G.R. No.

L-56358 October 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B.
BERDIN, accused-appellants.
Facts:
A benefit dance was held in one sitio in Lapu lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for the candidates
for princesses, attended by the entire family of one of the candidates. Also present were members of
the kwaknit gang, headed by Toring, noted for their bird-like way of dancing and their propensity for
drunkennessand provoking trouble.
Samuel, the father of the declared winner, while answering the callof nature, was approached by Toring
and two others and was stabbed from behind by Toring using a knife handed to him by a companion.
Samuel died of stab wound he sustained on the right side of his abdomen.
An information for MURDER was filed against Toring. The lower court rendered a decision discrediting
Toring's claim that the killing of Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger. While
Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon (Amion), prosecution
witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's thrusts with the butt of his
shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy isfatal to the defense because in appreciating the justifying
circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with definiteness the identity of the
stranger defended by the accused.
Upon appeal, Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified
because he acted in defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia is the first cousin of Toring their fathers
being brothers,( by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree) although no explanation appears on
record why they have different surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted
by the prosecution. Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, samuel stopped him,
pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia.
Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the bullet.
Issue: Whether the act of Toring in stabbing Samuel was justified for being done in defense of his
relative, Joel Escobia.
Held: NO. SC ruled that there was no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful
aggression and that prosecution failed to prove that Joel testified to favor Toring.
However, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of
provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of
defense of a relative.
Toring himself admitted in court that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto,
Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure
compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin.
Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud between
the Augusto and the Toring brothers
Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other.

Toring should be credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative
and the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code being reclusion temporal maximum
to death, the imposable penalty is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium in view of the
presence of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of relative and voluntary surrender (Art.
64 [5]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty to be meted on Toring
is prision correctional maximum as minimum to prision mayor maximum as maximum penalty.
David vs ca gr 111168

Herein petitioner Joaquin E. David was charged with homicide and frustrated homicide for the fatal shooting of Noel
Nora and the serious wounding of the latter's brother, Narciso Nora, Jr., on March 28, 1981, in Malabon, Metro
Manila.
The antecedent facts of the event are as follows:
o On March 28, 1981, at about 10:00 p.m., while the Nora brothers Arturo, Arnel, Noel and Narciso were
walking along Flerida Street in Malabon, they saw petitioner near the compound of his house.
o Noel Nora, the deceased, confronted him about derogatory remarks allegedly made by the latter. Petitioner
ran to his house to get a gun.
o When the Nora brothers reached the intersection of Flerida and Capitan
Tiago Streets, he shouted at them Putang ina nino (You sons of a bitch) and other epithets, and then fired
four times at them. One shot hit Noel, killing him. Another shot hit Narciso Nora on the ankle. Another nearly
hit the zipper of Arturo Nora.
o Petitioner claimed self-defense. He alleged that on the night in question, he went to the corner of Flerida and
Capitan Tiago Streets because Noel Nora had earlier challenged him to a fight. However, upon reaching the
place, he found that Noel had brought along his three (3) brothers and other companions who ganged up on
him.
Petitioner further contends that certain mitigating circumstances, besides voluntary surrender, should have
been considered in his favor, to wit: (a) that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceded the act; (b) that he acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against him; (c) that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion or obfuscation
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a self defense on the part of David
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of minority is applicable in the case at bar

RULING:

The claim of self-defense was denied by the court since there was no unlawful aggression immediately
preceeding the shooting of the victims, the claim of self-defense to justify the acts of the accused is
unavailing. 
the evidence established that there was in fact no immediate unlawful aggression to warrant the acts of the
accused in shooting the victims. While the accused was indeed mauled and beaten up by the deceased and his
companions, the aggression stopped when the accused was able to free himself from the assault of the group
and thereafter sought refuge in their house. An act of aggression, when its author does not persist in his
purpose or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in peril is not
unlawful aggression warranting self-defense

Having sought refuge in their house after the aggression had ceased, the accused should have desisted from
stepping out of their abode with his father's gun. In going after the deceased and his companions after the
unlawful aggression ceased to exist, the act of the accused became retaliatory in nature, done for the purpose of
avenging whatever pain and injuries he had suffered from the hands of the victims. Consequently, the same
cannot be considered as constituting self-defense for the act to repel the unlawful aggression must immediately
follow such unlawful aggression 

In shooting the victims, petitioner was not acting to protect himself but retaliating for the insult and physical
violence he had received at the hands of the victims and their group. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party has already ceased when the accused attacks him. In self-defense, the aggression
still exists when the aggressor is injured or disabled by the person making the defense

However, the court pointed out one circumstance not raised by the defense but evident from the record of this case--
minority.
In his statement to the police given on April 2, 1981, petitioner gave his personal circumstances as follows: Joaquin
David y Ejercito, 17 taong gulang, 2nd year college, binata at naninirahan sa 12-C Flerida St., Acacia, Malabon,
Metro Manila. At the hearing on November 11, 1987, petitioner's mother stated that he was 16 or 17 years old when
the shooting incident happened.
Yes, herein petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The court said, "It is clear that
on March 28, 1981, when the crime was committed, he (the petitioner) was only 17 years old."

According to the court, if the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his claim by contrary
evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact. And that any doubt in respect of the accused is resolved in his
favor.

There are therefore present in this case the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and two ordinary
mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense). Because of the
presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of reclusion temporal should be
reduced by one degree to prision mayor, pursuant to Art. 68 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty of prision
mayor should further be reduced to prision correccional because of the presence of two ordinary mitigating
circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Art. 64, par. 5 of the same Code. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be made to suffer imprisonment, the minimum of which
should be within the range of arresto mayor and the maximum of which within the range of prision
correccional. 

On the other hand, for the crime of frustrated homicide, the penalty imposable for the consummated crime of
homicide should be reduced by one degree, i.e., to prision mayor. Because of the presence of one privileged
mitigating circumstance and two ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by two degrees, i.e., to arresto mayor. 

People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 31045, 1 October 1929

We do not agree with the trial court that the appellant, in inflicting the wounds that caused the death of the
deceased (Calixto Perea) acted from an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation, simply
because the deceased favored his friend Cornelio Enriquez's, courting of Asuncion Hernandez, whom the
appellant also courted. Neither may the third extenuating circumstances of article 9 of the Penal Code he
considered in favor of the defendant, for; taking into account the wound in the deceased's abdomen, and the
weapon used by the appellant, the intent to kill is manifest." 

Touching the passion and obfuscation, the fact that the deceased favored a rival of the defendant in his
courtship of the young woman, Asuncion Hernandez, does not constitute a legitimate and sufficient cause of
that passion and obfuscation which mitigates the guilt.

the accused must have been actuated by such causes, both strong and powerful, as naturally produced passion
and obfuscation, and those causes which merely give rise to the excitement inherent in combatants are not
sufficient. Furthermore, the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings (U. S. vs. Flores, 28 Phil., 29).
The act of the deceased was not enough to obfuscate the defendant, nor did the latter have any right to prevent
others from courting the Hernandez girl, or the deceased from favoring said courtship. 

With respect to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so great a wrong as that committed, it
cannot be deemed present, considering the weapon employed by the defendant and the part of the deceased's
body upon which it had been used. There is no great or obvious disproportion between the means and
circumstances of the attack and the consequences thereof 
NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CONSIDERED

People vs. Magallanes, G.R. No. 114265, 8 July 1997

The appellant was in the company of several other cockfighting afficionados, among whom were Romualdo
Cempron and Danilo Salpucial. While on their way, they passed by Virgilio Tapales who was drinking in the
store of Umping Amores which was located on the elevated side of the road. Tapales hailed Cempron and
invited him for a drink but the latter courteously refused as he was going to the cockpit. Tapales approached
Cempron and conversed with him briefly. For some unknown reason, Tapales then directed his attention to the
appellant who was walking a few steps behind Cempron. Tapales held the appellant by his shirt slapped him
and strangled his neck. But seeing a knife tucked in Tapales' waist, the appellant pulled out the knife and
slashed at Tapales to loosen his grip. The appellant succeeded in wounding the face and neck of Tapales who
let go of the appellant and fled for his life. Insatiated, the appellant pursued Tapales and when the latter fell,
the appellant stabbed him several more times before uttering the following words: "you are already dead in that
case". With that, the appellant stood up and rode on the motorcycle being driven by Danilo Salpucial. Later,
the appellant surrendered to the police authorities of the town of Inabanga, Bohol. 

During arraignment, the appellant expressed his willingness to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide with the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender

Gregorio Magallanes where he invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor, and contends,
in the alternative, that he should be convicted of the crime of homicide only and not murder. 

The appellant asseverates that he was justified in stabbing Tapales as he was merely defending himself from
the former's unlawful and unprovoked aggression.

Issue w/n there was a self defense

Clearly, whatever act of aggression that was initiated by Tapales against the appellant had already ceased as
demonstrated by the fact that Tapales was running away from the appellant. The tables were turned when the
appellant chased Tapales with the obvious intent of stabbing him. At this juncture, the appellant had assumed
the role of aggressor, thus, his claim of self-defense cannot obviously prosper.

Another factor which militates against the appellant's claim of self-defense is the nature and number of wounds
suffered by Tapales.

Of the seven (7) wounds, five (5) were located in the neck area suggesting that the appellant struck at Tapales
with resolve to cause serious if not mortal damage to Tapales' person. There certainly was no necessity to
inflict such wounds upon Tapales especially in view of the fact that the latter was not even armed.

where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was done impulsively, there is
no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected and while the victim was running away with his
back towards the accused. As has been aptly, observed the accused could not have made preparations for the
attack, . . . ; and the means, method and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the accused,
because the attack was impulsively done. 
Finally, on record is the appellant's willingness to enter a plea of guilty but to the lesser crime of homicide. It
only remains to consider briefly whether the appellant's plea of guilty in the form it was entered constitutes a
voluntary confession of guilt before the court as defined in paragraph 7 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code. 

where the accused who was charged with murder entered a qualified plea of guilty by claiming that the alleged
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation did not exist, we said that: 

Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence became necessary, the qualification did
not deny the defendant's guilt and, what is more, was subsequently fully justified. It was not the defendant's
fault that aggravating circumstances were erroneously alleged in the information and mitigating circumstances
omitted therefrom. If such qualification could deprive the accused of the benefit of plea of guilty, then the
prosecution could nullify this mitigating circumstance by counteracting it with unfounded allegations of
aggravating circumstances. 25 

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by convicting the appellant Gregorio
Magallanes of the crime of homicide only with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of
guilty in his favor, 

People vs. Amit, G.R. No. L-2060, 15 February 1949

The appellant Rucila Amit y Buena was accused of qualified theft in the Court of First Instance of Manila 
Counsel and she pleaded guilty to the charge. Her counsel filed a motion for new trial on the ground that from
the investigation and observation he had made he was of the opinion that Rucila was suffering from some
mental disorder; that she had assured him that she was innocent of the charge of which she was found guilty
and convicted; that she did not know why she entered the plea of guilty, and that if she was given an
opportunity she could establish her innocence.

that in answer to the petition of appellant's counsel that she (appellant) said to be suffering from mental
derangement, be transferred to the National Psychopathic Hospital `for necessary and proper treatment

it is hereby ordered that the chief or Director of the National Psychopathic Hospital or any competent alienist
designated by him, place the herein appellant under observation for a reasonable period of time, in order to
verify the mental derangement, particularly the `word deafness' from which she is supposed to be suffering,
and if found to be suffering from said ailment, to determine how long she had been in that state, - if as far back
as December 21, 1947, when the crime imputed to her was said to have been committed, or, on January 9,
1948, when she pleaded guilty upon arraignment; and to file a report with this Court at the earliest time
possible. 

for about a month and the chief of said hospital has now filed the corresponding report. From said report which
appears to be quite comprehensive and adequate we gather that although Rucila, born 26 years ago of poor
parents, may have been a little unfortunate as regards family support, environment and opportunities for self-
improvement, nevertheless, she was quite normal mentally, even bright and above the average in intelligence.
Records taken of the behavior of Rucila during her stay at the Correctional Institution from January 1948 to
December 1948 reveals that Rucila had been behaving normally, that she was assigned to the different
institutional activities, and she had been doing excellent work. 

Rucila was transferred to the National Psychopatic Hospital on Dec. 18, 1948. 
MENTAL STATUS: 

"On admission to the National Psychopatic Hospital, Rucila was well behaved, cooperative, coherent and
relevant in her speech, well oriented in all spheres. No hallucinations or delusions elicited. 

From the above studies and findings, the undersigned and members of the staff of the National Psychopathic
Hospital are of the opinion that Rucila Amit y Buena is not psychotic and not suffering from `word deafness.'
That she was not psychotic, and did not suffer from "word deafness" during the commission of the crime on
December 21, 1947, that she was not psychotic and did not suffer from `word deafness' when she pleaded
guilty upon arraignment on January 9, 1948. 

"However, Rucila is suffering from a mild behavior disorder, as a consequence of the illness she had in early
life, which most probably was encephalitis, as evidenced by the development of squinting of the right eye and
the somewhat truant behavior. 

W/N Rucila should be accorded a mitigating circumstances because of her mild behavior disorder

Although she is mentally sane, we however, are inclined to extend our sympathy to the appellant because of
her misfortunes and her weak character. According to the report she is suffering from a mild behavior disorder
as a consequence of the illness she had in early life. We are willing to regard this as a mitigating circumstance
under article 13, Revised Penal Code, either paragraph 9 or 10 thereof which read as follows: 

"9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of consciousness of his acts. 

"10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned." 

Together with the plea of guilty, appellant has two mitigating circumstances in her favor without aggravating
circumstance to off-set them

we hereby impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law. The penalty corresponding to qualified
theft involving more than P200 is prision mayor in its medium and maximum degrees, penalty next lower to it
would be prision correccional in its maximum degree to prision mayor in its minimum degree.
People vs Bermas
On April 20, 1985, around 8:30 p.m., at the sea of Namanday, Bacacay, Albay, Expedito Bonaobra, barangay
captain of Cawayan, Bacacay, Albay, together with Arturo Abion, Catalino Bellen, Renato Abion, Antonio
Abion, Jesus Lotera and Teodoro Cas were on board a fishing boat named "Sagrada Familia" owned by Jose
Abion. They intended to catch fish that night and brought with them two (2) pressure gas lamps, a fishing net,
rope and a pole used for the net.

Subsequently, a small paddled boat with two (2) men on board approached the fishing boat. The small paddled
boat proceeded to the prow of the fishing boat and went around it four (4) times. As the paddled boat circled
the fishing boat the second time, Bonaobra and Renato recognized appellant (Bermas) as the one paddling the
small paddled boat. He was wearing a denim jacket and denim pants. Thereupon, Bonaobra ordered Arturo
Abion to remove the shade of the gas lamp so that they could recognize appellant's campanion. After Arturo
removed the shade, the paddled boat went around the fishing boat two (2) more times. Those notwithstanding,
appellant's (Bermas) companion could not be recognized because his face was covered with a mask and only
his eyes could be seen. Appellant's (Bermas) companion was then wearing a blue long-sleeved jacket and
maong pants.

Bonaobra asked appellant if he and his companion were going to catch fish. Appellant answered in the
affirmative and told Bonaobra that they were looking for somebody. Appellant then asked Bonaobra who
owned the fishing boat and Bonaobra informed him that Jose Abion owned it. Thereafter, appellant and his
companion pretended to paddle away. When the small paddled boat was about seven (7) meters away from the
fishing boat, appellant's companion fired his Armalite rifle at Bonaobra and his companions. They heard two
(20) volleys fired at them. They lay down but they could not avoid the attack. The fishing boat was hit and so
was one of the pressure gas lamps.

Issue: Whether or not Nighttime can be appreciated as Aggravating Circumstances in this case

No. With regard to nighttime, it needs be stressed that the mere fact that the offense was committed at night
will not suffice to sustain a finding of nocturnity. By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating
circumstance; it becomes so only when:
1.] it is specially sought by the offender; or
2.] it was taken advantage of by him; or
3.] it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from capture.

In the case at bench, other than the time of the occurrence of the felony, nothing else suggests that it was
consciously resorted to by accused-appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or that it was availed of
for the purpose of impunity.

Indeed, the records show that the scene of the crime was well illuminated by two (2) pressure gas lamps which
were on board the boat and that Expedito Bonaobra, in fact, even ordered Arturo Abion to remove the shade of
the gas lamp so that they could recognize accused Bermas' companion. Be that as it may, nocturnity is
absorbed in treachery and can not be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Likewise, abuse of
superior strength is absorbed in treachery, hence, it can not be appreciated as an independent aggravating
circumstance when treachery is already present.

People vs Lagarto
For the killing of Reynaldo Aducal, accused Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. was charged in an amended
information with the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
allegedly committed as follows: 

"That on or about the 25th day of May, 1983, at about 6:00 O'clock in the evening more or less, inside the
public market Bgy. Little Venice, Municipality of Laoang, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with deliberate intent to kill with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one REYNALDO ADUCAL y LURA with the use of a Batangas fan knife
or Balisong which the above-named accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said
victim fatal wounds on his chest, which wounds caused the instantaneous death of the victim. 

"Accused is a recidivist, having been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced IN
THE SAME TITLE OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THAT OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
1473."
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty. 

issue: whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism

Court found,, as the trial court found, that the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his
trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of the Revised Penal Code. Herein accused had been convicted of the crime of homicide in Criminal
Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal Case No. 1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein
accused alleged that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15, 1983, hence
when the accused was arraigned on October 11, 1983 for Criminal Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist. 

We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is
employed in its general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We
held that the phrase "at the trial" is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from
arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court.

In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983.
There being no appeal, the judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The second conviction was
rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the accused
had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second offense.  

[There is evident premeditation when the following elements concur: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.  ] 28

People vs. Ubina, G.R. No. L-6969, 31 August 1955

Facts: After a consideration of all the evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense, we
find the following facts to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt: That because of political
enmity and a personal affront committed by the deceased against appellant Tomas Ubiña, the latter
decided to take revenge, so at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 14, 1952, he called upon
his political adherents and protegees, namely, Marcelo De Guzman, Jose de Guzman and Loreto
Mercado, and his nephew, Jose Ubiña, to a conference, in which they resolved to put an end to the
life of the deceased; that at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, after Tomas Ubiña had placed 3
carbines and 1 pistol in a bag and armed himself with another revolver, they embarked on a truck,
together with said firearms; after crossing the Cagayan River they passed by Andarayan, Solana,
where the 3 other appellants were already waiting for them; that these 3 were advised of their
purpose and were asked to go with them, which they did; that all of them proceeded to Barrio
Bañgag, and once there and after the firearms were distributed among the original conspirators, they
went to the house of Esteban Tambiao and there attacked and fired at and killed Aureliano Carag,
Dionisia Tambiao and Esteban Tambiao.

Whether or not there is aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation

There is no question that evident premeditation was present. It has been held that if a crime was
planned at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and carried out at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, or planned at
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon and executed at 7:30 o'clock in the evening, the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation is present because sufficient time has intervened between the
conception of the idea and the resolution to carry it out and the fulfillment thereof

It is true that when the person killed is different from the one intended to be killed the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation may not be considered as present. However, evident
premeditation may be considered as present if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to
kill not only the intended victim but also any one who may help him put a violent resistance. In the
case at bar, it may not have been the original intention of the conspirators to murder Dionisia and
Esteban Tambiao, but the fact that the conspirators number more than five and were armed with
three carbines and two revolvers, indicates that they were to carry out their intention to murder the
deceased mayor notwithstanding any objection or opposition that the latter or his companions may
interpose or offer or may be able to put up. This determination to kill all who stood on their way is
evident from the answer of appellant Tomas Ubiña to the deceased mayor's call for help, when
Tomas Ubiña said that even if the deceased would call all his policemen he is not afraid of them. We
hold, therefore, that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present not only with
respect to the killing of the deceased Mayor Carag, but also with respect to Dionisia Tambiao and
Esteban Tambiao.

People vs. Apduhan, G.R. No. L-19491, 30 August 1968

FACTS:
● On Aug. 12, 1961, accused Apduhan together with his co-accused Rodulfo Huiso and
Felipe Quimson pled not guilty to a second amended information charging them with
robbery and homicide, aggravated by dwelling, nighttime, and the use of superior
strength.
● 2nd Amended Information states: That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about
7:00 PM, Apduhan, his two co-accused, and 5 other persons (whose true names are
not yet known), all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and
other deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent
of gain, enter, by means of violence, the dwelling house of the spouses Honorato
Miano and Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling house of their children, the
spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano; and, once inside the said
dwelling house, attack, hack and shoot Geronimo Miano and another person by the
name of Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said dwelling house, thereby
inflicting upon the said two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death; The
group also took cash amounting to P322 belonging to Honorato Miano and Geronimo
Miano.
● Atty. Tirol (the atty. of Apduhan’s co-accused) informed the trial court that he was
appearing as counsel de oficio for Apduhan, and was appointed by the trial court as
the same.
● Apduhan changed his plea to guilty. The judge repeatedly informed him as to the
severity and consequences of pleading guilty (among others, the imposition of the
capital penalty upon conviction) yet Apduhan persisted, only requesting that the death
penalty not be imposed.
● Apduhan eventually desisted, but again insisted on pleading guilty. After a 5-minute
recess, Atty. Tirol informed the court that Apduhan insisted on entering a plea of guilty.
● Court found that Apduhan’s plea was ambiguous, and reopened the case. Apduhan
categorically pleaded guilty.

Whether or not abuse of superior strength was absorbed by Band (NO)

There are 3 aggravating circumstances in the case: dwelling, band, and nighttime. The 4th, abuse
of superior strength, was withdrawn by the prosecution on the ground that it was absorbed by the
element of cuadrilla - band.
 The withdrawal was ill-advised as band and abuse of superior strength are different: Band
Abuse of Superior Strength.

The element of band is appreciated when the offense is committed by more than three armed
malefactors regardless of the comparative strength of the victim or victims. 
* Elements of Band:
1. At least 4 malefactors
2) All the malefactors are armed.

On the other hand, the gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of
their collective strength to overpower their relatively weaker victim or victims.
* Elements of Superior Strength:
1) Collective strength
2) Use of said strength to overpower relatively weaker victims. What are taken into
account are the relative physical strengths.

Hence, in the latter aggravating factor, what is taken into account is not the number of aggressors
nor the fact that they are armed, but their relative physical might vis-a-vis the offended party.

 Even if the withdrawal were valid, there are still 3 aggravating circumstances which do not
need to be proved because the accused has supplied the requisite proof by virtue of his
plea of guilt.

People vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 90641, 27 February 1990

On November 6, 1981, a number of persons, mostly tricycle drivers, had been invited to the birthday
celebration of Sergeant Leonardo Hernandez in Barangay Galamay-Amo in San Jose, Batangas. A
group of them were already engaged in a drinking spree when at around 6:30 in the evening, they
were joined by another group of five tricycle drivers, including Arturo Ilagan. After a short while,
Ilagan went out of the house to answer a call of nature. While he was thus occupied, a group of
three men, one of whom was armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly encircled him, and pinned him
closely ("dikit-dikit") to the center. Two men held his hands, while a third stabbed him repeatedly in
different parts of his body. They left him prostrate and moaning in pain, with blood oozing from his
twelve (12) stab wounds. He was rushed to a hospital but he expired at 4:00 of the next day. The
cause of death was diagnosed as "hypogelemic shock" due to multiple stab wounds on the waist,
abdomen and extremities.
Whether or not the crime committed was murder

The crime committed by the accused was murder with treachery by taking advantage of superior
strength with the aid of armed men or by employing means to weaken the defense. Three men,
armed with a knife, crept up in the dark against a defenseless and unsuspecting victim who was
answering a call of nature. When two of Ilagan's attackers pinioned his arms so that their companion
could stab him repeatedly and with impunity, they thereby employed means which assured the
execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense that their victim might
make.

People vs. Lagman, G.R. No. 197807, 16 April 2012

On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, Maniego was in front of her banana cue store on
Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside her mother, Sicor, inside the sidecar of
a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused approached her and punched her face several times.
The accused turned on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small
knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the
barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel
Santiago (Santiago), at the house of Santiago’s mother. On her way there, she saw the accused
4 

stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between
where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters. Maniego 5 

then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading towards Juan Luna
Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio
Hospital but he later expired. While Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was
being treated after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting
the accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.

The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was accused-
appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiago’s killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, Maniego.
Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The 21 

essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. These elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago. We quote with
22 

approval the appellate court’s finding on the presence of treachery:

In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without warning, stabbed him
four times successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend
himself from appellant’s onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellant’s act of suddenly
stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery. x x x
23 
Regardless of the alleged disparity in height between accused-appellant and the victim, We affirm
the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant’s method of inflicting harm
ensured that she would fatally wound Santiago without risk to herself. The perceived advantage of
the victim in terms of height was of no use to him as accused-appellant employed treachery in
attacking him. He was not afforded a means to defend himself as accused-appellant suddenly
started stabbing him repeatedly with an improvised knife.

Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.

People vs. Clijan, G.R. No. 94592, 28 September 1993

Ruben Calijan, a 39-year old farmer, passed by and persuaded Arnolfo to accompany him and they
fetched Fredo Paunillan, another farmer. While at Fredo's place, Ruben met Gerry Camporedondo,
took the latter's six-inch hunting knife and tucked it to his waist. Then they all proceeded to Felipe's
house where Ruben drank one "lapad" of Anejo rum while Arnolfo imbibed "tuba".

at around 10:00 o'clock they drank "tuba" again. By this time Ruben had already consumed about a
gallon of the native wine. Half an hour later, Ruben and Arnolfo headed for home. 2

Enroute home, the duo passed the house of Gregorio Belnas, the landlord of Arnolfo  back in Sitio
3

Pinanginan, Barangay Obat. Standing at the front yard, Ruben called out to Gregorio: "Nong, let us
smoke." 4

They smoked for ten minutes. Then, for no apparent reason, Ruben stood up saying, "Nong Gorio,
you want to be killed?" Completely taken aback, the 55-year old Gregorio could only mutter: "I have
not done any offense against you, Ruben, because we have not quarreled with each other. "Ruben
replied, "If I want to kill you, I may kill you now."
7

Arnolfo tried to pacify Ruben saying, "Dong, do not do that; Dong, let us go home." But Ruben could
not be dissuaded. Arnolfo stepped back and Gregorio ran towards the door. But Ruben, being much
younger, was quicker. He overtook Gregorio, held his left hand and stabbed him on his left chest
with the hunting knife he had earlier taken from Gerry.  The stab wound proved to be fatal. Gregorio
8

died of hemorrhage that same night.  Seeing the fallen Gregorio, Arnolfo ran away. 
9

Ruben went to Edwin’s (brother of Arnolfo) house and asked him, "Dong, come with me because
'Gorio' is already dead." So, together they repaired to the house of Gregorio. Pointing to the
prostrate victim, Ruben told Edwin to lift him because they were going to throw the cadaver into the
Sicopong River. Edwin refused but Ruben threatened him with the hunting knife.  11

After disposing of the corpse, Ruben and Edwin went to the house of Ruben's relative, Walter
Calijan, and both slept there. Edwin heard Ruben admitting to the wife of Walter that he (Ruben)
killed Gregorio.   Edwin left the following morning and reported the incident to a CAFGU member
12

who then formed a team to arrest Ruben and turn him over to the police.  13
The court a quo likewise took into account the "aggravating circumstance of adding ignominy on the
victim by throwing his cadaver (into) the river."   Strictly speaking, the act of disposing of a cadaver
22

into the river did not make the crime more shameful nor add to the victim's moral suffering since it
was done after death had occurred and intended more to conceal the effects of the felony.   The 23

correct aggravating circumstance to be appreciated is scoffing at the corpse of the deceased, as

provided in Art. 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code, which is a qualifying circumstance.
However, since this attendant circumstance was not expressly alleged in the Information, but only
proved at the trial, it should be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Ignominy produces moral suffering, while cruelty produces physical suffering.

Ignominy shocks the moral conscience of man while cruelty is physical. Ignominy refers to

the moral effect of a crime and it pertains to the moral order, whether or not the victim
is dead or alive. Cruelty pertains to physical suffering of the victim so the victim has to be
alive. In plain language, ignominy is adding insult to injury.

People vs. Samanada, G.R. No. L-11361, 26 May 1958

Semanada, 17 years of age, was unhappy and discontented and oftenly scolded by his parents, so he easily
yielded to the propaganda of the Hukbalahap organization, for he did not have the opportunity to obtain any
academic schooling except up to Grade II. He joined the Hukbalahap organization, and Semañada was
assigned to form part of the latter group, whose duty was to deliver letters and messages. 

In the evening of June 12, 1952, Felix Semanada, then 19 years of age, and in company of 2 Huks, i.e., all
armed, arrived at the house of the spouses Villate and Magtibay, where they had a store. Semañada ordered
Serapio Villate to go down and, apparently because the latter resisted the order, he was brought down to a
distance of about an arm's length from his house. Once there he was seized and hogtied by Commanders
Wennie and Heling with a string used for fishing. As his companions held the victim Semañada stabbed Villate
several times with a sharp pointed bolo. His wife, Magtibay, who hails from the same barrio of Semañada,
actually saw the stabbing from the opening of an upstairs window and she ran to her husband's aid but she was
not able to help him because of the 2 Huks that were unknown to her, one of whom blocked her way while the
other hit her with the butt of his gun on the upper lip, as a result of which her upper lip was cut and she lost 3
front teeth.

Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty but after hearing the Court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
 Counsel further maintains that even if convicted of the crime charged defendant is entitled to the benefits of
the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of instruction; On 1955, in Nagcarlang, Laguna, upon realizing the
evils of communism and having grown up to understand the beauty of democracy, he surrender voluntarily to
Sgt. Regalado. He said that he wanted to live peacefully and to start a new life.

Ruling:

As to the circumstance of lack of instruction, the Solicitor General states that the test for the mitigating
circumstance is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient intelligence, and the record discloses that far
from his claim that he suffers from lack of instruction, he possesses an intelligence worthy of a lawyer
considering his ability, for one unschooled, to distinguish between implications and innuendos. At any rate,
lack of instruction is not mitigating in cases of robbery, although it might be under certain situations in cases of
murder and homicide.

People vs. Asaad, G.R. No. 33673, 24 February 1931

trouble had been brewing between the Moro Angkaya and the Moro Japal Alli. Eventually Angkaya took
council with a number of his relatives and retainers and the plan was concocted to secure two other Moros by
the names of Sampang and Suhaili to murder Japal Alli. Those participating in the conferences looking to the
extermination of Japal Alli were Angkaya; his son Asaad, his daughter Nahula, wife of Mawaji, Saladi, and
Salim, a policeman of the councilor Asaad. On the third occasion, which was on July 11, 1929, Sampang and
Suhaili killed Japal Alli and his wife.

Sampang and Suhaili, the authors by direct participation in the crimes.

It is true that the head of the band which conspired to commit the murders was Angkaya, now deceased, but his
principal lieutenant was his son Asaad. It was at the house of Asaad that meetings were held;, and it was Asaad
who insisted that the wife of Japal Alli needed also to be killed. 

The only doubtful factor of the case has had to do with the guilt or innocence of the remaining four accused,
Mawaji, Salim, Saladi, and Nahula. These four accused attended the conferences and entered no opposition to
the nefarious scheme. After the commission of the murders, they joined with the other accused in celebrating
with a fiesta. Aside from this, these four did not cooperate in the commission of the crimes. Nor is it certain
that, as relatives or retainers of Angkaya, the four had any influence over Sampang and Suhaili, and that any of
the four said or did anything that determined the commission of the crimes. 

May they be considered as authors by inducement within the meaning of article 13 of the Penal Code?

four accused may neither be considered as authors by inducement nor as accomplices. Merely assenting out of
respect and fear, and merely attending a feast by way of custom does not constitute an effective inducement.
What the four did amounted to joining in a conspiracy.

there are similar means by which another may be induced to commit a crime which also make the one who
offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2. But it
must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before
the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice and such
words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under
the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or
such words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as
direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.
 Mawagi, Salim, Saladi, and Nahula have not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged, 

People vs. Aguilos, G.R. No. 121828, 27 June 2003

The incident occurred at the store where the victim Joselito and Julian Azul, Jr. were
drinking beer. Two of the accused, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba, arrived. An
altercation between Edmar and Julian ensued. Edmar punched Julian in the face. Edmar
and Julian traded fist blows. Joselito's intervention apparently did not sit well with
Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He
placed his left arm around Joselito's neck, and stabbed Joselito.

Ronnie and the appellant Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon
stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to
the scene and stabbed Joselito. Joselito fell in the canal. Odilon and the Pilola fled, while
Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran and when he noticed that
Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped and looked back. He saw
Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito's head. Not content,
Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled
from the scene. Joselito died on the spot.

Pilola argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and
Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his
participation in the criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent
with the criminal acts. He asserts that it was Odilon who had already decided, and in
fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the incident
was only a chance encounter between the victim, the appellant and his co-accused. In
the absence of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct
participation.

Whether or not PILOLA is an accomplice who cooperate in the execution of the crime by
previous or simultaneous acts.
NO. Pilola is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.

To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur:

 
(a) the community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;

(b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the

commission of the crime.

no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and PILOLA, the victim was already dead.
It cannot thus be argued that by the time Pilola and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing
the victim, the crime was already consummated.

All things considered, Ronnie and Pilola conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence,
all of them are criminally liable for the latter's death. The Pilola is not merely an
accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.

Even assuming that Pilola did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim,
Pilola is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab
wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the
victim or contributed materially thereto.

Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct
participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony  and only
then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the
principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where
one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by
themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not
merely an accomplice.

In this case, there is conspiracy, hence, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law,
the act of one would be the act of all.

From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may
be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts
which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim.

There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other
offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or
was not in on the scheme from the beginning.One need only to knowingly contribute his
efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his
own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators.

U.S. vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 5502, 7 March 1910

Romulo, de la Cruz, Canape, and Veloz, were charged with the crime of assassination against Mr. Adrian
Herren, a surveyor of the Bureau of Public Lands. Veloz’s imformation was dismissed for the purpose of using
him as a witness.

Herren, a surveyor in the Bureau of Public Lands, set out from a place called Malinao, where he was engaged
at work. He was accompanied by his four native assistants. When the party arrived at a clump of cane, Romulo
stepped up alongside Herren and struck him a blow with a hatchet which felled him face downward to the
ground. Immediately thereafter Canape struck the fallen man a number of blows on his head and body with a
heavy stick, and both assailants slashed and cut the helpless and unconscious man with their bolos. The body
of the deceased was at once hidden in the nearby of cane.
evidence fails to disclose what participation was taken in the commission of the crime by De la Cruz. No
evidence that he had any warning or knowledge that the sudden attack was about to take place, or that he could
have prevented it. De la Cruz and the deceased were on friendly terms at the time of the murder, and that De la
Cruz had worked for the deceased for many years and had his confidence. It appears that after the crime was
committed, De la Cruz, who was foreman of the native party, was present when the body was concealed in the
clump of cane, accompanied the murderers back to Majayjay, slept in the same house with them on arriving
there, and the following morning, manifestly for the purpose of concealing the commission of the crime, and
aiding the murderers, his companions, to escape detection and capture, voluntarily presented himself to the
president of Majayjay and volunteered false information

Whether dela Cruz’s participation in the commission of the crime is principal, accomplice or accessory

the guilt of de la Cruz did not sustain as principal or accomplice. He took no part in the commission of the
crime beyond the mere fact that he happened to be present during its execution. It does not appear that he was
aware of the existence of the criminal conspiracy between Romulo and Canape before the commission of the
crime thus, he cannot be principal or accomplice. But he is guilty of encubridor (accessary after the fact) of the
crime with which he was charged as principal, not because he was present with the murderers when the crime
was committed and when they concealed the body of the deceased, and continued in their company until the
following day, nor because he failed to denounce the crime to the local authorities; but because he went to the
municipal president of the town of Majayjay and volunteered false information which tended to deceive the
prosecuting authorities and to prevent the detection of the guilty parties and to aid them in escaping discovery
and arrest.

Article 15 of the Penal Code provides that ---- 

"Accessaries after the fact (encubridores) are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated therein either as principals or accomplices, subsequently take part in its
execution in any of the following manners: 

xxx xxx xxx 

"3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the culprit, provided any of the following
circumstances are attendant: 

xxx xxx xxx 

"(2) When the delinquent is guilty of treason, regicide, parricide, assassination, attempt against the life of the
Governor-General, or known to be an habitual criminal in any other crime." 

Dunlao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111343, 22 August 1996

FACTS: Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City
using the business name “Dunlao Enterprise.” Mariquit and Catog, both employees of
Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioners
premises together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to
verify information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes
Farms were to be found thereat. Upon arrival at petitioners compound, the group saw the
farrowing crates and pipes inside the compound. After he was informed by the police
operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police station.
Dunlap was found guilty of violation of Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner argues that the
prosecution failed to establish the fact that, in receiving and possessing the subject
items, he was motivated by gain or that he purchased the said articles. Further, he
questions the alleged value of the stolen properties stating that they are worth a lot
less than what the trial court declared them to be.
ISSUE: whether intent to gain need to be prove in crimes punishable by a special law such
as Anti-Fencing Law

RULING: No. First of all, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a
special law such as P.D. 1612. The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in
themselves called acts mala in se, and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with
reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in
acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

The farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in the premises of
petitioner.The positive identification by Fortunato Mariquit, an employee of Lourdes
Farms, Inc., that these items were previously owned by it gave rise to a presumption of
fencing under the law:

Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or
anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.

Secondly, law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as
mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing.
The Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed on petitioner's shelves
inside his compound. If petitioner were merely keeping the farrowing crates and G.I.
pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did he display them? When a storeowner
displays articles, it is assumed that he is doing so with the intention of selling them.

Lastly, Petitioners claim that the pipes were worth only P200.00 is not credible
considering that it took a truck to haul off the entire load from petitioner's premises, as
testified to by Fortunato Mariquit

People v. Mallari (GR no L-58886, Dec 13, 1988)

Facts: Consuelo Mallair with 3 others were charged with Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document. They obtained
the possession of Certificate of Land Title registered in the name of Balderas and making it appeared that she need
money and she was offering the lot as collateral to obtain a loan from Julia Saclolo
amounting to P1,500.00

In another case, It also happened to Remegio Tapawan. They were charged of the same crime for
obtaining a loan of the same amount from Remegio Tapawan.

Two information were separately filed against them. They were convicted of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents. When the second case was filed, Mallari raised that
he cannot be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Issue: WON the acts done by Mallari constitute a continuing crime

Held: Yes

A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. It is a
continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force. And
although there are series of acts, there is only one crime committed hence only one penalty shall be imposed.

The crime of estafa thru falsification of public document committed by Consuelo Mallari, although consummated
through a series of acts, was done by the single intent or impulse to defraud Remegio Tapawan. And there was only
one deceit practiced by petitioner on the two (2) victims, that being in need of money, Leonora Balderas was willing to
mortgage two (2) lots as security for a loan. It was, in fact, by mere play of fate that the second victim, Julia Saclolo,
should be dragged into the swindle by reason of Tapawan having only P1,500.00 at that time.

The singularity of the offense committed by Mallari is further demonstrated by the fact that the falsification of the two
(2) public documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the same date, in the same place, at the
same time and on the same occasion.

Requisites of double jeopardy

1. In order to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:
a.) First jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
b.) The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
c.) he second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first

Petitioner, having already been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public document in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR, it stands to reason that she
can no longer be held liable for the same crime in this case. The rule against double
jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment but against
being tried for the same offense. NEMO BIS PUNITUR PRO EODEM DELICTO. No man is
punished twice for the same fault or offense.

Risos-Vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, 21 January 2015

the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and impose the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Amoyo (PGMA) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to Estrada wherein he
restored to his civil and political rights.
Estrada later on filed a Cerificate of Candidacy (COC), for the Mayor of the City of Manila
Atty. Risos Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC stating that "Former President Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual
absolute disqualfication."

Risos-Vidal avers that in view of the Article 36 and 41, it is not enough that a pardon carries with it
the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and
political rights without categorically making mention what specific civil and political rights are
restored "shall not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it
remit the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification for the
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal."
[ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. ]

Whether or not former Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by President Arroyo

Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides
that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency. The only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was
no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.

Therefore, any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President.

Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot serve to abridge or diminish the
exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes. The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the
power of Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart
is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of the
accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in
the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency
and to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or
to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided
upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.
Albarquez vs. CA, G.R. No. 148557, 7 August 2003

petitioner issued in favor of Fertiphil Corporation five (5) checks drawn against
Republic Planters Bank, Dagupan Branch. checks were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Fertiphil demanded that petitioner make good the checks but to no avail,
prompting the former to file criminal complaints against him. Consequently, five informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with Rtc found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
BP 22.

Ruling of the Court

The fact that petitioner issued the subject checks knowing the inadequacy of his funds in the bank to
cover said checks makes him liable under B.P. 22. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is
malum prohibitum, provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved.
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the
national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although
mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. The determination of whether
the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the
Judge
decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular 12-2000 ought not
bedeemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for
violations of B.P. 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

Petitioner should be sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of P104,400.00 in

Criminal Case No. D-8137; P200,000.00 in Criminal Case No. D-8176; and P200,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. D-8177; with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39
of
the Revised Penal Code

VACA VS. CA
(GR 43596, 31 October 1936)
Facts:
Eduardo Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International while Fernando Nieto, Vaca's son-in-law, is the
firm's purchasing manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection
and Security (GARDS) and drawn against China Bank. When deposited with PCIBank, the check was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. GARDS sent a demand letter but the drawers failed to pay within the time given (7 days from
notice). A few days later, however, Vaca issued a check to GARDS for P19,866.16, drawn against Associated Bank,
replacing the dishonored check. GARDS did not return the dishonored check.
Later on, GARDS Acting Operations Manager filed a criminal suit against Vaca and Nieto for violation of BP 22.
The trial court sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and casts.

Held [1]: Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the drawer fails to
maintain sufticient funds within 90 days after the date of the check, or to make arrangement for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within 5 days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. Herein,
the second check supposedly replacing the dishonored check is actually the payment of two separate bills, and was
issued 15 days after notice. Such "replacement" cannot negate the presumption that the drawers knew of the
insulliciency of funds.

Petitioners are first-time offenders. the Court recognized the contribution of Filipino entrepreneurs to the
national economy; and that to serve the ends of criminal justice, instead of the 1 year imprisonment, a fine of double
the amount of the check involved was imposed as penalty. It would best serve the ends of criminal
justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.  In this 10

case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is
an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.

Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the
instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal.

Facts: 

Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of murder and
destructive arson before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of
Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.

In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's
counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the
voluntariness of the motion.

Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his
misimpression that the motion was necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid
Prison following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993.
She also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and that he immediately
left for his province without consultingher. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to
withdraw his appeal.

On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.

the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to
submit their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditionalpardon and
(2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court
why it recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the
pendency of the appeal.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon
granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not
yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal.

On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the conditionalpardon
extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues
that although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have
abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the
finality of his conviction.

Issue: 

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a
judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

Held: 

No. Section 19, Article VII of Constitution provides:

“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.” 

Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained
finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the
present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or  conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his  conviction by the trial court. Any application
therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should
not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities
of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed
from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a
certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. 
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal,
and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole
before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as
a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.

Jugueta together with Estores and San Miguel was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 for attacking and shooting the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, his brother-in-law causing injury
and killing the children of the Norberto, Mary Grace and Claudine. In answer to questions of what could have
prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was
angered by the fact that Norberto filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.
Accused was found guilty of 2 counts of murder (Art. 248) and Multiple Attempted Murder(Art. 248 in relation to
Article 51) with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

Ruling:

As to the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal cases
where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are
three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise,
actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the PC which states, "Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court
when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
P3,000, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.

Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as
physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept
of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant
for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss
is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative,nevertheless, that (1) injury
must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from
any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party. 

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are

intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages
when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to
deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

the principal consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided

by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public
penalty actually imposed on the offender.