget to also tend to the demands of the cause of Ukrainian
democracy.
2. Democracy is in the greatest danger when it is taken for granted, when non-democratic reality is covered up
with a democratic turn of the phrase; and World War I made this danger even greater, as it was a war of
societies, not just of armies.
3. Democracy is not just a legal regime, just a form of public life, but also the content that fills that form: the
democratic consciousness and the civic sense of citizenship. нo ithout o te t is dead. й pt sou d
kills, a d the spi it gi es life.
4. Democracy means public interest as the guiding light of political, economic, cultural – in a word, societal –
growth and improvement.
5. Democracy is embodied in the empowered mass of the people, conscious of its empowerment, which comes
from its political and civic education, from its organization into a civil society, from its sense of civic
obligations. Without this internal power, such mass will be vulnerable to manipulation and domination, at the
mercy and the whim of its rulers and leaders.
6. Democracy requires the populace to be politically conscious and educated, to balance its rights and duties, to
u de sta d the pu li i te est. The od is led to a d st uggle spirit, s ie e, thought… These are the
engine of democracy.

117
Brubaker, Rogers. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
. Thoughts o De o a . Vil a Ukrayina, 35-36: 77-9.
118
“ta osol s k i, Volod .

34
7. Democracy needs a strong and sober civic morality, because it is impossible to control each person or to keep
them under surveillance. To ensure the sustainability of the public life, democracy needs this internal force
ased o the se se of i i dut , o itize s i tue Mo tes uieu .
8. De o ra y’s fou datio is distrust of the people to ard its leaders, which calls for constant vigilance, for
relentless monitoring of and control over the activities of the people s government representatives, to keep
them from straying off of the path of serving the public interest. This control is evidence of the political
aturity of the people, e ause the la k of tra spare y destroys the people’s politi al po er at its very
source.

Clea l , “ta osol s k i as o e ed ith the effe t that the a ed st uggle might have on the
democratic ideals and practices, limited thought they might have been, that to a certain extent had
grown to be taken for granted by the Western Ukrainians within the constitutional regime of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. This o e as p o a l ei fo ed “ta osol s k i s p ofessio al e pe ie e. In
1930s, he often got involved as the defense attorney in numerous political trials of the young activists of
UVO and later OUN, who engaged in terrorist acts and conspiratorial politics. While he could not have
approved of such methods, given his philosophical worldview, he certainly understood the psychological
state of mind of these youths, full of patriotism, romanticism and juvenile maximalism, but lacking
judgment. As a father of three, he saw the reflection of his own children in these misguided activists.119
He also continued his activities in USDP, becoming its Chairman in 1937 until 1939, when the party was
dissolved to prevent giving the Soviets, who occupied Galicia within weeks after World War II started in
“epte e , g ou ds fo pe se utio . “ta osol s k i as a ested i De e e of , t ied i ou t as a
ou te e olutio a , o i ted a d e iled to a “i e ia o e t atio a p i Ja ua of ,
where he died a year later.

While his nationalist theory was widely read in the 1920s, unfortunately, it did not find support among
the members of the fledling Nationalist movement. To be sure, the Nationalist youth respected and
e e ed D . “ta osol s k i – he was one of the only two people from the older generation, the other
being Dr. Dontsov, who could freely visit the Ukrainian Academic House, the stronghold of the
Nationalist movement at the time.120 But they did not heed his warnings with regard to democratic
ethos, instead choosing to follow the direction set out by Dmytro Dontsov.

Theorizing Ukrainian Nationalism: New Nationalism

In 1921, Dontsov wrote a work that marked a transitional point from his early period of social-
democratic thought and activities to his period of becoming a firebrand of what he termed new
nationalism. His Foundations of Our Politics summarize his views and lay out his ruthless criticism of
Drahomaniv, his followers, and the Revolution of 1917-21. Federalism, pacifism and internationalism
(both liberal Wilsonianism and socialist) a e set out as Do tso s tes oi es, which stand in the way of
the ultu al atio s striving for statehood and the status of a politi al atio . I a pla o Nietzs he s
ideas, Do tso s ad o ates Wille zur Nation as the basic principle of human societies, which implies the
primacy of foreign affairs over internal affairs, to ensure independence and sovereignty of the nation

119
Op.cit., 107-9.
120 th
Ked , I a . . Volod “ta osol s k i Anniversary of His Birth). Pp. 485- i Olha Kuz o h,
ed. Within a Range of Interests (A Collection of Essays). New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, p.487.

35
 efo e a thi g else. I othe o ds, the ideas a d p i iples ased o the atio s i sti t of self-
p ese atio as a i depe de t olle ti e o ga is ust e i ple e ted the state ith i o
e e g . Besides this patent collectivist strain, the Ma ist lega i Do tso s thought is e ide t i his
o t ast et ee s ie tifi so ialis a d the “o ialist I te atio al, i hi h the latte o es out i
fa o a le light, si e it is ot ill ith pa ifis o fede alis , putti g its o e o lass struggle.
Nevertheless, it is just another instance of misguided cosmopolitanism to Dontsov, preaching the
delusion of international proletariat. To Dontsov, the dominating factor of international politics
becomes the struggle of the races [used in the wide sense of the word, as equivalent of ethnicities], not
the lasses, a d the atio s eed fo defe se e ists o l i sofa as other nations, not just some specific
type of social regime, harbor aggressive intentions toward it.121

Ukrainophiles were also nationalists, but without an uproar (halas). For them, the reason for
the hostility among the nations lay not in the eternal laws of competition of the races, not in the
struggle for existence, transferred from the organic world to the superorganic до оо,
but in the intellectual backwardness, in the struggle of ideas, and above all – in
122
misunderstanding.

In this regard, Dontsov derides the ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité, of constitutionality and of Don
Quixotism of the brotherhood of all people and the international pacifism, when the very question of
the atio s e iste e is at stake, he e e thi g ust e su o di ated to o e st o g ha d, to o e
powerful will. “o e hi ts of Do tso s “o ial Da i is that blossomed in full shortly afterwards are
detectable in his words: Revolution or evolution, universal suffrage or dictatorship, clericalism or
anticlericalism, royalism or republicanism, – all must be subordinated to the categorical imperative of
foreign affairs and the continued existence of a politically indepenedent nation. I Uk ai e s situatio ,
Dontsov argued further, traditionalism is tantamount to keep the nation united – he meant the tradition
of the Western civilization. He advocated for the occidentalization, westernization of the entire internal
life and culture of the nation, in political, social, cultural and religious realms, as a way of resisting the
oriental, Orthodox, despotic Russian culture. To Dontsov, this Western-European ideal was represented
by individualism, egois i so iet s o k, a o ga ized olle ti e a d i depe de t a tio , the
atio al olle ti e s e e ge ti defe se of its ights f o e te al foes, the egatio of the ‘ussia
ideals of the horde (ochlocracy and despotism), of the enslavement of the individual and of
cosmopolitanism.123

Instead of all these, in his view, exceptionally bad ideas, Dontsov sets his vague vision of a peasant
petite-bourgeois republic. He examines the socialist challenges to the bourgeois societies – statism,
syndicalism, nationalization, municipalization, Fabianism, trade-unionism, cooperative socialism and
even guild socialism, popular in Britain at the time – and concludes that all these forms of socialism have
one thing in common: they are all based on representative democracy, which rests on the notion of
independent economic and political self-reliance and self-government of an active mass of free

121
Dontsov, Dmytro. (1921). Pidstavy nashoyi polityky. The нou datio s of Ou Politi s . Vie a: Do tso s
Publishing House, pp. 101-106.
122 rd
Dontsov, Dmytro. (1966 [1926]). Nationalism (3 ed. . Lo do : League fo Uk ai e s Li e atio , p. .
123
Op.cit., 106-109.

36
individuals, unlike the Russian variety of socialism – the Soviet communism, – which is despotic and
totalitarian, resembling Tsarist absolutism that preceded it.124 In short, it is no wonder that Dontsov
espoused some admiration for America, albeit his own imaginary one, and advocated for a society of
peasant democracy.125

This intermediary phase did not last, however, and within several years Dontsov managed to shed all
vestiges of democratism or moderation. Afte etu i g to L i i , Dontsov, with the help from
Ye he Ko o alets , sta ted editing The Literary-Scientific Herald, as well as made his last attempt at
political activism. In 1923-24, he edited Zahrava (The Glow), a biweekly financed by UVO, around which
a circle of nationalists from various backgrounds congregated, who in 1924 formed Ukra i s ka Parti a
Natsio al o i ‘o ot (UPNR, or Ukrainian Party of National Work), which was also referred to as the
party of Natsio al a ‘e oliutsi a (Party of National Revolution) by the insiders. However, the party
existed for less than a year, deciding to join the other Ukrainian forces within the united front of
Ukra i s ke Natsio al o-Demokratychne Obyednannia (UNDO, or Ukrainian National-Democratic
Union) in 1925. The Nationalist movement during the interwar period opposed the legal UNDO,
denouncing it as uhodovstvo (collaborationism) for cooperating with the Polish occupants. Dontsov was
also disappointed, as he advocated for an exclusive and self-suffi ie t pa t , a d o side ed UPN‘ s
joining of UNDO to be ill-advised.126 After this, he would never again enter the realm of practical politics,
instead focusing on publicist activities.

In 1926, he published Nationalism, which eventually became gospel for the young Nationalists. There
was no more compromise of any kind for him, no more uncertainty and balancing acts, no more pacifism
and internationalism – only forceful, nationally selfish, Darwinist struggle for survival and liberation, in
which ends justify means and anything goes. Nationalism is divided into three parts, negative, positive
and mysticist: the first was a critique of pro a sal stvo (provincialism – the th-century nationalism of
de a , his term for essentially the entire spectrum of Ukrainian politics up to that point, which was
solely responsible for the defeat of the Ukrainian Revolution; the second was a description of his theory
of illful o a ti e atio alis ; a d the thi d as a des iptio of his u de sta di g of the Uk ai ia
Idea, the e atio al й os. 127 In the preface to the third edition of Nationalism in 1966, Dontsov
summarized his argument as a dichotomy of t o te pe a e ts, t o atio alis s, t o eeds of a
– a vivid example of the misguided dialectical thinking so typical of the Western mind in general and
Marxism in particular.

124
Op.cit., 120.
125
Op.cit., 204-10.
126
“os o s k i, op.cit., 170-1.
127
Dontsov, Nationalism, 301-11.

37
 Two temperaments T o spiritual reeds of a
Intellect Will (шляхетн ) Noble aristocrat Base commoner ( уж цьк )
Contemplation Action Kozak Swineherd
Logic Instinct Knight Plebeian
Passivity Aggression Fighter Corrupter of life (па тач ж ття)
Relativism Dogmatism National hero Mute and vile slave
Harmony Struggle A people of heroes Lazy nomads
Knowledge Faith Possessed by the spirit of truth Judas
(Gnosis) (Pistis) “o ole t spa of the
Martyr for the faith renegades
Some other i k a es (« о е кодло» д туп к )
Socialist castrates Patriot u les of the fo eig la d
Democratic Pharisees (дядьк отече т а чужо о)
Hermaphroditic demo-socialists
Politi al egeta ia s

"нo eig i pe ialis i Uk ai e as fo the othe s a a o al phe o e o , the easo fo hi h

as ig o a e, de ided Do tso the p e ious ge e atio s of Uk ai ia a ti ists. O e eed o l dispel
it, ake up f o the slu e a d d ea a d oot out of o e s hea t senseless e it to othe
peoples, a d the “la i la ds ill fi d pea e. 128 This suggestion seemed utterly ridiculous and devoid of
sense to Dontsov, who saw life in terms of the struggle of wills. He rejected the positivist point of view,
which rose to dominance in the West in the late 19th century and influenced the Ukrainian populists and
socialists. And he had good reasons to do so, it must be noted, because positivism is an insufficient
method of understanding humanity and society. The irrational, emotional element is an indelible and
unavoidable, even essential and indispensable part of being human. In this, positivism is similar to
Ma is , i that it has o philosophi al atego ies fo the u i ue fa ts of hu a pe so alit , a d…
manages to olle ti ize this hu a pe so alit out of e iste e, ote philosophe Willia Ba ett i
1958.
Both Marxism and Positivism are, intellectually speaking, relics of the nineteenth-century
Enlightenment that have not yet come to terms with the shadow side of human life as grasped
even by some of the nineteenth-century thinkers themselves. The Marxist and Positivist picture
129
of man, consequently, is thin and oversimplified.

Although Dontsov revolted against the positivist outlook of Drahomaniv, Fra ko, р ushe s k i a d
others, he was unable to also shed the Marxist skin from his own thinking, in the end committing the
same error, albeit in a different guise. Moreover, it is also a profound error to confuse philosophical
insights for political imperatives. Just for the sake of illustration, consider Nietzs he s concept ill to
power. What he actually meant by it was the will to create, to overpower the seeming hopelessness of
the human condition, to overcome nihilism, and certainly not as a means for an aggressive, genocidal
attack and destruction of thousands and millions of people. In any case, Dontsov denounced
materialism, if only e all , alo g ith i telle tualis , s ie tifi so ial uietis a d p o i ial
u i e salis of his p ede esso s a d o te po a ies. I the atego of ate ialist do t i es, he

128
Dontsov, Nationalism, 23.
129
Barrett, William. (1990[1958]). Irrational Man: A Study in Existentialist Philosophy. New York: Anchor, p.22.

38
placed liberalism, which put the interests of a mass of individuals above those of a nation; democratism,
people (which to him meant unformed crowd) above nation; and socialism, class above nation. He
subsumed pacifism, humanism and anarchism as varieties of liberalism (sic! – рe alled pa ifisi the
most vulgar form of liberalism), and provincialism as a kind of democratism. All of these -isms were
supposedly strongly opposed to the idea of statehood as an inherent value, and Dontsov holds them up
as examples of olle ti e egois of the o st ki d, hi h puts pa ti ula ist o fo t a o e the
i pe ati e of ki ship a d atio alit . To this he opposed the will of the strong, the strong will, which
does not see war and the resulting mass murders as evil, because there is something that is valued more
than life itself. нo those ho see thei ki , idea, o hi as the e d, e e the dest u tio of a
individual is an affirmation, the victor of life. 130

I the positi e se o d pa t, Do tso p ese ts the te ets of his a ti e atio alis , hi h a e si fold131:

1. Voluntarism (anti-intellectualism): “t e gthe i g of the atio s ill to li e, will to power, will to expansion.
I the struggle for growth and advantage, we distinguish expansion as the end, struggle – as the means.
132

2. Belligerence, militancy: The se o d te et of a health atio s atio al idea ust e that longing for
struggle, that consciousness of its imperative, without which neither heroic deeds, nor intensive life, nor faith in
133
life, nor triumph of a new idea, which wants to change the face of the world, are possible.
Do tso s ee ed at de o-li e alis , at he aph oditi o ld ie of the de o-socialist Ukrainian
leade ship, at its eak ess of spi it, to hi h a Social-Da i ist fittest to su i e, an u o p o isi g
ilita t spi it a d its aste o e atte as opposed. Do tso s oppo e ts considered this foolish
o a ti is , as opposed to the p i iple of ealit . Well, Dontsov was not bothered, as he had no regard
for eu u h-like ealis , which he opposed with that mysticism, without which any politics is dead;
134
sti is , hi h is the sou e of atio s life a d po e . This would be a good place to recall
D aho a i s oppositio of culture and education to mysticism and fatalism. The contrast could not be
starker.
3. Romanticism, dogmatism, illusionism: This idealism , this religiosity , this theology is that o a ti spi it ,
which raises the eternal above the temporal; the alues that i g us othi g a o e the ta gi le i te ests ;
subordination of , ou , ou i te ests to the idea of the g eat whole, which in the religious life is the
Church, in the ethical life – the moral principles, in the politically organized societies – the nation or the
135
state…
4. A) Fanaticism: An overpowering pathos, an intolerant passion. Every new idea is intolerant. Revolution,
St.Ba tholo e s ight massacre, religious wars, the Inquisition, times of terror – these are all similar
phenomena, caused by masses beholden to religious affect, which necessarily led to murder by fire and sword
of anybody who resisted the new faith. Practices of the Inquisition are the practices of the people completely
136
convinced in the truthfulness of their truth… All g eat e e ts i histo esulted f o fa ati ideas.
B) Amorality : "It's a moral that hates good people , who are good, because they are not strong enough to
be evil ; that protests against humanity , hi h kills faith i self a d desi e to fight fo o e s place in the sun;

130
Dontsov, op.cit., 51-4.
131
Op.cit., 220-90; Zaytsev, op.cit., p.164-8.
132
Op.cit., 233.
133
Op.cit., 244.
134
Op.cit., 5.
135
Op.cit., 249.
136
Op.cit., 264.

39
 that knows two basic drives of its ethics – the st e gthe i g of life i sti t a d its eake i g… ; Mo alit is
ot dis o e ed th ough e pe ie e, ut is al ead gi e , as a Plato i Idea. ; This idea is intolerant,
u o pro isi g, fa ati , a oral , it takes as its a i s o l that hi h is i the i terests of the spe ies.
These characteristics belong to each great national idea, and it is this, and nothing else, that gives it such an
137
e plosi e po e i histo . The Idea of the Nation – Ideya Natsiyi, or I.N.
5. Synthesis of rationalism and internationalism: History as evidence for the veracity of the first 4 items. Every
G eat Idea must not only be fanatic and uncompromising, but also serve the interests of progress, as it is
understood here, namely, as the right of the strong races to organize individuals and peoples to strengthen the
138
existing culture and civilization.
6. Creative violence and the initiatory minority: The people, in relation to any idea, whether it is in a static or
dynamic mode, – is a passive factor, the recipient. The active factor, the carrier of the idea; that, which gives
birth to this idea – is an active or initiatory minority. It has diffe e t a es: class-conscious proletariat as
opposed to the u o s ious ajo it , nationally conscious intelligentsia , aristocracy , ruling li ue ,
tyrants ; (its political creations: the USSR, Fascist state, totalitarian democracy – нűhrerde okratie …
139

To sum up, all these constituent elements must be synergized and directed toward this overpowering,
dogmatic Idea of the Nation, fighting both for external consolidation, against internationalist utopias,
and internal, against atomization, partisanship, difference. The national idea commands obedience and
dominates the weak in spiritual, political and economic domains. The e atio al й os is Do tso s
call to awake the desire to rule and conquer – to expand. Dontsov even provides a quote from one of
the articles by Roman Dmowski, the founding leader of the Polish right-wing nationalist National-
Democratic movement (Endecja , the a h i al of Piłsudski a d also a i teg al atio alist. The uote
states that it is i possi le to u ite a so iet u de the flag of o e idea t i g to e o ile the
opposites of fire and water, but by uniting those who support the idea, and then coercing to obedience
those ho do t a t to a ept it olu ta il . Quite a i id, exclusive and all-e o passi g pi tu e
has been painted here by Dontsov, to put it mildly.140 This is also, undoubtedly, a very worrisome and
menacing picture, as it clearly opposes any idea of multiculturalism, of cross-cultural dialogue, of
recognition of difference, of mutual understanding among ethnicities or among the majority and the
minorities in a multiethnic or multinational state. While this may not be surprising that such an ideology
emerged in Ukraine, given the historical period and the recent historical events, it cannot be justified,
because Dontsov used the contingent and, to a large extent, arbitrarily confluent events as evidence for
some eternal fatalistic myth, presenting them as immutable laws of nature and society.

In a haphazard, eclectic and somewhat arbitrary synthesis of multiple strains of European thought
(including Schope haue s Wille zum Leben ill to life , Nietzs he s theo izatio of ihilis a d Wille
zur Macht (will to power), integralism of Maurras and Barrès, “o el s so ial ths a d Pa eto s elitis ,
among others) with the Ukrainian context (partial influence of Mikh o s k i a d L p s k i as al ead
noted earlier), Dontsov offered a passionate and forceful vision of the nationalist struggle, sacralized

137
Op.cit., 267-8, 270-1.
138
Op.cit., 282.
139
Op.cit., 286.
140
Op.cit., 310-2.

40
into a form of political religion.141 Needless to say, many of the thoughts of other thinkers were
transformed beyond recognition or misinterpreted and pulled out of the context. For example,
Nietzs he s i flue e – namely, his concept of Götzen-Dämmerung – is evident from the first sentence
of the p efa e: Ou ti e is the ti e of the twilight of the idols worshipped in the 19th e tu
(emphasis mine – BP).142 й ept Niets he used that o ept a a o d pla o ‘i ha d Wag e s ope a
Götterdämmerung –Twilight of the Gods) as a title for his book Twilight of the Idols, or How One
Philosophizes with a Hammer to attack the preconceived ideas of his time, to attack his Zeitgeist of rising
nihilism and decadence.143 He wrote the book in 1888, during his period of prominent anti-Wagnerism,
whose xenophobic, imperialist and pseudoreligious German nationalism and anti-Semitism Nietzsche
atego i all opposed. рe also opposed рegelia s ste i philosophizi g a d Plato s dualist philosoph
of Being and Becoming, as well as his proto-totalitarian political philosophy of The Republic. As a result,
Nietzs he adopted a apho isti st le of as ste i philosophizi g ith a ha e , hi h as his sha p
wit, used by him to burst the bubbles of modern illusions of morality and virtue. Dontsov, on the other
hand, having understood Nietzsche onl supe fi iall , did e a tl the opposite. рe o o ed Nietzs he s
aphoristic style – the text of Nationalism is essentially nothing but a collection of quotes and disparate
ideas, all strung together unsystematically, without apparent order, in a stream-of-consciousness style
of iti g. The e is t e e a lea defi itio of hat a atio is – a fatal defect for a nationalist
144
theory.

In any case, Dontsov would not see this as a failure, because he was not trying to achieve coherence,
consistency, elegance of logic and argument – his goal was persuasion, evangelization, populist
propaganda, manipulation of emotions into true belief and devotion, ultimately the creation of the
thi d Uk ai ia elite, des i ed Mikh o s k i i his Independent Ukraine. One vitally important
diffe e e et ee Do tso a d Mikh o s k i, ho e e , as that the fo e eje ted the de o ati
component the latter always included in his political vision. The demos was no longer the source of
power in society – the avant-garde minority elite of society, embodied in the Nationalist movement and
organized not as a party, but as a medieval order of knighthood, was responsible for leading the nation,
sho i g it the o e t path fo a d.145 Once again, we see the stamp of Marxism: the notion of an
avant-garde party and the idea of false consciousness, al eit of a atio al olle ti e, i Do tso s
ite atio , ot a lass. As fa as Do tso s Ma hia ellia is , Ivan Lysiak-‘ud ts k i i isi el poi ts out
that even in his early writings, not to mention the later ones, Dontsov reveals himself as a sophist, not a
philosopher, namely, someone who uses words instrumentally, solely to achieve a certain desired effect,
emotive or cognitive, conscious or unconscious; rather than someone who pursues truth and wants to
app oa h it as losel as possi le. Mo eo e , hile the o ept of ill i itself is ot o i ous, Do tso s

141
Zaytsev, Oleksandr (ed.). (2011). Nationalism and Religion: Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Nationalist
Movement in Galicia (1920-1930s). L i : Uk ai ia Catholi U i e sit , pp. -8, 155.
142
Dontsov, Nationalism, 11.
143
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1982 [1889]). Twilight of the Idols. Pp. 463-564 in Walter Kaufmann, ed. The Portable
Nietzsche. New York: Penguin.
144
Motyl, The Turn to the Right, 154.
145
“os o s k i, op.cit., p.164-9.; Dontsov, Nationalism, p. 283-90.; Dontsov, D. (1930). Masa i provid [The Masses
and the Leaders]. Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 3-4: 279.

41
interpretation of it certainly is, precisely because it does not distinguish between the conscious will and
the unconscious outpourings of the whimsical subconscious.146 A pe so that does ot o t ol o e s
emotions and instead lets them reign freely, unburdened by reflection and conscious moderation,
having power to determine the fates of others is a disturbing thought indeed and brings to mind the
totalitarian dictators of the 20th century. Indeed, Lysiak-‘ud ts k i s criticism strikes at the heart of the
problem ith Do tso s fe e ish isio .

OUN’s organized nationalism

Besides the exclusively Ukrainian experience of revolutionary failure, the general interwar political
environment in Europe also affected the further development of the Ukrainian movement. Consider the
failure of the Treaty of Versailles to secure peace, the mismanagement of the liberal democratic regimes
(notably the Weimar Republic), and the economic downturn of the 1930s, all of which created favorable
conditions for the powerful political turn to the right. A wave of explicitly fascist regimes and fascistoid
nationalist movements swept many European countries, most prominent, of course, being Italian
Fascism and German National-Socialism, but also Croatian Ustasha, Romanian Legionary, and Polish
Endecja movements, among others. Many of these movements were pursuing irredentist claims of
national unification, given that the Versailles treaty determined the post-imperial borders in the East-
Central and Southern Europe primarily on the basis of pragmatic considerations of economic
sustainability.
The ideal state was nationally and culturally homogeneous, political centralized, economically
and technologically developed, and militarily powerful, namely, self-sufficient, and thus free.
Consequently, only nations in sovereign states able to attain economic, strategic, and political
autonomy were considered capable of enjoying self-dete i atio … As fa as possi le, e e
147
state received a variety of agricultural areas, industrial resources, and access to the sea.

The dominant opinion at the time was that as long as the states within the newly created boundaries
were self-sufficient, peace could be guaranteed. The question of culture and national homogeneity was
secondary to the question of independence and viability, effectively preserving the conditions that
precipitated World War I in the first place, and even making them worse:

National minorities found subjection to the nation-state o e opp essi e tha i pe ialisti ule…
Empires… had left ultu al atte s to the dis etio of atio al g oups… whereas] the nation-
state was not only assigned administrative, economic , and strategic functions, but also adopted
a particular ultu al a d atio al ide tit … Mo ilizatio of the asses, so ializatio , ultu al
uniformity, nation-building, assimilation, all the magic words of modern nation-states, became
148
the national i o ities ight a e.

146
Lysiak-‘ud ts k i, I a . . Mizh Istoriyeyu i Politykoyu Bet ee рisto a d Politi s . Mu i h: “u has ist ,
p.410-15.
147
Tamir, Yael. (1993). Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.142.
148
Op.cit., 144.

42
The Ukrainians were among those groups that were largely ignored by the Versailles Treaty, although its
representatives did attend the conference.149 The ost palpa le e p essio of dis ega d fo stateless
national groups was, and still is, that international institutions such as the League of Nations or the
U ited Natio s, i spite of thei a es, a ept o l states as e e s. 150 There is little wonder that,
faced with such a seemingly hopeless situation, the Ukrainian movement turned inward and responded
to the all of elia e o ou o fo es o l , hi h had fi st ee sou ded Mikh o s k i a d
echoed by many others since, including Dontsov himself. Do tso s idea of new nationalism came in this
vein, as a reaction to the failures of the preceding generation of liberals, social democrats and socialists
that dominated the UNR politicum in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1918. However, based on the above
quotes, we can see that the priorities highlighted by Dontsov mirrored the dilemmas of nationalities.
Effectively, he adopted the dominant view of the nation-state as a homogeneous unit, focusing his sight
on the goal of gaining independence and self-sufficiency over the question of culture and both civic and
national education. This opened his theory to criticism from other Nationalist theorists, such as
Volod Ma t ets , that his idea of willful nationalism is devoid of Ukrainian content.151

The renewed efforts to organize the Ukrainian movement and resume the struggle started immediately
in 1920, among the Ukrainian émigré circles in Prague, Vienna, Paris and other European cities. Yevhen
Ko o alet s a d his olleagues did ot suppo t Petliu a s Wa sa Pa t ith Pola d s Piłsudski a d
resolved to organize an alternative center for the Ukrainian army. Moreover, they believed that the
struggle for statehood could not be conducted from abroad and decided to find a new operational base
in Ukraine.152 Their sights ultimately became set on Galicia, where the devastation caused by war was
exacerbated by the Polish chauvinist policies, and where deep-seated anti-Polish sentiments were
quickly spreading.153 Therefore, in the summer of 1920, many prominent military leaders of Sich
Sharpshooters and other formations of the Army of UNR (AUNR; Ko o alets , Mel k, ‘. “ushko,
Ku ha s k i, Mat hak, Ch zh, ) like h a d othe s a d of Ukrainian Galician Army (Ukra i s ka
рal ts ka Ar i a, or UHA), the A of )UN‘ рolo i s k i, Na ots k i, “e k a d othe s , joined their
efforts together and formed Ukra i s ka Vi s ko a Orha izatsi a (UVO, or Ukrainian Military
O ga izatio , a o spi ato ial o ga izatio , a e o of the u de g ou d Uk ai ia a , as its
leaders frequently thought of themselves. Ye he Ko o alets , a highl e e ed ilita leader with a
154

ha is ati pe so alit , ould ot e halle ged a o e else a d e a e UVO s lea leade .

However, because he lived in the emigration, eventually a Kray (Homeland) leader was also appointed.
Due to the dangers of life under the Polish rule, this position was occupied by a number of different
i di iduals th ough the s, all p o i e t UVO e e s, hile Ko o alet s al a s e ai ed the
immutable leader and the symbol of the struggle. He gradually became a legend, a larger-than-life

149
Motyl, The Turn to the Right, 96.
150
Tamir, op.cit., p.144.
151
V.Ma t ets , uoted i “os o s k i, op.cit., p.231.
152
Ko o alets , Ye he . . L st Ko o al tsia z Vid ia a Uk a i u pe shi polo i oku. Lette s of
Ko o alets f o Vie a to Uk ai e i the fi st half of . Pp. -273 in Yuriy Boyko, Ye he Ko o alets a d
His Epoch. See pp.250-4.
153
Motyl, op.cit., 104.
154
Lysiak-‘ud ts k i, I a . . Mizh Istoriyeyu i Politykoyu [Between History and Politics . Mu i h: “u has ist ,
p.235.

43
persona, which in due time turned into a personality cult among the nationalist youth in Ukraine,
although he personally would not encourage such idolization.155 This propensity toward and tradition of
a pe so alit ult ould o ti ue i OUN, ith Ko o alet s ecoming its first Vozhd (Chief or Leader)
and, after his death, passi g o to Mel k a d, afte the fi st split, to Ba de a.

The ge e al a e sio to a ts of te o as a ethod of st uggli g as o e o e, a d UVO s p i a

activities were fourfold: acts of sabotage (arson, destruction of telegraph and telephone infrastructure,
postal stations), setting bombs, expropriations of property of various state administrative offices and
political assassinations. Despite this terrorist, revolutionary nature of the organization, its program was
fa f o e t e is : ai i g to esta lish a so e eig a d i depe de t u ited Uk ai ia state, UVO s
leaders had an ideal of UNR and ZUNR in mind – a national-democratic parliamentary system with a
capitalist economy. Initially, it was non-partisan and non-political, including members of the entire
political spectrum, from socialists to conservatives (excluding only the communists). In 1924, however,
various parties started withdrawing their members from UVO: first it was URP, then UNDO, and then the
rest. Therefore, through such attrition of these elements, it became increasingly more nationalist.156
Nevertheless, its activities were guided by pragmatic considerations driven by their goal of gaining
independence. If legal channels provided a way of recourse, they were not loath to use those channels,
as long as they felt that progress could be made.157 O e all, though, UVO s histo in the 1920s can be
summarized as a string of subversive acts, occasional captures and the resulting court trials, which
usually gained wide publicity, because such renowned attorneys as Volod “ta osol s k i, Lev
Hankevych, Stepan Shukhevych and others defended the young men from the full force of the Polish
ad i ist atio s pu ish e t. The new Nationalist movement was still in its infancy.

Parallel to UVO, other more explicitly political nationalist organizations were forming both in the
emigration and in Galicia. In 1922, a group of former officers and soldiers of UHA, interned in the camps
at Liberec and Josefov in Czechoslovakia, formed the Group of Ukrainian National Youth (Hrupa
Ukra i s ko i Natsio al o i Molodi – HUNM), which subsequently spread from Czechoslovakia to
Germany and Austria. In January of 1924, HUNM organized its first Congress, elected its Central
Executive and started publishing Natsio a a Du ka (National Thought), which from 1926 was partially
fi a ed UVO. Volod Ma t ets a d D t o A d i e s k i e e the two most prominent
ideologues and activists to emerge from this group. This group started theorizing its version of
nationalism, arguing for the Ukrainians to become more militant to their enemies, to merge their
individual egos with the ego of the collective nation. Besides this external aggressiveness, HUNM also
developed i te al ep essio a d so ial o t ol, taki g the p e ogati e to dete i e ho as a t ue
Uk ai ia pat iot a d ho as t, a ha a te isti that ould late e passed o to OUN. B ,
HUNM developed clear Nationalist positions, opposing the principle of the nation-state to the class
i te atio alis , a gui g fo the i possi ilit of thei s thesis a d ad a i g the sloga Uk ai e

155
K sh, )i o i . . Ye he Ko o alets o hakh olodsho i ge e atsi i UVO. Ye he Ko o alets
through the Eyes of the Younger Generation of UVO]. Pp.274-287 in Yuriy Boyko, ed. Ye he Ko o alets a d рis
Epoch.
Stakhiv, Ukra i s ki Parti i, 73-5; Knysh, Zinoviy. (1970). Na povni vitryla! [Sails away!] (UVO v 1924-1926).
156

Toronto: Sribna Surma, 90-1.

157
Hrytsak, Narys Istoriyi Ukrayiny, 197.

44
a o e all. I pla e of f at i idal lass slaughte , рUNM a gued fo oope atio , positi is , ealis
and patriotis . Al ead , so e diffe e es ith Do tso s thi ki g e o e e ide t, and the
aforementioned individuals later entered into passionate polemical disputes with the former.158

A d iie s k i sa the ke to i to i o ga izatio a d ot, like Do tso , i inspiration. This very

si ple, ut iti all i po ta t diffe e e, as to lie at the asis of the Natio alists i a ilit to
159
draw the publicist into their movement.

In the meantime, another nationalist group, League of Ukrainian Nationalists (LUN) emerged in Prague
in 1925, as a result of the merger of three other organizations advocating for Ukrainian statehood: the
Ukrainian National Union, headed M kola “tsi o s k i a d D t o De huk, the Union of Ukrainian
Fascists, headed by Leonid Kostariv and Petro Kozhevnykiv, and the Union for Liberation of Ukraine,
headed Yu i Kolla d. Thoughts are thoughts, and swords are swords Dumka – dumkoyu, mech-
mechem) became the League s otto. “tsi o s k i e t o to e o e of the leading ideologues of OUN,
coming up with a concept of natiocracy and writing an eponymous work of political philosophy in 1935.
Kostariv and Kozhevnykiv later turned out to be German spies and were stripped of their OUN
membership. Meanwhile, a minority faction of the League led by Kostariv, consisting mostly of
o a hists a d suppo te s of рet a “ko opads k i, a gued fo alig i g the League s p og a with
the Italia нas ist p og a . “tsi o s kyi, however, convinced the majority, mostly made up of UNR
supporters, that such efforts should be resisted, arguing for a need to establish a distinctly Ukrainian
e sio of Natio alis , ased o Uk ai e s ultu e, histo , t aditio s a d s olis . рo e e , as his
Natiocracy ould sho , “tsi o s k i thinking was influenced by such figures as Mussolini, French
integralist Barres, and Dontsov, among others, and he was not at all opposed to authoritarianism as a
principle on which the state and society should be built. In fact, it is safe to say that his ideas – and,
o se ue tl , LUN s positio s – even crossed the totalitarian line in their conception of a highly
regimented personal life, including familial and sexual, of glorification and the cult of the military, the
Ideal of the Nation, the struggle against chaos, and so on. In any case, his vision allowed him to become
the leading ideologue of LUN and unify its membership on the positions of Ukrainian nationalism.
Moreover, when in the summer of 1927 LUN and HUNM joined their efforts together in the Union of
O ga izatio s of Uk ai ia Natio alists, “tsi o s k i as also ele ted as its leade .160

The members of LUN advocated for the united front of Ukrainian political forces and acted accordingly,
remaining active in a variety of other organizations, attempting to catalyze convergence of different
political currents into one. At one point, LUN helped form the Ukrainian National-Political Union, in
which the radical-democrats, the socialist-revolutionaries, the social-democrats, HUNM, the agrarians
and the soldier organizations also took part at different points in time, but this initiative did not last due
to partisan struggles and animosities. This is why Motyl is justified in saying that this relative
superficiality, ideological imprecision and lack of a consolidated political identity presented a stark
contrast with Dontsov and his penchant for ideological purity and resolute action:

158
Motyl, op.cit., 129-32.
159
Op.cit., 133.
160
Op.cit., 133-4.

45
 Nevertheless, extreme as it was, the LUN was typical of the early Nationalists in its groping
attempts to divorce itself from its ideological heritage and develop an independent Nationalist
worldview. Unlike most of the other émigré Nationalists, however, the League made this
transition in a particularly simple- i ded a e that lea l efle ted its disdai fo thoughts
161
and infatuatio ith s o ds .

Last, but by no means the least, the illegal Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (“o uz Ukra i s ko i
Natsionalistychnoyi Molodi, o “UNM as fo ed i i L i . This o ga izatio ep ese ted the
younger generation of Nationalists, who were influenced L p s k i s statis a d e e o e so by
Do tso s Nationalism, maintaining close contacts with the latter. The base of SUNM i L i as the
Academic House, already mentioned above, which was visited frequently by Dontsov, as well as
“ta osol s k i. This group eventually produced the most prominent leaders of OUN: Stepan Bandera,
‘o a “hukhe h, “tepa Le ka s k i, “tepa Okhrymovych, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Zenon Kossak, Yulian
Vassyian, Yaroslav Starukh, Oleksa Hasyn, Volodymyr Yaniv and many others.162 “tepa Le ka s k i a d
Yulian Vassyian would emerge as the most prominent ideologues of Ukrainian nationalism, with the
latter also becoming one of the most independent and original Ukrainian social theorists and
philosophers. In 1928, a minority led by Osyp Bodnarovych, an avowed fascist, split from SUNM, turning
toward the legal electoral politics and cooperation with UNDO. The majority, led by Ivan Gabrusevych, a
fa ati al Natio alist a d the d i i g fo e ehi d “UNM s adi alizatio , fe e tl ad o ated Do tso s
ideas of exclusiveness (which Dontsov himself was unable to instill in UPNR) and unconditional rejection
of any form of cooperation with the enemy, which at this point were primarily the Polish rulers.163

Moreover, these young Nationalists were keen to admire and glorify the military leaders and fighters
from the previous generations, who had died in the struggle for Ukrai e s i depe de e – officers and
soldiers of Sich Sharpshooters, AUNR, UHA, also members of UVO – thus creating a cult of heroes.
Belie i g that o l th ough a ed st uggle ould Uk ai e s i depe de e e o , “UNM e e s
eventually developed this theory of permanent revolution as a style of politics – in effect, revolution for
its own sake, permanent involvement of wide population masses in the armed struggle – gradually
losing the sight of that for which they fought.164 This militancy was summarized by Stepa Le ka s k i i
the Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist (the title of which indicates the sacral aspect of this political
eligio that Natio alis as t a sfo i g i to , hi h i luded p i iples like Uk ai ia state o
death, do t let a o e i sult eithe ou s o ou Natio s ho o , e a t e e ge fo the deaths of
the G eat K ights, t eat the e e ies of ou Natio ith hat ed a d u o p o isi g st uggle,
among some others. Much similarity can be found between these principles and the Decalogue of UNP
itte Mikh o s k i. Late , Le ka s k i also o t i uted Cha a te isti s of the Uk ai ia
Natio alist (always prepared, idealistic, honest, obedient, enterprising and active, courageous, decisive,
hardy, equanimous, accurate, healthy, vigilant) a d ‘ules of Life, hi h, alo g ith the
programmatic, military, propagandist and educational-t ai i g p i iples o stituted the Cate his of

161
Op.cit., 137.
162
Zaytsev, op.cit., 182-4.
163
Motyl, op.cit., 141.
164
Op.cit., 141-2.

46
the Uk ai ia Natio alist, o plete ith a atio al a the , atio al a hi g so g, the ationalist
anthem and a prayer.165 This was a political religion in earnest.

Attempts to unify the Nationalist movement into one umbrella organization started in November of
1927, when the First Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists took place in Berlin. Fifteen delegates
attended, about half of which were UVO members, and the rest was equally divided among LUN, HUNM
and SUNM. The Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists (Pro id Ukra i s k kh Natsio alisti , or PUN) was
ele ted, ith Ko o alets as its leader, and Stsi o s k i, Ma t ets a d A d i e s k i as e e s.
Rozbudova Natsiyi Buildi g of the Natio as fou ded as PUN s p i ted o ga , ith Ma t ets as hief
editor. This periodical would become the primary channel through which the ideology and doctrine of
OUN was formulated, at the highest intellectual level. In April of 1928, the Second Conference of
Ukrainian Nationalists took place in Prague, with representatives of all four constitutive organizations, at
which PUN invested itself with the authority of the only representative of all nationalist organizations
and rejected any possibility of cooperation with other political forces, describing the Nationalist
Movement as being above all partisanship, representing the avant-garde of the Nation, authorized to
de ide the Natio s desti a d fate, autho ized to dete i e ho ualifies as a authe ti Uk ai ia ,
a d p o lai i g that the e t pe of Uk ai ia has e e ged. нi all , this fo ati e pe iod as
completed with the formation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) at the First Congress
of Ukrainian Nationalists held January 28 to February 3, 1929 in Vienna. There were 30 delegates, equal
number from Western and Eastern Ukraine, 12 of which were World War I veterans, and by profession
10 were engineers, 9 teachers, journalists or poets, and 3 students (the occupation of the remainder is
unknown). During this Congress, two main ideological currents emerged: that represented by Dmytro
Demchuk, veteran of AUNR, representative of LUN, who advocated for the democratic nationalism of
UN‘; a d that ep ese ted Yulia Vass ia , “tepa Le ka s k i a d “tepa Okh o ych, who
advocated for the voluntarist and idealist nationalism of Dontsov. Also at the Congress, a conflict
between the émigré circles and the Kray i les e a e e ide t: the fo e , led Ko o alets ,
proposed a vision of UVO as the revolutionary elite continuing on with its activities, and OUN as its legal
mass-based political organization spreading the ideology of Nationalism among the people, with
delegates representing this mass membership at OUN Congresses; while the latter, led by SUNM,
proposed a vision of OUN as mass-based revolutionary, terrorist organization – essentially an expanded
version of UVO. Eventually, the émigré faction prevailed, which was a terrible disappointment to the
young generation of Galicians, who had been preparing themselves for the revolutionary struggle.166

The Co g ess also ele ted a e PUN: Ko o alets as leade , “tsi o s k i, Ma t ets , Kozhe ki ,
Vass ia , A d i e s k i, De huk, Kosta i , a d the ge e al M kola Kapustia s k i as e e s. The
program of OUN was also adopted, defining Ukrainian Nationalism as a spiritual and political
movement, born of the inherent nature of the Ukrainian Nation in times of its all-encompassing struggle
fo the fou datio s a d goals of its eati e ei g. Natio as defi ed as the highest t pe of o ga i
community of persons, who, despite their psychological and social differences, share one nature, history

165
The Catechism of the Ukrainian Nationalist. HDA SBU, F.13, Spr.376, T.4, 044. Pages 2-3.
166
Motyl, op.cit., 151.

47
a d ele tless lo gi g to ealize thei po e . A so e eig Ukrainian Independent United State
Uk a i s ka “a osti a “o o a Derzhava, or USSD as posited as the t pe of politi al o ga izatio
ost adapted to the ultifa eted i te ests of the atio al life a d as the o l a fo the atio to
become a historical actor. The state as to e uilt o the fu da e tals of i tegralism of societal
forces with their rights and duties, a o di g to thei i po ta e to the e ti et of thei atio al life.
OUN as alled i to e iste e as the u leus a d the e odi e t of the Uk ai ia Natio alist
ideas, ha ged ith the p epa atory efforts toward realization of the ideal of USSD, o ga ized on the
principles of active idealism, self-dete i ed o al la a d i di idual a ti it . 167 While during the
liberation struggle, only national revolutionary dictatorship could provide the necessary powers to
a hie e statehood, o e the st uggle as o e a d a o olithi state od as esta lished, a
representative legislature would elect the Head of the State, who in turn would appoint the executive
branch of the government, to be accountable to the legislature. Administratively, the state would be
organized according to the principle of local self-government, with local representative legislature and
executive. Socioeconomically, the Ukrainian state would strive for self-sufficiency and national growth
based on cooperation among the state, the cooperatives and the private capital (corporatist capitalism,
solida is of “tsi o s k i .168

The principles of agrarian, industrial, trade, fiscal, social welfare, foreign, defense, cultural, educational
and religious policies followed, the most relevant being the concept of removal of all occupant forces
from Ukraine and consolidation of statehood through the process of national revolution. Any
cooperation with the historical enemies of the Ukrainian Nation was ruled out, but alliances with other
atio s, hostile to Uk ai e s o upa ts, e e allo ed. The ideal te ito ial e pa se of the Uk ai ia
state would include as much of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory as possible that would ensure its
economic self-sufficiency. The schooling was to be mandatory and provided by the state, while any
private or foreign-language schooling could be allowed on a case by case basis and would be controlled
by the state. Freedom of religion would be ensured, as long as it was devoid of denationalizing
tendencies. Finally, OUN vowed to oppose all those forces, foreign or domestic, which would resist
either actively or passively the implementation of all of the above and reconfirmed that it was opposed
to and would not tolerate any and all partisanship or class-based politics.169
A curious mixture of ideals and principle it was, at the very least, but generally understandable, given
the context and the history of the Ukrainian national movement up to that point, which, again, does not
justify the ideas itself. The si ila ities a d the diffe e es of this o ga ized atio alis of OUN a d
Do tso s a ti e atio alis should e uite e ide t.
For [Dontsov], simple harmonization or integration or organization was not enough to mobilize
the nation and lead it to statehood. Instead, his first priority was to find the idea that would
o ilize the atio s ill. A o se ue e of this elief, i identally, was that Dontsov, although
a Nationalist, paradoxically lacked a developed theory of the nation in the 1920s.) It is not

167 st
Resolutions of the 1 Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, HDA SBU, F.13, Spr.376, T.4, 001
168
Op.cit.; “tsi o s k i, M kola. . Natsiokratiya. [Natiocracy]. Retrieved April 10, 2013 from
http://ukrlife.org/main/evshan/natiocracy.htm
169 st
Resolutions of the 1 Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (full). HDA SBU, F.13, Spr.376, T.4, 002

48
 surprising, therefore, that Dontsov and the Nationalists found it impossible to cooperate. For
Dontsov, the problem was essentially ideological; for the Nationalists, it was essentially
170
organizational.

Due to the authoritarian nature of the ideology with an emphasis on the cult of personality, as well as to
the differences among various groups and generations, OUN was not able to stay united. Bitter
personality clashes during and after the war caused the organization to split into several different
factions, each of which, however, retained the name OUN, contributing even more to the general
wartime confusion. Although the ideologies of different OUN factions diverged and continued to evolve
during and after the war, much historical detail was lost due to the emigration of the majority of
nationalist circles, both old and new, and due to the Soviet repression of any memory or mention of
ou geois atio alis . Moreover, all of the warring sides – the Soviets, the Nazis, and all of the OUN
factions – did not hesitate to engage in propaganda and historical distortion, both during the war and
after the fact. All these issues complicate the study of OUN and its ideology and program. This should
not, of course, prevent such study and much is yet to be discovered and analyzed. What this situation
makes clear, though, is that no easy and simple conclusion can be drawn in terms of the ideology of
OUN. To answer that question, the context – which faction during which period espoused what beliefs in
principle and engaged in what practices pragmatically, and so on – must be examined carefully and
painstakingly.

Fascism?
An important question to answer is how this new nationalism relates to fascism. First of all, some
theoretical definitions are in order to avoid conceptual confusion. Therefore,
Integral nationalism – a type of authoritarian nationalism that views a nation as an organic
whole and demands unquestioning subordination of the individual to the interests of the
national collective, which are valued above the interests of any other social group, other nations
and humanity in general.

Political religion – a form of secular religion that is based on sacralization of certain ideology and
integralist political movement, rejects coexistence with other ideologies or movements, denies
individual autonomy, subordinates or opposes traditional religions.

Fascism – a form of revolutionary integral nationalism of the nation-states that proclaims its goal
to be the national rebirth through mobilization of masses and reorganization of state on the basis
of totalitarianism, hierarchy, Führerprinzip and militarism.

Totalitarianism – politics, directed toward establishing total control of one political group over
171
the life and consciousness of the entire society.

Gi e these defi itio s, it is safe to sa that oth Do tso s a ti e atio alis a d OUN s o ga ized
nationalism belong in the category of a totalitarian, politically religious integral nationalism. It cannot be

170
Motyl, op.cit., p.154
171
Zaytsev, Nationalism and Religion, 31-5.

49
identified with fascism, primarily because of the statelessness of the Ukrainian Nationalism Movement.
This is a distinction of vital importance in any context similar to the Ukrainian one. Just as the distinction
between the dominant nationalities and the oppressed nationalities became a problem for the Marxist
social-democrats and the Leninist revolutionaries, ultimately clearly showing that the idea of
international proletariat was a utopia at best and a deliberate hoax at worst – Lenin certainly used it as a
tool of manipulation, pretending to be holding out a carrot of self-determination and freedom for the
oppressed nationalities within the Russian empire, just to guarantee their allegiance to the revolution,
immediately turning around once in power and ruthlessly stomping out any national aspirations of the
subdued peoples. Similarly, this Europe-wide rise of integralism and fascism must take into account this
key distinction between the nation-states and the stateless nationalities struggling to achieve statehood.
While this should not prevent us from assessing the possible similarities between these two categories
of movements and ideologies, they must not be confused with each other.

Uk ai ia Natio alis s histo i al a d ideologi al o igi s i ight- i g Uk ai ia o se atis

point to the fact that, in spite of its ideological affinity with non-Ukrainian right-wing movements,
the Nationalist ideology was primarily (and obviously) a product of the post-war Ukrainian
intellectual and socio-political climate. The political chaos, social dislocation, intellectual self-
searching, and moral disillusionment virtually demanded that a movement considering itself a
172
negation of the existing reality arise.

The Social-Nationalist Movement

After Ukraine has gained its independence and political pluralism was restored, the nationalist political
organizations quickly reemerged in Ukraine. One of such organizations was the Social-National Party of
Ukraine (SNPU), formed in the fall of 1991 and officially registered for the first time in the fall of 1995.
As Yu i M khal h sh , o e of the leade s of “NPU a d o a e e of pa lia e t i Uk ai e f o
Svoboda, sa s i the i t odu tio to “NPU s ea l -1992) formulation of its program,

“NPU s, th ough its a ti ities a d u o p o isi g positio s, had laid the foundations of the
st
ideological face, the external style and the street-power drive of the 21 -century Ukrainian
nationalism. The ideological doctrine of SNPU, defined as social-nationalism, remains the most
promising way of climbing out of the abyss into which Ukraine was led by the liberal extremists
173
(sic!) and overt agents of foreign influence.

Immediately, the similarities between SNPU and the 20th century nationalism of Dontsov and OUN are
e ide t: the pseudo eligious heto i s of sal atio ; the la i g of li e alis a d fo eig i flue e the
politi s of Puti s K e li , fi st a d fo e ost fo the Uk ai ia people s e o o i , politi al a d ultu al
ha dship; the glo ifi atio of the ph si al st uggle i the st eets, the u o p o isi g atu e of
nationalism. The actual early SNPU program includes 31 items, among which the emphasis is placed on
the e state, the e so iet a d the e o ld, to hi h hu a it is looki g fo a d o the

172
Motyl, op.cit., 172
173
Program of the Social-National Party of Ukraine. Retrieved April 10, 2013 at http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-
natsionalizm/prohrama-sotsial-natsionalnoyi-partiyi-ukrayiny.html

50
 usp of the thi d ille iu a d hi h ust e e ge f o the geopoliti al e te of йu asia – from
G eat Uk ai e hi h epla es the outdated otto of I depe de t Uk ai e . Mo eo e , the
ideology of social-nationalism is said to be based in the nation and its welfare, as well as an honorable
and dignified individual that cultivates the spirit of the struggle and lives according to the principles of
justice, and not notions of good and evil. Patriotism, religiousness, sports and esthetics are the
cornerstones of social-nationalist education and worldview. SNPU rejects the possibility of entering into
electoral blocks with any other parties, relying on the strength of its ideas to increase its membership
and influence. SNPU considers the Russian state, traditionally despotic and dogmatic, to be the cause of
all misfortunes in Ukraine. Russians do not represent a fully formed nation, in contrast with Ukrainians,
e ause the a e este ea s Ug o-Finnic tribes of Urals and Siberia of the nomadic Mongoloid descent
and hence national nihilism is very characteristic to them. The struggle against the influence of Moscow
and the pro-Moscow sentiments is one of the priorities of SNPU. Other political forces are treated as
atio al- olla o a ts, the t aito s of the Uk ai ia e olutio , o as atio al- o a ti s, this ste ile
losso of the atio al e olutio , u a le to p odu e a thi g e o d so e e pt e olutio a
turn of the phrase. Clearly, this raw and immature rhetoric, driven by inexperience and marginal
character of SNPU, cannot and was not taken seriously. On September 9th of 1995, SNPU finally
registered its official Program for the Protection of Ukrainians with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.
This program, with amendments and additions, has remained the official program of SNPU and after
2004 of Svoboda.174 Some of the more radical and immature rhetoric has been removed, of course, as
the party leaders realized that they could not remain marginal and extremist in their words and actions,
if they wanted to gain enough support and become sufficiently popular to be considered a viable
competitor for state power in the Ukrainian electoral system.

Nevertheless, even in this later version of the program, we find such notions as criminal responsibility
fo Uk ai opho ia, hi h is ot defi ed although the te is ot de oid of ea i g a d a e used
to describe the phenomenon of harboring feelings of hatred toward Ukrainians, of their discrimination
and denigration, of denying the very existence of Ukrainians as a nation and a people, or of the
Ukrainian ethnocultural space as such.175 ; the p oposal to etu the atego of atio alit to
Ukrainian identification documents, such as passports and birth certificates, as well as the proposal to
make it mandatory for the candidates vying for elected positions to list their nationality and their prior
employment history, dating back as far as the Soviet times; the proposal to establish a presidential
republican system, with centralized executive powers of the Head of State, Head of Government and
Commander-in-Chief of the ilita ; the p oposal to allo all e tall health itize s that ha e e e
been o i ted of a i e to a fi ea s a d old eapo k i es, lades, et . ; the p oposal to
atio alize those p i ate e te p ises that do ot fulfill thei o ligatio s to so iet , to i esto s, o
othe ise, ithout a fu the defi itio . Pa ti ular attention should be paid to Section 3, The health

Program of VO “ o oda Progra for the Prote tio of Ukrainians). Retrieved April 10, 2013 at
174

http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/prohrama/
175 th
However, Muzychko, Oleksandr. (2013). Evil beside and inside. Day, April 4 . Retrieved on April 4, 2013 from
http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/podrobici/zlo-poryad-i-vseredini

51
of the nation: Overcoming the demographic crisis and raising the standard of living, which include the
proposal of the free universal healthcare, covering emergency and first aid services; the program
‘ep odu ti e health of the atio , outla i g a o tio , e ept i ases of edi al e essit a d fa ts
of ape, p o ed i ou t, a d e uati g illegal a o tio s to atte pted u de ; the politi s of e o o i
protectionism with regard to domestic pharmaceutical and medical device industries; establish criminal
espo si ilit fo p opaga da of a ko a ia d ug addi tio , i ludi g so alled light a oti s a d
se ual de iatio s ho ose ualit , o ho ose ualis , as the te is ost f e ue tl used i Ukraine,
is the primary target of this particular proposal, being equated to pedophilia and other practices). In
Section 4, Citizenship and migration: The right to Fatherland and protection of the living space,
citizenship is defined both on the basis of jus sangra and of jus soli, to those born in Ukraine or tho
ethnic Ukrainians from abroad, and strongly anti-immigrant proposals are advanced, including
p ohi iti g adoptio of Uk ai ia hild e fo eig e s, the ost st i ge t a ti-i ig a t easu es
and i p o e e t of the s ste of dete tio a d depo tatio of illegal alie s.

Section 6, Historical Justice: Continuity of state building and overcoming the legacies of occupation,
p oposes to i di ate i the Co stitutio of Uk ai e that toda s Uk ai ia State is a result of the 300-
year-long national liberation struggle of the Ukrainians and is a legal descendant of the states of Kyivan
‘us , Gali ia -Vol ia Ki gdo , the Cossa k ‘epu li of the рet a ate pe iod, the Uk ai ia People s
Republic (UNR), the Western-Uk ai ia People s ‘epu li )UN‘ , the Ca pathia Uk ai e, a d the
Ukrainian State, renewed on June 30, 1941 by OUN-Bandera movement. In addition, the program
demands that the fact of occupation of Ukraine by the Bolshevik Russia in 1918-1991 is recognized, as
well as the genocide – Holodomor – that esulted f o it; se e e i i al espo si ilit fo de i g
that Holodomor was a genocide of the Ukrainian nation must be instituted; those Ukrainians that
experience the brunt of repression, as well as the descendants thereof, must be compensated
proportionally to their suffering; Moscow must officially recognize, apologize and compensate for the
genocide of Ukrainians; OUN and UPA must be recognized as national liberation fighters for the
Ukrainian statehood and be given appropriate privileges and compensations for the years of being
ig o ed si e Uk ai e s i depe de e as esta lished i . I te s of fo eig poli se tio ,
йu opea Uk ai o e t is is dete i ed as the st ategi ou se of the Ukrainian State, according to
hi h Uk ai e is seeki g to e o e ot o l the geog aphi al, ut also the geopoliti al e te of
йu ope; Uk ai e s u lea status should e eesta lished; Uk ai e s o ilita -industrial complex
should be established, with integrated scientific research institutions; the autonomous status of the
Crimean Republic should be downgraded to the regional status of oblast a d “e astopol should e
stripped of its special status as the base of the Black Sea Navy, including the Russian military bases; the
Ap il Kha ki a o ds of Ya uko h a d Med ede , e te di g the deadli e fo ‘ussia s e o al of
its fleet f o “e astopol , should e epealed. нi all , if e tu to the pa t s o stitutio , also a lega
from the one registered in 1995 by SNPU, states that Svoboda s goal is to o ti ue uildi g
i depe de t Uk ai ia U ited “tate o the asis of so ial a d atio al justi e a d ha o ious
i te a tio of the i te ests of so iet a d the state, a d help eate the st u tu es of i il so iet a d
the state of rights (Rechtsstaat) based o popula ule, plu alis a d the ule of la . 176

“tatut VO “ o oda a ti e . Retrieved on April 10, 2013 from http://www.svoboda.org.ua/pro_partiyu/statut/

176

52
Similarly to the 1929 program of OUN, this represents a curious and idiosyncratic mix of principles and
postulates. Many of them, taken in isolation, may not be a matter of concern, as similar postulates and
principles could probably be found in various perfectly legitimate and generally acceptable party
programs across the spectrum of liberal-democratic regimes. The usual and familiar right-wing rhetoric
of the decline of traditional family values and structures, of denationalization, of exploitation by the
foreign global interests is employed and combined with the populist rhetoric to appeal to as wide an
electoral base as possible. This moderation in rhetoric has certainly contributed to Svoboda s a ilit to
gain a wider electoral base and to finally overcome the 5% electoral barrier. So, perhaps all of this
rhetoric is just so much juvenile maximalism and misguided bombast, behind which age-old political
opportunism is hiding? Perhaps Svoboda will be chastened by the experience of participation as a player
within a political system and eventually transform into a perfectly acceptable mainstream rightist or
even right-center party? Prognostication is a thankless occupation, vascillating between the poles of
fortune-telling and solid analysis, but there are signs that carelessly brushing off concerns about the
authoritarian and xenophobic elements of Svoboda s ideolog a d p a ti e is ot a ise ta ti .

Prior to entering the national parliament, Svoboda was able to win a number of parliamentary seats, as
ell as a o al a d othe e e uti e offi es i the lo al pa lia e ts a d ad i ist atio s of L i ,
Ternopil a d I a o-н a ki s k egio s. This e pe ie e has p o ided so e e p i ial asis o hi h the
party can be assessed. And the results are not favorable to the party – there are few results. For the
ost pa t, it s ee usi ess as usual, hi h ea s o ruption, nepotism, lack of transparency, only
practiced by a different political clique, which hides behind the nationalist slogans, the embroidered
shirts and the florid populist rhetoric. Recently, a string of stories about some shady business deals and
financial interests, secret properties of the various party members, the excesses of the party members,
occupying positions of power, and their relatives have started to emerge in the media. This signals the
possibility that Svoboda may be no different in its nature as a political power (although different in the
scale and degree of transgressions) than the criminal Party of the Regions. In that sense, it would mean
that Svoboda is just another piece of the neo-Soviet political puzzle represented by the Yanukovych
egi e. I fa t, the e s ee u h dis ussio i the Uk ai ia edia a out the pa t leade Oleh
Tiahnybok and other prominent representatives from Svoboda having disproportionately frequent
access to media outlets, particularly as guests of the live political talk shows that air weekly on Friday.
Since practically all of the major TV channels are controlled by various oligarchs, there is reason to
suspect that this is deliberate. Two possibilities seem to emerge: either the Yanukovych regime and its
supporters among the oligarchs are using the unwitting Svoboda political hacks, along with their rhetoric
and radicalism to create the image of some crazy neo-Nazi Western Ukrainian nationalists that want to
overtake the country and impose their xenophobic totalitarian regime on everyone else; or Svoboda is a
conscious participant in this political theater of the absurd, which is arguably worse, because that would
mean that they are a purely political-te h ologi al o ga izatio desig ed to ha el people s
frustrations and help prevent the possibility of a authentically revolutionary situation from developing.

I will let the numbers speak for themselves: in the first 5 months of 2011, the representatives of
Svoboda e e i ited out of ti es to Big Politi s, a talk sho hosted Ye he K sielio , a
former Russian journalist who moved to Ukraine. This means they were on air on more than half of

53
a aila le o asio s: ti es it as Tia ok s deput A d i Mokh k, t i e ea h A d i Illie ko, Iho
Mirosh he ko a d the odious MP of L i Cit Cou il Yu i M khal h sh , ho e a e i fa ous
fo his state e ts ith ega d to the Ba de ite a , p o isi g to th o the lue-butted gang out of
Uk ai e, efe i g to the Pa t of the ‘egio s, the pa t colors of which are blue and white.177 The
frequency of visits at another talk show hosted by Savik Shuster, another former Russian journalist, also
raises questions. Representatives of Svoboda were invited to 10 airings, which is exactly one half of the
20 a aila le oppo tu ities. A d i Illie ko a d Yu i M khal h sh e e i ited ti es ea h, hile
Tiahnybok attended twice. Combining both talk shows, Svoboda members were present at 21 out of 39
airings – or 54% of the time. The question then becomes why the representatives of a party that up until
that time had been marginal at best, got so much attention from a channel, the owner of which at the
ti e as the Di e to of “e u it “e i es Kho oshko s k i, ho si e the left “BU a d the state-
owned channel, fully controlled by the government.

This aises suspi io s that the edito ial poli of Big Politi s a e i flue ed the ‘ussia politi al
technologist Ihor Shuvalov, who works at the Presidential Administration. This free access to TV
broadcast ti e is desig ed to ai tai the spe t e of the Ba de ite e a e, so that the ele to al ase
of President Yanukovych continues to support him despite his corruption, nepotism and inflation in the
economy. Similar tactics were used in 2004, when Shuvalo a a ged fo Tiah ok s e opho i , a ti-
Russian and anti-Semitic speech on top of the mount Yavoryna to be recorded by TV channel Inter and
later repeatedly to be used in the PR war against Yushchenko. After that speech, Tiahnybok was stripped
of his membership in Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) parliamentary faction, marking the time that
Svoboda effectively started its career as an independent political force after it had changed the name
from SNPU.178 Such tactics help influence the priorities of the voters in Eastern Ukraine, who tend to
have the irrational fear of the nationalists, largely due to decades of Soviet and now neo-Soviet
propaganda and misinformation. In these circumstances, the existential threat of a xenophobic neo-Nazi
overpowers any personal issues related to the poor living standards that are caused by the rent-seeking
and corrupt bureaucrats and politicians.

The recent history of the Ukrainian political process, as well as the geopolitics in the region includes such
disappointments (however inevitable they might have been) as the failure of the chaotic post-Orange
Revolution regime of President Yushchenko, with its petty internecine bickering, its dithering in most
policy areas, its continued nepotism and corruption, its failure to deliver on electoral promises, and its
quite primitive instrumentalization of the memory politics with regard to the veterans of UPA, the
Holodomor, and such figures as Bandera and Shukhevych. And subsequent revanchism of the neo-
Soviet, semi-authoritarian kleptocratic regime of President Yanukovych, in response to whose electoral
falsifications the Orange Revolution had protested in the first place, has exacerbated the popular
discontent. As a result of these shortcomings, the populace in Ukraine is already disillusioned with the
democratic values, without ever having tasted the flavor of authentic democratic process.

177
Shcherbyna, Serhiy. (2011). Politi al talk sho s. рo do the do it? Ukra i s ka Pra da, Tuesday,
June 7th. Retrieved on April 10, 2013 from http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2011/06/7/6275793/
178
Op.cit.

54
 Big
Mai figure – Кількі ть
Politi s VO “ o oda Го ті "Шу те Li e"
a prominent politician появ
Airings
Iryna Akimova,
Jan 21 Yu i M khal h sh олод Ол к 15
Serhiy Tihipko
Jan 28 Mykola Azarov Ihor Miroshnichenko кол К те ук 10
Dmytro Tabachnik vs.
Feb 4 І о о ло ьк 9
Viacheslav Kyrylenko
Feb 11 M kha lo Yezhel Andriy Mokhnyk ле т л е ко 9
Feb 18 Anatoliy Mohyliov Andriy Illienko Оле ь До 8
Iryna Akimova vs. Nataliya
Feb 25 Се Со олє 7
Ko ole s ka
Mar 4 Oleksandr Popov Iryna Farion е е к 6
Mar 11 Mykola Azarov Andriy Mokhnyk тол е ко 6
Mar 18 Yuliya Tymoshenko Ihor Miroshnichenko о е ко 6
Mar 25 Serhiy Tihipko ло од ьк 5
Kostiantyn Hryshchenko,
Apr 1 Оле о д е ко 5
Yuriy Boyko
Apr 8 Studio discussion ло Че ето 4
Olena Lukash, Renat
Apr 15 л д л Лук' о 3
Kuz i
Kostiantyn Hryshchenko vs.
Apr 22
Serhiy Soboliev
Apr 29 Yuriy Boyko Yu i M khal h sh
May 13 Anatoliy Mohyliov Andriy Illienko

May 20 Studio discussion

May 27 Viktor Pshonka Andriy Mokhnyk

June 3 Serhiy Tihipko Sviatoslav Khanenko

Moreover, the Ukrainian population generally has a tendency to be conservative and patriarchal, a
propensity that is reinforced by the anti-leftist knee-jerk reflex conditioned by the Soviet experience.
The de o ati a d li e al ideas of the old atio alists of UN‘ ha e ee tho oughl fo gotte , a d
now the current political milieu contributes to their remaining forgotten, because the environment is
much riper for the radical rhetoric of the nationalist right-wingers. It has become increasingly easy to sell
the radical rhetoric of national salvation and Messianism, as well as to point to the decline of the West,
agai la i g it o this spe t eof li e alis , o , as these adi al atio alists like to sa , Li e ast
dege e ates. As M khal h sh ites,

55
 Tolerance that cannot protect its truth is elementary cowardice. That is why those who in a state
of permanent war of extermination against the Ukrainians sing odes and spread propaganda of
tolerance, are considered to be nothing but excrement by social-nationalists. Social nationalism
teaches us that when the enemy engages in genocide toward the Ukrainians, the Ukrainians
must meet the enemy with lead, bayonets and scolding iron, rather than conduct round table
179
discussions or seek consensus.

Oleh Tiahnybok, I a нa io , Yu i M khal h sh , A d i Illie ko, Oleksa d “ h Deput Chai a

of Svoboda for Ideology) – all of these leading figures within Svoboda, who currently serve as MPs,
explicitly refer in their speeches and writings to the theorists of illiberal, anti-democratic, xenophobic
variety of the 20th e tu atio alis . Tiah ok ites of Do tso as ot just a pe so , ut a e ti e
epo h 180
a d a out the ill of the atio agai st the a it a ule of the oliga hi la s 181 Farion
ites a out Do tso s spi itual a d o al a i s, 182 Illienko writes about social-nationalism and the
idea of t o si ulta eous e olutio s, so ial a d atio al, of hi h Ya osla “tets ko, OUN-B leader,
wrote at one time,183 “ h ites a out “tsi o s k i notion of natiocracy, the esse e of hi h is full
authority (povnovladdia of a atio i its eth i te ito ies, being the political idea of nationalism.184
нi all , M khal h sh ites a out the a io s of so ial-nationalism:

Nation is the highest form of social unity, a community of blood and spirit, created within the
borders of a clearly defined ethnic territory by a wave of historical energy, directed into the
future. The Nation must live eternally, so the struggle for the right to eternal life is the meaning
of existence of all normal people on this planet. Only cosmopolitans and grant consumers, which
became totally arrogant due to indolence and idiocy, can deny this fact. While the Nation lives –
death does not exist. The Nation and the state as categories ideally relate to each other as
185
content and form.

The e t se te e is pe haps the ost i te esti g: “o ial-nationalism advocates the socialist (emphasis
mine – BP odel of e o o i justi e, atio a i state uildi g a d a tiglo alis i fo eig poli .
He then goes on to explain the three building blocks of social-nationalism. Socialism means that political
is above the economic; that industry and land should be nationalized, while means of production –
socialized; that society should plan the economic development, not capital; that workers should

179
M hal h sh , Yu i . . The O ie ti g Milesto es of the Cultu al “t uggle of “o ial Natio alis . Vatra
(National-Revolutionary Periodical), June 18. Retrieved 4/17/13 from http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-
natsionalizm/oriyentyry-kulturnoyi-borotby-sotsial-natsionalizmu.html
180
Tiah ok, Oleh. . D t o Do tso – not just a person – a e ti e epo h. Offi ial e site of VO
“ o oda , August . ‘et ie ed / / f o http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/analityka/023570/
181
Tiah ok, Oleh. . The ill of the atio agai st the a it a ule of the la s. Offi ial VO “ o oda
website, Oct 15. Retrieved 4/17/13 from http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/zmi/012389/
182
нa io , I a. . “pi itual-moral maxims of XVI-XVII e tu ies f o D t o Do tso . Offi ial Svoboda
website of Iryna Farion. Retrieved 4/17/13 from http://www.farion.info/dopysy/statti/00001704/
183
Andriy Illienko. . Social-Nationalism and Revolution. Ukrayinska Pravda, March 2. Retrieved on 4/17/13
from http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2011/03/2/5976089/
184
“ h, Oleksa d . . Natio a – the politi al ideal of atio alis . Offi ial VO “ o oda e site, Ma h
17. Retrieved 4/17/13 from http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dopysy/dopysy/010221/
185
M khal h sh , Yu i . . A io s of “o ial-Natio alis . Vatra (National-Revolutionary Periodical),
March 15. Retrieved 4/17/13 from http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-natsionalizm/aksiomy-sotsial-natsionalizmu.html

56
participate in the redistribution of income as co-owners of the national wealth; that a community should
strive towards autarky, or economic self-sufficiency. Natiocracy means a political regime, where the
titular nation is represented in the institutions and the classless society enjoys direct rule, without any
ediatio f o the so- alled politi al elite , as a esult of e olutio a eati it , ot of u eau ati
state uildi g. The ights of the titula atio to ha o ious u i e sal ep ese tatio i the o te t of
formation of political institutions take precedence to the dogmas of the inte atio al hu a ights
sta da ds. The lassless so iet is a so iet ithout lass st uggle o pa asiti g oups a d ith
harmonious productive relations among all socially useful layers of population. Antiglobalism means a
strategy of resistance and survival of those national communities that are able to defend themselves
throughout the world, based on rejection of antihuman by essence and antinational (antynarodna) by
form phenomenon of globalization.

Globalization is a merciless war of the rich against the poor, the exploiters against the exploited,
the cosmopolitans against the nationalists, the parasites against the workers. The main exploiter
today is big transnational capital, which is cosmopolitan both phenomenologically and
anthropologically. … In other words, a total and permanent national, class and racial war is being
waged against the Ukrainians, the aim of which is elimination: our liquidation as a community of
186
blood and spirit, as a social type of warrior-worker and as anthropological species.

Positive values of social-nationalism Negative values

Freedom Authority Devotion Antibourgeois

Totality Discipline Passionarianism Anticapitalist
Force Fraternity Equality Antiglobalist
Loyalty Faith Nonconformism Antidemocratism
Justice Sacrifice Hatred Antiliberalism
Hierarchy Pride Passion Antibureaucratism
Order Messianism Desire of the Antidogmatism
impossible

It is absurd to apply the universal ethical principles in conflict with the carriers of a hostile culture and
ideology. Any ethical system has a clearly expressed social and national charcter. Ethics of the Ukrainian
social-nationalism considers life, health and well-being of the Ukrainian workers to be the highest moral
values, and considers those who threaten the historical subjectivity of our nation to be a malignant
biomass. The categorical moral and ethical imperative of nationally and socially capable Ukrainians is
defense of the values enumerated above in a revolutionary way.

Therefore, revolutionary social- atio alists ust ot ait fo the leade , but cultivate
aggressive leadership characteristics in oneself and those around him, thus resisting the system
that has turned the people into plankton and simultaneously preparing cadres form the
inevitable and successful revolutionary struggle for freedom. Vozhdyzm (Supreme Leader

186
Op.cit.

57
 principle), activism, optimism, dedication and discipline – these are the most needed elements in
187
the formation of the new type of Ukrainian personality.

Unity of style, will, idea and logic will ensure the success of the revolution. Style is the external
manifestation of the internal essence of a political phenomenon. Social-nationalism is distinguished
stylistically by its heroic realism and by the affirmation of a heroic personality in an anti-heroic
consumerist world. Will is a source of the internal vector of discipline and concentration of effort on
reaching the goal. The will of social-nationalism is the will of the national community and its young
avant-garde to power for the sake of renewal and eternal life of the nation. Idea is a higher form of
spiritual being. The idea of social-nationalism is the Idea of the Nation – the total and universal
domination of the community of Spirit and Blood. Logic is a collection of imperative laws and methods
of knowing the world. The Logic of social nationalism is the logic of permanent social, national, class and
cultural liberation struggle for survival of the person and the nation in an antihuman and antinational
environment. In other words, social-nationalism is based on the heroic worldview, the voluntarist
struggle for the conquest of the surrounding world, the idealist competition of the spirit against
antimatter and the rejection of the kingdom of darkness.188

In practice, the spiritual beauty of a person often depends directly on how many kilograms that
pe so a e h p ess o ho good is that pe so s ight pu h. … We eed to i p o e
ou sel es… to e o th of the highest alli g of the e olutio a st uggle… to sho the
a e age Uk ai ia s, f ighte ed the s ste , a ea o to follo … to protect the world and the
Ukrainian culture from the global swinishness. Including with brutal physical force, if the
189
situation calls for it.

Impressively militant, one must say. Perhaps it is the distance in time, but the ideology of the 20th
century Nationalists does not seem as aggressive and hateful as the preceding. Given the objective
conditions of that historical period in Europe, with wars raging one after another, with the very question
of phsycial, national and cultural survival under a big question mark, in the actual struggle for existence,
such extremism may be understood, if not condoned or approved. However, the objective conditions of
toda s Uk ai e a e ot ea l as ho ifi . Yes, the e a e a diffi ulties a d o sta les efo e the
Ukrainian society can become truly free and democratic, empower itself and create a strong civil society
as a counterbalance to the powers of the state, and elect the truly Ukrainian government, the goals of
which include the well-being of the people and the nation. The developed world today, however, is
much less bellicose than during the first half of the 20th century, when the imperialisms of different
European nations clashed and the oppressed nationalities struggled for self-determination. Having gone
through that struggle ourselves, the Ukrainians must understand and empathize with those who
continue to struggle today. Indeed, not only Ukrainians but all nations, especially those who knew

187
M hal h sh , The Orienting Milestones of the Cultural Struggle of Social Nationalism.
188
M khal h sh , Yu i . . A io s of “o ial-Natio alis . Vatra (National-Revolutionary Periodical),
March 15. Retrieved 4/17/13 from http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-natsionalizm/aksiomy-sotsial-natsionalizmu.html
189
M hal h sh , Yu i . . The O ie ti g Milesto es of the Cultu al “t uggle of “o ial Natio alis . Vatra
(National-Revolutionary Periodical), June 18. Retrieved 4/17/13 from http://www.vatra.cc/sotsial-
natsionalizm/oriyentyry-kulturnoyi-borotby-sotsial-natsionalizmu.html

58
oppression in their past. Such xenophobic, hostile, Hobbesian, nightmarish worldview is uncalled for and
is a dangerous, volatile thing.

Dontsov was misguided, mistaken, miseducated, immature, intolerant, and combative. He

misinterpreted the thoughts of others, glorified violence and irrationality, advocated whimsical behavior
and amorality, playing God with the fates of others, soothing oneself with thoughts about the
p eo dai ed desti a d the Messia i fate of the Natio . As a e ie of Do tso s olle tio of
essa s н o sti is to politi s i Vil a Ukra i a puts it, й e thi g that Do tso is iti g – is not
mysticism, but primitive rationalism, which he extrapolates from various writers whom he has not
digested p ope l . 190 I this o te t, it is lea that M khal h sh is the t ue dis iple of Do sto ,
he he ites that the heap pseudoi telle tual s o ish ess, alled upo to de o st ate o e s self-
i po ta e, usuall a ifests itself th ough the de o st ati e aggi g of the i telle tuals , sho i g
off thei ookish k o ledge . Afte this se te e he th o s up a list of a es that t pi all o e up
in conversations ith su h pseudoi telle tuals, si ulta eousl de ou i g a d de ig ati g the :
Derrida, Habermas, Althusser, Marcuse, Gadamer, Buber, Fromm, Foucault, Freud, Adorno, Rawls and
Nozick. Well, inability to perceive irony and a lack of self-awareness are grave deficiencies of personality,
and, it seems, are very common for the ultraradical, xenophobic and militant Nationalists.

Conclusion
I began this paper by talking about the general situation in Europe and the resurgence of right-wing
nationalist or xenophobic radical parties. So, it is fitting to end on that note as well. Very recently, an
excellent article was published in the Independent Cultural Journal Ї , which examined the electoral
success of Svoboda in the context of this general European trend of the right-wing party resurgence. It
summarizes several extremely important points, which have also occurred to me on different occasions
as I have observed the developments within Ukrainian politics in recent years.191

First of all, although it is certainly unpleasant that the notion of Ukrainian nationalism is sooner
associated with xenophobic, homophobic and even racist rhetoric and actions of Svoboda members
than with patriotism, cultural uniqueness, historical struggles for freedom and cross-cultural interethnic
and international dialogue. At the same time, as indicated at the very beginning, this is a widely-based
European phenomenon, so the situation in Ukraine is, so to speak, normal – now Ukraine also has right-
wing radicals in parliament, just as most European countries do. Indeed, Svoboda did establish ties to
the European right- i g atio alist a d adi al pa ties, fo e a ple Le Pe s Natio al н o t,192 with

o politi s. Vil a Ukra i a, 17: 76-7.

190
‘.‘. . Neithe sti is
191
Likha ho , Via hesla . . Tiah ok and all-all-all: “ o oda i the all-йu opea o te t. Independent
Cultural Journal Ї . Retrieved on April 10, 2013 from http://www.ji-
magazine.lviv.ua/anons2013/Lihachov_Tyahnibok_i_vsi.htm
192
Press-se i e of VO “ o oda . . Oleh Tiah ok et ith the P eside tial Ca didate of н a e Ma i e
Le Pe . Offi ial e site of VO “ o oda http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/020874/

59
Austrian Party of Freedom,193 and others. Svoboda has also participated as an observing member at
some of the conferences of the right-wing Alliance of European National Movements (AENM), although
it claimed to be a member, relying on the relative lack of familiarity with the European political system
in Ukraine. As it turned out, it could not have become a member, because only those countries that are
EU members can send their representatives to the all-European parties. Nevertheless, it did establish
contacts with this clearly radical right-wing European movement. While this wave of radicalization and
anti-immigrant sentiment is not something to be taken lightly, Europe has seen worse, and the interwar
period of the 20th e tu e tai l ualifies as o e of those o se pe iods. At that ti e, a po e ful
surge of integralist, fascist regimes swept throughout Europe and the support for these movements was
much more pronounced and massive. Therefore, there seems to be no need for excessive worry in this
regard.

At the same time, there are significant differences between the general European context and Ukraine,
as there always have been – during the development of the populist and socialist movement in late 19th
century, during the period of Revolution of 1917-1921 and during the interwar period and World War II
with regard to the Nationalist movement. As with OUN, there is no single voice that reflects Svoboda s
ideology. On one hand, in recent years it has seemingly distanced itself from its former allies in the
social-nationalist movement, similarly to how most European parties participating in elelctoral politics
stay away from the radical and overtly racist and xenophobic extremists. For example, a paramilitary
social- atio alist o ga izatio Pat iot of Uk ai e, fo e l a lose asso iate of “NPU, eleased a
announcement on December 17, 2007, in which it publicly severed its ties with Svoboda: The
o ga izatio Pat iot of Uk ai e as eated a d has a ted as a o ata t a a t-garde of Ukrainian
social-nationalism. We no longer desire to associate ourselves in any way with this liberal-virtual project
of the “ ste that is a ed VO “ o oda . The a ou e e t a used Svoboda of e o i g a safe
light i g od fo the atio alist se ti e ts of the Uk ai ia s, t a sfe i g these se ti e ts o to the
problems that are secondary to national existe e, e o i g a o pletel safe st u tu e fo the
cosmopolitan occupant forces. Furthermore, the announcement accused Svoboda of corruption (listing
several instances of bribery), stealing of public property (questionable privatization/sale of several state
e te p ises i L i o last , a d deg adatio of the pa t leade ship i its o alit a d idealis
(allegedly appointing a homosexual person as a member of Svoboda s politi al pa t ou il .194 On the
other hand, the materials written by the leading members of Svoboda just quoted above clearly indicate
that o lea eak has o u ed. Afte all, it is uite possi le that this se e i g of the ties as a a t
of political theater, to give Svoboda room to maneuver politically. Or it is equally possible that the
announcement was in earnest - to find out more details, further investigation is needed. In any case,
even if this divergence between Svoboda and the ultraradical social-nationalist movement has indeed
occurred, the rhetoric coming forth from the party leaders does not point to some newfound
moderation in their worldview. The most we can conclude is that Svoboda decided to try less radical and

193
Tiah ok, Oleh. . VO “ o oda Wishes “u ess to the Ca didate f o the Aust ia Pa t of н eedo i
the Ma o al йle tio s i Vie a. Offi ial e site of VO “ o oda.
http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/016969/;
194
A ou e e t of the O ga izatio Pat iot of Uk ai e a out se e i g its ties ith VO “ o oda. ‘et ie ed o
March 30 from http://patriotukr.org.ua.

60
 o e oppo tu isti ethods of gai i g po e a d this softening of their image is purely instrumental,
temporary and tactical.

Another important point is that many of the people who voted for Svoboda in the elections were
moderates and did so only out of desperation, hoping that it can counteract the Party of the Regions at
least to some extent, using similarly rough and tumble methods of primitive stand-off, demagoguery,
political theater and so on. This may mean that Svoboda might become more moderate with time, if
they want to remain in power and gai ide ele to al ase. No , that is a ig if , ut e essi e fea
mongering and overly anxious warnings from many of the liberal observers and researchers are not
entirely warranted either.

Thus, the e pe ts ould soo e ag ee that the ideolog of “ o oda lies ithi the f a e o k of
the existing European political spectrum. Ukrainian national-radicals, just as their European
counterparts, balance on the cusp between the allowed and the prohibited, resorting to indirect
hints and Esopic language, sometimes deliberately shocking the common citizen with their
radical statements and militant rhetoric, and sometimes – putting on the mask of respectability
195
and in such a way gaining the support of a substantial percentage of the voters.

True, it is necessa to keep at h a d iti ize the i ade ua ies of “ o oda s a tio a d spee h, ut
adding tension to the already highly charged situation might not the best tactic. This is especially critical
ith ega d to usi g su h te s as fas ist , si e i the post-Soviet space that term carries a somewhat
different connotation then in the Western nations, because of how the term was used and manipulated
by the KGB and the Soviet propaganda. The forces in the employ of Kremlin often cover up their efforts
to subve t the politi al a d ultu al p o ess i the i depe de t Uk ai e ith a tifas ist sloga s,
knowing that this can strike an emotional cord, particularly among the populations in Eastern and
Southern Ukraine. In addition, many Ukrainians tend to overestimate the influence from Moscow and
sp ead ala ist o pa a oid o spi a theo ies, aki to Do so s th-making with regard to the
G eat De il, the Mos o poiso , a d so o . While it is e tai l eas to u de sta d h the
Ukrainian people are susceptible to such speculations and distrust toward their northern neighbors,
such irrational fear is easily manipulable. Moreover, the weakness of the civil society, the still persistent
atomization and lack of social capital (engendered by the fact that, as the legend goes, every sixth
citizen in the Soviet Union was a secret informer for KGB, deeply damaging the ability to trust others in
general) and the underdeveloped political culture of liberalism and democratism make the
autho ita ia - o se ati e se ti ents quite widespread. The author of this paper has heard many
times, from friends, relatives, other seemingly educated and reasonable people, sentiments expressed
that Uk ai e eeds to fi d its Pi o het. This th of the possi ilit of e e ole t di tato ship, as e
were able to see, has some historical tradition in Ukrainian politics, which was influenced to various
extents both by Marxist ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat and by antiliberal, antidemocratic
ideas of the authoritarian European movements of the interwar period.

If we were to sum up everything that has been discussed so far in a few sentences, it may be said that
Svoboda lea l a ies the sta p of Do tso s a ti e atio alis , as ell as that of OUN s
195
Likhachov, Tiahnybok and all-all-all.

61
 o ga ized atio alism. However, while the original Nationalists were authentic in their beliefs and
actions, the post-Soviet politics of integral nationalism make for more of a farce, a theater of the absurd.
As o e of the autho s a uai ta es o e ted, it is o pletel silly to claim to be descendants of
OUN and UPA, because those organizations were children of their times – they were created with the
express purpose of gaining statehood and liberating the nation from the oppression of occupying foreign
powers. It is possible to have a debate about the effectiveness or need of such radicalism and
revolutionary ethos in such situation as the one that Ukraine found itself in during the first half of the
20th century, bot one thing is clear: now that Ukraine is an independent state, there is even less need for
such radicalism.

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