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fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/LWC.2018.2879842, IEEE Wireless
Communications Letters
Secure UAV-to-UAV Systems with Spatially Random UAVs
Jia Ye, Chao Zhang, Hongjiang Lei, Gaofeng Pan, M ember, IEEE , and Zhiguo Ding, SeniorM ember, IEEE
Abstract—In this letter, we investigate the secrecy performance
of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-to-UAV system, where
a UAV acts as the source (S) transmitting information to
a legitimate UAV receiver while a group of UAVs trying to
eavesdrop the information delivery between S and legitimate
UAV receiver. The locations of the legitimate UAV receiver and
the eavesdropping UAVs are randomly distributed in the coverage
space of S. We first characterize the statistical characteristics of
the signal-to-noise ratio over S to the legitimate UAV receiver
links; and then the closed-form analytical expressions for secrecy
outage probability and the average secrecy capacity have also
been derived accordingly. Finally, Monte-Carlo simulations are
carried out to verify our proposed analytical models.
Index Terms—Average secrecy capacity, secrecy outage prob-
ability, stochastic geometry, unmanned aerial vehicles.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) hook more and
more researchers’ interests as they have been regarded as
an effective complement to aerial communications, which
can provide robust and reliable communication networks [1].
UAVs could not only play a key role in both military and
civilian area [2], but also apply in wireless communications
[3]. The authors of [4] analyzed the deployment of and UAV
as a flying base station in a given geographical communica-
tion area. [5] studied the optimum relay UAV placement to
maxmize reliability. The applicability of UAV networks was
investigated in [6].
However, most of the existing literatures have not consid-
ered the security of the confidential information transmitted
from the transmitting UAV to a legitimate UAV. Actually, there
is a promising method, that is, physical-layer (PHY) security
which can prevent information delivery from eavesdropping
[7]- [8]. Several techniques have been investigated to achieve
positive secrecy rates for UAV communication systems, such
as artificial noise [9], power control [10], and so on. The
authors of [11] studied the maximum secrecy rate and the
UAV’s optimizing trajectory considering transmit power over
a finite horizon. [12] discussed how spatial communication se-
curity was affected by the communication through theoretical
analysis and simulation results. In [13], hybrid outage proba-
bility was derived to examine the security issue of UAV-aided
communication systems while the eavesdropper performing
Manuscript received Apr. 20, 2018; revised Aug. 17, 2018; accepted
Nov. 2, 2018. This research was supported by the UK EPSRC under grant
number EP/P009719/2 and by H2020-MSCA-RISE-2015 under grant number
690750. The work of H. Lei is supported by the Project of Fundamental
Science and Frontier Technology Research Plan of Chongqing under Grant
cstc2017jcyjAX0204. The associate editor coordinating the review of this pa-
per and approving it for publication was Pawel Dmochowski. (Corresponding
author: Gaofeng Pan.)
J. Ye, C. Zhang and G. Pan are with Chongqing Key Laboratory of Non-
linear Circuits and Intelligent Information Processing, Southwest University,
Chongqing, 400715, China. e-mail: gfpan@swu.edu.cn.
H. Lei is with the Chongqing Key Lab of Mobile Communications Tech-
nology, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing
400065, China.
Z. Ding is with School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, The
University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL, U.K.
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eavesdropping and malicious jamming simultaneously. The
tight lower-bound of ergodic capacity was obtained for UAV
aided cellular communications systems [14]. However, most of
the existing works mainly focus on the UAV-to-ground systems
in 2-dimensional (2D) space which only has one direction of
communication model from the ground to the air. The security
of UAV-to-UAV (A2A) systems in 3-dimensional (3D) space
will be more complicated since the receivers or eavesdrop-
pers work in all directions, leading to the difficulties in the
mathematical derivations during the performance modeling,
as shown in Section II, III and IV. It is obvious that the 3D
security model has not been well investigated and understood,
still leaving an open issue.
Furthermore, most of the researches only consider the fixed
locations and fixed number of UAVs, while UAVs can move
freely and flexibly in the 3D space. However, in practical sce-
narios, the positions of UAVs may vary due to the conditions
of airspace or the scheduled tasks to the UAVs. Especially,
the malicious UAVs, who want to eavesdrop the transmitted
information, will always change their positions to cover up
their eavesdropping behaviors. Thus, in this work we will
consider a general case with the randomness of the terminals’
positions, as well as the random number of the eavesdropping
UAVs. Moreover, Many previous works have considered 2D
space and are not suitable for A2A systems, because UAVs
may be distributed anywhere in the airspace.
Motivated by the above observations, in this letter we
investigate the secrecy performance of an A2A communication
system with a legitimate UAV and a group of eavesdropping
UAVs in the line of sight (LoS) 3D space. It is reasonable
to assume that channels mainly experience LoS fading in the
open space [15] because UAVs flying above buildings and
shadows are more likely to observe the radio path clearance
from other UAVs in the surrounding areas. Also, in some
application scenarios that UAVs fly in stratosphere, there is
no reflected signal and LoS fading plays the main role during
the transmissions [16]1 . We also consider the randomness of
the locations of all UAVs and the number of the eavesdropping
UAVs by using the stochastic geometry theory. The main
contributions of this work are summarized as: 1) We charac-
terize the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR)
over the A2A links; 2) The closed-form analytical expressions
for secrecy outage probability (SOP) and the average secrecy
capacity (ASC) have been derived.
Notations: B (x, y) and f (x, y) denote Beta functions and
joint PDF related x and y. 3 F2 (·) and 2 F1 (·) denote Gauss
hypergeometric functions. ln (·) denote natural logarithms.
j (N −1)!
CN −1 = j!(N −1−j) with N > 1.
1 In Section V, we present some simulation results under case with both LoS
and Non-line-of-sight (NLoS, e.g., Nakagami-m fading) fading to show the
impact of NLoS fading on the secrecy performance of the considered system.
We leave the analysis of this case for future works due to its complexity and
the page limitation.
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Communications Letters

γP
II. S YSTEM MODEL Lemma 1. The CDF of γi = d2
can be expressed as
i

√
 3
( γP ) γP
1− , x≥

3 D2
Fγi (x) = x 2 D3 . (1)
 0, γP
x< D2

3
Proof: Using fW (w) = 4πD 3
, we have the CDF of di as
Zx Zπ Z2π
3
Fdi (x) = sin φi d2i dθi dφi d (di )
4πD3
0 0 0

 0, x < D

= x3
D3
, 0≤x≤D . (2)

1, x > D

Fig. 1: System model
Therefore, we can achieve the CDF of γi as
In this work, we consider a A2A communication system, as ( r )
shown in Fig. 1, where a UAV with a single omni transmitting γP
Fγi (x) = Pr {γi ≤ x} = 1 − Pr di ≤ . (3)
antenna acts as the source (S) trying to transmit its information x
to a legitimate UAV2 . Furthermore, there are also a group of
UAVs distributed in the coverage space (in which the received Then, the proof is completed.
signal strength is equal or above the threshold at the receiver
Corollary 1. Accordingly, the PDF of γi can be expressed as
to demodulate and decode the received signal) of S trying
√
 3
to eavesdrop the information transmission between S and the  3( γP )
, x≥ γP
5 D2
legitimate UAV. For tractability purpose, in this work we treat fγi (x) = 2x 2 D3 . (4)
 0, γP
the coverage space of S as a sphere, V, with radius, D (D > 0) x< D2

m, where S is located at the center of the sphere. Without

of loss generality, we assume that the legitimate UAV and Proof: The PDF of γi is the derivative of (1).
N (N > 1) eavesdropping UAVs can be modeled as a set of Lemma 2. The CDF of γmax with N eavesdropping UAVs
independent and identical uniformly distributed points without can be derived as
cooperation with each other in the sphere V, denoted by W , in √ 3 N
  
( γP ) γP
1− , x≥

order to protect their eavesdropping activities. The number of FγNmax (x) = 3
x 2 D3
D2 . (5)
γP
the eavesdropping receivers is
Poisson distributed with density

0, x< D2
3
λ, i.e., P {N = k} = µkV /k! exp (−µV ), where µV = 4πD 3
λ
is the mean measure. Proof: Using probability theory, we have Fz (z) =
In the following, we name the legitimate receiver as the Pr {max {x1 , x2 , ..., xM } ≤ z}, if x1 , x2 , ..., xM are M (M >
M
0th receiver to facilitate the following analysis. Therefore, 1) independent variables. Then, Fz (z) =
Q
Fxi (z), where
the distance between S and UAVs can be calculated from i=1

W , the PDF of which can be given by using Eq. (1) in Fxi (x) is the CDF of xi . As the eavesdropping channels are
[17] as fW (w) = 4πD 3 independent with each other, we can derive the CDF of γmax
3 . In this work, we assume that the

communication channels from S to UAVs are dominated as (5).

by LoS links rather than other channel impairments in the Corollary 2. Accordingly, the PDF of γmax with N eaves-
open airspace, such as shadowing or small-scale fading, as dropping UAVs can be expressed as
treated in [3]. Thus, the channel power gain from S to the   √
( γP )3
N −1 √
3( γP )
3
γP
N 1− 3 , x≥

ith (0 < i 6 N ) UAV follows the free-space path loss model, fγNmax (x) = x D 2
5
3
2x D 2 3 D2
which can be given by gi = βd−2 i , where β denotes the channel

0, x< D γP
2
power at the reference distance d = 1 m, whose value depends  √ 3 N −1 √ 3j
 N (3 γP ) P
(−1)j CNj ( γP ) γP
on the carrier frequency, antenna gain, etc., and di is the link 2D 3 −1 3 j+ 5 3j , x ≥ D 2
= j=0 x2 2D .
distance between S and the ith UAV. 
0, γP
x< D 2
Let P denote the transmit power at S. The received SNR (6)
at the ith UAV from S can be expressed as γi = Pδg2i = γP d2
,
i
2 β
Proof: The PDF of γmax is the derivative of (5).
where δ denotes the noise power, and γ = δ2 represents the
γP
reference SNR. In the following, we also denote vmin = D 2 ≤

γi ≤ vmax = ∞ for simplification, where vmin and vmax means
the minimum and maximum values of γi respectively.
2 In this work, we only consider omni transmitting antenna to introduce the
analysis method for A2A systems and the system with directional antenna is a
special case of the one with omni transmitting antenna: the coverage space of
directional antenna is a part of the one of omni antenna, leading to a portion
of the sphere for eavesdroppers to distribute, as indicated in Fig. 1.
III. T HE S ECRECY O UTAGE P ROBABILITY
In this letter, SOP is defined as the probability that the
instantaneous secrecy capacity is below a threshold secrecy
rate, Cth (Cth ≥ 0). Therefore, the instantaneous secrecy
capacity from S to the legitimate UAV is
CS (γ0 , γmax ) = max {log2 (1 + γ0 ) − log2 (1 + γmax ) , 0} , (7)

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Communications Letters

N
where γmax = max {γi }. Thus, we can calculate C̄s1 as
i∈{1,...,N }
Then, let ν = 2 Cth
. SOP can be written as Z∞
N
  C̄s1 = ln (1 + x) f0 (x)
1 + γ0
Pr (Cth ) = Pr {Cs ≤ Cth } = Pr ≤ 2Cth vmin
1 + γmax
Zx √
3 N −1 √
3j
= Pr {γ0 ≤ νγmax + ν − 1} . (8) 3 γP X γP
× N (−1)j CN
j
−1 3 5 dydx
2D3 j=0 y 2 j+ 2 D3j
vmin
−1 √
3j+6 Z∞
Theorem 1. Using the Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, we can N
X 9N (−1)j γP 5
express Pr (Cth ) as follows: = j
CN −1 3 3 x− 2 ln (1 + x)dx
√
3j+6 j=0 2(3j + 3) vmin 2 j+ 2 D3j+6
∞
"N −1 vmin
X µV −µV X j j 3N γP √
3j+6 Z∞
Pr (Cth )= e (−1) CN −1 3 j+3
N −1
9N (−1) γP j
N =1
N! j=0 (3j + 3) vmin 2 D3j+6 −
X j
CN
3
x− 2 j−4 ln (1 + x)dx.
−1
N −1 √
3j+6 j=0
2(3j + 3) D3j+6
X 3N γP vmin
− (−1)j CN
j
−1 3 (13)
j=0 2ν 2 D3j+6
  In order to facilitate the analysis, we define a new function
B 2 j + 3, 1 2 F1 23 j + 52 , 1; 23 j + 23 ;
3 3


2vmin R∞ m
× q , g1 (m) = x ln (1 + x) dx. Using Eq. (2.6.10.47) in [19],
3 5
vmin 2 j+ 2 1 − ν1 + vmin vmin
we can easily calculate g1 (m) as
(9)
g1 (m) = vmin m+1 B (1, −m − 1) [ln (vmin ) + ψ (−m)
Proof: As the main and eavesdropping channels are
independent with each other, we can calculate Pr (Cth ) with −ψ (−m − 1)] + vmin m B (1, −m)
 
N eavesdropping UAVs as 1
× 3 F2 −m, 1, 1; 2, −m + 1; − . (14)
Z∞ νy+ν−1
Z vmin
PrN (Cth ) = fγ0 (x) fγmax (y) dxdy N
Then, using (14) in (13), we can easily derive C̄s1 as
vmin vmin
N −1 √
3j+6
√
3 9N (−1)j
 
Z∞ νy+ν−1
N
X j γP
5
3 γP C̄s1 = CN g −
Z
−1 3 3 1
= fγmax (y) 5 dxdy j=0 2(3j + 3) vmin 2 j+ 2 D3j+6 2
2x 2 D3 √
vmin vmin N −1 3j+6
9N (−1)j γP

 
Z∞ √
3j+6
X j 3
N −1
3N γP − CN −1 g1 − j − 4 , (15)
X j j 2(3j + 3) D3j+6 2
= (−1) CN −1 3 3 5 dy. (10) j=0
j=0 2vmin 2 D3j+6 y 2 j+ 2
vmin R∞
where g1 (m) = xm ln (1 + x) dx.
vmin
Using Eq. (3.197.2) in [18] and taking the Poisson distribut- N
Similarly, we can also derive C̄s2 by using (14) as
ed number of eavesdroppers into consideration, Pr (Cth ) can
be obtained as (9). Z∞ vZ
max √
3
N 3 γP
C̄s2 = ln (1 + y) fγmax (y) 5 dxdy
IV. T HE AVERAGE S ECRECY C APACITY 2x 2 D3
vmin y

In this work, ASC is defined the expected value of secrecy N −1 √
3j+6 Z∞

X 3N γP 3
capacity as follows3 = (−1)j CN
j
−1 y − 2 j−4 ln (1 + y) dy
j=0
2D3j+6
C̄s (γ0 , γmax ) = E [Cs (γ0 , γmax )] vmin
N −1 √
3j+6 
Z∞ Z∞

X 3N γP 3j
= Cs (γ0 , γmax ) f (γ0 , γmax ) dγ0 dγmax . (11) = (−1)j CN
j
−1 g1 − − 4 . (16)
j=0
2D3j+6 2
υmin υmin

As the main and eavesdropping channels are independent Finally, ASC can be obtained by substituting (15) and (16)
with each other, we can rewrite ASC as into (12).
X∞
µV V. N UMERICAL RESULTS
N N
C̄s (γ0 , γmax ) = exp (−µV )(C̄s1 − C̄s2 )/ ln 2, (12)
N ! In this section, Monte Carlo simulations are carried out
N =1
to validate our proposed analytical expressions for SOP and
N
R∞ Rx
where C̄s1 = ln(1 + x)fγ0 (x) fγmax (y) dydx and ASC under dominated LoS fading channels and Nakagami-m
υmin υmin
R∞ R∞ fading. The main adopted parameters are set as γ = 80 dB
N
C̄s2 = ln(1 + y)fγmax (y) fγ0 (x)dxdy . [11], P = 10 dBW, Cth = 1 bits/s/Hz and the expectation of
υmin y
channel power gain of the Nakagami-m fading channel is 1
3 The ergodic secrecy capacity aims at a case that the source can gain the dB. Moreover, the coverage distance of the source UAV is set
channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping link and transmits the from hundreds of meters to tens of km to reflect the practical
information only when the legitimate channel outperforms the eavesdropping scenarios of UAVs in civil and military applications.
channel. Therefore, the ergodic secrecy capacity is a special case of ASC, as
ASC is calculated for the case that no matter the CSI of the eavesdropping Fig. 2(a) shows the SOP versus λ for various Cth with
channel is available or not at the source. D = 500 m. Since a high threshold secrecy rate means the

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10 0
SOP
10 -1
-100 -98 -96 -94 -92 -90 -88 -86 -84
(a) SOP versus λ
Fig. 2: SOP
10 0
ASC
10 -1
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
(a) ASC versus D
Fig. 3: ASC
system requires a large channel secrecy rate, we can see that
the systems with a small Cth outperforms the one with a
large Cth . Fig. 2(b) shows the SOP versus D for various λ.
Clearly, there are more eavesdropping UAVs when λ and/or
D increase, resulting in degraded SOP. Because the diversity
gain of the information eavesdropping will increase, while the
number of eavesdropping UAVs enlarging.
Fig. 3(a) presents the ASC versus D for various λ, in which
one can see that ASC can be improved in the low λ region and
degrades in large λ region when λ decreases or D increases.
Because low λ and large D can improve the probability that
the distance between S and the legitimate UAV is shorter than
the ones among S and the eavesdropping UAVs. Then, the
legitimate UAV will suffer weaker eavesdropping, compared
to the case with high λ and small D. However, it is exactly
opposite for ASC in the high λ and/or low D regions, since
there will be more eavesdropping UAVs, leading to poorer
secrecy performance. As shown in Fig. 3(b) with λ = −130
dB, we can also see that the reference SNR γ cannot play
a positive role significantly, since the received SNR over the
eavesdropping links will also be improved when γ increases.
Moreover, while suffering both LoS and Nakagami-m fad-
ing, we also present the SOP performance with m = 2
and m √ = 3 in Fig.√2(a) and Fig. 2(b), and the ASC with
m = 6 and m = 2 in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), separately.
One can see that the SOP and ASC suffering both LoS
propagation and Nakagami-m fading outperforms the ones
only experiencing LoS propagation. This observation can be
explained by the fact: Benefiting from the diversity gain of
multiple eavesdropping UAVs, the equivalent received SNR at
eavesdroppers, γmax , will degrade slower compared with the
received SNR at the legitimated UAV, γ0 , when the channels
get worse. Therefore, we can see that the SOP only suffering
LoS fading acts as the upper bound of the SOP, and the ASC
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Communications Letters
10 0
only experiencing LoS fading serves as the lower bound of
the ASC.
10 -1
Finally, we can also clearly see from Figs. 2-3 that simu-
lation and analysis results match very well with each other,
SOP
10 -2
which can verify the correctness of our proposed analysis
10 -3
models.
VI. C ONCLUSION
-82 -80
10 -4
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 In this letter, we have studied the secrecy performance of
a A2A communication system and derived the closed-form
(b) SOP versus D analytical expressions for SOP and ASC. We consider the
randomness of the number and the positions of all UAVs to
make our system more practical. From the numerical results,
we can obtain that the density of the eavesdropping UAVs and
the radius of the coverage space of S exhibit a negative impact
10 -1
on SOP. However, the ASC can be improved by increasing the
radius of the coverage space of the source UAV.
ASC
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