Apurado, Carmel E.

BSA1_6
Alburo, Glady Grace P. BSA1_6
Escasinas, Diane A. BSA 1_6

CONTRACT OF LEASE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This CONTRACT OF LEASE is made and executed at the City of Cebu, this day of October 16, 2022, by and between:
 
CARMEL E. APURADO, of legal age, single, Filipino, and with residence and postal address at Ibarra St., Parian, Cebu
City, hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR.

 
-AND-

 
GLADY GRACE P. ALBURO, of legal age, single, Filipino and with residence and postal address at Brgy. Malingin,
Bogo City, hereinafter referred to as the LESSEE.
 

WITNESSETH; That
 
WHEREAS, the LESSOR is the owner of THE LEASED PREMISES, a residential property situated at Sanciangko St.,
Cebu City.
 
WHEREAS, the LESSOR agrees to lease-out the property to the LESSEE and the LESSEE is willing to lease the same;
 
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the LESSOR leases unto the LESSEE and the
LESSEE hereby accepts from the LESSOR the LEASED premises, subject to the following: 

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

 
1. PURPOSES:   That premises hereby leased shall be used exclusively by the LESSEE for residential purposes only and
shall not be diverted to other uses. It is hereby expressly agreed that if at any time the premises are used for other
purposes, the LESSOR shall have the right to rescind this contract without prejudice to its other rights under the law.
 
2. TERM:  This term of lease is for ONE (1) YEAR. from (October 25, 2022) to (October 25, 2023) inclusive. Upon its
expiration, this lease may be renewed under such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon by both
parties, written notice of intention to renew the lease shall be served to the LESSOR not later than seven (7) days prior to
the expiry date of the period herein agreed upon.
 
3. RENTAL RATE:   The monthly rental rate for the leased premises shall be in FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00), Philippine Currency. All rental payments shall be payable to the LESSOR.
 
4. DEPOSIT:   That the LESSEE shall deposit to the LESSOR upon signing of this contract and prior to move-in
an amount equivalent to the rent for TWO (2) MONTHS or the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00),
Philippine Currency.  wherein the one (1) month deposit shall be applied as rent for the 12th months and the remaining
one (1) month deposit shall answer partially for damages and any other obligations, for utilities such as Water, Electricity,
CATV, Telephone, Association Dues or resulting from violation(s) of any of the provision of this contract.
 
5. DEFAULT PAYMENT:  In case of default by the LESSEE in the payment of the rent, such as when the checks are
dishonored, the LESSOR at its option may terminate this contract and eject the LESSEE. The LESSOR has the right to
padlock the premises when the LESSEE is in default of payment for One (1) month and may forfeit whatever rental
deposit or advances have been given by the LESSEE.
 
6. SUB-LEASE:   The LESSEE shall not directly or indirectly sublet, allow or permit the leased premises to be occupied
in whole or in part by any person, form or corporation, neither shall the LESSEE assign its rights hereunder to any other
person or entity and no right of interest thereto or therein shall be conferred on or vested in anyone by the LESSEE
without the LESSOR'S written approval.
 
7. PUBLIC UTILITIES:   The LESSEE shall pay for its telephone, electric, cable TV, water, Internet, association dues
and other public services and utilities during the duration of the lease.
 
8. FORCE MAJEURE:   If whole or any part of the leased premises shall be destroyed or damaged by fire, flood,
lightning, typhoon, earthquake, storm, riot or any other unforeseen disabling cause of acts of God, as to render the leased
premises during the term substantially unfit for use and occupation of the LESSEE, then this lease contract may be
terminated without compensation by the LESSOR or by the LESSEE by notice in writing to the other.
 
9. LESSOR'S RIGHT OF ENTRY:   The LESSOR or its authorized agent shall after giving due notice to the LESSEE
shall have the right to enter the premises in the presence of the LESSEE or its representative at any reasonable hour to
examine the same or make repairs therein or for the operation and maintenance of the building or to exhibit the leased
premises to prospective LESSEE, or for any other lawful purposes which it may deem necessary.
 
10. EXPIRATION OF LEASE:   At the expiration of the term of this lease or cancellation thereof, as herein provided,
the LESSEE will promptly deliver to the LESSOR the leased premises with all corresponding keys and in as good and
tenable condition as the same is now, ordinary wear and tear expected devoid of all occupants, movable furniture, articles
and effects of any kind. Non-compliance with the terms of this clause by the LESSEE will give the LESSOR the right, at
the latter's option, to refuse to accept the delivery of the premises and compel the LESSEE to pay rent therefrom at the
same rate plus Twenty Five (25)% thereof as penalty until the LESSEE shall have complied with the terms hereof.  The
same penalty shall be imposed in case the LESSEE fails to leave the premises after the expiration of this Contract of
Lease or termination for any reason whatsoever.
 
11. JUDICIAL RELIEF:   Should any one of the parties herein be compelled to seek judicial relief against the other, the
losing party shall pay an amount of One Hundred (100)% of the amount clamed in the complaint as attorney's fees which
shall in no case be less than P50,000.00 pesos in addition to other cost and damages which the said party may be entitled
to under the law.
 
12. This CONTRACT OF LEASE shall be valid and binding between the parties, their successors-in-interest and
assigns.
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, parties herein affixed their signatures on the date and place above written.

CARMEL E. APURADO                 GLADY GRACE P. ALBURO

LESSOR                                                LESSEE

 
Signed in the presence of:

DIANE A. ESCASINAS
WITNESS
 
 
___________________________________________________________
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
 
Republic of the Philippines)
_________________________) S.S
 
BEFORE ME, personally appeared:
 
   Name                                  ID Number             Date/Place Issued
 
Carmel E. Apurado                          2022015542           October 20, 2022 / Cebu City
Glady Grace P. Alburo                    2022015074           October 20, 2022 / Bogo City
 
Known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me
that the same is their free and voluntary act and deed.
 
This instrument consisting of 3 page/s, including the page on which this acknowledgement is written, has been signed on
each and every page thereof by the concerned parties and their witnesses, and sealed with my notarial seal.
 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL, on the date and place first above written.
                                                                    
                                                  
Notary Public
 
Doc. No.______;
Page No. ______;
Book No.______;
Series of 20___.
 CASE
DIGEST
CASE #1
MA. LUISA A. PINEDA, Petitioner
Versus
VIRGINIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VEGA, Respondent
April 10, 2019, G.R. No. 233774

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner filed a complaint dated June 10, 2005 against respondent, praying for the payment of the latter's principal
obligation and the interest thereon or, in default of such payment, the foreclosure of the property subject of a real estate
mortgage.
In her complaint, petitioner alleged that, on March 25, 2003, respondent borrowed from her ₱500,000.00 payable within
one year with an interest rate of 8% per month. To secure the loan, respondent executed a real estate mortgage (2003
Agreement) over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-339215, together with all the buildings
and improvements existing thereon (Property), in petitioner's favor.7 On the loan's maturity, respondent failed to pay her
loan despite demand.8 As of May 2005, the unpaid accumulated interest amounted to ₱232,000.00.9
In her answer, respondent denied petitioner's material allegations and countered that the complaint was dismissible for
lack of prior barangay conciliation proceeding and for failure to join her husband as a party.10 She also argued that the
interest rate agreed upon was excessive and unconscionable, thus illegal.11 She further denied receiving ₱500,000.00
from petitioner and claimed that the said amount was the accumulated amount of another obligation she earlier secured
from petitioner.12
In her reply, petitioner averred that respondent's husband did not need to be joined because the transaction did not involve
him and although the agreement was to charge an interest rate of 8% per month, what was actually charged was just 4%
per month.13 Petitioner admitted that the original loan which respondent obtained in 2000 was only ₱200,000.00 with an
undertaking to pay 3% interest per month.14
In the written interrogatories addressed to petitioner, she admitted that the ₱500,000.00 indicated in the 2003 Agreement
referred to a previously executed undated real estate mortgage (undated Agreement) between the parties which secured
respondent's loan of ₱200,000.00 from her.15
After the parties underwent mediation proceedings, which turned out to be unsuccessful, the case was set for hearing.16
Despite the leeway provided by the RTC, respondent failed to formally offer her evidence.17
On April 30, 2015, the RTC rendered a Decision finding that (1) the existence of the loan and the real estate mortgage had
been established and, thus, judicial foreclosure would be proper given respondent's non-compliance therewith; (2) since
the undated Agreement had no provision on the payment of interest, the legal interest of 12% per annum should be
imposed; (3) the 2003 Agreement's interest rate was unconscionable; (4) the non-joinder of respondent's husband was not
a jurisdictional defect and did not warrant the complaint's dismissal; and (5) the non-referral to the barangay conciliation
proceeding did not prevent the court from exercising its jurisdiction given that the parties had already undergone several
conciliation and mediation proceedings.

Issues of the Case:

Petitioner, invoking several exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 certiorari petition,
submits for resolution the following factual issues: Was a demand letter sent by petitioner to respondent and was it
received by the latter?
Ruling of the Case:
Given the foregoing, the Court sustains the RTC's ruling which orders respondent to pay petitioner the loaned amount of
₱200,000.00. However, the RTC's ruling that in default of respondent's payment, petitioner can foreclose on the mortgage
is erroneous.
Secondly, the RTC erred on the rate of interest that it imposed. The 12% per annum rate of interest should be revised in
the light of Nacar v. Gallery Frames.53 Since the RTC found that the undated Agreement contained no stipulation on
interest54 and the 2003 Agreement's interest rate was unconscionable,55 the rate of interest on the loan of respondent
should be 12% per annum from judicial demand or filing of the original complaint with the RTC until June 30, 2013 and
6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Decision. The total amount due as of such date of finality shall bear
an interest of 6% per annum until its full satisfaction.
Thirdly, as already pointed above, the RTC erred in reckoning the imposition of interest from extrajudicial demand
because the finding of the CA in this respect is upheld.
Fourthly, the award of ₱50,000.00 nominal damages is deleted. As reiterated in Robes-Francisco Realty & Development
Corp. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch XXXIV),56 "nominal damages cannot coexist with compensatory
damages."57
As to the award of attorney's fees, the same is sustained. Attorney's fees are recoverable under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code when the defendant's act has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest and when the court
deems it just and equitable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 21,
2017 and its Resolution dated August 30, 2017 in CA-G.R. CV No. 106404 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated April 30, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 17 in Civil Case No. 526-M-
2005 is PARTLY REINSTATED insofar as the order against respondent Virginia Zuñiga vda. de Vega to pay petitioner
Ma. Luisa A. Pineda the loaned amount of ₱200,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as attorney's fees is concerned. Respondent
Virginia Zuniga day. de Vega is also ordered to pay petitioner Ma. Luisa A. Pineda interest on the loaned amount at the
rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the original complaint up to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013
until the finality of this Decision; and on the total amount due on the Decision's finality, interest of 6% per annum from
such date of finality until full payment thereof.

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/apr2019/gr_233774_2019.html?
fbclid=IwAR0KJSTEjj6kYfyhjCFCEViX_M9_wqzCaNFTn9OimRyPFfJbpt7lS5bCFfY

CASE #2
GERRY S. FEGARIDO and LINALIE A. MILAN, Petitioners
Versus
ALMARINA S. ALCANTARA, CYNTHIA A. DE VERA, YOLANDA A. TAYAG, CRISTY SUSAN A. DE
GUZMAN, JESSIE S. ALCANTARA, EMILIE A. VELANCIO, JUDITH A. RAGUINGAN, CHARLIE S.
ALCANTARA, all suing heirs of deceased mother CRISTINA S ALCANTARA (victim), and all represented by their
attorney-in-fact and co-plaintiff, CHARLIE S. ALCANTARA
June 13, 2022, G. R. No. 240066

Fact of the Case:

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may file an independent civil action for damages based on quasi-delict separately
from a criminal action for imprudence. This civil action may proceed simultaneously with the criminal action and requires
only preponderance of evidence. Nevertheless, .the aggrieved party may recover damages only once based on the same act
or omission.

At around 6:30 p.m. on October 15, 2008, Cristina S. Alcantara (Alcantara) figured in a vehicular crash while crossing the
road on 25th Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. She was hit by a public utility jeepney driven by Fegarido, who
was making a left turn toward 25th Street. The impact threw Cristina off a few meters away before hitting the pavement.7
she was rushed to the hospital to be treated for physical injuries, but was declared brain-dead and died three days.

Issues of the Case:

Fegarido was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in an amended Information filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities.

Meanwhile, the heirs of Cristina S. Alcantara filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order not only against Fegarido, but also Milan,
the registered owner of the jeepney.

In June 19, 2012 Decision, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities acquitted Fegarido of the crime charged. It found that the
evidence on record was insufficient to prove with moral certainty that Fegarido recklessly drove the jeepney.

In October 13, 2017 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision finding Fegarido and
Milan solidarily liable for damages. It ruled that Fegarido's acquittal in the criminal case for the prosecution's failure to
prove his criminal liability with moral certainty did not preclude a finding of liability for damages based on negligence. It
stressed that the pieces of evidence weighted against F egarido, when taken together, established his negligence based on
quasi-delict. As to Milan's liability, the Court of Appeals similarly decreed that she failed to exercise the due diligence
required by law when she entrusted her legal duties in the selection and supervision of her employee to her husband.

Fegarido and Milan filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court against the heirs of Alcantara. Petitioners
argue that the Regional Trial Court erred in declaring Fegarido negligent. They maintain that Fegarido was acquitted in
the criminal case after not being found negligent, thus negating any basis for liability.

Petitioners likewise contend that the Regional Trial Court's ruling "was based on presumptions without any factual basis."
They stress that respondents' witnesses never testified that petitioner Fegarido drove the vehicle in a negligent and
reckless manner. The Regional Trial Court merely inferred that since Fegarido had to deliberately step hard on the gas, the
jeepney he was driving was moving too fast.
In their Comment, respondents aver that petitioners cannot use Fegarido's acquittal to escape liability. They maintain that
under the law, the aggrieved party in a negligence case can choose to enforce the erring party's civil liability through a
separate civil action for damages, where they only need preponderance of evidence-which, respondents insist, was met by
the pieces of evidence they presented.

The petition of Fegarido and Milan is denied.

The issue of whether petitioners acted negligently is a question of fact beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. This Court
is not a trier of facts. It need not reassess or revaluated the evidence presented by the parties, especially when the findings
of both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are similar as to petitioners' negligence.

In this case, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner Fegarido's gross negligence in
operating the jeepney was the proximate cause of Alcantara's death. They relied on the testimonies of Joe Barnes, Dr.
Rolando Ortiz and Marcelino Menor Jr., which, when taken together, sufficiently proved his negligence.

Testimony of Joe Barnes, a traffic enforcer of the Olongapo City Traffic Management & Public Safety Office who was at
duty at the time of the incident. He gave the go signal to the vehicles to turn left to the 25th street, when he suddenly heard
the screeching sound of a vehicle on sudden break. He checked the vehicle and found a person lying on the pavement and
personally rushed the victim to the hospital.

Testimony Dr. Rolando Ortiz, the physician who examined the victim stated that the patient sustained mostly head injuries
consistent with the vehicular accident.

Testimony Marcelino Menor Jr., the security guard on duty at the Landbank branch located at 25th Street East Bajac-
Bajac, Olongapo City, stated that he saw a woman bumped by a brown passenger jeepney which was later on discovered
to be the subject vehicle driven by Fegarido. He saw how the victim was hit on the left side of the jeep, the part where the
reserved tire was. She was about to cross the street when the jeep side swept her. The jeep was running fast because it was
turning.

Based on this, it can be inferred that at the time of the incident, the jeepney was being driven fast from the time it made a
left tum toward 25th Street up to the moment it hit the victim. The screeching sound the jeepney made when it abruptly
stopped after the incident, and Alcantara being thrown off a few meters away, prove that petitioner Fegarido was making a
left turn swiftly and negligently. This is bolstered by the personal account of Marcelino Menor, Jr., the security guard who
saw the jeepney moving fast while turning the corner, sideswiping Alcantara.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees....
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. As this Court has said, "once negligence on the part of the employee is
established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said
employee. The employer may refute this presumption by presenting adequate evidence that they exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. A review of the records reveals that petitioner
Milan, the registered owner of the jeepney, had never personally vetted petitioner Fegarido when he was applying as
driver. She delegated her legal duties to her husband Nestor, who admitted having tested Fegarido's driving skill only
once. Nestor likewise testified that he never experienced riding with Fegarido as the driver. Moreover, Fegarido was
required to submit only clearances from the police and the National Bureau of Investigation, but was not required to
undergo a medical, physiological, or even drug test.61 Petitioner Milan failed to exercise the diligence that the law
requires of her in selecting and supervising her employees. Nestor's testimony confirms the insufficient screening process
petitioner Fegarido had gone through before being employed. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals' ruling
that she is vicariously liable for Alcantara' s death, and must solidarily pay with petitioner Fegarido the liabilities they owe
respondents.

Ruling of the court:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 13, 2017 Decision and May 4, 2018 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. l 05000 are AFFIRMED.

Petitioners Gerry S. Fegarido and Linalie A. Milan are solidarily liable to pay respondents-heirs of Cristina S. Alcantara
the following:

1) Actual damages worth P138, 591.00;

2) Moral damages worth P100, 000.00;
3) Exemplary damages worth P50, 000.00; and
4) Attorney's fees and litigation expenses worth P40, 000.00.

The total amount shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

Source: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28620/?
fbclid=IwAR11irKxKzqm1wyQT4MQRdZaYqh9WJEmf2gmO3QkRHKpI6pPOBO7jsgXUXA#

CASE #3
ALLAN MAÑAS, JOINED BY WIFE LENA ISABELLE Y. MAÑAS, Petitioners,
VS.
ROSALINA ROCA NICOLASORA, JANET NICOLASORA SALVA, ANTHONY NICOLASORA, AND MA.
THERESE ROSELLE UY-CUA, Respondents.
February 03, 2020, G.R. No. 208845

Facts of the case:

On April 18, 2005, the Mañas Spouses entered into a Lease Contract with Rosalina Roca Nicolasora (Rosalina) over a property
in Tacloban City that was owned by Rosalina's husband, Chy Tong Sy Yu (now deceased).

The Lease Contract partly stated:

WHEREAS, the LESSEE is also interested in buying the same real property, during the existence of the lease or thereafter,
upon notice, from the LESSOR under mutually acceptable terms and conditions;

WHEREOF, premises considered, the parties hereto have covenanted and agreed on the following:

a) That the duration of this Agreement is for one (1) year from the date of execution hereof, unless sooner revoked or
cancelled by either party upon serious violation of any of the terms and conditions hereof; Provided, that this lease may
be renewed for like period at the option of the LESSEE;

b) That parties agree also that in case of any conflict or dispute that may subsequently arise out of this covenant, to refer
the matter to the Philippine Mediation Center, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, for Mediation and settlement, before any
Accredited Mediator who is a Lawyer; Provided, further, that in the remote event that no such settlement is reached
before the said Mediator, that the venue of any litigation that may arise, shall be in a competent court in Tacloban City.

c) Finally, should the LESSOR desire to sell the subject real property, he shall notify first the LESSEE about such intent,
and the latter is given Thirty (30) days within which to accept the offer, or make a [counter]-offer, in writing; Provided,
that the LESSOR may reject the Counter-offer in writing, within the same period of time, in which case, he shall have
the right to sell the same to any interested party.

It appears that the Lease Contract lapsed in 2006, with no express renewal. However, the Mañas Spouses continued using the
premises and paying the rentals, without any objections from Rosalina and her children, Janet and Anthony.

Issues of the case:

The issues for this Court's resolution are the following:

a) First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Complaint's dismissal on the ground that it stated no
cause of action. Subsumed here are the issues of whether or not the lease was impliedly renewed, and whether or not
the renewal includes the right of first refusal;

b) Second, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale must be rescinded due
to the incapacity of the vendee, respondent Ma. Therese Roselle Uy-Cua, at the time of the sale; and

c) Finally, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Complaint's dismissal for failure to comply with a
condition precedent.

On February 14, 2008, Chy Tong Sy Yu sold several parcels of land, including the property being leased to the Mañas Spouses,
to Ma. Therese Roselle Uy-Cua (Roselle). The sale was made "with the conformity" of Rosalina, Janet, and Anthony. The titles
to the properties were subsequently transferred to Roselle. However, the Mañas Spouses claimed that they were neither
informed of the sale nor offered to purchase the property. They said that only upon receiving a letter dated June 2, 2008 from
RMC Trading did they learn of the sale of the property. According to the Mañas Spouses, their right of first refusal embodied in
the Lease Contract was violated. Thus, before the trial court, the Mañas Spouses filed a Complaint praying that the contract of
sale be rescinded, the relevant title be canceled, and their right of first refusal or option to buy be enforced. To this, Roselle filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Complaint stated no cause of action and that the Mañas Spouses failed to comply
with a condition precedent, specifically, barangay conciliation. She also averred that because the contract was only impliedly
renewed, the spouses' right of first refusal was not renewed: Defendant-movant [Roselle] submits that the plaintiffs (the Mañas
Spouses) have no right of first refusal or priority to buy the leased property. Meanwhile, Rosalina, Janet, and Anthony filed an
Answer with Counterclaim. They argued that the right of first refusal was "granted only during the original term of the contract
of lease," and that the Complaint was prematurely filed. In their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the Mañas Spouses
claimed that the sale was invalid owing to Roselle's alleged incapacity; that is, she was a minor when the sale was made. On the
allegation that the sale is void due to her incapacity, respondent Roselle counters that petitioners cannot assail its validity since
they stopped being the real parties-in-interest after failing to expressly renew the contract. In addition, she points out that the
action filed is for rescission of contract but what petitioners are asking for is the annulment of contract.

Ruling of the Supreme Court of the case:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The April 17, 2013 Decision of the Court G.R. CV No. 03402 is AFFIRMED.

On January 7, 2009,25 the Court granted Roselle's Motion to Dismiss, effectively dismissing the Mañas Spouses' case.
It discussed: Defendant Uy-Cua argues that the plaintiffs never exercised the option to renew the lease contract after its
expiration, thus the condition thereof granting the latter the right of first refusal (Priority to Buy), was never renewed. Although
there was an implied renewal of the contract of lease in (sic) a month-to-month basis, in accordance with Article 1670 of the
New Civil Code, the plaintiffs' right of first refusal was never renewed for the reason that the said condition is not germane to
possession. Furthermore, defendant Uy-Cua asserted that the filing of the case is premature. The case did not undergo the
required Barangay Conciliation, pursuant to RA 7160, a condition precedent before resort to the courts is initiated. The Mañas
Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied in a March 16, 2009 Order. 

The court stated: The issue that the subject Deed of Absolute Sale is a simulated contract and therefore void was raised by the
plaintiffs in their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Although this issue was not threshed out in the assailed Order, this Court
believes that to attack the validity of [the] Deed of Absolute Sale for being simulated should be made in an action for
Annulment of Contracts, not in an action for Rescission. Hence, the Mañas Spouses filed a Notice of Appeal. In their Brief, they
again alleged that Roselle was a minor at the time of sale; hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale was void. They also faulted the trial
court for ruling that their Complaint stated no cause of action. They asserted that the trial court incorrectly found that they had
no right of first refusal because the contract was not expressly renewed. The Mañas Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the Court of Appeals through its July 24, 2013. Thus, the Mañas Spouses filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari,36 arguing that the trial court erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss based on "respondent's defenses and not on the
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint."

Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_208845_2020.html