RULE 17

DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff.
A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue
an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.
1) Three kinds of dismissal by plaintiff
A. S1 Dismissal upon notice of dismissal by plaintiff
B. S2 Dismissal upon motion by plaintiff
C. S3 Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff
1. Upon motion of the defendant or motu proprio
Sec. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff.
Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action
unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his
counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court.

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.

If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

Sec. 4. Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint.

The provisions of this Rule shall apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
complaint. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant by notice as in section 1 of this Rule, shall be made
before a responsive pleading or a motion for summary judgment is served or, if there is none, before
the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
DISMISSALS BY THE PLAINTIFF (RULE 17)

1. Limaco v. Shohan Gakuen Children’s House, G.R. No. 158245, June 30, 2005
COMPLAINT: (1) Rescission filed by Shohan (2) Specific Performance by Limaco. But Specific Performance was
earlier served.
WHO WITHDREW: Limaco, and then prayed for dismissal of Counterclaim.
WHEN WITHDREW: after Shohan already filed its answer with counterclaim.
KIND OF COUNTERCLAIM: Compulsory

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Limaco owns 3 parcels of agricultural land in Laguna.
a. They entered into a Contract of Sale with Shohan Gakuen over said parcels of land in the amount of
12.5M.
b. Parties agreed that a down payment of 1.2M would be paid upon signing and the rest would be paid in
installments.
c. Also, it was stipulated that should the vendors be unable to transfer the property, similar properties would
be substituted.
d. Due to Limaco’s failure to get clearance and approval from the DAR, Shohan demanded the Limaco solve
the tenancy problem or substitute the lots with another acceptable, suitable, and untenanted land.
2. Thereafter, Limaco informed Shohan that, to solve the problem, the properties for the tenant farmers should
first be donated to the municipality, and in turn, would donate to Shohan.
a. However, the scheme was not accepted by Shohan because they don’t want future municipal officials to
feel that Shohan is “beholden to it.”
b. Thus, they insisted on the substitution. However, Limaco did not respond.
3. Shohan filed a Complaint for Rescission with Damages in RTC of Makati.
a. To counter, Limaco and the tenant farmers filed an Action for Specific Performance in the RTC of
Laguna.
b. Because the Action for Specific Performance was served earlier than the Complaint for Rescission, the
latter was dismissed in lieu of the Action for Specific Performance.
4. In Shohan’s Answer with Counterclaim in the Action for Specific Performance, it claimed that the remedy is
not possible because Shohan already bought another property for the purpose.
a. During trial, the parties were able to compromise and agree that only half (600K) of the downpayment
would be returned.
b. However, Limaco only remitted 487K leaving a balance of 113K. As such, the case continued.
5. Then, Limaco filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint in light of Shohan’s contention that Specific
Performance was no longer possible.
a. Limaco prayed that their Complaint as well as Shohan’s Counterclaim be ordered withdrawn.
i. Shohan objected saying that dismissal of the Counterclaim would be prejudicial to them.
ii. As such, RTC denied Limaco’s motion.
iii. Moreover, the tenant farmers were also dropped from the case.
b. Finally, RTC ordered Limaco to pay the 113K balance.
6. On appeal, CA ruled that the entire own payment (713K) should be paid because Limaco’s failure to non-
compliance cancelled their Compromise Agreement.
a. In their MR, Limaco revived their argument that the Shohan’s Compulsory Counterclaim should have been
dismissed.
b. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

I: Should the counterclaim be dismissed along Limaco’s (plaintiff) Dismissal of the complaint? NO, because this is a
compulsory counterclaim which is not dismissed with the permissive counterclaim.

DOCTRINE:
The applicable provisions are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 17 of the old Rules:

Sec. 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for
summary judgment[.]
Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court. — Except as provided in the preceding section, an action
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph shall be without prejudice.

Thus, there are TWO WAYS by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff.
First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer
or a motion for summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant.
Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed
by the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a
motion for summary judgment.

While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff without need of a judicial order,
the second mode requires the authority of the court before dismissal of the case may be effected. This is
so because in the dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should
always be taken into consideration.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Limaco filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after Shohan already
filed its Answer with Counterclaim . In fact, the reason for their motion for withdrawal was the special defense
of Shohan in its answer that substitution was no longer possible as it already bought another property in lieu of the
subject lots under the contract. It is, therefore, inexplicable how petitioners could argue that their complaint was
successfully withdrawn upon the mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged in
this petition that “[p]rivate respondent objected to [the] withdrawal and the Trial Court sustained the objection.”

More important, the OLD RULES OF COURT provided that “[i]f a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court”.

What may invariably remain for independent adjudication are permissive counterclaims as compared to
compulsory counterclaims which generally necessitate a simultaneous adjudication with the complaint itself. In the
case at bar, Shohan’s counterclaim is compulsory in nature, hence, cannot remain for independent
adjudication.

2. Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, June 30, 2006

COMPLAINT: Injunction (to prohibit Pinga from entering the premises) filed by Heirs
WHO DISMISSED: the defendant by MTD

QUICKIE FACTS:

1. In May 1998, the Heirs of Santiago filed a Complaint for Injunction against Pinga in the RTC of Zamboanga
a. It alleged that Pinga and Saavedra unlawfully entered the coco lands of Santiago and prayed that they be
enjoined from doing such act.
b. In their Answer with Counterclaim, Pinga disputed Santiago’s ownership claiming that, as early as
1968, the Santiagos had already been ejected from the property.
2. By 2005, the trial had not yet finished. In fact, the Heirs of Santiago had failed to present their evidence. In
the July 2005 hearing, Santiago’s counsel failed to appear, sending instead a representative to postpone the
hearing.
a. Pinga’s counsel opposed the motion for postponement and moved to dismiss the case.
b. Thus, the Complaint for Injunction by the Heirs of Santiago was dismissed but, at the same time,
the RTC allowed Pinga to present their evidence ex parte.
3. In their MR, the Heirs prayed that the entire action be dismissed and that Pinga be not allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
a. Essentially, they contended that the counterclaim could not stand.
b. RTC granted the MR and dismissed the counterclaim.
c. MR denied.
d. Hence, this Petition (R45)

I: WON the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the counterclaim. NO, whether the
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.

DOCTRINE:
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due
to the fault of plaintiff DOES NOT necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim ,
compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of
defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule
17 mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the
counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on
the merits of such counterclaim. Reversal of the RTC is in order, and a remand is necessary for trial on the
merits of the counterclaim.

Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral characteristics as a complaint;
namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting an act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another. The main difference lies in that the cause of action in the counterclaim is maintained by the defendant
against the plaintiff, while the converse holds true with the complaint. Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim
without a cause of action cannot survive.

A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence

constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties , and stands within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount involved
and the nature of the claim. The fact that the culpable acts on which the counterclaim is based are
founded within the same transaction or occurrence as the complaint, is insufficient causation to negate
the counterclaim together with the complaint.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the
counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself
and not on the survival of the main complaint.

Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended
rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same
time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim
from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
XVI. PRE-TRIAL (RULE 18)
RULE 18
PRE-TRIAL
Section 1. When conducted.
After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move
ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.

Sec. 2. Nature and purpose.

The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the
action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

Sec. 3. Notice of pre-trial.

The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel served with
such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him.

Sec. 4. Appearance of parties.

It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may
be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the
court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief.

The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt
thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain,
among others:

(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;

(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;

(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;

(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral
to commissioners; and

(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Sec. 7. Record of pre-trial.

The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order
which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments
allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The
contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent
manifest injustice.

PRE-TRIAL:
Q: Upon termination of the pre-trial, the judge dictated the pre-trial order in the presence of the parties
and their counsel, reciting what had transpired and defining three (3) issues to be tried.
a. If, immediately upon receipt of his copy of the pre-trial order, plaintiff’s counsel should move for its
amendment to include a fourth (4th) triable issue, should the motion to amend be granted? Reasons.
(PRE-TRIAL Amendment)
b. Suppose trial had already commenced and after the plaintiff’s second witness had testified, the
defendant’s counsel moves for the amendment of the pre-trial order to include a fifth (5th) triable
issue, Should the motion be granted over the objection of plaintiff’s counsel? Reasons. (2009 Bar)
(Trial Amendment)
A: a. YES, policy of Rules to afford opportunity for complete determination of the controversy consistent with
substantial justice
b. NO, the Trial had commenced. R18 S7, “modified before trial”
DOC:
PRE-TRIAL Amendment of Issues: allowed
Trial Amendment of Issues: not allowed

Q: Give three distinctions between a pre-trial in a criminal case and a pre-trial in a civil case. (1997
Bar)
A:
1. Crim: conducted only where accused and counsel agreed
Civ: mandatory
2. Crim: No compromise
Civ: there is
3. Crim: Pre-trial agreement made by accused and counsel
Civ: Agreement is in form of Pre-Trial Order

1. Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006

Action for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages
Who failed to appear in pre-trial? Diaz and counsel (defendant)

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Diaz was an operator of a taxi business.
a. Arman Retes drove one of her Tamaraw FX taxis.
b. While driving at an excessive speed, it hit the back of a Hino cargo truck owned by Lantoria and driven by
Francisco.
c. As a result, 9 passegers of the taxi died including Sherly Moneno.
d. Thus, Moneno’s heirs filed an Action for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages against Diaz
and Retes. In turn, Diaz impleaded Lantoria and Francisco in a Third-Party Complaint.
2. The pre-trial conference was set on July 11 1998 but was reset for July 30 because Diaz and
counsel failed to appear despite due notice.
a. Again, Diaz and her lawyer failed to appear.
b. Consequently, the RTC allowed Moneno to present evidence ex parte.
3. More than 7 months after the presentation of evidence, Diaz filed a Motion for Leave to Present Evidence
on her defense but was denied.
a. RTC denied her Motion to Present Evidence and 3rd Party Coplaint.
b. Thereafter, RTC ruled that Diaz and her driver solidarily liable for the death of Moneno.
4. CA affirmed.
a. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the failure of Diaz’ lawyer in not attending pre-trial binds her. YES, His failure to do so constituted
negligence which bound Diaz.

DOCTRINE:

First, Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court states that:

The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The
counsel served with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party
represented by him.

Diaz was represented by Atty. Cipriano Lupeba to whom the notice was sent. It was incumbent on the latter to
advise Diaz accordingly. His failure to do so constituted negligence which bound Diaz.

Further, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 read:

Sec. 4. Appearance of Parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at
the pre-trial. The non-appearance of the party may be excused only if a valid cause is
shown therefore or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear . — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on
the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and
the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

Consequently, it was no error for the trial court to allow Moneno to present their evidence ex parte when
Diaz and her counsel failed to appear for the scheduled pre-trial conference.

2. Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152202, G.R. No. 152202, July 28, 2006
COMPLAINT: Collection
WHO DID NOT APPEAR IN PRE TRIAL: Alcaraz and Counsel (defendant)

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Equitable Card Network issued a credit card to Alcaraz.
a. Through said credit card, the latter purchased goods and services on credit.
b. Alcaraz owed Equitable unpaid credit. Despite receipt of several demands, the latter failed to pay.
c. As such, Equitable sought payment of the balance including the interest, penalties, and surcharges as
stipulated in the contract. It filed an action for collection in the RTC of Makati.
2. In his defense, he argued that the case filed against him was premature because Alcaraz claimed that he was
just an honorary member and was not required to submit any application or sign any contract prior to the
issuance of the card.
a. He also claimed that he was entitled to pay on installments without interest.
3. RTC: After several postponements of the pretrial conference, RTC declared Alcaraz as in default upon
Equitable’s motion and allowed the latter to present evidence ex parte.
a. Afterwards, RTC ruled in favor of Equitable.
b. Alcaraz filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied.
4. CA: On appeal, CA affirmed.
a. Hence, this Petition alleging violation of his right to due process.
b. He claims that he suffered a stroke while his lawyer suffered from a gall bladder ailment.

Issue: WON there is violation of due process for allowing Equitable to present evidence ex parte. NO, failure to
appear in pretrial is not justifiable, i.e. Alcaraz is represented by a law firm

DOCTRINE:

Under the Rules of Court, both the parties and their counsels are mandated to appear in the pre-trial
conference. If the parties opt not to be present, their counsel must be armed with a SPA specifically for
the purpose. This must be so as the pretrial conference is primarily for the purpose of exploring the possibility
of a compromise, or on the failure thereof, for the parties to make certain admissions and stipulations in
order to facilitate a more efficient proceeding at the trial proper.

In the case at bar, both Alcaraz and his counsel did not appear at the scheduled pre-trial . Instead, it was
the Alcaraz’s wife alone who made the verbal manifestation on behalf of her husband and his counsel
while presenting an unverified medical certificate on the latter’s behalf. As correctly observed by the CA,
the records are bereft of any medical certificate, verified or unverified, in the name of Alcaraz to establish the
cause of his absence at the pre-trial conference. Even assuming arguendo that Alcaraz and Atty. Ibuyan’s
absence on the February 23, 1999 pre-trial conference is due to justifiable causes, Alcaraz is
represented by a law firm and not by Atty. Ibuyan alone. As such, any of the latter’s partners or associates
could have appeared before the court and participate in the pretrial or at least make the proper motion for
postponement if necessary.

The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial
court.
3. Macasaet v.Macasaet, G.R. No. 154391, September 30, 2004
QUICKIE FACTS:
Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet had a son named Ismael. Ismael married Teresita. The parents filed an
Ejectment Suit in the MTC of Lipa against Ismael and Teresita alleging that, as owners of 2 parcels of land in
question, they executed a Verbal Lease Agreement in favor of Ismael and Teresita for them to occupy the lots and
use them as their residence. They also claim that despite repeated demands, Ismael and Teresita failed to pay
P500 monthly rent.

Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of such agreement and claime that his parents invited them on the said
property so they could leave near each other. Moreover, they claim that it was actually an advance grant of
inheritance in favor of their children.

MTC ordered Ismael and Teresita to vacate since they were merely being tolerated. RTC affirmed but allowed the
parents to appropriate the improvements built in accordance with the Civil Code. CA sustained. Hence, this
petition.

Ismael and Teresita claims that the MTC should have dismissed the case upon failure of his Parents to attent the
preliminary conference pursuant to Sec. 8 of Rule 70. However, they do not dispute that an Attorney-in-Fact with a
written authorization from his Parents appeared during such conference.

Thus, they question whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a party’s personal
appearance.

DOCTRINE:
Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary
conference. Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a
valid cause; or by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into
an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents.

Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception to
personal appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference. If there are
valid reasons or if a representative has a “special authority,” a party’s appearance may be waived. As petitioners
are challenging only the applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule on preliminary conference, the written
authorization from respondents can indeed be readily considered as a “special authorization.”

4. Chingkoe v. Republic, 702 SCRA 677 (2013)

COMPLAINT: Collection
WHO FAILED: OSG (Plaintiff)
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. The Republic, through the Bureau of Customs, filed 2 Complaints for Collection of Money against Chiat Sing
Carboard Inc, Filstar Textile, and Chingkoe on account of the use of fake and spurious tax credit certificates.
a. The cases were then consolidated and were jointly heard in RTC of Manila.
2. The cases were referred to the Philippine Mediation Center for mandatory mediation. Likewise, pretrial for the
consolidated cases was set on January 9, 2006.
a. On said date, the pretrial was again moved to Feb 15 because the mediation proceedings were still on
going.
b. Again, it was moved to March 17 for the same reason. Afterwards, no settlement or compromise was
agreed upon. As such, on March 17, pretrial commenced.
c. Starting on the March 17 pretrial setting, the pretrial date was moved to 4 more dates (April 19, 2006,
May 25, 2006, June 30, 2006, July 14, 2006).
d. In all cases, the OSG failed to appear.
3. In the June 30 pretrial setting, a certain Atty. Bautista Corpin appearing on behalf of BOC appeared but was
not prepared for pretrial.
a. On the other hand, petitioners were all present during said pretrial settings.
b. Because of this, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of the Republic’s failure to
prosecute.
4. RTC: In the last pre-trial date (July 14, 6th time), the petitioners moved anew and the RTC
dismissed the case. MR denied.
5. CA: Republic went to the CA on certiorari (Rule 65) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
a. CA granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
b. Petitoners’ MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON OSG IS CORRECT IN AVAILING CERTIORARI (R 65) TO QUESTION RTC ORDER OF DISMISSAL. NO.
Petition for Review is the proper remedy (NOTICE OF APPEAL R. 41). RTC’s Order was a final adjudication.
A petition for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own
negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the basis is grave abuse of discretion. The RTC Order subject
of the petition was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the merits; hence, an ordinary appeal
was the proper remedy.
2. WON the RTC was correct in dismissing the case. YES, the OSG never attended the Pre-Trial which had been
reset for 6x. Not once did the OSG offered a reasonable explanation.

DOCTRINE:

The RTC amply gave the Republic sufficient notice and opportunity to attend the pre-trial conference,
but despite this, it neglected its duty to prosecute its case and attend the scheduled pre-trial hearings.
Hence, the RTC cannot be
faulted for dismissing the case.

This Court finds that the dismissal of the case by the RTC was due to the fault and negligence of the
Republic. There is clear negligence and laxity on the part of both the BOC and OSG in handling this case on behalf
of the Republic. Despite several re-settings of the hearing, either or both counsels failed to attend the pre-trial
conference, without giving a justifiably acceptable explanation of their absence.

This utter neglect of its duty to attend the scheduled hearings is what led the trial court to ultimately
dismiss the cases.
In finding that the dismissal by the trial court is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the CA committed reversible
error.

The records bear out that the pre-trial conference has been reset for 6 times, for various reasons. It is fairly
obvious that the trial court gave the Republic, through the OSG and the BOC, every opportunity to be
present during the pre-trial conference. The hearings had to be reset six times due to various reasons, but
not once was the OSG and BOC properly represented. Too, not once did the OSG and BOC offer a
reasonable explanation for their absence during the hearings. Despite the express warning by the trial court
during the penultimate setting on June 30, 2006, the OSG and BOC still failed to attend the next scheduled setting.
Despite the leeway and opportunity given by the trial court, it seemed that the OSG and BOC did not accord
proper importance to the pre-trial conference.

PRE-TRIAL, to stress, is way more than simple marking of evidence. Hence, it should not be ignored or
neglected, as the counsels for respondent had. In Tolentino v. Laurel, this Court has this to say on the matter of
importance of pre-trial:

In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, the Court held that pre-
trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it
serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not
indeed its dispensation. The Court said that:

The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be overemphasized. In Balatico v. Rodriguez, the Court,
citing

Tiu v. Middleton, delved on the significance of pre-trial, thus:

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was
discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and
the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as “the most important procedural innovation in
Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century,” pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of

dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to
avoid unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

5. LBL Industries v. City of Lapu-Lapu, 705 SCRA 688 (2013)

COMPLAINT: Expropriation
WHO ALLEGEDLY FAILED? City
FACTS:
1. LBL Industries owns 40K sqm of land in Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City.
a. In 2006, the City filed a Complaint for Expropriation before the RTC. It wanted to expropriate around
2.7K sqm for its road opening project. Upon deposit of 15% of the land’s FMV, the City took possession of
the property.
2. LBL filed its Answer to the Complied with an attached Board Resolution and Sec Cert authoring one Elsie
Marino to commence any action or file any pleadings necessary for the case.
a. Additionally, LBL filed a Motion to Conduct a Joint Survey and Set Case for Pre-trial.
b. RTC then issued 2 Orders dated July 2006 and March 2007 directing the Clerk of Court the issuance of a
Writ of Possession. However, the Clerk failed to comply.
3. In 2008, LBL moved to dismiss the case alleging that the City failed to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time considering that the City did not move for the setting of the case for pre-trial.
a. In its defense, the City claimed that the reason for the delay was that it was waiting for the RTC’s
resolution over the motion to Conduct a Joint Survey and Set Case for Pre-trial.
4. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that the City cannot be faulted for the delay.
a. MR was likewise denied and it was included in the dispositive part a third order to the Clerk of Court to
issue a Writ of Possession.
5. CA: On appeal, LBL attached a Sec Cert authorizing one Roberto Sison along with Elsie Marino to file the
pleadings.
a. CA dismissed the appeal because no Board Resolution authorizing Sison was attached.
b. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
HELD: NO. THE FAULT WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CLERK OF COURT AND THE RTC IN DELAYING ITS DECISION
OVER THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET FOR PRE-TRIAL.

While the Court considered that Sison was indeed authorized, it nonetheless ruled that the petition is bereft of
merit because the RTC correctly denied LBL’s Motion to Dismiss.

Sec. 1, Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, reads:

Sec. 1. When conducted. — After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty
of the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.

Related to the above section is Sec. 3 of Rule 17, which states:

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, x x x the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion x x x.

Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after
the last pleading is served and filed. With this in mind, We have, in several cases, ruled that the plaintiffs
omission to promptly move that the case be set for pre -trial is a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint due to his fault, particularly for failing to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time,
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17.

The parties, as well as the courts below, however, failed to consider that the aforequoted Sec. 1 of Rule 18
had already been superseded by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, which took effect on August 16, 2004, Item 1.2 of
which states:
I. PRETRIAL A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.2 x x x Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file
said motion within the given period, the Branch [Clerk of Court] shall issue a
notice of pre-trial.

Thus, the present rule is that if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial within 5 days
from the filing of a reply, the duty to set the case for pre-trial falls upon the branch clerk of court.
However, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently.

For a plaintiff (City of Lapu-Lapu) to be excused from its burden to promptly prosecute its case , it must
convince the court that its failure to do so was due to justifiable reasons. If the neglect is justified, then a
dismissal of the case on said ground is not warranted.

A consideration of the events that transpired in the said expropriation case readily shows that the delay cannot
solely be attributed to the City of Lapu-Lapu but is in fact due to the failure of the branch clerk of court
to set the case for pre-trial pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, as well as the trial court’s delay in
resolving LBL’s Motion to Conduct Joint Survey and Set the Case for Pre-Trial.

We find good reason to believe the City’s assertion that it acted in good faith when it did not move to
set the case for pre-trial, since LBL already moved for the pre-trial setting. Another motion from
respondent can be simply repetitive of petitioner’s earlier motion.

The Court, however, is mindful of LBL’s predicament that the delay in the resolution of the expropriation case and
the City’s continued occupation and enjoyment of the subject property for more than half a decade is extremely
disadvantageous and prejudicial to said corporation without any payment of just compensation. To prevent further
damage to LBL, the trial court is directed to immediately resolve its Motion to Conduct Joint Survey, set the case
for pre-trial, and take all appropriate measures to expedite the resolution of said case.
XVII. INTERVENTION (RULE 19)
RULE 19
Intervention
Section 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed
to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding. (2[a], [b]a, R12)
Section 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties. (n)
Section 3. Pleadings-in-intervention. — The intervenor shall file a complaint-in-intervention if he asserts a claim
against either or all of the original parties, or an answer-in-intervention if he unites with the defending party in
resisting a claim against the latter. (2[c]a, R12)
Section 4. Answer to complaint-in-intervention. — The answer to the complaint-in-intervention shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
(2[d]a, R12)

Q: What are the requisites for an intervention by a non-party in an action pending in court? (2000 Bar)
A: The requisites for Intervention are:
a. Legal interest in the matter in controversy; or
b. Legal interest In the success of either of the parties; or
c. Legal interest against both; or
d. So situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof.
e. Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of original parties;
f. Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected In a separate proceeding (Acenas II v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
107762, August 29, 1995; Sec. 1, Rule 19).

1. Looyuko v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001

COMPLAINT: 3 Complaints; Foreclosure
WHO INTEREVENED: Looyuko and Gutang (Creditors/Assignees of Sps. Mendoza)
WAS IT ALLOWED? No becauseit was made after judgment
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. These consolidated cases involve a house and lot in Mandaluyong previously owned by Sps. Mendoza where
various creditors and assignees are contesting the property.
2. LOOYUKO AND UY V. SPS. MENDOZA
a. Looyuko and Uy won. As a result, RTC issued a writ of execution on the property and was later sold at
public auction to Looyuko and Uy as the highest bidders. The Register of Deeds issued a TCT in their
name.
3. GUTANG V. MENDOZA
a. In this Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages, Gutang won and successfully caused to be annotated
on the TCT a notice of levy on execution. The property was sold at public auction in favor of Gutang.
Later, TCT was issued in his name.
4. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION V. MENDOZA
a. FGU filed an action against Sps. Mendoza in the RTC of Manila by reason of the failure of Sps. Mendoza to
satisfy their obligation secured by a real estate mortgage over said property. Mendoza filed an Answer but
failed to appear during pretrial. So, they were declared as in default and evidence was received ex
parte.
b. RTC then ruled in favor of FGU.
i. No appeal was taken and the decision became final and executory.
ii. Upon issuance of the writ of execution, the property was sold at public auction with FGU as highest
bidder.
5. However, before a TCT was issued in FGU’s favor, Gutang filed a Motion in Intervention arguing that they are
new registered owners of said property.
6. RTC allowed the motion and set aside the decision.
a. MR denied.
7. CA: FGU went up the CA on certiorari contending that the motion for intervention should not be allowed
considering that the decision is already final and executory.
a. In the CA, Looyuko et al filed an Urgent Motion Praying for Leave to File a Motion for Intervention alleging
they were attachment creditors which was allowed.
b. Thereafter, CA denied the Motion for Internvention. Hence, this petition.
c. Looyuko et al contend that they were deprived of due process when they were not allowed to
intervene.

ISSUE: Were the Motions for Intervention filed by Gutang and Looyuko proper considering that the case was
already final and executory? NO, the case was terminated by final judgment. Unless they were indispensable
parties which they were not.

DOCTRINE:
Then Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, the law prevailing at the time, reads as follows:
Intervention. — A person may, before or during a trial be permitted by the court, in its discretion,
to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation , or in the
success of either of the parties , or an interest against both, or when he is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof.

None of the grounds underscored above are present to warrant their intervention. Accordingly, we assume for
purposes of discussion that the action was indeed for the foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject property.
The rule stated above also requires that a motion for intervention should be made “before or during a trial.”
Because of varying interpretations of the phrase, the present Rules have clarified that the motion should be filed
“any time before rendition of judgment.”

In the present case, the motions for intervention were filed when the case was already final and executory.
Certainly, AFTER JUDGMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN RENDERED, indeed intervention can no longer be
allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.

Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action , and not an
independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between
the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the
intervention may be based. Here, there is no more pending principal action wherein the Spouses Gutang and
Looyuko, et al. may intervene.

In EXCEPTIONAL CASES, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment
by the trial court. In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, intervention was allowed even when the petition for
review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. Recently in Mago vs.
Court of Appeals, the Court granted intervention despite the case having become final and executory.

It must be noted, however, that in both these cases, the intervenors were INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. This
is not so in the case at bar. Section 1, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court requires all persons having or claiming an
interest in the premises subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made defendants in the action
for foreclosure.
Sps. Gutang argued that they should be allowed to intervene because they have subordinate lien. SC said, no,
because subordinate lien is subordinate to superior lien.

2. Limpo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124582, July 16, 2000

COMPLAINT: Civilly liable in Estafa and BP 22 > Petition to Surrender TCT > Petition for issuance of a
writ of possession
WHO INTEREVENED: Sps. Bulalong as Mortgagor
WAS IT ALLOWED? No, because it was raised filed after appeal is submitted for resolution. It took 5
years delay (laches)

QUICKIE FACTS:

1. Despite having been acquitted for charges of estafa and violations of BP 22, Limbo was adjudged to be civilly
liable to Veronica Gonzales in the amount of P275K by the RTC of Malolos.
a. This decision became final and executory. To enforce said judgment, Gonzales caused the issuance of a
Writ of Execution.
b. Pursuant to this, parcels of land registered in Limpo’s name were levied upon. Said properties were
likewise sold to Gonzales after an auction sale. Later on, Gonzales was able to cause new TCTs to be
issued in her favor.
c. A dispute arose on account of Limpo’s refusal to vacate the premises. This dispute reached the SC.
2. While the case was pending deliberation in the SC, spouses Bulaong filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene alleging that they have an interest in the parcels of land in question.
a. They claim that as early as 1993, the Limpos mortgaged the lands to them for 4.3M and that said
mortgage was annotated on the TCT.

DOCTRINE:

Intervention cannot be allowed at this late stage of this case. Intervention may be granted only where its
allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties to a case.

Generally, it will be allowed “before rendition of judgment by the trial court,” as Rule 19, §2 expressly
provides. After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted. Certainly it cannot be
allowed on appeal without unduly delaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties.

Indeed, there is no justification for granting the motion for the intervention of the spouses Bulaong which
they filed only on April 25, 2000, after the appeal in this case had already been submitted for
resolution, when they could have done so earlier.

The result of all this is that the spouses Bulaong, knowing Gonzales’ interest in the properties in conflict
with theirs, could have sought to intervene much earlier and not only now on appeal. It took them
nearly 5 years from March 29, 1995, when Gonzales filed a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, before
filing their motion for leave to intervene in this case. Such delay amounts to laches and justifies the denial of
their motion. Allowance of intervention at this late stage would unduly delay the resolution of the appeal as trial
would be conducted anew to allow the spouses Bulaong to present evidence in support of their claim of ownership.

3. Asian Terminals v. Ricafort, G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006

COMPLAINT: Replevin
WHO INTEREVENED: ATI
WAS IT ALLOWED? Yes, but the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. A shipment of secondhand buses from Japan arrived in the Port of Manila. However, Customs impounded the
vehicles and ordered them stored at Asian Terminals Inc’s (ATI) warehouse.
a. As a result, the importers filed a Complaint for Replevin in the RTC of Paranaque with prayer of the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction. RTC granted the Writ of Replevin.
b. BOC, through the OSG, filed an MR contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction over vehicles subjected to
seizure by the BOC.
2. ATI then filed a Motion for Intervention and for Admission of its Complaint-in-Intervention alleging
that it had a lien on the vehicles.
3. RTC then dismissed the Complaint stating that it had no jurisdiction over the case.
a. Likewise, the RTC dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention.
b. ATI filed an MR which was however denied.
4. CA: On certiorari, CA likewise denied ATI’s petition. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
a. ATI claims it has legal interest and dismissal of action should not necessarily dismiss the ancillary action.

DOCTRINE:

Section 602 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that the Bureau of Customs shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over seized and forfeited cars. It is tasked to enforce tariff, and supervise and control customs law
and all other laws, rules and regulations relating to the tariff and customs administration; and to supervise and
control all import and export cargoes, loaded or stored in piers, terminal facilities, including container yards and
freight stations, for the protection of government revenues.

As the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass
upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of
Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods.
Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein ,
issue the writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and
set the sale thereof at public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset.
By granting the plea of respondents (plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to
the court, the RTC acted without jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof.

The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing ATI’s complaint-inintervention. Considering that it had no
jurisdiction over respondents’ action and over the shipment subject of the complaint , all proceedings
before it would be void. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act
thereon except to dismiss the same.

Moreover, considering that intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation
and never an independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the
dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action
has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention. Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.

4. Salas Jr. v. Aguila, 706 SCRA 252 (2013)

COMPLAINT: Nullity of marriage, partition of proprty
WHO INTEREVENED: Rubina Salas
WAS IT ALLOWED? No because she has no legal interest

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Juan S. Salas and Eden Aguila were married. Months after Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Salas left the
conjugal dwelling and no longer communicated with Aguila.
a. Years later, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on account of psychological
incapacity.
b. In her Petition, she stated that they “have no conjugal properties.” Then, RTC declared the null ity of the
marriage.
2. Then, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion that she discovered parcels of land in QC and Tondo registered
under “Juan S Salas, married to Rubina Salas.”
a. Salas opposed arguing that Aguila’s statement was a judicial admission and was not made through
palpable mistake.
3. RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. Then, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention and claimed that said
properties were her paraphernal properties.
a. Also she claimed that her brother was the one who registered the properties in the name of “Juan S.
Salas, married to Rubina Salas.”
4. CA: On appeal, CA affirmed.

DOCTRINE:

On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention
unmeritorious. The TCTs state that “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas” is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to,
because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. The phrase “married to” is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of
the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that
Salas supported Rubina’s statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.

Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has
no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only “a person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.”

The partition of co-ownership is sustained.

5. Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, 705 SCRA 392 (2013)

COMPLAINT: Abatement of Nuisance and Injunction
WHO INTEREVENED: Court was asked to intervene
WAS IT ALLOWED? No, because the precondition to judicial intervention is the exhaustion of admin
remedies (HLURB)

QUICKIE FACTS:
1.
1. Florentino Sebastian agreed to lease to Smart a piece of vacant lot. Smart immediately constructed and
installed a cellular base station on said property.
a. Within said base station is a communications tower rising 150 ft high with antennas and transmitters.
There was also a power house open on 3 sides with a diesel power generator.
b. Close to said base station are houses, hospitals clinics, and establishments including properties of Aldecoa
et al.
2. Aldecoa et al filed in the RTC a Complaint against Smart for Abatement of Nuisance and Injunction with TRO.
a. Smart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment since full blown trial is not needed when there is no issue
as to the any material facts or COA of Aldecoa.
b. RTC granted the motion
3. It was alleged that said base station is susceptible to collapse, emits noxious and deleterious fumes, radiates
ultra high frequency radio waves emissions, and violates the law by constructing a tower without the
necessary public hearing, permit, and other requirements of the NTC.
a. Moreover, they stated that judicial intervention is needed to ensure that death, injuries, and
damage will not happen.
 b. On the other hand, Smart denied.
4. RTC ruled in Smart’s favor and dismissed the complaint.
5. On appeal, CA declared the base station a nuisance. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE:
Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the
validity or nullity of petitioner’s locational clearance for its cellular base station.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were explained at
length by the Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.

Court of Appeals, as follows:

The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the
court’s power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal
reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for
speedier disposition of controversies . Our courts of justice for reason of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.

In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed
administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative
body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the
same correctly.

The Court again discussed the said principle and doctrine in Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social
Organization, Inc. v.
Megaworld Properties & Holdings, Inc., et al.citing Republic v. Lacap, to wit:

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should
first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of
the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

The HLURB is the planning, regulatory, and quasi-judicial instrumentality of government for land use
development. In the exercise of its mandate to ensure rational land use by regulating land development, it issued
HLURB Resolution No. R -626, series of 1998, Approving the Locational Guidelines for Base Stations of Cellular
Mobile Telephone Service, Paging Service, Trunking Service, Wireless Loop Service and Other Wireless
Communication Services (HLURB Guidelines). Said HLURB Guidelines aim to protect “providers and users, as well
as the public in general while ensuring efficient and responsive communication services.”

There is no showing that respondents availed themselves of the aforementioned administrative

remedies prior to instituting Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 before the RTC. While there are accepted
exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
respondents never asserted nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply the
exceptions instead of the general rule to this case.

MODES OF DISCOVERY
RULE 23
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTIONS
1. Discovery – device employed by a party to obtain information
2. Deposition – written testimony of the witness
3. Difference from affidavit – affidavit is ex parte, no cross-examination; not admissible in evidence (XPN:
summary procedure)
4. Classification of Depositions:
a. D on oral examination
b. D on written interrogation
c. D de bene esse – pending action (R23)
d. D in perpetuam rei memoriam – on appeal (R24)

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.

By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the
subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a
subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The
deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.
1. When?
a. By leave of court - before service of answer, but after jurisdiction over the defendant/property is acquired
i. Reason: issue not yet joined, and facts are not clear
b. Without leave – after service of answer
2. Whose? the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party
3. Modes
a. D on oral examination
b. D on written interrogation
4. Attendance of witnesses: by subpoena

Sec. 2. Scope of examination.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by section 16 or 18 of this Rule, the deponent may
be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending
action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
1. Any matter
a. XPN: Privilege communication
i. Husband and wife
ii. Atty and client
iii. Dr and patient
iv. Minister and penitent
v. Communications made to public officer in official confidence
b. Other privileged communication
i. Voters
ii. Bank deposits
iii. Editors in source
iv. Trade secrets
v. Tax census return
2. Relevant to the subject
3. Under limitations of sec 16 and 18

Sec. 3. Examination and cross-examination.

Examination and cross-examination of deponents may proceed as permitted at the trial under sections
3 to 18 of Rule 132.

Sec. 4. Use of depositions.

At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding , any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof , in accordance
with any one of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a
party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if
the court finds:
(1) that the witness is dead; or
(2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition; or
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or
(4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena; or
(5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the
testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to
introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other
parts.
1. Where D may be used:
a. Trial
b. Hearing of motion
 c. Hearing of interlocutory proceeding
2. Against whom D may be used:
a. Party present at time of its (D) taking
b. Party represented at time of its taking
c. Party Notified of its taking
3. USE of D:
Deponent Used by Purpose
Any person who is not a party any party contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of deponent as a
witness
a party or of any one who at the an adverse party any purpose
time of taking the deposition was
an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private
corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party
witness, whether or not a party any party Any purpose if the deponent is not
available due to (DROUSE):
1. Dead
2. Resides more than 100km from
place of trial
3. Out of Ph
4. Unable to attend bec. of age,
sickness, infirmity, imprisonment
5. Subpoena, party offering
deposition unable to
6. Exceptional circumstance

Sec. 5. Effect of substitution of parties.

Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions previously taken; and, when an
action has been dismissed and another action involving the same subject is afterward brought between
the same parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and
duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor.

Sec. 6. Objections to admissibility.

Subject to the provisions of section 29 of this Rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing to
receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion
of the evidence if the witness were then present and testifying.

Sec. 7. Effect of taking depositions.

A party shall not be deemed to make a person his own witness for any purpose by taking his
deposition.
Sec. 8. Effect of using depositions.
The introduction in evidence of the deposition or any part thereof for any purpose other than that of
contradicting or impeaching the deponent makes the deponent the witness of the party introducing the
deposition, but this shall not apply to the use by an adverse party of a deposition as described in
paragraph (b) of section 4 of this Rule.
1. Effect of taking D: taking D of a person does not make him a witness of the party taking his D (S7)
2. Effect of using D: (S8_
a. GR: introduction of D binds the party who introduces it
b. XPN: does not bind when
i. D is introduced to impeach or contradict the witness
ii. D is the D of an opposing party

Sec. 9. Rebutting deposition.

At the trial or hearing, any party may rebut any relevant evidence contained in a deposition whether
introduced by him or by any other party.

Sec. 10. Persons before whom depositions may be taken within the Philippines.
Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any judge, notary public, or the person
referred to in section 14 hereof.
Sec. 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries.
In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b)
before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the
person referred to in section 14 hereof.
Sec. 13. Disqualification by interest.
No deposition shall be taken before a person who is a relative within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or employee or counsel of any of the parties; or who is a relative within the same degree, or
employee of such counsel; or who is financially interested in the action.
Sec. 14. Stipulations regarding taking of depositions.
If the parties so stipulate in writing, depositions may be taken before any person authorized to
administer oaths, at any time or place, in accordance with these Rules, and when so taken may be used
like other depositions.
1. Before whom taken
a. S10 within Ph
i. Judge
ii. Notary Public
 iii. Any person authorized to administer oaths, if parties stipulate so in writing (S.14)
b. S.11 Outside Ph
i. secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines
ii. such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory
iii. S.14
2. S.13 No D shall be taken before a person who is:
a. Relative (6th degree)
b. Employee/counsel of any of the parties
c. Such Counsel’s Relative within same degree or employee
d. Financially interested in the action

Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory.

A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient, on application and
notice, and on such terms and with such direction as are just and appropriate. Officers may be
designated in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and letters rogatory may be
addressed to the appropriate judicial authority in the foreign country.
1. Commission – instrument issued by court/tribunal to authorize a person to take D
2. Letters Rogatory – instrument sent in the name of court to another requesting him to examine a witness
a. Issued only after commission had been returned unexecuted.
COMMISSION LETTER ROGATORY
TO WHOM ISSUED Non-judicial foreign officer Judicial foreign officer
APPLICABLE RULES Requesting Court (Ph) Foreign Court
WHEN RESORTED Foreign country gave permission If execution of commission is
refused in foreign country
LEAVE OF COURT No Yes

Sec. 15. Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place.
A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable
notice in writing to every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking
the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is
not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he
belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown
enlarge or shorten the time.
1. Notice is required to other party in taking D of any person upon oral exam
2. Notice
a. Time and place of taking D
b. Name and address of witness (if not known, general description sufficient to identify him.

Sec. 16. Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. PROTECTION ORDER
After notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by
any party or by the person to be examined and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some
designated place other than that stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only on written
interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination
shall be held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel, or that
after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret processes,
developments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the
court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance,
embarrassment, or oppression.
1. Court may order the following as means of protection (after notice of taking D is served):
a. the deposition shall not be taken, or
b. that it may be taken only at some designated place other than that stated in the notice, or
c. that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or
d. that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or
e. that the scope of the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the action and
their officers or counsel, or
f. that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or
g. that secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or
h. that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or
i. the court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.

Sec. 17. Record of examination; oath; objections.

The officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on oath and shall
personally, or by some one acting under his direction and in his presence, record the testimony of the
witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically unless the parties agree otherwise. All
objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of the officer taking the
deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party,
and any other objection to the proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evidence
objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral examination,
parties served with notice of taking a deposition may transmit written interrogatories to the officers,
who shall propound them to the witness and record the answers verbatim.
Sec. 20. Certification and filing by officer.
The officer shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn to by him and that the
deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness. He shall then securely seal the
deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of the action and marked "Deposition of (here insert
the name of witness)" and shall promptly file it with the court in which the action is pending or send it
by registered mail to the clerk thereof for filing.
Sec. 21. Notice of filing.
The officer taking the deposition shall give prompt notice of its filing to all the parties.
Sec. 22. Furnishing copies.
Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall furnish a copy of the deposition to any
party or to the deponent.
1. Duties of Officer taking D upon oral examination
a. S17 Put the witness on oath
b. S17 Record the testimony stenographically (unless parties agree otherwise)
c. S17 Note all objections made
d. S20 Certify on the D that:
i. Witness was duly sworn to by him
ii. D is a true record of the testimony given by the witness
e. S20 Secure the seal the D in an envelope
f. S20 Promptly file it with the court
g. S21 Give prompt notice of its filing to all parties
h. S22 Furnish a copy of the D upon payment of fees

Sec. 18. Motion to terminate or limit examination.

At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion or petition of any party or of the deponent
and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the action is
pending or the Regional Trial Court of the place where the deposition is being taken may order the
officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the
scope and manner of the taking of the deposition, as provided in section 16 of this Rule . If the order
made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of the court in
which the action is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the
deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make a notice for an order. In granting or
refusing such order, the court may impose upon either party or upon the witness the requirement to
pay such costs or expenses as the court may deem reasonable.
1. On motion, RTC may order the officer to
a. Terminate the taking of D
b. Limit examination as provided in S. 16
2. If the examination is conducted in:
a. Bad faith
b. Such manner to annoy, embarrass, oppress the deponent or party
c. Inquiry touches irrelevant or the privilege communication
d. Self-incrimination is invoked
3. Where to file this motion:
a. Court where the action is pending
b. RTC where D is being taken
PROTECTION ORDER S.16 M TO TERMINATE/LIMIT
EXAMINATION
Purpose Protection before taking of D Protection during taking of D
Where filed Court where action is pending a. Court where the action is
pending
b. RTC where D is being taken

Sec. 19. Submission to witness; changes; signing.

When the testimony is fully transcribed, the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for
examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and reading are waived by the
witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall
be entered upon the deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for
making them. The deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation
waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not
signed by the witness, the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the waiver or of the
illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together with the reason given
therefor, if any, and the deposition may then be used as fully as though signed, unless on a motion to
suppress under section 29 (f) of this Rule, the court holds that the reasons given for the refusal to sign
require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.

Sec. 23. Failure to attend of party giving notice.

If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to attend and proceed therewith and
another attends in person or by counsel pursuant to the notice, the court may order the party giving
the notice to pay such other party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by him and his
counsel in so attending, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
Sec. 24. Failure of party giving notice to serve subpoena.
If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition of a witness fails to serve a subpoena upon
him and the witness because of such failure does not attend, and if another party attends in person or
by counsel because he expects the deposition of that witness to be taken, the court may order the
party giving the notice to pay to such other party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by
him and his counsel in so attending, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
1. S23
a. Party giving notice of the taking of deposition fails to attend and proceed therewith
b. Another attends in person or by counsel pursuant to the notice
2. S24
a. Party giving notice of the taking of deposition fails to serve a subpoena upon him
b. The witness does not attend because of such failure
c. Another attends in person or by counsel
3. Penalty for S24 and S25 pay expenses including atty fee

Sec. 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories.
A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them
upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer
them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be
taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the
party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct
interrogatories upon a party who has served cross- interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being
served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition.
1. A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall
a. serve them upon every other party
b. with a notice stating
i. the name and address of the person who is to answer them and
ii. the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken.
2. When served
a. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition.
b. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who has served
cross- interrogatories.
c. Within three (3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

Sec. 26. Officers to take responses and prepare record.

A copy of the notice and copies of all interrogatories served shall be delivered by the party taking the
deposition to the officer designated in the notice, who shall proceed promptly, in the manner provided
by sections 17, 19 and 20 of this Rule, to take the testimony of the witness in response to the
interrogatories and to prepare, certify, and file or mail the deposition, attaching thereto the copy of the
notice and the interrogatories received by him.

Sec. 27. Notice of filing and furnishing copies.

When a deposition upon interrogatories is filed, the officer taking it shall promptly give notice thereof
to all the parties, and may furnish copies to them or to the deponent upon payment of reasonable
charges therefor.

Sec. 28. Orders for the protection of parties and deponents.

After the service of the interrogatories and prior to the taking of the testimony of the deponent, the
court in which the action is pending, on motion promptly made by a party or a deponent, and for good
cause shown, may make
1. any order specified in sections 15, 16 and 18 of this Rule which is appropriate and just or
2. an order that
a. the deposition shall not be taken before the officer designated in the notice or that
b. it shall not be taken except upon oral examination.

Sec. 29. Effects of errors and irregularities in depositions.

(a) As to notice.- All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a deposition are waived unless
written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice.
(b) As to disqualification of officer.- Objection to taking a deposition because of disqualification of the
officer before whom it is to be taken is waived unless made before the taking of the deposition begins
or as soon thereafter as the disqualification becomes known or could be discovered with reasonable
diligence.
(c) As to competency or relevancy of evidence.- Objections to the competency of a witness or the
competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or
during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been
obviated or removed if presented at that time.
(d) As to oral examination and other particulars.- Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral
examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the
oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of the parties and errors of any kind which might be obviated,
removed, or cured if promptly prosecuted, are waived unless reasonable objection thereto is made at
the taking of the deposition.
(e) As to form of written interrogatories.- Objections to the form of written interrogatories submitted
under sections 25 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless served in writing upon the party propounding
them within the time allowed for serving succeeding cross or other interrogatories and within three (3)
days after service of the last interrogatories authorized.
(f) As to manner of preparation.- Errors and irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is
transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, indorsed, transmitted, filed, or
otherwise dealt with by the officer under sections 17, 19, 20 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless a
motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with reasonable promptness after such
defect is, or with due diligence might have been, ascertained.

RULE 24
DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING
APPEAL.
Section 1. Depositions before action; petition.
A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another person regarding any matter
that may be cognizable in any court of the Philippines, may file a verified petition in the court of the
place of the residence of any expected adverse party.
1. D in perpetuam rei memoriam is availed when a person desires to perpetuate:
a. His own testimony or
b. That of another person
2. The perpetuation of testimony is filed by a verified petition in the place of residence of the adverse party

Sec. 2. Contents of petition.

The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show:
(a) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action in a court of the Philippines but is presently
unable to bring it or cause it to be brought;
(b) the subject matter of the expected action and his interest therein;
(c) the facts which he desires to establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for desiring to
perpetuate it;
(d) the names or a description of the persons he expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so
far as known; and
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which
he expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the
depositions of the persons to be examined named in the petition for the purpose of perpetuating their
testimony.

Sec. 3. Notice and service.

The petitioner shall serve a notice upon each person named in the petition as an expected adverse
party, together with a copy of the petition, stating that the petitioner will apply to the court, at a time
and place named therein, for the order described in the petition. At least twenty (20) days before the
date of the hearing, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served on the parties and prospective
deponents in the manner provided for service of summons.

Sec. 4. Order and examination.

If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice,
it shall make an order designating or describing the persons whose deposition may be taken and
specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with Rule 23
before the hearing.
1. If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice, it shall
make an order:
a. designating or describing the persons whose deposition may be taken and
b. specifying the subject matter of the examination and
c. whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
2. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with Rule 23 before the hearing.

Sec. 5. Reference to court.

For the purpose of applying Rule 23 to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each reference therein
to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which the petition
for such deposition was filed.

Sec. 6. Use of deposition.

If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under this Rule, or if, although not so taken, it would
be admissible in evidence, it may be used in any action involving the same subject matter subsequently
brought in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 23.

Sec. 7. Depositions pending appeal.

If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a court, including the Court of Appeals in proper cases,
or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the court in which the judgment
was rendered may allow the taking of depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use in
the event of further proceedings in the said court. In such case the party who desires to perpetuate the
testimony may make a motion in the said court for leave to take the depositions, upon the same notice
and service thereof as if the action was pending therein. The motion shall state (a) the names and
addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit
from each; and (b) the reason for perpetuating their testimony. If the court finds that the perpetuation
of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may make an order allowing the
depositions to be taken, and thereupon the depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and
under the same conditions as are prescribed in these Rules for depositions taken in pending actions.
1. The court in which the judgment was rendered may allow taking of D:
a. If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a court, including the Court of Appeals in proper cases,
b. before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired
2. The party who desires to perpetuate D may make a motion
3. The motion shall state:
a. Names and addresses of persons to be examined
b. Substance of testimony
c. Reason for perpetuating their testimony
4. Court may order allowing D to be taken if the perpetuation is proper to avoid failure or delay.

RULE 25
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
Section 1. Interrogatories to parties; service thereof.
Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any party desiring to elicit material and
relevant facts from any adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be
answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership
or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf.
1. Interrogatories to parties is availed by filing and serving
2. If juridical entity, the written interrogatories shall be answered aby any competent officers in its behalf
3. When?
a. By leave of court - before service of answer, but after jurisdiction over the defendant/property is acquired
i. Reason: issue not yet joined, and facts are not clear
b. Without leave – after service of answer

Sec. 2. Answer to interrogatories.

The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person
making them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall file and serve a copy of
the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service thereof,
unless the court, on motion and for good cause shown, extends or shortens the time.
1. Answer:
a. Fully in writing
b. Signed and sworn by the person making them
2. When: within 15 days after service.
3. Answers cannot be made by an agent or atty; effect if answer bot by parties = null
4. Judgment by default may be rendered against a party who fails to serve is answer to written interrogatories.

Sec. 3. Objections to interrogatories.

Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within ten (10) days after service
thereof, with notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be deferred until the objections are
resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable.

Sec. 4. Number of interrogatories.

No party may, without leave of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be answered by the
same party.

Sec. 5. Scope and use of interrogatories.

Interrogatories may relate to any matters that can be inquired into under section 2 of Rule 23, and the
answers may be used for the same purposes provided in section 4 of the same Rule.

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party
not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in
open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
1. GR: party may not be compelled to give testimony
2. XPN: allowed by court
a. For good cause shown
b. To prevent a failure of justice

RULE 26
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY
Section 1. Request for admission.
At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document
described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact
set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have
already been furnished.
1. Party may file and serve upon other party a request to:
a. Admit the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request or
b. Admit the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
2. When may file and serve request:
a. Any time after issues have been joined

Sec. 2. Implied admission.

Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a
period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or
within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed
files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically
the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested within
the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding
paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are resolved, which
resolution shall be made as early as practicable.
1. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such
further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon
the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either:
a. denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
b. setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
2. Deferment of compliance
 a. May be effected by filing objections to any request for admission to the court.

Sec. 3. Effect of admission.

Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending action only
and shall not constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same be used against
him in any other proceeding.

Sec. 4. Withdrawal.
The court may allow the party making an admission under this Rule, whether express or implied, to
withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be just.

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission.

Unless otherwise allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party
who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the adverse party of material and relevant facts
at issue which are, or ought to be, within the personal knowledge of the latter, shall not be permitted
to present evidence on such facts.
1. GR: party shall not be permitted to present evidence
2. XPN: allowed by court
c. For good cause shown
d. To prevent a failure of justice

RULE 27
PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may
(a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf
of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or
(b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated
relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are
just.

RULE 28
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS
Section 1. When examination may be ordered.
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which
the action is pending may in its discretion order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
physician.

Sec. 2. Order for examination.

The order for examination may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the
party to be examined and to all other parties, and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions and
scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.

Sec. 3. Report of findings.

If requested by the party examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver to him
a copy of a detailed written report of the examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions.
After such request and delivery, the party causing the examination to be made shall be entitled upon
request to receive from the party examined a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter
made, of the same mental or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report,
the court on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and if a
physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his testimony if offered at the
trial.

Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege.

By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by taking the deposition of the
examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving
the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may
thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical examination.

RULE 29
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY
Section 1. Refusal to answer.
If a party or other deponent refuses to answer any question upon oral examination, the examination
may be completed on other matters or adjourned as the proponent of the question may prefer. The
proponent may thereafter apply to the proper court of the place where the deposition is being taken,
for an order to compel an answer. The same procedure may be availed of when a party or a witness
refuses to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rules 23 or 25.
If the application is granted, the court shall require the refusing party or deponent to answer the
question or interrogatory and if it also finds that the refusal to answer was without substantial
justification, it may require the refusing party or deponent or the counsel advising the refusal, or both
of them, to pay the proponent the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order,
including attorney’s fees.
If the application is denied and the court finds that it was filed without substantial justification, the
court may require the proponent or the counsel advising the filing of the application, or both of them,
to pay to the refusing party or deponent the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing
the application, including attorney’s fees.

Sec. 2. Contempt of court.

If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer any question after being directed
to do so by the court of the place in which the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered
a contempt of that court.

Sec. 3. Other consequences.

If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under section 1
of this Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an order under Rule 27 to produce any
document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to
permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 28 requiring him to submit to a
physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just,
and among others the following:
(a) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked, or the character or
description of the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or the physical or mental condition of the
party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents or things or items of
testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or mental condition;
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party; and
(d) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order directing the arrest of any
party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination.

Sec. 4. Expenses on refusal to admit.

If a party after being served with a request under Rule 26 to admit the genuineness of any document
or the truth of any matter of fact, serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of such document or the truth of any such matter of fact,
he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses
incurred in making such proof, including attorney’s fees. Unless the court finds that there were good
reasons for the denial or that admissions sought were of no substantial importance, such order shall be
issued.

Sec. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers.

If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to
take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice,
may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay
reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney’s fees.

Sec. 6. Expenses against the Republic of the Philippines.

Expenses and attorney’s fees are not to be imposed upon the Republic of the Philippines under this
Rule.

XIX. DEPOSITION (RULES 23 TO 29)

b. Deposition may be taken anytime after institution of any

action; Uses of Deposition
Jonathan Land Oil v. Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004
DOC: May deposition be taken even if deponent’s name is not included in the Pre Trial Brief? YES
COMPLAINT: Damages filed by Mangudadatu
WHO FILED NOTICE TO TAKE D? JLO to prove that they never received a copy of the Order resolving Motion for
New Trial

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. In a Complaint for Damages filed by Sps. Mangungudatu against JLO, the latter was declared in default for
failure to appear at Pretrial.
a. Thereafter, a decision was rendered against it.
b. As a result, JLO filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue which was also denied.
c. Without having received an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion, JLO received already a copy of
a Writ of Execution.
i. So, JLO filed a Motion to Quash/Recall the Writ of Execution.
2. Meanwhile, JLO’s counsel, Attys. Mario and Peligro withdrew their appearance and were replaced by Ong Abad
Santos & Meneses who filed an Entry of Appearance with a Supplement wherein Attys Mario and Peligro’s
affidavits were attached stating that they had not received the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion.
3. Sps. Mangungudatu filed a Vigorus Opposition wherein there was attached a Certification of the Postmaster
that the Order denying the Omnibus Motion was received by Attys. Mario and Peligro.
a. Thus, JLO served on Spouses Mangudadatu a Notice to Take Deposititon Upon Oral Examination
to prove that they never received a copy of the Order.
4. Then, JLO’s previous Motion to Quash was denied.
a. Consequently, Spouses Mangungudatu moved to Set Auction Sale of JLO’s levied properties.
5. CA: As a result, JLO filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA and argued that since it had not received the
Order denying its Omnibus Motion, the judgment never bécame final and thus would not be subject to a Writ
of Execution.
a. However, CA denied.
b. It ruled that JLO could no longer avail of a deposition since trial had already been terminated.

ISSUE: May JLO avail deposition even if trial had already been terminated? YES, there is no prohibition despite the
fact that trial had already been terminated

DOCTRINE:
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant
or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been
served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for
the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis
during the preparation for trial.
The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is “well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in
good faith and within the bounds of the law.”
Limitations would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.

As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:

(1) It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury.
(2) It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
(3) It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.
(4) It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements out of court.
(5) It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.
(6) It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting the trial.
(7) It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.

The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be
taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies
through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial.

Thus, “[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action , whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it;
no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pretrial .” There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact
have become numerous or complicated.

In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a “departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge.” Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility
exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).

The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended. However, it is
well-settled that this discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised — not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively — but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its
purpose may be attained.

SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE RELIABILITY

The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to object to their admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those for excluding evidence if
the witness were present and had testified in court; and for errors and irregularities in the deposition. As a rule, depositions should be allowed, absent any showing that taking them would prejudice
any party.

USE OF DEPOSITIONS
Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the circumstances specified unde Section 4. The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the
above-cited Section 4(c) (2) of Rule 23 — the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing . Petitioner offered the depositions in
support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final.

As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.

However, the SC did find not reason to disturb the findings of the CA as regards the circumstances surrounding the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.

d. Period to apply for Deposition:

When answer is filed and issues are joined
Rosete v. Lim, June 8, 2006, G.R. No. 136051
DOC: In a criminal case with civil case, may the accused/defendant refuse to give Deposition on the basis of right against self-incrimination? NO, such right applies to criminal case only and may be invoked
particularly.
COMPLAINT: Annulment, Specific Perfromance, and Damages by Lim Against Rosete
WHO FILED FOR NTTD? Lim
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Lim filed a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Perfromance, and Damages against Rosete, AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits Systems, Espreme Realty, etc.
a. It asked that the Deed of Sale covering certain parcels of land be annulled and that ownership be resotred to Lim.
b. Motions to Dismiss were filed but were all denied.
c. Rosete et al manifested that they filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA to challenge the orders denying the Motions to Dismiss.
d. They likewise informed the RTC that they filed an Ex Parte Motion to Admit Answers Ex Abundante Cautela.
2. Thereafter, Lim filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination and gave notice that they will take the deposition of Rosete and Mapalo.
a. Rosete et al filed an Motion and Objection to Take Deposition on the ground that deposition may not be taken without leave of court considering no answer has yet been served and the issues have not
yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abundanti cautela.
3. RTC denied Rosete et al’s Motion and Objection and scheduled the taking of the deposition.
4. They then went up on certiorari to the CA challenging said order but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: May D be taken even when the answer made is an Answer Ex Abundante Cautela? YES, it is still an answer. It contains defenses

DOCTRINE:

Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without
such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23.

Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

From the quoted section, it is evident that once an answer has been served, the testimony of a person, whether a party or not, may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. In the case before us, Rosete et al contend they have not yet served an answer to Lim because the answers that they have filed with the trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words,
they do not consider the answers they filed in court and served on Lim as answers contemplated by the Rules of Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti cautela.

We find Rosete et al’s contention to be untenable. Ex abudanti cautela means “out of abundant caution” or “to be on the safe side.” An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of an
answer. A cursory look at the answers filed by Rosete et al shows that they contain their respective defenses. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses and the failure to file
one within the time allowed herefore may cause a defending party to be declared in default.Thus, petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their answers despite the pendency of
their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial of their motion to dismiss.

Rosete et al’s argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must necessarily fail in light of our ruling that petitioners have filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti cautela.
Issues are joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before the court. In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when
Rosete, as well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and defenses of the parties have been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have been laid down.

Hyatt International v. Ley Construction, G.R. NO. 147143, March 10, 2006
DOC: The court cannot disallow deposition if intent to delay is only alleged(?)
COMPLAINT: Specific Performance and Damages by Ley against Hyatt
WHO FILED NTTD? Ley
ALLOWED? No by RTC; Yes by CA, SC

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. LCDC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages in the RTC of Makati against Hyatt International, Princeton Development, and Yu He Ching (President of Hyatt).
a. LCDC claims that Hyatt reneged on its obligation to transfer 40% of the real property in favor of LCDC even after LCDC’s full payment of the purchase price.
b. Likewise, it was alleged that Hyatt sold said property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC.
2. LCDC filed Notices to Take Depositions of Yu, Go (Account Officer of RCBC), and Sy (Finance Officer of Hyatt). Likewise, Hyatt also filed Notices to Take Depositions of Manuel Ley (President
of LCDC).
3. RTC ordered the depositions to proceed.
a. At the scheduled deposition, Hyatt prayed that depositions be disregarded and instead proceed to Pretrial arguing that the depositions would just delay the proceedings.
 b. RTC agreed and cancelled all scheduled depositions and set the pretrial.
c. Aggrieved, LCDC appealed to the CA which was however dismissed.
4. RTC: During Pretrial, LCDC refused to enter into pretrial.
a. As such, it was declared non-suited and the complaint was dismissed.
b. MR denied.
5. CA: Then, LCDC went up again to the CA to appeal.
a. This time, the appeal was granted and the CA remanded the case to allow depositions to be taken.
b. Hyatt now files this petition.
c. Essentially, they question whether the CA was correct in remanding the case and ordered for deposition-taking to proceed.

DOCTRINE:
The CA was correct in remanding the case to the RTC and ordering the deposition-taking to proceed. A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is
accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged , and the inquiry is
made in good faith and within the bounds of law.

It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the
principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of
court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.The rules on discovery should not be unduly
restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.

Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and
clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures . Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories
to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5
days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or
their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners.

Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to the effectivity of said issuance , however, the depositions sought by LCDC shall be evaluated based on the jurisprudence and rules then prevailing,
particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the
action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these
Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served. LCDC having complied
with the rules then prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling the previously scheduled depositions.

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of
the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege, such circumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.

Hyatt also argues that LCDC has no evidence to support its claims and that it was only after the filing of its Complaint that it started looking for evidence through the modes of discovery. On this point, it is well to
reiterate the Court’s pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan:

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial , such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, “ the deposition-
discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment . No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying
his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.

The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of Elena Sy, the Finance Officer of Hyatt and Pacita Tan Go, an Account Officer of RCBC, may not be obtained at the pre-trial conference, as the
said deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be defined at the pre-trial . Without
such information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in the dark — the very situation which the rules of discovery seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial
less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable.

f. Application of Rule 23 in criminal cases—suppletory only

Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008
DOC: One may use deposition in criminal case, but Rule 119 is followed and not Rule 23.
COMPLAINT: Estafa by Risos against Manguerra
Who filed NTTD? Prosecutor over Manguerra
Allowed? Yes by RTC Makati

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Risos et al were charged with Estafa through Falsification of a Public Document in the RTC of Cebu.
a. It was alleged that Risos et al falsified a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage when they made it appear that Concepcion Manguerra affixed her signature to the document.
b. While in Manila, Concepcion was unexpectedly confined at Makati Med and advised to stay there for futher treatment. Concepcion’s lawyer filed a Motion to Take Deposition of Concepcion.
c. He explained that there was a need to perpetúate her testimony due to her weak physical condition and advanced age.
2. As such, RTC granted the Motion and ordered the deposition of Concepcion before the RTC of Makati.
a. Risos et al’s MR was denied.
b. Thereafter, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken.
3. Aggrieved, Risos et al assailed via certiorari the Order of the RTC allowing deposition-taking.
a. CA granted the petition and declared the deposition taken to be void.
b. It was stated that the Rules governing the examination of the prosecution witness is governed by Sec 15 Rule 119 of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23
c. Thus, the deposition could only be taken before the judge where the case is pending (RTC of Cebu) and not in Makati.
d. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Should the D be taken before the judge where the case is pending? YES, sec 15 R119 is applicable. When too sick, witness for prosecution is conditionally examined before the court where case is pending

DOCTRINE:

It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge . This is ESPECIALLY TRUE IN CRIMINAL CASES in order that the accused may be afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.

This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13, and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.

In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the Manguerra, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
play, and it provides:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court,
or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending . Such examination, in the presence
of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined:

(1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
(2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would
have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.

Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be made BEFORE THE COURT WHERE THE CASE IS PENDING. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted
in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to Manguerra’s contention, there is nothing in
the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in
the present case.

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119
adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.

======================================================================================
a. Deposition taken in another proceeding (R23 S4)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Jose Africa, Imelda Marcos, et al. G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011
DOC: Deposition cannot be used as evidence if it was not subjected to cross-examination of adverse party. This deposition may be opposed by the party under the hearsay rule (Sec. 47 Rule 130). Compliance with
Sec. 4 Rule 23 must be coupled with compliance to.
COMPLAINT: Reconveyance of Shares
WHO HAD D? PCGG (Plaintiff)

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. The Marcoses illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI).
2. The case spawned other cases:
a. Civil case 0130
i. PCGG conducted ETPI Stockholders meeting and a PCGG-controlled directors were elected.
ii. Africa, an ETPI Stockholder, filed a petition for injunction with the SB.
iii. SB ordered to conduct a SH meeting.
iv. PCGG assailed this order of SB.
v. At PCGG’s instance, the testimony of Mr. Maurice Bane, former director of ETPI, was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the
Philippine Embassy in London, England.
vi. PCGG Invoked Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their
answer.
vii. The case reached the SC which ordered SB to receive evidence to determine WON the shares are ill-gotten wealth.
b. Civil case 0009
i. FIRST MOTION: PCGG filed a Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition at the trial
1. SB denied the motion for the reason that said deponents according to the [PCGG] are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents]. (1998 Resolution)
ii. 2ND MOTION: PCGG offered evidence, but failed to include the Bane Deposition. To rectify the omission PCGG filed a Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
1. SB denied the motion because Bane Deposition should be offered in Exhibits and not on judicial notice
iii. 3RD MOTION: Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
1. SB denied the motion because the denial of introduction of Bane Deposition as evidence has become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within
the 15-day reglementary period.

ISSUE: WON the SB erred in refusing to admit Bane Deposition. NO, the Bane deposition is not admissible under the rules of evidence.
A party cannot use D in lieu of actual open testimony before the court. That is a violation of the Rules on Evidence. Reason: opposing party is not afforded opportunity for cross examination. (Hearsay Rule)

DOCTRINE:
I. Preliminary Considerations
(a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.
(b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition
(a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility
(b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under Section 47, Rule 130
(c). Unavailability of witness
(d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of parties; and identity of subject matter
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that:
(1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion – the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was a legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of
discretion;
(2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case at the petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and
(3) notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not admissible under the rules of evidence.

Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its subparagraphs (a) to (d); it also
requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with “the rules on evidence.” Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the Republic failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the
rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.

In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered . This is particularly true in
this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.

A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130 of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.

A DEPOSITION is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

Since depositions are principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open
court of a party or witness . Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.

The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the
hearsay rule — i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the
taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against
him during the trial or hearing of a case . However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former testimony or
deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded. A fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.

This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination afforded an adverse party in usual trials regarding “matters stated in the direct examination or connected therewith.” Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in
the present case where the former testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.

Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was — or would have been — sufficiently
tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so. (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the same. Although some issues may not be the
same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.)
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided
or disregarded.

Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition , taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan
found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as
a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be
taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay , unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is whether
the petitioner complied with the latter rule.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.

(1) The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

(2) The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
(3) Involving the same parties;
(4) Relating to the same matter;
(5) The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony or deposition can be
introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the
prior issue that we must now examine and resolve.

c. Deposition not a substitute for actual testimony

Sales v. Sabino, G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005
DOC: D is not a substitute for testimony in open court. If the Deponent is at hand (malapit lng), his D should not be used. Violation of this would make the D a hearsay.
COMPLAINT: Damages
WHO FILED NOTICE TO TAKE D? Sabino (Plaintiff) to take D of Corral

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Sabino filed a Complaint against Sales, the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Sabino’s son, Elbert.
2. Before any responsive pleading was filed, Sabino notified the Sales that he will take the deposition of one Corral before the RTC.
a. Thus, the deposition on oral examination of Corral was taken in the presence and active participation of Sales’ counsel who even cross-examined Corral.
b. During trial, Sabino had the deposition marked as exhibits.
3. After the presentation of evidence, Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits.
a. Sales opposed the admission.
4. RTC: Nonetheless, the RTC admitted it.
a. MR denied.
5. CA: On certiorari, CA denied.
a. It stated that Sales’ active participation estopped him from assaling the admissibility.
b. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: May the D of Corral be admitted in evidence? yes, because the deponent was not at hand, he was abroad.
GR: D cannot be used as substitute for actual testimony in open court of witness
XPN: DROUSE
DOCTRINE:
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, upon which petitioner mounts his challenge to the admission in evidence of the subject deposition, pertinently reads:

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial . . . any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the
taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(1) that the witness is dead; or
 (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by
the party offering the deposition; or
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
(5) upon application and notice, that such exception circumstances exist and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used.

While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a
deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open
court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent , provided the
existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is
out of the Philippines.

The trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer of his deposition was made. This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves
respect, having been adequately substantiated. As it were, the certification by the Bureau of Immigration provides that evidentiary support. Accordingly, the attribution of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court must be struck down. It has been said to be customary for courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness as a predicate to the use of depositions. Had deponent
Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent to his departure via Flight No. PR 658, petitioner could have presented evidence to show that such was the case . As it is, however, the
petitioner does not even assert the return as a fact, only offering it as a possibility since no contrary proof had been adduced.

In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial
proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging
the admissibility of the deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.

Lest it be overlooked, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, no less, lends support to the conclusion just made. In gist, it provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice,
qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to the
competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition ,
unless they could be obviated at that point.

If not objected before or during the taking of D:

1. As to irregularities in notice, qualification of officer, manner = deemed waived
2. As to competency of witness or testimony = not waived, may be made at trial

e. Non-resident foreign corporation to testify through deposition

Allowed – resides 100km from court
San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. 159127, March 3, 2008
DOC: Use of D of a foreigner is allowed because it is one of the limited purposes enumerated in Rule 23 Sec. 4c, i.e. resides 100km frm court
COMPLAINT: Collection by Berdex against San Luis.
WHO FILED NTTD? Berdex
WHAT KIND? Written

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Suing on an isolated transaction, Berdex International Inc., a corporation based in California, filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Ramon San Luis.
a. It was alleged that San Luis loaned money from Berdex and that San Luis refused to sign the contract of loan.
b. In his defense, San Luis argued that there was no contract of loan.
2. Berdex then filed a Motion to Authorize Deposition Taking through Written Interrogatories stating that all of its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office therein. Likewise, one of the witnesses
was old and could not travel to the Philippines.
3. LT Of San Luis
a. San Luis opposed this saying that it would deprive the court of the right to examine the demeanor of the witnesses.
b. Moreover, he also claimed that this would violate his right to cross-examine the witness.
4. Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA allowed the taking of depositions.
ISSUE: WON Sec 1 of Rule 23 allows a non-resident foreign corporation testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines. YES, because deponents resides 100km away.

DOCTRINE:

Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition . The fact that Berdex is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that
the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts
relative to the issues of the case. The evident purpose is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials
and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark.

In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, where we upheld the right of plaintiff during the trial stage of the case to present its evidence by deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of
their oral examination in court, we said:

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or
proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical
and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the
adverse party and the latter’s own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may
have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the
Court, without omission or suppression.

Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the
ground that it is hearsay: the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for
crossexamination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually
presented against him during the trial or hearing.

However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes.
These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the
Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition “shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public” (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign
state or country, the deposition “shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice -consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.”

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting Berdex’s MOTION (To Allow Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering Berdex’s allegation in its MOTION
that its witnesses are all Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance
of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.

The situation in Dasmariñas is the same as in the instant case since in both cases, it was already during the trial stage that the deposition through written interrogatories was sought to be taken. It does not
matter whether one witness for the plaintiff had already testified since the Dasmariñas ruling did not make such testimony in court a condition to grant the deposition of the two other witnesses. Also, in Dasmariñas,
the plaintiff sued defendant to recover a certain sum of money which was the same as in the instant case as private respondent was suing petitioner for collection of sum of money.

While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention, such limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches
upon the recognized domains of privilege. It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and should not be unduly restricted if the matters inquired
into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the
disposal of litigation would be defeated. In fact, we find nothing in the rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract as alleged by petitioner.
Philippine Computer Solutions v. Jose Hernandez, G.R. NO. 168776, July 17, 2007
DOC: When a deponent has already testified, there is no need for taking his D.
COMPLAINT: Viol of SRC
WHO FILED NTTD? PCS to take D of Corporate Officer in Australia

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. PCS filed a complaint before the SEC against 2 of its incorporators, Condol & Lisama, and one Manzo.
a. The complaint alleged that its corporate name was being unlawfully used in unauthorized business transactions here and abroad.
b. Specifically, it was alleged that Condol acted as a purported President and Manzo as the purported secretary/treasurer.
c. They entered into a partnerhsip with PeopleSoft Australia.
2. Only Manzo filed an Answer to the Complaint because summons was not served on the others on account of their change of address.
a. Before issuance of summons by publication, RA 8799 took effect, thereby transferring jurisdiction of intracorproate matters from the SEC to the regular courts.
b. Upon service by publication, no answer was still filed.
c. Thus, PCS moved to declare them in default.
3. Also, PCS filed a Motion for Issuance of a Commission to take the deposition in Australia of a corporate officer Mr. Ralph Bergen (already in USA) of PeopleSoft Australia regaing the details of PeopleSoft’s
transactions with Condol et al.
a. Unfortuantely, the RTC denied the Motion for Issuance of a Commission.
i. It ruled that, under the Interim Rules for Intra Corporate Disputes, a party can only avail of modes of discovery within 15 days from the joinder of issues.
4. CA: On appeal, CA dismissed PCS’ petition.
a. CA ruled that even though no responsive pleading was filed, PCS failed to serve written interrogatories on its witness abroad within 15 days.
b. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
5. LT of PCS
a. According to the petitioner, the 15-day reglementary period mandated under Rule 3 of the Interim Rules pertains to a deposition resorted to as a mode of discovery. It does not apply when the deposition is
resorted to by a party as a means of presenting the testimony of its witnesses, as in the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the PCS should be allowed to take D of Mr. Bergen. No, they already did(?)

DOCTRINE:
The underlying prayer of the petitioner in its Complaint had been granted in the decision of the trial court. In a very real sense, therefore, the RTC has already granted what the petitioner had asked for in its
Complaint. Even more, during the hearings before the trial court, Mr. Ralph Bergen had already personally testified, hence, foregoing any need for taking his deposition.

This Court notes that during the pendency of the instant Petition, specifically on 27 December 2006 , the trial court already rendered a Decision in the main case , SEC Case No. 68524. Taking her bearings from this
incident, Manzo prays in her memorandum before this Court that the instant petition should now be dismissed.

It is not disputed that a Decision in the main case, SEC Case No. 68524, has already been rendered. While the Court of Appeals has yet to act on petitioner’s Petition for Review, it is this Court’s view that the issue
has become moot and academic.

Considering the trial court’s Decision dated 27 December 2006 in SEC Case No. 68524 and the personal testimony of Bergen before the trial court, this Court finds that the issue of whether a commission should
be issued for the taking of depositions of petitioner’s witnesses has indeed become moot.

Since a Decision has already been rendered by the trial court in SEC Case No. 68524 on 27 December 2006, then the Order of the same court dated 8 December 2003 denying petitioner’s motion to take deposition,
being an interlocutory order, should have been included and raised in the petition for review filed by the petitioner before the Court of Appeals.

g. Purpose of taking deposition

Pajarillaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163515, October 31, 2008
DOC: Primary purpose of D is to supplement pleading in preparation for trial
D may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. In this case after plaintiff rested his case and before defendant’s presentation of evidence

COMPLAINT: Collection by Kalangeg against Pajarillaga

WHO FILED NTTD? Pajarillaga (defendant)
Kind? Written interrogatories
Allowed? No by RTC, CA
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Kalangeg filed in the RTC of Bontoc a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Pajarillaga.
a. In one hearing date, despite due notice, Pajarillaga failed to appear.
b. Thus, Kalangeg was allowed to present his witnesses subject to cross on the next hearing date.
c. However, Pajarillaga was again absent.
d. Consequently, upon Kalangeg’s motion, the RTC declared that Pajarillaga waived his right of cross-examination.
2. Thereafter, Pajarillaga moved to reset the hearing which the RTC granted.
a. Then, Pajarillaga filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Deposition of Kalangeg upon written interrogatories on the grounds that Pajarilla lives in Manila which is more tan 400KM away from
Bontoc and that he was suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing strenous activities.
b. Kalangeg opposed.
3. Afterwards, RTC denied Pajarillaga’s motion.
a. MR denied.
4. CA also affirmed.
a. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the taking of Kalangeg’s deposition by written interrogatories is proper. NO because of protracted delay of Pajarillaga.
However, he would be allowed sana even after Kalangeg has rested his case and prior to Pajarillaga’s presentation of evidence

DOCTRINE:

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, THE PRIMARY FUNCTION of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to
make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.

It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of
promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if
summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.

There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand . There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the
period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition exists against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory
judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.

Such being the case, there is really nothing objectionable, per se, with Pajarillaga availing of this discovery measure after Kalangeg has rested his case and prior to Pajarillaga’s presentation of
evidence. To reiterate, depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.

But when viewed vis the several postponements made by Pajarillaga for the initial presentation of his evidence, we are of the view that his timing is, in fact, suspect. The records before us show that he
stopped attending the hearings after Kalangeg presented his first witness . He offered no excuse for his and his counsel’s absences . Moreover, the trial court has set four (4) hearing dates for the initial
presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting without invoking the grounds which he now presents before us.

Here, we find the protracted delay in unsubstantiated allegations of illness and motion.
Here, we find the protracted delay in the litigation at petitioner’s instance coupled with the belated and unsubstantiated allegations of illness and threats to petitioner’s life, more than sufficient
reasons for the trial court to deny petitioner’s motion.
 h. Letters rogatory and commission
Dulay v. Dulay, G.R. No. 158857, November 11, 2005
DOC: The taking of D before a notary public in NY when the Clerk of Court of Boston ignored the letters rogatory is valid as it amounts to substantial compliance.
Complaint: Recovery of Bank Deposit
Who filed? Rodrigo (Plaintiff)
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Rodrigo Dulay is a naturalized American citizen living in Massachusettes.
a. He opened a trust account in the Bank of Boston in favor of his nephew Pfeger Dulay in the amount of $230,000.
b. Much to his surprise, Pfeger squandered the money away.
c. Thus, Rodrigo filed a Complaint for Recovery of Bank Deposit against Pfeger et al.
2. Thereafter, Rodrigo filed a Petition for Issuance of Letters Rogatory to get the depositions of several witnesses residing abroad.
a. Pfeger et al moved to be allowed to file cross-examination questions to Rodrigo’s written interrogatories
b. the RTC granted.
c. Said order stated that the Clerk of Court in Boston conduct examination of Rodrigo Dulay and the bank manager of the Bank of Boston.
3. However, the depositions were instead taken before a notary public in New York.
a. Thus, Pfeger et al filed an Omibus Motion praying that the written interrogatories be declared inadmisible.
4. RTC: However, this was denied by the RTC and stated that there was substantial compliance with the Rules.
5. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Is interrogation abroad through Letters Rogatory allowed to be done before a notary public in NY? Yes, this is substantial compliance. fault was due to COC of Boston not by Rodrigo.

DOCTRINE:
While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk of Court of Boston to take the depositions needed in the case, it became impossible to follow the directive since the Clerk of
Court of Boston merely brushed it aside and refused to cooperate. Rodrigo cannot be faulted for the resultant delay brought about by this circumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for
allowing the admission of the depositions taken not in strict adherence to its original directive, nor for directing the petitioner to have the depositions authenticated.

Obviously, it was not within the trial court’s power, much less the Rodrigo’s to force the Clerk of Court of Boston to have the deposition taken before it. It would be illogical and unreasonable to expect
respondent to comply with the letters rogatory without the cooperation of the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory and requested to examine the witnesses. After all, while a court had the
authority to entertain a discovery request, it is not required to provide judicial assistance thereto. This reality was recognized by the trial court when it ordered Rodrigo to have the questioned depositions
authenticated by the Philippine consulate. Indeed, refusing the allowance of the depositions in issue would be going directly against the purpose of taking the depositions in the first place, that is, the disclosure of facts
which are relevant to the proceedings in court.

More importantly, the Court finds that Rodrigo substantially complied with the requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries. In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken:

(1) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or
(3) before any person authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties.

LR V COMMISSIONS:
While LETTERS ROGATORY are requests to foreign tribunals, COMMISSIONS are directives to officials of the issuing jurisdiction.

Generally, a COMMISSION is an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, directed to a magistrate by his official designation or to an individual by name, authorizing him to
take the depositions of the witnesses named therein, while a LETTER ROGATORY is a request to a foreign court to give its aid, backed by its power, to secure desired information. Commissions are taken in
accordance with the rules laid down by the court issuing the commission, while in letters rogatory, the methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign tribunal.

Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines and the
defendant’s answer has already been served. However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.
In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the notary public who took the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained through a
commission, and no longer through letters rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even sanctioned by the trial court by virtue of its Order dated 28 September 2000. With the ratification of the depositions
in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.

Besides, the allowance of the deposition can not be said to have caused any prejudice to the adverse party . They were given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through their cross-
interrogatories, which were in turn answered by the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings, petitioners were unable to point out any injury they suffered as a result of the trial court’s action.

i. Failure to answer written interrogatories

Jaravata v. Karolus, G.R. No. 154988, June 21, 2007
DOC: Before one is considered in default for not answering the written interrogatories, the proponent must fist compel an answer to the written interrogatories.
COMPLAINT: Reconveyance and Declaration of Nullity of Titles by Jaravata v Karolus
WHO FILED NTTD: Jaravata
Kind? written
ALLOWED?

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Felisa Jaravata filed an Action for Reconveyance and Declaration of Nullity of Titles and Damages against Diana Karolus.
a. She claims that she is the lawful owner and actual occupant of a parcel of land in Zambales which is subdivided into 3 different lots.
b. She further alleges that Karolus illegally secured titles to 2 of the 3 subdivided lots.
2. In their Answer, Karolus contended that the issuance of the free patents was not fraudulent and that there was no overlapping of the lots.
a. They also set up the defense of prescription.
b. Thereafter, a Third Party Complaint was filed against Javarata’s lawyer, Atty. Tacorda.
3. Later on, Jaravata served two separate sets of written interrogatories upon Karolus.
a. However, the latter objected to them but was denied by the RTC.
b. As such, Karolus filed a Manifestation and Compliance attaching their answers to the written interrogatories.
4. Jaravata and Atty. Tacorda then filed a Joint Omibus Motion to compel Karolus to fully and completely answer the written interrogatories.
5. RTC: Failing this, RTC declared Karolus in default pursuant to Sec 3 (c) of Rule 29.
a. Thereafter, RTC ruled for Jaravata.
6. However, CA reversed the decisión and ruled in favor of Karolus.

ISSUE: should Karolus be in default for failure to answer written interrogatories. NO, requisite was not followed: first require an application by the proponent to compel an answer to written interrogatories

DOCTRINE:
The CA rightly held that the RTC erred in rendering a judgment by default against Karolus for refusal or failure to answer written interrogatories, without first requiring an application by the
proponent to compel an answer. This is the requisite procedure under Section 1 of Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

NEVERTHELESS, the CA erred in proceeding to decide the case on the merits since there was as yet no trial or presentation of evidence in the RTC. Jaravata’s prayer to affirm the trial court’s December
18, 1997 default decision does not mean that there was a trial. The decision of the RTC was based on constructive admissions by Karolus of the allegations of the plaintiff due to the court’s application of the
sanction for not answering the written interrogatories. In reversing the application of the sanction, the CA should have given the parties a chance to substantiate by evidence their respective claims at
the trial court.

This is particularly true with respect to the Jaravata’s claim of physical possession for more than 30 years, regarding which the CA said that clear and convincing evidence was required but wanting. This is because the
wrong procedure followed by the trial court effectively aborted a trial and presentation of evidence.

j. Consequences of failure to answer interrogatories (R29 S3c, S5)

Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172175, October 9, 2006
DOC: Striking out/dismissal/judgment by default only happens when there is refusal to answer a PARTICULAR QUESTION from the written interrogatories. If refused to answer the whole, then there is no dismissal.
COMPLAINT: Nullification of Foreclosure Proceedings and Loan Documents by Zepeda v China Bank
WHO FILED: Chinabank
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Sps. Zepeda filed a Complaint for Nullification of Foreclosure Proceedings and Loan Documents with Damages against Chinabank before the RTC.
a. It was claimed that they obtained a loan from CBC secured by a real estate mortgage.
b. When the Sps Zepeda encountered difficulties in paying the loan, CBC allegedly agreed to a restructuring plan.
c. Despite their agreement, CBC extrajudicially foreclosed on the property and bécame the highest bidder.
d. Later, title was consolidated in its favor.
2. CBC filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied.
a. So, it filed an Answer with affirmative defenses.
3. Also, CBC filed a set of written interrogatories with 20 questions.
a. RTC: However, RTC denied the affirmative defenses and directed the COC to set pre-trial conference.
b. A Motion to Expunge the complaint for being premature was also denied.
4. CA: Thus, CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA which was granted on the ground that Sps. Zepeda failed to answer CBC’s written interrogatories, among others.
a. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON failure to answer CBC’s written interrogatories warrants dismissal of the complaint. NO, because Sps. Zepeda refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular question.
Striking out/dismissal/judgment by default only happens when there is refusal to answer a PARTICULAR Q
Remedy sana: Sec 5 of Rule 29 not Sec 3c

DOCTRINE:

We do not agree with the CA ruling that the complaint should be dismissed for failure of Sps. Zepeda to answer CBC’s written interrogatories. It should be noted that CBC filed a motion to expunge the complaint
based on Section 3(c) of Rule 29 which states:

SEC. 3. Other consequences. — If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated
questions, or an order under Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or
an order made under Rule 28 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the
following:

(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party[.]

As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories
is served, refuses to answer a PARTICULAR QUESTION in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.

In the instant case, Sps. Zepeda refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, CBC should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not
Section 3(c) of Rule 29.

Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:

SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. — If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served
with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories , the court on motion and notice, may strike out all
or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to
pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney’s fees.

Due to CBC’s filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that the Motion to Expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on
Section 3.

This Court has long encouraged the availment of the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Rules of Court. The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, we held:

For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial
courts to examine well the circumstances of each case and to make their considered determination thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 24, 2006 Decision and the March 31, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which granted CBC’s petition to annul the April 1, 2004 and October 22, 2004
Orders of the RTC denying CBC’s affirmative defenses without a hearing as well as its motion to expunge the complaint because of Zepeda’s failure to answer the written interrogatories are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30, for further proceedings.
 k. Request for Admission not answered (R.26)
Sime Darby v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148021, December 6, 2006
DOC: Request for Admission is not always granted or needed to be answered as in this case that the mere purpose of admission is to delay the proceedings.
COMPLAINT: Illegal Lockout, ID, ULP by Union v Sime Darby
WHO FILED NTTD:
ALLOWED?

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. By reason of a bargaining deadlock, Sime Darby declared and implemented a lockout against its hourly employees who belong to the Union.
a. Thus, the Union filed a Complaint for Illegal Lockout.
b. Meanwhile, stockholders of Sime Darby sold tire manufacturing assets and closed down its Sale of Tire Manufacturing Operation.
c. Thus, its employees were terminated.
d. As a result, these terminated employees filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
e. Later, a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice was filed. These cases were then consolidated.
2. LA dismissed the complaints and found the lockout as well as the mass termination legal and valid.
a. On appeal, NLRC affirmed. CA also affirmed. Hence this petition.
b. The Union claims that the LA erred in not considering as admitted the matters contained in their Request for Admission after Sime Darby failed to file a sworn answer thereto.
i. Darby only filed an unsworn reply

ISSUE: WON the failure to answer under oath the Request for Admission is fatal. NO, Unions request amount to mere reiteration of what has been alleged in the pleadings.

DOCTRINE:
The submission that the Union’s Request for Admission should have been deemed admitted in their favor after Sime Darby had failed to file a sworn reply or objection thereto cannot be sustained.

WHAT IS REQUEST FOR ADMISSION:

A REQUEST FOR ADMISSION is a remedy provided by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which allows a party to file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission of:
(1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; or
(2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.

SANCTION:
Said request must be answered under oath within the period indicated in the request, otherwise the matters of which admission were requested should be deemed admitted.

The Union claims that Sime Darby, instead of filing an answer under oath, filed an unsworn reply/objection thereto. Thus, the admissions should be deemed admitted in their favor.

The Union’s Request for Admission does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said Request for Admission shows that it contained matters which are precisely the issues in the
consolidated cases, and/or irrelevant matters; for example, the reasons behind the lockout, the company’s motive in the CBA negotiations, lack of notice of dismissal, the validity of the release and quitclaim, etc.
Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading . That is its primary function. It does
not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.

Otherwise stated, the Union’s request constitutes “an UTTER REDUNDANCY and a USELESS, POINTLESS PROCESS which Sime Darby should not be subjected to.” The rule on admission as a mode of
discovery is intended “to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.” Thus, if
the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

l. Request for Admission instead of Offer to Stipulate (R26)

Manzano v. Despabiladeras, G.R.No. 148786, December 16, 2004
COMPLAINT: Collection by Manzano v Despabiladeras
WHO FILED: RTC ordered Manzano to Submit Offer to Stipulate
ALLOWED? RTC allowed the Request for Admission

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from Roger Manzano various construction materials to be used by the former in a construction project. According to Manzano, he delivered to Despabiladeras a total of
P307,140.50 worth of construction materials. Having paid only about P130K, Manzano filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Despabiladeras in the RTC of Iriga City.
2. In her Answer, Despabiladeras claimed that Manzano altered the prices.
a. So, there was a dispute on how much the materials really were.
b. Thereafter, the case was set for Pretrial.
3. After said pretrial, the RTC ordered that, upon agreement of the parties, Manzano shall submit an Offer to Stipulate showing an itemized list of the materials delivered to Despabiladeras within 15 days to
Despabiladeras who shall be allowed to object thereto.
a. Instead of submitting an Order to Stipulate, Manzano filed a Request for Admission which asked Despabiladeras to admit within 15 days from receipt that Manzano in fact delivered construction materials
amounting to 300k and that Despabiladeras only paid 130K thereof.
4. The Request for Admission remained unheeded during the 15 day period.
a. It was only during trial wherein Despabiladeras filed a list of ítems it admits to having been delivered by Manzano.
5. Thereafter, RTC ruled that the facts requested to be admitted are confirmed in light of the fact that Despabiladeras did not file an answer.
6. RTC: Then, RTC finally ruled in favor of Manzano and ordered Despabiladeras to pay the balance.
7. CA: On appeal, CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Is it proper for Manzano to submit a Request for Admission instead of Offer to Stipulate (as agreed by parties)? Yes, substantial compliance.

DOCTRINE:
The agreement of the parties during the pre-trial conference of October 2, 1990, as reflected in the pre-trial order of even date, was that “Manzano shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of
construction materials delivered to Despalidares together with the cost claimed by Manzano within fifteen (15) days[,] furnishing copy thereof to Despalidares who will state her objections if any, or comment
there[o]n within the same period of time.” In substantial compliance with said agreement, Manzano chose to instead file a REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, a remedy afforded by a party under Rule 26.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 should not be disregarded, as in fact the trial court did not, when it ordered Despalidares to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that petitioner submit “an
offer to stipulate.”

For, as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy afforded any party after the issues had been joined.

Despalidares having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is, to deny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the “Request for Admission,” she
was deemed to have admitted that she received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated in the request and was indebted to petitioner in the amount of P184,610.50 (P314,610.50 less the
partial payment of P130,000.00).

m. Failure to respond to a Request for Admission (R26)

Limos v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No.186979, August 11, 2011
COMPLAINT: Complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title, and Dam by Sps. Odones v Limos
WHO FILED? Limos (defendant)
ALLOWED?

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Spouses Odones filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title, and Damages against Limos in the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac.
a. It alleges that Odones are the owners of a parcel of land by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale executed by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal.
b. When they decided to register the document, they found that the land’s OCT was cancelled and a new one was issued under the names of Limos et al.
c. The latter allegedly obtained title thereto by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Lardizabal and her husband Razalan in 1972.
2. Odones seeks to cancel the Limos’ TCT on the ground that the signatures in the Deed of Sale were forgeries because its signatories were already dead prior to 1972.
a. Thus, Limos had to file an Answer.
b. Thereafter, Odones filed a Reply.
c. Then, Limos served on Odones a Request for Admission on several matters.
3. Odones failed to respond.
a. Thus, Limos filed a Motion to Set Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses arguig that Odones’ failure to respond or object to the Request for Admission amounted to
an implied admission.
4. RTC denied this Motion on the ground that the matters subject to the Request for Admission were essentially redundant or have already been challenged in the pleadings already filed. MR denied.
5. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: was there an implied admission for failure to respond/object to request for admission? YES, in general. BUT NO, in this case because the sanction is determined by the court. In this case Court finds it is mere
redundancy.

DOCTRINE:
Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of
any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.

SEC. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall be not less than fifteen
(15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically the matters for which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.

Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the
application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the
applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice.

The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery also rests on sound judicial discretion. Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the
determination of whether or not to impose the sanctions attributable to such fault.

As correctly observed by the RTC, the matters set fort in Limos’ Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer which Odones already traversed in their Reply. The
said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes. In effect, Limos sought to compel Odones to deny once again the very matters they had already denied, a redundancy,
which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is “to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs
of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.”

A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the
request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.

Verily then, if the RTC finds that the matters in a Request for Admission were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny
them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.

In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of Limos’ Request for Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe the operation of the implied admission rule
in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. There being no implied admission attributable to Odones’ failure to respond, the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
 n. Documents to be produced should be described with particlularity (R27)
Solidbank v. Gateway Electronics, G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008
COMPLAINT: Collection by Bank v GE
WHO FILED Motion for Production and Inspection: Solidbank against GE
ALLOWED?

QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Gateway obtained from Solidbank 4 foreign currency denominated loans evidenced by promissory notes.
a. To secure the loans, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds from its “Back-end Services Agreement” with Alliance Semiconductor. Incidentally, Gateway defaulted and had an outstanding debt of $1.9M.
After demands went unheeded, Solidbank filed a Compaint for Collection of Sum of Money against Gateway.
2. Thereafter, Solidbank received information that Gateway already received from Alliance proceeds of the Back-end Services Agreement.
a. As such, Solidbank filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.
b. Essentially, Solidbank asked the court to inspect all documents involving said Agreement and copies of all documents and statements connected thereto.
3. RTC granted the Motion for Production and Inspection.
a. Gateway submitted invoices related thereto.
b. Unsatisfied, Solidbank filed Motion to cite Gateway in contempt. For not exerting effort to produce docs
c. RTC denied said motion and chastized Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to produce said documents evidencing payment. MR denied.
4. CA: When Gateway appealed, CA reversed and ruled that the Motion for Production and Inspection failed to comply with Rule 27 Section 1.
a. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the Motion for Production and Inspection failed to comply with Rule 27 Section 1. Yes it failed, the request for inspection is too broad.

DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party or permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation
thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.

PURPOSE OF PRODUCTION OF DOCS:

The aforecited rule provides the mechanics for the production of documents and the inspection of things during the pendency of a case. It also deals with the inspection of sources of evidence other
than documents, such as land or other property in the possession or control of the other party. This remedial measure is intended to assist in the administration of justice by facilitating and expediting the
preparation of cases for trial and guarding against undesirable surprise and delay ; and it is designed to simplify procedure and obtain admissions of facts and evidence , thereby shortening costly and
time-consuming trials. It is based on ancient principles of equity. More specifically, the purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover material information which, by reason of an opponent’s
control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary method of obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in the custody or
under the control of an adversary. It is a further extension of the concept of pretrial.

The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits “fishing” for evidence , the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc.,
sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in the action. The lament against a
fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To
that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. However, fishing for evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without limitations.

In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the REQUISITES in order that a party may compel the other party to produce or allow the inspection of documents or things, viz.:
(1) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good cause therefor;
(2) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
(3) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;
(4) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;
(5) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action, and
 (6) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or control of the other party.

In order to ascertain the veracity of the information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. The purpose of Solidbank’s motion is to compel Gateway to produce the documents evidencing
payments received from Alliance in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement. Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the documents. It had also shown that the said documents
are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action. However, Solidbank’s motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to specify with particularity
the documents it required Gateway to produce. Solidbank’s motion for production and inspection of documents called for a BLANKET INSPECTION. Solidbank’s request for inspection of “all documents pertaining to,
arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement” was simply too broad and too generalized in scope.

A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated
with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce.

Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the proceeds of the Back-end Services Agreement were already received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the instant case.

RULE 30
TRIAL
1. Trial is the stage in which the parties adduce their respective evidence in support of their claims or defenses.
2. Trial terminates at judgment
3. Hearing involves several stages of a case (E.g. hearing of motion). It does not follow the order of trial (R30 S5). There need not be a presentation of evidence.
4. GR: judgment should not be rendered without trial.
5. XPN: when there’s no need for trial
a. Default
b. Failure to comply with Bill of Particulars
c. MTD due to PURE
d. 2-dismissal rule
e. MTD by Plaintiff and due to fault of plaintiff
f. Failure to comply with Pre-trial
g. Refusal to answer written interrogatory or comply with order in Modes of Discovery
h. Judgment on pleadings
i. Full summary judgment
j. Judgment based on stipulation of facts
k. Judgment on compromise
l. Judgment by confession
m. Judgment in Summary Procedure

Section 1. Notice of trial.

Upon entry of a case in the trial calendar, the clerk shall notify the parties of the date of its trial in such manner as shall ensure his receipt of that notice at least five (5) days before such date.

Sec. 2. Adjournments and postponements.

A court may adjourn a trial from day to day, and to any stated time, as the expeditious and convenient transaction of business may require, but shall have no power to adjourn a trial for a longer
period than one month for each adjournment, nor more than three months in all, except when authorized in writing by the Court Administrator, Supreme Court.
1. Grounds:
a. illness
b. no evidence
Sec. 3. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for absence of evidence.
A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality or relevancy of such evidence, and that due diligence has been used
to procure it. But if the adverse party admits the facts to be given in evidence, even if he objects or reserves the right to their admissibility, the trial shall not be postponed.
1. Requisites:
a. A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence must be filed
b. The motion must be supported by an affidavit showing:
i. the materiality or relevancy of such evidence
 ii. that due diligence has been used to procure it
2. This section does not apply to criminal cases

Sec. 4. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or counsel.

A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of illness of a party or counsel may be granted if it appears upon affidavit or sworn certification that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial
is indispensable and that the character of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable.
1. Requisites:
a. Motion to postpone trial for illness must be filed
b. Motion must be supported by an affidavit showing:
i. that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial is indispensable and
ii. that the character of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable

Sec. 5. Order of trial.

Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as
follows:
(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;
(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint;
(c) The third-party defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and fourth-party complaint;
(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded by them;
(e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original
case; and
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further
pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses appear by different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence.
1. May pre-trial be modified? YES if before trial to prevent manifest injustice (R18 S7)
2. May the court change the order of trial? YES sec.5 e.g. reverse order of trial
3. Reverse order of trial:
a. When proper? If defendant alleges only affirmative defenses
b. Reason: by alleging affirmative defenses, the defendant hypothetically admits the material allegations in the complaint.
c. Preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses is not a full-blown trial. Parties are only required to submit their respective comments on Q of Law and evidence on Q of Fact. No presentation of witnesses or offer
of documentary evidence.
4. Evidence-in-chief: evidence presented to prove his action/defense
Rebuttal Evidence: evidence to refute the evidence-in-chief
a. When evidence-in-chief may be allowed during rebuttal evidence:
i. Newly discovered
ii. Omitted through mistake
iii. Purpose is to correct evidence previously offered.

Sec. 6. Agreed statement of facts. (SOF)

The parties to any action may agree, in writing, upon the facts involved in the litigation, and submit the case for judgment on the facts agreed upon, without the introduction of evidence.
If the parties agree only on some of the facts in issue, the trial shall be held as to the disputed facts in such order as the court shall prescribe.
1. SOF
a. GR: must be in writing
b. XPN: orally before judge during pre trial hearing because that is equivalent to judicial admission
i. Admission during the course of proceeding does not require proof
2. May SOF be made orally in criminal cases? NO
3. SOF not applicable in annulment of marriage and legal separation (Art. 48 FC)

Sec. 7. Statement of judge.

During the hearing or trial of a case any statement made by the judge with reference to the case, or to any of the parties, witnesses or counsel, shall be made of record in the stenographic notes.

Sec. 8. Suspension of actions.

The suspension of actions shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.
1. Art 2030
 a. Willingness to compromise

Sec. 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court.

The judge of the court where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties. However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties
agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or
to the admission of exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing .
1. GR: judge shall personally receive and resolve the evidence to be adduced by the parties
XPN: Clerk of court, requisites:
a. Delegation is made only in:
i. Default proceedings (default and as in default)
ii. Ex-parte hearings
iii. Any cases where parties agree in writing
b. Lawyer
c. No power to rule on objections to question or admission of evidence or exhibits
d. Submit his report within 10days from the termination of hearing.

RULE 31
CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE
Section 1. Consolidation.
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
1. Consolidation: at least two cases filed independently involving a common Q of law or fact which may be jointly heard.
2. GR: Consolidation is discretionary
XPN: mandatory
a. Pending before the same judge
b. Filed with different branches of same RTC
3. Purpose: avoid multiplicity of action
4. Requisites of Consolidation
a. Actions involve a common Q of law or fact
b. At least two action pending before the same court (Yu v. Magno – 2 different branches allowed)
NOTE: identity of parties or COA not required
5. May there be consolidation pending before different branches of the court? YES
6. May there be consolidation pending before different judicial districts? YES
7. Three ways of consolidation
a. Recasting the cases already instituted;– amending pleading, dismissing some cases and retaining only one case;
b. Consolidation proper – joint trial with joint decision;
c. Test-case method – hearing only the principal case and suspending others until judgment in principal case
8. 3 kinds of consolidation (Neri v SB)
a. quasi consolidation – one only is tried; the judgment of one trial is conclusive of others
b. actual consolidation – several actions combined into one
c. consolidation for trial – tried together but has separate judgment

Sec. 2. Separate trials.

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
1. Severance has single action involving a number of claims or causes of actions which may be separately tried.
2. Severance in relation to misjoinder of action –
3. Severance in relation to separate judgment –

RULE 32
TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER
Section 1. Reference by consent.
By written consent of both parties, the court may order any or all of the issues in a case to be referred to a commissioner to be agreed upon by the parties or to be appointed by the court. As
used in these Rules, the word “commissioner” includes a referee, an auditor and an examiner.
1. Upon completion of the proceeding, the commissioner shall file a written report with the court.
2. Commissioner includes a referee, auditor, examiner
3. GR: Trial by commissioner is discretionary of the court
XPN: Mandatory
a. Expropriation, just compensation: 3 comm
b. Settlement of Estate
c. Hearing for approval of the executor/administrator’s accounting
4. Matters that may be referred to a commissioner by consent: any or all of the issues

Sec. 2. Reference ordered on motion.

When the parties do not consent, the court may, upon the application of either or of its own motion, direct a reference to a commissioner in the following cases: (a) When the trial of an issue of
fact requires the examination of a long account on either side, in which case the commissioner may be directed to hear and report upon the whole issue or any specific question involved therein;
(b) When the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the court before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect;
(c) When a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect.
1. In the following cases:
a. Examination of a long account
b. Taking of an account is necessary
c. Carrying a judgment or order into effect
d. Q of fact, other than upon the pleading arises

Sec. 3. Order of reference; powers of the commissioner.

When a reference is made, the clerk shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy of the order of reference. The order may specify or limit the powers of the commissioner, and may direct
him to report only upon particular issues, or to do or perform particular acts, or to receive and report evidence only, and may fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing
of his report.
Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and
take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless otherwise
provided in the order of reference, he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or hearing before him shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.
1. Order of reference may:
a. specify or limit the powers of the commissioner, and
b. direct him to
i. report only upon particular issues, or to
ii. do or perform particular acts, or to
iii. receive and report evidence only, and
c. fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of his report.
2. Powers of commissioner:
a. regulate the proceedings in every hearing before him
b. Rule upon the admissibility of evidence/ Rule on objections
c. Issue subpoena
d. Swear witnesses
e. do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties

Sec. 4. Oath of commissioner.

Before entering upon his duties the commissioner shall be sworn to a faithful and honest performance thereof.

Sec. 5. Proceedings before commissioner.

Upon receipt of the order of reference and unless otherwise provided therein, the commissioner shall forthwith set a time and place for the first meeting of the parties or their counsel to be held
within ten (l0) days after the date of the order of reference and shall notify the parties or their counsel.

Sec. 6. Failure of parties to appear before commissioner.

If a party fails to appear at the time and place appointed, the commissioner may proceed ex parte or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving notice to the absent party
or his counsel of the adjournment.
1. Commissioner may:
a. Proceed ex parte
 b. Adjourn the proceeding to future day

Sec. 7. Refusal of witness.

The refusal of a witness to obey a subpoena issued by the commissioner or to give evidence before him, shall be deemed a contempt of the court which appointed the commissioner.

Sec. 8. Commissioner shall avoid delays.

It is the duty of the commissioner to proceed with all reasonable diligence. Either party, on notice to the parties and commissioner, may apply to the court for an order requiring the
commissioner to expedite the proceedings and to make his report.

Sec. 9. Report of commissioner.

Upon the completion of the trial or hearing or proceeding before the commissioner, he shall file with the court his report in writing upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.
When his powers are not specified or limited, he shall set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law in his report. He shall attach thereto all exhibits, affidavits, depositions, papers and the
transcript, if any, of the testimonial evidence presented before him.

Sec. 10. Notice to parties of the filing of report.

Upon the filing of the report, the parties shall be notified by the clerk, and they shall be allowed ten (l0) days within which to signify grounds of objections to the findings of the report, if they so
desire. Objections to the report based upon grounds which were available to the parties during the proceedings before the commissioner, other than objections to the findings and conclusions
therein set forth, shall not be considered by the court unless they were made before the commissioner.

Sec. 11. Hearing upon report.

Upon the expiration of the period of ten (l0) days referred to in the preceding section, the report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying, or
rejecting the report in whole or in part, or recommitting it with instructions, or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court.
1. Court is not bound by the Commissioner’s report

Sec. 12. Stipulations as to findings.

When the parties stipulate that a commissioner’s findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law shall thereafter be considered.

Sec. 13. Compensation of commissioner.

The court shall allow the commissioner such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant, to be taxed as costs against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice
requires.

XX. TRIAL, TRIAL BY COMMISSIONERS, HEARINGS AND CONSOLIDATION OF CASES (RULES 30

TO 32)
1. Lourdez de Castro v. Crispino de Castro, G.R. No. 172198, June 16, 2009
DOC: Postponement of hearing must be done Before the hearing NOT on the day of the hearing itself
The justification must be one that is “unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen.” Taking care of grand child is not justified.

Nullity of Marriage
Lourdez de Castro requested to cancel hearing due to unavailability of witness. She was deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

FACTS:

1. Crispino and Lourdes De Castro are spouses. The RTC granted Crispino’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage based on psychological incapacity for failure of Lourdes to file an Answer.
a. The latter filed a Motion for Leave to FIle an Omnibus Motion Seeking a New Trial or Reconsideration on the ground that she was misled and prevented from participating in the annulment case because
Crispino promised support for their children.
b. RTC granted said motion.
2. On July 17, 2002, the RTC had to reset the hearing because there was no return of the notice sent.
a. Thereafter, the hearings were reset 12 more times.
b. On Aug 20, 2003, the RTC denied Lourdes’ request to cancel the hearing due to unavailability of witnesses.
c. RTC deemed to have waived her right to present evidence due to her failure to present evidence that day.
3. On Dec 12, 2003, RTC denied Lourdes’ request to Reconsider the denial claiming that her absence was justifiable with no intent to delay the proceedings.
a. Lourdes filed a Petition fo Certiorari which the CA denied.
b. Hence, this petition.
c. LT: She now questions Judge Umali’s act of ruling that her right to present evidence was waived when she failed to appear at the August 20 hearing.

ISSUE: WON the right to present evidence was waived when she failed to appear at the hearing. YES, because her reason was not “unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen.”

DOCTRINE:

We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement by Lourdes were made on the scheduled hearing dates themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing, despite previous warning that no
further postponement would be allowed, she still failed to appear. We agree with the CA when it pointed out that she obviously knew in advance that she could not make it to the August 20, 2003
hearing. As of the last scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still out of the country. The least that petitioner could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation with the
RTC by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing.

Between July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one . Obviously, the warning by the court of the consequence of another non-appearance in the hearing fell on deaf ears. After
having been granted numerous motions for postponement, she cannot now claim that she was denied due process.

In Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, we ruled that:

Where a party seeks postponement of the hearing of this case for reasons caused by his own inofficiousness, lack of resourcefulness and diligence if not total indifference to his own
interests or to the interests of those he represents, thereby resulting in his failure to present his own evidence, the court would not extend to him its mantle of protection . If it was he
who created the situation that brought about the resulting adverse consequences, he cannot plead for his day in court nor claim that he was so denied of it.

Further in Hap Hong Hardware Co. v. Philippine Company, we sustained the trial court’s denial of a motion for postponement on the ground that the defendant’s witnesses, officers of the company, could not
come because it was the beginning of the milling season in the municipality of San Jose, Mindoro Occidental and their presence in the Central was necessary. We held that the reason adduced was “not
unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen.”

In the case at bar, Lourdes’ excuse — that she was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn grandchild, while her witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on her,
was likewise out of the country, attending a convention — was unjustified. These reasons were “not unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen.” The date of the trial was set one month
prior, and as of July 25, 2003, Lourdes was in the U.S. Certainly, Loures would know in advance if she could make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. Likewise, attending a convention is a scheduled event,
also something known in advance.

It is the basic duty of a litigant to move for postponement BEFORE THE DAY OF THE HEARING, so that the court could order its resetting and timely inform the adverse party of the new date. This
was not the case at bar for the subject motion was presented only on the day of the trial without any justification . We thus hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
postponement.

2. Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001

DOC: two cases filed arising from one contract must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court because they have common Q of law or facts
FACTS:

1. Asia Brewery and Zulueta entered into a Dealership Agreement where Asia Brewery would manufacture and distribute beer for Zulueta to sell in the outlet he operates.
a. Thereafter, alleging violation of said Dealership Agreement, Zulueta filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, and Damages against Asia Brewery in the RTC of Iloilo.
b. While said case was pending, Asia Brewery likewise filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money in the RTC of Makati against Zulueta for the latter’s unpaid beer products bought.
2. Zulueta moved to dismiss the Complaint in Maati on the ground of splitting causes of action and violation against the principle of multiplicity of suits but was denied.
a. Later on Zulueta moved that the cases be consolidated. This was granted.
3. On appeal, CA reversed the ruling and stated that there is no common issue of law or fact between the two cases since the Iloilo case was about the alleged violation of the Dealership Agreement while the Makati
case was about Zulueta’s debt for unpaid beer products.
a. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the two cases should be consolidated and tried jointly. YES, because they both came from the dealership agreement.

DOCTRINE:
True, Zulueta’s obligation to pay for the beer products delivered by Asia Brewery can exist regardless of an alleged breach in the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this obligation and the relationship
between Asia Brewery and Zulueta, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from the Dealership Agreement which is now the subject of inquiry in the Iloilo case . In fact, Zulueta herself
claims that her obligation to pay was negated by Asia Brewery’s contractual breach. In other words, the nonpayment — the res of the Makati case — is an incident of the Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in question, it would be more, practical and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences. The
issues in both civil cases pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the
judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related issues.

Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. The consolidation of cases
is proper when they involve the resolution of common questions of law or facts.

Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on
the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.

3. Roque Yu v. Magno, G.R. No. 138701, October 17, 2006

DOC: Rules allow two decision from two RTC branches be penned by one judge, because the trial court is a multi-sala court, provided that the requisites of consolidation are met.
FACTS:
1. Sps Roque and Asuncion Yu, as controlling stockholders of Leyte Lumber, entered into a verbal agreement with Engr. Magno where Leyte Lumber would supply Magno with building materials he may need his
construction business.
a. Magno then established BG Magno Construction and Development Enterprises.
b. Thereafter, Roque and Magno entered into a joint venture called the Great Pacific Construction Company.
c. This continued until Magno died.
2. A year after Magno’s death, Sps Yu and Leyte Lumber filed separate Complaints for Sum of Money with Damages and Preliminary Attachment against BG Magno and the estate.
a. In the case instituted by Leyte Lumber, it wanted to collect on the principal amount of 1.2M for construction materials.
b. In the case instituted by Sps. Yu, they wanted to collect on loans and advances amounting to 3.5M.
3. Both cases were raffled to separate RTC branches which rendered decisions in favor of BG Magno.
a. However, the 2 decisions were penned by Judge Francisco.
b. The parties did not file an MR nor called the attention of Judge Francisco on the absence of an Order for Consolidation. Instead, they directly filed appeals before the CA.
4. In the CA, the 2 cases were consolidated.
a. CA modified in the case instituted by Leyte Lumber but reserved the one instituted by Sps. Yu.
b. Sps. Yu filed an MR but was denied.
c. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the Propriety of Judge Francisco in formulating the two decisions where one case was tried in another branch was proper. YES, it was agreed by the to consolidate the two cases for decision by Judge
Francisco.
-same collection of sum, identical parties, same defense, same period of transaction, same issues of facts, identical
-6 months prior to the judgment, there was a consolidation of the two cases. It was not objected by the parties. It’s too late for Sps. Yu to question Judge Francisco.

DOCTRINE:

On the question of the propriety of Judge Francisco of Branch 6 formulating the decision in Civil Case No. 5822 which was pending and tried in Branch 8, we declare that there was nothing irregular in the
procedure taken. The records show that there appears to have been a previous agreement to either transfer or consolidate the two cases for decision by the presiding judge of Branch 6.

Indeed, when the Magno filed a Motion to Lift, Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with Branch 6 on January 20, 1993, the caption thereof indicated the docket numbers of both cases. Likewise, on
October 29, 1993, when the Sps. Yu’s new counsel entered his Formal Appearance, in the caption thereof was also written the docket numbers of both cases. Sps. Yu’s previous counsel of longstanding
(whose representation dates back to the filing of the two complaints in 1979) filed his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on October 30, 1993, and the caption thereof similarly indicated the docket numbers of
both cases. Subsequent orders of the court which emanated from Branch 6 also bear, in the caption thereof, the titles and docket numbers of both cases.

In other words, as early as 6 months prior to the promulgation of Judge Francisco’s decisions in the 2 cases, there appears to have been a transfer or consolidation of said cases in Branch 6 and the
parties knew of it, albeit the actual date when the two cases were consolidated or transferred does not appear on record. Nonetheless, the fact remains that no opposition or objection in any manner was
registered by either of the parties to the same, thereby evincing their consent thereto. It is, therefore, already too late in the day for the Sps. Yu to question the competence of Judge Francisco to
render the separate decisions in the two cases.

The two cases were filed just a few months apart; they involve simple cases of collection of sums of they entailed presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesses; in fact, a broad part of
money between identical parties and no other; Magno’s claim, in both cases, essentially the same the evidence and testimonies in one case was totally adopted or reproduced in the other by either or
defense, which is overpayment; they cover the same period of transacting continuous business both parties. And the trial court, being multi-sala courts, its Branches 6 and 8 possessed
that spans 4 years; they relate to simple issues of fact that are intimately related to each other; jurisdiction to try either or both cases on their own.

A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues,
and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the
court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial will
not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of
any of the parties.
The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard
against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays , to clear congested dockets,
to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.
Consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time,
the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable
end to be achieved, within the context of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and
individual and state finances are limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is
in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their
cases before the courts. Another compelling argument that weighs heavily in favor of consolidation is the
avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or
more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.
4. Mega Land v. C-E Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 165211, July 31, 2007
DOC: Consolidation is not a cure for forum shopping
Consolidation in CA is not mandatory, but discretionary only
FACTS:
1. Mega Land and CE Construction had an arbitration case before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC).
a. CIAC rendered a decisión ordering Mega Land to pay CE 1.6M.
b. After Megal Land received the decisión on June 20, 2002, pursuant to Rule 43, it had 15 days
(July 5) to appeal to the CA.
2. On July 4, Fajardo Law Offices filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review
and sought an extensión until July 20 on the ground that the legal issues are complex and the
records are voluminous.
a. This case was raffled to the 16th Division.
3. However, on July 5, Mega Land’s President and GM (Sy) also filed a Motion for Extension which
was assigned a different docket number.
a. This was raffled to the 5th división (now 3rd Division).
b. The reason for the second Motion was because it was no longer availing of the services of
Fajardo Law Offices. No move was undertaken to withdraw or disavow the Motion earlier filed
by Fajardo Law Offices.
c. These 2 Motions for Extensions were granted and thus prolonging the period to July 20.
4. Meanwhile, Mega Land secured the services of Atty. Flores. As such, he filed a 2nd Motion for
Extension of Time with Formal Entry of Appearance on July 15.
a. Flores sought a new 15 day period to appeal or on Aug 4.
b. In his Motion, the caption was that of the 2nd case.
c. This was granted thus further prolonging the period to appeal from July 20 to August 4.
5. On August 1, Flores filed a Petition for Review on behalf of Mega Land but the caption thereof was
that of the first case.
a. As a result, the 16th Division handling the first case dismissed the Petition for Review for having
been filed out of time because the time extensión was only until July 20.
b. As for the 3rd Division handling the 2nd case, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that
Mega Land did not file a Petition for Review within the period granted or on August 4.
c. Mega Land filed an MR to the 1st case but was denied. Hence, this petition.
d. Essentially, Mega Land contends that the 2nd Motion for Extension of Time should have bound
the 16th Division which would thereby make its period Aug 4 than merely July 20.
Gist: 2 motions for extension of time were filed involving similar parties and COA. SC says this is Forum
Shopping. Consolidation is not a cure for FS. The suits are dismissed.
ISSUE: WON the 2nd motion for Extension of Time filed with 5th division should bind the 16th division.
DOCTRINE:
The fact that the petition for review intended for filing in the second case bore instead the docket
number of the first case indicates that Mega Land and its new counsel, Atty. Flores, knew of the
first case earlier initiated by Fajardo Law Offices. In short, at the time the petition was filed with
the CA, Mega Land had known that there were two similar cases involving the same parties
and causes of action.
There were a variety of options Mega Land could have resorted to in order to rectify the anomaly. Upon
learning that there were actually two different cases pending before the Court of Appeals, it could have
moved to withdraw either any of the motions for extension of time, so that there would be only one
case pending with the appellate court.
Had Mega Land done this at the onset, even if later the filed petition itself stated the wrong docket
number, the Court of Appeals could have easily recorded the pleading under the case that
remained in existence since it would anyway be incapable of filing the same under the records of a
case that had already been withdrawn.
NO MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION IN THE CA
We have duly considered that perhaps this entire untidiness could have been avoided had the Court of
Appeals at the outset consolidated the two cases. Yet such consideration is ultimately of no moment to
Mega Land. For one, under the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), there is no
mandatory obligation to consolidate related cases. The language utilized in Rule 3, Section 3 of the
RIRCA, which authorizes consolidation of cases, is merely directory in character, providing as it does:
“[w]hen related cases are assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated and assigned to one
Justice.”
More importantly perhaps, the consolidation of cases was never intended to cure the defect of
forum shopping. If one litigant has filed multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, the consolidation of these suits is not the correct palliative. These suits
should instead be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
5. Neri v. Sandiganbayan, 703 SCRA 350 (2013)
DOC: When consolidation is improper (no commonality of particulars, witnesses) it should not be
resorted to because it will only cause delay.
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. The Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 2 criminal Informations in connection with the ZTE
Project.
a. First, it filed an Information against Abalos (Abalos case) for violation of RA 3019. This was
raffled off to the Fourth Division.
b. Second, an Information was filed against Romulo Neri (Neri case) also for violation of RA 3019.
This was raffled off to the Fifth Division.
2. During Pretrial of the Abalos case, Neri took the stand against Abalos.
3. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor in the Neri case moved that the Neri case be
consolidated with the Abalos case to promote a more expeditious and less expensive
resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction.
a. Neri opposed the consolidation claiming that it would be oppressive and would violate his rights
as an accused.
 b. Nonetheless, the Fifth Division granted consolidation subject to the conformity of the Fourth
Division.
c. Neri’s MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the cases should be consolidated. NO. The particulars for each cases are dissimilar. The
witnesses stated in the Pre-Trial Order are different. The testimonies of Abalos have no relation with the
crim charged against Neri. Consolidation will only result to delay.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE IS MOOT ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERVENING EVENTS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
As may be recalled, the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division ordering the
consolidation of the Neri case with the Abalos case pending with the Fourth Division, was subject to the
“conformity of the said (4th) Division.”
On October 19, 2012, the Fourth Division, on the premise that consolidation is addressed to the sound
discretion of both the transferring and receiving courts, but more importantly the latter as the same
transferred case would be an added workload, issued a Resolution refusing to accept the Neri case, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Fourth Division RESPECTFULLY
DECLINES to accept SB-10-CRM-0099 (Neri case) for consolidation with SB-10-
CRM-00998 (Abalos case) pending before it.
It declined the consolidation on the ground that it already Heard Neri testify against Abalos. As such, the
Fourth Division had already formed their respective opinions on the matter of Neri’s credibility.
IMPROPRIETY OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
CONSOLIDATION is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases
in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously
while providing justice to the parties. Toward this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in
the court’s docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are permitted by the rules.
The term “consolidation” is used in THREE (3) DIFFERENT SENSES OR CONCEPTS, thus:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment [in one] trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is
referred to as such. (QUASI CONSOLIDATION)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become
a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation
where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have
been set out originally in one complaint. (ACTUAL CONSOLIDATION)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate
character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does
not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the
other. (CONSOLIDATION FOR TRIAL)
CivPro
To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is
entitled “Consolidation or Severance.” And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides:
Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it may make
such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay.
CrimPro
The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for CRIMINAL CASES is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court stating:
Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. — Charges for offenses founded on
the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be
tried jointly at the discretion of the court.
SB Pro
as complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the SANDIGANBAYAN REVISED INTERNAL RULES which
states:
Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. — Cases arising from the same incident or series
of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be
consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket
number is raffled.
Whether as a procedural tool to aid the court in dispatching its official business in criminal or civil cases,
the rule allowing consolidation — in whatsoever sense it is taken, be it as a merger of several causes
of actions/cases, in the sense of actual consolidation, or merely joint trial — is designed, among other
reasons, to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, attain justice with
the least expense and vexation to the litigants.
While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it approved, there
is nothing in the records to show that what the prosecution vied for and what the Fifth
Division approved went beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly
on the aforequoted Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial. Given the above
perspective, Neri should now disabuse himself of the unfounded notion that what the Fifth
Division intended was a fusion into one criminal Proceedings of the Abalos and Neri cases, where one is
unidentifiable from the other, or worse, where he will be tried as coaccused in the Abalos case.
REQUISITES FOR CONSOLIDATION OF TRIAL
Jurisprudence has laid down the REQUISITES FOR CONSOLIDATION OF TRIAL. As held in Caños v.
Peralta, joint trial is permissible “where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction,
involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that
the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party
an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.”
Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact.
There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the
allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
Since conviction or acquittal in a criminal case hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts
constituting, or the elements, of the crime were indeed committed or are present, allegations in
the information are crucial to the success or failure of a criminal prosecution.
As can be gleaned from the charges in the Informations, the inculpatory acts complained of, the
particulars and specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were
allegedly done in connection with the negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project. Due
to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the pre-trial order in the Neri case are
also different from the list of the people’s witnesses lined up to testify in the Abalos case,
albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders.
A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose Neri to testimonies which have no
relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby
delaying the resolution of his case.
Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however
irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be resolved –– a
needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him.
a. However, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the transaction or the
execution of any documentary evidence which had been merely endorsed to him.
b. As a result, RTC ordered the termination of the presentation of evidence.
c. Thereafter, Sps. Vicente filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of
action.
3. RTC granted it on the ground that the evidence presented by Radiowealth was merely based on
hearsay.
4. On appeal, however, CA reversed and stated that its genuineness and due execution were
admitted thereby establishing the Vicente’s indebtedness.
a. As such, CA remanded it for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Did the defendants (Del Rosario) lose the right to present evidence when they appealed? Yes
RULE 33 Did CA correctly remand the case? NO, when the CA disagrees with the dismissal of the trial court based
on Rule 33, the CA should resolve the case and render judgment. Remand will only prolong litigation.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DOCTRINE:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.
The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
consequence on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
provision of Rule 33 reads as follows:
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. — After the plaintiff has completed the
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
the right to present evidence.
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
1. Demurrer is an objection by a party to the effect that the evidence produce is insufficient to sustain
denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
the issue.
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
2. Rule 33 Sec. 1 (failure to state COA) v. Rule 16 Sec. 1g (lack of COA)
the right to present evidence.
a. Rule 33 – raised after presentation of evidence
Rule 16 – raised before answer
b. Rule 33 – insufficiency of a factual basis for the action
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana
Rule 16 – insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading
pronounced:
3. If Denied, defendant shall have the right to present evidence.
a. Interlocutory Order.
The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is
b. Remedy: MR, Certiorari
permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is
4. If Granted, defendant shall lose the right to present evidence. (Radiowealth v. Del Rosario)
not granted, to move for a dismissal that upon the facts as thus established
(Oropesa v Oropesa)
and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial
a. Adjudication on Merits.
court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient
b. Remedy: Appeal or Certiorari (if with grave abuse)
for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains
5. Leave of court
before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the
a. In civil cases – no need
defendant’s evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending
b. In criminal cases – with or without
parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the
i. With leave of court – no waive of right to present evid
appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with
ii. Without leave – waiver of right (People v Cachola)
the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally
6. Bar exam: MTD on the ground of insufficiency of basis for action (a mere disguise of demurrer)
receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all
possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon
XXI. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE (RULE 33)
appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and
1. Radiowealth v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000
avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded
DOC: The defendant loses the right to present evidence if demurrer is granted but on appeal CA
evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant
reverses.
delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his
FACTS:
demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed
on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and
1. Sps. Vicente and Del Rosario jointly and severally executed in favor of Radiowealth Finance
he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of
Company a PN for P138K on installments with an acceleration clause.
plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses
a. When the Sps Vicente defaulted, demands for payment were sent but went unheeded.
the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the
b. Thus, Radiowealth filed a Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money before the RTC of Manila.
basis of plaintiff’s evidence.
2. During the trial, Radiowealt’s Collection and Credit Officer (Famatico) presented in evidence in check
payments, demand letters, etc.
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on
appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the
defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition,
resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage
prolonged litigations.
In the case at bar, the RTC, acting on Sps. Vicente’s demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint
on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the
CA reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of
evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on
the basis of the evidence submitted by Radiowealth. While the CA correctly ruled that “the
documentary evidence submitted by Radiowealth should have been allowed and appreciated,” and that
“it presented quite a number of documentary exhibits enumerated in the appealed order,” we agree with
Radiowealth that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A
remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of
the facts on record.
2. People v. Cachola, G.R. No. 148712, January 21, 2004
DOC: In criminal case, filing of demurrer without leave is a waiver of right to present evidence
FACTS:
1. Cachola et al were charged with murder in the RTC of La Union. During trial 12-year old Jessie
Barnachea, his older brother Robert, and their neighbors were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution.
a. Jessie testified that armed men entered their house and shot and stabbed to death his uncle,
mother, brother, and cousin.
b. Meanwhile, Robert testified that while he was in his uncle’s house next door, he saw armed men
running towards their house.
c. After several shots, they saw them running away and noticed a stainless jeep with “fruits and
vegetables dealer” marked on it parked in front of their house.
d. Some neighbors at a nearby store likewise saw the same jeep with an “El Shaddai” marked in
front and “fruits and vegetables dealer” marked on the side.
e. After reporting this to the pólice, they intercepted said jeep carrying the 8 accused at a
checkpoint in the highway.
f. During a pólice lineup, Jessie identified Cachola et al as assailants.
2. After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense orally asked for leave of court to file a Demurrer
to Evidence.
a. However, RTC denied this outright and set the Schedule for presentation of evidence for the
defense.
b. Instead of presenting evidence, the Defense filed another Demurer without leave of court.
3. Thereafter, RTC no longer allowed the presentation of the defense and convicted Cachola and Amay
as principals, and the 6 others as accomplices.
4. Hence, this automatic review. It is contended that the RTC wrongly disallowed the Defense’s
presentation of evidence.
ISSUE: WON the RTC wronly disallowed the defense’ presentation of evid. YES, because when Cachola
filed demurrer without leave of court, he waived his right to present evidence.
DOCTRINE:
As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing the Cachola to present evidence after filing their
demurrer to evidence without leave of court, then Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Court is clear on
the matter, thus:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the court
may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of
the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave
of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The filing by Cachola of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a
clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had been
denied due process because the evidence they belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated them
would be to allow them to “wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent
viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.”
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver was not clear. The trial court postponed the
hearings on the motion for demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied, and then granted
extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the position of his co-appellants. At no time other than in
this automatic review was there any attempt that is contrary to the waiver of the presentation of
evidence.
3. Oropesa v Oropesa Gr. 184528 (2012)
Facts:
1. Petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the properties of his father/respondent. He alleged
that his father is incompetent (stroke).
2. the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship.
3. Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his
sister, and the (respondent’s) former nurse.
a. After presentation of evidence, The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
b. Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived
the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge
the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to
File Demurrer to Evidence.
4. RTC: The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
5. CA: affirmed
ISSUE: WON the respondent is incompetent who should be placed under guardianship. NO
Should the defendant first be required to present evidence when his demurrer is granted before
dismissing a case? NO, because the effect of granting a demurrer is to preclude a defendant from
presenting his evidence.
DOCTRINE:
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven
to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind
but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be 7. Rule 16 – filed by defendant before answer
placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads: Rule 34 – filed by plaintiff after answer
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes 8. Motion for J on the Pleadings is ex parte(?)
persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf 9. No “Partial” Judgment on the Pleadings unlike in Partial Summary Judgment
and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they 10. Defendant may file a motion on the pleadings when a counterclaim is made because he is the
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, plaintiff in such counterclaim.
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and
manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. RULE 35
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
 SJ – no trial if there exist no genuine issue or controversy as to material fact except as to
applied in the case at bar. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.
amount of damages
 Purpose – expedite or promptly dispose cases
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without
 Genuine issue – issue calls for presentation of evidence as opposed to issue which is a sham,
first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer
fictitious, patently unsubstantial
to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant
 When issue is a sham – if issue cannot be proven or party tendering it has no sincere intention
from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no
to prove it
right to relief.
 No SJ in nullity, annulment of marriage and legal separation, damages(?)
RULE 34  PN without date. Defendant admits there is PN, but defense is no date = Summary judgment
because issue is sham and not J on the P because he did not admit all (still denied something)

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant.

A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such favor upon all or any part thereof.
pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party.
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief
1. Judgment on the pleadings is a judgment if the answer fails to tender an issue or admits the is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
a. J on the P will Not apply when no answer is filed 1. Who can file:
b. Rendered without trial or even before or after pre-trial a. Plaintiff (“to recover”) – any time after answer and issues have been joined
2. Grounds for J on the P: b. Defendant (“against whom”) – any time
a. Fails to tender an issue – answer does not comply requirements of specific denial (R8 S8, 10); 2. Defendant needs to file answer so that issues may be joined to move for SJ
(e.g. general denial; fail to deny genuineness and due execution of an actionable doc) XPN: SJ before answer IF with regard to liquidated damages.
b. Admit the material allegations – answer not only expressly confesses, but also omits to deal 3. Court cannot motu proprio decide on SJ.
with them all. (e.g. oral admission in pre-trial; failure to substantiate affirmative defenses) a. It must be by filing a motion.
3. GR: Judgment on the pleadings must be on motion b. Supported by: affidavits, depositions or admissions
XPN: Motu proprio if at pre-trial the judgment on the pleadings is proper (R18 S2g)??? Still on
motion - Diway Sec. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.
4. Hypothetical admission The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing.
a. One who prays for judgment on pleadings without proof of his own allegation = admission of all The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3)
material allegations of the opposing party days before the hearing.
b. Not deemed admitted by filing J on the P:
i. Irrelevant allegation After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
ii. Immaterial allegation supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount
iii. Allegation of unliquidated damages (R8 S11) of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
5. Q: is it proper to render a J on the P when only affirmative defenses are raised in the answer? entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
a. NO, court still has to determine the merit of the affirmative defenses 1. Procedure
b. YES, if court finds that the affirmative defenses are without merit. Why? Effect is hypothetical a. File motion for SJ together with supporting/opposing affidavits
admission of material allegations. b. Service 10d before hearing - 10-day Notice Rule
6. J on the P does not apply in c. Adverse party may serve opposing affidavits 3d before hearing
a. Nullity, annulment, legal separation d. Hearing
b. Amount of unliquidated damages e. Judgment
c. Only conclusions of law are alleged 2. Non-observance of proceeding – warrants setting aside of summary judgment
3. 10d before hearing = motion serve
3d before hearing = ADA serve
4. Movant must establish two requisites:
a. there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and
b. the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
Sec. 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. (PSJ)
If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining
the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith
controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted
facts accordingly.
1. Partial Summary Judgment
a. Interlocutory order, not a final judgment, not finally dispose of an action
b. PSJ is Not appealable (XPN R41g)
c. SJ is appealable only when it is a complete SJ not partial
2. When PSJ? After hearing of the motion to SJ, the court may render a PSJ disposing of the claims not
substantially controverted and conduct trial on controverted facts.
a. WHEN PSJ: claims without substantial controversy
b. WHEN NOT PSJ: claims substantially controverted
Sec. 5. Form of affidavits and supporting papers.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Certified true copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
1. supporting/opposing affidavits must:
a. based on personal knowledge
b. set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence
c. show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein
d. Certified true copies of all papers is attached and served
Sec. 6. Affidavits in bad faith. or solely for purposes of delay
Should it appear to its satisfaction at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to
this Rule are presented in bad faith, or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the offending party or counsel to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including
attorney’s fees. It may, after hearing, further adjudge the offending party or counsel guilty of
contempt.
1. Sanction:
a. Pay reasonable expenses and Atty Fees
b. Contempt indirect to party or counsel
2. Bases of SJ: [ADAA]
a. Affidavits on personal knowledge
b. Depositions of adverse party or 3rd Party R23
c. Admission of adverse party R26
d. Answers to interrogatories R25
XXII.JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RULE 34 AND 35)
1. Wood Technology v. Equitable Banking, G.R. 153867, February 17, 2005 – R34 v R35
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Equitable filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against WTC, Cordova, and Young.
a. It was alleged that WTC obtained a loan from Equitable in the amount of $75K as evidenced by
a PN which was signed also by Cordova and Young as representatives of the WTC.
b. Likewise, Cordova and Young executed a Surety Agreement binding themselves as WTC’s
sureties for the loan.
2. In their Answer, WTC admitted that they obtained a loan and that Cordova and Young bound
themselves as sureties.
a. However, they claimed that the loan had not yet matured as the maturity date was purposely
left blank subject to the agreement by the parties at a later date.
b. Thus, since no maturity date had been fixed, the Complaint was filed prematurely and that it
failed to state a cause of action.
c. Equitable moved for Judgment on the Pleadings.
3. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Equitable.
4. CA affirmed and stated the PN’s genuineness and due execution were deemed admitted and
that there was no need to present evidence to prove the maturity date of the PN since it was
payable on demand.
a. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the motion for J on the P is proper. NO, this should be under Summary Judgment because
WTC’s Answer apparently shows issues were raised, and such issues were not factual ones requiring trial
nor were they genuine issues.
 Issue in R34 – WON there are issues generated by the pleadings
 Issue in R35 – WON the issues raised by the answer are factual ones requiring trial or genuine
issues
DOCTRINE:
The Rules of Court seeks to shorten the procedure in order to allow the speedy disposition of a case.
Specifically, we have rules on demurrer to evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and summary
judgments. In all these instances, a full blown trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered
on the basis of the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions of the parties.
In this case, at issue is the propriety and validity of a judgment on the pleadings. A JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.
We note now that (1) the RTC knew that the Answer asserted special and affirmative defenses;
(2) the Court of Appeals recognized that certain issues were raised, but they were not genuine
issues of fact; (3) WTC insisted that they raised genuine issues; and (4) Equitable argued that
WTC’s defenses did not tender genuine issues.
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
However, whether or not the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry
in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In
a case for JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The
essential question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. This is
the distinction between a proper case of summary judgment, compared to a proper case for judgment
on the pleadings. We have explained this vital distinction in Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, thus,
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand,
and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case
for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for
 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, there is no ostensible issue at all because of
the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue . On the other hand,
in the case of a SUMMARY JUDGMENT, issues apparently exist — i.e. facts are
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the
answer — but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or
not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
Indeed, WTC’s Answer apparently tendered issues. While it admitted that WTC obtained the loan,
that Cordova and Young signed the promissory note and that they bound themselves as sureties for the
loan, it also alleged special and affirmative defenses that the obligation had not matured and that the
promissory note and surety agreement were contracts of adhesion.
Applying the requisites of a judgment on the pleadings vis-à-vis a summary judgment, the judgment
rendered by the RTC was not a judgment on the pleadings, but a summary judgment.
Although the Answer apparently raised issues, both the RTC and the CA after considering the
parties’ pleadings, petitioners’ admissions and the documents attached to the Complaint, found that
the issues are not factual ones requiring trial, nor were they genuine issues.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses
offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a
summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to
justify a summary judgment?
“GENUINE ISSUE ” means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a
genuine issue for trial.
We note that this is a case for a sum of money, and WTC have admitted that they obtained the
loan. They also admitted the due execution of the loan documents and their receipt of the final
demand letter made by Equitable. These documents were all attached to the Complaint. WTC merely
claimed that the obligation has not matured. Notably, based on the promissory note, the RTC and
the CA found this defense not a factual issue for trial, the loan being payable on demand.
We agree with both the RTC and CA that this matter proffered as a defense could be resolved judiciously
by plain resort to the stipulations in the promissory note which was already before the trial court. A full-
blown trial to determine the date of maturity of the loan is not necessary. Also, the act of
leaving blank the maturity date of the loan did not necessarily mean that the parties agreed to fix it
later. If this was the intention of the parties, they should have so indicated in the promissory note.
2. Bascug v. Aranday, A.M.-RTJ 00-1591, April 11, 2002 – R34
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. In the case of Ditching v Odisco Farms System Cooperative, Bascug, President of Odisco, filed an
Administrative Complaint charging Judge Aranday with grave misconduct when he directed a
judgment on the pleadings.
a. Bascug claims that Judge declared that the parties agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings even if Odisco had never agreed to it.
b. In fact, Odisco never submitted any memorándum for judgment on the pleadings
required by the Judge in an Order.
2. In his defense, Judge claimed that the parties manifested that they had no objection to the
submission of the case for judgment on the pleadings.
ISSUE: WON the judge correctly directed a J on the P even without the motion of the parties. NO, that
was not called for nor the parties made an implied admission of factual allegations
DOCTRINE:
Section 1, Rule 34, of the Rules on Civil Procedure provides —
Where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading.
In his order, dated 20 December 1994, Judge required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda for a judgment on the pleadings. Bascug was the President of the corporation who
maintained that the corporation never agreed to have the case submitted for judgment on the
pleadings. As so aptly put by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 14 August 1998 —
It is believed that under the circumstances of the case, judgment on the pleadings
was not called for and prevented a fair and full resolution of controversy. The
trial court stated that both parties agreed to have judgment on the pleadings, the
minutes of the session held on December 20, 1994 merely stated that ‘both parties
will submit their respective memoranda for judgment on the pleadings’. Only
the plaintiffs submitted Memorandum praying for judgment on the pleadings; the
defendants did not submit their memorandum for judgment on the pleadings .
In fact, in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Judgment on the pleadings, the
defendants pointed out that the parties presented ‘widely opposing contentions’ in
their respective pre-trial brief, and the court cannot rely on ‘conjectures’ on the ‘wild’
monetary claims of plaintiffs. In view of the objections expressed by the defendants to
the issues raised, there was no clear agreement to submit the case to a judgment or
the pleadings, much less an implied admission of each other’s factual allegations,
which the defendants-appellants correctly describe as ‘widely opposing,’ that would
support a submission by the parties to a judgment on the pleadings.
3. Eland Phil. V. Garcia, G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010 – R35
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Garcia et al filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC
against Eland Phils. Inc.
a. They claimed that they are owners of a parcel of land by occupation and possession.
b. They further claim that they were not aware of any person who had a legal or equitable interest
or claim on the same lot until they were requesting that the lot be declared for tax purposes.
c. They found out that the lot was subject to a Land Registration Proceeding which had already
been decided.
2. RTC declared Eland in default and allowed Garcia to present evidence ex parte.
a. Eland filed an MR which was granted.
3. Then, the RTC admitted Eland’s Answer Ad Coutelam.
a. Thereaafter, Pretrial Conference was set and the parties submitted their respective Pretrial
briefs.
b. Eland tried to suspend the proceedings by filing a Petition for Certiorari which was however
denied.
c. Hence, the RTC ruled that the reception of evidence presented by Garcia remained as part of
the records subject to Eland’s right to cross-examine.
4. Eventually, Garia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which Eland filed its
Opposition.
5. RTC granted Summary Judgment. Hence, this petition.
 a. Eland questions the propriety of the Summary Judgment rendered in this case of Quieting of
Title.
ISSUE:
WON there is violation of the 10-day Notice Rule. NO, there was substantial compliance (when Garcia
filed motion for SJ, they furnished eland Phil. with a copy thereof on the same day)
WON SJ applies to quieting of title. YES, the only xpn are annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation.
WON the SJ in this case is proper. NO, there exists genuine issues.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant.—A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after
the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.—The motion shall be served at least ten
(10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to
the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
NO VIOLATION OF THE 10-DAY NOTICE RULE
Eland contended that the 10-day notice rule was violated, because the copy of the motion for summary
judgment was served only on August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing.
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was correct in its observation that there
was substantial compliance with due process . The CA ruled, as the records show, that the 10-day
notice rule was substantially complied with because when Garcia et al filed the motion for
summary judgment on August 9, 1999, they furnished Eland with a copy thereof on the same
day as shown in the registry receipt and that the motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or
10 days from the date of the filing thereof.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLIES TO QUETING OF TITLE; EXCEPTIONS
This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the
sole exception of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation.
IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT; EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if,
while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in
granting a motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving such
nonexistence. The RTC found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate
conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the Garcia failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of
any genuine issue of fact. They merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for
quieting of title and opposed some issues raised by the Eland in its Answer Ad Cautelam.
Clearly, the facts pleaded by Garcia in their motion for summary judgment have been duly
disputed and contested by Eland, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a
full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested ,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.
In the present case, Eland was able to point out the genuine issues. A “genuine issue” is an issue
of fact that requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false claim.
By granting the summary judgment, the RTC has in effect annulled its former ruling based on a
claim of possession and ownership of the same land for more than 30 years without the
benefit of a full-blown trial. The fact that Garcia et al seek to nullify the original certificate of title
issued to Eland on the claim that the former were in possession of the same land for a number of years,
is already a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists.
4. Smart Communications v. Aldecoa, supra
ISSUE: WON the granting of Smart’s Motion for Summary Judgment is proper. NO because there are
clearly factual issues disputed or contested by the parties.
DOCTRINE:
At the outset, the RTC erred in granting Smart’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering the
dismissal of Aldecoa’s Complaint in Civil Case. Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court.
In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court discussed extensively when a summary judgment is
proper:
For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites:
(a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and
(b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended
thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a
genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving
party is entitled to a summary judgment. A GENUINE ISSUE is an issue of fact
which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.
On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a
trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can
reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Courts must be critical of the papers
presented by the moving party and not of the papers/documents in opposition
thereto.
Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as a. No decisions within the purview of the const
there are clearly factual issues disputed or contested by the parties. b. Mere incidental matters that don’t touch the merits of the case
9. Memorandum decision – decision of the appellate court which adopts the findings of the trial court
a. Conditions for the validity of a memorandum:
i. Must not simply incorporate the findings and conclusion of trial court; must also provide
direct access to the facts and the law adopted (di basta kopya)
RULE 36 ii. Must comply with Art 8 Sec 14 1987 Const., R36 S1
iii. Only when there are no doctrinal complications involved.
JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY 10. Obiter dictum – opinion expressed by a court; not enforceable nor a source of a judicially actionable
claim
THEREOF 11. GR: validity of judgment/order cannot be collaterally attacked
 Final Judgment/Order – one that finally disposes of a case. It is an adjudication on merits. XPN:
 This section applies only to final judgments, not to interlocutory orders. a. Lack of jurisdiction
o Interlocutory if order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something b. Irregularity of judgment is apparent upon its face
more to be done on its merits. 12. Kinds of judgments
 Contents of Judgment: All of these have Res Judicata
o Statement of case a. J upon compromise – compromise between parties. Avoid litigation by making reciprocal
o Statement of facts concessions.
o Issues i. Compromise is binding even without approval of court.
o Court Ruling Advantage of approval of court: in case of breach, parties may move for execution of
o Dispositive Portion judgments based on Rule 39
ii. REMEDY: motion to set aside on ground of vitiating consent R41 S1e
 GR: when there is conflict between dispositive portion and the body, the DP controls
b. J upon confession – defendant expressly agrees to the other party’s claim
 Judgment that will never apply finality: support cases
i. Cuts off all defenses and right of appeal
ii. Two kinds
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. [FORMAL REQUISITES]
1. J by cognivit actionem – after service instead of entering a plea, defendant concedes
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
liability
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
2. J by confession relicta verificationem – after pleading and before trial, defendant
is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
concedes or abandoned his plea
1. Reason for rendition in writing: to put juridical existence
iii. REMEDY: Motion to set aside. If denied R.65
2. Requisites of valid judgment
c. J upon merits – legal declaration of the respective rights and duties based on disclosed facts
a. Jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, court must have
i. Can there be J on merits even without trial? Yes
b. Authority to hear and determine the matter
e.g.
c. Evidence must have been considered
1. Deliberate forum shopping
d. Parties must have been given opportunity to be heard
2. Res Judicata PURE
3. Formal requisites:
3. 2nd order of dismissal on notice of Plaintiff
a. Writing
4. Failure to comply with order of court
b. Personally and directly prepared by judge
5. Pre trial or pretrial brief
c. stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
d. Clarificatory J – to clarify ambiguous judgment or difficult to comply
d. signed by him, and
i. REMEDY: File Motion for Clarificatory Judgment NOT assail J as void
e. filed with the clerk of the court
ii. E.g. clerical error
NOTE: substantive basis of formal requisites Art 8 Sec 14 1987 Const
e. J non pro tunc (now for then) – record an act of court done at former time which was not
4. Consequence of non-compliance: void
recorded
Interlocutory orders need not follow sec. 1
f. J sin perjuicio (without prejudice) – only dispositive portion; no body; findings of fact and
5. NOTE VERY WELL: Unqualified dismissal based on Sec. 3 R17 IS deemed with prejudice. As such it
conclusions of law are reserved in subsequent judgment. It is void.
is an adjudication on merits and must follow sec. 1.
g. J by default R9 -
6. WHAT IF the judge was transferred to another branch BEFORE rendition of judgment, may the new
h. J on Demurrer of evid R 33 -
judge replace him render such judgment?
i. J on the Pleadings R 34
a. GR: YES, the judge who takes over inherits all cases
j. Summary J R35
b. XPN: Any parties may move the case to be decided by the same judge who heard the evidence.
k. Several J R36 S4 – against one or more defendants, but not all of them; leaving the action to
(this is not applicable when a judge is promoted to a higher position, retired, disqualified, etc.)
proceed against the others
7. Resolutions of SC
e.g. joint debtors
a. Not “decisions” within the purview of the Const.:
l. Separate J R36 S5 – disposing a claim among several others
i. E.g. denying petition to review decision of CA; minutes resolutions
m. Special J R39 S11 -
8. Interlocutory orders
n. J for specific acts R39
 o. Conditional J – the effectivity depends upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event. It is
void. Sec. 5. Separate judgments.
p. Final and executory J When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a
q. Amended J determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of
r. Supplemental J the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate
s. Incomplete J – leaves certain matters to be settled in a subsequent proceeding judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to
the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a
Sec. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders. separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the
If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may
these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is
entries of judgments. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be rendered.
the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final order has Sec. 6. Judgment against entity without juridical personality.
become final and executory. When judgment is rendered against two or more persons sued as an entity without juridical
1. When Final and Executory? If no appeal or motion for new trial or MR is filed within the personality, the judgment shall set out their individual or proper names, if known.
reglementary period. 1. How action is filed? Under the name by which they are generally or commonly known R3 S15
2. Effect of Finality of Judgment 2. How summons is served? On anyone of them or to the person in charge of the place of business R14
a. The prevailing party is entitled to execution as a matter of right S8
b. Immutability of Judgment 3. How J is rendered against them? J shall set out their individual proper names, if known S6
c. Res Judicata 4. REMEDIES AGAINST J or ORDERS
3. GR: DOC. OF IMMUTABILITY: power to amend a judgment is inherent before judgment becomes a. Before finality
final and executory; after final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable i. MR
XPN: ii. Appeal
a. Correction of clerical error iii. M for New Trial
b. Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party b. After finality
c. Void Judgment i. Relief from Judgment
d. If execution of judgment would be unjust and inequitable ii. Annnulment of J
4. Reckoning date of finality of judgment: date of entry, not the date the coc entered it in the books of iii. Certiorari R38
Entries of Judgment iv. Collateral attack (if void upon its face; lack of jurisdiction)
a. E.g. Oct 3 judgment became final and executory; Oct 31 judgment was entered by coc in the
book of entries of judgment. ANS Oct 3. XXIII.JUDGMENT (RULE 36)
b. Applicability in 5-year period for execution by motion or 6-month for petition for relief
5. Doctrine of immutability of Judgments or Conclusiveness of Judgments 1. Consing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143584, March 10, 2004
a. GR: Prohibits alteration, modification or correction of final and executory judgment because QUICKIE FACTS:
issuance of J is purely ministerial. 1. As sugar-farm owners, Sps Consing purchased various grades of fertilizer from Sugar Producer’s
b. Heirs of Valdez v CA Cooperative Marketing Association (SPCMA), an association assisting planters to procure fertilizer
XPN: Even granting that the first Resolution became final and executory, the rule on and other farm needs.
immutability of judgment does not apply in cases where what is to be modified or altered a. The debt was evidenced by a PN. When SPCMA presented the PN to PNB in which Sps. Consing
involves: had a Fertilizer Credit Line, the latter refused to honor the note.
i. the correction of clerical errors; 2. Thus, SPCMA filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money against the Sps Consing with the RTC
ii. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; of Negros.
iii. void judgments [such as a dismissal without prejudice that was not intended to be issued] 3. RTC, through Judge Querubin, ruled in favor of SPCMA.
and those where circumstances transpire after the finality that render the execution or a. In its 2-page judgment, it merely narrated the facts showing the indebtedness of the
enforcement, as in this case, of the judgment unjust or inequitable. Sps. Consing and immediately went to the dispostive part holding the Sps liable to
SPCMA in the amount of P1.2M.
4. On appeal, CA affirmed.
Sec. 3. Judgment for or against one or more of several parties. 5. Sps Consing’s MR denied. Hence this petition.
Judgment may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or against one 6. LT: Sps. Consing allege that their the RTC decisión failed to state the legal basis of its ruling
or more of several defendants. When justice so demands, the court may require the parties on which is in violation of the express mandate of the Constitution.
each side to file adversary pleadings as between themselves and determine their ultimate
rights and obligations. ISSUE: WON Judge failed to meet the constitutional requirements in rendering decisions. YES, no law on
Sec. 4. Several judgments. which the decision is based mentioned.
In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper,
render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the DOCTRINE:
others.
While Judge Querubin mentioned his factual findings, the legal basis of his ruling is not set out in
the decision. Judge Querubin failed to meet faithfully the requirement demanded by the Constitution
from the courts in rendering their decisions.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution declares that:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
The court must inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for the court’s decision so that if
a party appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the points of law to which it disagrees .
Every judge should know the constitutional mandate and the rationale behind it. Judge Querubin should
have known the exacting standard imposed on courts by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and
should not have sacrificed the constitutional standard for brevity’s sake.
The failure of the RTC decision to measure up to the standard set by the Constitution is too gross to
ignore as it is in stark contrast to the CA’s decision. The CA’s decision, while also brief, being only
three pages long, laid down the factual and legal reasons why Antonio and Soledad are the
ones liable to SPCMA, and not PNB. The Court of Appeals’ discussion of the merits of this case
enabled the parties to pinpoint the proper issues that we now review.
2. Heirs of Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163208, August 13, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. In an action for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of TCTs entittled Manila Construction
Development v. Sps. Dela Rosa et al, the RTC granted the Heirs of Valdez & Sps Malvar an
Injunction Order and a Writ of Preliminar Mandatory Injunction to place them in possession of a
parcel of land in dispute.
a. Thus, the Sheriff implemented the order and writ in the property in possession by Lopez
Resources. In doing so, they tore down the fence enclosing the said property.
2. Aggrieved, Lopez Resources questioned the RTC decisión in the CA which was assigned to the Ninth
Division.
a. Here, the CA issued 2 conflicting resolutions.
i. First resolution dismissed the petition without prejudice for violation of the
provision against fórum shopping. (mere clerical error)
ii. Second resolution was issued which required the Heirs of Valdez & Sps. Malvar to file
their comments to the Petition while requiring Lopez Resources to rectify the
deficiency in its fórum-shopping certification.
3. Confusion arose when some parties were not able to get both resolutions.
a. Third Resolution: As a result, 86 days after the issuance of the conflicting resolutions, the CA
again issued another resolution clarifying that the first resolution was merely a clerical
error.
4. Pursuant to this, Lopez Resources made the necessary corrections in its petition and refiled the
case.
a. Thereafter, the Heirs of Valdez and Sps Malvar moved to dismiss the re-filed Petition
on the ground that CA has no jurisdiction because the prior resolution had already
become final and executory.
b. However, the CA went to proceed with the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the first resolution with clerical error became final and executory. NO, it could not lapse to
finality because of the mistake the court committed
DOCTRINE:
The fact that the Ninth Division of the CA committed a monumental error cannot be erased. But the
error was not in the court’s intent on what to do with the forum shopping violation it found. In both
resolutions, what is clear is that the court intended to allow a rectification of the deficiency in
Lopez Resources’ non-forum shopping certification in view perhaps of what it perceived to be the
merits that the face of the petition showed.
We have no doubt that it was within the CA’s power and prerogative to issue what either resolution
decreed without committing an abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
To look at the matter from another perspective, the issuance of two conflicting resolutions — one
for dismissal, the other for the continuation of the case, with one cancelling out the other — can only
mean that no definite, specific determination was made by the court; at least, there was
uncertainty on what the court really intended to do. Under this situation, we find it fallacious to
conclude that one resolution lapsed to finality while the other did not. In legal effect, there was
effectively no definite resolution that could have lapsed to finality because of the mistake the
court committed. This status continued until a clarification was made by the issuing court.
Even granting that the first Resolution became final and executory, the rule on immutability of
judgment does not apply in cases where what is to be modified or altered involves:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments [such as a dismissal without prejudice that was not intended to be issued]
and those where circumstances transpire after the finality that render the execution or
enforcement, as in this case, of the judgment unjust or inequitable.
To be sure, the rule does not apply in cases where a supervening event — such as the mistake
undisputably committed by the court (i.e., the unintended release of one of the resolutions, thus
resulting in the conflict and confusion) — took place.
3. Intramuros Tennis v. Philippine Tourism Authority, G.R. No. 135630, September 26,
2000
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. PTA owns Victoria Tennis Courts located in Intramuros. Pursuant to a MOA, PTA transferred the
management, operation, administration, and development of Victoria to the Philippine Tennis
Association (PhilTA) for 10 years.
a. Intramuros Tennis Club is affiliated with PhilTA and its members are tennis players
who frequently use the facilities of Victoria.
b. During the pendency of the MOA, PTA alleged that PhilTA violated its terms and
conditions and thus demanded the surrender of its possession of Victoria. It likewise
asked PhilTA to vacate the premises.
2. As such, Intramuros filed a case for Preliminary Injucntion, Damages, and TRO in the RTC of
Manila against PTA alleging that PTA’s demand to vacate was tantamount to a unilateral pre-
termination of the MOA.
a. RTC granted the TRO and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
3. Thereafter, PTA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cause of action bécame
moot and academic in light of the expiration of the MOA.
a. As a result, MOA dismissed the case and lifted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
b. It also declared that PTA is entitled to the possession of Victoria.
c. Aggrieved, Intramuros appealed.
4. Before the resolution of the appeal, PTA filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
a. CA granted said Motion. MR denied.
b. Hence, this petition.
5. LT : Intramuros contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering
execution pending appeal.

ISSUE: Was it right for CA to order execution of RTC Order pending appeal? Yes, the CA under
Discretionary Execution may order execution pending appeal if there is a judgment of final order. 2.
- The RTC Order is a final order despite being appealed to the CA
- Sec 2 Rule 39 only requires “Final” Judgment or Order and not “final and executory” judgment
or order
3.
DOCTRINE:
Based on the Sec 2 Rule 39 (Discretionary Execution), the CA may order execution pending appeal 4.
subject to the following conditions:
(1) there must be a judgment or final order;
(2) the trial court must have lost jurisdiction over the case;
(3) there must be “good reasons” to allow execution; and
(4) such good reasons must be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Undoubtedly, the RTC order which granted PTA’s Motion to Dismiss and lifted the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is a “final order” within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of 5.
Court. Intramuros maintains that the said RTC order could not be the proper subject of execution
because it was still appealed to the CA, but this merely confuses the concept of a “final” judgment
or order from one which has “become final” (or to use the more established term, “final and 6.
executory”) — a distinction that is definite and settled.
b. Thus, in 1990, they filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Nonpayment of Monetary
Benefits.
LA and NLRC ruled in favor of Salamuding et al.
a. An Entry of Judgment was made and an Alias Writ of Execution issued based on the NLRC
ruling.
b. On certiorari, the SC affirmed.
Soon after the SC decisión in 1993, Polymer ceased operations.
a. On motion, another Alias Writ of Execution was issued but was returned unsatisfied.
In 2004, Polymer’s office was gutted by a fire.
a. As such, LA issued its 5th Alias Writ of Execution and commanded the sherrif to collect an
amount of P2.9M.
b. In the implementation of the Writ, Ang’s shares of stock at USA Resources Corporation were
levied.
c. As such, Polymer moved to quash the 5th Alias Writ of Execution alleging that Ang cannot be
made solidarily liable with Polymer considering that it was only the latter whom the LA, NLRC
and SC adjudged to be liable previously.
LA quashed the Writ and ruled that Ang can no longer be held liable because the decisión
had become final and executory and would thus vary the tenor of the judgment.
a. NLRC affirmed. MR denied.
On certiorari, CA reversed and held Ang liable after it pierced Polymer’s corporate veil.
a. Hence, this petition.

“FINAL” JUDGMENT OR ORDER V “FINAL AND EXECUTORY” JUDGMENT OR ORDER
A “FINAL” JUDGMENT OR ORDER is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more
for the court to do in respect thereto — such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground of res
judicata or prescription, for instance.
It is to be distinguished from an order that is “INTERLOCUTORY,” or one that does not finally
dispose of the case, such as an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading. As such, only final judgments or orders
(as opposed to interlocutory orders) are appealable.
Now, a “FINAL” JUDGMENT OR ORDER in the sense just described becomes “final and
executory” upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom where no appeal has been duly
perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of the appellate court in turn
becomes final. It is called a “final and executory” judgment because execution at such point
issues as a matter of right.
By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal requires only a “final”
judgment or order (as distinguished from an “interlocutory” order) and not a “final and executory”
judgment or order. In the instant case, the RTC order dated August 5, 1997 which granted PTA’s
motion to dismiss, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and held that PTA entitled to possess the
Victoria Tennis Courts is a final order within the contemplation of Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, inasmuch as it makes an adjudication on the merits of the case and
dismisses Intramuros’ action. Intramuros, in fact, impliedly recognized the finality of this RTC order
when they filed an ordinary appeal (and not a petition for certiorari) therefrom with the CA.
4. Polymer Rubber Corporation v. Salamuding, 702 SCRA 153 (2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Salamuding et al were employees of Polymer Rubber Corporation of which Ang was the highest
ranking director.
a. They were dismissed by Polymer for committing certain irregularities.
ISSUE: WON Ang can be personally liable even if the judgment of LA which limits the liability to Polymer
and not to Ang had become final and executory. NO, final and executory judgment can no longer be
altered.
- The Alias writ of Execution is void for going beyond the tenor of the LA Judgment.
-
DOCTRINE:
The CA imputed bad faith on the part of Polymer and Ang when Polymer ceased its operations the day
after the promulgation of the SC resolution in 1993 which was allegedly meant to evade liability. The CA
found it necessary to pierce the corporate fiction and pointed at Ang as the responsible person to pay for
Salamuding’s money claims. Except for this assertion, there is nothing in the records that show
that Ang was responsible for the acts complained of. At any rate, we find that it will require a
great stretch of imagination to conclude that a corporation would cease its operations if only to evade
the payment of the adjudged monetary awards in favor of three (3) of its employees.
The dispositive portion of the LA Decision dated November 21, 1990 which Salamuding attempts to
enforce does not mention that Ang is jointly and severally liable with Polymer. Ang is merely one
of the incorporators of Polymer and to single him out and require him to personally answer for the
liabilities of Polymer is without basis. In the absence of a finding that he acted with malice or bad
faith, it was error for the CA to hold him responsible.
To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment of the LA, as affirmed
by the NLRC and later by the SC had already long become final and executory. It has been held
that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered. The judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. “Since the
alias writ of execution did not conform, is different from and thus went beyond or varied the tenor of the
judgment which gave it life, it is a nullity.
5. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 705 SCRA 430
(2013)
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. FTC manufactures and produces cigarettes. Originally, its cigerette brands were subject to ad
valorem tax.
a. However, with the passage of RA 8240 in 1997, a specific tax system was adopted which
imposed excise taxes on cigarette brands.
b. Pursuant to RRs issued to impement the law, FTC paid excise taxes on all cigarettes
manufactured.
c. Thereafter, FTC sought administrative redress for refund for 3 different periods (2000, 2001,
2002) before the CIR.
2. Since the claims were not acted upon, FTC filed 3 Petitions for Review in the CTA with claims for
refund of the overpaid excise taxes.
a. As such, the CTA ordered CIR to refund FTC for 3 different periods. MR denied.
b. As a result, CIR went to the CA on Petition for Review assailing the ruling in the consolidated
cases involving the claims from 2000 and 2001.
c. Subsequently, CIR filed another Petition for Review for the case involving the period 2002.
3. CA denied the CIR’s Petitions for Review. MRs were likewise denied.
4. In the SC, it ruled against the CIR in July 21 2008. In its fallo, it only said that, “The Decision of
the CA in CA-GR SP No. 80675 (which consolidated only the claims for 2000 and 2001) are
affirmed.”
5. In 2009, upon FTC’s motion, CTA issued a Writ of Execution and ordered CIR to refund FTC the
amounts stated in the 2008 SC decisión which attained finality by virtue of an Entry of Judgment in
Nov 2008.
a. In said Entry of Judgment, however, only the claims in years 2000 and 2001 were
mentioned .
b. Thus, FTC filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Additional Writ of Execution covering the
judgment in the claims for year 2002.
c. However, this Motion was denied. MR was likewise denied.
6. CTA en banc also denied.
a. Hence, FTC comes now via Petition for Review.
ISSUE: WON a Writ of Execution should be issued to cover the claims for 2002 which was left out. YES
through rendering a judgment nunc pro tunc to address the error in the fallo. This is a clerical error and
not judicial error.
DOCTRINE:
After a scrutiny of the body of the aforesaid July 21, 2008 Decision, the Court finds it necessary to
render a judgment nunc pro tunc and address an error in the fallo of said decision. The office of
a JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC is to record some act of the court done at a former time which
was not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is
restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually been
taken.
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, that has been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show
what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment
which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, not to
supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been. The Court would thus
have the record reflect the deliberations and discussions had on the issue. In this particular case it is a
correction of a clerical, not a judicial error. The body of the decision in question is clear proof that
the fallo must be corrected, to properly convey the ruling of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The dispositive portion of the Court’s July 21, 2008 Decision in
G.R. Nos. 167274-75 is corrected to reflect the inclusion of CA-G.R. SP No. 83165 therein. As
amended, the fallo of the aforesaid decision shall read:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP No. 80675 and 83165 (2002 claim) dated 28
September 2004, and its Resolution, dated 1 March 2005, are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
6. Gadrinab v Salamanca (2014)
FACTS:
1. Respondent filed a Petition for Partition against her siblings represented by the petitioner
a. Upon being referred to mediation, the parties entered into a compromise agreement.
b. On April 10, 2003, the Regional Trial Court approved the compromise agreement to sell the
property.
c. Based on the entry of judgment, the case became final and executory.
2. Gadrinab filed a motion for execution of the compromise agreement to sell the property.
a. But Salamanca moved for the physical partition of the property before the Regional Trial Court
instead of selling it.
b. Gadrinab opposed the motion. They contended that the judgment on the compromise
agreement had already become final and executory and had the effect of res judicata.
c. RTC granted the Motion for Physical Partition.
3. Gadrinab appealed to the Court of Appeals. They assailed the grant of Salamanca’s motion for
physical partition after the issuance of the judgment on compromise agreement.
a. CA dismissed.
b. MR denied
c. Hence, this petition
4. Salamanca defended that this case fell under the exception of the rule on immutability of
judgments. The non-compliance of some of the parties with the compromise agreement constituted
an event that "[makes] it difficult if not totally impossible to enforce the compromise agreement.
ISSUE: WON the RTC was correct in granting the Motion for Physical Partition after the issuance of the
judgment on compromise agreement. NO,
DOCTRINE:
In a compromise agreement, the parties freely enter into stipulations. "A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits"of the case. It has the effect of res
judicata. These principles are impressed both in our law and jurisprudence.
Thus, Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
In Spouses Romero v. Tan, this court said:
It is well settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is
immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside [by mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the
compromise agreement].
A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and
is immediately final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent. The doctrine of
immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained finality, even
if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify
principle must immediately be struck down. the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
NT MR
This doctrine admits a few exceptions, usually applied to serve substantial justice:
GROUNDS 1. FAME 1. Damages awarded are
1. "The correction of clerical errors;
2. NDE excessive
2. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
2. Insufficient evidence to
3. void judgments; and
justify decision
4. whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
3. Decision is contrary to law
unjust and inequitable."
Rule on Second Motion Allowed if ground was not Prohibited (Single Motion Rule)
existing at the time 1st in Judg or F. Order.
REMEDIES IN COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
motion was made (NDE) BUT Allowed in Interlocutory
The issue in this case involves the non-compliance of some of the parties with the terms of the
Order
compromise agreement. The law affords complying parties with remedies in case one of the parties to an
NOTE: 2ND MR RUNS THE PERIOD
agreement fails to abide by its terms. A party may file a motion for execution of judgment.
DELICADO
Execution is a matter of right on final judgments.
Effect of granting Original judgment is vacated. Amend the judgment
Since a judgment on compromise agreement is effectively a judgment on the case, proper remedies
Case stands for trial de novo
against ordinary judgments may be used against judgments on a compromise agreement.
and tried anew
Provided these are availed on time and the appropriate grounds exist, remedies may include the
following: When available May be even on appeal, only Trial court or appellate court
a) motion for reconsideration; if NDE
b) motion for new trial; FAME not available in CA
c) appeal; When not allowed summary procedure and Same
d) petition for relief from judgment; small claims procedure
e) petition for certiorari; and 1. When to file? Within period of appeal within 15 or 30d from notice of judgment
f) petition for annulment of judgment No motion for extension of time
2. Where to file?
In this case, instead of availing herself of the proper remedies so the compromise could be 3. FAME
enforced and the partition could be effected, respondent Salamanca chose to move again for a. Fraud – must be extrinsic or collateral fraud (fraud which ordinary prudence could not have
the partition of the property and set aside a valid and final judgment on compromise. This guarded against)
court cannot allow such motion to prosper without going against law and established jurisprudence on i. Extrinsic fraud – fraudulent scheme prevented litigant a day in court
judgments. ii. Intrinsic fraud – fraudulent acts like falsification and false testimony could have been
litigated and determined at the trial. No prevention of litigant a day in court.
Forgery of documents for use at trial – intrinsic fraud
RULE 37 b. Accident – event without one’s foresight
c. Mistake – mistake of fact and not of law
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION i. Not mistake of judge – remedy is appeal
1. New Trial – the re-hearing of a case already decided BUT before judgment becomes final and d. Excusable Negligence – so gross that ordinary diligence could not have guarded against it.
executory i. Must be imputable to the party and not his counsel. Counsel’s negligence binds client
2. Reconsideration – MR under R37 is directed against a judgment or final order (not interlocutory ii. GR: Counsel’s negligence binds client
order) XPN:
3. New Trial and MR are prohibited in summary procedure and small claims procedure 1. Deprives of due process
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. 2. Application will result in the outright deprivation of liberty and property
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set 3. Interest of justice so requires
aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following 4. NDE
causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party: a. Requisites of NDE (Berry Rule)
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have i. Discovered after the trial
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in ii. Could not be discovered at trial even with exercise of reasonable diligence
his rights; or iii. Must be material and not merely collateral
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have iv. Evidence is of such weight that it would probably alter the result of the action
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
Sec. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof.
The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice
of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.
A motion for new trial shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions. A motion A motion for new trial shall include all grounds then available and those not so included shall
for the cause mentioned in paragraph (a) of the preceding section shall be supported by be deemed waived.
affidavits of merits which may be rebutted by affidavits. A motion for the cause mentioned in A second motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first
paragraph (b) shall be supported by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is motion was made, may be filed within the time herein provided excluding the time during
expected to be given, or by duly authenticated documents which are proposed to be which the first motion had been pending.
introduced in evidence. No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order.
1. Single motion rule – second MR not allowed in J/F.O. (no interlocutory)
A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the
judgment or final order which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law,
making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial.
law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions. If a new trial is granted in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the original judgment
or final order shall be vacated, and the action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded
A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of evidence taken upon the former trial, in so far as the same is material and competent to
appeal. establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same.
1. Formal Requisites of NT and MR: 1. If FAME – original Judgment is vacated, action stands for trial de novo
a. Writing 2. IF NDE – no need for trial de novo; opened only for admitting new evidence
b. Written notice is served on adverse party 3. WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE EVIDENCE: if material and competent, used for new trial
c. Must state the grounds
2. If FAME – must be supported by affidavit of merits Sec.7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.
If NDE – must be supported by affidavit of the witnesses or duly authenticated documents (no need If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only
for affidavit of merits) a part, or less than all of the matter in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties
3. When MNT is merely pro forma to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable
a. Based on same ground raised in a denied motion without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest.
b. Same arguments in the opposition to a granted MRTD
c. New ground could have been alleged in the first MNT which was denied Sec. 8. Effect of order for partial new trial.
d. Based on FAME, but does no specify facts or no Affidavit of Merit When less than all of the issues are ordered retried, the court may either enter a judgment or
e. Non-compliance with Rule 15 final order as to the rest, or stay the enforcement of such judgment or final order until after
4. When MR is merely pro forma the new trial.
a. Second MR
b. Failed to substantiate alleged errors Sec. 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
c. Merely alleged that decision was contrary to law An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy
d. Adverse part was not served a notice being an appeal from the judgment or final order.
e. Non-compliance with Rule 15 1. If u wish to challenge the denial of MNT or MR, you may include such denial in the assignment of
errors of the appeal.
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration. 2. MR is no longer assailed by certiorari AM 07-7-12
The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such The only remedy is to appeal from the judgment or final order
terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have 3. Fresh Period rule – aggrieved party has 15 days from notice of denial of MR or MNT within which to
been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may file his appeal J/F.O. (Reconcile with Fernandez v CA)
amend such judgment or final order accordingly. a. Applies to 40-41, 42-43 (but it has its own provision),
1. NT
a. Grant new trial and Set aside judgment/f. order XXIV. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND NEW TRIAL (RULE 37)
b. Deny new trial
2. MR 1. Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, May 16, 2005 -MR>MNT period when
a. Grant MR and amend J/F.O. to file
b. Deny MR QUICKIE FACTS:
3. When amendment: 1. Olivarez filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Fernandez in the MTC.
a. excessive damages or a. MTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action.
b. judgment or final order is contrary to evidence or law b. On appeal, RTC reversed the MTC and ordered Fernandez to pay rent in a decisión dated May 2,
1994.
Sec. 4. Resolution of motion. c. Fernandez received a copy thereof on June 28, 1994.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty (30) days from the d. On July 12 1994 (14 days after), Fernandez filed an MR.
time it is submitted for resolution. e. On Nov 29, 1994, Fernandez received the denial of his MR.
f. Thus, on Dec 1, 1994, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review in the
Sec. 5. Second motion for new trial. CA.
2. Meanwhile, upon discovering new evidence of receipts proving his rental payments, Fernandez
filed a Motion for New Trial in the RTC on Dec 9, 1994.
a. On Dec 12, 1994, CA granted his Motion for Extension.
b. However, on Dec 29, 1994, Ferndandez filed a Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review.
3. On Feb 6, 1995, RTC denied the Motion for New Trial and stated that by filing a Motion to Extend in
the CA which was eventually granted, CA already had jurisdiction over the case and not the RTC.
a. Thereafter, upon motion of Olivares, RTC issued a Writ of Execution.
4. This prompted Fernandez to File a Petition for Certiorari in the CA.
a. However, CA dismissed the Petition.
b. MR denied. Hence this petition.
5. LT: Fernandez questions whether or not his mere filing of a Motion for Extension (which was later
withdrawn) automatically divested the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case as to take cognizance of
a Motion for New Trial.
ISSUE: WON Fernandez’ mere filing of a Motion for Extension (which was later withdrawn) automatically
divested the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case as to take cognizance of a Motion for New Trial. NO,
because CA has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez merely filed a motion for
extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself.
- Fernandez filed his MR after 14d from Notice. When MR is denied, he had only 1 day left to file
for MNT (15d-14d=1d) (?-reconcile with fresh period rule)
DOCTRINE:
It may seem at once apparent that the CA had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. It has been
repeatedly held that an appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. He may
appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to
the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
As we are dealing here with the jurisdiction of an appellate court, additional rules are required
for jurisdiction to attach therein, to wit:
(1) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals within the time
for doing so;
(2) he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for doing so;
(3) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and
(4) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time.
The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed
perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket
and other lawful fees. In the discussion of the Committee on the revision of the Rules of Court, it was
emphasized that to perfect the appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket
fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear and unequivocal that the
petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the docket fees.
Thus, it may be argued, and rightly so, that the CA has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case
because Fernandez merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the
petition itself. Withal, sans the petition, it cannot be said that the CA has acquired jurisdiction over the
case as to say that the trial court is without authority to act on a motion for new trial. It is axiomatic
that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
On this point we fully agree in the position taken by Fernandez that when he filed the motion for
extension of time to file petition for review, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals had not yet
attached, such that his failure to file the petition itself would normally have the effect of rendering the
decision of the lower court final and executory.
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD TO FILE A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court providing for the period to file a motion for new trial
in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 is in point.
Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. —
Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial
court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of
the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party.
Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal
shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
It is without question that Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28 June 1994. Fourteen
(14) days after the receipt of the decision or specifically on 12 July 1994, he filed a motion for
reconsideration. This motion was denied by the RTC and the Order of denial was received by Fernandez
on 29 November 1994. Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, he had only one (1)
day left to file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial should be filed within the
period to appeal, that is, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. The motion for new
trial suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which
an appeal must be perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the
balance of the reglementary period within which to appeal.
Applying the foregoing, Fernandez’s motion for new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-
day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended.
IN SUM, considering that a motion for new trial must be filed during the period for filing an appeal and
that such period cannot be extended, Fernandez, by filing his motion for new trial beyond the
period to appeal, had unwittingly sealed his fate and stripped himself of any further relief.
2. Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003, supra – MR period when to file
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Peralta et al are the heirs of one Benedicto Alonday. The latter was granted a Homestead Patent by
the DENR over a lot in Davao. Title was thereafter issued in his name.
a. In 1969, Bureau of Forest Development sought permission to use a portion of said property.
b. Instead, BFD constructed a building on it. Benedicto’s lawyer demanded for the BFD to vacate.
c. Failing this, Peralta filed a Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of
Davao.
d. RTC ruled in favor of Peralta and orded the Republic to vacate the property and remove all
improvements thereon.
2. On May 30, 1997 or 5 days before the expiration of the period to appeal, Republic filed through
registered mail a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC decison.
a. However, on June 11, 1997, the RTC expunged the MR on the ground that it failed to
incorporate any notice of hearing as required by the Rules.
b. The Republic received said order on June 18, 1997.
c. Thereafter, on July 22, 1997, Republic filed a Notice of Appeal.
d. In opposition, Peralta et al filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the MR was a mere scap
of paper and thus did not toll the running of the reglementary period for perfecting appeal.
3. Pending all this, the RTC judge retired.
a. On Jan 28, 1999, the new judge issued an order giving due course to Republic’s Appeal but was
again reversed in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention.
 b. Peralta et al then moved for the execution which was granted.
c. Republic filed an MR assailing the dismissal of it Appeal as well as the granting of the Writ of
Execution.
d. MR denied.
4. On certiorari in the CA, Republic’s petition was again dismissed.
a. Hence, this petition.
5. LT: Republic assails the CA’s declaration that they failed to perfect their appeal.
ISSUE: WON OSG failed to perfect its appeal. YES, the OSG’s defective MR did not suspend the running
of the reglementary period to perfect the appeal. It is mere pro forma
DOCTRINE:
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the
defective motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion
for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds
therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written
notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 4,
paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all
the parties concerned at least 3 days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule
requires that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the
time and place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements, far from being merely technical and
procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process.
Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or
opposition, the trial court would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant
to set the time and place of hearing of its motion. The requirements entombed in Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance therewith is fatal and
renders the motion pro forma—a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to
receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for
the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the
mere filing or pendency of said motion.
In this case, the Republic, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence,
they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new
trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the Republic filed the
motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period, said motion
failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that
Peralta et al were actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration
containing the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
3. People v. Odilao, April 14, 2004, G.R. No. 155451 ???? - MR in CA while filed in SC
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Odilao et al were charged with Estafa in an Information filed in the RTC of Cebu.
a. A Warrant of Arrest was issued. However, upon motion of Odilao, reinvestigation was
conducted.
b. Based on the reinvestigation report, no probable cause was found. Thus, the Prosecution sought
to dismiss the case.
c. As a result, the prívate complainant (Bugash) opposed the reinvestigation report and filed a
Petition for Review in the DOJ.
d. Thus, the RTC did not rule on the Motion to Dismiss until the DOJ resolves the petition.
2. A year later, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.
a. Thus, Odilao filed an MR which was denied.
b. Consequently, Odilao went up to the CA via Petition for Certiorari.
c. CA granted the Petition and directed the RTC to wait until the DOJ resolves the Petition filed
before it.
d. As a result, the People filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.
3. While said Petition was pending resolution before the SC, Bugash filed an MR before the
CA seeking reversal of its decisión which granted Odilao’s Petition.
a. This MR was granted and the CA reversed itself and denied the Motion to Dismiss the case filed
by the Prosecutor.
b. Thereafter, DOJ denied the Petition for Review and held that there was no probable cause
ISSUE: was CA correct in granting the MR before it while the case is submitted already for resolution in
the SC? No
DOCTRINE:
It cannot be avoided that we remind the Court of Appeals of the provisions of Section 15, Rule VI of the
2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (effective August 22, 2002), which explicitly provides
thus:
SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. — No motion for
reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously
filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for
extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently filed,
the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed
abandoned.
We are, therefore, quite perplexed why the CA did not act in accord with the aforequoted Rule
and instead resolved the motion for reconsideration of its Decision dated September 27, 2002,
filed by Bugash, despite service on it of a copy of the Motion For Extension To File Petition For Review
dated October 15, 2002, filed by the OSG.
At the very least, prudence dictates that the CA should have first required Bugash to secure the
conformity of the OSG, or required the latter to comment on the motion for reconsideration of Bugash.
The positions taken by the Office of the Solicitor General and Bugash are practically identical. In any
event the Court of Appeals ought not to have acted on the said motion for reconsideration of private
complainant Bugash. It should have considered said motion which, in the first place, was without
the conformity of the OSG, the representative of the People of the Philippines, as having been
abandoned by the filing of herein petition by the OSG, pursuant to the aforequoted Section 15, Rule
VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
4. Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005 – MR and Appeal
period
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Neypes et al filed an Action for Annulment of Judgment and Titles and Reconveyance before the RTC
against Bureau of Forests, Bureau of Lands, et al.
a. However, in Feb 12, 1998, RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the action already
prescribed.
b. Neypes received the order on Mar 3, 1998.
c. On Mar 18, 1998 or 15 days later, Neypes filed an MR.
d. On July 1, 1998, RTC dismissed the MR on and the order was received on July 22, 1998.
e. On July 27, 1998 or 5 days later after receipt, Neypes filed a Notice of appeal and paid docket
fees on August 3, 1998.
2. RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed 8 days late. MR was denied.
3. Neypes went up the CA via Petition for Certiorari and assailed the dismissal of the Notice of Appeal.
a. LT of Neypes: He claims that they filed it on time and argued that the 15-day period
started to run only from the date they received the order dismissing the MR on July
 22. Thus, when they filed their MR 5 days later, it was still within the reglementary
period.
b. CA dismissed the Petition and reckoned the 15-day period from March 3.
c. MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON, Neypes filed the Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period. Yes, according to Fresh
Period rule he still has 15days from receipt of order dismissing MNT or MR.
- Feb 12 – dismissed the complaint = This is not the final order
- Mar 18 – filed MR
- July 1 – dismissed MR = This is the final order
- July 22 – received copy of denial = This is the reckoning period of 15d period to appeal
- July 27 – filed notice of appeal
DOCTRINE:
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from . A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court
to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order
or judgment that dismisses an action.
FINAL ORDER
As already mentioned, Neypes argues that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their MR should be
construed as the “final order,” not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.
Since they received their copy of the denial of their MR only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998.
We sustain Neypes’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their MR was the final order
contemplated in the Rules.
START OF THE 15-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; FRESH PERIOD RULE
Under Rule 41, Section 3, Neypes had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal
the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
Neypes did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a MR.
According to the RTC, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that
Neypes, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15 -day reglementary period to appeal, had only one
(1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Neypes,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from
receipt of the “final order” or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “FRESH PERIOD RULE” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final
order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
5. Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Annie Tan leased a portion of her building in Binondo in favor of Bloomberry Export Manufacturing
Inc.
a. For alleged violations of the lease contract, Tan filed a Complaint for Ejectment against
Bloomberry.
b. Bloomberry likewise filed a Case for Consignation on account of Tan’s refusal to accept its rental
payment.
c. These 2 cases were consolidated.
2. As a matter of course, MTC dismissed the Complaint as well as Bloomberry’s counterclaim.
3. On appeal, RTC affirmed.
4. Consequently, Tan filed an MR which however did not include a Notice of Hearing as required
by the Rules.
a. Thus, Bloomberry filed an Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Judgment on the ground that the MR was
a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the reglemantary period. In other words,
Bloomberry contends that the RTC decisión has already become final and executory.
5. Thereafer, Tan filed a Motion to Set for Hearing the MR.
a. Tan avers that she inadvertently omitted said Notice on account of her lawyer’s
messenger’s honest mistake.
b. Also, she claims that, due to work-related pressures, her lawyer was not able to follow up the
motion.
6. Over the vehement opposition of Bloomberry, the RTC granted the Motion and set the hearing at a
specified date and time.
a. Aggrieved, Bloomberry filed an MR which was denied.
7. As such, Bloomberry filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA.
a. CA granted the Petition and reversed the RTC in favor of Bloomberry.
b. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the omission through inadvertence of a Notice of Hearing for an MR is a fatal defect which
does not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal. YES, it is fatal.
DOCTRINE:
We are not in the least convinced.
First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the messenger . The burden of preparing
a complete pleading falls on counsel’s shoulders, not on the messenger’s. The counsel is ultimately
responsible for the acts or omissions of his agents. Hence, the messenger’s conduct can neither justify
the counsel’s mistake nor warrant a departure from the mandate of the aforesaid procedural rules.
Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left behind
due to honest mistake. In fact, there was no such page. Tan’s claim is belied by the very MR she filed
which ended exactly on the 3rd page as evidenced by the “copy furnished” notation. It is safe to
conclude that there was no accidental or excusable neglect in not including a fourth page in Effect of Denial Not appealable Not appealable
this case. In other words, Tan’s counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing. REMEDY: appeal the J/F.O. on REMEDY: R65
merits
Finally, the fact that Tan’s former counsel calendared the motion for hearing for August 23, 1996 belies Nature Legal Remedy Equitable Remedy
the excuse that an alleged fourth page had been left behind. In the first place, if a notice of hearing Necessity of verification NO YES
had been included in the MR, there would have been no need for Tan to file the Motion to set Summary Proc & Small Claims NO NO
the time and date of hearing. What is clear is that said counsel filed the latter Motion, only after
Bloomberry had submitted its Motion for Entry of Judgment — with copy furnished Tan’s counsel — on Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.
the ground that Tan’s MR was a mere scrap of paper that did not stop the period for appeal. A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final

RULE 38 order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR be.
1. Double Period Requirement: Within 60d from knowledge of judgment and 6mo from entry of
OTHER PROCEEDINGS judgment
e.g. Oct 18 – entry of judgment (6 months after it)
RFJ – remedy to any person against whom a decision is entered through FAME
Dec 17 – published decision in newspaper; petitioner constructively learns (60d after it)
- It is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no other
2. Form and content
available remedy
a. Verification
- If he has other remedy (e.g. MNT or appeal) he cannot avail RFJ
b. Affidavit of merit showing
- If remedy is lost through his own negligence, no RFJ. Why? You cannot revive the right lost
i. FAME
through inexcusable negligence
ii. the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense
- RFJ cannot be used to challenge decision of SC. Why? Because SC is not the trier of facts, and
3. Affidavit of Merit – one which recites FAME on which motion is based and the facts constituting the
FAME is a Q of fact.
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense
- Who may file? Only parties in the proceedings just like MNT and MR
a. Substantial compliance if no affidavit of merit but the verified petition contains the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.
b. When Affidavit of merit is not necessary:
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
i. No jurisdiction over the defendant, subject matter
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he
ii. J by default
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
iii. J entered by mistake of fraud
proceeding be set aside.
Sec. 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal.
Sec. 4. Order to file an answer.
When a judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by
If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court in which it is filed,
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal,
shall issue an order requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within fifteen (15) days
he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the appeal be given due
from the receipt thereof. The order shall be served in such manner as the court may direct,
course.
together with copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits.
1. Grounds for RFJ:
1. Summons need not served; simply serve an order requiring the adverse party to answer
a. S1 When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
2. Failure to answer is NOT default. Even without answer the court will still hear the petition on its
against a party in any court through FAME – petitioner was not able to participate during the
merits
trial
b. S2 When petitioner has been prevented from taking an appeal by FAME
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings.
2. Where to file RFJ: court which rendered judgment.
The court in which the petition is filed, may grant such preliminary injunction as may be
a. Relief is not an independent action; no different docket number
necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties, upon the filing by the petitioner of
b. Relief applies to special proceedings (land registration, intestate settlement, guardianship)
a bond in favor of the adverse party all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by
3.
reason of issuance of such injunction or the other proceedings following the petition; but such
MNT/MR Relief
injunction shall not operate to discharge or extinguish any lien which the adverse party may
When available Before final and executory After F/E have acquired upon the property of the petitioner.
Application J/F.O only J/F.O. and special proceedings 1. RULE: execution of judgment is not stayed UNLESS a writ of Prel. Inj. is issued.
Grounds FAME and NDE FAME 2. Upon filing the Petition for Relief:
When filed Within time to appeal 60d from knowledge of a. Court may grant Prel. Inj. to preserve rights
judgment b. Such injunction shall not discharge any lien which adverse party acquired upon the property of
6mo from entry of judgment the petitioner
Sec. 6. Proceedings after answer is filed.
After the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period therefor, the court shall hear the
petition and if after such hearing, it finds that the allegations thereof are not true, the
petition shall be dismissed; but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set aside the
judgment or final order or other proceedings complained of upon such terms as may be just.
Thereafter the case shall stand as if such judgment, final order or other proceeding had never
been rendered, issued or taken. The court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case
as if a timely motion for a new trial or reconsideration had been granted by it.
1. Two Hearings:
a. Hearing on the determination WON judgment should be set aside
b. If affirmative, hearing on merits of the case
Sec. 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside.
Where the denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower court shall be required to give due
course to the appeal and to elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely and proper
appeal had been made.
1. Remedy is r38 is not available:
a. R 47 Annulment of Judgment
b. Direct or collateral attack if judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction
2. R38 is interlocutory order - unappealable
XXV. PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (RULE 38)
1. Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.156021, September 23, 2005
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Francisco Provido, filed a Petition for Probate of the will of Soledad Provido Elevencionado who died
in January 2000 in the RTC of Iloilo.
a. He alleged that he was an heir of the decedent.
b. The Probate Court allowed the probate of the will.
c. Meanwhile, Flores filed an Petition for Letters of Administration with the RTC of General Santos.
d. However, RTC of General Santos dismissed the Petition because the Probate Court in Iloilo
already had jurisdiction over the case.
2. After 4 months from the finality of the Probate Court, Alaban, Flores, et al filed a Motion to
Reopen the probate proceedings claiming that they were intestate heirs of the decedent.
a. Thereafter, RTC issued an Order denying the Motion.
3. Consequently, Alaban, Flores, et al filed with the CA an Petition for Annulment of the Decision
and Order of the RTC.
a. They claimed that Provido fraudulently secured the probate of the will by making them think
that they were going to enter into a Compromise Agreement.
b. However, CA dismissed the Petition on the ground that Abalan, Flores, et al failed to
avail of the ordinary remedies of New Trial, Appeal, Petition for Relief from Judgment,
or other appropriate remedies.
c. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.
4. LT: Abalan, Flores, et al essentially claim that since they were not made parties to the
proceedings in the RTC of Iloilo (Probate Court), they could not have availed of the ordinary
remedies of New Trial, Appeal, Petition for Relief from Judgment, etc.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ABALAN COULD FILE A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
WITHOUT AVAILING OF ORDINARY REMEDIES LIKE PETITION FOR RELEIF FROM JUDGMENT.
HELD: NO. SINCE IT IS AN ACTION IN REM, THEY BECAME PARTIES TO THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS BY
PUBLICATION. THUS, THEY SHOULD HAVE AVAILED OF THE ORDINARY REMEDIES BEFORE FILING
THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 37 allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of an MR on the grounds of excessive
award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or
final order is contrary to law. Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file
a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It
must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six
(6) months after entry thereof.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available
only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been
held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein,
cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
NOTICE BY PUBLICATION
However, Alaban, Flores et al are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to
the probate proceedings.
It has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though they were not mentioned in the
petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing. As parties to the probate proceedings, they could have validly
availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment.
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IS THE PROPER REMEDY
Conceding that they became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have
still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners
claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time
the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, they could
no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their
own inaction or negligence.
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final
and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to
in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on
only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.
A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled , and it is only essential that
he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he
would be adversely affected thereby.
2. Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Filomena Crisostomo owns a parcel of land in Noveleta. After her death, she was survived by her
sister Leonor Raon.
a. Raon filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Regalado Samartino in the MTC of Noveleta and
alleged that the lease with Crisostomo already expired and still she refused to vacate.
2. Summons was served upon Samartino’s brother because he was then confined in rehab in Tagaytay.
a. As a result, the liason officer of the rehab appeared before the MTC with a certification that
Samartino cannot comply with the directive file an Answer within the reglementary period.
b. Nonetheless, upon motion of Raon, MTC declared Samartino in default and ordered Raon to
present evidence ex parte.
c. Then, MTC ruled in favor of Raon and ordered Samartino to vacate.
3. After learning of the adverse decision by the MTC, Samartino filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment in the RTC.
a. However, RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling.
b. The RTC decision became final.
c. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued and the parcel of land was levied upon.
4. Thus, Samartino filed in the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment with an affidavit of
merit alleging that Filomena Crisostomo sold the land to him as evidence by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
a. Nevertheless, RTC dismissed the Petition for Relief from Judgment.
b. MR was likewise denied.
c. On certiorari, CA dismissed Samartino’s petition.
d. MR was denied as well. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY DISMISSED SAMARTINO’S PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT.
HELD: NO. NO VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS. ALSO, THE PETITION FOR RELIEF WAS FILED ON TIME.
There being no valid substituted service of summons (no explanation of impossibility of personal service;
brother was not proven to be of sufficient age and discretion and resident thereof), the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person Samartino.
In addition, the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment for having been filed out of time. According to the RTC, the petition for relief, filed on
November 25, 1996, was late because Samartino had actual knowledge of the judgment in the
ejectment case since March 1996. The period within which to file a petition for relief should have
been reckoned from the date Samartino learned of the judgment of the RTC. It should not have
been counted from the date of the MTC’s decision because, precisely, Samartino appealed the
same. It was the RTC’s decision that became final and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for
relief from judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a final and
executory judgment.
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when Samartino learned of the decision of the RTC
affirming the judgment of the MTC. What appears is that the said decision became final only on
August 15, 1996 , and must have been entered sometime thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief
filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the 6-month period prescribed by the Rules.
3. Purcon v. MRM Philippines et al., G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008
QUICKIE FACTS:
1. Purcon was a seaman working for MRM. He suffered a hernia and was thus repatriated back to the
Philippines.
a. After the doctor declared that he was fit to work, he reported to MRM. However, he was told
that there was no vacancy for him.
b. As such, he filed Complaint for Reimbursement of Disability Benefits and other monetary
benefits in the NLRC. In its defense, MRM averred that since the hernia was not work related,
Purcon was not entitled to disability benefit and related claims.
2. LA dismissed Purco’s Complaint.
3. On appeal, NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal which became final and executory.
4. Thereafter, Purco filed in the CA a Petition for Certiorari which was however denied.
a. The CA’s resolution also became final and executory.
5. Nonetheless, Purco filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC which was also denied.
a. As a result, Purco filed before the SC a Petition for Relief from Judgment.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A PETITIONER CAN AVAIL OF A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
FROM AN SC DECISION WHICH DISMISSED ITS PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
HELD: NO. IT IS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY IN THE SC.
FIRST, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from
judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original
cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. — Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of
the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court.
A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally
cognizable by this Court.
SECOND, while Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers only to MTCs and RTCs. As revised,
Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the MTC which decided the case or
issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the
judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for MTCs and
RTCs and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.
THIRD, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions
of the Rules of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this
Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to
the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of
judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and
new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason
that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or When does the court which renders judgment loses jurisdiction? When all periods have expired. Note:
excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court. when there are different parties, there may be different periods due to different decisions made over
their MRs
Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The
late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Purco’s lack of 2 Kinds of Petition for Review R42 and R43
devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable 1. R42 RTC>CA
negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to Applies when MTC decision is denied by RTC
prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown. 2. R43 Quasi Judicial Agencies>CA
Summary procedure, what to file when lose in MTC? R, Notice of appeal filed to the court which rendered
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the judgment. DON’T USE MR.
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or If RTC denied, R42
mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to Small claims, what remedy? Final and executory ang small claims, no appeal and no mr allowed.
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due Remedy is 65
to a mistake of procedure by counsel.
R43 when is it applicable, what kind of decisions? S1
Important requirement: the quasi judicial body which rendered decision Must be under the exercise of
quasi-judicial adjudicatory powers(NB).
When your salary is withheld, no R43 because that is not a decision or adjudication but an
3 modes of appeal exercise of administrative function.
What to file in ordinary appeal? Notice of Appeal or Record on Appeal. E.g. CSC ruled over an Employees violation of dress code, remedy is R43
When to file Notice of Appeal? Period? How many days to file a PFR? 15d same with R42
When to file Record on Appeal? Period? Extension? R43 S4 YES, limited to one extension.
Can you extend 15d period in Notice of Appeal? NO. GR: no 2nd extension XPN: most compelling reason
Remember the fresh period rule when MR is denied.
Can you extend 30d period in Record of Appeal? GR: NO. XPN: when authorized alteration or Requirements R42 PFR?
modification of record Verified
Where to file notice of appeal? Always filed to the court who rendered judgment (NB) Attach copy of decision
Record of appeal, meaning. R40S3; R41S6. All pleadings, decisions which are necessary for the Affidavit of material things
understanding of the case involve. It is a sequential compilation of pleadings and decisions/orders by Date of timeliness
court in chronological order. E.g. partial appeal only, you attach only the relevant pleadings and Parties, issues, errors
decisions to that partial decision appealed
- Important on both appeals: Material Date Rule Requirements R43 PFR?
Notice of appeal, meaning. R41S5. One piece of paper contains “Plaintiff files an appeal from the Same, but must be all certified true copies. CA cannot verify docs because quasi judicial bodies
decision of ___ court…” (you basically say magaapeal ako, so that the judgment will not become final do not forward to CA (NB)
and executory) In practice, upon recept of decision get the certified true copy
- Record on appeal used in multiple appeals; happens when there are multiple parties
Steps in Rule 40: Is the enumeration in R43S1 exclusive? NO
1. File notice or record E.g. of R43 Decision of the Office of the President, DARAB,
2. Pay docket fees Not: NLRC>CA but not R43, but R65; HLURB>Office of Pres; CTA>CTA En Banc>SC R65
3. Court that rendered judgment will take note. MTC Clerk of court will submit to RTC The only way you can go to SC is by R65, xpn: Capital Offense of criminal case by Ordinary
4. RTC will order party to admit brief or memo Appeal (NB)
5. RTC will no longer examine witnesses, but rely on the decision of MTC
PFR on certiorari, how many days? R43S_ 15d with extension for another 15d
Rule 41 PFR on certiorari (R43) is not the same as petition for certiorari (R65)
RTC rendered judgment in Rule 41
Appellate court: CA R44 ORDINARY APPEALED CASES
Why called ordinary appeal? Because RTC has original jurisdiction, in effect there is only one decision How is Jurisdiction acquired over persons over original cases filed over CA?
rendered over the case. 1. Service by order or resolution not rule 14
Petition for review – decided twice Rule 13 requirements must be followed
Rule 44 – procedure before the CA 2. Voluntary submission
How many days to file appellant’s brief? R44S7 45d May CA conduct a hearing? YES,
Appellee’s brief: __ In what cases? In cases where CA has original jurisdiction (mandamus, quo warranto
Appellant’s reply brief: 20d Annulment of judgment seeking to annul RTC decision is an original action (NB)
MTC>RTC how many days to file memorandum? R40S7 15d Can you file AOJ seeking to annul MTC decision? YES, but file it to RTC
Can you file AOJ seeking to annul RTC decision? YES, through original action filed to CA
 Can you file AOJ seeking to annul CA decision? NO, because R47 is not allowed to SC. The only
way you can go to the SC from CA is through R45
R47 is allowed MTC>RTC and RTC>CA but not CA>SC
Can the CA justices (collegiate court) / division itself hear the case? YES, alternatively you can ask the
CA to receive evid on their behalf
CA has preliminary conference (not asked in bar, just read)
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES R57 onward
- You can avail provisionally, wala pang decision ang court
- GR you can ask for relief upon trial; XPN: provisional remedies, wala pang trial, but pwede
mawala after judgment which will dissolve or annul such PR
1. PA – para dimabenta, magalaw ang property
- Two ways to avail:
(1) upon filing Complaint with prayer or application for the writ of attachment (In practice wag
ito, dahil makikita agad ng defendant sa summons at baka ibenta agad ang property)
(2) upon motion
- Application for PA is Ex parte because of the grounds (R57S1) defendant is alleged to be in bad
faith, there is danger over the property being dissipated. If not ex parte, defendant will
immediately dispose the property. Ex parte to keep it secretive to attach and secure the
properties.
- Still with reception of evidence but not full blown trial. Court will see if property is linked to the
plaintiff’s interest in the complaint or under the grounds in Sec 1
- 3 stages:
(1) Court will issue order granting the application for attachment
(2) ISSUANCE: Court will issue writ of attachment Implement the writ
YOU DON’T NEED J OVER THE DEFENDANT in stages 1 and 2. Anyone can see
attachment of your property because PA is secretly made.
YOU NEED J OVER THE DEFENDANT when implementing the writ like in give
notices to the bank not to allowed withdrawal
(3) ENFORCEMENT: Implement the writ
HOW TO ACQUIRE WRIT? First acquire J over the defendant by Summons. Your
service of S must be done prior or contemporaneous to the implementation of the
writ (in practice mas okay ang contemporaneous to keep it secret)
SummonS: Defect cannot be cured, attachment will be lifted.
- MEMORIZE Sec1 GROUNDS
Usually asked in BAR: Fraud (dolo) in contracting obligation
C must relate to property, E is against the property not directed against the person itself
F no need for fraud
- How to discharge the attachment?
1.Post a counter bond, must be done after the enforcement of the writ (you cannot use
it before enforcement, ung iba nalalaman agad nila due to rats inside the court)
2. Regular/Improper (S20). Improper means not on the grounds; Irregular means
irregularly issued e.g. writ is enfored agad – no. 2 may be done even before
enforcement of writ
S20 applies to all provisional remedies XPN support
- Damages apply it before/after trial. If you are not entitled to the damages, defendant may seek
damages even after trial.
2. PI – injunction as provisional remedy
a. Injunction can be provisional remedy (temporary) or independent action for injunction
(permanent);
b. Mandatory injunction for final action is not a preliminary remedy
- Principal action: to seek for final injunction, permanent
Preliminary injunction: preserve status quo, temporary only
- 3 Requisites of PI: (MEMORIZE)
1. Clear and unmistakable right - Right in esse (BAR)
2. Right is validated and substantial
3. Necessity of remedy against serious damage
– something cannot be repaired by money (e.g. Lease kwento ni mam
kung maalala mo)
- “serious damage.” E.g. prevent playing of Hello Garci Tapes, money
cannot repair; prevent mother to apply immigration of the child
- In practice, most abused remedy.
o In Certiorari the judgment continuous to stand, the only way is to file TRO or
injunction.
o NLRC decisions become executory because R65 is not a mode of appeal but an
independent action. Remedy: Injunction/TRO with injunction
o ALL decisions can be enjoined by injunction.
o Requirement of PI is “Clear and Unmistakable Right” unlike in elements of COA
- 2 kinds
o – tigil lahat
o Mandatory injunction – to compel someone to do something; e.g. ibalik ang kuryente
ng MERALCO; MANDAMUS is different, directed to public officer
- NOTE: Injunction being a provisional remedy only, you need only such evidence to establish
just to establish the ground and not of the entire case in order to justify the need; incomplete
or initial evidence is enough; you don’t need to present all the evidence otherwise just wait for
the trial
- Can judge issue an INJUCTION without notice and hearing?
o GR: NO; XPN: in case of irreparable damage, judge can issue ex parte, but TRO has
time limit (72h)
o Within 72h, hear the case. During hearing TRO can be extended to 20d. Within 20d
you must secure an injuction.
- Posting a bond is condition sine quanon. You need a bond to protect the person against whom it
is issued. Without posting bond, no injuction will be issued.
o You will still pay damage if injunction is dissolved
- You cannot attach anymore when the property is already mortgaged (kwento ni mam; their
remedies: adverse claim, then filed complaint, then lis pendens, then injunction na dahil na
mortgaged na and foreclosed kaya dina pwede ang attachment; nagfile sila ng consulta appeal)
- No injunction of foreclosure when there is contract for right to foreclose.
- 2 KINDS OF TRO
o 72h tro – can be issued only by the presiding judge of the single sala court, executive
judge of the multi-sala court
- Can be issued before raffle, without notice and hearing
- 3d tro can become 20d after raffle, hearing will be conducted to assess if TRO can
become 20d
o 20d tro – can be issued by regular courts, judge after raffle
- also without notice and hearing, but only after raffle
- 20d tro cannot be extended, because there is no notice and hearing (violation of due
process), only way to extend life of TRO is through a preliminary injunction
- TRO can be issued without notice and hearing; Preliminary injunction cannot/never
be issued without notice and hearing.
- Issuance of PI, is that appealable? NO, it is interlocutory R65. Will the enforcement of
the PI be suspended? NO. Remedy: file certiorari with injunction against an injunction
(the only way to prevent injunction is to file injunction) (NB).
- in practice when you file an injunction, TRO is included
3. Receivership – when someone is interested, at baka idispose, to appoint someone to __
- Only remedy for post judgment
- Grounds
 - Need bond
- Can be dissolved by posting counterbond and assailing the ground
4. Replevin – bawiin personal property even pending action
- Case: can something held as evid in crim be subject of replevin? NO,
- Prove grounds and requisites in your application for writ of replevin
- Requires: 1. Bond 2. Affidavit
- Deprivation must be legal and lawful
- Can you quash? Yes, like other prov remedies
- Dissolve: counterbond and attack the issuance (through motion)
- How much is the bond? Double the value of the property
- Content of affidavit: S2 MEMORIZE
- When to apply? S1 at the commencement of action and anytime before answer; unlike other
remedies replevin has time limit
- Remedy after answer is filed: attachment since jurisdiction has already been acquired over the
defendant
- Attachment v Replevin
A: 1 kinukuha but not physically 2. Kunin ng sheriff 3. Di ikaw may ari 5. Attachment can be in
any case mentioned in RUles
R: 1. Kuha physically 2. Kunin ng dati, repossess 3. Ikaw may ari 4. All that can be attached
can be subject of replevin 5. Only asked if main action is “recovery” of the thing
- DANAO case: can you replevin a motor vehicle in custody of another court? NO, S2 R60
- Logs in custody of forestry, replevin? NO, because item is not lawful
- R39 s16, R67 S?: 3rd party claim rule over attachment and replevin
5. Support pendente lite – pending litigation you can ask for support
- Only prov rem that does not require bond. Bond’s use is to answer for damage due to unlawful
issuance.
- Unlawful issuance, effect: you can’t recover damages, only reimbursement or 3rd party
complaint in same action
- If refused to comply? Court may order execution, contempt
- 2 instances when writ of execution is issued before judgment: 1. Support pendente lite 2.
Indigent no filing fees
- If a person believes he needs to support,
- Dissolve support pendente lite? Yes, no more reason to give support

SCA