I. Filing Fees i) When the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated ………..………….

Rule 141, Sections 1, 2 , 3, 4, 7, 8 and 19 5,000.00

LEGAL FEES
2. For filing a petition for review from a decision of the Regional Trial Court or of the
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. – Upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an Central Board of Assessment Appeals or a special civil action with the CTA or an appeal from a
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full. chan robles virtual law library decision of a CTA Division to the CTA En Banc – THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS

Sec. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief (c) For the performance of marriage ceremony, including issuance of certificate of marriage – THREE
different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS
fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall
assess and collect the corresponding fees. (d) For the certified copies of any record, judgment or entry thereof for each page – ten (P10.00)
pesos AND for ANY certification – one hundred (P100.00) pesos.
Sec. 3. Persons authorized to collect legal fees. – Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the
officers and persons hereinafter mentioned, together with their assistants and deputies, may demand, (e) For every search fee of archived cases or those above a year’s standing and reading the same –
receive, and take the several fees hereinafter mentioned and allowed for any business by them ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS
respectively done by virtue of their several offices, and no more. All fees so collected shall be forthwith
remitted to the Supreme Court. The persons herein authorized to collect legal fees shall be accountable (f) For filing a motion for special raffle – FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS
officers and shall be required to post bond in such amount as prescribed by the law.
(g) For filing a motion for extension to file a pleading when allowed by the rules – THREE HUNDRED
Sec. 4. Clerks of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax (P300.00) PESOS
Appeals.
(h) For filing a motion for postponement – FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS chan robles virtual law
(a) For filing an action or proceeding with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan, library
for each action or proceeding including a petition or motion for intervention – P3,000.00 chan robles
virtual law library (i) For filing a motion or asking in the prayer of the pleading the issuance of provisional remedies
under Rules 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61 like Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), writ of preliminary
(b) For filing an action or proceeding with the Court of Tax Appeals injunction and others – ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS

1. For filing an action or proceeding, including petition for intervention, and for all (j) For personal service of writs, orders and decisions outside Metro Manila – ONE HUNDRED
services in the same, if the sum claimed or the amount of disputed tax or customs assessment, (P100.00) PESOS
inclusive of interest, penalties and surcharges, damages of whatever kind and attorney’s fees or
value of the article of property in seizure cases, is: (k) For personal remand of records to the lower courts – FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS

a) Less than P50,000.00 …………....... P 750.00 (l) For processing of travel permit – ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) pesos
b) P50,000.00 or more but
less than P200,000.00………….. 1,000.00 (m) For a commission on all money coming into his hands by these rules, order or writ of the court
c) P200,000.00 or more but and caring for the same – two (2%) per centum on all sums not exceeding forty thousand (P40,000.00)
less than P400,000.00 ……………... 1,500.00 pesos and one and a half (1 ½%) per centum on all sums in excess of forty thousand (P40,000.00)
d) P400,000.00 or more but pesos.
less than P600,000.00 ……………... 2,500.00
e) P600,000.00 or more but Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts-
less than P800,000.00 ………………... 4,000.00
f) P800,000.00 or more but a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counter-claim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money
less than P1,000,000.00 …………........ 5,000.00 claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint,
g) P1,000,000.00 or more but less than P7,500,000.00 or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES,
On the first P1,000,000.00, the fee shall be P5,000.00 and for each SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND
P1,000.00 in excess of P1,000,000.00 but not more than P7,500,000.00 …...... COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in
7.00 litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF
h) P7,500,000.00 or more THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE
On the first P7,500,000.00, the fee shall be STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL
P50,500.00 and for each P1,000.00 PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is:
in excess of P7,500,000.00 ………..….. 10.00
Provided that for assessments beyond P50 million, the filing fee for the excess shall be XXXXX
the equivalent of one-half (1/2) of one (1%) per centum

Page 1 of 136
Sec. 8. Clerks of Court of the First Level Courts. –
(a) For each civil action or proceeding where the value of the subject matter involved, or the amount
of the demand, inclusive of interests, penalties, surcharges, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs is:
XXXXX
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Indigent litigants (a) whose
gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with A FAIR MARKET
VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION of more than THREE hundred
thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant
unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and
his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor they own any real property with
the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth
of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal
liability may have been incurred. (16a)
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009 ARTICLE VIII
TESTS
SEC. 19. Combined tests. - The Chapter Legal Aid Committee or the [NCLA], as
the case may be, shall pass upon the request for legal aid by the combined
application of the means test and merit test, and the consideration of other factors
adverted to in the following sections.
SEC. 20. Means test. - The means test aims at determining whether the applicant
has no visible means of support or his income is otherwise insufficient to provide
the financial resources necessary to engage competent private counsel owing to
the demands for subsistence of his family, considering the number of his
dependents and the conditions prevailing in the locality.
The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the
Developmental Legal Aid Program such as Overseas Filipino Workers,
fishermen, farmers, women and children and other disadvantaged groups.
SEC. 21. Merit test. - The merit test seeks to ascertain whether or not the
applicant's cause of action or his defense is valid and chances of establishing the
same appear reasonable.
SEC. 22. Other factors. - The effect of the Legal Aid Service or of the failure to
render the same upon the Rule of Law, the proper administration of justice, the
public interest involved in given cases and the practice of law in the locality shall
likewise be considered.
SEC. 23. Private practice. - Care shall be taken that the Legal aid is not availed
of to the detriment of the private practice of law, or taken advantage of by anyone
for personal ends.
SEC. 24. Denial. - Legal aid may be denied to an applicant already receiving
adequate assistance from any source other than the Integrated Bar.
The "means and merit tests" appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility
for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be
improved to ensure that any exemption from the payment of legal fees that may
be granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of the various IBP
chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the poor. This will
guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this
end, the following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in
IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said
clients:
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re: Rule on the Exemption From the Payment
of Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid and of
the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of the Clients of the
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in
the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Page 2 of 136
Page 3 of 136
RULE 3
Sec. 21. Indigent party.
A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex
parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an
indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful
fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time
fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose.

Page 4 of 136
 The Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is
the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real
property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule
  141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not commit any error in
1. Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation V. Formaran, G.R. No. affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case
175914, February 10, No. 2006-0030.

2009
DOCTRINE:
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly pronounced that “[t]he
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.” Hence,
the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. In Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its previous
pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified
the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said
lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in
its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do
the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land from
respondents Tan and Obiedo.

Under these circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did
title to or possession of real property. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct
docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as
alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in their complaint the value of
the real properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for
nonpayment of the correct docket fees.

In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on
the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as
stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever
is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.

Page 5 of 136
2. Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 176339,
January 10, 2011
DOCTRINE:

What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC
acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original
complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same . The plaintiffs’ non-
payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of
the jurisdiction it already had over the case.

Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs
sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that
they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay
the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them
for it. But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due
on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

Page 6 of 136
3. Jonathan Dee v. Harvest All, et al., G.R. 224834, March 15, 2017
4. Luis Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015
5. Chua v. Executive Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, 706 SCRA 698 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not trying to evade or deny
his obligation to pay for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before
the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is incapable of
fulfilling such obligation in its entirety. Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be
allowed to pursue some of the cases, the filing fees of which he is capable of financing.
Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all
the forty (40) BP Blg. 22 cases. We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner’ request.
The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire P540,668.00 as one indivisible
obligation, when that figure was nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each count
of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the MeTC. Granting petitioner’s request would not constitute a
deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay in full the filing fees of some,
albeit not all, of the cases filed.
Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each initiatory pleading filed. In
criminal actions, these pleadings refer to the information filed in court.
In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before
the MeTC. And each of the forty (40) was, in fact, assessed its filing fees, individually, based on the
amount of check one covers. Under the rules of criminal procedure, the filing of the forty (40) counts
is equivalent to the filing of forty (40) different informations, as each count represents an
independent violation of BP Blg. 22.
That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated from a single complaint filed
in the OCP is irrelevant. The fact remains that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg.
22 that were filed before the MeTC and, as a consequence, forty (40) individual filing fees to be paid.
Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any difference. Consolidation
unifies criminal cases involving related offenses only for purposes of trial. Consolidation does not
transform the filing fees due for each case consolidated into one indivisible fee.
6. Fedman Development Corporation v. Agcaoili, G.R. 165025, August 31, 2011
7. IN RE: EXEMPTION OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF
FILING/ DOCKET FEES, [ A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010 ]
DOCTRINE:
The subject letter of NPC for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees and court
fees. Section 22 of
Rule 141 reads:
Sec. 22. Government exempt. — The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local
government units and government-owned or controlled corporations with or
without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on privatization of
NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC “shall remain as a national government-owned and -
controlled corporation.”
Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees.
The non-exemption of NPC is further fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No.
08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, stressed that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to
promulgate these rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive.
With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear that NPC can no longer invoke
Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as its basis
for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
Page 7 of 136
8. Unicapital v. Consing, 705 SCRA 511 (2013)
DOCTRINE:
Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of
the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the
fees are paid within a reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the
stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester
Development Corporation v. CA should be applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence
of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay the correct
amount of filing fees.
As pronounced in the case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor:
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement,
even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was
no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
9. Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nacional de Paris, G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005
DOCTRINE:
FILING FEES ARE INCLUSIVE OF INTEREST, DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES, AND
COSTS
The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration “the
total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in litigation.”
APPLICATION OF EXCHANGE RATE
Respecting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the clerk of court did not err when he applied the
exchange rate of US $1 = P43.00 “[i]n the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which
said court functionary was duty bound to follow,[hence,] the rate he applied is presumptively correct,”
the same does not lie.
The presumption of regularity of the clerk of court’s application of the exchange rate is not
conclusive. It is disputable. As such, the presumption may be overturned by the requisite
rebutting evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners have adequately proven with documentary
evidence that the exchange rate when the complaint was filed on September 7, 1998 was US $1 =
P43.21. In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
MERELY RELIED ON ASSESSMENT MADE BY CLERK OF COURT
The ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court
held that in the former there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay
the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide
by paying the additional fees as required.
In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court
which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the
responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing
which the complaint merits dismissal.
INTEREST ACCRUING UNTIL FILING OF COMPLAINT
Parenthetically, in the complaint, respondent prayed for “accrued interest subsequent to August 15,
1998 until fully paid.” The complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondent’s claim
includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding to its claim for interest from
August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed, this
is required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, which was the rule
applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands, respondent cannot claim the
interest from August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless respondent is allowed by
motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of
interest petitioners owe from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 1998 and pay the corresponding
docket fee therefor.
INTEREST ACCRUING AFTER FILING THE COMPLAINT
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same can only be
determined after a final judgment has been handed down. Respondent cannot thus be made to
pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94,
respondent should be made to pay additional fees which shall constitute a lien in the event
the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to interest accruing after the filing of the complaint.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding
awards of claims not specified in the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Page 8 of 136
10. Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying
Filing and Docket Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009 11. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption form legal and filing fees of the Good
DOCTRINE: Shepherd Foundation,
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal
assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC
nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the DOCTRINE:
NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good
from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in Shepherd Foundation,
court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced
and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock. Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the
foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption
from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, thus:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules of Court on indigent litigants indicate
that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant . The Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and
possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity
with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be
accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment.

Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer.

Extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and
underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation
requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of
the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-
consuming and wasteful for the courts.

Page 9 of 136
 II. Jurisdiction
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129
Republic Act 7691
Circular No. 21-99: MTC jurisdictional amount
1991 Rules on Summary Procedure as amended
Rules on Small Claims

1. City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA, G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014

There are several aspects of jurisdiction.143 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is “the power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.”144 It is
conferred by law, which may either be the Constitution or a statute.145 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter means “the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.”146 Thus, the
cause of action and character of the relief sought as alleged in the complaint are examined to
determine whether a court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.147 Any decision rendered
by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is void.
Another aspect of jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the person. It is “the power of [a] court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other
rulings rendered in the action.”149 A court automatically acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the plaintiff upon the filing of the initiatory pleading.150 With respect to the defendant,
voluntary appearance in court or a valid service of summons vests the court with jurisdiction
over the defendant’s person.151 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is indispensable
in actions in personam or those actions based on a party’s personal liability.152 The
proceedings in an action in personam are void if the court had no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
Jurisdiction over the res or the thing under litigation is acquired either “by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a result
of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective.”154 Jurisdiction over the res is necessary in actions in rem or those actions “directed
against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as
against the whole world.”155 The proceedings in an action in rem are void if the court had no
jurisdiction over the thing under litigation.
Jurisdiction v Venue:
jurisdiction is “the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong.”170 Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law;
venue is “the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought.”175 In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law.
Rule 45 v Rule 65 See Notes

Page 10 of 136
2. Bernabe L. Navida, et al. v. Hon. Teodoro A. Dizon et al., G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011
*JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW NOT BY
1. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER
a. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
b. Jurisdiction; Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than
by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
2. JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
a. Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the allegations of the complaint,
3. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
a. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by
his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons.
4. JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
a. Jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is authority to
decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly,
where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the
subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions
arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE:
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases
in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 0994, states: “2. The exclusion of the term
“damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section
33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount
sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The
RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both
claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of
the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that the defendants were
at fault or were negligent in that they manufactured, produced, sold, and/or used DBCP and/or
otherwise, put the same into the stream of commerce, without informing the users of its
hazardous effects on health and/or health and/or without instructions on its proper use and
application.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the
acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or
otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, without informing the
users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its proper use and application.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants —
a quasi-delict, which under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations
of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction
of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a
quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously
falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted
from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the
Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The
factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which
undeniably occurred in the Philippines.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in
containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the
stream of commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs. The cases are not criminal
cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of
jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases.
In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to
be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
CONVENIENT FORUM
Page 11 of 136
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines:

1. Plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in
Davao City
2. The specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA,
et al., initially filed their claims for damages

3. The testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-
workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather
in the Philippines

Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines,
demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having
jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for
trying these cases.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of all the defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly
appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant
companies designated and authorized representatives to receive summons and to represent them in the
proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various
affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.

Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons.

Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an

invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will
bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is authority to decide a case,
not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the
decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction.

Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of
judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the
jurisdiction over the case.

Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to procure
a dismissal of the same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this Court finds such
argument much too speculative to deserve any merit.

Page 12 of 136
3. Darma Maslag v. Monzon, et al., G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013
* JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW NOT BY COURT ISSUANCES
1. Jurisdiction; Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original
and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), depending on the assessed value of the subject property.
a. P20,000.00 or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the [assessed] value [of
the property] exceed P50,000.00 except actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer.
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is “not within the courts, let
alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.”
4. Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010
* JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW NOT BY DECISION OF FOREIGN COURT
a. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time Herald filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
DOCTRINE:
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time Herald filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child
custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, Herald went to the right court.
What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various
provisions of its Judgment for Dissolution.” Herald’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various
provisions” of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce agreement on child custody. Thus, the
action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s “retained jurisdiction.”
While the trial court had jurisdiction, the agreement cannot be enforced because it is void for being
contrary to law (daughter was below 7 years old and, by law, she must stay with the mother). Also, the
agreement was repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody.
Page 13 of 136
5. Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin, 2013
*JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW NOT BY DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE/ CONSENT or Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian dispute among the
WAIVER OF PARTIES parties, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the DAR
*RULES OF PROCEDURE IS NOT A LAW Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised by petitioners.
1. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution
and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action.

DOCTRINE:

The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the
DARAB. It is not enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the
Land Registration Authority for the DARAB to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial consideration is
the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties.

Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an AGRARIAN DISPUTE as “any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements” and includes “any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”

Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between
the parties for the

DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of the following
indispensable elements, to wit:

(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

(5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not allege in their
complaint that a tenancy relationship exists between them and respondent.

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government

agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the
petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action . Nor can it be acquired through, or
waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue ,
especially where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.

Page 14 of 136
6. Far East Bank v. Shemberg, G.R. No.163878, December 12, 2006
1. A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees.
2. Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary estimation? YES. RTC has
jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE:
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The importance
of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court expenses in the
handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits
of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. Hence, the
non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous losses to the government in
general and to the judiciary in particular.

Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary estimation?

Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional
Trial Courts have sole, exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide “ all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.”

In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court laid the test for determining whether the subject matter
of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus:

(a) Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.

(b) If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction would
depend upon the amount of the claim.

(c) However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is only incidental or a consequence of
the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil Case No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation
of the real estate and chattel mortgages for want of consideration. In Bumayog v. Tumas, this
Court ruled that where the issue involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation. In the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil, this Court, citing Bumayog, held
that an action questioning the validity of a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons for this Court to revisit Bumayog and Russell. Hence,
petitioner’s contention cannot be sustained. Since respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the
clerk of court, consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. MAN4045.

Page 15 of 136
7. Air Transportation Office v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 173616, June 25, 2014
RTC lost its jurisdiction because of perfection of appeal, effects
1. Discretionary Execution; Execution of the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) judgment under
Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution but a ministerial duty of the RTC.
a. Discretionary execution is authorized while the trial court, which rendered the
judgment sought to be executed, still has jurisdiction over the case as the period to
appeal has not yet lapsed
b. It is part of the trial court’s residual powers, or those powers which it retains after
losing jurisdiction over the case as a result of the perfection of the appeal.
2. The trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion,
said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
FACTS: 1.290M
1. ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Iloilo City, Branch 3:
2. MTCC: in favor of ATO
3. RTC: affirmed MTCC; granted Ato’s urgent Motion for Execution
4. CA: affirmed RTC and
TWO CA cases: 1. Certiorari for revival of writ of execution 2. Appeal
5. SC: reversed CA
Pending the appeal sa CA, biglang nag issue si RTC ng Writ of Execution. Pwede ba yon? NO.
REASON: The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
GR: Upon perfection of appeal RTC is divested of its jurisdiction.
XPN: RTC has residual jurisdiction applies only in ejectment cases generally to order execution even
pending appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent court (RTC) has jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution after the
appeal over its decision had been perfected and the petition for review
RTC in Iloilo City has no jurisdiction to order the issuance of such writ of execution  If wrongful exercise of jurisdiction: appeal
8. Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manza, G.R. No. 163602, September 07, 2011
1. A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders is a remedy of last resort.
a. It is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such action is never
resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect
b. The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
2. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
- In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show
not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction—
lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should
not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
3. The erroneous grant of relief by the Regional Trial Court on appeal is but an exercise of
jurisdiction by said court—the ground for annulment of the decision is absence of, or no,
jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law
does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) acted
in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal when, instead of simply dismissing the
complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the defendants, it ordered the lessors
to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation
of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within
a certain period and for a fixed price
4. JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
a. Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an
exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC.
b. jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered
therein.
They filed their MR late so pampalusot they filed for annulment based on lack of jurisdiction.
LT: RTC has no jurisdiction to look into appeal over “possession” in ejectment case, and RTC decided
over issue on “ownership.”
SC:
RTC had an excess of jurisdiction but it doesn’t mean RTC has lack of jurisdiction from the very start.
No jurisdiction over the Subj Matter, remedy is MTD or Annul Judgment.
Grave abuse of discretion: Rule 65
In practice: file before dead line.
DOCTRINE:
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can
only be availed of where “the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.” It is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a
party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies. The only
grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
The petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent assurances or negligent acts of their
counsel, but on lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief
inconsistent with the nature of an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in
their answer. They contend that whatever maybe questionable in the decision is a ground for
assignment of errors on appeal — or in certain cases, as ground for a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 — and not as ground for its annulment.
Page 16 of 136

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for
annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and
establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action
for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. We have held that although it was proper for
the RTC, on appeal in the ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and receive evidence on
possession de jure, it cannot adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of the
property to either party by ordering the cancellation of the TCT.
In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents
when, instead of simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the
defendants (petitioners), it ordered the respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale
in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease
which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased premises within a certain period (two years from
date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in an ejectment case
where the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the physical
possession of the property.
JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of
jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause,
and not the decision rendered therein. The ground for annulment of the decision is absence of
, or no jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because
the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the
RTC did not have the authority to decide the case on appeal. As we held in Ybañez v. Court of
Appeals:
Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners’ appeal from the
adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably
exercising its appellate jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce, its decision
may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as it has, beyond cavil,
jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC decision on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction as said court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners’ appeal.
9. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, PETITIONER, VS. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, March 15,
2010
1. JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER GOVERNED MY WARSAW CONVENTION
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for
damages before —
i. the court where the carrier is domiciled; -London, British corp
ii. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; -London
iii. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has
been made; or -Rome, ticket
iv. the court of the place of destination. -Rome
2. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is jurisdictional in character and not a venue provision.
3. RTC of Makati has no jurisdiction.
4. TORTIOUS CONDUCT WITHIN PURVIEW OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
a. Allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during
the course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of
the Warsaw Convention.
5. NO VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION. Mere filing of MTD before the RTC cannot be
deemed voluntary submission.
Dual concept of jurisdiction under Warsaw Convention.
Warsaw convention is jurisdictional. “must be brought”
Objective of convention is to regulate jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE:
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. When the place
of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an “international carriage.”
The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and
those which subsequently adhered to it.
In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place
of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw
Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an “international carriage”
within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER GOVERNED MY WARSAW CONVENTION
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages
before —
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made;
or
4. the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London,
United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business . Hence, under the first and second
jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom.
In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears
that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the
petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner
Page 17 of 136
and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given
the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring
her action before the courts of Rome, Italy.
We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the
case filed by the petitioner.
TORTIOUS CONDUCT WITHIN PURVIEW OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of
the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
NO VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION
The special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other
pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule
that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver
of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its person.
10. BPI v. Eduardo Hong, G.R. No. 161771, February 15, 2012
Jurisdiction; The nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which court or agency of
the government has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of
the complaint in relation to the law involved and the character of the reliefs prayed for, whether
or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of such reliefs.
petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation before SEC
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real properties mortgaged to it by Eyco Properties, Inc before
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City
FACTS:
Bankruptcy proceeding.
BPI filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred Ship Mortgage under
Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with the RTC. Other creditors
didn’t like it.
Mr. Hong opposed the foreclosure. He filed for injunction in RTC Valenzuela City
Issue: SEC/RTC
Injuction suit was filed during effectivity of law.
RULING: RTC.
DOC: jurisdiction is determined by law at the time of the filing of the complaint
Prin. Of Hierarchy of Courts: bawal sa SC agad
Page 18 of 136
11. Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, GR 196200 2013 (hierarchy of courts)  III. CAUSE OF ACTION
DOCTRINE: RULE 1
 Under the PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS, direct recourse to this Court is improper GENERAL PROVISONS
because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to Section 1. Title of the Rules.
satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of Court.
to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket.
 Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been Sec. 2. In what courts applicable.
allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the These Rules shall apply in all the courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.
petition, such as:
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; Sec. 3. Cases governed.
(2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal, and special
(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or proceedings.
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the (a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
immediate and direct handling of the case. right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
1. This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary
demands that this Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
resolve the matter which has been dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in (b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission
light of the fact that what is involved is a final judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but punishable by law.
proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and seek final clarification. (c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.
Sec. 4. In what cases not applicable.
These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and
Hierarchy of Courts; Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
improper because it is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within
Sec. 5. Commencement of action.
its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket; Exceptions:
A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If an additional
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is commenced with regard to him on the
(2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
date of the filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether the motion for its admission,
(3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
if necessary, is denied by the court.
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and
Sec. 6. Construction.
direct handling of the case.
These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Appeals:
 “Ordinary Appeal” and “Petition for Certiorari,” Distinguished.―There are considerable
differences between an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari which have been
RULE 2
exhaustively discussed by this Court in countless cases. The remedy for errors of judgment,
CAUSE OF ACTION
whether based on the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or legal soundness of a
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of.
decision, is an ordinary appeal. In contrast, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original
action designed to correct errors of jurisdiction, defined to be those “in which the act
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
complained of was issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined.
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of in excess of
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
jurisdiction.”
Sec. 3. One suit for a single cause of action.
 It is a general rule of procedural law that when a party adopts an inappropriate mode of appeal,
A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
his petition may be dismissed outright to prevent the erring party from benefiting from his
Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.
neglect and mistakes
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one
 
or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others.
FACTS:
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action.
SC after 17 years ruled to give ownership of the ship.
A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action
Colorado claimed the ship already sank.
as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
RTC resolved the motion for execution: to just remit the proceeds from salvage instead of returning the
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
ship in its good condition.
Dy skipped CA and went to SC. Certiorari over mandamus
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
ISSUE: is that correct? YES it was allowed to have xpn to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues

Page 19 of 136
or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the (a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; and
Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. (d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the
Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded
with separately.
GUIDE In reading cases:
2. Focus on issue on COA | Only the 2nd issue in Macaslang vs. Zamora | Principle of
In reading rules hypothetical admission in NM Rothschild vs. Lepanto | Ignore substantive issues
Memorize Sections 3 and 4, R1.
Sec. 3. Cases governed. These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission
punishable by law.
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.
Sec. 4. In what cases not applicable.
These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.
Memorize Sections 2 and 5, R2.
SECTION 2. Cause of action, defined. - A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another. (n)
SECTION 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of
the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (5a)
What is the effect of splitting COA? Of Misjoinder?
Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others.
Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action.
Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action
may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with
separately. Anong case ‘to?
What are the requisites for joinder of COA
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. To prevent multiplicity of suits
A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may
have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

Page 20 of 136
1. Mindanao Terminal v. Phoenix Assurance, G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009

FACTS:
1. Phoenix and McGee instituted an action for damages7 against Mindanao Terminal in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao
2. RTC dismissed the complaint.
a. Phoenix and McGee had no cause of action against Mindanao Terminal because the
latter, whose services were contracted by Del Monte, a distinct corporation from
Del Monte Produce, had no contract with the assured Del Monte Produce.
b. awarded the counterclaim of Mindanao Terminal in the amount of P83,945.80 as actual
damages and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. + actual damages
3. CA reversed
a. even with the absence of a contractual relationship between Mindanao Terminal and
Del Monte Produce, the cause of action of Phoenix and McGee could be based on
quasi-delict under Article 2176
b. pay Phoenix and McGee “the total amount of $210,265.45 plus legal interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney’s fees of 20% of the claim

ISSUE: WON Phoenix and McGee have a cause of action against Mindanao Terminal. YES, based on
quasi-delict which requires mere allegation of negligence to establish a cause of action.

The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and
stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and
McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract
of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause
of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort.

DOCTRINE:
The complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case
has arisen, states a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the
negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce.

Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte
Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still
the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that
the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.

In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries
arising from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by
which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce.

Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao
Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to
establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.

Page 21 of 136
2. Dolores Macaslang v. Renato Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011
FACTS:
Zamora filed against Macaslang: unlawful detainer in the MTCC
The MTCC declared Macaslang in default upon the respondents’ motion to declare her in default, and
proceeded to receive evidence.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
CA: reversed RTC; reinstated MTCC
SC: concurred CA as to issue of cause of action
ISSUE: WON the complaint stated a COA. YES
DOCTRINE:
The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the evidence showed
that there was no demand to vacate made upon the petitioner. The CA disagreed. We agree with the
CA.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant
about the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the
defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the
complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the
complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal
conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.
Based on its allegations, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Firstly, it averred that the petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance of the respondents.
Secondly, the respondents demanded that the petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her
possession illegal. Thirdly, she remained in possession of the property despite the demand to vacate.
And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999, which was well within a
year after the demand to vacate was made around September of 1998 or later.
FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION V. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the
one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading , and is a
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action
refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the
pleading.
Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction:
Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of
action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while
the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5
of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to
require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or,
at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of
a cause of action, namely:
(1) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(2) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of
the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a
motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of
fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.
Cause of Action; In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the
facts alleged in the complaint are considered.—In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of
action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can
render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Only
ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the
test.
Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each
other.—Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other.
On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers
to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
Page 22 of 136
3. Philip Turner, et al. v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 157479, November 24,
2010 A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or
FACTS: supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the
1. stockholders’ suit to recover the value of their shareholdings from the corporation action.
2. 1,010,000 shares,
a. Petitioner: P2.276 per share, P2.298M
b. Respondent: P0.41/share, P414k only
c. Appraisal committee: P2.54/share, P2.565M
3. petitioners sued the respondent for collection and damages in the RTC in Makati City.
4. petitioners filed their motion for partial summary judgment.
5. Respondent: petitioner has no COA
6. Reraffled to Manila branches because of principal office: Branch 46 of the RTC in Manila,
presided by Judge Artemio Tipon,7 pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-
Corporate Controversies
7. RTC: granted motion for partial summary judgment; issued writs of garnishment
8. CA: reversed CA; dismissed the complaint

ISSUE: WON there is COA. NO, therefore RTC did not validly render the partial summary
judgment.

DOCTRINE:
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The
essential elements of a cause of action are:

(a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;

(b) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and
(c) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a
resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the
recovery of relief from the defendant.

Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of
the last element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief.

In order to give rise to any obligation to pay on the part of the respondent, the petitioners should first
make a valid demand that the respondent refused to pay despite having unrestricted retained
earnings. Otherwise, the respondent could not be said to be guilty of any actionable omission
that could sustain their action to collect.

Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of the
complaint cure the lack of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The petitioners’ right of action
could only spring from an existing cause of action. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has not
yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence
or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the action. For, only when there is an
invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative. Verily, a
premature invocation of the court’s intervention renders the complaint without a cause of
action and dismissible on such ground. In short, Civil Case No. 01-086, being a groundless suit,
should be dismissed.

Even the fact that the respondent already had unrestricted retained earnings more than sufficient to
cover the petitioners’ claims on June 26, 2002 did not rectify the absence of the cause of action at the
time of the commencement of Civil Case No. 01-086. The motion for partial summary judgment, being a
mere application for relief other than by a pleading, was not the same as the complaint in Civil Case No.
01-086.

Page 23 of 136
4. Chua v. Metrobank, et al., G. R. No.182311, August 19, 2009
FACTS:
1. Petitioner loan 4M + more other loans + REM + open credit because the collateral was more
than the loan.
2. Debt: 79.6M; Interest: 7.8M. Metrobank asks 103M; mortgage debt was set as 88m excluded
others.
3. Petition for Foreclosure filed by respondent Metrobank
4. 1st Chua: a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), Preliminary Injunction and Damages, in Regional Trial Court of Parañaque (RTC-Branch
257),
5. After expiration of TRO, auction sale proceeded. Metrobank bought.
6. 2nd Chua: Motion to Admit Amended Complaint and Amended Verified Complaint claiming the
sale is void. Certificate of sale is a falsified document. + damages + TRO
7. 2 cases were consolidated
8. RTC dismissed due to FS of Chua
9. CA: affirmed RTC
10. SC: affirmed CA
ISSUE: WON FS is committed. YES, by splitting a single COA, so it must be dismissed.
Judgment in either case would result to res judicata
DOCTRINE:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis
pendentia);
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); bar by
prior judgement and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or
res judicata).
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping, attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-Branch 195, the
existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. Nevertheless, petitioners
insist that they are not guilty of forum shopping, since the two cases do not have the same
ultimate objective —
(1) Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 seeks the annulment of the 8 November 2001 public auction
and certificate of sale issued therein; while
(2) Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 prays for the award of actual and compensatory damages for
respondents’ tortuous act of making it appear that an auction sale actually took place
on 8 November 2001.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action,
although with different prayers. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court proscribe the splitting
of a single cause of action:
Section 3. A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that
there is a splitting of a cause of action. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful
act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true
that a single act or omission can violate various rights at the same time, as when the act
constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where
there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person.
Petitioners would like to make it appear that Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 was solely concerned with
the nullification of the auction sale and certification of sale, while Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 was a
totally separate claim for damages. Yet, a review of the records reveals that petitioners also
included an explicit claim for damages in their Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, to
wit:
20-A. The abovementioned acts of [herein respondents] Metrobank and Atty.
Celestra are in gross violation of the injunction made under Article 19 of the Civil Code,
thereby entitling the [herein petitioners] to recover damages from the said
[respondents] in such amount as may be awarded by the Court.
The Court observes that the damages being claimed by petitioners in their Complaint in Civil Case
No. CV-05-0402 were also occasioned by the supposedly fictitious 8 November 2001
foreclosure sale. There is no question that the claims of petitioners for damages in Civil Case No. CV-
01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05 -0402 are premised on the same cause of action, i.e., the purportedly
wrongful conduct of respondents in connection with the foreclosure sale of the subject properties.
The rule against splitting a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy, to protect the defendant from unnecessary
vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. It comes from the old maxim
nemo debet bis vexari, pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same
cause).
Page 24 of 136
5. Catalina Chu, et al. v. Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185,
September 12, 2011
FACTS:
1. Deed of Sale with Assum. Of Mort. 5 lands. P5.1M. Vendor si chua, vendee si cunanan
2. Cunanan was able to transfer the title to her name without Chu’s knowledge.
3. Chu attached unpaid vendor’s lien
4. Cunanan sold the 2 to carloses. Assigned the 3 to Cooltown Realty
5. 1st: Chus commenced Civil Case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Cunanan
6. 2nd after 5 yrs: amended the complaint to seek the annulment of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage + damages + impleaded Cooltown and RD of San Fernando
Pampanga.
a. Resulted to compromise agreement which RTC approved.
7. 3rd: Chus another suit to cancel TCT of carloses + impleaded Cunanan.
8. Cunanan moved to dismiss: 1. Bar by prior judgment 2. FS.
9. RTC: denied motion to dismiss, panalo si Chu. Compromise agreement did not extend to
carloses
10. CA: reversed RTC. Compromise agreement ended the legal controversy
ISSUE:
WON Chu is guilty of splitting COA. YES.
DOCTRINE:
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or
rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of
dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two
or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or
divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and
then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective
was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by res judicata.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all
points and matters determined in the previous suit
Yet, in order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions
a. identity of parties,
b. identity of the subject matter, and
c. identity of cause of action.
It is settled that the absolute identity of parties was not a condition sine qua non for res judicata to
apply, because a shared identity of interest sufficed; Mere substantial identity of parties, or even
community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not
impleaded in the first case, was sufficient.
There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same , or there is privity
between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity
As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Identity of the causes of action was also met, because Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251
were rooted in one and the same cause of action — the failure of Cunanan to pay in full the
purchase price of the five lots subject of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In other
words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised Civil Case No. G-1936, the only difference between them being
that the petitioners alleged in the former that Benelda Estate was “not also a purchaser for value and in
good faith.”
In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis-à-vis the five lots were all defined and governed by
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the only contract between them. That contract was
single and indivisible, as far as they were concerned. Consequently, the Chus could not properly
proceed against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251, despite the silence of the compromise
agreement as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one action where the
contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims
and damages. The Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that
single cause of action the basis of several suits.
Page 25 of 136
6. NM Rothschild & Sons (AUSTRALIA) Limited, v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company, G.R. No.
175799, November 28, 2011
FACTS:
1. Lepanto filed with the (RTC) of Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons
(Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contract as void for
being violative of A. 2018 of NCC + damages.
2. RTC brought through DFA Summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in
Sydney
3. NM moved to dismiss for failure to state COA, Lepanto has no COA, RTC acquired no Jurisdiction
for improper service of summons.
4. RTC: in favor of Lepanto, dismissed MTD
5. CA: affirmed RTC
ISSUE: 1. WON NM is a RP in Interest because NM changed its name. YES, RP in interest pa rin.
2. Is there a COA? YES, all 3 elements were present
As previously stated, petitioner seeks the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-782 on the following grounds:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of
summons; (b) failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action and absence of a cause of
action; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
ABSENCE OF CAUSE OF ACTION V. FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION
As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the alleged ABSENCE OF A CAUSE
OF ACTION (as opposed to the failure to state a cause of action), the alleged estoppel on the part of
petitioner, and the argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged
contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues closely related to the validity and/or
existence of respondent’s alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during
the trial.
As regards the allegation of FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, while the same is usually
available as a ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present
Petition without going into the very merits of the main case.
It is basic that “[a] cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.”
Its elements are the following: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the
defendant to respect the plaintiff's right, and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.
We have held that to sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated
or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
The trial court held that the Complaint in the case at bar contains all the three elements of a cause
of action, i.e., it alleges that:
(1) plaintiff has the right to ask for the declaration of nullity of the Hedging Contracts for
being null and void and contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
(2) defendant has the corresponding obligation not to enforce the Hedging Contracts
because they are in the nature of wagering or gambling agreements and therefore the
transactions implementing those contracts are null and void under Philippine laws; and
(3) defendant ignored the advice and intends to enforce the Hedging Contracts by
demanding financial payments due therefrom.
The rule is that in a Motion to Dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the
material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff's complaint. However, this principle of
hypothetical admission admits of exceptions. Thus, in Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held:
The flaw in this conclusion is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that
averments in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing
of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, it did
not take into account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a
motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor
allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere
inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law;
nor allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice ; nor
matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous
matter inserted merely to insult the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts;
nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading,
or by a document referred to; and, nor to general averments contradicted by
more specific averments.
A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the
court be not restricted to the consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may consider other facts within the
range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the
courts are bound to take into account, and they are also fairly entitled to examine
records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in
ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.
In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being
contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts,
despite the express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely to
compel each other to pay the difference between the value of the gold at the forward price stated in the
contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery.
Whether such an agreement is void is a mere allegation of a conclusion of law, which therefore
cannot be hypothetically admitted. Quite properly, the relevant portions of the contracts sought to
be nullified, as well as a copy of the contract itself, are incorporated in the Complaint. The
determination of whether or not the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve
an inquiry into whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is,
precisely, the very issue to be determined in Civil Case No. 05-782. Indeed, petitioner’s defense
against the charge of nullity of the Hedging Contracts is the purported intent of the parties that
actual deliveries of gold be made pursuant thereto. Such a defense requires the presentation of
evidence on the merits of the case. An issue that “requires the contravention of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within
the province of a mere Motion to Dismiss.” The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the Motion to
Dismiss on this ground.
*A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
*Principle of hypothetical admission admits of exceptions.—The rule is that in a Motion to Dismiss, a
defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts
contained in the plaintiff’s complaint. However, this principle of hypothetical admission admits of
exceptions. i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud;
nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law
Page 26 of 136
7. Pua v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 180064, Sep. 16 2013 (SEC JURISDICTION) other civil suits under Sections 56, 58, 59, 60, and 61 of the SRC shall be exclusively brought before
the regional trial courts. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the term “shall” is a
FACTS: word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is
1. Citibank Hongkong offered to sell securities to PUA. Bank required Pua to open an account in generally imperative or mandatory. Likewise, it is equally revelatory that no SRC provision of similar
HK. import is found in its sections governing criminal suits; quite the contrary, the SRC states that criminal
2. Pua bought securities. Then he learned that they were not registered in SEC. cases arising from violations of its provisions should be first referred to the SEC.
3. PUA filed in RTC a Complaint for declaration of nullity of contract and sums of money with
damages against CITIBANK binondo Therefore, based on these considerations, it stands to reason that civil suits falling under the SRC are
4. PUA filed criminal complaint with the DOJ for violation of SRCode. DOJ dismissed this complaint. under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts and hence, need not be first
5. Bank: MTD. Invoked doc of Primary jurisdiction. SEC has jurisdiction. filed before the SEC, unlike criminal cases wherein the latter body exercises primary jurisdiction.
6. RTC: in favor of PUA, denied MTD. Ratio: CsOA are more appropriate for the judiciary than
administrative agency
7. CA: reversed RTC
8. SC: reversed CA, Pua is correct

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s action falls within the primary jurisdiction of SEC. NO

RTC ang may jurisdiction. WHY? Civil case ito.

If Criminal case as in the Baviera Case, sa SEC ang jurisdiciton.

DOCTRINE:
Records show that Pua’s complaint constitutes a civil suit for declaration of nullity of contract and
sums of money with damages, which stemmed from Citibank’s alleged sale of unregistered securities,
in violation of the various provisions of the SRC.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge

Sections 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 of the SRC pertain to civil suits involving violations of the
same law. Among these, the applicable provisions to this case are Sections 57.1 and 63.1 of the SRC
which provide:
SEC. 57. Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection With Prospectus, Communications and
Reports. – 57.1. Any person who: (a) Offers to sell or sells a security in
violation of Chapter III;
Or

(b) Offers to sell or sells a security, whether or not exempted by the provisions of this
Code, by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication, by
means of a prospectus or other written or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and
who shall fail in the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of
any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security.

SEC. 63. Amount of Damages to be Awarded. – 63.1. All suits to recover damages
pursuant to Sections 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61 shall be brought before the
Regional Trial Court which shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
such suits. The Court is hereby authorized to award damages in an amount not
exceeding triple the amount of the transaction plus actual damages.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that cases falling under Section 57 of the SRC, which pertain to civil
liabilities arising from violations of the requirements for offers to sell or the sale of securities, as well as

Page 27 of 136
 IV. PARTIES (RULE 3)
RULE 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant.
Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant,
or the third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth,
etc.) party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.
Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall
be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules.
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be
sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the
principal.
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties.
Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Sec. 5. Minor or incompetent persons.
A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with the assistance of his
father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem.
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties.
All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in
the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such
orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to
expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Sec. 8. Necessary party.
A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination
or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded.
Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the
pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court
find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted
necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be
deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party.
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.
If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be
made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may
be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party
may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Sec. 12. Class suit.
When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of
all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the
right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
Sec. 13. Alternative defendants.
Where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may
join any or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one
may be inconsistent with a right of relief against the other.
Sec. 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant.
Whenever the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he may be sued as the unknown
owner, heir, devisee, or by such other designation as the case may require; when his identity
or true name is discovered, the pleading must be amended accord
Sec. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant.
When two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a
transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly
known.
In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons composing said
entity must all be revealed.
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall
be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs.
Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer.
When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency
dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained
by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such
time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that
there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or
continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a
substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto,
shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be
Page 28 of 136
heard.
Sec. 18. Incompetency or incapacity.
If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may
allow the action to be continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person
assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad litem.
Sec. 19. Transfer of interest.
In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original
party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to
be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.
Sec. 20. Action on contractual money claims.
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at
the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until
entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the
estate of a deceased person.
Sec. 21. Indigent party.
A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court,
upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money
or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and
of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The
amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying
shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the
court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party
declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper
docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment
is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof,
without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
Sec. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General.
In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential
decree, rules or regulations, the court, in its discretion, may require the appearance of the
Solicitor General who may be heard in person or through a representative duly designated by
him.
RULE 8
Sec. 4. Capacity.
Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons
that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are
peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
1. In reading rules
a. Memorize sections 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 3. Five star!
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming
party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) - party plaintiff. The term
"defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-
defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) - party defendant. (1a)
SECTION 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. (2a)
SECTION 6. Permissive joinder of parties. - All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief
in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all
such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as
may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in
connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (6)
SECTION 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)
SECTION 8. Necessary party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (8a)
b. What is a class suit? What are the requisites?
Sec. 12. Class suit.
When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so
numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be
sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or
defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.
REQUISITES: (Banda v. Ermita, 2010)
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and
can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
1. Common SM 2. Sufficiently Numerous (SN) 3. So Numerous (SN)
c. What happens if a party to an action dies?
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel
Page 29 of 136
 to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer.
When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies,
resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or
against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may
be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a
substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or
threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the
party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice
of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.
Sec. 18. Incompetency or incapacity.
If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated, the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the
action to be continued by or against the incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal
guardian or guardian ad litem.

GUIDE In reading cases:

a. Focus on the parties to the case. Who is the plaintiff and defendant. How many
plaintiffs and defendants are there
b. What is the relief sought by plaintiff
c. Relief granted by the trial court
d. Who is alleged to be an indispensable party
i. How was the argument regarding indispensability raised? Through Motion to
Dismiss, Petition for annulment
ii. Arguments in support of indispensability of the party
iii. Ruling of the SC on whether indispensable or not
e. For class suits
i. How many plaintiffs
ii. Were the requisites for class suit present
f. For death of a party
i. Who died? Was he plaintiff or defendant
ii. Who wanted to substitute the dead party? According to the SC, who is the proper
person to substitute?
iii. How was substitution done? What pleadings were filed? What orders were issued
for the substitution.
g. For indigency: study the evolution of Rule 141
h. Ignore irrelevant issues: constitutionality, and concurring opinion in Banda vs Ermita

Page 30 of 136
1. Philip Go, et al. v. Distinction Properties Development, G.R. No. 194024, April 25,
2012
FACTS:
P: Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim
D: Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI)  as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that
Who is indispensable Party (IP): PHCC
Arguments of P to refute: action may continue without PHCC
Arguments of D: petitioners sought to address the invalidation of the corporate acts duly
entered and executed by PHCC as a corporation of which petitioners are admittedly members
of, and not the acts pertaining to their ownership of the units. Such being the case, PHCC
should have been impleaded as a party to the complaint. Its non-inclusion as an indispensable
party warrants the dismissal of the case.  the HLURB, the dispositive portion in particular, DPDCI was ordered
Through MTD/ Petition for Annulment
SC ruling if indispensable: YES
1. Phoenix Heights Condominium located at H. Javier/Canley Road, Bo. Bagong Ilog, Pasig City,
2. DPDCI turned over the ownership to Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC)
3. Pacifico Lim filed an Application for Alteration of Plan for 22 storage units. The same 22 units were
used to set off association dues between PHCC and DPDCI
4. filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of
the MDDR. Misrepresentation through flyers. Amenities not available. Breach of promise
5. HLURB: in favor of Petitioners. Agreement between PHCC and DPDCI is void.
6. CA for certiorari and prohibition: set aside HLURB, no jurisdiction.
a. Jurisdiction over PHCC was never acquired. PHCC is the IP
ISSUE: WON PHCC is an IP. YES.
Indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that
a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
DOCTRINE:
As it is clear that the acts being assailed are those of PHHC, this case cannot prosper for failure
to implead the proper party, PHCC.
An INDISPENSABLE PARTY is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest. In the recent case of Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Keihin
(NLMKOLALIA-KMU) v. Keihin Philippines Corporation, the Court had the occasion to state that:
When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the
plaintiff. The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent the multiplicity of suits by
requiring the person arresting a right against the defendant to include with him, either
the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.
From all indications, PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, either as a
plaintiff or as a defendant, in the complaint filed before the HLURB as it would be directly and
adversely affected by any determination therein. To belabor the point, the causes of action, or the
acts complained of, were the acts of PHCC as a corporate body. Note that in the judgment rendered by
(1) to pay P998,190.70, plus interests and surcharges, as condominium dues in arrears and turnover the
administration office to PHCC; and (2) to refund to PHCC P1,277,500.00, representing the cost of the
deep well, with interests and surcharges. Also, the HLURB declared as illegal the agreement regarding
the conversion of the 22 storage units and Units GF4-A and BAS, to which agreement PHCC was a party.
Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC. Petitioners cannot exercise the same
except through a derivative suit. In the complaint, however, there was no allegation that the action
was a derivative suit. In fact, in the petition, petitioners claim that their complaint is not a derivative
suit. In the cited case of Chua v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:
For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing
for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing
on a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other
stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. It is a
condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because
not only is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it
must be served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon the
corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and
may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same
cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party
because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment
must be a res adjudicata against it.
Without PHCC as a party, there can be no final adjudication of the HLURB’s judgment. The CA
was, thus, correct in ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to implead an indispensable party.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, ‘parties in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.’
If there is afailure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered
would have no effectiveness. It is precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not
before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to
those present.’ The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a
complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves,
but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment . A
decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable
parties. Similarly, in the case of Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a
final decree would necessarily affect the rights of indispensable parties so
that the Court could not proceed without their presence. In support thereof, the
Court in Plasabas cited the following authorities, thus:

Page 31 of 136
2. Macawadib v. Philippine National Police Directorate, G.R. No. 186610, July 29, 2013
FACTS:
P: POLICE SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT DIMAPINTO MACAWADIB,
D: THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT
Who is indispensable Party
a. Arguments of PNP: RTC decision is null for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, “an
unimpleaded indispensable party.”
Through MTD/ Petition for Annulment
SC ruling if indispensable: YES
2. Compulsory retirement of age 56. Records born June 11, 1946.
3. 2001, petitioner filed an application for late registration of his birth with the Municipal Civil
Registrar’s Office of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. It should be 1956.
4. petitioner filed with the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8, a Petition for Correction of Entry in the Public
Service Records Regarding the Birth Date.
5. RTC: awarded. Final and exec on year 2002
6. 2008 Respondent in CA filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: WON PNP is IP. YES
DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public
records in the custody of the PNP, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which are involved and which would be affected by any decision rendered in
the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner.
The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the
proceeding. They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case
can be had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest.
In the fairly recent case of Go v. Distinction Properties Development the Court had the occasion to
reiterate the principle that:
It is “precisely ‘when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action
should be dismissed.’ The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act , not
only as to the absent parties but even to those present.” The purpose of the
rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues
not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons
who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain
real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.
court, the same should be dismissed. When an indispensable party is not before the
court, the action should be dismissed.
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff.
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they
stand to be adversely affected by petitioner’s petition which involves substantial and
controversial alterations in petitioner’s service records. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioner’s service is extended by ten years, the
government, through the PNP, shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits that
would have to be given to petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside from the OSG, all other
agencies which may be affected by the change should be notified or represented as the truth
is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceedings, the decision of the trial court granting petitioner’s prayer for the correction of
entries in his service records , is void. As mentioned above, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
NO ESTOPPEL
On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC for
failure of the OSG, as government representative, to participate in the proceedings before the trial court
or to file an opposition to petitioner’s petition for correction of entries in his service records, this Court
rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on the validity of the appeal which the petitioner
filed before the CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the government, be considered in
estoppel due to the petitioner’s seeming acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it
initially made corrections to some of petitioner’s records with the PNP.
This Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from government agencies
is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the Republic barred from assailing the decision
granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such
petition has no merit.

Citing previous authorities, the Court also held in the Go case that:

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the
joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. For this
reason, our Supreme Court has held that when it appears of record that there are
other persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not
made parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial until
such parties are made either plaintiffs or defendants. Where the petition failed
to join as party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in the

Page 32 of 136
3. Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, G.R. No. 203775, August 05, 2014

FACYS
1. Sps Faustino and Sps Mesina bought 2 lands from Sps Fian
2. The heirs of FIan refused to acknowledge the payment of the buyers. They refused to vacate the
land.
3. Heirs of Mesina filed for an action for quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte (Naming only Theresa Fian)
4. Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action
and that the case should be dismissed for gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3
5. LT of Theresa
She claims that the “Heirs of Mesina” could not be considered as a juridical person or entity
authorized by law to file a civil action. Neither could the “Heirs of Fian” be made as defendant, not
being a juridical person as well.
6. RTC dismissed. Same argument with Theresa
7. CA: affirmed RTC

ISSUE: WON the non-impleading of indispensable party amounts to failure to state a cause of action.
NO.

RULING:
the infirmity is not failure to state a cause of action but the non-joinder of indispensable parties.

Non-joinder means the “failure to bring a person who is a necessary party [or in this case an
indispensable party] into a lawsuit.”

Non-Joinder of Indispensable Parties; The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action; The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Page 33 of 136
4. Rebecca Pacana, et al. v. Rovila Water, G.R. 168979, December 2, 2013

FACTS
1. PLAINTIFF (2): Petitioners Rebecca and Rosalie Pacaña are children of SPS. Pacaña
DEFENDANT (5): They filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and
Marisa for accounting and damages.
2. Plaintiffs claimed they owned Rovila Water Supply, and the defendants tookover the
business by forming Rovina Inc to usurp the family business.
3. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in their own names instead of the names of the parents.
4. The parents died. The respondents claimed the substitution of plaintiffs from parents to
children was improper
LT of plaintiffs: We are the RP in Interest! They sued in their own right because of their
substantial interest as heirs or co-owners.
LT of defendants: They are not the RP in Interest! They failed to substitute as heir of
plaintiffs.

ISSUE: WHO are the RP in Interest? The deceased parents, bec. they are indispensable
parties.

Ratio:
1. Without the inclusion of the indispensable parties, there can be no final determination of
the case.
both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that
they are indispensable parties
2. REMEDY: Sec. 9 Rule 3: implead the indispensable parties.
their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. Failure to implead indispensable parties is a
curable error
The heirs should be impleaded as indispensable parties because of their hereditary rights

RP in Interest includes both indispensable parties and necessary parties. (mas malawak)

Page 34 of 136
5. Metrobank v. Rural Bank of Gerona, G.R. No. 159097, July 05, 2010
FACTS: As discussed, Metrobank was a third party to the Central Bank-RBG agreement, had no interest
1. Metrobank is RBG’s depository bank. except as a conduit, and was not legally answerable for the IBRD loans. Despite this, it was
2. The Central Bank approved farmers’ loan applications and credited the money to Metrobank which Metrobank’s demand deposit account, instead of RBG’s, which the Central Bank proceeded
credited the same to RBG. against, on the assumption perhaps that this was the most convenient means of recovering
3. HOWEVER, the central bank demanded reversal of loan application. Metrobank cannot debit RBG the cancelled loans. That Metrobank’s payment was involuntarily made does not change the reality
anymore since it already released the money. that it was Metrobank which effectively answered for RBG’s obligations.
4. MB: Complaint for collection of sum of money.
5. RTC ruled for MB Was there express or tacit approval by RBG of the payment enforced against Metrobank? After
6. CA reversed: CENTRAL BANK should be impleaded as a necessary party Metrobank received the Central Bank’s debit advices in November 1978, it (Metrobank) accordingly
LT of MB: inclusion is unnecessary since RBG already admitted liability. Impleading CENTRAL BANK debited the amounts it could from RBG’s special savings account without any objection from
would cause unnecessary delay of remanding the case. RBG. RBG’s President and Manager, Dr. Aquiles Abellar, even wrote Metrobank, on August 14, 1979,
1979 complaint; 1994 RTC; 2002 CA; 2010 SC with proposals regarding possible means of settling the amounts debited by Central Bank from
Metrobank’s demand deposit account. These instances are all indicative of RBG’s approval of
ISSUE: Is CB a necessary party? NO Metrobank’s payment of the IBRD loans. That RBG’s tacit approval came after payment had been
DOCTRINE: made does not completely negate the legal subrogation that had taken place.
 Ang farmers ang principal debtors.
 Ang hinabol dapat ng CB ay ang RBG at Farmers. Si MB ay 3rd Party lng sa CB-RGB Article 1303 of the Civil Code states that subrogation transfers to the person subrogated the
Agreement. credit with all the rights thereto appertaining, either against the debtor or against third persons.
 Hindi necessary party si CB, because subrogation already took place by MB. CB’s As the entity against which the collection was enforced, Metrobank was subrogated to the
presence is immaterial rights of Central Bank and has a cause of action to recover from RBG the amounts it paid to
the Central Bank, plus 14% per annum interest.

A basic first step in resolving this case is to determine who the liable parties are on the IBRD
loans that the Central Bank extended. The Terms and Conditions of the IBRD 4th Rural Credit Project
(Project Terms and Conditions) executed by the Central Bank and the RBG shows that the farmers-
borrowers to whom credits have been extended, are primarily liable for the payment of the
borrowed amounts. The loans were extended through the RBG which also took care of the collection
and of the remittance of the collection to the Central Bank. RBG, however, was not a mere conduit and
collector. While the farmers-borrowers were the principal debtors, RBG assumed liability
under the Project Terms and Conditions by solidarily binding itself with the principal debtors
to fulfill the obligation.
Under this situation, impleading the Central Bank as a party is completely unnecessary. We note
that the CA erroneously believed that the Central Bank’s presence is necessary “in order x x x to shed
light on the matter of reversals made by it concerning the loan applications of the end users and to have
a complete determination or settlement of the claim.” In so far as Metrobank is concerned, however, the
Central Bank’s presence and the reasons for its reversals of the IBRD loans are immaterial
after subrogation has taken place.

Based on these arrangements, the Central Bank’s immediate recourse, therefore should have
been against the farmers-borrowers and the RBG; thus, it erred when it deducted the amounts
covered by the debit advices from Metrobank’s demand deposit account. Under the Project Terms and
Conditions, Metrobank had no responsibility over the proceeds of the IBRD loans other than
serving as a conduit for their transfer from the Central Bank to the RBG once credit advice has
been issued.

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that the agreement governed only the parties involved
— the Central Bank and the RBG. Metrobank was simply an outsider to the agreement.

Our disagreement with the CA is in its conclusion that no legal subrogation took place; the
present case, in fact, exemplifies the circumstance contemplated under paragraph 2, of Article
1302 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal subrogation:

(1) When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even without the debtor’s
knowledge;
(2) When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the
express or tacit approval of the debtor;
(3) When, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the
fulfillment of the obligation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as
to the latter’s share.

Page 35 of 136
6. Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, 706 SCRA 580 (2013)

FACTS
1. 2 plaintiffs; Heirs represented by Asuncion
3 defendants
2. COMPLAINT: Nullification of a document of Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman due to fraud.
3. C-CLAIM: privies sila plaintiffs/respondents sa X-Judicial settlement with Waiver kasama si Maria
Laquindanum na parent nila
4. RTC: in favor of petitioners; applied in pari delicto doctrine; valid document
5. CA: reversed; invalid document

ISSUE: Valid ba ang doc? YES, privies sila plaintiffs/respondents. They are successor-in interest who
merely stepped into the shoes of Maria.
Yung X-Jud Settlement with Maria ay binding sa kanila.

DOCTRINE:

We agree with the trial court that respondents are “privies” to Maria Laquindanum. By the term
“PRIVIES” is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not
literally parties to the said action. This Court, in Correa v. Pascual, had occasion to explain that
“privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and donee, grantor
and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their respective
assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is one, it
has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one who takes by
conveyance.”

In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and are in the same
position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such successors, respondents’
situation is analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz where this Court held:

As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the

original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the
property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an indispensable,
party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the judgment against his
predecessor.

Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is
applicable to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.

Page 36 of 136
7. Cagato v. Almonte, 707 SCRA 172 (2013)
1. PLAINTIFFS: 1. Cagatao
COMPLAINT: action for annulment of deeds of sale, cancellation of title and damages
DEFENDANTS: 7? Almonte, Aguilar, SPS Fernandez (2), Fernandez sibs (3)
Dapat isinama si Carlos: 8 sana ang Defendants
2. Cagatao received land by private written instrument given by his papa-in-law.
3. Defendants took possession because they bought it from a Reconstituted Title of Carlos.
4. Cagatao filed a complaint to annul sale between sps. Fernandez and Carlos. But he failed to implead
Carlos as an indispensable party.

ISSUE: Indispensable party ba si Carlos? `

DOCTRINE:
SUBSTANTIVE
From the arguments of Cagatao, it is clear that he is assailing the validity of the title of Carlos
over the land in question. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states that “a certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.” An attack on the validity of the title is considered to be a
collateral attack when, in an action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the said
action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.

Cagatao’s original complaint before the RTC was for the cancellation of TCT No. T-249437 in the
name of the Fernandez Siblings and the nullification of the deeds of sale between the
Fernandez Siblings and Spouses Fernandez, and the earlier one between the latter and Almonte
and Aguilar. Nowhere in his complaint did Cagatao mention that he sought to invalidate TCT
No. 12159-A. It was only during the course of the proceedings, when Spouses Fernandez
disclosed that they had purchased the property from Carlos, that Cagatao thought of questioning
the validity of TCT No. 12159-A.

Although the CA correctly ruled that the transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was invalid, the
existence of a valid Torrens title in the name of Carlos which has remained unchallenged
before the proper courts has made irrelevant the issue of whether Gatchalian and his
successors-in-interest should have retained ownership over the property. This is pursuant to
the principle that a Torrens title is irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct
proceeding. Hence, a Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole
world unless it is nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for
cancellation of title.

PROCEDURAL
Moreover, Carlos, as the registered owner of the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify, should have
been impleaded as an INDISPENSABLE PARTY. It is clear in this case that Cagatao failed to
include Carlos in his action for the annulment of TCT No. 12159-A. Basic is the rule in procedural
law that no man can be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger and strangers to a
case cannot be bound by a judgment rendered by the court.

It would be the height of injustice to entertain an action for the annulment of Carlos’ title
without giving her the opportunity to present evidence to support her claim of ownership
through title. In addition, it is without question a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.

Thus, should Cagatao wish to question the ownership of the subject lot of Carlos and Spouses
Fernandez, he should institute a direct action before the proper courts for the cancellation or
modification of the titles in the name of the latter two. He cannot do so now because it is
tantamount to a collateral attack on Carlos’ title, which is expressly prohibited by law and
jurisprudence.

Page 37 of 136
8. Legaspi Towers 300 v. Amelia Muer, et al., G.R. No. 170783, June 18, 2012
FACTS
1. Petitioners 5: Legaspi + Plaintiffs 4 incumbent directos of Legaspi
Respondents/defendants: 8
2. Annual stockholders meeting. Wala quorum so petitioners want to adjourn. Respondents pushed
through so sila nagging Directors.
3. Petitioners filed for Complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Elections with Prayers for the lssuance
of Temporary Restraining Orders and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages
4. Petitioners then filed amendment. Then Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint para
maging Plaintiff si LEGASPI represented by Petitioners.
ISSUE: okay lng ba ung Second Amended Complaint? NO, because it is treated as a derivative suit. As
such dapat the relief sought is for the benefit of the corp. In this case the party who stands to be
benefitted ay ang petitioners.
NULLFICATION OF ELECTION is a DIRECT ACTION.
1. Individual suit – for stockholder, wrong done personally
2. Class suit – for group of stockholders, wrong done as a group
3. Derivative suit – for the corp, through mismanagement of BOD
DOCTRINE:
The Court notes that in the Amended Complaint, PETITIONERS as plaintiffs stated that they are the
incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., and that defendants,
herein RESPONDENTS, are the newly-elected members of the Board of Directors; while in the
Second Amended Complaint, the PLAINTIFF is Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., represented by
petitioners as the allegedly incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
The Second Amended Complaint states who the plaintiffs are, thus:
That the plaintiffs are: LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., non-stock corporation xxx duly represented by the
incumbent reconstituted Board of Directors of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., namely:
ELIADORA FE BOTE VERA xxx, as President; BRUNO C. HAMAN xxx, as Director; LILY
MARQUINEZ PALANCA xxx, as
Secretary; ROSANNA DAVID IMAI xxx, as Treasurer; and members of the Board of Directors,
namely:
ELIZABETH GUERRERO xxx, GLORIA DOMINGO xxx, and RAY VINCENT.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Second Amended Complaint is meant to be a
derivative suit filed by petitioners in behalf of the corporation.
INDIVIDUAL SUIT V. CLASS SUIT V. DERIVATIVE SUIT
Cua, Jr. v. Tan differentiates a derivative suit and an individual/class suit as follows:
A derivative suit must be differentiated from individual and representative or class suits, thus:
Suits by stockholders or members of a corporation based on wrongful or
fraudulent acts of directors or other persons may be classified into individual
suits, class suits, and derivative suits. Where a stockholder or member is denied
the right of inspection, his suit would be individual because the wrong is done to
him personally and not to the other stockholders or the corporation. Where the wrong
is done to a group of stockholders, as where preferred stockholders’ rights are
violated, a class or representative suit will be proper for the protection of all
stockholders belonging to the same group. But where the acts complained of
constitute a wrong to the corporation itself, the cause of action belongs to the
corporation and not to the individual stockholder or member . Although in most
every case of wrong to the corporation, each stockholder is necessarily affected
because the value of his interest therein would be impaired, this fact of itself is not
sufficient to give him an individual cause of action since the corporation is a person
distinct and separate from him, and can and should itself sue the wrongdoer.
Otherwise, not only would the theory of separate entity be violated, but there
would be multiplicity of suits as well as a violation of the priority rights of
creditors. Furthermore, there is the difficulty of determining the amount of damages
that should be paid to each individual stockholder.
However, in cases of mismanagement where the wrongful acts are committed by
the directors or trustees themselves, a stockholder or member may find that he
has no redress because the former are vested by law with the right to decide
whether or not the corporation should sue, and they will never be willing to
sue themselves. The corporation would thus be helpless to seek remedy. Because of
the frequent occurrence of such a situation, the common law gradually recognized
the right of a stockholder to sue on behalf of a corporation in what eventually
became known as a “derivative suit.” It has been proven to be an effective
remedy of the minority against the abuses of management. Thus, an individual
stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate
rights, whenever officials of the corporation refuse to sue or are the ones to
be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing
stockholder is regarded as the nominal party, with the corporation as the
party-in-interest.
RELIEFS IN A DERIVATIVE SUIT MUST PERTAIN TO THE CORPORATION
Since it is the corporation that is the real party-in-interest in a derivative suit, then the reliefs
prayed for must be for the benefit or interest of the corporation. When the reliefs prayed for do
not pertain to the corporation, then it is an improper derivative suit.
REQUISITES OF DERIVATIVE SUIT
The requisites for a derivative suit are as follows:
(1) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction
complained of, the number of his shares not being material;
(2) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of
directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea;
and
(3) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having
been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing
the suit.
In this case, petitioners, as members of the Board of Directors of the condominium corporation before
the election in question, filed a complaint against the newly-elected members of the Board of Directors
for the years 2004-2005, questioning the validity of the election held on April 2, 2004, as it was
allegedly marred by lack of quorum, and praying for the nullification of the said election.
Page 38 of 136
As stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ complaint seek to nullify the said election, and to
protect and enforce their individual right to vote. Petitioners seek the nullification of the election of
the Board of Directors for the years 2004-2005, composed of herein respondents, who pushed through
with the election even if petitioners had adjourned the meeting allegedly due to lack of quorum.
Petitioners are the injured party, whose rights to vote and to be voted upon were directly
affected by the election of the new set of board of directors.

The party-in-interest are the petitioners as stockholders, who wield such right to vote. The cause
of action devolves on petitioners, not the condominium corporation, which did not have the right
to vote. Hence, the complaint for nullification of the election is a DIRECT ACTION by
petitioners, who were the members of the Board of Directors of the corporation before the election,
against respondents, who are the newly-elected Board of Directors. Under the circumstances, the
derivative suit filed by petitioners in behalf of the condominium corporation in the Second
Amended Complaint is improper.

The stockholder’s right to file a derivative suit is not based on any express provision of The
Corporation Code, but is impliedly recognized when the law makes corporate directors or
officers liable for damages suffered by the corporation and its stockholders for violation of their
fiduciary duties, which is not the issue in this case.

Page 39 of 136
9. Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy, G.R. No. 155394. February 17, 2005.
FACTS:
1. Agunoy filed for a land free patent. It was registered. Nueva Ecija
2. Perez filed for protest.
3. B. of Lands found the patent was fraudulently issued.
4. Agunoy died. Heirs executed x-jud partition. The land was divided and was subsequently sold,
others mortgaged.
5. Director of lands instituted cancellation of Free patent, oct and subsequent tct.
6. PLAINTIFF: rep
Defendants: Agunoy, Sr. his children, Sps. Dee and Rural Bank of Gapan

ISSUE: RP in interest ba ang republic? NO. Because land is no longer disposable.

DOCTRINE:

To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-
interest in this case. Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, meaning “the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit,” a procedural rule
reechoed in a long line of cases decided by this Court. For sure, not too long ago, in

Shipside, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, citing earlier cases, we wrote:

Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the
instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being
applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2
of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” To qualify a person to be a real
party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced. A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by REAL INTEREST is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy,
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.

The very complaint in this case, filed by petitioner Republic before the trial court unmistakably alleges
that at the time Free Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-45222
were issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., “the property in question was already adjudicated as private
property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu,” and that at that time, “the
property in question was no longer a disposable public land.”

With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are
already private properties of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore, “no
longer disposable public land” over which the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau,
“no longer had any jurisdiction and control,” we are simply at a loss to understand how petitioner
Republic can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this case , and insists that the
disputed properties are still part of the public domain. If ever, the real party-in-interest could be
none other than the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner.

Page 40 of 136
10. Juana Complex I Homeowners Association v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc. G.R. No. 152272,
March 05, 2012
Facts:
1. The HOA instituted a COMPLAINT for DAMAGES, a class suit against Defendants
DEFENDANTS: Fil-Estate, FEEC, La Paz and Warbird Security and officers
2. HOA wants to use La Paz Road.

ISSUE: was the case properly instituted as a class suit. YES, the case was of common interest.
Individual representation would be numerous and impractical
Common interest: usage of road

DOCTRINE:

With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the
opposition without merit. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:

Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for
the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:

(1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons;
(2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and
(3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the
class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz
Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz
Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons.
The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the
lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and
claiming that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also
prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in
the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties
and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim
to be residents of various barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San
Pedro, Laguna.

Page 41 of 136
11. Sylvia Banda v. Eduardo R. Ermita G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
 Plaintiff: employees of national printing office
Defendant: exec sec, director general of Phil Info Agency, Natl Treasurer
 Eo 378 constitutionality remove jurisdiction of npo over other printing services violates security of
tenure
ISSUE: Is this case qualified as a class suit? NO, petitioner failed to state the number of employees
affected. Only 67 out of 549 employees.
32 signed affidavit of desistance
67 signed the CNFS
Only 20 is in the jurat
DOCTRINE:
Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the petition
indeed qualifies as one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet, we held that “[c]ourts must exercise utmost
caution before allowing a class suit , which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all
indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the
plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded
by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.”
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit . — When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common
or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as
parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for
the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his
individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are:
(1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons;
(2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and
(3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class
and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, the Court held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such
in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the
attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action
should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a
subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the
number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be
enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the
number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine
whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of
general or common interest.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the
assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General,
as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67
petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to
represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while
one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to
34.
Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is
highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted
this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who
signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact
mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. Inother
words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. , we observed that
an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the
question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider
(1) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other
members of the class;
(2) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the
class; and
(3) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the
class.
OPPOSING INTERESTS BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND MEMBERS OF THE CLASS
Previously, we held in Ibañes v. Roman Catholic Church that where the interests of the plaintiffs
and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class
suit will not prosper.
It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned Affidavit
of Desistance was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers
Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWA’s opposition to the filing of
the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the contention of petitioners’ counsel
that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation, the said pleading is a
clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the
class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an
apparent conflict between petitioners’ interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent.
Page 42 of 136
12. Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008.
DEATH OF A PARTY
1. Respondents/Plaintiffs (2) are the owners of lot in leyte.
2. Sued Juan Napere for its encroachment. The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of
title and damages
3. Juan Napere died. Counsel informed court of his death and submitted heirs’ names and
addresses. BUT RTC FAILED TO ORDER SUBSITUTION
LT of Napere: TC has no jurisdiction over the heirs who were not ordered substituted as party-
defendants for the deceased. Rule 3 Sec 17
Issue: may jurisdiction ba ang RTC? Yes, kahit RTC failed to order the substitution.
 It is a mere oversight. Basta nacomply ni counsel ang informing the court.
 Mere failure to substitute is no sufficient to nullify RTC decision. But non-compliance of this rule
amounts to violation of due process.
 Rule on substitution is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.
 Requirement ng substitution: pending action survives
to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of one’s defense. When due process is
not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a
promulgated decision.
In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the
judgment rendered therein because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a codefendant of the
deceased, actively participated in the case. The records show that the counsel of Juan Napere
and petitioner continued to represent them even after Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel,
petitioner was able to adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below .
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner.

DOCTRINE:
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules
require the substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case,
counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address
of the latter’s legal representative.

The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that
survives the death of the defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty
to inform the court of his client’s death and the names and addresses of the heirs. The trial court,
however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless, despite this oversight, we
hold that the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.

The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform
the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the
proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The
trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.

Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s
decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due
process.

Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party’s right to due
process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate.

Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for
the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the
decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the
deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial
proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.

Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear,
participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. In such case, there is
really no violation of the right to due process. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity

Page 43 of 136
13. Judge Sumaljap v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS: LEYTE
1. Josefa Maglasang filed a complaint for the Nullity of a Deed of Sale of Real Property executed
between her as vendor and the Sps. Literato as vendee in the RTC.
2. Literato filed a Counterclaim alleging that Sumaljag occupied said land at the instance of Maglasang
without authority.
3. However, RTC dismissed the Counterclaim.
4. After dismissing the Counterclaim, Literato declared a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence
of Lease Contract,
5. Recovery of Possession of Land and Damages against Sumaljag and Maglasang.
6. Pending trial, Maglasang died. Atty. Suray, common counsel of Sumaljag and Maglasang,
filed a notice of death and substitution praying that Maglasang be substituted by
Sumaljag.
7. RTC denied the Motion for Substitution. MR denied. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: okay ba ung substitution? NO, because the substitute is not one of those mentioned in Rule 3
Sec 16 because Judge Sumaljap is a counterclaim co defendant of josefa
 the pending action survived the death of Josefa maglasang: involves property and property rights
 the report of counsel was late pero okay pa din
DOCTRINE:
The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs[.]
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the
litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself
protected as he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate.
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT PENDING ACTION SURVIVES
A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether Civil Case Nos. B-1239
and B-1281 are actions that survive the death of Josefa. We said in Gonzalez v. Pagcor:
The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or
petitioner was elucidated upon in Bonilla v. Barcena as follows:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which SURVIVE, the wrong
complained [of] affects PRIMARILY and PRINCIPALLY property and property
rights , the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of
action which DO NOT SURVIVE, the injury complained of is to the person, the
property and rights of property affected being incidental.
Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then we are
dealing with actions that survive so that Section 16, Rule 3 must necessarily apply.
DUTY OF COUNSEL; TIMELINESS NOT AN ISSUE
The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after the death of his client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the
deceased’s legal representative or representatives. Incidentally, this is the only representation
that counsel can undertake after the death of a client as the fact of death terminated any further
lawyer-client relationship.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the lower court,
although belatedly, of the fact of her death. However, he did as well inform the lower court that —
2. That before she died she executed a QUITCLAIM DEED in favor of REMISMUNDO D.
MAGLASANG over the land in question (Lot No. 1220-D of Benolho, Albuera, Leyte),
evidenced by a
QUITCLAIM DEED, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’ who in turn sold it in
favor of JUDGE ANTONIO SUMALJAG, evidenced by a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex ‘C.’
Further, counsel asked that “the deceased Josefa Maglasang in her capacity as plaintiff and as Third
Party Counterclaim Defendant be substituted in the case at bar by JUDGE ANTONIO SUMALJAG
whose address is 38 Osmeña Street, Ormoc City” pursuant to “Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of the death of litigant
Josefa Maglasang so as to free her counsel of any liability for failure to make a report of death
under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In our view, counsel satisfactorily explained to the
lower court the circumstances of the late reporting, and the latter in fact granted counsel an extended
period. The timeliness of the report is therefore a non-issue.
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE IMPROPER
The “legal representatives” that the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized by law — the
administrator, executor or guardian who, under the rule on settlement of estate of deceased
persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise
expressly provides that “the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator.”
Significantly, the person — now the present petitioner — that counsel gave as substitute was not
one of those mentioned under Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a COUNTERCLAIM CO-
DEFENDANT of the deceased whose proferred justification for the requested substitution is the
transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her death.Under the
circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally correct in not giving effect to
counsel’s suggested substitute.
HEIRS AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in determining who the
appropriate legal representative/s should be in the absence of an executor or administrator. The second
paragraph of the Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, is clear — the heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator. Our decisions on this matter have been clear and unequivocal. In San Juan,
Jr. v. Cruz, this Court held:
The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals that priority is given
to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and
Page 44 of 136
 that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or
administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to
be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.

We likewise said in Gochan v. Young:

For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances
recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when
there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator
has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs
as the proper representatives of the deceased.

Page 45 of 136
14. Memoracion Cruz v. Oswaldo Z. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 01, 2010 What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute
QUICKIE FACTS: Memoracion as party to the pending case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules
1. Memoracion filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages in the RTC of of Civil Procedure, and established jurisprudence. Consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court
Manila against her son Oswaldo. of Appeals, we consider such Manifestation, signed by Memoracion’s heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining
2. Allegedly, the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud. Atty. Neri’s services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo
3. After presenting evidence, Memoracion died. Cruz.
4. Her lawyer notified the court and informed the same that her son Edgardo would substitute her.
5. Oswaldo moved to dismiss on the ground that the Action for Reconveyance is a personal action
which does not survive the death of Memoracion. It also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz (respondent), although also an heir of Memoracion,
6. RTC dismissed the case. CA upheld. should be excluded as a legal representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.

ISSUE: okay ba ang substitution? Yes, the action survived the death
It is attached to property and property rights

DI: Recoveyance ba ay personal action?

DOCTRINE:
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE, RECONVEYANCE AND DAMAGES SURVIVED THE DEATH OF
PETITIONER

The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in
Bonilla v. Barcena, to wit:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of ACTION WHICH SURVIVE, the
wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which DO NOT SURVIVE, the injury complained of is to the person, the property
and rights of property affected being incidental.

If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of
the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato, we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property rights, and therefore, survives the
death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits
survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.

DUTY OF COUNSEL IN CASE OF SURVIVAL OF PENDING CASE

If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform the
court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s legal
representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action.

If NO LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative
FAILS TO APPEAR within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending
to order the OPPOSING PARTY to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be
affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate.

IMPROPER TO DISMISS THE INSTANT CASE; IMPROPER TO SUBSTITUTE HEIR WHO IS AN ADVERSE
PARTY

It was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of
sale involves property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion.
The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly, of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the
name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz.

Page 46 of 136
15. Algura v. LGU of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Sps Algura filed a Complaint for Damages against Naga City for the illegal demolition of their
residence and boarding house.
2. Also, Algura filed an Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigents.
3. They claim that they have a gross monthly income of 10K and a net pay of 3K.
4. They also showed that they had no property.
5. In Naga’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs for Nonpayment of Filing Fees, it was shown that the Sps
Algura exceeded the gross income requirement.
6. Thus they were disqualified as indigent litigants.
ISSUE: qualified indigent litigant ba si Algura? yes, dahil sa rule 3 sec 21
 Property requirement was met.
 Income requirement was not satisfied, mataas ng 1500/mo sa threshold
 Kung di na meet ang one of the requirement, eto ang last test: “one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.” (pasado cla)
DOCTRINE:
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and
neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income
of PhP 10,474.00, and a Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have
property declared in their names for taxation. Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as
shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the property requirement is met.
However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of
PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura
when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then
Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied.
The trial court was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants
although the court should have applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing
of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141,
Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application could not have been granted as the
combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income
threshold.
RULE 141 § 19 & RULE 3 § 21 ON INDIGENT LITIGANTS CAN BE APPLIED TOGETHER
Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000
Order disqualifying them as indigent litigants that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3,
Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as
indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is “one who has no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.” The trial court did
not give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21
on Indigent Party.
The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as
indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141,
Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141,
Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal
Fees.
The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section
18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which
is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants. Instead of
declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18 and later
Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be harmonized.
The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle
that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them.
APPLICATION OF THE RULES ON INDIGENT LITIGANTS
When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and
supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the
income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141 — that is, the
applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s immediate family do not exceed an amount double
the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair
market value of more than PhP 300,000.00. If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the
income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically
granted and the grant is a MATTER OF RIGHT.
However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would
set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has “no money or property
sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.” In
that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented
by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence
adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still
contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court,
possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was
heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person
with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose.
Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the
salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is
mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the
application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the “indigency test” under
Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for an
exemption.
Page 47 of 136
ADDITIONAL CASES
Heritage Park Management v. CIAC, G.R. No. 148133, October 8, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
In developing into a memorial park a piece of land in Fort Bonifacio, PEA engaged the services of EDC
(Elpidio Uy) under a Lanscaping and Construction Agreement wherein EDC would undertake to develop
and do landscaping works on 105 hectare
Heritage Park. However, due to PEA’s inability to evict the squatters, it was delayed. Aggrieved, EDC
filed a complaint befCore the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission seeking to collect damages
from PEA. Thereafter, PEA executed a Dead of Assignment in favor of Heritage Park Management
Corporation which assigns all of PEAs rights and contracts to the Hertige. As a result, Heritage, as
assignee, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction in the CA to enjoin the CIAC from ruling on the
complaint. Heritage claims that CIAC has no jurisdiction because it was not impleaded as an
indispensible party.
DOCTRINE:
Petitioner (Heritage) claims that it is an indispensable party to the proceedings before the CIAC as the
assignee of the PEA of the latter’s rights, interests, and obligations in the Heritage Park Project. Thus, its
non-inclusion in the proceedings before the CIAC deprived the latter of jurisdiction over the case.
Heritage argues that it is in possession and control over the funds of the Heritage Park Project which
EDC is targeting with its complaint before the CIAC.
Such contention is bereft of merit. It must be remembered that when the case was originally filed
by EDC before the CIAC on January 12, 2000, PEA had not yet transferred its rights and
obligations over the Project to Heritage, as evidenced by the Deed of Assignment dated March
2000. Thus, by impleading PEA as respondent, the CIAC had jurisdiction over the case at that
time.
Heritage, however, claims that when PEA transferred its rights and obligations over the Project to
Heritage, the CIAC lost its jurisdiction. In other words, Heritage alleges that a court may lose jurisdiction
over a case based on the subsequent actions of the parties. This is unacceptable.
The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow parties
that disagree with the decision of a judicial tribunal to annul the same through the expedient of
transferring their interests or rights involved in the case.
HERITAGE NOT AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY; TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE
Moreover, Heritage is mistaken when it claims that it is an indispensible party to the case and that it was
not included in the case before the CIAC. Being a transferee of the interests of PEA over the
Project during the pendency of the case before the CIAC, it is bound by the proceedings in like
manner as PEA. In Jocson v. Court of Appeals, this Court held the Bank of the Philippine Islands is
bound by the decision of the trial court being the transferee pendent lite of the original
defendant therein, despite the fact that it had not been substituted for the original defendant
and had not been notified of the proceedings against it.
CASE IS BINDING UPON THE TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE
Rule 3 of Section 20 (now Section 19, Rule 3) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 20. Transfer of Interest. — In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined
with the original party.
This Court has declared in a number of decisions that a transferee pendente lite stands in exactly
the same position as its predecessor-in-interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the
proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to it. It is a proper but not an
indispensible party as it would in any event be bound by the judgment against his predecessor. This
would follow even if it is not formally included as a defendant through an amendment of the
complaint.
Verily, the non-inclusion of Heritage in the proceedings before the CIAC is of no moment as the
Rules of Court specifically allows the proceedings to proceed with the original parties while
binding the transferee.
William Genato v. Benjamin Bayhon, G.R. No. 171035, August 24, 2009
QUICKIE FACTS:
Bayhon contracted a loan with Genato. Thereafter, Bayhon et al filed an Action for the Declaration of
Nullity of a Dacion en Pago executed by Bayhon in favor of Genato. Likewise, Genato filed an Action for
Specific Performance against Bayhon compelling the latter to pay the loan and execute a dacion en pago
in his favor. Upon consolidation of the 2 cases, RTC ruled in favor of Genato and held Bayhon liable for
the loan. During Bayhon’s appeal, he died. CA reversed the RTC and ruled that Bayhon’s liability was
extinguished by his death.
DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. In Estate of Hemady v.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the
Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, held:
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations.
The Court proceeded further to state the GENERAL RULE: “Under our law, therefore, the general rule is
that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The loan in this case was contracted by Bayhon. He died while the case was pending before the
Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists
against his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs
UNLESS the debt has first been satisfied.
The procedure in VINDICATING MONETARY CLAIMS involving a DEFENDANT WHO DIES BEFORE
FINAL JUDGMENT is governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied,
and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action
was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be
allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained
by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
Page 48 of 136
Pursuant to this provision, petitioner’s remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the deceased
respondent.
Clearly, the respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real
parties-in-interest allowed by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC. This is not necessarily to
say, however, that Galang represents AMBALA, for as records show and as HLI aptly noted, his
“petisyon” filed with DAR did not carry the usual authorization of the individuals in whose behalf it was
supposed to have been instituted. To date, such authorization document, which would logically include a
list of the names of the authorizing FWBs, has yet to be submitted to be part of the records.

Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July
05, 2011
DOCTRINE:
HLI would deny real party-in-interest status to the purported leaders of the Supervisory Group and
AMBALA, i.e., Julio Suniga, Windsor Andaya, and Rene Galang, who filed the revocatory petitions before
the DAR. As HLI would have it, Galang, the self-styled head of AMBALA, gained HLI employment in June
1990 and, thus, could not have been a party to the SDOA executed a year earlier. As regards the
Supervisory Group, HLI alleges that supervisors are not regular farmworkers, but the company
nonetheless considered them FWBs under the SDOA as a mere concession to enable them to enjoy the
same benefits given qualified regular farmworkers. However, if the SDOA would be canceled and land
distribution effected, so HLI claims, citing Fortich v. Corona, the supervisors would be excluded from
receiving lands as farmworkers other than the regular farmworkers who are merely entitled to the “fruits
of the land.”
The SDOA no less identifies “the SDP qualified beneficiaries” as “the farmworkers who appear in
the annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or
periodically employed by [HLI].” Galang, per HLI’s own admission, is employed by HLI , and is, thus,
a qualified beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within the definition of a real party-in-interest
under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, meaning, one who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly
employed by HLI and whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA.
Being qualified beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are certainly parties
who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment recalling the SDP or replacing it with
some other modality to comply with RA 6657.

Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers , but are
in the category of “other farmworkers” mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, thus only
entitled to a share of the fruits of the land, as indeed Fortich teaches, this does not detract from the
fact that they are still identified as being among the “SDP qualified beneficiaries.” As such, they
are, thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP.

Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer -leaders are expressly allowed to
represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the
DAR. Specifically:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—

Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow

farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however,
that when there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or
group before any DAR proceedings.

Page 49 of 136
 V. Venue (Rule 4)

RULE 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Venue of real actions.

Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried
in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions.

All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Sec. 3. Venue of actions against non-residents.
If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action
may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property
or any portion thereof is situated or found.
Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable.
This Rule shall not apply:
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or

(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.

Page 50 of 136
Sec. 4b
1. Spouses Ochoa v. Chinabank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011 (3135)

CASE NATURE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a resolution of the Supreme Court.

RD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED

F:
COMPLAINT (REAL):
(1) Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed in RTC Paranaque;
(2) Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage filed in RTC Paranaque (neither real nor personal)

VENUE: Petitioner: Makati; Respondents: Paranaque City

1. The parties engaged in a Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgaged property is located in Paranaque
City.
a. The parties stipulated in their REM Contract that Makati City should be the exclusive venue of
any “Action” they will undertake.
b. However, Chinabank filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage in RTC Paranaque
—a violation of the parties’ stipulation.
c. The petitioners also filed an Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages in RTC Paranaque.
2. CA ruled that the stipulated exclusive venue of [RTC] Makati City is binding only on
petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the RTC
of Parañaque City, but not on respondent bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage,
which was filed with the same court [RTC Paranaque]. (SC affirmed this decision)
3. LT:
a. Petitioners: Makati should be the venue because according to Sec. 4(b) Rule 4, parties may
stipulate the exclusive venue of the filing of action.
b. Respondent: Paranaque should be the venue because Extra-Judicial Foreclosure, not being an
“action,” is not governed by ROC, but by Act 3135.

I: Which place is the proper venue of Extrajudicial Foreclosure of REM? Paranaque or the place where
the mortgaged property is located.

R:
1. Sec. 4 Rule 4 pertains to Venue of “Actions”
a. “Extra-Judicial Foreclosure” is not within the meaning of the word “action.”
Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated
by filing a petition not with any court of justice but with the office of the
sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. By no stretch of the
imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the category of a court of justice…
extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits
(Supena v De la Rosa, 1997).
b. The venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages is governed by the special
law and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.
i. Act 3135 provides that the venue of Extrajudicial Foreclosure of a REM cannot be
made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is situated.
ii. In application, since the mortgaged real property is located in Paranaque City, the venue
should also be in Paranaque city. The stipulated exclusive venue is applicable only in the
Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages and not to Extrajudicial Foreclosure of REM.

Page 51 of 136
Sec. 4b and Sec. 2
2. San Miguel Corporation v. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 23, 2005
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
RD: WHEREFORE, XXX RTC [Naga City B-20]is the proper venue of the amended complaint for a sum of
money filed XXX. The case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC of Naga City.
F:
COMPLAINT (PERSONAL): Collection of Sum of Money filed by Monasterio.
VENUE: Petitioner: Makati or Pasig or other choice of SMC; Respondent: Naga City
1. SMC entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement (EWA) with SMB Warehousing Services
(SMB), represented by its manager, respondent Troy Francis L. Monasterio for “warehousing
services.”
a. The EWA stipulated that the courts of Makati or Pasig or other courts chosen by SMC should be
the venue of actions.
b. Monasterio is a resident of Naga City.
2. Monasterio filed a Collection of Sum of Money in Naga City for P900k unpaid cashiering fees for
“cashiering services”.
a. SMC filed a MTD on the ground of improper venue.
3. LT:
a. Petitioner: Makati or Pasig or other courts chosen by SMC should be the venue because the
venue is stipulated. The “cashiering job” is under the EWA.
b. Respondent: Naga City should be the venue because “cashiering services” are separate and
distinct services under the EWA. Hence, the applicable rule is Sec. 2 that the venue should be
the place of residence and not Sec. 4b of ROC.
4. RTC: Denied MTD
a. Pending the MR, respondent filed an Amended Complaint deleting his claim for unpaid
warehousing and cashiering fees but increasing the exemplary damages from P500,000 to
P1,500,000.
5. CA: Dismissed SCA for Certiorari assailing the order of RTC.
a. CA ruled that cashiering services are inseparable from warehousing services, thus the venue
stipulated in EWA should have been the proper venue if not for the filing of the respondent’s
amended complaint to which SMC filed an answer. Because of which the case had become moot
and academic. (SC found this decision incorrect)
I: Which is the proper venue for the Collection of Sum of Money? Naga City, because Cashiering service
is not included in the EWA.
DI1: WON “cashiering services” are separate and distinct services under the EWA? YES, therefore Sec.
4b is not applicable.
R:
1. Cashiering service is separate from warehousing service. Records show that respondent received a
separate consideration of P11,400 for the cashiering service he rendered to SMC.
a. The amended complaint shows that the respondent’s cause of action is limited to collection of
sum from cashiering services only.
RULE: allegations in the complaint determines the cause of action or the nature of the
case
2. Where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those
not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the
stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific
undertaking or agreement.
3. Since convenience is the raison d’être of the rules on venue, venue stipulation should be deemed
merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties’
convenience.
1
Decisive Issue
Sec. 4b and Sec. 1
3. Briones v. CA and Cash Asia Credit Corp, G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015
CASE NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of RTC are REINSTATED.
F:
COMPLAINT (REAL): for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure
of Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT, and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC
VENUE: Petitioner: Manila; Cash Asia: Makati
1. A loan of P3.5M from Cash Asia was contracted through forgery with the ff. contracts: Promissory
Note, Loan Agreement and Deed of REM. These contracts stipulated the exclusive venue in
Makati City. The property is located in Manila.
a. Briones claimed that he was in Vietnam when the loan was contracted.
b. Because of the unpaid loan, Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose the property.
2. Briones assailed the validity of the contracts in RTC Manila
a. Cash Asia filed a MTD on the ground of improper venue.
3. RTC: Denied MTD
4. CA: annulled RTC order without prejudice to refiling to proper venue.
a. Notwithstanding the claim of forgery, the contracts are clear that actions should be exclusively
filed in Makati City
5. LT:
a. Petitioner: Manila should be the venue because the venue stipulation in the contracts cannot
bind him.
i. His signature was forged, and he was never a party in the contracts.
b. Respondent: the venue stipulation should be followed.
I: Which place is the proper venue? Manila, because Briones’ complaint directly assails the validity of the
contracts.
R:
 Manila is the proper venue because Briones’ complaint directly assails the validity of the contracts.
a. GR: The venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the
court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
XPN: Written stipulation
XPN to XPN: the validity of the written instrument itself (not just a
stipulation) is assailed; Effect: Go back to the GR. [DOCTRINE]
b. Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity.
NOTE: Condition of Written Stipulation on Exclusivity of Venue (Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils., 2008)
 The stipulation must be exclusive using qualifying or restrictive words such as “exclusively,”
“waiving for this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to
the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import.
 Effect if condition is not followed: venue is deemed a mere option.
Page 52 of 136
Page 53 of 136
Rule 4 Sec. 2; Rule 16 Sec. 1c
4. Irene Marcos Araneta v. CA and Benedicto , G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
RD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
F:
COMPLAINT (PERSONAL): Reconveyance of shares of stocks against Benedicto
VENUE: Petitioner: Batac, Ilocos Norte; Respondent: No particular venue mentioned
1. Irene Marcos trusted shares of stocks to Benedicto amounting to 65% of shares placed in
Benedicto’s name in the Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity
Corporation (UEC).
a. However, Benedicto refused to give the shares to Irene when she demanded reconveyance.
b. Irene Marcos filed in RTC Batac, Ilocos Norte. But she was staying at her husband’s
house in Forbes Park, Makati City.
2. Benedicto filed MTD on the following grounds:
a. RTC has no jurisdiction but the SEC being an intra-corporate dispute (filed on March 2000;
RA8799 became effective on July 2000)
b. No cause of action. It was not alleged that Benedicto accepted the trust in her favor.
c. Improper venue. [ISSUE AT HAND]
3. RTC dismissed the complaint because of the improper venue.
a. Irene filed a Motion to Amend her complaint to include her “new trustees” as
plaintiffs who are all residents of Ilocos Norte to cure the improper venue. LOL!
4. RTC: admitted the amended complaint
a. Amended complaint cured the defect of improper venue.
b. Filing of amended complaint is a matter of right under Sec. 2 Rule 10 ROC.
5. CA: set aside the order of RTC in granting the amended complaint; CA decision on venue:
a. The respondents did not waive improper venue.
b. The petitioners are not residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte.
6. LT:
a. Petitioner:
i. Amended complaint is proper under Sec. 2 Rule 10 ROC
ii. Respondents are precluded from raising the issue of proper venue by their subsequent acts
of filing numerous pleadings which imply waiver of objection to improper venue.
iii. The inclusion of the co-plaintiffs of Irene cures the defect. (SC ruled that the co-
plaintiffs are not the real party-in-interest)
iv. CTC shows she’s a resident of Batac. (SC ruled that CTC is easy to secure)
b. Respondent:
i. There is no original complaint to amend, because the complaint was already dismissed with
finality. (SC ruled that the amended complaint was valid)
ii. Irene (1) is not a resident of Marcos’ Mansion as testified by Marcos’ Mansion household
staff, (2) did not vote in the 1998 national elections, (3) lives in Forbes Park, Makati City.
iii. The case is a real action involving properties outside RTC Batac. (SC ruled this involves
personal property)
I: 1. WON respondents are deemed waived in raising the issue of improper venue. NO
2. WON RTC Batac has jurisdiction. NO, because of improper venue
DI: What is the nature of the case? Personal
R:
1. Respondents did not impliedly waive improper venue.
a. When deemed waived: when not raised seasonably, i.e., where the defendant failed to
either file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the same
as an affirmative defense.
b. In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time possible, meaning
“within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint,” the matter of
improper venue.
Rule 16 MTD; Section 1. Grounds.
Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
XXX
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
XXX
2. RTC Batac has no jurisdiction on the ground of improper venue. Reasons:
a. Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions
i. REAL AND PERSONAL ACTIONS, DISTINGUISHED: In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of
damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein. The venue of real actions shall be the proper court which
has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election
of the plaintiff.
ii. In this case, the action is in personam because of the alleged personal liability to Irene
upon an alleged trust. They are not actions in rem, because the actions are not against the
real properties of FEMII and UEC even if the assets of the corporations are real properties.
b. Venue is Improperly Laid
i. “ANY OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES RESIDES,” INTERPRETATION: when there is
more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties
should be the basis for determining proper venue.
 The word ‘principal’ has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to
prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or
defendant as the venue. (Civil Procedure Annotated by Justice Feria)
 Eliminate the qualifying term “principal” and the purpose of the Rule would be
defeated where a nominal or formal party is impleaded in the action since the
latter would not have the degree of interest in the subject of the action which
would warrant and entail the desirably active participation expected of litigants in
a case. (Remedial Law Compendium by Justice Regalado)
ii. In this case, the Principal Plaintiff (Irene) is not a Resident in Venue of Action
1. Irene is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit
(Sec. 2 Rule 3); hence, she is the only real party-in-interest.
2. The co-plaintiffs are “new trustees.” Trustees can only serve as mere representatives
of the beneficiary.
The Court will not speculate on the reason why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and expenses
she and her adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her case be heard and
decided by the RTC in Batac.
HAHAHAHAHA! ALAM NA 😊
Page 54 of 136
5. Heirs of the Late Flaviano Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corporation, 706 SCRA 235, 2013
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The complaint for the recovery of the deficiency
amount is hereby DISMISSED. The extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, however,
STANDS.

F:
COMPLAINT (REAL): for recovery of the deficiency amount after extrajudicial foreclosure of
REM

VENUE: Petitioner: Tacloban; Respondent: either Tacloban “Capital of Leyte Province” or Ormoc City
1. Sps. Maglasang secured a loan from the Bank secured by 7 Real Properties in Ormoc City.
2. The Sps. Died. The properties of the Sps were extrajudicially partitioned without prejudice to the
claims of the creditors.
3. The bank extrajudicially foreclosed the REM for the amount of P350k but it was deficient. So the
Bank filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of P250k against the Estate of Maglasang.
4. RELEVANT FACTS IN THE VENUE ISSUE:
a. In their mortgage contract it was stipulated that the venue for foreclosure sale should be
Tacloban City. However, the stipulation lacks exclusivity.
b. The foreclosure was made in Ormoc City or the location of the property pursuant to Act 3135.
5. RTC: jointly and severally pay MBC the deficiency amount after extrajudicial foreclosure of REM
(P434,742.36 + interest).
6. CA: affirmed RTC
7. LT concerning the Venue:
a. Petitioner: Tacloban should be the venue because that is stipulated in the mortgage contract.
b. Respondent: either Tacloban or Ormoc can be the venue because the stipulation lacks
exclusivity.

I: Which is the proper venue? EITHER TACLOBAN OR ORMOC, because stipulation lacks exclusivity

R:
1. Tacloban, the stipulated venue, is only an “additional venue.”
a. Case law states that absence of such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the
exclusivity of the agreed forum, the stipulated place should only be as an additional, not
a limiting venue. As a consequence, the stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135
can be applied alternatively.

Page 55 of 136
Sec. 1 and Sec. 4b
6. Paglaum Management v. Union Bank, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
RD: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED.

F:
COMPLAINT (REAL): for Annulment of Sale and Titles with Damages and Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Injunction in RTC Makati
VENUE: Petitioner: Makati; Respondent: Cebu
1. UB extended a credit line of 10M to HealthTech. PAGLAUM EXECUTED 3 REMs to secure the loan.
The properties are located in Cebu.
2. The 3 REM contained 3 venue stipulations.
a. First REM in Makati, MM or location of properties
b. Second REM in Cebu, MM or location of properties
c. Third REM in (blank) or location of properties
3. The parties entered into a restructuring agreement with a venue stipulation in Makati City
only “waiving any other venue.”
4. HealthTech defaulted on its payment. UB extrajudicially foreclosed the properties.
5. PAGLAUM filed a complaint for annulment of sale and titles.
6. Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.
7. LT:
a. Petitioner: Makati should be the proper venue, because:
i. the Restructuring Agreement governs the choice of venue between the parties, and
ii. the agreement on the choice of venue must be interpreted with the convenience of the
parties in mind and the view that any obscurity therein was caused by Union Bank.
b. Respondent: Cebu should be the proper venue, because:
i. the Restructuring Agreement is applicable only to the contract of loan, and not to the Real
Estate Mortgage, and
ii. the mortgage contracts explicitly state that the choice of venue exclusively belongs to it.
8. RTC: granted MTD
9. CA: affirmed RTC

I: Where is the proper venue? MAKATI, because the case is a real action.

R:
1. The action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial foreclosure by Union
Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action
Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950:
“An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different
from an action to annul a private sale of real property.
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his
claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of
which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for
the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface
the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover
said real property. It is a real action.”
2. Real actions shall be commenced and tried in the court that has jurisdiction over the area where the
property is situated. However, the venue stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement should be
controlling.

Page 56 of 136
Sec. 1 and Sec. 4b
7. Unionbank v. Maunlad Homes, Inc. G.R. No. 190071, August 15, 2012
PETITION: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
RD: WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the decision of CA.

F:
COMPLAINT (REAL): Unlawful Detainer
VENUE: Petitioner: Makati; Maunlad: Malolos Bulacan
1. UB entered into a Contract To Sell with Maunland involving the Maunlad Shopping Mall for a Total
Price of P151M, a Down Payment of P2.4M and the balance to be amortized for 180 months.
a. Rescission contract allows extrajudicial taking by UB
b. Venue stipulation provides Makati.
2. For failure to pay the amortization, UB sent a Notice of Rescission of Contract.
3. Maunlad refused to vacate the premise after sending a demand letter. UB instituted an ejectment
suit.
4. MeTC: dismissed the ejectment suit because of claims of possession and ownership based on
contract the appropriate action should be accion reinvidicatoria over which it had no jurisdiction.
5. RTC: affirmed RTC
a. The RTC declared that Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue provision in the
contract because ejectment is not an action arising out of or connected with the
contract.
6. CA: affirmed RTC
7. LT:
a. Petitioner/UB:
i. Ejectment suit is correct.
ii. Makati is the venue because it is stipulated in the contract (Sec. 4b).
b. Respondent/Maunlad:
i. UB’s action based on propriety of the rescission is within the RTC not MeTC.
ii. Malolos is the venue because the real property is situated there (Sec. 1)

I: Who has the jurisdiction? MeTC, because it is a case of Unlawful Detainer

Where is the proper venue? Makati, because of venue stipulation

R:
1. MeTC has the jurisdiction because it is a case of Unlawful Detainer
a. UB met all the elements of unlawful detainer:
i. Defendant had lawful possession
ii. Defendant’s possession became illegal
iii. Defendant remained in the property
iv. Within 1 year from demand
b. Maunlad may not divest the MeTC of its jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of
the property
2. Makati is the proper venue.
a. Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Venue; The Supreme Court upheld the validity of a
stipulation in a contract providing for a venue for ejectment actions other than that
stated in the Rules of Court

Page 57 of 136
 VII. Pleadings (Rules 6 to 8) A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant.
RULE 6
KINDS OF PLEADINGS Sec. 10. Reply.
Section 1. Pleadings defined.
A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of
Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such
the court for appropriate judgment. new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are
Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed. deemed controverted.
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall
The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party be set forth in an amended or supplemental complaint.
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a claim against him. Sec. 11. Third, (fourth, etc.) party complaint.
An answer may be responded to by a reply.
A third (fourth, etc.) party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
Sec. 3. Complaint. against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and residences Sec. 12. Bringing new parties.
of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
Sec. 4. Answer. When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of
complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them
An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses. to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.
Sec. 5. Defenses. Sec. 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.) party complaint.

Defenses may either be negative or affirmative. A third (fourth, etc.) party defendant may allege in his answer his defenses, counterclaims or cross-
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claims, including such defenses that the third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff may have against the
claimant essential to his cause or causes of action. original plaintiff's claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against the original
plaintiff in respect of the latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the
material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery
by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment,
illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other
matter by way of confession and avoidance.

Sec. 6. Counterclaim.

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
Sec. 7. Compulsory counterclaim.

A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of
or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction
of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action
before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of
the amount.
Sec. 8. Cross-claim.
A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-
claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
Sec. 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-cross-claims.

A counterclaim may be asserted against an original counter-claimant.

Page 58 of 136
 therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
RULE 7
PARTS OF A PLEADING A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or
Section 1. Caption. upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.

The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original
complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first
party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
Sec. 2. The body.
The body of the pleading sets forth its designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the
relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading.
(a) Paragraphs. - The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered
as to be readily identified, each of which shall contain a statement of a single set of
circumstances so far as that can be done with convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by
its number in all succeeding pleadings.
(b) Headings. - When two or more causes of action are joined, the statement of the first shall be
prefaced by the words "first cause of action," of the second by "second cause of action," and so
on for the others.
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the
complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer
to the second cause of action" and so on; and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are
addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to that effect.

(c) Relief. - The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further
or other relief as may be deemed just or equitable.

(d) Date. - Every pleading shall be dated.

Sec. 3. Signature and address.

Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his
address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in
violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly
report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.

Sec. 4. Verification.
Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations

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 RULE 8
MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS
Section 1. In general.
Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may
be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall
be clearly and concisely stated.
Sec. 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses.
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically,
either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses. When two
or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would
be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements.
Sec. 3. Conditions precedent.
In any pleading a general averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent shall be
sufficient.
Sec. 4. Capacity.
Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party, must be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to
the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such
supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
Sec. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind.
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated
with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person may be
averred generally.
Sec. 6. Judgment.
In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of
a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter
showing jurisdiction to render it.
Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document.
Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof
shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
Sec. 8. How to contest such documents.
When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of
an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument
or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
Sec. 9. Official document or act.
In pleading an official document or official act, it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or
the act done in compliance with law.
Sec. 10. Specific denial.
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to
support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall
specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial.
Sec. 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.
Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover
usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath.
Sec. 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein.
Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted
by these Rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty (20) days after the service of the
pleading upon him, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order any
pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or false, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom.
RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Sec. 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred.
A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.
RULE 15 MOTION
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion.
Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, aand all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.
Page 60 of 136
CNFS
1. Cosco Philippines Shipping v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. RTC reinstated.
F:
COMPLAINT: Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages
PLAINTIFF (1): Kemper Insurance Company, insurer
DEFENDANT (1): Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc., cerrier
CNFS, SIGNED BY (1): Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, counsel of Kemper
1. Genosi, Inc. (consignee) imported boneless beef from Australia. Kemper insured the shipment.
Kemper has no license to engage in business in the Philippines.
a. However, Genosi rejected a portion of the shipment due to spoilage.
2. Genosi filed a claim against Cosco and Kemper. McLarens Chartered recommended a settlement of
$64k which Kemper paid to Genosi.
3. Kemper made demands for the return of $64k, but Cosco refused.
a. Kemper filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages.
b. Cosco filed a MTD.
4. LT:
a. Respondent/Plaintiff:
i. Spoilage was due to faulty electronic that resulted to fluctuations in temperature of the
reefer.
ii. Kemper admitted that it failed to attach in its complaint the proof of Atty. Lat’s
authority. But the subsequent compliance through SPA cures it.
b. Petitioner/Defendant:
i. Kemper has no capacity to sue since it was doing business in Ph without license;
1. Atty. Lat, counsel of Kemper, failed to show authority to sue and sign the
CNFS either through SPA, Board Resolution or Secretary Certificate
a. The Atty. Lat’s SPA is defective. It was signed by Kemper’s underwriter
who also lacks authority.
2. Atty. Lat’s act of signing CNFS violates Sec. 5 Rule 7.
ii. complaint has prescribed or is barred by laches
iii. loss sustained was due to causes beyond the carrier’s control
5. RTC: granted the MTD.
a. Signing of the CNFS must be executed by the petitioner itself, and not by the counsel.
b. Since Atty. Lat did not have any SPA, the CNFS was fatally defective—ground for dismissal
6. CA: reversed RTC; remanded the case to RTC
a. factual circumstances of the case warranted the liberal application of the rules
7. SC: reversed CA; reinstated RTC
I: WON Atty. Lat was properly authorized by Kemper to sign CNFS? NO, no valid authorization
WON Cosco is barred by laches in raising lack of jurisdiction due to defective CNFS. NO, complaint is not
deemed filed.
R:
1. Atty. Lat is not authorized.
a. GR: Principal parties must sign CNFS
XPN: Duly Authorized Agent by the Principal Parties may sign CNFS
b. In case of a corporation, the CNFS may be signed by its lawyer.
i. Conditions:
1. Lawyer must be duly authorized by a Board Resolution or Sec. Certificate. The Physical
act of signing of the corp, can be performed by natural persons duly authorized by By-
Laws or a Board Resolution.
2. Corp has a capacity to sue or be sued.
 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines (FASAP), 2006. Only individuals vested with authority by a valid
board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf
of a corporation. We also required proof of such authority to be
presented. The petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was
submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority.
ii. In this case, Kemper failed to show proof of authority when it executed the CNFS.
c. GR: The lack of CNFS is generally not curable by mere amendment, and it is a ground of
dismissal without prejudice
i. XPN: Instances when the general rule is relaxed
1. The board resolution, which was subsequently attached, recognized the pre-
existing status of the bank manager as an authorized signatory (Chinabank v
Mondragon Intl Phil).
2. SC took into consideration the merits of the case and to avoid a re-litigation of the
issues and further delay the administration of justice (Abaya Investment Corp v
Merit Ph)
ii. In this case, there is no necessity to relax the rule, because
1. there was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show
subsequent compliance with the requirement of the law. Neither was there a
copy of the board resolution or secretary’s certificate subsequently submitted to
the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized.
2. The SPA subsequently submitted was defective being signed by a person not
authorized to sign. LOL!
2. Petitioner is not barred by laches from raising the defect in CNFS.
REASONS:
a. when a complaint is filed by one not duly authorized, the complaint is not deemed filed.
b. Further, since no valid complaint was filed, RTC never acquired jurisdiction over Kemper. Issue
of jurisdiction may be raised anytime and is not lost by waiver or estoppel.
c. Also in this case, the jurisdiction was questioned as early as the pre-trial stage. It cannot be
considered a considerable length of time elapsed for laches to attach
LACHES is defined as the “failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it
Page 61 of 136
CNFS; Sec. 5 Rule 7
2. Iglesia ni Kristo v. Hon. Ponferrada and Heirs of Enrique Santos, G.R. No. 168943, October
27, 2006
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
RD: petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
F:
COMPLAINT: Quieting of Title and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria
PLAINTIFFS (6): Alicia, Alfredo, Roberto, Enrique and Susan, all surnamed Santos, and Sonia Santos-
Wallin represented by Enrique (Jr) OR “Heirs of Enrique Santos”
DEFENDANT (1): INC
CNFS, SIGNED BY (1): Enrique G. Santos
1. Enrique Santos (Sr) is the owner of subject property covered by a TCT in Tandang Sora, QC.
2. The RD of QC was burned. RD reconstituted the TCT. But INC was claiming ownership over the
property.
3. Plaintiffs filed for Quieting of Title and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria (year 2000).
4. INC filed for MTD.
5. LT:
a. Petitioner/Defendant:
i. Violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7.
1. Only Enrique signed the CNFS instead of all.
2. Although plaintiffs alleged Enrique as their representative, there is no showing that he
was authorized to file complaint and to sign CNFS.
3. Enrique must implead other plaintiffs as indispensable parties.
4. Plaintiffs did not aver the capacity of INC to sue or be sued.
5. Complaint has no address of plaintiffs.
ii. Quieting of Title and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria had prescribed for filing beyond 10 year
period. The reckoning period is 1984 when INC acquired the TCT.
b. Respondent/Plaintiffs:
i. Enrique is authorized. There is co-ownership; thus, any co-owner can act for the benefit of
all without need for authorization. There is no need to implead other co-owners.
ii. Action has not prescribed. The reckoning period is 1996 when INC barred plaintiffs from
fencing their property.
6. RTC (Hon. Ponferrada) : in favor of Plaintiffs; CNFS was signed properly
I: WON the sole signing of the CNFS of Enrique on behalf of the other plaintiffs is sufficient even without
an authorization document? YES, because of the commonality of interest of the plaintiffs
i. Consequently the sole signature of Enrique is sufficient for RTC to take cognizance of the
case. There is no need to execute a SPA.
ii. We uphold the validity of the complaint because of the following circumstances:
1. the caption of the instant case is Heirs of Enrique Santos v. Iglesia ni Cristo;
2. the opening statement of the complaint states that plaintiffs are the heirs of Enrique
Santos and likewise names the particular heirs of the latter who instituted the
complaint below;
3. the case involves a property owned by the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs therein;
4. the verification signed by Enrique G. Santos clearly states that he is one of the children
of the late Enrique Santos and that he represents the heirs of said Enrique Santos.
2. Substantive Rule v. Procedural Rule
a. Rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice. Being instruments for
the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they may be used to achieve such end, not
to derail it.
b. the apparent merit of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a special
circumstance or compelling reason to allow the relaxation of the rule.
c. Rules may be liberally construed if literal construction will result in a patent denial of
substantial justice.
CNFS, PURPOSE: The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of
the petition (or complaint) have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance
therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional requirement.

R:
1. The lone signature of Enrique is sufficient for RTC to take cognizance.
a. GR: certification must be signed by all plaintiffs
XPN: substantial compliance rule – allows the signature of not all the parties, because of the
commonality of interest of all the parties with respect to the subject of the
controversy.
1. Valid certification although signed by only one of petitioners because he is a relative of
the other petitioners and co-owner of the properties in dispute (Cavile v Heirs of
Cavile)
2. Valid certification although signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a
family home in which all the petitioners shared a common interest (Heirs of Agapito T.
Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines)
3. Valid the certification signed by only four of the nine petitioners because all petitioners
filed as co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against respondents for quieting of title and
damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the undivided whole (Gudoy v.
Guadalquiver)
b. In this case, the plaintiffs have a common interest being the heirs of Enrique Santos, and
considered co-owners pro indiviso of the whole property.

Page 62 of 136
CNFS c. In fine, in the absence of justifiable and compelling reasons, a liberal application of
3. Narciso v. Pacific Traders, G.R. No. 194176, September 10, 2014 procedural rules is not warranted in this case.
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
RD: WHEREFORE, Petition is DENIED
A CNFS is a requisite for the perfection of an appeal. This is clearly enunciated in Section 4, Rule VI of
F: the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules)
COMPLAINT: illegal dismissal with money claims
PLAINTIFF (38?): Narciso and friends
DEFENDANT (2): PACIFIC TRADERS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION (PTMC)/TABOK WORKERS
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (TWMPC)
CNFS, SIGNED BY ( ):
1. Petitioners were employees of Pacific. Then Pacific referred them to the Coop which was Pacific’s Job
Contractor. When they reported to DOLE over non-receiving of labor benefits, they were terminated.
2. They filed for illegal dismissal
3. LA: no illegal dismissal, but pay separation pay.
4. On appeal to NLRC, the petitioners failed to attach CNFS within the reglementary period of
filing a memorandum of appeal. Because their counsel inadvertently deleted the
paragraphs intended for the CNFS. LOL!
5. NLRC: (appealed by both parties) dismissed both appeals outright for failure to attach CNFS.
a. REASON: Appeal is a mere statutory privilege and the period and manner for its
perfection are not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.
b. Petitioners submitted a Motion to Admit CNFS pleading for a liberal application of
procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice, but NLRC denied it.
6. CA: Affirmed NLRC
a. REASON: petitioners failed to file the CNFS within the reglementary period of filing a
Memorandum of Appeal.
b. The CA also ruled that the petitioners failed to cite any compelling reason which will warrant a
relaxation of procedural rules.
7. LT:
a. Petitioner/Plaintiffs:
i. Illegally dismissed without just cause.
ii. The failure to attach CNFS was because they were in a hurry to file the
memorandum of appeal which must be filed in 10 days. This should be a
justifiable cause.
iii. The outright dismissal of their appeal on a mere technicality would seriously
impair the orderly administration of justice.
b. Respondent/Defendants:
i. Petitioners are contractual employees assigned by the Coop to PTMC. Petitioners are
members of the Coop. The Coop tried to change per hour basis into pakyaw basis. The
Petitioners refused. To settle the matter they agreed to withdraw membership provided
separation pay will be paid. But petitioners reported to DOLE.

I: WON liberal application of rules should be applied in this labor case. No, because the case is
substantively unmeritorious

R:
1. Liberal application of Rules cannot be applied.
a. Rules of Procedure in labor cases.
GR: Technical rules are not necessarily fatal and they can be liberally applied.
 CONDITION: All things being equal, any doubt or ambiguity would be resolved in favor of labor.
XPN: Should the case be substantively unmeritorious, technicalities and limitations in
procedural rules must be fully enforced.
b. In this case the petitioners have no substantive merit, becaus their money claims were already
amicably settled and there is no illegal dismissal.

Page 63 of 136
Verification; Sec. 4 Rule 7 (14) complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1;
4. Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011 (15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court;
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA (16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under the Interim Rules
RD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies;
(17) complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules
F: on Corporate Rehabilitation; and
COMPLAINT: for Recovery of Damages (18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
PLAINTIFF (1): Jocelyn Catubig marriages as well as petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code.
DEFENDANT (1): Vallacar Transit b. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure
CNFS, SIGNED BY ( ): an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and
1. VT owns Ceres Bulilit. Quirino Cabanilla drove the bus which collided with Mr. Catubig who while correct and not of mere speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply
driving his motorcycle overtook a 10 wheeler truck. Mr. Catubig and his backride died in the order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance
collision. with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
2. Cabanilla was charged with R. Imprudence resulting to double homicide in MCTC. MCTC dismissed It does not divest court of jurisdiction. It’s not fatal. However, failure to attach may
the case because there was no contributory negligence. cause dismissal even if not is in the ground.
3. Mrs. Catubig filed a complaint for damages (actual, moral, exemplary) in RTC of P484k. This is just a complaint. No need for verification.
4. VT asked for dismissal. c. CNFS is required in Initiatory Pleadings (Rule 7 Sec 5)
5. LT: 2. CNFS v. VERIFICATION (Pajuyo v CA, 2004)
a. Petitioner/VT: “A party’s failure to sign the CNFS is different from the party’s failure to sign
i. Proximate cause of collision is the sole negligence of Mr. Catubig personally the verification.
ii. Failure to state a cause of action. No allegation that VT was negligent in the selection or CNFS: The CNFS must be signed by the party, and not by counsel. The certification
supervision of its employee driver. of counsel renders the petition defective.
iii. Complaint was not verified. VERIF: The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer
1. The CNFS attached to the complaint is not a valid substitute for respondent’s or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may
verification that she “has read the pleading and that the allegations therein sign the verification.”
are true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic Note: VT won the substantive issue for Plaintiff’s failure to prove negligence.
records.” Complaint need not be verified, but for practice purposes, just verify the same.
2. A pleading lacking proper verification is treated as unsigned pleading. GR: Lawyers not allowed to verify/sign verification XPN:
I: WON verification is required in an action for damages. NO

R:
1. Verification is not required in an action for damages.
a. GR: Pleadings need not be verified
 EFFECT OF NO VERIFICATION: pleading is treated as “unsigned pleading”
without any legal effect
XPN: there is a law or rule requiring the same
(1) all pleadings filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure;
(2) petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only
questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2;
(3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 42, Section 1;
(4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section
5;
(5) petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1;
(6) petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section
4;
(7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4;
(8) application for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section
4;
(9) application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59, Section 1;
(10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1;
(11) petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional
commissions under Rule 64, Section 2;
(12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3;
(13) petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1;

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Sec 5 Rule 7 CNFS when, required R:
5. Korea Technologies v. Hon. Alberto Lerma (RTC-Muntinlupa) and Pacific General Steel, G.R. 1. Docket Fees and CNFS over Counterclaims not required.
No. 143581, January 7, 2008 a. Issue of Non-Payment of Docket Fee
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA i. When Pacific filed its Answer with Counterclaims in 1998, it was not liable to pay filing fees
RD: WHEREFORE, this petition is PARTLY GRANTED. RTC order and CA decision are REVERSED. Parties because it was compulsory in nature.
are ordered to submit to the arbitration. ii. However, filing fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim
because Sec. 7 Rule 141 was amended since Aug. 16, 2004.
F: b. Issue of CNFS
COMPLAINT: Specific Performance PLAINTIFF (1): KoreaTech DEFENDANT (1): Pacific i. Sec. 5 Rule7 requires CNFS only in “complaint or other initiatory pleading.”
CNFS, SIGNED BY ( ): ii. Counterclaims are responsive pleadings.
1. KoreaTech entered into contract with Pacific to set up an LPG Manufacturing Plant in Carmona,
Cavite. The contract was executed in Ph. Pacific will pay $1.5M to KoreaTech for machineries.
a. The contract contained an arbitration clause NOTE: SC ruled that Arbitration clause is not contrary to public policy.
b. Pacific entered into a Contract of Lease with Worth-Phil. for use of warehouse to house the LPG In our jurisdiction, the policy is to favor alternative methods of resolving disputes,
Manufacturing plant. particularly in civil and commercial disputes. Arbitration along with mediation,
c. KoreaTech sent the machineries to Pacific. Pacific paid $1.2M to KoreaTech. Pacific issue to Post conciliation, and negotiation, being inexpensive, speedy and less hostile methods have
Dated Checks for the $300k balance to KoreaTech. long been favored by this Court.
d. When KoreaTech deposited the PDCs, they were dishonored for the reason of “Payment
Stopped.”
e. Pacific alleged that the PDCs were funded, but Pacific stopped payment because KoreaTech
altered the quantity and quality of the machineries.
2. Pacific unilaterally rescinded the contract and filed for estafa against the President Kang of
KoreaTech.
3. KoreaTech filed an Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board
(KCAB).
4. Then it filed Complaint for Specific Performance in RTC.
a. Pacific Filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim: it had right to rescind contract
b. Korea filed a (1) Reply to Answer and (2) Answer to Counterclaim: insisted on arbitration’s
validity.
c. Korea filed MTD Pacific’s Compulsory Counterclaim.
d. Pacific filed a Motion for Inspection of Things to inspect the Machines.
5. RTC: in favor of Pacific
a. Arbitration clause is void for being against public policy as it ousts local courts of their
jurisdiction over this issue
b. Denied MTD because the Compulsory Counterclaim met the requisites.
6. CA: affirmed RTC
a. Arbitration clause is void for being against public policy as it ousts local courts of their
jurisdiction over this issue.
b. No need to pay docket fees and attach CNFS because compulsory counterclaims are
not initiatory pleadings.
7. LT:
a. Petitioner/Plaintiff:
i. Pacific violated the arbitration clause
ii. Pacific should pay docket fees and attach the CNFS when it filed the counterclaims.
b. Respondent/defendant: arbitration is void for being against public policy as it ousts local courts
of their jurisdiction over this issue.

I:
1. WON Payment of docket fees and Filing of CNFS are required for counterclaims. NO, because payment
only became required when the amendment became effective (2004) and Compulsory Counterclaims are
responsive pleadings not initiatory pleadings.
2. Is KoreaTech guilty of Forum Shopping in filing the petition for certiorari? NO, because the motion for
reconsideration was already denied when it filed a petition for certiorari to assail RTC’s interlocutory
order.

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Sec. 7-8 Rule 8 Admission of the Genuineness and Due Execution of a Document
6. Filipinas Textile v. CA and State Investment House, G.R. No. 119800, November 12, 2003
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
RD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED

F:
COMPLAINT: for Collection of the Sum of Money P3.1M + interest, exemplary damages, A. Fees
PLAINTIFF (1): State Investment House, Inc. (“SIHI”)
DEFENDANTS (2): Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. (“Filtex”) and Bernardino Villanueva (“Villanueva”)
CNFS, SIGNED BY ( ):
1. SIHI granted a loan to Filtex an amount of P3.7M to purchase raw materials.
a. Villanueva executed a comprehensive surety agreement to guarantee that he will be jointly and
severally liable with Filtex.
b. Because of failure to pay, SIHI filed a complaint against the petitioners to be jointly and
severally liable.
c. Filtex filed an Answer with Counterclaim claiming the comprehensive surety agreement as void.
Petitioners failed to have their Answers placed under oath under Sec. 7 Rule 8.
2. LT:
a. Petitioners/Defendants: Comprehensive surety agreement is inadmissible in evidence because
of non-payment of DST2
b. Respondent/Plaintiff:
3. RTC: petitioners are jointly and severally liable.
4. CA: affirmed RTC
I:
1. WON the docs are admissible in evidence even without payment of DST. YES, because of implied
admission of the genuineness of these documents (Sec. 8 Rule 8)

R:
1. The failure of the petitioners to include in their Answer with Counterclaim any specific
denial under oath gives rise to the implied admission of the genuineness of these
documents (Sec. 8 Rule 8)
1. Hence, the petitioners can no longer dispute the admissibility of the letters of credit, sight
drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement. HOWEVER, this does not preclude the
petitioners from impugning these documents by evidence of:
i. fraud;
ii. mistake;
iii. compromise;
iv. payment;
v. statute of limitations;
vi. estoppel; and
vii. want of consideration.

“Admission of the Genuineness and Due Execution of a Document,” Explained.—In Benguet

Exploration, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the admission of the genuineness and due
execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed
the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment,
or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.

2
Documentary Stamp Tax

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GROUNDS WHEN CNFS ALLOWED considered together with the other parts , and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
Commonality of interest enactment. This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:
For orderly administration of justice/ strict application of the rule clearly unjustified or inequitable/
NOT ALLOWED Sec. 3. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT every action or proceeding.
7. Sy Tiong v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009
Ignore first half DEFINITION: THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
3rd p complaint. 179438 daw court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for
CASE NATURE: contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. It is
RD: actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. In
fact, were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third -party complaint would have to
F: be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-
COMPLAINT: Complaint for Accounting and Damages, TRO or P. Injunction to restrain Sy Chim from party defendant.
calling stockholders meeting for lack of authority. PURPOSE of a third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary
PLAINTIFF ( ): Corporation proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising
DEFENDANT ( ): Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy) from one particular set of facts.
CNFS, SIGNED BY ( ):
1. Sy Siy Ho & Sons charged Sps. Sy with Robbery after failing to report to work and for failing to It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the
respond to a demand letter for accounting of misappropriated money in the amount of P67M which allowance of the filing of third-party complaints is premised on one objective — the expeditious
the Spouses failed to deposit to the corporation’s banks. disposition of cases. Moreover, following the rule of liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules,
2. Meanwhile, the Corporate VP, Sy Tiong, and his wife, Juanita, were elected as new President and VP and taking into consideration the suppletory application of the Rules of Court under Rule 1, Sec. 2 of the
of the corporation, respectively. Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and should not be prohibited in
3. Then, another Complaint for Accounting and Damages was filed by the corporation against the controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are rendered
Sps. Sy. beyond question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan are not complete
4. Sps. SY Answer with Counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages. strangers to the litigation as in fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of the principal
a. LT of Defendant Sps. Sy: the newly elected officers had no authority and that they were the complaint for accounting and damages against the Spouses Sy.
ones authorized by the By-laws to administer the corporation.
5. Later, the Sps. Sy filed a Motion for Leave to file a Third-Party Complaint against Sy Tiong and REQUISITES FOR IMPLEADING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT: “Allegation of Liability”
Juanita Tan (in their personal capacity) alleging that the latter are the one’s directly liable for the
misappropriation. A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third- party claim
a. Sy Tiong and Juanita Tan failed to file an answer to the 3rdP Complaint for not furnished of be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other
copies. They did not file MR, but directly to CA for certiorari substantive right. The bringing of a THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT is proper if he would be liable to the
6. RTC: granted the Motion for Leave. plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original
7. CA: reversed defendant, although the third-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction.
a. a Third-Party Complaint is prohibited under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies. The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant:
8. SC: reversed CA (1) on an allegation of liability of the Third-Party Defendant to the defendant for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief;
LT of Sy Chim and Felicidad: a third-party complaint is not excluded or prohibited by the Interim
Rules, and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that their third- party complaint is not actionable (2) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or
because their action is not in respect of the corporation’s claims. Only causes multiplicity of
suits (3) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.

I: WON the 3rd Party Complaint should be allowed. YES, SUFFICIENCY OF THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT: must be alleged.

R:
DOCTRINE:
The Third-Party Complaint should be allowed.
There are conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies.
There is a conflict, for while a Third-Party Complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings,
neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by
following the well -entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint
and the third-party complaint must be examined. A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT must allege facts
which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or other relief from the third-party defendant.
In the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who
had full and complete control of the day-to day operations and complete control and custody
of the funds of the corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for any shortfall or
unaccounted difference of the corporation’s cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan

Page 67 of 136
should render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received
and earned by the corporation since 1993, including the amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the
complaint for accounting and damages.

The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation interposed against
the Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that the Spouses Sy’s third-party complaint is in respect of
the plaintiff corporation’s claims, and thus the allowance of the third-party complaint is
warranted.

Page 68 of 136
Specific denial of actionable document
8. Equitable Cardnetwork, inc v. Capistrano, G.R. No. 180157, February 08, 2012
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
RD: WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and AFFIRMS the order of the Court of Appeals
F:
COMPLAINT: Collection Suit (P217k) in RTC Cebu
PLAINTIFF ( ): ECI
DEFENDANT ( ): Capistrano
1. Josefa Capistrano applied for membership in manila yacht club (MYC). She has a Visa Credit Card
from ECI.
2. Valentina C. Redulla presented herself as Mrs. Capistrano’s daughter, and that she has authority to
use the card.
3. The debt was demanded from Mrs. Capistrano. Collection suit commenced.
4. RTC: in favor of ECI
a. Mrs Capistrano failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of ECI’s actionable
documents that were attached to the complaint,
b. So Mrs. Capistrano impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of those documents.
In effect she admitted:
1) applying for membership at the MYC;
2) accomplishing the MYC membership information sheet which contained a request for an ECI
Visa card;
3) holding herself liable for all obligations incurred in the use of such card;
4 ) authorizing Mrs. Redulla to receive the Visa card issued in her name;
5) applying for an ATM Card with ECI; and
6) using the credit card in buying merchandise worth P217,235.36 as indicated in the sales
slips.
c. The RTC reasoned that she did not, in her verification, deny signing those documents or state
that they were false or fabricated.
d. The documents’ genuineness and due execution shall be deemed admitted unless the
defendant specifically denies them under oath and states what he claims to be the facts.
5. CA: Reversed RTC
a. The CA ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano’s answer was somewhat infirm, still she raised the
issue of the genuineness and due execution of ECI’s documents during trial by presenting
evidence that she never signed any of them. Since ECI failed to make a timely objection to its
admission, such evidence cured the vagueness in her answer. (SC says this is incorrect)
b. Further, the CA ruled that Mrs. Capistrano sufficiently proved by evidence that her signatures
had been forged.
6. LT:
a. Respondent/Defendant/Capistrano: having verified her answer, she should be deemed to have
denied those documents under oath.
I:
1. WON although Mrs. Capistrano failed to make an effective specific denial of the actionable documents
attached to the complaint, she overcame this omission by presenting parol evidence to which ECI failed
to object. NO, Capistrano’s infirmity was not cured by the failure of ECI to object Capistrano’s evidence,
BUT BY her specific denial under her “special and affirmative defenses.”
2. WON Mrs. Capistrano presented clear and convincing evidence that her signatures on the actionable
documents had been forged. YES (This issue is for Evidence Course).
R:
An answer to the complaint may raise a negative defense which consists in defendant’s specific denial of
the material fact that plaintiff alleges in his complaint, which fact is essential to the latter’s cause of
action.
Specific denial has three modes. Thus:
1)  The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and whenever practicable set forth the substance of the matters on
which he will rely to support his denial;
2)  When the defendant wants to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment in
the complaint, he must specify so much of the averment as is true and material and
deny the remainder; and
3)  When the defendant is without knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state
and this shall have the effect of a denial.
But the rule that applies when the defendant wants to contest the documents attached to the claimant’s
complaint which are essential to his cause of action is found in Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SECTION 8. How to contest such documents.—When an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts;
To determine whether or not respondent Mrs. Capistrano effectively denied the genuineness and due
execution of ECI’s actionable documents as provided above, the pertinent averments of the complaint
and defendant Capistrano’s answer are here reproduced.
Mrs. Capistrano’s answer:
3.  She specifically denies paragraph[s] 3 and 4
Mrs. Capistrano’s answer:
4.  She specifically denies paragraph 5 of the complaint
Etc.
In substance, ECI’s allegations, supported by the attached documents, are that Mrs. Capistrano applied
through Mrs. Redulla for a credit card and that the former used it to purchase goods on credit yet Mrs.
Capistrano refused to pay ECI for them. On the other hand, Mrs. Capistrano denied these allegations “for
lack of knowledge” as to their truth. This mode of denial is by itself obviously ineffectual. A
person’s denial for lack of knowledge of things that by their nature he ought to know is not an
acceptable denial.
HOWEVER, this inadequacy was cured by her quick assertion that she was also denying the
allegations regarding those actionable documents “for the reasons as stated in her special
and affirmative defenses.”
In the “Special and Affirmative Defenses” section of her answer, Mrs. Capistrano in fact denied ECI’s
documented allegations that she applied for a credit card, was given one, and used it.
And, since Mrs. Capistrano in fact verified her claim that she had no part in those transactions, she in
effect denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents supporting them. For this
reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those documents were forged.
Infirmity of Mrs Capistrano: defense was merely lack of knowledge-ineffectual
Cured by: quick assertion of denying the allegations regarding actionable documents. This was verified.
Effect:
Not cured by: ECI’s failure to object Capistrano’s evidence.
Page 69 of 136
Actionable Document
9. Asian Construction v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 176949, June 27, 2012
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED; CA is Affirmed with Modification (deleted
award of 150k)

F:
COMPLAINT: for Sum of Money RTC Caloocan
PLAINTIFF (1): Mendoza
DEFENDANT (1): Asian Construction
1. Lourdes K. Mendoza, sole proprietor of Highett Steel Fabricators (Highett).
2. Asian Construction purchased 1.2M worth of materials from Highett. It did not pay.
3. Mendoza filed a complaint.
4. Asian filed an answer with counterclaim denying liability and interposing the defense of lack of cause
of action.
a. Asian moved for a bill of particulars on the ground that no copies of purchase orders and
invoices were attached to the complaint. RTC denied this motion.
5. RTC: olats si Asian
6. CA: olats nanaman si Asian
7. SC: nanalo pa
8. LT:
a. Petitioner/defendant/Asian:
i. a charge or sales invoice is not an actionable document; thus, petitioner’s failure to deny
under oath its genuineness and due execution does not constitute an admission thereof.
ii. respondent was not able to prove her claim as the invoices offered as evidence were not
properly authenticated by her witnesses.
b. Respondent/:
i. charge invoices are actionable documents,
ii. that these were properly identified and authenticated by witness Tejero, who testified that
upon delivery of the supplies and materials, the invoices were stamped received by
petitioner’s employee.

I: WON the charge invoices are actionable documents. NO, these documents are not actionable per se,
they only provide details on the alleged transaction.

R:
Actionable Documents; A document is actionable when an action or defense is grounded upon
such written instrument or document; These documents (Invoices) need not be attached to
or stated in the complaint as these are evidentiary in nature.— In the instant case, the Charge
Invoices are not actionable documents per se as these “only provide details on the alleged transactions.”
These documents need not be attached to or stated in the complaint as these are evidentiary in nature.
In fact, respondent’s cause of action is not based on these documents but on the contract of sale
between the parties.

Section 7 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states:

“SEC.  7.  Action or defense based on document.—Whenever an action or defense is based upon a
written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth
in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set
forth in the pleading.” (Emphasis supplied.)
CNFS

Page 70 of 136
10. PTA of St. Matthew Academy v. Metrobank, GR.No. 176518, March 2, 2010 to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the
Ignore siie not related to cnfs case where the motion is filed.
CASE NATURE:
RD:
It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
F: foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of possession
COMPLAINT: was denominated as a “petition”, it was in substance merely a motion. Indeed, any insignificant
1. MB’s Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession; lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by the MBTC did not render the writ
2. Matthew’s Petition for Injunction consolidated irregular. After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be attached to the
3. PTA’s Motion for Leave to File Petition in Intervention in the Injunction against MB motion.

1. For failure to pay their loan with Metrobank, Sps. Ilagan’s properties were extrajudicially foreclosed. Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in the MBTC’s petition was
In the public sale, Metrobank as the highest bidder. signed by its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did not render the said petition defective in
a. During the period of redemption, Metrobank filed an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of form.
Possession.
b. Thereafter, St. Matthew filed a Petition for Injunction against Metrobank.
2. The judge issued a joint resolution for the 2 cases and ruled that Metrobank is entitled to the Writ of
Possession.
a. MR was filed by St. Matthew.
3. Pending resolution of the MR, PTA of St. Matthew filed a Motion for Leave to File Petition in
Intervention in the Injunction case against Metrobank.
4. RTC granted said Motion for Leave. However, it later reversed its ruling.
a. held that PTA of St. Matthew would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the
Writ of Possession.
5. CA dismissed appeal. Olats si PTA
a. In this petition, PTA of St. Matthew claim that Metrobank Branch Head lacked authority to sign
the Certification Against Forum Shopping attached to the Petition for the Issuance of Writ
of Possession and, thus, it was rendered worthless.
6. SC: Olats 3x si PTA
7. LT on the issue of CNFS:
a. Petitioner/PTA: The lack of authority to sign the certificate on non-forum shopping attached to
the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession rendered the same worthless and should
be deemed as non-existent.
b. Respondent/MB: MBTC asserts otherwise, citing (Sps Arquiza v. CA) where we held that an
application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding which is in
substance merely a motion, and therefore does not require such a certification.

I: WON the Petition for Writ of Possession requires CNFS. No, petition for issuance of writ of possession
is not an initiatory pleading, but a motion.

R:

DOCTRINE:
PTA of St. Matthew’s contention lacks basis. In Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, where the issue of validity of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was questioned
in an application for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, we held that:

MOTION V PLEADING:
It bears stressing that a CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING is required only
in a complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the
subject petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by private
respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion. What
distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title
given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The PURPOSE OF A MOTION is not

Page 71 of 136
FS and Certification Requirement (3) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such
11. Abbot Laboratories v. Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013, 701 SCRA 682 that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
WHAT IS THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT?
F: o plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any
COMPLAINT: Illegal Dismissal pending case if the latter involves the SAME ISSUES as the one that was filed (Sec. 5b
PLAINTIFF (1): Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz Rule 7).
DEFENDANT (6): Abbot Laboratories, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. o If there is no similar pending case, the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the
YABUTMISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G. ALMAZAR best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending (Sec. 5a Rule 7)
CNFS, SIGNED BY ( ): o
1. Alcaraz applied to become a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. Abbott accepted her on a PROHIBITION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING V. VIOLATION OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
probationary basis for 6 months. In Sps. Ong v. CA, the Court explained that:
a. However, she failed to meet the regularization standard of the said position. She was asked to
resign or else be terminated. She did not resign, so she was terminated. Compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of
b. She filed for ID. the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment
2. LA: not guilty between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition
3. Abbot then appealed to the NLRC via Memorandum of Appeal against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of
4. 1st petition for certiorari filed by abbot enforcing them.
5. 2nd petition for certiorari filed by abbot
6. NLRC: Guilty of ID FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT constitutes sufficient
7. CA: affirmed NLRC cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of the complaint or initiatory
8. LT: pleading upon motion and after hearing;
a. Petitioner/: VIOLATION OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING is a ground for
b. Respondent/Plaintiff: summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.
i. Petitioners where guilty of forum shopping when they filed the second CA petition
pending the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of CA’s decision in the
first CA petition.
ii. Petitioners did not comply with the Certification requirement when it failed to
disclose the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC
I: WON NO, because the elements of forum shopping are not present except for identity of parties.
WON petitioners violated the Certification Requirement. NO, because the issue raised in the Petition in
the SC is different from the issue raised in the Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC.

R:
1. No FS because the elements of FS are not present. There is no identity of subject matters and
causes of action.
a. First CA Petition was to question NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal
b. Second CA Petition was to question the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment award
pending the resolution of the First CA Petition
2. No violation of certification requirement. There is no identity of subject matters and causes of
action.
a. PETITION for review on certiorari (to SC) questions the validity of Alcaraz’ dismissal.
b. MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL (to NLRC) questions the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
execution.

WHAT IS FORUM SHOPPING? FS takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same
parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, namely:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both
actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and

Page 72 of 136
SPECIFIC DENIAL
12. Permanent Savings Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004  the document or that it is otherwise FALSE or FABRICATED. Neither does the
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
RD: Petition is granted
F:
COMPLAINT: Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money RTC Mla.
PLAINTIFF ( ): PSB
DEFENDANT ( ): Velarde
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. For failing to settle his loan obligation evidenced by a Promissory Note, PSB filed a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money against Velarde in the RTC of Manila.
2. In his Answer, Velarde denied having received the proceeds of the loan and also claimed that the
Promissory Note did not express the true intention of the parties.
3. After PSB rested its case, Velarde filed a Demurrer to Evidence instead of presenting evidence.
a. He alleged that PSB failed to prove its case and that the cause of action is barred by
prescription.
4. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed PSB’s complaint.
a. It ruled that merely presenting documents evidencing the loan without testimony of a
competent witness did not meet the required quantum of evidence.
5. CA affirmed.
a. The bank should have presented at least a single witness qualified to testify on the existence
and execution of the documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of Velarde.
b. It is not true, as the Bank claims, that there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting
papers as Velarde has already admitted these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his
responsive pleading.
6. SC Reversed RTC and CA.
This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he DID NOT SIGN
statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent
representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary
such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since
it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.
In fact, Velarde’s allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and
genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon
it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the
document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the
one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the
signatures were unauthorized.
Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Velarde specifically denied
PSB’s allegations regarding the loan documents, as Velarde’s Answer shows that he failed to specifically
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and its concomitant
documents. Therefore, Velarde is deemed to have admitted the loan documents and
acknowledged his obligation with PSB; and with Velarde’s implied admission, it was not
necessary for PSB to present further evidence to establish the due execution and authenticity
of the loan documents sued upon.

7. LT:
a. Petitioner/PSB/Plaintiff:
i. there is no need to prove the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde has already
admitted these.
b. Respondent/:

I: WON Velarde made a specific denial regarding the loan documents. NO, velarde even made an
implied admission! Denial is ineffective, it was not specific.

R:
DOCTRINE:

A reading of Velarde’s Answer, however, shows that he DID NOT SPECIFICALLY DENY that he
signed the loan documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the signature appearing at
the back of the promissory note seems to be his. Velarde also denied any liability on the promissory
note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express
the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his “denial under
oath,” stating that “the promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine
signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real
intention of the parties as stated in the defenses.”

Velarde’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early
case of Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on HOW TO DENY THE GENUINENESS AND DUE
EXECUTION of AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENt, viz.:

Page 73 of 136
Verification and CNFS, when not to raise—not in CA nor SC, but in RTC The S.C. Megaworld’s argument is untenable. It failed to reckon that any objection as to
13. S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada, GR 183804, 2013  compliance with the requirement of verification in the complaint should have been raised in
Ignore novation and interest issues the proceedings below, and not in the CA for the first time.
CASE NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
RD: Petition denied; CA affirmed.
In KILUSAN-OLALIA v. CA, it was held that verification is a FORMAL, not a jurisdictional requisite:
F:
COMPLAINT: Collection (P800k) VERIFICATION is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to
PLAINTIFF ( ): S.C. MEGAWORLD CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith
or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The Court may order the
CORPORATION
correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the
DEFENDANT ( ): ENGR. LUIS U. PARADA, represented by ENGR. LEONARDO A. attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be
PARADA of GENLITE INDUSTRIES dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.
CNFS, SIGNED BY ( ):
In Young v. John Keng Seng, it was also held that the question of forum shopping cannot be raised
1. S.C. Megaworld bought electrical lighting materials from Gentile Industries, a sole proprietorship in the CA and in the Supreme Court, since such an issue must be raised at the EARLIEST
owned by Engr. Parada. OPPORTUNITY in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading. The high court even warned that
2. However, S.C. Megaworld was unable to pay for the purchase price on the due date. “[i]nvoking it in the later stages of the proceedings or on appeal may result in the dismissal of the
a. It blamed its failure to pay on its failure to collect from EnviroKleen Technologies money under action.”
its sub-contract.
b. S.C. Megaworld was able to convince EnviroKleen to pay Parada P250K. VERIFICATION NOT BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE MUST BE BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS
c. However, there is still an outstanding balance of P800K in favor of Parada.
3. After unheeded demands, Parada filed an Action for Collection in the RTC. Moreover, granting that Leonardo has no personal knowledge of the transaction subject of the
4. RTC ruled for Parada. complaint below, Section 4 of Rule 7 provides that the verification need not be based on the
5. CA affirmed. verifier’s personal knowledge but even only on authentic records. Sales invoices, statements of
a. In its MR, S.C. Megaworld alleged for the first time that the Verification and the accounts, receipts and collection letters for the balance of the amount still due to the respondent from
Certification Against Forum Shopping attached was invalid. the petitioner are such records. There is clearly substantial compliance by the Parada’s attorney-
b. Nonetheless, CA still denied the MR. in-fact with the requirement of verification.
6. Apparently, while the case was pending, Engr. Parada died and his heirs were substituted on his
behalf. The heirs executed an SPA authorizing Leonardo, one of Engr. Parada’s sons to represent Same; Same; Same; Verification; Any objection as to compliance with the requirement of
them in this petition. verification in the complaint should have been raised in the proceedings below, and not in the
7. SC: olats 3x si Megaworld appellate court for the first time.— In KILUSAN-OLALIA v. CA, 528 SCRA 45 (2007) it was held that
verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite: We have emphasized, time and again, that
8. LT: verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to secure an
a. Petitioner/Megaworld: TC should have dismissed outright for invalid verification and assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and
CNFS not mere speculation. The Court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the
i. the SPA executed by the Parada did not specifically include an authority for unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be
Leonardo to sign the verification and certification dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served. Further, in rendering justice, courts have
always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities
I: WON the issue of validity of CNFS and verification should be tenable even if raised the first time on take a backseat vis-à-vis substantive rights, and not the other way around. x x x.
appeal. NO
Same; Same; Same; Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the verification need not be
R: based on the verifier’s personal knowledge but even only on authentic records.—Granting that Leonardo
has no personal knowledge of the transaction subject of the complaint below, Section 4 of Rule 7
provides that the verification need not be based on the verifier’s personal knowledge but even only on
authentic records. Sales invoices, statements of accounts, receipts and collection letters for the balance
DOCTRINE: The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the complaint is not a of the amount still due to the respondent from the petitioner are such records. There is clearly
jurisdictional but a formal requirement, and any objection as to non-compliance therewith substantial compliance by the respondent’s attorney-in-fact with the requirement of verification.
should be raised in the proceedings below and not for the first time on appeal.

In this petition, the S.C. Megaworld reiterates its argument before the CA that the above verification is
invalid, since the SPA executed by the Parada did not specifically include an authority for
Leonardo to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, thus rendering the
complaint defective for violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7.

Page 74 of 136
CNFS substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification against forum
14. Fuji Television v. Arlene Espiritu, G.R. No. 204944, September 10, 2014 shopping.
CNFS, SIGNED BY (1): Corazon, a office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila Bureau of Fuji
Television Network, Inc. for 23 years.

I: Did Fuji comply with the requirement of verification and CNFS by allowing Corazon to sign. YES

R:

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Verification; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Rule 7,
Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the requirement of verification, while
Section 5 of the same rule provides the requirement of certification against forum shopping.—
Section 4(e) of Rule 45 requires that petitions for review should “contain a sworn certification against
forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.” Section 5 of the same rule
provides that failure to comply with any requirement in Section 4 is sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the general rule is that failure to attach a verification
and certification against forum shopping is a ground for dismissal, there are cases where this
court allowed substantial compliance.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The physical act of signing the verification and certification
against forum shopping can only be done by natural persons duly authorized either by the
corporate bylaws or a board resolution.—Being a corporation, Fuji exercises its power to sue and be
sued through its board of directors or duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, the physical act of
signing the verification and certification against forum shopping can only be done by natural persons
duly authorized either by the corporate bylaws or a board resolution. In its petition for review on
certiorari, Fuji attached Hideaki Ota’s secretary’s certificate, authorizing Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to
represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji. The secretary’s certificate was duly authenticated by
Sulpicio Confiado, Consul-General of the Philippines in Japan. Likewise attached to the petition is the
special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano, authorizing Corazon to sign on his behalf. The
verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Corazon.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has recognized that there are instances
when officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping without a board resolution.—This court has recognized that there are instances
when officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping without a board resolution. In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR, 545 SCRA 10 (2008), it
was held that: In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign
the verification and certification without need of a board resolution:
(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
(2) the President of a corporation,
(3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager,
(4) Personnel Officer, and
(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and
certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a
case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate
officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being ‘in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.’
Corazon’s affidavit states that she is the “office manager and resident interpreter of the
Manila Bureau of Fuji Television Network, Inc.” and that she has “held the position for the
last twenty-three years.” As the office manager for 23 years, Corazon can be considered as
having knowledge of all matters in Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office and is in a position to verify
“the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Petition.” Thus, Fuji

Page 75 of 136
 VIII. Default (Rule 9)
RULE 9: EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
(i) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter , that there is (ii) another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is (iii) barred by a
prior judgment or by (iv) statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Sec. 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred.

A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.

Sec. 3. Default; declaration of.

If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon
motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure,
declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment
granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be
delegated to the clerk of court.

(a) Effect of order of default. - A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but not to take part in the trial.

(b) Relief from order of default. - A party declared in default may at any time after notice
thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be
set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

(c) Effect of partial default. - When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of
action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so,
the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon
the evidence presented.

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. - A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.

(e) Where no defaults allowed. - If the defending party in an action for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.

RULE 15: MOTIONS

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion.
Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived.

Page 76 of 136
RULE 37: NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for
new trial or reconsideration.
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set
aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following
causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in
his rights; or

(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the
grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify
the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.

RULE 38: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.

Pointers below:
1. In reading rules, know the ff
a. When amendment a matter of right or of discretion
b. Two kinds of amendment to conform to evidence
c. Difference between an amendment and a supplement?
d. Contents of amended pleading
e. Effect of amended pleading
f. Purpose and contents of Bill of Particulars (BOP), when to file
g. Three courses of action which court may do upon receipt of motion for BOP
h. Effect of non-compliance with BOP
i. Effect of BOP with period to file responsive pleading

2. In reading cases

a. Focus on
i. Which party was trying to amend which pleading?
ii. When did the party seek to amend a pleading?
iii. What did the amendment consist of?
iv. Filing fee in PAGCOR vs. Lopez
v. What pleading was the subject of the Motion for BOP
vi. What details were being asked in the Motion for BOP
vii. Was there compliance

Page 77 of 136
 I: WON the service of summons is defective. YES, however, the defendants failed to invoke the lack of
E.g. of Defense deemed waived: jurisdiction over the person jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. This failure is fatal.
1. Anuncacion v. Bocanegra, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009
PETITION: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA R:
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 1. The filing of the Motion to Dismiss and the Supplemental MTD, without invoking the lack of
COMPLAINT: Action for Queting of Title and Cancellation of TCT jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of
VENUE: RTC Manila the respondents under Section 20, Rule 14 which states:
PLAINTIFF (4): Anuncacion et al
DEFENDANT (2): Bocanegra et al “Sec.  20.  Voluntary Appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action
i. Which party was trying to amend which pleading? Defendants | MTD shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
ii. When did the party seek to amend a pleading? After voluntary appearance by filing MTD and other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
Supplemental MTD shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.”
iii. What did the amendment consist of? Inclusion of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants. It was only in the Second Supplemental MTD did the defendants raise the issue on lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The filing of the Second Supplemental MTD did not divest the court of
F: jurisdiction because the defendants already voluntarily appeared before the court by filing
1. Atty. Pizaro counsel of Bacanegra sent a demand letter against Anuncacion to vacate the premises. their MTD and Supplemental MTD.
2. Anuncacion filed an Action for Queting of Title against Bocanegra. 2. “Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
a. Summons were served to Atty. Pizaro in the office in Tondo. deemed waived.” (Rule 9 Sec. 1)
b. Later, Bocanegra filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state cause of action.
i. The MTD was signed by Atty. Norby Caparas, another counsel of the defendant
3. After Anuncacion filed his Comment, Bocanegra again filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss
alleging an additional ground of failure to file filing fees. DOCTRINE:
4. After Anuncacion filed their respective responses, Bocanegra again filed a Second Supplemental Bocanegra’s failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to
Motion to Dismiss alleging that there’s no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, no dismiss was fatal to their cause. They are already deemed to have waived that particular ground for
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and no cause of action. dismissal of the complaint. The trial court plainly abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint
a. Anuncacion filed their responses again. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. Under the Rules, the only
b. SUMMARY OF Pleadings and Motions filed by parties: grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if NOT PLEADED in the motion to dismiss or
i. Plaintiff (Anuncacion): Complaint answer, are:
ii. Defendant (Bacanegra): MTD: failure to state COA
iii. Plaintiff (Anuncacion): Comment on MTD (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
iv. Defendant (Bacanegra): (1) Reply to Comment on MTD (2) Supplemental MTD: + (2) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
failure to file filing fees (3) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
v. Plaintiff (Anuncacion): (1) Comment to Reply to Comment on MTD (2) Opposition to NOTE: wala sa enumeration ang lack of jurisdiction over defendant’s persons
Supplemental MTD
vi. Defendant (Bacanegra): Second Supplemental MTD: no jurisdiction over SUPPLEMENTAL MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED
defendant + no jurisdiction over SM + no COA We likewise cannot approve the trial court’s act of entertaining supplemental motions to
vii. Plaintiff: Additional Comment. dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers
5. RTC: dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the and litigants to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the
defendants. MR denied. prosecution of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
a. REASON: service on lawyer of defendant is an invalid service of summons because Atty. Pizarro
was not considered a representative of the defendants. The fact that he is the lawyer
doesn’t make him a representative.
6. CA: dismissed the petition. MR denied. GIST:
a. REASON: The service of summons was defective. Atty. Pizarro cannot be deemed the 1. Plaintiffs wrongly served their Summons to Atty. Pizarro instead of Atty. Caparas.
counsel on record because Atty. Caparas who signed the pleading is the counsel on a. This mistake is fatal, because the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the persons
record. of the defendants.
b. The fact that Atty. Pizarro who wrote and signed the demand letter does not fall under the b. Lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants is a ground for dismissal.
Substituted Service Rule. 2. However, the defendants, instead of invoking “the lack of jurisdiction over the persons of
7. SC: Panalo si Anuncacion. the defendants” on their first MTD, only brought the same issue on the second
8. LT: Supplemental MTD AFTER THEY ALREADY MADE THEIR VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE.
a. Petitioner: Notice to counsel is notice to client. The service made to Atty. Rogelio Pizarro, a. Lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants is cured by defendants’
Jr. was deemed service upon respondents/defendants. voluntary appearance.
b. The failure to raise the objection of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants in the MTD makes the objection deemed waived (Rule 9 Sec. 1).

Page 78 of 136
Page 79 of 136

Default and Right to Appeal
2. Martinez v. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, October 30, 2006
PETITION: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
COMPLAINT: Petition for Registration of 3 parcels of land
VENUE: RTC Cortes, Surigao del Sur
PLAINTIFF: Martinez
DEFENDANT: Republic (OSG)
F:
1. Martinez filed a Petition for Registration of 3 parcels of land wherein he alleged that he has claimed
it through acquisitive prescription.
a. The RTC published the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette.
2. OSG opposed arguing that the possession was not in accordance with CA 141 for failure to
prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the parcels.
a. Despite the Opposition filed by the OSG, RTC issued an Order of General Default
against the Republic (via OSG) because no party appeared during the hearing to
oppose Martinez’s Petition.
b. Martinez claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in OCEN possession for over
100 years.
3. RTC: proceeded to receive evidence and ruled in favor of Martinez.
4. CA: reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Registration.
5. LT of Petitioner: On Petition for Review to the SC, Martinez contends that OSG no longer
had personality to appeal following the Order of General Default.
6. SC: CA and Republic is correct
I: WON OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal its allowance by the RTC,
following the order of general default.
 NO, although OSG did not appear on the day of initial hearing, it had duly filed its
Opposition long before the said hearing.
 Furthermore, even if OSG is defaulted, it still has a right to appeal under the controlling
doctrine of Lina Case.
Doctrinal Issue: WON the 1997 ROC gives Right to Appeal to a party in default even if the same is not
expressly mentioned. Yes, because of post 1997 jurisprudence where the same is recognized.
R:
DOCTRINE:
The RTC appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor
appeared before it on the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that the OSG had
already duly filed its Opposition to Martinez’s petition long before the said hearing . As we held
in Director of Lands v. Santiago:
[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having
been formally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking
cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default
simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing . The
pertinent provision of law which states: ‘If no person appears and answers within the
time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded,’ cannot be interpreted to
mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed,
for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and
unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on the
date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his having
filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms,
considering the serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in this
case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is
alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicant’s
evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor’s evidence. The
oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample
opportunity to establish the government’s claim.
PURPOSE OF DEFAULT: The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By
forgoing the need for adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy resolution
of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail to give regard or obedience to the judicial
processes.
EFFECT OF DEFAULT IN LIM TOCO CASE (1948): NO RIGHT TO APPEAL The extent to which a
party in default loses standing in court has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential debate. Way
back in 1920, in Velez v. Ramas, we declared that the defaulting defendant “loses his standing in
court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case, nor to appear in the suit in
any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing.”
SAME: These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay, decided in 1948, where
a divided Court pronounced that a defendant in default had no right to appeal the judgment
rendered by the trial court , except where a motion to set aside the order of default had been
filed. This, despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no provision in the then
Rules of Court or any law “depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to be heard on appeal.”
LIM TOCO CASE OVERRULED, RIGHT TO APPEAL REMAINS EVEN WHEN IN DEFAULT UNDER
1964 ROC: In Tanhu v. Ramolete, the Court cited with approval the commentaries of Chief Justice
Moran, expressing the reformulated doctrine that following Lim Toco, a defaulted defendant
“cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing, although [under Section 2,
Rule 41,] he may appeal the judgment rendered against him on the merits.”
1997 ROC DID NOT REINSTATE THE LIM TOCO DOCTRINE: Thus, for around 30-odd years, there
was no cause to doubt that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal the adverse decision of the
trial court even without seeking to set aside the order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule 41.
SAME: Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal was
REMOVED from Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules
incorporated the particular effects on the parties of an order of default.
SAME: It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of a defendant
declared in default to appeal the adverse decision was not replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no
longer has the right to appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been
reinstated? NO, the right to appeal remains.
LINA CASE (1985) IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE: RIGHT TO APPEAL BY DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT
STILL EXISTS UNDER THE LINA DOCTRINE
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the REMEDIES OF A PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT had
evolved into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v. Court of Appeals:
(1) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment,
file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
Page 80 of 136
 answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has
meritorious defenses; (SEC. 3, RULE 18)

(2) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under SECTION 1(A) OF RULE 37;
(3) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under SECTION 2 OF RULE 38; and

(4) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by
him. (SEC. 2, RULE 41)

The FOURTH REMEDY, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Yet even
after that provision’s deletion under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely
again on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from
the judgment rendered against him.

Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right of appeal finds no anchor
in the 1997 Rules, THE DOCTRINE STILL EXISTS, applying the principle of stare decisis.
Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules has continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which
embodies this right to appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this
petition persuades the Court to rule otherwise.

Rules and Jurisprudence in cases of default:

1. Lim Toco (1948): No Right to Appeal
2. 1964 ROC: Right to Appeal exists (by express provision)
3. Lina v CA (1985): Right to Appeal exists
4. 1997 ROC: Right to Appeal exists (though express provision in 1964 is deleted)
5. Post 1997 Jurisprudence: Right to Appeal exists

GIST:
1. Martinez applied for registration of land.
a. RTC published Notice of Hearing.
b. OSG filed its opposition.
c. However, OSG failed to appear during the initial hearing of the RTC. RTC ordered a
General Default against OSG.
2. RTC ordered the registration. CA reversed the RTC order.
a. On appeal, Martinez argued that OSG who is in default has no right to appeal.
b. SC said: (1) OSG is not in default because even if it did not appear in the initial
hearing, it filed Opposition before the initial hearing; (2) even if OSG is in default,
Right to Appeal remains to the party in default under Lina Case.

Page 81 of 136
 Under the rule, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter , litis pendentia, res
When Defenses not deemed waived: prescription judicata, and prescription of action may be raised AT ANY STAGE of the proceedings, even for the
3. Dico v. Vizcaya Management Corporation, GR 161211, 2013 first time on appeal, EXCEPT that the objection to the lack of jurisdiction over the subject
PETITION: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA matter may be barred by laches.
RD: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA
COMPLAINT: Action for Annulment and Cancellation of Titles of VMC Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if NOT PLEADED in
VENUE: RTC Bacolod the motion to dismiss or answer, are:
PLAINTIFF (2): Dico – in the Action for annulment of TCT
DEFENDANT (1): VMC (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
F: (3) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
1. Celso Dico resides on and owns a lot in Negros Occidental covered by a TCT. It adjoined 2 more lots.
2. In 1964, he and his wife filed a Free Patent Application for the 2 adjoining lots with the Bureau of
Lands but were not acted upon. GIST:
a. As it turns out, VMC had TCTs covering both adjoining lands. VMC developed there its Don 1. The Dicos applied for the adjoining lot, but it was already occupied by and registered to
Eusebio Subdivision and Cristina Village Subdivision. VMC.
b. As a result, in 1981, VMC filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Dico. 2. Dicos filed for Action for Reconveyance.
c. MTC ordered the demolition of the Dicos sluice gate (locally known as trampahan). Decision a. VMC failed to put the defense of prescription in its answer or MTD, but only on
became final because the Dicos did not appeal. appeal to CA. Pwede ba yon? YES!
3. In 1986, the Dicos filed an Action for Annulment and Cancellation of Titles of VMC. b. The SC ruled that prescription or statute of limitation can be raised any time and
a. In 1987, Dicos amended the complaint alleging that they are possessors-by-succession of the 2 not deemed barred even if not raised in answer or MTD. This is expressly provided
other lots. sa Sec. 1 Rule 9 kahit basahin mo pa!
b. During the pendency of the case, Celso Dico died and was substituted.
4. RTC: ruled in Dicos’ favor and ordered VMC to vacate.
5. CA: reversed and ruled VMC as absolute owner.
a. Moreover, CA declared that prescription/laches already barred Dico from asserting their right.
b. MR denied.
6. LT
a. VMC: The action for reconveyance of Dicos is barred by prescription (10 years). This argument
was raised only on appeal to CA not in answer nor in MTD.
b. Dicos: The argument of VMC that Dicos is barred by prescription cannot stand because
of failure to aver the same in the MTD or in the answer. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. (Sec. 1 Rule 9)
7. SC: VMC and CA is correct.

I: WON the argument of VMC of prescription is deemed waived because it failed to aver the same in the
MTD or in the answer. NO, prescription is one of the XPNs.
 GR: defenses and objections not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are
deemed waived.
 XPN: the following defenses may be raised anytime: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata, and prescription of action

R:
DOCTRINE:

The action of the Dicos for reconveyance was properly dismissed. The insistence of the Dicos that
prescription could not be used by the CA to bar their claim for reconveyance by virtue of VMC’s failure to
aver them in a motion to dismiss or in the answer was unwarranted.

We agree with VMC’s contention to the contrary. Although defenses and objections not pleaded in
a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived, it was really incorrect for the Dicos to
insist that prescription could not be appreciated against them for that reason. Their insistence
was contrary to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

Page 82 of 136
DEFAULT
4. Heirs of Medrano v. Estanislao De Vera, G.R. No. 165770, August 09, 2010
PETITION: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. CA is affirmed.
COMPLAINT: Quieting of Title, reconveyance, reformation of instrument, and/or partition with damages
VENUE: RTC Urdaneta City
PLAINTIFF: Heirs of Medrano
DEFENDANT: De Vera
F:
1. Medrano paid for the expenses of Flaviana’s medication and Burial.
a. As payment Medrano obtained ownership over a parcel of land after the heirs (Hilaria and
Elena) of the original owner (Flaviana) waived all their hereditary rights in favor of Medrano.
2. After Hilaria and Elena died, some of the children acknowledge Medrano’s claim and executed Deeds
of Confirmation of Private Document and Renunciation of Rights in favor of Medrano
a. However, some of the children refused to sign the deeds.
b. Medrano filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against the other relatives.
3. Some of these relatives named as defendants renounced their rights in favor De Vera (transferee
pendente lite).
a. As such, De Vera filed an Answer with Counterclaim to the Medrano’s complaint.
b. He claims to be the real-party in interest.
4. Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with Counterclaim of Estanislao D. De Vera and
to Declare Defendants in Default.
a. Some of the defendants were declared in default for failing to file an Answer on time even when
summons were served.
b. Medrano asked for: (1) Motion to Set Reception of Evidence—presentation of evidence ex
parte against defaulted defendants (RTC GRANTED); (2) order De Vera to file a pleading-in-
intervention so that he can be a defendant.
5. As for De Vera, the RTC admitted his Answer but required him to file a Pleading in Intervention
to be able to participate in the case. The RTC treated De Vera’s interest as independent or severable
from the other defendants.
a. Reasons:
i. De Vera need not submit SPA from defendants because his claim was not on their behalf.
ii. He made a voluntary appearance as transferee of rights.
iii. While it is not sure if De Vera is an indispensable party, he is a necessary party and must
be joined for complete relief.
iv. Admission of his answer is proper to avoid multiplicity of suit.
b. However, De Vera did not file a Pleading in Intervention.
6. RTC: in favor of Medrano. Thereafter, Medrano was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
a. De Vera filed a MR. LT: He was an indispensable party or Real Party in Interest; he was not
given an opportunity to present evidence—violation of due process.
b. RTC denied MR: De Vera had no legal personality to file an MR since he did not file a Pleading in
Intervention.
7. CA: reversed and held that RTC should not have required De Vera to file a Motion in Intervention.
8. SC: De Vera and CA is correct
I: WON De Vera is a Real-Party in Interest. If yes, he does not need to file a Pleading-in-Intervention.
YES, because being a transferee pendente lite his rights are derived from the defendants, and any
judgment over the case will bind him.
Doctrinal Issue: WON the RTC is correct to allow Medrano to present evidence ex parte. NO, because in
a partial default, the answer of the defendant not in default is deemed the answer of all defendants in
default. BASIS: Rule 9 Sec. 3(c). De Vera was denied of Due Process.
R:
DOCTRINE:
The trial court’s approach is seriously flawed because De Vera’s interest is not independent of or
severable from the interest of the named defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named
defendants by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation of Rights. His rights were derived from the named
defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he would be bound by any judgment against his transferors
under the rules of res judicata. Thus, De Vera’s interest cannot be considered and tried separately from
the interest of the named defendants.
EFFECT OF PARTIAL DEFAULT
While the rule allows for discretion, the paramount consideration for the exercise thereof should be the
protection of the parties’ interests and their rights to due process. In the instant case, the
circumstances demanded that the trial court had already admitted De Vera’s Answer when it
declared the original defendants in default. As there was a transferee pendente lite whose
Answer had already been admitted, the trial court should have tried the case on the basis of
that Answer, based on Rule 9, Section 3(c):
Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause
of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others
fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed
and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
Thus, the default of the original defendants should not result in the ex parte presentation of
evidence because De Vera (a transferee pendente lite who may thus be joined as defendant under
Rule 3, Section 19) filed the Answer. The trial court should have tried the case based on De
Vera’s Answer, which Answer is deemed to have been adopted by non-answering defendants.
To proceed with the ex parte presentation of evidence against the named defendants after De Vera’s
answer had been admitted would not only be a violation of Rule 9, Section 3(c), but would also be a
gross disregard of De Vera’s right to due process. This is because the ex parte presentation of
evidence would not result in a default judgment which would bind not just the defaulting defendants, but
also De Vera, precisely because he is a transferee pendente lite. This would result in an anomaly wherein
De Vera would by a default judgment even if he filed an answer and expressed a desire to participate in
the case.
GIST:
1. Medrano filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against the defendants.
2. Some of the defendants were defaulted except De Vera who was the transferee pendiente
lite of other defendants. So, this is a case of “Partial Default.”
3. The RTC did not consider De Vera as a Real Party-in-Interest.
4. Since there was a default the RTC ordered Medrano to present evidence ex parte. Tama ba
yon? NO!
5. The SC said that RTC should have allowed De Vera to present evidence, because in Partial
Default the answer of a defendant not in default is deemed to have been adopted by non-
answering/defaulted defendants.
1.
Page 83 of 136
When the Defense is Deemed Waived: deficiency in the complaint GR: NON-COMPLIANCE WITH BARANGAY CONCILIATION MAKES CASE VULNERABLE TO A MOTION TO
5. Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008 DISMISS;
PETITION: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of the
RD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. LGC on barangay conciliation is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative
COMPLAINT: Ejectment remedies — the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre -maturity; and the controversy
VENUE: QC there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion
PLAINTIFF: Ernesto Aure and Aure Lending to dismiss.
DEFENDANT: Aquino
XPN:
F: NEVERTHELESS, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-
1. By virtue of a Deed of Sale, Aure purchased a parcel of land from Aquino. Despite the sale, Aquino compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over
refused to vacate the property. the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
2. As such, Aure filed an Action for Ejectment against Aquino.
a. In his defense, Aquino contends that the sale was invalid because Aquino did not As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
receive any consideration.
3. MTC: dismissed the complaint for Aure’s failure to undergo barangay conciliation Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could
proceedings. affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
a. Aure Lending is improperly included as plaintiff because it is no a Real Party in Interest. vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the
4. RTC: affirmed. same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
5. CA: RTC and MTC were reversed and the case is remanded to the MTC for further proceedings. adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to
a. Additionally, CA stated that failure to comply with barangay conciliation is not a object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire
jurisdictional flaw and will not affect the COA considering that Aquino failed to raise proceedings a quo. [P]etitioners cannot now
said issue in his Answer. be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of
6. LT: the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.
a. Petitioner: non-recourse to barangay mediation makes the action for ejectment premature and
hence, dismissible. MTC has no jurisdiction (She raised this defense during the pre-trial in In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the
her position paper). MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have
b. Respondent/Aure: scrupulously examined Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter
i. Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal. MTC should have ordered the exclusion lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which could oust the MeTC
of Aure Lending. of its jurisdiction.
ii. Mere allegation of Aquino of ownership should not divest MTC of its jurisdiction.
iii. He was not allowed to rectify the procedural defect by going through brgy conciliation and By Aquino’s failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the Complaint, she is deemed to have
refile the Complaint. already acquiesced/agreed or waived any defect attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot
thereafter move for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lending’s failure to resort to
I: WON non-recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing so. The fact that Aquino
dismissal of the ejectment suit. NO, conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non- raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction. of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer as required
Doctrinal Issue: Whether she brought her objection seasonably (during pre-trial) or too late. LATE, by omnibus motion rule.
because she should have brought the objection to attack the jurisdiction of MeTC in her answer not in Rule 15 Sec.  8.  Omnibus Motion.—Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a
pre-trial. motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
R:
DOCTRINE:
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of GIST:
such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s Complaint 1. Aure filed an ejectment case against Aquino.
before the MeTC. The only issue to be resolved is whether non-recourse to the barangay 2. Aquino failed to raise in his answer the defense of the deficiency in the complaint which
conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the ejectment suit could oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction. He only raised it during the pre-trial. Pwde ba yon?
filed with the MeTC. 3. SC said he should have averred the objection in the answer, thus it is deemed waived
under Rule 9 Sec. 1

Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment premature
and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial and
even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the MeTC. We do not agree.

Page 84 of 136
DEFAULT BY WRONG SERVICE OF MOTION AND TARDINESS
6. Philip Palileo, et al. v. Planters Bank, G.R. 193650, October 8, 2014
PETITION: FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE AMENDED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
RD: Petition is granted
COMPLAINT: action for specific performance/sum of money with damages
VENUE: RTC Gen Santos City
PLAINTIFF (2): George Philip P. Palileo and Jose Dela Cruz, ,
DEFENDANT (6): Planters Development Bank, Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Arturo R. delos Reyes,
Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad and Emmanuel Tesalonia.
F:
1. In the first hearing of pre-trial, the defendants did not appear. The defendants did not appear also
in the second hearing. According to PDB, it was difficult to book a flight to Gen San.
a. RTC declared the defendant in default
b. The plaintiff moved for presentation of evidence ex parte.
c. On the basis of which, RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
2. PDB received a copy of the decision.
a. Then PDB filed to RTC Gen San through private courier service (LBC) its Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial. PDB had 15 days to file.
b. PDB also sent the Omnibus motion to the Petitioners in Tupi, S. Cotabato via LBC. However,
there was no LBC there.
c. Then PDB refiled and resent the omnibus motion by registered mail. But it was One
day Late.
3. RTC: in favor of the plaintiffs; denied the motion for new trial
a. the motion is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper for failure to be filed within the reglementary
period (10 days).
4. CA: affirmed RTC order at first
5. Amended Decision of CA upon MR: reversed RTC (LT of PDB)
a. CA ruled that the “distances involved in the case at bench call for a relaxation of the application
of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court” deserved consideration.
b. Since RTC judgment was arrived at mere default or technicality, it calls for a relaxation of the
Rules, in line with the principles of substantial justice.
6. SC: plaintiff is correct; CA amended decision is reversed.
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that it timely filed its Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial, it nonetheless violated the ten-day requirement on the
notice of hearing under Section 5 of Rule 15.
Third, even before it could be notified of the trial court’s resolution of its omnibus motion on
September 14, 2006 — assuming it was timely filed, it filed a notice of appeal on September 7,
2006 — which thus implies that it abandoned its bid for reconsideration and new trial, and
instead opted to have the issues resolved by the CA through the remedy of appeal.
Fourth, instead of properly pursuing its appeal to free itself from the unfavorable effects of the
trial court’s denial of its notice of appeal, PDB chose with disastrous results to gamble on its
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial by filing an original Petition for Certiorari
to assail the trial court’s denial thereof. Time and again, it has been said that certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal.
GIST:
1. Nag file ng complaint sila plaintiffs kay PDB. Eh ang layo ng Gen San at ang hirap
makabook ng ticket, kaya di naka attend ang lawyer ng PDB sa Pre-Trial. Kaya na default si
PDB.
2. Nag order ang RTC upon the presentation of evidence ex parte ng plaintiff.
3. Nag file ng motion for new trial si PDB kaso pinadala sa LBC. Realizing the mistake,
nagpadala sila via registered mail. Kaso one day late na. Dapat bang irelax ang rules dahil
malayo ang Gen San? NO
4. SC said 4x palpak ang PDB. Effect ng palpak nila is foreclosure of right to appeal.
Philip Plileo Case vis-à-vis Martinez Case:
1. Sa Philip: Defaulted ang party pero walang right to appeal, bec. the lost of the right was due to non-
compliance to reglementary period.
2. Sa Martinez: Defaulted ang party pero may right to appeal, bec. there was no other violation of the
ROC to forfeit the right.

I: WON a relaxation of rules should be applied. NO, because it did not follow the Rules about service of
motion. LBC was not allowed.
EFFECT: right to appeal is foreclosed

R:
Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules. This is
not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was not covered
by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB refiled and resent the omnibus motion by
registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-
day period had expired.

Since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the 15-
day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal, it
follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer question the trial court’s
Decision in any other manner.

Neither can the Court lend a helping hand to extricate PDB from the effects of its mistake; indeed, PDB
erred more than once during the course of the proceedings.
First, it did not attempt to set right its failure to appear during pretrial, which prompted the
court to allow petitioners to present evidence ex parte and obtain a favorable default judgment.

Page 85 of 136
 Third, he must have a meritorious defense.
DEFAULT
7. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma Corp and PBCOM, G.R. No. 193494, March 07, 2014
3 Requisites
PETITION: FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
1. FAME
RD: WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
2. Under oath
COMPLAINT: for Interpleader and Consignation
3. Meritorious defense
VENUE: RTC Makati
PLAINTIFF: Zuellig Pharma (lessee)
EFFECT OF DEFAULT
DEFENDANT: Lui and PBCom
1. A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court.
2. He or she is “deprived of the right to take part in the trial and forfeits his [or her] rights as a party
F:
litigant,”
1. Pharma rented Lui’s land in Davao City. Then PBCOM claimed to be the new owner of the land asked
3. has no right “to present evidence [supporting his or her] allegations,” and
for Lui’s rent.
4. has no right to “control the proceedings [or] cross-examine witnesses.”
2. Because of conflicting claim, Pharma filed for interpleader. Pharma asked RTC to consign its
The consequence of the default is that the court may “render judgment barring [the defaulted claimant]
payment.
from any claim in respect to the subject matter.”
a. PBCom filed an answer
b. While Lui filed a MTD. There is a pending case for nullification of dation in payment between Lui
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE PARTY IN DEFAULT:
and PBCom in RTC Davao. (BUT Lui filed the MTD beyond the 15 day reglementary period, 4
NOTE: The remedies below are mutually exclusive, not alternative or cumulative.
days late)
1. Motion to Set Aside Order of Default (motion for relief) if after Notice of the Declaration of
c. Pharma and PBCom moved that Lui be declared in default.
Default but before the Trial court renders judgment.
3. RTC: Lui is declared in default. Heard the case without participation of Lui.
 The defendant enjoys the most liberality from this court with a motion to set aside order of
4. After one year Lui filed a Motion to Set Aside order of default on the ground of excusable
default, as he or she has no default judgment to contend with, and he or she has the whole
negligence (due to former counsel).
period before judgment to remedy his or her default.
a. Pharma: a counsel’s failure to file a timely answer was inexcusable negligence which bound his
2. Motion for New Trial if the defendant discovers the default after judgment but before it
client.
becomes final and executory (Rule 37 Sec. 1a)
b. RTC denied on ground of Lui’s lost of standing in court.
 With a motion for new trial, the defendant must file the motion within the period for taking
5. CA: affirmed RTC. Lui failed to show excusable negligence.
an appeal or within 15 days from notice of the default judgment. Although a default
6. SC: affirmed RTC and CA
judgment has already been rendered, the filing of the motion for new trial tolls the
reglementary period of appeal, and the default judgment cannot be executed against the
I: WON the failure of Lui to file within the 15 day period was due to an excusable negligence. NO,
defendant.
its excuse that the fault was due to its counsel is not considered excusable, i.e. not due to fraud,
3. Petition for Relief from Judgment if the defendant discovers the default after judgment
accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
has become final and executory (Rule 38 Sec. 1)
 A petition for relief from judgment is filed after the default judgment has become final and
R:
executory. Thus, the filing of the petition for relief from judgment does not stay the
HOW DEFAULT OCCURS:
execution of the default judgment unless a writ of preliminary injunction is issued pending
When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is required to answer
the petition’s resolution.
within 15 days from the day he or she was served with summons. The defendant may also move to
4. Appeal (Rule 41 Sec. 2). Ground: evidence
dismiss the complaint “[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer.”
 He may do so even without filing a Petition to Set Aside Order of Default.
When a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons, the court may declare
 Upon the grant of a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a petition
the defendant in default on plaintiff’s motion and notice to defendant.
for relief from judgment, the defendant is given the chance to present his or her evidence
against that of plaintiff’s. With an appeal, however, the defendant has no right to present
GR: DEFAULT IS NOT FAVORED.
evidence on his or her behalf and can only appeal the judgment for being contrary to
The general rule is that courts should proceed with deciding cases on the merits and set aside orders of
plaintiff’s evidence or the law.
default as default judgments are “frowned upon.” As much as possible, cases should be decided with
5. Petition for Certiorari if order of default was done with grave abuse of discretion. Ground:
both parties “given every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicality.”
grave abuse
 Similar to an appeal, a petition for certiorari does not allow the defendant to present
CONDITION OF DEFAULT:
evidence on his or her behalf. The defendant can only argue that the trial court committed
However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
grave abuse of discretion in declaring him or her in default.
must first be complied with. The defendant’s motion to set aside order of default must satisfy three
NOTE: only in 1,2,3 remedies you can present evidence.
conditions.
First is the time element. The defendant mharsh
In this case, sa remedy #1 pasok si Lui. It must present evidence to prove excusable
ust challenge the default order before judgment.
negligence.
Second, the defendant must have been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
GIST:

Page 86 of 136
1. Zuellig filed Interpleader because Lui and PBCom both claim Zuellig’s rent.
2. Lui was 4 days late in filing its MTD. Lui blamed its counsel.
3. Lui was declared in default. It filed Motion to Set Aside order of default on the ground of
excusable negligence. Excusable ba talaga? NO
4. SC said although the motion for relief was right, it was not not due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.

Page 87 of 136
8. Otero v. Tan, G.R. No. 200134, August 12, 2012
PETITION: FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
RD: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED
COMPLAINT: Collection for Sum of Money and Damage
VENUE: MTCC Cagayan de Oro
PLAINTIFF: Tan
DEFENDANT: Otero
F:
1. Tan filed a collection for unpaid petroleum product against Otero.
2. The summons was served to the wife of Otero.
3. Otero failed to file an answer. Tan filed a motion to declare Otero in Default. Otero claimed he did
not receive the service of summons. The hearing was scheduled but Otero failed to attend.
4. MTCC: in favor of Tan; allowed Tan to present evidence ex parte.
a. Otero appealed to RTC for denial of due process
5. RTC: affirmed MTCC; no denial of due process because he filed a Comment to Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default instead of an Answer.
a. Otero appealed to CA raising the objection of genuineness and due execution of statements of
account by Tan.
6. CA: affirmed RTC; the objection of Otero is deemed waived for failing to file an answer (SC says this
is incorrect, Otero’s argument is not deemed waived)
7. SC: affirmed CA
LT:
Petitioner:
Respondent:
I: WON a party (Otero) may raise an objection while on appeal when declared in default. YES, he has
the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground:
1. that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed
for, or
2. that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or
3. that the decision is contrary to law.
However, in this case Tan sufficiently proved the material allegations in his complaint against Otero.
R:
Otero asserts that Tan failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint since the statements of
account which he presented are inadmissible in evidence.
A defendant who was declared in default may nevertheless appeal from the judgment by default, albeit
on limited grounds.
Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 2004
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court
and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the
right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the
ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different
in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material
allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party
declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed
decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it
were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a
right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in default, and which he
failed to have vacated.
CONSEQUENCE OF DEFAULT; A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be
declared by the court in default; A party in default loses his right to present his defense,
control the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses.― the consequence of an
order of default is loss of standing in court, the forfeiture of one’s right as a party litigant, contestant or
legal adversary. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and
examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon
by the court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him.
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO A PARTY WHO HAS BEEN DECLARED IN DEFAULT.―The fact that a
defendant has lost his standing in court for having been declared in default does not mean that he is left
sans any recourse whatsoever.
In Lina v. CA, et al., 135 SCRA 637 (1985), this Court enumerated the remedies available to party who
has been declared in default, to wit:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious
defenses; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory,
he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41) KNOW THE 3 GROUNDS OF APPEAL
Same; Same; Same; A defendant who has been declared in default is precluded from raising
any other ground in his appeal from the judgment by default since, otherwise, he would then
be allowed to adduce evidence in his defense, which right he had lost after he was declared in
default.― Indeed, he is proscribed in the appellate tribunal from adducing any evidence to bolster his
defense against the plaintiff’s claim.
GIST:
1. Nagfile si Tan ng collection of sum of money kay Otero.
2. Na-default si Otero for failing to file an answer
3. Nakarating sa CA ang case. Only then Otero assailed (1) that Tan’s documents are
inadmissible (2) that Tan failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint. Pwede ba
yon? YES!
4. SC said ung Tan’s docs averred as inadmissible is equivalent of bla bla material allegation.
Kaso talo parin si Otero, dahil facts show na naprove nmn ni Tan ang material
allegation nya.
Page 88 of 136
 VIII. Amendment and Supplement
RULE 10
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Section 1. Amendments in general.
Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party,
or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive
manner.

Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right.

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (l0) days after it is served.

Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court.

Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion
was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section
shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an
opportunity to be heard.

Sec. 4. Formal amendments.

A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors
may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on
motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.

Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if
the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.

Sec. 6. Supplemental pleadings.

Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are
just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or
events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The
adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the
supplemental pleading.

Sec. 7. Filing of amended pleadings.

When any pleading is amended, a new copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the
amendments, which shall be indicated by appropriate marks, shall be filed.

Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleadings.

An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in
superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; and claims or
defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.

Page 89 of 136
RULE 6: KINDS OF PLEADINGS
Section 1. Pleadings defined.

Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties
submitted to the court for appropriate judgment.

RULE 11: WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

Sec. 3. Answer to amended complaint.

[When] the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the

defendant shall answer the same within thirty (30) calendar days after
being served with a copy thereof. Where its filing is not a matter of right,
the defendant shall answer the amended complaint within fifteen (15)
calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer
earlier filed may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new
answer is filed.

This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim, amended

cross-claim, amended third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, and amended
complaint-in-intervention. (3a)

RULE 12: BILL OF PARTICULARS

Sec. 3. Compliance with order.
If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be effected
within ten (l0) days from notice of the order, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
The bill of particulars or a more definite statement ordered by the court may be filed either in
a separate or in an amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the adverse party.

RULE 16: MOTION TO DISMISS

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion.
After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the
amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied
upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.t

Page 90 of 136

1. PAGCOR v. Judge Lopez, A.M. RTJ-04-1848, October 25, 2005
PETITION: FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
RD: WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge Romulo A. Lopez is
DISMISSED.
COMPLAINT: Action for Specific Performance which became Collection for Sum of Money
Admin. Complaint against Judge Lopez
VENUE: RTC Manila
PLAINTIFF: FILGAME and BELLE JAI-ALAI CORP
DEFENDANT: PAGCOR, DILG and Sec. Alfredo Lim
i. Which party was trying to amend which pleading? Filgame and Belle
ii. When did the party seek to amend a pleading? After promulgation of Del Mar v PAGCOR
which disallows PAGCOR to have joint agreement with Filgame and Belle
iii. What did the amendment consist of? Change of COA from Spec. Perf. to Collection for
Sum of Money
F:
1. PAGCOR filed an administrative case against Judge Lopez for gross ignorance of the law
and disbarment.
2. The complaint arose when PAGCOR, who was given funds (P1.5B) by FILGAME and BELLE JAI-ALAI
CORP for the Jai-Alai operations in the Philippines, was ordered by the Office of the President and
the DILG to close down Jai-Alai operations.
a. Aggrieved, on Nov. 6, 2000, FILGAME and BELLE filed an Action for Specific Performance
against PAGCOR, etc which was raffled to Judge Lopez.
b. Weeks later, Del Mar v. PAGCOR was promulgated enjoining BELLE and FILGAME from operating
Jai-Alai games.
RD: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Respondents PAGCOR, Belle Jai-Alai
Corporation and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation are enjoined
from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games, and from enforcing the
agreement entered into by them for that purpose.
3. As a result, they filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint to change their cause of action
from 1ST Specific Performance to 2ND Recovery of Sum of Money amounting to 1.5B
considering that they can no longer ask for Specific Performance anymore.
a. PAGCOR opposed the Amendment on the ground that there is a substantial change in the
complaint and cause of action.
b. Judge Lopez admitted the Amended Complaint over PAGCOR’s opposition.
4. Thus, PAGCOR filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of FILGAME and BELLE to pay the correct docket
fees based on the Amended Complaint which now amounted to 15.8M.
a. Judge Lopez denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction was not lost
by the amendment. Since the original complaint was filed and the corresponding
docket fee was paid by the plaintiff, the Court had acquired jurisdiction over the said
complaint.
b. As such, PAGCOR filed its Answer.
c. BELLE and FILGAME filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
5. Then, without conducting hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Lopez ruled in
favor of BELLE and FILGAME ordering PAGCOR to return the 1.5B.
a. PAGCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA and an Administrative Case against Lopez.
b. When the Administrative Case was allowed to continue, CA Justice Tijam recommended the
dismissal of the Complaint.
I: 1. WON the amended complaint which substantially changed the COA should be allowed. YES, under
Sec. 3 Rule 10 which allows amendments with substantial change of COA and defense.
2. WON the amended complaint should be admitted even without payment of the additional filing fee for
that amended complaint. YES, under the Sun Insurance Doctrine the court may allow the payment of
filing fee within a reasonable time or make the unpaid additional fee as lien on jusgment.
R:
DOCTRINE:
The Court finds no gross ignorance of law committed by Judge Lopez when he admitted the
Amended Complaint notwithstanding that it substantially altered the cause of action of
FILGAME and BELLE. Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding
section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such
leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent
to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made
upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to
be heard.
As held in Valenzuela vs. CA,
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the
former rule in such manner that the phrase ‘or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered’ was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear
import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, ‘the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.’ This
should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote
the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a ‘just, speedy an
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.’
The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs was for Specific Performance and injunction with prayer for
damages and for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against complainant while the Amended
Complaint was for Recovery of Sum of Money. Such amendment to the original complaint was filed
by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE after the Supreme Court decision declared that complainant
could not enter into a joint agreement with other corporations to operate the Jai-Alai, and that
the Agreement dated June 17, 1999 entered into between complainant and the plaintiffs is
null and void. However, since plaintiffs had provided funds for complainant’s preoperating
expenses and working capital, plaintiffs had to file an amended complaint which seeks the
recovery of their expenses.
Although the amended complaint substantially changed the cause of action of plaintiffs FILGAME and
BELLE, the admission thereof by Judge Lopez is allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 and
jurisprudence.
SUN INSURANCE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO NON-PAYMENT OF FILING FEES
The Court also finds that respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he admitted
the amended complaint despite the non -payment by plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE of additional docket
fees on the amended complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, the Court laid down the
rules on the payment of docket fees as follows:
Page 91 of 136
 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the o 2. Make the additional filing fee as lien on judgment.
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Lopez is correct in ruling in his Order dated June 19, 2002 that the court had jurisdiction over the
amended complaint as it had acquired jurisdiction over the case when the original complaint
was filed and the corresponding docket fee was paid thereon. Plainly, while the payment of the
prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Also, the unpaid additional docket fees should be considered as a lien on the judgment even
though plaintiffs had specified the amount of P1,562,145,661.87 in the prayer of the amended
complaint.

Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction for non-payment of additional docket fees is deemed abandoned as
there was neither a motion for reconsideration nor a petition questioning such Order filed by
complainant. In fact, when the amended complaint was admitted and respondent directed complainant
to file its answer, the latter filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim and without
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of insufficient payment of docket
fees. Complainant even invoked the court’s authority when it asked for affirmative relief on its
counterclaim, thus it is estopped from challenging the court’s jurisdiction.

GIST:
1. Nagfile ng Action for Specific Performance si Filgame kay PAGCOR. Nagbayad ng filing fee
si Filgame.
2. Lumabas ang Del Mar v. PAGCOR, nag utos ang SC na bawal na makipag Joint Agreement si
PAGCOR kay Filgame.
3. Na-realize ni Filgame na di na pwede ang Specific Performance, kaya nag file sya ng
Amended Complaint for Collection of Money.
4. Eto ginawa ni Judge: (1) tinanggap nya ung Amended Complaint kahit substantially
changed ang COA; (2) tinanggap nya ung Amended Complaint kahit walang additional docket
fee. Pwede ba yon? YES
5. Sabi ng SC:
 (1) pwede na tanggaping ang Amended Complaint which substantially altered
COA/Defense under Rule 10 Sec. 3
 (2) Sun Life doctrine says non-payment of docket fee does not automatically dismiss
a case, because courts may do the ff:
o 1. Allow payment within reasonable time not beyond the reglementary period

Page 92 of 136
2. Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008
PETITION: FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
RD: WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE CA (3) DENY the entry of appearance of
the Lazaro Law and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the City
Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City (5) AFFIRM the RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and
(6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun from representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he
filed in behalf of Capalad.
COMPLAINT: Action for Annulment of Contracts
VENUE: RTC Urdaneta
PLAINTIFF: Del Castillo, as Taxpayer
DEFENDANT: APP, Capalad and Urdaneta City
i. Which party was trying to amend which pleading? Urdaneta City through Omnibus
Motion to withdraw its Answer,
ii. When did the party seek to amend a pleading? After Pre-trial; after Urdaneta already
filed its Answer alleging the validity of the contract
iii. What did the amendment consist of? (1) drop Urdaneta as defendant and be joined a
Plaintiff with Del Castillo (2) Change of counsel from City Prosecutor to Lazaro Law Firm.
F:
FACTS:
1. Waldo Del Castillo, as taxpayer, filed an Action for Annulment of Contracts against Urdaneta City,
Capalad (JJEFWA Builders) and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Goco.
a. It was alleged that Urdaneta Mayor entered into contracts for the design, construction, and
management of a commercial center and hotel amounting to 250M.
b. The contractor was paid 95M. Del Castillo claims that the contract is void because the object,
being public domain, is outside the commerce of man.
2. In their Answer, APP claimed that the contracts were valid.
a. Urdaneta also joined and claimed that the contracts were properly executed with prior authority
from the Sanggunian.
b. It also claimed that Del Castillo has no capacity to sue and states no cause of action.
c. Capalad also filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss against Del
Castillo.
3. After pre-trial, Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta and filed an
Omnibus Motion with prayer to withdraw its Answer, drop Urdaneta as defendant and be joined as
plaintiff, admit its Complaint, and conduct new pre-trial.
a. Urdaneta allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
4. RTC admitted the entry of appearance of Lazaro Law Firm and withdrew appearance of the City
Prosecutor.
a. Urdaneta’s Complaint was likewise admitted and was consolidated with Del Castillo’s.
b. Thereafter, Defendants were directed to Answer Urdaneta’s complaint. This was also done to
Calapad’s because he wanted to join the plaintiffs and be dropped as a defendant.
c. Thus, APP filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
5. CA: dismissed. MR denied.
6. Hence, this Petition.
a. LT of Petitioners: It is claimed that Urdaneta is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer
that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trail brief, that the execution of the contracts was in
good faith. (SC: No)
I: WON Urdaneta is estopped to reverse admissions in its answer and pre-trial that the contracts are
valid. NO, because ROC provides that if the evidence objected to at trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues raised in the pleadings, the court may allow PLEADINGS TO BE AMENDED.
R:
DOCTRINE:
The court may allow amendment of pleadings. Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provides that if evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with
liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will
be subserved thereby.
Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined
as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties’ evidence
on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and
admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be
made to cause them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta City’s judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to
consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over
documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party’s testimony in open court may also
override admissions in the Answer.
As regards the RTC’s order admitting Capalad’s complaint and dropping him as defendant, we find the
same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun
claims otherwise. We note, however, that Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the
contracts are valid. On the other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts.
Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should
expunge all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.
GIST:
1. Nag file ng Tax Payer suit to Annul Contracts si Castillo laban kay Urdaneta, Capalad and
APP dahilbawal dawg awing commercial center ang public domain being outside the
commerce of man.
2. Nag file ng Answer sila Urdaneta, Capalad and APP na valid daw ang contracts.
3. After pre-trial nag switch sides sila Urdaneta and Capalad para maging plaintiff. Now they
say during the trial na invalid ang contracts (balimbings).
4. Sabi ni APP estopped na si Urdaneta to reverse admission in its answer. Tama ba yon? NO
5. sabi ng SC, kung wala ung issues na raised sa trial doon sa issues na written sa pleadings,
pwede i-amend ung pleadings under Sec. 5 Rule 10.
Page 93 of 136
3. Tiu v. PBCOM, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009
PETITION: FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI OF THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE CA
RD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED
COMPLAINT: Collection for Sum of Money
VENUE: RTC CDO
PLAINTIFF: PBCom
DEFENDANT (3): Tiu, Go, Co
i. Which party was trying to amend which pleading? PBCom
ii. When did the party seek to amend a pleading? During its Reply with Motion for Leave of
Court to Substitute
iii. What did the amendment consist of? PBCom made the Substitution of the Altered
Document with the Original.
F:
1. Asian Water Resources Inc, represented by Tiu, was granted a loan by PBCOM which was
guaranteed by a parcel of land.
a. Wanting to apply for a bigger loan, PBCOM required all members of the Board to become
sureties through a Surety Agreement which was executed by its Directors and acknowledged by
a notary public.
b. One copy was kept by the notary public while the other was sent to the Records Management
and Archives Office through the RTC Clerk of Court.
2. PBCOM denied the request to pay the existing loan via dacion en pago.
a. Thereafter, PBCOM demanded payment which remain unheeded.
b. Thus, PBCOM filed a Collection Case against Tiu.
3. In Tiu’s Answer, they claim that the Surety Agreements were falsified because when they signed it
the words “in his personal capacity” was not yet there.
a. Upon investigation, PBCOM discovered that the insertion was ordered by the bank auditor.
b. It alleged that when the Surety Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor, he called the
attention of the loans clerk as to why the words “In his personal capacity” did not appear under
the signature of each party. As such, the loans clerk was ordered to insert such words.
4. PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to
Substitute the current annex in the Complaint.
a. It likewise admitted its mistake in making the insertion without the knowledge of the notary
public.
b. It maintained that it was not a falsification but was made only to speak the truth of the parties’
intentions.
c. Moreover, PBCOM asserted that Tiu et al were already primarily liable even without the
insertion.
5. RTC: allowed the substitution of the altered document with the original. MR denied.
6. CA: Tiu et al’s petition was likewise dismissed.
7. LT:
a. Petitioner/Tiu: Rule 10 Sec 3 does not allow the withdrawal and substitution of a falsified
document once discovered by the opposing party.
b. Respondent: since the complaint is based on an actionable document, i.e., the surety
agreement, the original or a copy thereof should be attached to the pleading as an exhibit,
which shall be deemed part of the pleading.
i. Considering that the surety agreement is annexed to the complaint, it is an
integral part thereof and its substitution with another copy is in the nature of a
substantial amendment, which is allowed by the Rules, but with prior leave of
court.
I: WON the substitution of the Surety Agreement that was annexed to the complaint should be allowed.
YES, because the Surety Agreement is part of the pleading being an actionable document according to
Sec. 7 Rule 8. Since the Surety Agreement is part of the Complaint, it can be amended (Sec. 3 Rule 10).
R:
DOCTRINE:
As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint with the
original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the substitution.
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, its substance must be set forth, and
the original or a copy thereof “shall” be attached to the pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part
thereof, to wit:
Section 7. Action or defense based on document.—Whenever an action or defense is
based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or
document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed
thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided in the next preceding
section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such
leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent
to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made
upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to
be heard.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the
former rule in such manner that the phrase ‘or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered’ was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear
import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, ‘the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.’ This
should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a ‘just, speedy andinexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.’
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that
the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the
case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if
the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still
be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay;
and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
Page 94 of 136
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made If the order is not obeyed, or in case of insufficient compliance therewith, the court may order
before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to the striking out of the pleading or the portions thereof to which the order was directed or
answer and to prepare for trial. make such other order as it deems just.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts
and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.
That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.
Sec. 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading.
After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of
his motion, the moving party may file his responsive pleading within the period to which he
was entitled at the time of filing his motion, which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event.

In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the
altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have
submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that, through
inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words “IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY” were inserted to conform to the bank’s standard practice. This alteration was
made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOM’s counsel had no idea that what it
submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety
agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved.
GIST:
1. Nagfile ng collection suit si PBCom.
2. Nung nagfile na ng complaint, mali ung Surety Agreement na inattach ni Atty sa annex ng
complaint.
3. Tinira tuloy ni Tiu ung mistake na un sa answer nya.
4. upon realizing the mistake, isinabay n ani PBCom sa reply nya ung Motion for Leave of
Court to Substitute the current annex in the Complaint. Pwede ba yon? YES
5. Sabi ng SC ung Surety Agreement is considered an actionable document attached to the
complaint. Kaya pwede ma amend upon leave of court based on Rule 10 Sec. 3.
Sec. 6. Bill a part of pleading.
A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading for which it is intended.
RULE 17: DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.
If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared
by the court.

IX. Bill of Particulars

RULE 12: BILL OF PARTICULARS
Section 1. When applied for; purpose.
Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion
must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the
defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.

Sec. 2. Action by the court.

Upon the filing of the motion, the clerk of court must immediately bring it to the attention of
the court which may either deny or grant it outright, or allow the parties the opportunity to
be heard.

Sec. 3. Compliance with order.

If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be effected
within ten (l0) days from notice of the order, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
The bill of particulars or a more definite statement ordered by the court may be filed either in
a separate or in an amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the adverse party.

Sec. 4. Effect of non-compliance.

Page 95 of 136
1. Palm Avenue Holding Co. v Sandiganbayan GR 195795, 2014 Indeed, sequestration is an extraordinary and harsh remedy. As such, it should be confined to its lawful
PETITION: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari parameters and exercised with due regard to the requirements of fairness, due process, and
RD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is granted justice.
COMPLAINT: Sequestration
VENUE: GIST:
PLAINTIFF: 1. Nag file ng complaint si PCGG kay Palm.
DEFENDANT: 2. Ang labo ng complaint ni PCGG, kaya humingi ng BOP si Palm.
i. What pleading was the subject of the Motion for BOP? The 3rd Amended Complaint 3. Palpak ung BOP ni PCGG. Anong effect? Dismissal, violation of Due Process eh.
ii. What details were being asked in the Motion for BOP? what are the alleged illegally
acquired funds or properties of the Palm Avenue Companies which they are liable to return,
remains unanswered, a product of uncertainty.
iii. Was there compliance? No.

F:
1. PCGG (Republic) sequestered all assets of Palm Companies.
2. PCGG filed a complaint in SB but did not implead Palm as defendants. However, SB ordered the
Palm to be impleaded. So PCGG filed an amended complaint to implead Palm.
3. SB granted the Palm’s Urgent Motion to Lift the Writ of Sequestration and Motion to Release
Sequestered Funds.
a. Then Palm, seeing that the allegation against it is vague, filed a Motion for BOP to direct the
PCGG to submit a bill of particulars regarding matters in the amended complaint which were not
alleged with certainty or particularity.
b. The PCGG submitted its BOP.
c. Palm filed for MTD on the ground that PCGG’s BOP did not satisfactorily comply the requested
details.
4. SB granted the MTD.
a. SB said that PCGG’s BOP are indefinite and deficient inasmuch as the question of what are the
alleged illegally acquired funds or properties of the Palm Avenue Companies which they are
liable to return, remains unanswered, a product of uncertainty.

I: WON there is a compliance with the BOP. No, so the MTD was granted.
R:

PURPOSE OF BOP
Simple justice demands that the Palm Companies must know what the complaint against
them is all about. The law requires no less. In the similar case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA
661 (1997), petitioner Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars, asserting that the allegations
against him are vague and are not averred with sufficient definiteness as to enable him to
effectively prepare his responsive pleading. Although the allegations therein may be vague,
dismissal of the action is not the proper remedy because the defendant may ask for more
particulars. As such, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any
matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity. This is to enable him to
properly prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.

In view, therefore, of plaintiff Republic’s failure to file the proper bill of particulars which
would completely amplify the charges against defendant Palm Avenue Companies , and
applying the above quoted ruling of the High Court in the Virata case, this Court deems it just and
proper to order the dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint in so far as the charges against the
Palm Avenue Companies are concerned.

Finally, we sustain defendant-movants’ argument that the failure of the plaintiff to sufficiently
provide the ultimate and material facts they required in their motion for bill of particulars,
makes the third amended complaint dismissible for failure to state a cause of action.

Page 96 of 136
2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007
PETITION: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
RD: PETITION is DISMISSED. SB’s granting of BOP is proper.
COMPLAINT:
VENUE:
PLAINTIFF:
DEFENDANT:
i. What pleading was the subject of the Motion for BOP
ii. What details were being asked in the Motion for BOP? clarification on the specific
nature, manner and extent of participation of his Pres. Marcos in the acquisition of the
assets; particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of Cruz’ properties;
and the specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.
iii. Was there compliance? NO
F:
1. Marcos had been declared in default for failure to respond to alias summons when he was in exile in
Hawaii.
2. After Marcos died, Imelda moved to set aside the order of default which was granted by the
Sandiganbayan.
3. Thereafter, as executor of Marcos’ estate, Bong Bong filed a Motion for Leave to File Responsive
Pleading which was also granted.
a. He even asked for 3 extensions totaling 35 days to file an Answer.
b. However, instead of filing an Answer, Bong Bong filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and prayed
for clearer statements of the allegations which he claimed were mere conclusions of law and
thus too vague and general to enable them to intelligently answer.
c. This motion was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan.
4. In opposition, Republic argued that since Motions for Extension to File Answer were filed, the
Sandiganbayan should not have granted the Motion for Bill of Particulars.
I: WON SB is correct in granting the Motion for BOP while Motions for Extension to File Answer are filed.
YES,
R:
DOCTRINE:
PROPRIETY OF MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS
As to the propriety of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, we find for respondent as the
allegations against former President Marcos appear obviously couched in general terms. They do not
cite the ultimate facts to show how the Marcoses acted “in unlawful concert” with Cruz in illegally
amassing assets, property and funds in amounts disproportionate to Cruz’s lawful income, except that
the former President Marcos was the president at the time.
acts constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations against the Marcoses, aside from being
maladroitly laid, were couched in general terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that
could show the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and sufficiently set forth by
petitioner.
That the late president’s co-defendants were able to file their respective answers to the complaint does
not necessarily mean that his estate’s executor will be able to file an equally intelligent
answer, since the answering defendants’ defense might be personal to them.
Phrases like “in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers with
grave and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws,”
“unjust enrichment,” “embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth,” “arrogated
unto himself all powers of government,” are easy and easy to read; they have potential media
quotability and they evoke passion with literary flair, not to mention that it was populist to flaunt those
statements in the late 1980s. But they are just that, accusations by generalization. Motherhood
statements they are, although now they might be a politically incorrect expression and an affront to
mothers everywhere, although they best describe the accusations against the Marcoses in the case at
bar.
The facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation
of excesses against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of
particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so
that trial in this case will proceed as expeditiously as possible. To avoid a situation where its
pleadings may be found defective, thereby amounting to a failure to state a cause of action, petitioner
for its part must be given the opportunity to file a bill of particulars . Thus, we are hereby
allowing it to supplement its pleadings now, considering that amendments to pleadings are favored and
liberally allowed especially before trial.
Lastly, the allowance of the motion for a more definite statement rests with the sound
discretion of the court. As usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court
will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly
erroneous order . This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion
in setting aside default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands
and the law requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.

In his motion for a bill of particulars, respondent wanted clarification on the specific nature,
manner and extent of participation of his father in the acquisition of the assets cited above
under Cruz; particularly whether former President Marcos was a beneficial owner of these
properties; and the specific manner in which he acquired such beneficial control.

The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine prescribes a motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss,
as the remedy for perceived ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth, which was similarly worded as the complaint in this case. That doctrine provided
protective precedent in favor of respondent when he filed his motion for a bill of particulars. While the
allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, they were vague and unclear as
to the acts of the Marcos couple who were allegedly “in unlawful concert with” the former.
There was no factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the collaboration of or on the
kind of support extended by former President Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful

Page 97 of 136
 RULE 13
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS,
JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS
Section 1. Coverage.
This Rule shall govern the filing of all pleadings and other papers, as well as the service
thereof, except those for which a different mode of service is prescribed.
Sec. 2. Filing and service, defined.
Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned . If any
party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of
them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel
appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon
him by the opposite side.
Sec. 3. Manner of filing.
The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers
shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally
to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court
shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the
mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the
post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of
their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the
case.
Sec. 4. Papers required to be filed and served.
Every judgment, resolution, order, pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion,
notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court,
and served upon the parties affected.
Sec. 5. Modes of service.
Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made
either personally or by mail.
Sec. 6. Personal service.
Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel,
or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person
is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy,
between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's
residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.
Sec. 7. Service by mail.
Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed
envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his
residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster to
return the mail to the sender after ten (l0) days if undelivered. If no registry service is
available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by
ordinary mail.
Sec. 8. Substituted service.
If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made
under the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel
being unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof
of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the time of
such delivery.
Sec. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions.
Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail.
When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final
orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense
of the prevailing party.
Sec. 10. Completeness of service.
Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon
the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from
the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes
must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
Sec. 12. Proof of filing.
The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case. If it
is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by
the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on a copy of the
same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person who
did the mailing, containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the
post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if not
delivered.
Sec. 13. Proof of service.
Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of
the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall
consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this
Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together
with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens.
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the
registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of
the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the
time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and
only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party,
or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Page 98 of 136
Pointers for Service and Filing
1. In reading rules
a. Who files, and who receives what it filed
b. Who serves, and who receives what is served
c. Mode of filing and service
d. Proof of every mode of filing and service
e. Kinds of papers that are filed and served
f. When service is deemed completed
2. In reading cases
a. What pleading was allegedly defectively filed or served?
b. What were the defects in filing or service?
c. Domingo vs CA - Ignore complicated facts, focus on defect in filing/service
d. Dumaguete vs. Phil Ports Authority – ignore issue of notice of hearing on
motions, focus on defects in filing/service
e. Spouses Topacio vs. Banco Filipino, focus on Issue (B)
f. Lis Pendens cases (Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove, St. Mary of the Woods vs
RD), Vicente vs. Avera - Focus on
i. Who is the registered owner of the property where the Notice of Lis Pendens in
registered
ii. What is the source of the claim of the person trying to register a NLP
iii. Nature of action filed
iv. When the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (before or after appeal)
v. Where the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (trial court or appellate court)

Pointers for Summons

1. In reading rules
a. What is summons
b. ALL modes of summons
c. Summons made to special defendants
d. Requirements for substituted service of summons
e. Master the rules on summons
2. In reading cases
a. Who are the defendants
b. When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons
c. How was summons served
d. What was the alleged defect in the service of summons
e. What was the content of the server’s return
f. Requirements for substituted service of summons

Page 99 of 136
1. Marcelino Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010
Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. (Rule 65)
Complaint: for annulment of the deed of sale before RTC of Sto. Domingo, N. Ecija
RD: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
 Who are the defendants? Marcelino and Mananghaya
 When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? CA (?)
 How was summons served? By mail
 What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? No written explanation to justify service by
mail in lieu of personal service
 What was the content of the server’s return?
FACTS:
1. The RTC of Sto Domingo declared as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land
between Marcelino Domingo & his wife (buyer) and Julio Domingo (seller) due to the forged
signature of the seller.
a. Marcelino was thus ordered to deliver possession of said property to the Domingos.
b. After the appeal was denied, the decision became final and executory.
c. As such, a Writ of Execution was issued in favor of the Domingos.
2. Then, Marcelino filed with the DAR a Petition that he be declared as a tenant-beneficiary of the
property.
a. While the DAR case as pending, Marcelino reentered and retook possession of the property.
b. As such, the Domingos filed in the RTC a Motion to cite Marcelino in contempt for not complying
with the judgment.
c. RTC found him in contempt.
d. Later on, Marcelino employed 6 men to reenter the same property. Thus, they were arrested.
e. They were eventually released after they declared in writing that they would no longer interfere
with the Domingos.
f. RTC also warned Marcelino that a warrant of arrest will be issued if he reenters the property
again.
3. Afterwards, DAR granted Marcelino’s petition and declared him as tenant-beneficiary.
a. Consequently, Marcelino reentered and retook the possession of the same property.
b. Then, the Domingos filed another motion in the RTC to cite him in contempt and for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
4. RTC: MR denied.
5. CA also denied Marcelino’s Petition for Certiorari for failure to serve the pleadings personally and for
failure to provide a written explanation why the service was not done personally.
a. the Petition was deemed not filed because there was no written explanation to justify
service by mail in lieu of personal service.
b. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
6. LT of Marcelino Domingo: Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “merely
directory” and it is incumbent upon the court to use its discretion in determining whether
substantial justice will be served.
I: WON the Sec. 11 Rule 13 is mandatory. YES, basis is Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge
Ricafort.
DOCTRINE:
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.—Whenever practicable, the service
and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with
respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not
filed.
Section 11 is mandatory. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, the Court held that:
Pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other
papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through
other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why
the service or filing was not done personally.
REASON FOR PERSONAL SERVICE AND FILING: Personal service and filing are
preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution
on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail ,
considering the inefficiency of postal service. Likewise, personal service will do
away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort
to the following less than ethical practices:
(1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard,
thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
responsive pleadings or an opposition; or
(2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered parcel
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be
claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not
claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such
pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of
Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as
not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no
written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the
first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability of
personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.”
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort
to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal
service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or
filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing
was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a
court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow
circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay
in the administration of justice. For the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest
compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated.
GIST:
1. Marcelino Domingo failed to “personally” serve the summons to the defendants without written
statement to justify service “by mail.”
2. Marcelino claims that Sec. 11 Rule 13 is merely directory and not mandatory. Is that correct? NO.
3. Sec. 11 Rule 13 is mandatory.
GR: Personal service and filing “whenever practicable”
XPN: Service and filing by mail, provided there is a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally.
Page 100 of 136
2. City of Dumaguete through Mayor Remollo v. Phil. Ports Authority GR 168973, 2011
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA (Rule 45)
Complaint:
RD: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review of petitioner City of Dumaguete is hereby GRANTED.
 Who are the defendants? PPA
 When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? After the City filed its MR and
Supplemental MR before RTC.
 How was summons served? Not mentioned, but not personally
 What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? No written explanation why it was not
served personally
F:
1. The City through Mayor Remollo filed an Application for Original Registration of Title of a property in
Looc, Dumaguete.
2. The Republic and the PPA filed their Oppositions and MTD claiming the area as public domain being
a swamp/foreshore land.
3. RTC: initially, dismissed the case.
4. City filed its MR and Supplemental MR. The service was not done personally and without a
written explanation to justify the same.
5. RTC: resolved to have a full-blown proceeding to hear the case.
a. PPA filed MR. MR denied.
6. CA: reversed RTC.
7. LT of PPA:
a. Petitioner violated Sec. 11 Rule 13 when it did not attach a written explanation why it
did not resort personal service to its MR. The MR of petitioner should be treated as a
mere scrap of paper with no legal effect. It did not interrupt the reglementary period
to appeal.
b. No liberal application in absence of compelling reason to do so.
8. SC: reversed CA
I: WON liberal application of Sec. 11 Rule 13 may be applied in this case? YES, although there is no
compliance to the requirement of written explanation, the written explanation would have been
superfluous anyway. It is obvious why personal notice is not practicable: the plaintiff is in Cebu, while
the defendant is in QC.
DOCTRINE:
WHEN LIBERAL APPLICATION OF THE RULES IS APPLIED:
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of
the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must
yield to the latter. In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of
procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy.
In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner, which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 dismissing LRC Case No. N-
201, cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application of procedural rules.
Liberal application of procedural rules is allowed only when two requisites are present:
(1) there is a plausible explanation for the non-compliance, and
(2) the outright dismissal would defeat the administration of justice.
WHEN “WRITTEN EXPLANATION” IS “SUPERFLOUS,” THE OMISSION OF THE WRITTEN
EXPLANATION MAY BE JUSTIFIED UPON THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and
liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be
done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal
service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and
Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would
have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service
was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so
worded with the use of “may,” signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the
court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid
application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial
justice.
In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such
distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why
service was not done personally “might have been superfluous.”42 (Emphases supplied and
citations omitted.)
Our ruling in the above-cited cases is relevant to the instant case. Counsel for petitioner holds
office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, in the Visayas; while counsel for respondent holds
office in Quezon City, Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the considerable distance between the
offices of these two counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the
other was clearly not practicable and a written explanation as to why personal service was
not done would only be superfluous. In addition, we refer once more to the merits of the Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7,
2000 filed by petitioner, which justify the liberal interpretation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court in this case.
GIST:
1. The City of Dumaguete filed an application for registration of land.
2. The PPA opposed the application. The RTC dismissed the application.
3. The City filed its MR and the Supplemental MR. However, the City served its summons not
“personally” and failed to make a written explanation to justify the same. This is a violation of Sec. 11
Rule 13.
4. The City asks for liberal application of the Rules. Is liberal application warranted in this case? YES.
5. Liberal application is warranted. Reasons:
(1) the written explanation is superfluous3. The plaintiff is in Cebu, while the defendant is
in QC, so personal notice is not practicable.
(2) the City cited meritorious ground.
3
Superfluous - unnecessary, especially through being more than enough.
Page 101 of 136
3. Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA (Rule 65)
Complaint: Petition to Set Aside the Auction Sale and Writ of Possession before RTC of Valenzuela City
RD: WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED.
 Who are the defendants? Banco Filipino
 When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? When BF was reorganized 6
years after it closed its operation, it filed a Motion to Clarify the Order and moved for the Issuance
of an Alias Writ of Possession.
 How was summons served? NONE whether personally or via mail
 What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? No service at all
FACTS:
1. After Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed on the REM of Sps. Topacio, it was able to purchase
said property at an auction sale.
a. After getting the Certificate of Sale, RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of BF.
b. However, said writ was not implemented because Sps. Topacio filed a Petition to Set Aside the
Auction Sale and Writ of Possession to which the RTC issued a TRO.
c. BF filed its Answer.
d. Then, Sps. Topacio filed a Reply.
2. The proceedings were postponed due to the instance of both parties.
a. In Dec 1986 or 2 years later, the RTC dismissed the Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession for failure to prosecute.
b. However, BF was not served a copy of the Order of Dismissal as it closed operations
in Jan 1985.
3. When BF was reorganized 6 years later, it filed a Motion to Clarify the Order and moved for the
Issuance of an Alias Writ of Possession.
a. The Alias Writ of Possession was granted.
b. As such, Sps Topacio filed an MR which was denied.
4. CA affirmed and held that the previous dismissal was not a dismissal on the merits having been
based on purely technical grounds.
a. Moreover, BF was not served a copy of the Order of Dismissal.
5. LT of Sps. Topacio: that RTC was already barred by res judicata.
a. NOTE: they only raised this issue on appeal.
I: WON RTC/BF were barred by res judicata. NO, because the former judgment was not final and
executory due to the absence of a valid service.
DOCTRINE:
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all
points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a “matter adjudged,
judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.” The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same
parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that “public policy requires that
controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time.”
The doctrine of res judicata embraces 2 concepts: the first is “BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT” under
paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is “ CONCLUSIVENESS OF
JUDGMENT” under paragraph (c) thereof.
Res judicata applies in the concept of “BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT” if the following requisites concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of causes of action.
The Sps. Topacio claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case because all
of the elements thereof are present. In response, the BF argues that res judicata did not set in as the
first element is lacking. We agree with the BF.
DEC. 1986 DISMISSAL NEVER ATTAINED FINALITY AS IT WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED
The Sections 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service of
judgments.
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through
registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a
person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not appealed nor made
subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains finality.
In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the Resolution of the
NLRC, denying the respondent’s MR, cannot be deemed to have become final and executory as
there is no conclusive proof of service of the said resolution. In the words of the Court, “there was
no proof of actual receipt of the notice of the registered mail by the respondent’s counsel.” Based on
these findings, the Court concluded that the CA properly acquired jurisdiction over the respondent’s
petition for certiorari filed before it; in the absence of a reckoning date of the period provided by law for
the filing of the petition, the Court could not assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.
Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang, the Court held that the decision of the RTC did not become
final and executory where, from the records, the respondent had not received a copy of the
resolution denying her motion for reconsideration. The Court also noted that there was no
sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the said Order or that she
indeed received a first notice. Thus, the Court concluded that there could be no valid basis for the
issuance of the writ of execution as the decision never attained finality.
In the present case, we note that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to
have become final and executory in view of the absence of a valid service, whether personally or
via registered mail, on the BF’s counsel.
GIST:
1. BF foreclosed the property of the Sps. BF bought it in the auction sale.
2. However Sps filed a Petition to Set Aside Auction Sale and the Writ of Possession.
3. Nagsara si BF nung 1985. Kaya nung 1986 natalo si BF for failure to prosecute (1st judgment). BUT
BF did not receive the Order of Dismissal kas inga sarado sila.
4. Pero BF opened again. It filed a Motion to Clarify the Order and moved for the Issuance of an Alias
Writ of Possession. This time nanalo sila (2nd judgment).
5. Nagreklamo si Sps claiming that RTC’s 2nd judgment is barred by res judicata. Tama ba? NO
6. There are 4 requisites sa res judicata. Ung isa hindi na meet: “former judgment must be final.” The
judgment was not final and executory due to absence of a valid service.
Page 102 of 136
4. Aberca et al. v. Ver, et al., G.R. No. 166216, March 14, 2012
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
Complaint: (1) Sum of Money and Damages (2) Petition for Reconstitution before RTC of QC
RD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
 Who are the defendants? Gen. Ver, et al (AFP personnel)
 When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? On appeal
 How was summons served? by publication in BALITA
 What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? Not personally, by mail or substituted svc.
FACTS:
1. The case started when Aberca et al, as suspected subversives (NPA), were arrested, detained, and
allegely tortured by Fabian Ver’s forces.
a. A Complaint for Damages were filed by Aberca et al but was eventually dismissed on motion of
Ver et al through then SolGen Estelito Mendoza.
b. However, pending appeal, EDSA Revolution broke out.
2. In 1988, the SC declared to annul the Dismissal of the case and remanded the case to trial.
a. However, the trial could not proceed immediately because the records of the case were burned
when the QC City Hall burned down.
b. Thus, in 1989, Abera et al sought to reconstitute the record of the case.
c. When the Petition for Reconstitution was set for hearing, Ver et al were not notified.
Thus, it was granted.
3. Aberca was directed to report to the RTC the addresses and whereabouts of Ver et al.
a. However, Aberca could not comply.
b. Instead, it sought to declare them in default.
c. RTC denied the Motion to Declare in Default because Ver et al were not duly notified by the SC
decisión.
d. RTC granted the request to serve Notice to File Answer by Publication. After the
Notices were published in BALITA, no answer was still filed.
4. RTC: declared them in default.
a. RTC said publication cured the procedural defect.
5. CA reversed.
a. CA ruled RTC abandoned the proper modes of service of notices. It failed to avail of substituted
service after failing to effect personal service or service by mail. it authorized service by
publication. the respondents were declared in default because they were not duly notified and,
therefore, were denied due process.
b. Hence, this petitition.
6. LT of Aberca et al: They claim that the RTC did not err in declaring Ver et al in default and in
allowing them to present evidence ex parte.
I: WON RTC is correct in declaring the respondents in default. NO, there was a denial in due process
when they were declared in default based on a defective mode of service i.e. via publication.
DOCTRINE:
Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered affecting one’s person or property. Moreover, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5) of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court adopted and promulgated Sections 5, 6, 7, & 8 of Rule
13 concerning, among others, the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts.
The above rules, thus, prescribe the modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders,
judgments, and other papers, namely:
(1) personal service;
(2) service by mail; and
(3) substituted service, in case service cannot be effected either personally or by mail.
The Rules of Court has been laid down to insure the orderly conduct of litigation and to protect the
substantive rights of all party litigants. It is for this reason that the basic rules on the modes of
service provided under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court have been made MANDATORY and, hence,
should be STRICTLY FOLLOWED.
In the case at bench, the Ver et al were completely deprived of due process when they were
declared in default based on a defective mode of service — service of notice to file answer by
publication. The rules on service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers
were not strictly followed in declaring the respondents in default. The Court agrees with the CA that
the RTC committed procedural lapses in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing
the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte.
THE 3 MODES EXPLAINED
As correctly observed by the CA, the RTC’s August 17, 1990 Order was an attempt to serve a notice to
file answer on the respondents by personal service and/or by mail. These proper and preferred
modes of service, however, were never resorted to because the OSG abandoned them when the
petitioners failed to comply with the August 17, 1990 RTC order requiring them to report the addresses
and whereabouts of the respondents. Nevertheless, there was still another less preferred but
proper mode of service available — substituted service — which is service made by delivering the
copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail.
Unfortunately, this substitute mode of service was not resorted to by the RTC after it failed to
effect personal service and service by mail. Instead, the RTC authorized an unrecognized
mode of service under the Rules, which was service of notice to file answer by publication.
IN CASE THE FIRST TWO MODES FAIL, RESORT TO THIRD MODE:
In view of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, the RTC should have instead directed
the petitioners to exert diligent efforts to notify the respondents either personally or by
registered mail. In case the preferred modes were impractical, the Court should have required the
petitioners to at least report in writing why efforts exerted towards personal service or
service by mail failed. In other words, a convincing proof of an impossibility of personal service or
service by mail to the respondents should have been shown first. The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled
that the publication of a notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the
procedural defect equivalent to lack of due process. The RTC cannot just abandon the basic
requirement of personal service and/or service by mail.
At any rate, the Court is of the view that personal service to the respondents was practicable under the
circumstances considering that they were well-known persons who used to occupy high government
positions.
To stress, the ONLY MODES OF SERVICE of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and
other papers allowed by the rules are (1) personal service, (2) service by mail and (3) substituted
service if either personal service or service by mail cannot be made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of
Rule 13 of the Rules. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to file answer by publication
is mentioned, much less recognized.
WHEN SERVICE BY PUBLICATION IS ALLOWED: in summons
Furthermore, the Court would like to point out that service by publication only applies to service of
SUMMONS stated under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of summons
in civil cases are:
(1) personal service;
(2) substituted service;and
(3) service by publication.
Page 103 of 136
Similarly, service by publication can apply to judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided
under Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions.— Judgments, final orders or

resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party
summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final
orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at
the expense of the prevailing party.

GIST:
1. Martial Law victims-petitioners filed damages against alleged torturers-respondents.
2. It was dismissed.
3. After EDSA Rev., the SC remanded the case to RTC.
4. However, the RTC records were burned.
5. Petitioners filed a Petition for Reconstitution. But the respondents were not notified.
6. The RTC published Notices in BALITA, but the respondents failed to answer.
7. RTC declared the respondents in default and allowed petitioners to present evidence ex
parte. RTC claimed that publication cured the procedural defect. Is that correct? NO.
8. SC enumerated the modes of service of pleadings (not summons), and publication
is not one of them. This is a denial of due process. Furthermore, kilala nmn ung respondents,
pwede nmn mag personal notice.

Page 104 of 136

5. FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMF AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006 complainants, as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA (Rule 45) compliance with Article 224(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Complaint: Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction
RD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is NOT A
 Who are the defendants? Labor Union FINAL JUDGMENT for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality. Consequently, the
 When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? CA rule on service of summons and orders, and not the proviso on service of decisions and final awards,
 How was summons served? The process server of NLRC posted the Order to several conspicuous governs the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
places within the Hospital
 What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? The mode of service is not sanctioned by Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of ORDERS should be made by the
NLRC Rules of Procedure and Rules of Court. process server either personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent
nature of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by
the issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most
FACTS:
expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended
1. As a result of the failure in negotiations between FEU and its workers’ unión, the unión filed a notice
parties as may be warranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, in this case, personal service is
to strike.
the proper mode of serving the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.
a. Thereafter, FEU filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction with the NLRC.
b. The Secretary of Labor granted the Petition and issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the
It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons may be
labor dispute which would effectively prohibit any strike or lockout.
effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
2. However, in his certification, the NLRC process server claimed that at 4PM of Sep 5 1996,
he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order to the unión officers
Let it be recalled that the process server merely posted copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction
but no one was around at the strike area.
Order in conspicuous places in the hospital. Such posting is not prescribed by the rules , nor is it
a. As such, he just posted copies of the order at several conspicuous places within the
even referred to when the said rules enumerated the different modes of effecting substituted
premises of the hospital.
service, in case personal service is impossible by the absence of the party concerned.
3. Claiming that they had no knowledge, the striking employees continued to hold the strike.
a. Sec of Labor issued another order directing all employees to return to work and for FEU to
Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
accept them under the same terms and conditions.
requirement of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party concerned
b. Later FEU filed a case before the NLRC contending that the unión staged a strike in defiance of
personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted
the Assumptio Order.
service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at
4. LA: declared the strike illegal and dismissed the unión officers.
the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing
5. NLRC: affirmed.
therein.
6. CA: reversed on the ground that no personal service was validly effected by the process.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required that
I: WON the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order was validly effected. NO, the Rule on Service
statutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully
of Summons and Orders is applicable in the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order because it is not classified
observed. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the
as a final judgment. Therefore it must be served by personal service according to the Rule.
proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of this rigid requirement is that the person, to
whom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, is made to answer for the consequences of the
DOCTRINE:
suit even though notice of such action is made, not upon the party concerned, but upon another whom
The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service was rendered impossible since
the law could only presume would notify such party of the pending proceedings. Applying this
the striking employees were not present at the strike area. This mode of service, however, is not
principle in the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of
sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court. The pertinent
Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred from the circumstances considering the
provisions of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure read:
adverse effect in case the parties failed to heed to the injunction directed by such Order.
Section 6. Service of Notices and Resolutions.
Merely posting copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid
(a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, shall be served on the parties to the
requirement for proper service outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner
case personally by the Bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3)
of service made by the process server was invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not
days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided, That in special
therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was not properly apprised thereof.
circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with
Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was valid under the circumstances.
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; Provided further, that in
cases of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both
GIST:
parties and their counsel or representative by registered mail; Provided
1. Nag notice to strike ang union. Nagkaron ng Assumption of Jurisdiction Order ang NLRC para di
further, that in cases where a party to a case or his counsel on record personally
matuloy ang strike.
seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party shall be
2. Ang proper service ng notice ay Personal Service. Kaso, nung dumating si Process Server ng NLRC sa
deemed effected upon actual receipt thereof; Provided finally, that where parties
site, wala dun ung union kaya Pinost na lng nya sa conspicuous places ng hospital.
are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of
3. Dahil di natanggap ng union ang order, nagstrike sila. Kaya hinablahan sila ng illegal dismissal.
4. Sabi ng Union we were denied of due process. Is the contention tenable? YES

Page 105 of 136

5. SC said personal notice dapat. Serving the Assumption Order has same rule with summons, kaya
pwede ung 3 modes: personal, mail, substituted service.

Page 106 of 136

6. Republic v. BPI, 705 SCRA 650 (2013)
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA (Rule 45)
Competition: Expropriation before RTC of Las Pinas
RD: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
 Who are the defendants? BPI, Bayani Villanueva
 When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? When BPI filed a Motion for
Partial New Trial to determine just compensation
 How was summons served?
 What was the alleged defect in the service of summons?
 What was the content of the server’s return?
 Requirements for substituted service of summons:
FACTS:
1. DPWH filed an Expropriation case against portions of properties owned by BPI and Bayani Villanueva
for the construction of the Zapote-Alabang Flyover.
a. On 25 Nov. 1998, the RTC set the FMV at 40K psm.
b. On Dec. 15, 1998, the branch clerk of court issued a Certification that the decision has become
final, executory, and unappealable.
c. Meanwhile, on Dec 16, 1998, BPI filed a Motion for Partial New Trial to determine just
compensation of the building which was not included in the determination of just compensation.
d. BPI claimed that the motion was timely filed since it only received a copy of the Decision on Dec
1, 1998. RTC granted said Motion for Partial New Trial.
2. For failure of DPWH to appear in the hearing, BPI was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
a. On Sep 10, 1999, RTC set just compensation for the building at 2.6M.
b. DPWH filed MR which was granted.
c. Thereafter, RTC set a new amount of just compensation at 1.9M.
d. DPWH appealed to CA claiming that the Nov 1998 decision already attained finality.
3. However, CA dismissed the appeal stating when BPI filed the Motion, the Decision has not
yet attained finality due to the absence of any Return or Affidavit of the party serving the
Decision was attached.
A careful review of the record shows the absence of any proof that the Decision of 25 November
1998 was served upon BPI. Hence, the CA correctly held that absent any proof of service to
BPI of the Decision, the period of 15 days within which to file its motion for partial new trial
did not begin to run against BPI. However, BPI’s admission that it received a copy of the
Decision on 01 December 1998 is binding on it, and was correctly considered by the CA as the
reckoning date to count the 15-day period.
GIST:
1. I-expropriate ni DPWH ung lupa at bldg. ni BPI.
2. Nagkaron ng hearing for just compensation. Lupa lang ang nabigyan ng value.
Nov. 25 – nagkaron ng judgment sa value ng lupa
Dec. 1 – natanggap ng BPI ung copy ng decision
Dec. 15 – final and executory na ung decision sabi ng RTC
Dec. 16 – nag file ng Motion for New Trial ang BPI dahil nga Dec. 1 lng nila natanggap
3. Tinanggap ni RTC yung motion for new trial kaya may just compensation na value na rin ang building.
4. Reklamo ni DPWH ay final and executory na daw ung Nov. 25 judgment.
5. Sabi ng SC na dapat may “proof of service.” Dahil walang mapakitang proof of service, Dec. 1 nga
ung time na natanggap ng BPI ung copy of decision, kaya dun sa Dec. 1 mag start ung 15 day period to
file a motion for partial new trial.

I: WON the decision on Nov 998 (excluding the value of the bldg.) attained finality. NO, because of the
absence of “proof of service.” As such the 15 day period did not begin to run on Nov, but on Dec 1,
1998.

DOCTRINE:
A perusal of the Certification reveals that it certifies that the 25 November 1998 Decision had already
become final, executory and unappealable as to petitioner:
The Decision in this case dated November 25, 1998 has become FINAL, EXECUTORY
and UNAPPEALABLE as of December 11, 1998 considering that the Office of the
Solicitor General failed to file any Notice of Appeal or Motion for
Reconsideration despite receipt of a copy thereof on November 26, 1998.

There can be no other reading of this certificate that would be supported by the record. Section 9 of
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states that judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served
either personally or by registered mail. Section 13 of the same Rule provides what consists PROOF
OF SERVICE:

Proof of PERSONAL SERVICE shall consist of a written admission of the party

served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. x x x If service is
made by REGISTERED MAIL, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender.

Page 107 of 136

7. Atlantic Erectors v. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA (Rule 45)
Complaint: Sum of Money with Damages in the RTC of Makati
RD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED
i. Who is the registered owner of the property where the Notice of Lis Pendens is registered? HC
ii. What is the source of the claim of the person trying to register a NLP? Payment for the construction of
townhouses on HC’s land in Tagaytay
iii. Nature of action filed: Sum of Money with Damages (Personal action)
iv. When the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (before or after appeal): before appeal, during MR
v. Where the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (trial court or appellate court): RTC
FACTS:
1. Based on a Construction Contract, Atlantic Erectors undertook to construct 4 units of townhouses on
Herbal Cove’s parcel of land in Tagaytay.
a. However, AE claimed the 180-day period of completion was not complied because of reasons
attributable to HC.
b. Thus, AE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages in the RTC of Makati.
c. Additionally, AE filed a Notice of Lis Pendens for the annotation of the pendency of the case on
the TCTs thereof.
2. HC then filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for non-compliance with the Contact’s
arbitration clause.
a. Thus, RTC dismissed the case.
b. AE’s MR was denied.
c. HC also filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens because the Complaint is a personal
action to collect a sum of money and does not directly affect title to or possession real property.
d. RTC granted the motion. On MR, RTC reinstated the Notice of Lis Pendens.
3. On appeal, CA granted HC’s petition and reinstated the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
4. LT:
a. AE, plaintiff:
i. According to petitioner, the money claim constitutes a lien that can be enforced to secure
payment for the said obligations. It argues that, to preserve the alleged improvement it
had made on the subject land, such annotation on the property titles of respondent is
necessary.
b. HC, defendant:
i. Respondent Herbal Cove argues that the annotation is bereft of any factual or legal basis,
because petitioner’s Complaint does not directly affect the title to the property, or the use
or the possession thereof.
ii. It also claims that petitioner’s Complaint did not assert ownership of the property or any
right to possess it. Moreover, respondent attacks as baseless the annotation of the Notice
of Lis Pendens through the enforcement of a contractor’s lien under Article 2242 of the Civil
Code. It points out that the said provision applies only to cases in which there are several
creditors carrying on a legal action against an insolvent debtor.
I: WON NLP is proper. NO, because this is a purely personal action due to AE’s failure to mention any
contractor’s lien over the property.
DOCTRINE:
PROPER BASIS FOR NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as
follows:
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
(b) an action for partition; and
(c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon
or the use or the occupation thereof.
Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases
that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking
to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to
enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it.
Apparently, AE proceeds on the premise that its money claim involves the enforcement of a lien. Since
the money claim is for the nonpayment of materials and labor used in the construction of townhouses,
the lien referred to would have to be that provided under Article 2242 of the Civil Code (Contractor’s
Lien).
However, a careful examination of AE’s Complaint, as well as the reliefs it seeks, reveals that no such
lien or interest over the property was ever alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the
payment of construction services and materials plus damages, without mentioning — much less
asserting — a lien or an encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was a purely personal action
and a simple collection case. It did not contain any material averment of any enforceable right,
interest or lien in connection with the subject property.
As it is, AE’s money claim cannot be characterized as an action that involves the enforcement
of a lien or an encumbrance, one that would thus warrant the annotation of the Notice of Lis
Pendens. Indeed, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
COLLECTION CASE WITH DAMAGES NOT PROPER TO ENFORCE CONTRACTOR’S LIEN
Even assuming that AE had sufficiently alleged such lien or encumbrance in its Complaint, the
annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens would still be unjustified, because a complaint for
collection and damages is not the proper mode for the enforcement of a contractor’s lien.
In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the concept of a contractor’s lien
under Article 2242 of the
Civil Code and the proper mode for its enforcement as follows:
Specifically, the contractor’s lien claimed by the petitioners is granted under the third
paragraph of Article 2242 which provides that the claims of contractors engaged in the
construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings or other works shall be preferred
with respect to the specific building or other immovable property constructed.
However, Article 2242 finds application when there is a concurrence of credits,
i.e., when the same specific property of the debtor is subjected to the claims of
several creditors and the value of such property of the debtor is insufficient to
pay in full all the creditors. In such a situation, the question of preference will arise,
that is, there will be a need to determine which of the creditors will be paid ahead of
the others. Fundamental tenets of due process will dictate that this statutory lien
should then only be enforced in the context of some kind of a proceeding
where the claims of all the preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated,
such as insolvency proceedings.
Clearly then, neither Article 2242 of the Civil Code nor the enforcement of the lien thereunder
is applicable here , because AE’s Complaint failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. Nowhere
does it show that HC’s property was subject to the claims of other creditors or was insufficient
to pay for all concurring debts . Moreover, the Complaint did not pertain to insolvency proceedings or
to any other action in which the adjudication of claims of preferred creditors could be ascertained.
GIST:
1. Nagpagawa ng townhouse si HC kay AE.
2. Hindi sila nagkabayaran kaya nagfile ng Complaint for Sum of Money si AE.
3. Then nag file si AE ng NLP sa RTC against the property ni HC. Tama ba? NO
4. Sabi ng SC, walang basis ang NLP because the nature of the case is purely personal—nothing is
mentioned about lien or encumbrance of the property. Ito’y simple collection only, d pwede ang NLP.
Page 108 of 136
Page 109 of 136
8. St. Mary of the Woods School v. RD of Makati, G.R.No. 174290, January 20, 2009
Case Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition. (Rule 65)
Complaint: Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Assignment and Sale
RD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, these Petitions for Certiorari are hereby DISMISSED.
i. Who is the registered owner of the property where the Notice of Lis Pendens in registered? ODC
ii. What is the source of the claim of the person trying to register a NLP? Forged deeds
iii. Nature of action filed?
iv. When the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (before or after appeal)? Before appeal, after
dismissal of the case. RTC granted the cancel, but CA reinstated NLP on motion.
v. Where the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (trial court or appellate court) In RTC
Who filed the NLP? Hilario
Who filed to cancel NLP? Marcial
(1) to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation; and
(2) to announce to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as
a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own
risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF NLP
A trial court has, however, the inherent POWER TO CANCEL a notice of lis pendens, under the
express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on 2 grounds:
(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded.

FACTS:
1. Tomas Soriano, father of petitioner Marcial Soriano and respondent Hilario Soriano, owned a few
parcels of land in Makati.
a. Tomas and his wife executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Oro Development Corp (ODC)
which covered said parcels of land.
b. By virtue of said Deed, ownership and title of the properties were transferred to ODC.
c. Thereafter, ODC executed a Deed of Sale in favor of St Mary involving the property.
d. Tomas died intestate.
2. Later on, Hilario discovered that Tomas’ signature in the Deed of Assignment had been forged.
a. So he filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Assignment and Deed of Sale
and Cancellation of the TCTs in ODC’s and St. Mary’s name.
b. By reason of this, a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on the titles of ODC.
3. Marcial Soriano, however, recognized the validity of the transfer of property.
a. Thus, he sought to dismiss the case.
b. RTC dismissed the case. RTC denied the MR.
c. So, Marcial filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens which was granted.
4. Hilario appealed to the CA.
a. Pending appeal, St. Mary mortgaged the property for 8M.
b. Eventually, Hilario’s appeal was granted and Reinstated the Notice of Lis Pendens.
5. Aggrieved, Marcial filed this petition.
a. LT of Petitioner: They claim that the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens was valid and
proper because they were issued on the basis of Hilario’s lack of interest/right over the
properties.
Considering that the dismissal of Hilario’s Complaint by the RTC was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which Complaint refers to the properties covered by TCTs No. 175209, No. 220977, and No. 220978 that
bear the annotations of lis pendens, and such properties therefore are irrefragably still the
subject matter of litigation, the CA rightly saw the need for giving notice to the public of such
a fact. The necessity becomes even more compelling considering that St. Mary had already
entered into transactions with third parties involving the subject properties.
GIST:
1. The property was transferred to ODC allegedly through forgery.
2. The heir of the owner of the property sought the nullity of the deed and caused NLP to ODC’s title.
3. The RTC cancelled the NLP.
4. The CA reinstated the NLP. During the appeal, the property was mortgaged to a 3rd person.
5. The petitioners claim that CA gravely abused its discretion by causing the re-annotation of NLP based
on the motion file by the respondent. Tama bang argument? NO, CA may still reinstate NLP because the
properties are still the subject of litigation especially now that the properties are mortgaged.

I: WON the NLP is proper. YES. CA may still reinstate NLP because the properties are still the subject of
litigation especially now that the properties are mortgaged.

DOCTRINE:

Granting arguendo that the present special civil action for certiorari can be given due course, the Court
still finds that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting Hilario’s Motion
to Reinstate/Re-annotate Notice of Lis Pendens.

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which
a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended:

Page 110 of 136

9. Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009
Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA
RD: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED.
i. Who is the registered owner of the property where the Notice of Lis Pendens in registered? Rebuquiao,
but carried over to TCT of Sps. Vicenete
ii. What is the source of the claim of the person trying to register a NLP? Nullity of Marriage
iii. Nature of action filed? Personal
iv. When the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (before or after appeal)?
v. Where the Motion to cancel Lis Pendens was filed (trial court or appellate court)
In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners’ title to the property in
dispute . A notice of lis pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party,
where the transferee who acquires land with a notice of lis pendens annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which case the transferee’s title is subject
to the results of the pending litigation. The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation
involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and
his title. The notice of lis pendens pertains to the Nullity case between Avera and Domingo. Since
Rebuquiao’s title to the property in dispute is not subject to the results of the Nullity case ,
petitioners’ title to the same property is also not subject to the results of the Nullity case.

FACTS: GIST:
1. Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of a parcel of land. 1. Dalawang bentahan over the same property of Rebuquiao: kay Sps. Vicente at kay Sps. Domingo.
a. In Oct 1 1987, the Rebuquiao executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Sps. Vicente over said land. 2. Nagpa-nullity of marriage ang Sps. Domingo kaya na NLP ang property. Claim ni Delia Avera ung wife
b. On the other hand, Delia Avera alleged that on Oct 9 1987, Rebuquiao sold the same land to na kanya ung property at nanalo sya sa case.
her husband Roberto Domingo. 3. Pinapavacate na ni Avera ung property from Sps Vicente. Sabi ni Avera subject ang Sps. Vicente sa
c. In 1991, Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage wherein she asserted her outcome ng Nullity of Marriage and Partition. Tama ba yon? NO, the NLP affects only Avera and
exclusive ownership over said property. Domingo. It does not affect the title of Rebuquiao and his successor-in-interest Vicente.
d. As such, a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated.
e. In 1997, Sps. Vicente possessed the property and a new TCT was issued to them which carried
over the Notice of Lis Pendens.
2. RTC finally declared the marriage of Avera and Domingo null and void and ordered their conjugal
properties to be in Avera’s custody.
a. The same RTC also issued an Alias Writ of Execution ordering Sps. Vicente to vacate since the
transfer was made despite the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
b. Sps. Vicente sought to enjoin the implementation of the Alias Writ of Execution and a TRO was
issued.
3. CA set this aside.
4. Hence, this petition.

I: is the NLP correct? NO, the NLP affects only Avera and Domingo. It does not affect the title of
Rebuquiao and his successor-in-interest Vicente.

DOCTRINE:

Petitioners’ title to the property in dispute is not subject to the outcome of the litigation covered
by the notice of lis pendens. Section 24, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
purchaser of the property affected by the notice of lis pendens is deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of filing such notice. Section 14, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates this rule.

Thus, a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice, is
bound by any judgment, which may be rendered for or against the transferor, and his title is subject to
the results of the pending litigation.

A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien . It serves
to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending
resolution. While the notice of lis pendens remains on a certificate of title, the registrant could rest
secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation. Once a notice
of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land
involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation . For this reason, the Court
has pronounced that a “purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is
in litigation between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his
title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation.”

Page 111 of 136

 XII. SUMMONS (RULE 14)
RULE 14
SUMMONS
Section 1. Clerk to issue summons.
Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall
forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants.
Sec. 2. Contents.
The summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by the clerk of court under seal, and contain:
(a) the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action;
(b) a direction that the defendant answer within the time fixed by these Rules;
(c) a notice that unless the defendant so answers, plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be
granted the relief applied for.
A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, shall be attached to the
original and each copy of the summons.
Sec. 3. By whom served.
The summons may be served by the sheriff, his deputy, or other proper court officer, or for justifiable
reasons by any suitable person authorized by the court issuing the summons.
Sec. 4. Return.
When the service has been completed, the server shall, within five (5) days therefrom, serve a copy of
the return, personally or by registered mail, to the plaintiff's counsel, and shall return the summons to
the clerk who issued it, accompanied by proof of service.
Sec. 5. Issuance of alias summons.
If a summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants, the server shall also
serve a copy of the return on the plaintiff's counsel, stating the reasons for the failure of service, within
five (5) days therefrom. In such a case, or if the summons has been lost, the clerk, on demand of the
plaintiff, may issue an alias summons.
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant.
Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service.
If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Sec. 8. Service upon entity without juridical personality.
When persons associated in an entity without juridical personality are sued under the name by which
they are generally or commonly known, service may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon
any one of them, or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in such
name. But such service shall not bind individually any person whose connection with the entity has,
upon due notice, been severed before the action was brought.
Sec. 9. Service upon prisoners.
When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or institution, service shall be effected upon him by
the officer having the management of such jail or institution who is deemed deputized as a special
sheriff for said purpose.
Sec. 10. Service upon minors and incompetents.
When the defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an incompetent, service shall be made upon him
personally and on his legal guardian if he has one, or if none, upon his guardian ad litem whose
appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the case of a minor, service may also be made on his
father or mother.
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Sec. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity.
When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines,
service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if
there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines.
Sec. 13. Service upon public corporations.
When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General;
in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its
executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.
Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.
In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court,
be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such time as the court may order.
Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service.
When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the
property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of
the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as
under the preceding section.
Sec. 17. Leave of court.
Page 112 of 136
Any application to the court under this Rule for leave to effect service in any manner for which leave of
court is necessary shall be made by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some
person on his behalf, setting forth the grounds for the application.

Sec. 18. Proof of service.

The proof of service of a summons shall be made in writing by the server and shall set forth the manner,
place, and date of service; shall specify any papers which have been served with the process and the
name of the person who received the same; and shall be sworn to when made by a person other than a
sheriff or his deputy.

Sec. 19. Proof of service by publication.

If the service has been made by publication, service may be proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of
the publication shall be attached, and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and
order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to
his last known address.

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.

The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

RULE 11
WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
Sec. 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity.
Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of summons is made on the
government official designated by law to receive the same, the answer shall be filed within thirty (30)
days after receipt of summons by such entity.

Page 113 of 136


1. Cada v. Time Saver, G.R. No. 181480, January 30, 2009
Who are the defendants? Time/Leslie Perez
When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? NLRC appeal
How was summons served? To Cada’s co-worker Alfredo Perez
What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? Not personal as required by NLRC Rules
What was the content of the server’s return? X
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Josefina Cada worked as a Presser at Time Saver Laundry, a single proprietorship owned by Leslie
Perez. For allegedly failing top pay her overtime pay and other employment benefits, she filed a
case for illegal dismissal and underpayment of salary with against Time Saver in the NLRC.
2. The bailiff sought to serve summons on Leslie Perez personally. However, since she was
out of town, it was served upon one of Cada’s co-workers Alfredo Perez. (ALLOWED by
SC)
3. Time Saver/Perez failed to appear so the LA heard the case ex parte.
a. Based on Cada’s position papers, the LA ruled in her favor.
b. Time Saver/Perez appealed to the NLRC on the ground of improper service of
summons.
c. Nonetheless, NLRC affirmed the LA stating that they were given opportunity to be heard.
4. In the CA, NLRC was reversed stating that considering that the summons were not
personally served upon Leslie Perez, no jurisdiction was properly acquired over her
person.
5. Hence, this petition.
substantial compliance is required. That the summons was served in the premises of therein
petitioners’ office was enough to convince the court that the service of said processes was completed
and resultantly, the requirement of notice has been served.
In QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NLRC and its ARBITRATION BRANCH, procedural
rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance
thereof is sufficient. The constitutional requirement of due process with respect to service of summons
only exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice
desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the
requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair play is satisfied, due process
is served.
To apply the technical rules on service of summons would be to overturn the bias of the
Constitution and the laws in favor of labor. In labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent
technical rules maybe relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the complete and
equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties.
Moreover, it is a legal presumption, based on wisdom and experience, that official duty has been
regularly performed; that the proceedings of a judicial (and quasijudicial) tribunal are regular and
valid, and that judicial (quasi-judicial) acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly
performed. The burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct, if any, is on the part of respondents
who, in this case, clearly failed to discharge the same.

I: pwede ba na hindi personally served sa labor case? Yes, personal service was unpracticable. Although
NLRC Rules only provides personal service, quasi-judicial proceedings require only substantial
compliance.

DOCTRINE:
Based on the NLRC Rules, notices or summonses shall be served on the parties to the case
personally. The same rule allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be
effected in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, service of summons on respondent Perez should be
made personally. But was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely, was substituted service
of summons justified? Obviously, in this case, personal service of summons was not practicable.
By Leslie Perez’s own admission, she was out of town during the entire proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter. Given this admission, she would be unable to personally receive the
summons and later the notices from the Labor Arbiter.

Thus, even if the bailiff would return at some other time to personally serve the summons on
respondent Perez, it would still yield the same result. To proceed with personal service of
summons on respondent Perez who unequivocally admits that she was out of town during the
entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter would not only be impractical and futile - it would
be absurd.

While we are not unmindful of the NLRC rules which state that service of summons should be
made personally, considering the circumstances in the instant case, we find that service of
summons at TSL, Leslie Perez’s place of business, amounts to with the Rules.

In the fairly recent case of Scenarios v. Vinluan, service of summons by registered mail at therein
petitioners’ place of business was considered valid. This Court declared in the said case that
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings; only

Page 114 of 136

2. Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009
Who are the defendants? Lourdes Pascual
When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? Upon filing a Motion to Set Aside
Order of Default for non-service of summons in RTC
How was summons served? Substituted Service: Alias
What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? Not personal as required by NLRC Rules; (1) No
proper service as the maid who received a copy was illiterate (2) not in a sworn statement executed
before a notary public
What was the content of the server’s return? UNSERVED
FACTS:
 three Officer’s Return. He points out that the absence in the officer’s return of a statement about the
1. Constantino Pascual filed an Action for Specific Performance in RTC of Malolos against Lourdes
Pascual.
2. In the Process Server’s Return, it indicated that: SUBSTITUTED SVC
-May 20, 2002: He went to Lourdes’ house in QC but the latter was not home and her maid
refused to receive summons.
-He then requested the Barangay for a certifcation that he exerted efforts to effect service.
-The next day, Lourdes was still not at her house.
-On May 29, 2002, an Alias Summons was issued.
-Still, the maid said she was not at her house even though her car was there and neighbors
verified that she was just inside.
-As such, the Alias Summons was returned unserved.
-On August 14, 2002, the Process Server reported that he effected Substituted Service by
leaving a copy to the maid who is of age and of reason but refused to sign.
1. For failure of Lourdes to file an Answer, Constantino moved to declare her in default.
a. RTC granted said motion and allowed Constantino to present evidence ex parte.
b. RTC ruled in Constantino’s favor ordering Lourdes not to interfere in the corporate affairs of
Rosemoor Mining.
2. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decisión.
a. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
In a case where the ACTION IS IN PERSONAM and the DEFENDANT IS IN THE PHILIPPINES, the
service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. A plain and simple reading of the provisions indicates that
personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the
said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to
substituted service.
This Court gave an in-depth discussion as to the NATURE and REQUISITES of substituted service in
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.:
(1) IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT PERSONAL SERVICE: The party relying on
substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.
(2) SPECIFIC DETAILS IN THE RETURN: The sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.
(3) A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION: If the substituted service will
be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of
“suitable age and discretion then residing therein.”
(4) A COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE: If the substituted service will be done at
defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business
of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons.
Constantino contends that there was a valid substituted service of summons as shown in not one, but
impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service was invalid. He adds that
proof of prior attempts to serve personally can be deduced from the other returns when there are
several in a series of officer’s returns all tending to establish the impossibility of personal service upon
the respondent. However, the said argument of the petitioner is merely a plain deduction that
veers away from the well-established requisite that the officer must show that the defendant
cannot be served promptly, or that there was an impossibility of prompt service.
The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any POSITIVE
STEPS taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the
defendant. As in Jose v. Boyon, this Court ruled that:
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive
step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the
summons personally on respondents . At best, the Return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information
was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without
specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to
serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not
suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of
summons.
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons
must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any
substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
It is a method extraordinary in character and, hence, may be used only as prescribed
and in the circumstances authorized by statute.
Petitioner further states that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
must be applied to the present case. The said argument, however, is only meritorious, provided that
there was a strict compliance with the procedure for serving a summons. In the absence of
even the barest compliance with the procedure for a substituted service of summons outlined
in the Rules of Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions
does not apply.
Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of the respondent was never
vested with the RTC, because the manner of substituted service by the process server was
apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due process. Jurisdiction over
the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or
when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.”
Page 115 of 136
3. National Petroleum v RCBC GR 183370 Same; Same; Same; Same; Voluntary Appearance; Despite improper service of summons upon
their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Words and Phrases; Summons is a writ by which the court through their voluntary appearance.—Despite improper service of summons upon their
the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. Its purpose is two (2)-fold: persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through
(1)to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and their voluntary appearance. The second sentence of Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules that “[t]he
(2)to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.—Summons is a writ by which the defendant is defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance” clearly refers to affirmative defenses, not
notified of the action brought against him or her. Its purpose is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the affirmative reliefs.
person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may
be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. “[C]ompliance with the rules regarding
the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he
should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.”

Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons; When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein
petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14
of the Rules. The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and
exclusive following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.—Service of
summons on domestic corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule
14 of the Rules, which states:
SECTION 11. service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. expressio unios
est exclusio alterius.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the Court of Appeals (CA)
that there was a valid and effective service of summons upon petitioner corporation through
its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate secretary.—

Same; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; To overcome the presumption of regularity of official

functions in favor of such sheriff’s return, the evidence against it must be clear and
convincing.—It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process server is prima facie
evidence of the facts as set out therein. This is fortified by the presumption of the regularity of
performance of official duty. To overcome the presumption of regularity of official functions in favor of
such sheriff’s return, the evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Sans the requisite quantum
of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith and credit.

Same; Civil Procedure; Summons; Service of Summons; Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules cannot
be construed to apply simultaneously and do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons
which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties for, under our
procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred
over substituted service.—

Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service of Summons; To avail themselves of substituted
service of summons, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff’s actions and a
showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts.—

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21 (2006), stresses that for
substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff
to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in
order to prove impossibility of prompt service.—In the instant case, it appears that the sheriff hastily
and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort
to locate the individual petitioners.

Page 116 of 136

4. Sansio Phil. v. Mogol, G.R. No. 177007, July 14, 2009
COMPLAINT: for Sum of Money and Damages before MeTC Manila
 Who are the defendants? Sps. Mogol
 When did the defendant raise the invalidity of service of summons? NLRC appeal
 How was summons served? Personally by the Process Server of MeTC at the court room
 What was the alleged defect in the service of summons? Service of summons can only be served on
the address indicated in the complaint.
 What was the content of the server’s return? “The original and duplicate copies of the Summons
are hereby returned, UNSERVED.”
FACTS:
1. Sps. Mogol purchased aircon units and fans from Sansio Philippines and paid with postdated checks.
a. However, some of them bounced.
b. So Sansio filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Sps Mogol in the MeTC of
Manila.
c. In the Complaint, it stated that service of process to the Sps will be made at their residence in
Lucena City.
2. When the case was filed, the Process Server of MeTC Manila served the Summons and the
Copy of the Complaint to the Sps. Mogol at the courtroom in Branch 24 since they were
already in the premises while waiting for their hearing in a violation of BP22 case filed by
Sansio.
a. Upon being informed of said summons, Sps. Mogol referred it to their lawyer.
b. Said lawyer then informed the process server that summons can only be served on
the address indicated in the Complaint. So, he gave the summons back to the Process
Server.
3. A Return of Service was given to MeTC which reported what had happened.
a. For failure to file any responsive pleading, Sansio moved to declare the Sps. Mogol in default
despite valid personal service of summons.
b. They also prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor.
c. Sps. Mogol opposed contending that there was no valid service of summons.
I: Was there a valid summons? YES, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain
a copy of the summons and the copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be
served only in the address stated therein, was a gross mistake.
- Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service of summons on the
defendant in person must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons.
DOCTRINE:
A summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or
her. In a CIVIL ACTION, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendant’s volunta ry appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
submit to the court’s jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the
court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and void. Where the action is
in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of
the defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in
Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by
handing a copy thereof to him in person or , if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the
constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is the
handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be
found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.
In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the
persons of spouses Mogol. To recapitulate, the process server presented the summons and the
copy of the complaint to respondent spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch
24. The latter immediately referred the matter to their counsel, who was present with them in the
aforesaid courtroom. At the express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons and the
copy of the complaint, read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of the said
documents. Ineluctably, at that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of
receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part
of his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent. Already accomplished
was the operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person.
Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by
the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of
respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process
server was no longer material.
Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the
summons and the copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served only
in the address stated therein, was a gross mistake.
Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service of summons on the
defendant in person must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons.
On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that, whenever practicable, summons shall be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him. Nothing more is required. As correctly held by the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, the
service of the copy of the summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 24 was the most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process
server need not wait for respondent spouses Mogol to reach their given address, i.e., at 1218
Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, before he could serve on the latter the summons and the copy
of the complaint. Due to the distance of the said address, service therein would have been
more costly and would have entailed a longer delay on the part of the process server in
effecting the service of the summons.
PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS PREFERRED OVER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said
provisions do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be
resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of
summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted service.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary
method, since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit, even
though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume
would notify him of the pending proceedings. For substituted service to be justified, the following
circumstances must be clearly established:
(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;
(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the
party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of
business.
Page 117 of 136
Relevantly, in Lazaro v. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., very categorical was our
statement that the service of summons to be done personally does not mean that service is
possible only at the defendant’s actual residence. It is enough that the defendant is handed a
copy of the summons in person by anyone authorized by law.

Page 118 of 136

5. Carson Realty v Red Robin Security GR 225035

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Substituted Service of Summons; In personam action
(such as this case) Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must:
(a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time;
(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of defendant—

The filing of a motion for additional time to file answer is considered voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court.— Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it
filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007 acknowledging Carson’s
receipt of the Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading.
As noted by the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and Motion was being filed by
way of a conditional appearance to question the regularity of the service of summons. Thus, by securing
the affirmative relief of additional time to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Page 119 of 136

6. Palma v. Galvez, G.R.No. 165273, March 10, 2010
QUICKIE FACTS:
Leah Palma filed an Action for Damages against Phil. Heart Center, Dr. Giron, and Dr. Cruz for medical
malpractice in negligently removing her right ovary. Answers were thereafter filed. Subsequently,
however, Palma filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint praying for the inclusión of the
nurses at PHC including prívate repsondent Agudo. After the RTC granted the Motion, summons were
issued to them.
RTC’s process server submitted his return stating that the alias summons and copies of the complaint
were served upon Agudo thru her husband who received and signed the same since Agudo was
temporarily out of the country (Ireland). Thereafter, Agudo’s lawyer filed a Notice of Appearance and
Motion for the Extension of Time to File Answer. Days later, another Motion for Extension was filed
stating that the draft Answer would still be coursed through the Phil. Consulate in Ireland for the
clarification of Agudo.
Thereafter, Agudo filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over her person
as she was not served with summons properly. According to the RTC, considering she was a resident
temporarily out of the country, she can only be served summons by publication. Over Palma’s
objections, RTC dismissed the Complaint for invalid service of summons. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
In CIVIL CASES, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by
the service of summons or by the latter’s voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of
the former. Agudo was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the
time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When an action is commenced
against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is
temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section.
The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of
extraterritorial service, thus:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by
PERSONAL SERVICE as under section 6 ; or BY PUBLICATION in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order ,
in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify
a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within
which the defendant must answer.”
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and
“also,” it is not mandatory.
Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the
serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines . Thus, if a
RESIDENT DEFENDANT is TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to:
(1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14;
(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
(4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Considering that Agudo was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be
validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. —If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in
the summons is living at the time when the service is made , even though he may be temporarily
out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant
that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of
due process as that of jurisdiction.
Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule
presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and
the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some
way give him notice thereof.
In this case, the Sheriff’s Return stated that Augdo was out of the country; thus, the service of
summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt
thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place
and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent’s behalf.
Notably, Agudo makes no issue as to the fact that the place where the summons was served
was her residence , though she was temporarily out of the country at that time, and that
Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to
file answer submitted by private respondent’s counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff’s Return by
stating that private respondent was out of the country and that his service was ngaged by respondent’ s
husband.
These statements establish the fact that Agudo had knowledge of the case filed against her, and
that her husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her
counsel.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Agudo when the latter’s counsel entered his appearance on Agudo’s behalf, without
qualification and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed 2
Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.
Page 120 of 136
7. RCBC v. Hi-Tri Devt June 12, 2012

Escheat proceedings refer to the judicial process in which the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims abandoned, left vacant, or unclaimed property, without there
being an interested person having a legal claim thereto; Escheat is not a proceeding to penalize
depositors for failing to deposit to or withdraw from their account

Escheat proceedings are actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead
of the person. Thus, an action may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal
service upon the depositors or other claimants. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court
over the res. Consequently, a judgment of escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement,
as publication is considered a general and constructive notice to all persons interested.

IF Banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of a copy of the complaint and
summons upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of the defendant bank.
IF On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants of the unclaimed balances (such as this
case), service is made by publication. banks are concerned, service of processes is made by delivery of
a copy of the complaint and summons upon the president, cashier, or managing officer of the defendant
bank.8 On the other hand, as to depositors or other claimants of the unclaimed balances, service is
made by publication. A notice about the forthcoming escheat proceedings.
- A notice about the forthcoming escheat proceedings must also be issued and published.

Page 121 of 136

8. De Pedro v Romasan Devt GR 194751

Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons; A decision rendered without proper service of
summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction.—Regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of
summons is imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in
jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioner’s certificate of title is
sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed
with the case with authority and competence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service of Summons; The rules allow summons to be
served by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent
cannot be served within reasonable time.

Service of Summons by Publication; Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general

circulation is allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner
or if his or her whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.”—

Service of Summons by Extraterritorial Service; Service of summons by extraterritorial service is

allowed after leave of court when the defendant or respondent does not reside or is not found
in the country or is temporarily out of the country.

Page 122 of 136

 XIII. Motions (Rule 15) Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
RULE 15 proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
MOTIONS waived.
Section 1. Motion defined.
A motion is an application for relief other than by a pleading. Sec. 9. Motion for leave.
1) Kinds: A motion for leave to file a pleading or motion shall be accompanied by the pleading or motion sought to
A. Litigated motion – requires hearing be admitted.
B. Motion ex parte – no hearing; no prejudice to adverse party
C. Motion of course – matter of right Sec. 10. Form.
D. Special motion – leave of court The Rules applicable to pleadings shall apply to written motions so far as concerns
(1) caption,
Sec. 2. Motions must be in writing. (2) designation,
All motions shall be in writing except those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial. (3) signature, and
(4) other matters of form.
Sec. 3. Contents.
A motion shall state the RULE 49
(1) relief sought to be obtained and the ORAL ARGUMENT
(2) grounds upon which it is based, and if required by these Rules or necessary to prove facts alleged
therein, shall be accompanied by Sec. 3. No hearing or oral argument for motions.
(3) supporting affidavits and other papers.
1) 4 Requisites:
Motions shall not be set for hearing and, unless the court otherwise directs, no hearing or oral argument
A. Writing
shall be allowed in support thereof. The adverse party may file objections to the motion within five (5)
B. Hearing
days from service, upon the expiration of which such motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
1. 3 day notice rule: must be notified at least 3 days before hearing
2. 10 day Rule: hearing must not be later than 10 days from filing
RULE 56-A
C. N of Hearing
ORIGINAL CASES
D. P of Service
Sec. 2. Rules applicable.
The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.
shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51,
Except for (Ex Parte) motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
52 and this Rule, subject to the following provisions:
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
a) All references in said Rules to the Court of Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the Supreme
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
Court;
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
b) The portions of said Rules dealing strictly with and specifically intended for appealed cases in the
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. [3Day Notice Rule]
Court of Appeals shall not be applicable; and
1) XPN to 3 Day Notice Rule
c) Eighteen (18) clearly legible copies of the petition shall be filed, together with proof of service on all
A. Ex parte motion
adverse parties.
B. Urgent motion
The proceedings for disciplinary action against members of the judiciary shall be governed by the laws
C. Motion for summary judgment
and Rules prescribed therefor, and those against attorneys by Rule 139-B, as amended.
2) Notice of Hearing is mandatory
A. XPN: no prejudice, party has opportunity to be heard (e.g. filed his pleading)

Sec. 5. Notice of hearing.

The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of
the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary.

No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

Sec. 7. Motion day.

Except for motions requiring immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing on Friday
afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day.

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion.

Page 123 of 136

1. Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003 reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or
COMPLAINT: Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of Davao. pendency of said motion.
PLAINTIFF: Peralta
DEFENDANT: Republic (OSG) In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence,
DEFECT OF MR: No Notice of Hearing given to Peralta they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new
SC RULING: The OSG’s negligence is fatal trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed the
motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period , said motion
FACTS: failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that
Peralta et al were actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13
1. Peralta et al are the heirs of one Benedicto Alonday. of the Rules of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration
a. Alonday was granted a Homestead Patent by the DENR over a lot in Davao. Title was thereafter containing the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
issued in his name.
b. In 1969, Bureau of Forest Development sought permission to use a portion of said property.
Instead, BFD constructed a building on it.
c. Benedicto’s lawyer demanded for the BFD to vacate. GIST:
2. Failing this, Peralta filed a Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of OSG filed its MR but without any notice of hearing to the adverse party. The negligence is fatal. It
Davao. renders the motion pro forma.
a. RTC ruled in favor of Peralta and orded the Republic to vacate the property and remove all
improvements thereon.
3. Days before the expiration of the period to appeal, on May 30, 1997, Republic filed through
registered mail a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC decison.
a. However, the RTC expunged the MR on the ground that it failed to incorporate any notice of
hearing as required by the Rules.
b. From this decisión, Republic filed a Notice of Appeal.
c. In opposition, Peralta et al filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the MR was a mere
scrap of paper and thus did not toll the running of the reglementary period.
4. Pending all this, the RTC judge retired.
a. The new judge issued an order giving due course to Republic’s Appeal but was again reversed in
light of jurisprudence brought to its attention.
b. Peralta et al then moved for the execution which was granted. Republic filed an MR assailing the
dismissal of it Appeal as well as the granting of the Writ of Execution.
c. MR denied.
5. On certiorari in the CA, Republic’s petition was again dismissed.
a. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the
defective motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion
for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds
therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written
notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 4,
paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all
the parties concerned at least 3 days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule
requires that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the
time and place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements, far from being merely technical and
procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process.

Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or
opposition, the trial court would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant
to set the time and place of hearing of its motion. The requirements entombed in Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance therewith is fatal and
renders the motion pro forma—a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to
receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for the

Page 124 of 136

2. Preysler v. Manila Southcoast, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010
COMPLAINT: Forcible Entry in MTC Nasugbu
PLAINTIFF: Preysler
DEFENDANT: MS
ALLEGED DEFECT: Preysler failed to properly observe the 3 Day Notice Rule
SC RULING: Substantial compliance suffices because no prejudice was caused to the adverse party
FACTS:
1. Preysler Jr. filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against MS.
a. It alleged that Preysler’s property in Nasugbu covered by TCT overlapped with MS’ TCT.
b. MTC ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered MS to vacate.
c. On appeal, RTC reversed and dismissed Preysler’s Complaint.
2. Preysler received the RTC Decision on Feb 9, 2004 and then filed an MR which was set for hearing
on Feb 26, 2004.
a. Preysler sent a copy of the MR to MS through registered mail on Feb. 23, 2004.
b. However, it was only on March 3, 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing that MS received
a copy of the MR.
3. During the scheduled hearing, the judge reset the hearing to April 2. Thereafter, it was again
rescheduled to April 7. Finally, said hearing was reset to August 6.
a. After the hearing, MS filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the 3-Day Notice Rule was not
complied with and thus did not stop the running of the period thereby causing the RTC Decision
to become final and executory.
b. RTC declared that the decision had become final and executory because Preysler’s MR was
fatally flawed.
c. CA likewise dismissed the petition for certiorari and stated the the 3-Day Notice Rule was
mandatory.
DOCTRINE:
The 3-Day Notice Rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse
party and has not deprived the court of its authority.
Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts
must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice.
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro , the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the
rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was
caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several
postponements of which the parties were duly notified.
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack
of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard
and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:
As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice
required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the
requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon
the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the
motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The TEST is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to
study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
which it is based.
In this case, the CA ruled that Preysler failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the
CA overlooked the fact that although MS received Preysler’s MR six days after the scheduled
hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to
the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than 5 months after MS received a copy of
Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, MS had more
than sufficient time to oppose Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration . In fact, respondent did
oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances
of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of
dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the
RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits.
OMNIBUS MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioner’s Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to
comply with the 3-day notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of petitioner’s
Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9
November 2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing was one day short of the
prescribed minimum three days notice.
We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that “[e]very written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party
at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.” Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of
the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioner’s Omnibus Motion was set for
hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have
received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November
2004. Clearly, respondent’s receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of
the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the
required minimum three-days’ notice.
As explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the notice of
hearing should be given:
The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be SERVED BY
TUESDAY at the latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be
complied with. If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually
received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office, the date of the first
notice of the postmaster should be at least (5) days before Tuesday.
GIST:
MR was filed by Preysler. Preysler sent a notice of hearing to MS through registered mail. However, MS
received the copy 6 days after the scheduled hearing.
Substantial Compliance is allowed because no prejudice was caused to the adverse party.
Omnibus Motion: 1 day late according to RTC. SC said it was still within the 3 day period
Page 125 of 136
3. Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143440, February 11,

COMPLAINT: Damages (Tort)

PLAINTIFF: Bolos
DEFENDANT: Bacelonia, Roxas-Cu and Carino
DEFECT: MR was filed beyond the period (10 days)
SC RULING: the period is mandatory. The failure to comply renders the MR as pro forma

FACTS:

1. Jemelee Bolos, a student of St. Bridget, died in a vehicular accident involving her School Service
Vehicle and an Isuzu Truck.
a. Initially, the owners of the School Service Vehicle (Bacelonia) sued the owner (Roxas-Cu) and
driver (Carino) of the Isuzu Truck for damages.
b. However, the case was dismissed after the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.
2. Subsequently, the parents of Jemelee Bolos filed a Complaint for Damages against Bacelonias,
Roxas-Cu, and Carino.
a. As a result, Bacelonia filed a Motion to be Dropped as Defendants on the ground of the
Compromise Agreement entered into by the co-defendants previously wherein it was alleged
that Roxas-Cu admitted sole responsibility.
b. Roxas-Cu opposed and denied having admitted anything and that res judicata does not apply in
the present case.
3. RTC denied the Bacelonia’s Motion to be Dropped and scheduled the reception of evidence of the
defense on Feb. 3, 2000.
a. As such, on Jan 31, 2000, Bacelonias filed an MR and set the hearing on Feb. 15, 2000.
b. On the same day, they also filed another motion to Cancel the Hearing for Presentation of
Evidence on Feb 3. Sps Bolos opposed both motions.
4. During the hearing on Feb 3, RTC denied the MR.
5. On certiorari, CA dismissed Bacelonia’s petition.
a. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:

The CA correctly dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 57455 for the reason that the RTC did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Bacelonia’s MR on February 3, 2000.

It should be noted that the MR of the RTC’s resolution on January 10, 2000 was filed by Bacelonia on
January 31, 2000. The date and time of hearing thereof was set by the petitioners on February
15, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. In this connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Court on motions provides:

Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must NOT
BE LATER than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said MR was BEYOND THE PERIOD specified by
the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than 10 days after the filing of the motion, or no later
than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory
term “must” in fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that
fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and
presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.

Page 126 of 136

 XIV. MOTION TO DISMISS (RULE 16) The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the
RULE 16 same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Section 1. Grounds. RULE 33
Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
(c) That venue is improperly laid; denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; RULE 15
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; MOTIONS
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or Sec. 8. Omnibus motion.
otherwise extinguished; Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
frauds; and waived.
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
RULE 9
Sec. 2. Hearing of motion. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law and their
evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.
trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
presenting the same. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion. cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
After the hearing, the court may dismiss the claim.
(1) dismiss the action or claim,
(2) deny the motion, or
(3) order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not
indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.

Sec. 4. Time to plead.

If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the balance of the period prescribed by
Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any
event, computed from his receipt of the notice of the denial.
If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11
counted from service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.
(15d if matter of right)
(10d if w/ leave of court)

Sec. 5. Effect of dismissal.

Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i)
of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.
BARS REFILING/WITH PREJUDICE: Remedy is Appeal
F – res judicata/prescription [PURE]
H – extinguished claim
I – Unenforceable

Sec. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.

If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing
may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

Page 127 of 136

1. Heirs of Loreto Maramag v. Eva Maramag etal, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009
COMPLAINT: for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds
PLAINTIFFS: Heirs (Legitimate)
DEFENDANTS: Eva Maramag (Illegitimate)
GROUND OF MTD: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
SC: MTD is granted
FACTS:
1. The Legitimate Heirs of Loreto seek the reduction and revocation of insurance proceeds of the
lllegitimate Heirs.
a. They claim that Eva De Guzman was a concubine of Loreto and is suspected of having killed the
latter and thus disqualified to receive proceeds from Loreto’s insurance policies with Insural Life
and Grepalife.
b. Moreover, it is claimed the illegitimate children of Loreto are entitled to only ½ of the legitime
of the legitimate children.
2. In their Answer, Insular and Grepalife averred that since Eva was disqualified as beneficiary, the
Insurance proceeds should go to the illegitimate children.
a. A Motion to Dismiss was likewise incorporated alleging that the Complaint failed to
state a cause of action considering that the Insurance Code provides that once a
beneficiary has been revoked and disqualified, the proceeds must go to the remaining
beneficiaries (illegimate children).
DOCTRINE:
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the petition failed to
state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads —
SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states
a cause of action when it contains the 3 elements of a cause of action:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff;
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right.
If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on
the FACTS ALLEGED in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such
allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether,
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.
However, this rule is SUBJECT TO WELL-RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS, such that there is no
hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
(1) the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
(2) such allegations are legally impossible;
(3) the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
(4) by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
(5) there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or
in the course of the hearings related to the case.
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the
legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies
issued by Insular and Grepalife . The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of
Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance
policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of
the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code, Eva’s
share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of
Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate
children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective
legitimes.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds
are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the
maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was
intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or
indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no
legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a
beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s
insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the
children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether
forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the
insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said
illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases
where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified
by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the
estate of the insured.
GIST:
MTD is granted for lack of COA. There is no COA because the plaintiffs/petitioners were not named as
beneficiaries in the insurance.
Page 128 of 136
2. Rebecca Pacana v. Rovila Water
COMPLAINT:
PLAINTIFFS:
DEFENDANTS:
GROUND OF MTD: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
DEFECT: it was filed out of time (after pretrial)
SC: MTD is not granted

FACTS
5. PLAINTIFF (2): Petitioners Rebecca and Rosalie Pacaña are children of SPS. Pacaña
DEFENDANT (5): They filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and
Marisa for accounting and damages.
6. Plaintiffs claimed they owned Rovila Water Supply, and the defendants tookover the
business by forming Rovina Inc to usurp the family business.
7. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in their own names instead of the names of the parents.
8. The parents died. The respondents claimed the substitution of plaintiffs from parents to
children was improper

1st MTD: RTC has no Jurisdiction over intra-corp controversy (denied)

2nd MTD: Not RP in Interest and No COA

Ratio:
3. Without the inclusion of the indispensable parties, there can be no final determination of
the case.
both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that
they are indispensable parties
4. REMEDY: Sec. 9 Rule 3: implead the indispensable parties.
their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. Failure to implead indispensable parties is a
curable error
The heirs should be impleaded as indispensable parties because of their hereditary rights

RP in Interest includes both indispensable parties and necessary parties. (mas malawak)

Dismissal of Actions; Actions; Interlocutory Orders; While an order denying a motion to

dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to
address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction.—In Barrazona v. RTC,
Branch 61, Baguio City, 486 SCRA 555 (2006), the Court held that while an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and nonappealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an
order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is granted to keep an
inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Real Party-in-Interest; A suit that is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is
dismissible on the ground that the complaint “fails to state a cause of action.”

Page 129 of 136

3. Manila Banking v. University of Baguio, G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007
COMPLAINT: Complaint for Sum of Money Hence, a motion to dismiss based on LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION is filed by the defendant after
PLAINTIFFS: MBC the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to
DEFENDANTS: UB, Sps. Bautista and GDI (impleaded) the relief sought. While a MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 is based on preliminary
GROUND OF MTD: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (loan paid by objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a MOTION TO DISMISS
Dacion and failure to prosecute for unreasonable time) UNDER RULE 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
DEFECT: Not under Rule 16 (before responsive pleading) nor 33 (after presentation of evid and rested) evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case.
SC: MTD is improper
In this case, UB’s March 19, 1998 motion to dismiss the amended complaint was improper under
FACTS: Rule 16 because it was filed after UB filed its responsive pleading, its Answer. Also, the motion’s
merit could not be determined based solely on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the
1. MBC granted a 14M credit line to UB for the construction of buildings and the purchase of new amended complaint, since the motion was based on the deed of dacion en pago, which was not
equipment. even alleged in the complaint. And since the deed of dacion en pago had been expunged from the
a. Vice Chairman Bautista signed in behalf of UB. record, the trial court erred in its finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the deed. In
b. However, the loan was not paid because Bautista diverted the net proceeds of the loan to Group fact, on January 11, 2002 or just three months before it dismissed the amended complaint, the trial
Developers Inc. (GDI). court had even noted petitioner counsel’s manifestation regarding the parties’ initial efforts to enter into
2. Thus, MBC filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against UB, Bautista, and his wife before RTC of a “dacion en pago but not based on the previous offer made but on a new proposal involving new
Makati. properties”and urged them to pursue further settlement discussions.
a. Later, MBC amended the Complaint and impleaded GDI.
b. In its Answer, UB claimed that the bank and GDI approved the diversion. In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had “no more cause of action” or lacked a cause of
c. By way of cross-claim, UB prayed that GDI be ordered to pay UB the amount it owed to MBC. action against the university. Following Domondon, that motion was a motion to dismiss under
3. So, MBC and GDI executed a Deed of Dacion en Pago where GDI ceded and transferred to MBC a Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer to evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had
parcel of land in full settlement of the loan. presented its evidence and rested its case. In the case at bar, there had been no presentation
a. Thereafter, UB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground that of evidence yet and petitioner had not rested its case. Therefore, the August 17, 1999 Order
there was no more cause of action since the loan had already been settled by GDI and that properly denied the motion to dismiss for being improper under either Rule 16 or 33.
MBC failed to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.
b. RTC denied.
c. Likewise, RTC expunged from its record the Deed of Dacion en Pago because no compromise GIST:
agreement was submitted for approval. The MTD filed by UB is improper both under Rule 16 and Rule 33.
d. UB again filed a Manifestation regarding its previous Motion to Dismiss and claimed that it  Rule 16: must be filed before responsive pleding~UB filed after
should not have been denied.  Rule 33: must be filed after petitioner presented its evidence and rested its case~UB no
e. MBC opposed. presentation yet and had not rested its case.
f. Then, RTC granted the Motion and dismissed the case since MBC no longer had a cause
of action.

DOCTRINE:

MTD FOR FAILURE TO STATE COA V MTD ON LACK OF COA

In Domondon v. Lopez, we distinguished a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action from a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by
Section 1 (g), Rule 16, while the second by Rule 33, of the Rules of Court, to wit:

MTD FOR FAILURE TO STATE COA MTD ON LACK OF COA

The FIRST [situation where the complaint
does not allege a sufficient cause of action]
is raised in a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is
filed and can be determined only from
the allegations in the initiatory pleading
and not from evidentiary or other
matters aliunde.
The first does not concern itself with the
truth and falsity of the allegations
The SECOND [situation where the evidence
does not sustain the cause of action alleged]
is raised in a demurrer to evidence
under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has
rested his case and can be resolved only
on the basis of the evidence he has
presented in support of his claim.
while the second arises precisely because
the judge has determined the truth and
falsity of the allegations and has found
the evidence wanting.

Page 130 of 136

4. Corales v. Republic, 703 SCRA 623 (2013).
COMPLAINT: Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus
PLAINTIFFS: Corales and Dr. Angeles
DEFENDANTS: Andal (OSG)
GROUND OF MTD: Lack of COA, Premature and Non-Exhaustion of Admin Remedies
SC: MTD is granted
FACTS:
1. Corales was elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms.
a. In those 3 terms, he appointed Dr. Angeles as Municipal Administrator.
b. In his first term, the appointment was unanimously approved.
c. However, in the last two terms, the Sanggunian disapproved on the ground of nepotism and
allegedly because of Dr. Angeles’ unsatisfactory performance.
d. Despite this, Dr. Angeles still discharged the duties of his office for which he received salary.
2. Thereafter Maximo Andal, as Provincial State Auditor, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum
(AOM) to Corales and asking the latter to comment/reply.
a. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against Andal and the
Sanggunian before the RTC of San Pablo.
b. In opposition, SolGen, representing Andal, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of
cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss by SolGen.
a. MR denied.
4. Thus, the Republic went up the CA.
a. CA granted the petition in favor of the Republic.
b. Hence, this petition.
c. Essentially, the CA dismissed Corales’ action for Prohibition.
DOCTRINE:
PREMATURE
As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative
process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even
granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or
resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to
reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since
there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM.
Section 1, Rule 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: “[a]n aggrieved
party may appeal from an order or decision overruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report,
memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the
Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.” From the final order or decision of the
Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper. It is the decision or resolution of
the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.
Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to
exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the
auditing process has just begun but the petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a
Petition for Prohibition.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first
avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should
not
be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Also, in The Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals and Government Service
Insurance System, this Court has extensively pronounced that:
The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s
cause of action. The DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case.
Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of government to
deal with the issues within their respective specializations prior to any court intervention.
DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER (Rule 65)
In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their favor, petitioners aver that by filing a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in essence, admitted all the
material averments and narration of facts stated in the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus. As such,
there is no longer any question of fact to speak of and what remains is a pure question of law. The
judgment, therefore, of the trial court denying the Motion to Dismiss is no longer subject to any appeal
or review by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it is already appealable and reviewable by this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only pure questions of law may be raised and dealt with. This is in
line with the pronouncement in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals (China Road
Case).
Petitioners’ above argument is misplaced. China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench.
Therein, the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was granted. As the order granting the motion to
dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory order, the proper remedy was an appeal in
due course.
In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an
order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is not
appealable, not even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The only remedy for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a special civil action for certiorari
(Rule 65) showing that such denial was made with grave abuse of discretion.
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5. NHA v. Baello, 703 SCRA 333 (2013)
COMPLAINT: Action for Recovery of Possession and Damages. CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT does not require identity of the causes of
PLAINTIFFS: Baello action for it to work. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second
DEFENDANTS: NHA action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
GROUND OF MTD: (f) res judicata point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final
SC: MTD is granted and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit ; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not
FACTS: conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts
1. Pedro Baello and Nicanora Beallo-Rodriguez applied to register a parcel of land. and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
a. CFI confirmed title in their favor. future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different
b. The Republic, through the Director of Lands, did not appeal so it became final and executory. claim or cause of action.
c. An OCT were then issued in their names.
d. Then, the property was later subdivided into 2 parcels of land with 2 TCTs.
2. During Martial Law, Marcos issued a PD expropriating land and authorizing the NHA to develop the In this case, the NHA’s petition is barred by conclusiveness of judgment which states that —
land into a residential area. any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
a. It covered both the Baello and Rodriguez properties. determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
b. Thereafter, a truckload of military personnel forcibly ejected Baello and Rodriguez out of their the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
properties. between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
c. The NHA then took possession thereof. subject matter of the two actions is the same.
3. After the EDSA Revolution, the Baellos executed a extrajudicial partition.
4. On August 1987, NHA filed an Action for Eminent Domain against Baello and Rodriguez at the RTC We sustain the CA in ruling that the main issue raised by the NHA, which it alleged in its Answer
of Caloocan Branch 120 but was dismissed for res judicata and lack of cause of action. before the trial court, is the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The validity of OCT No. (804) 53839
a. CA affirmed. had long been settled by this Court in G.R. No. 143230. In that case, the Court ruled that the
b. SC affirmed. action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the decision in LRC Case No. 520. The Court noted
5. Then, in 1993, the NHA filed a Complaint for Nullity of the OCT issued in favor of Pedro & Nicanora that the Republic did not oppose Pedro and Nicanora’s application for registration in LRC Case No. 520,
in RTC of Caloocan Branch 128. and neither did it appeal the decision. OCT No. (804) 53839 was issued by the Register of Deeds in 1959
a. The same court, however, dismissed the complaint due to estoppel and res judicata. and the Republic did not file any action to nullify the CFI’s decision until the NHA filed a complaint for
b. CA affirmed. nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839 on 5 November 1993, the case which was the origin of G.R. No. 143230.
c. SC affirmed. As pointed out by this Court in G.R. No. 143230, the NHA was already barred from assailing OCT
6. During the pendency of the case in Branch 128, Baello filed an Action for Recovery of Possession No. (804) 53839 and its derivative titles.
and Damages against NHA.
a. RTC ruled in favor of Baello.
b. On appeal, CA denied NHA’s appeal.
c. MR denied.
d. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of res judicata has been explained as follows:

The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action
and were admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment
rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be
litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of
the form of the latter.

Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects:
1. The first, known as “BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT,” or “estoppel by verdict,” is the
effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action.
2. The second, known as “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT,” otherwise known as
the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action.

The Court explained further:

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6. Unicapital v. Consing, 702 SCRA 511 (2013)
COMPLAINT:
 Consing filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Unicapital and PBI in the RTC of Pasig.
 Unicapital filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Consing and Dela Cruz
before the RTC of Makati.
 PBI filed a Complaint for Damages and Attachment before the RTC of Manila.
TWO MOTIONS: (1) MTD filed by Unicapital and PBI on ground of Failure to State COA
(2) M FOR CONSOLIDATION filed by Consing.
SC: MTD is not granted (there is a COA);
MFC not granted (two cases proceed from diff. sources of obl.)
FACTS:
1. Consing and his mother (Dela Cruz) obtained a loan an 18M loan from Unicapital secured by PNs
and a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite.
a. Interested in developing said property into a residential subdivision, Plus Builders (PBI),
through its real estate development arm, URI, negotiated with Dela Cruz and Unicapital to
purchase the same.
b. Thereafter, Dela Cruz decided to sell to Unicapital and PBI.
c. For said purpose, she appointed Consing as her attorney-in-fact.
2. After paying Consing but before the TCTs were transferred to PBI and URI, some Chinese dudes
popped up and claimed to be lawful owners.
a. Upon investigation, it was found that Dela Cruz’s title was dubious.
b. Thus, PBI and Unicapital demanded from Consing to return the money.
3. As a result, the following cases were filed:
a. In May 1999, Consing filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Unicapital and PBI in
the RTC of Pasig.
i. They claimed that due to incessant harassment from Unicapital, his professional and
personal life was affected.
ii. On the other hand, Unicapital filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Failure to
State a Cause of Action.
iii. PBI likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of that the complaint Does
Not Have a Cause of Action.
iv. RTC denied the motions.
v. CA affirmed.
b. In August 1999, Unicapital filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against
Consing and Dela Cruz before the RTC of Makati.
c. Likewise, PBI filed a Complaint for Damages and Attachment before the RTC of Manila.
4. The RTC Manila case was subsequently consolidated with the case in RTC Pasig.
a. Then, Consing filed a Motion to Dismiss the case in RTC Makati but was denied.
b. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Consolidation of the cases in Makati with the case in Pasig.
c. However, RTC of Makati dismissed said motion on the ground that said cases had no identity of
rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.
d. MR denied.
e. On certiorari, CA also refused to consolidate. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE:
PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS OF UNICAPITAL
A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief
prayed for. Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.
As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, citing Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan (HSBC):
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated
otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
presented by the defendants.
Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not
the complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause
of action. Lest it be misunderstood, FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION is properly a ground
for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the latter (NO
CAUSE OF ACTION) is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule.
In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in RTC Pasig properly states a cause
of action since the allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19
(harassment) and 26 (libelous statements) of the Civil Code. Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s
complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner in which
Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him.
Accordingly, these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of
damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that “[e]very person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.” Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for
damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code.
PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION
In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No.
991418, although involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain
unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of obligations and, hence, would not
yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and damages case based on the Civil
Code provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 991418 is a collection and
damages suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA
No. 1759 deals with whether or not Unicapital and PBI, et al. abused the manner in which they
demanded payment from Consing, Jr., while Civil Case No. 991418 deals with whether or not Unicapital
may demand payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in
one case would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each case are separate
and distinct from the other.
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7. Brown–Araneta v. Araneta, 707 SCRA 202 (2013)
COMPLAINT: Petition for Custody filed by Mr. Araneta; Petition for Protection Order filed by Mrs.
Araneta
GROUND OF MTD: (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause; (Litis Pendentia and Forum Shopping)
SC: MTD is granted (there is FS and LP committed)
FACTS:
1. Juan Ignacio Araneta and Michelle Brown-Araneta were married in Vegas.
a. They bore 2 daughters namely Ara and Ava.
b. The spouses separated after 7 years.
c. During the separation, the daughters remained in Michelle’s custody.
d. In 2007, Juan filed a Petition for Custody in the Makati RTC against Michelle and her mother
claiming that they have completely barred him from seeing his daughters.
2. Pending the Petition for Custody, Michelle filed a Petition for Protection Order in the RTC of
Muntinlupa claiming that Juan had committed sexual, psychological, and economic abuse on her and
their daughters.
a. In this petition, it was stated that there was a pending case in the Makati RTC for the custody of
the children.
b. Muntinlupa thereafter granted the TPO.
3. Later, Juan filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Prayer to Lift TPO in the Makati RTC on
the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping since the Makati RTC is competent to
grant the very same reliefs sought by Michelle in the Petition for Protection Order.
a. Also, he alleged that Michelle’s filing in Muntinlupa amounts to forum shopping.
4. RTC ruled partly in favor of Michelle and partly in favor of Juan.
a. So both parties appealed.
5. In the CA, Michelle was found guilty of forum shopping.
a. MR denied.
b. Hence, this petition.
c. Michelle contends that there was no forum shopping when she filed her Petition for
Protection Order in Muntinlupa while the Petition for Custody was still pending in
Makati.
DOCTRINE:
A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of an adverse decision in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
certiorari by raising identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Stated a bit differently,
FORUM SHOPPING is the institution of two or more actions involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would come out with a favorable disposition. An indicium of the presence of, or the
test for determining whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other case.
LITIS PENDENTIA, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that
the second action becomes vexatious and unnecessary. For the bar of litis pendentia to be
invoked, the concurring requisites must be present:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the
other.
Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping:
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the
CA since in such case said party deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as one case
in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy)
would still be open”; or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing
to obtain it from the original court.
The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants,
taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different
fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres to the
rules against forum shopping, and a breach of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.
FORUM SHOPPING WAS COMMITTED; IN ANTICIPATION OF AN ADVERSE RULING IN MAKATI
RTC, MUNTINLUPA RTC WAS SOUGHT FOR A FAVORABLE OPINION
As discussed above, the presiding judge of the Makati RTC, in the custody case, made of record that she
was not inclined to issue a protection order in favor of Michelle because she did not bother to appear in
Court and that the allegations against Juan Ignacio cannot, per se, prevent him from exercising
visitation rights over his children. After this adverse ruling, Michelle sought the favorable opinion of the
Muntinlupa RTC by filing an independent Petition for Protection Order.
IDENTICAL PARTIES
The Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same parties who
represent the same interests. The fact that Ava and Ara, who are parties in the Petition for Protection
Order, are not impleaded in the Petition for Custody is of no moment because they are precisely the
very subjects of the Petition for Custody and their respective rights are represented by their mother,
Michelle.
In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, it was held that forum shopping exists even
in cases like this where petitioners or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as respondents or
defendants in another. Moreover, this Court has constantly held that the fact that the positions of
the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or
vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the
case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.
IDENTITY IN RIGHTS ASSERTED AND RELIEFS PRAYED FOR
Further, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Petition for Protection Order are practically based on
the same facts and are so intertwined with that in Petition for Custody, such that any judgment rendered
in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res judicata.
ELEMENTS OF LITIS PENDENTIA ARE PRESENT
Any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata. Consider: If the Makati RTC were to grant Juan Ignacio’s Petition for Custody,
this would necessarily mean that it would be in the best interest of the children if he were
allowed to visit and spend time with them and that granting Juan Ignacio visitation rights
would not pose any danger or threat to the children.
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On the other hand, a grant by the Muntinlupa RTC of Michelle’s prayer for a permanent protection
order would presuppose at the minimum that it would be to the children’s best interest if Juan
Ignacio is directed to keep away from them, necessary implying that he is unfit even to visit Ara
and Ava. Conversely, if Juan Ignacio’s Petition for Custody were denied, then it would mean that
the Makati RTC gave weight and credence to Michelle’s allegations of abuse and found them
to be in the best interest of the children to bar Juan Ignacio from visiting them. Thus, the
Muntinlupa RTC should have no ground to deny Michelle’s Petition for Protection Order pending before it.

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