BCAS Cicular - In-Line X-Ray - 11-2017

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Government of India
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
'A' Wing -I, II, III, Janpath Bhawan, Janpath,
New Delhi-II 0 00 I
No. CAS-iOO/07/20I7-Tech.Div/Order/Circular/Addendum/Corrigendum Dated: 041h Aug, 2017
C I R C U L A R NO. 1112017
Sub: Minimum Standards for Civil Aviation Security Equipment.
In order to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices, articles or

substances, which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing
of which is not authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever in the restricted
areas of an airport and on board an aircraft engaged in civil aviation and in view of the
advancement of technology, the minimum Standards/ Specifications, with regard to the X-Ray
Baggage Inspection System used for screening of hand baggage, hold baggage. cargo and mail
and otr.er such items which are required to be screened before being allowed for carriage in
the restricted areas of the airport through stand-alone X-ray Baggage Inspection System (BIS)
and Inline CT-EDS Baggage Screening System at the airports in India have been revised and
prescribed as per the following appendices, for the said Security Equipment:
(i) X-ray Baggage Inspection System (BIS) Appendix --A

(ii) In-line CT-EDS Appendix B
2. This Circular supersedes Appendix-E and Appendix-F of AVSEC Circular No 25/2004

issued on 27.12.2004 including all previous Corrigendum, addendum etc. relating to the above
two appendices.
3. The specifications prescribed in this Circular shall be implemented by all concerned with
immediate effect for all future procurements. No X-ray screening equipment for the purpose
mentioned in this AVSEC Circular shall be allowed at the airports from the date of issue of this
circular, in India unless the said screening equipment meet the minimum specifications
prescribed as per the above appendices of this AVSEC Circular.
4. BCAS officers while undertaking quality control oversight at the airports in India shall
ensure implementation of instructions on the subject.
(L.Il. ~ ..,.A u..J).
(Kumar Rajesh Chandrffg .I-=r
Director General
Distribution
as per list attached.
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Appendix' A'
BUREAU OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

SPECIFICATIONS FOR X-RAY BAGGAGE INSPECTION SYSTEM
1. Each XBIS shall be equipped with two individual independent X-Ray generators with dual
VIew Image.
2. All machines should operate on 230V AC SO Hz power supply and should be able to
withstand voltage fluctuations in the range of 170V to 260 V and frequency fluctuations +/-
S%
3. Tunnel size of the machine should conform to the purpose for which the machine is used.
4. Penetration should be of 30 MM thickness of steel or more.
S. Resolution: The machine should be able to display single un-insulated tinned copper wire of
40 SWG.
6. The system should be able to produce clear images on colour monitor(s) with minimum of
1280 X 1024 pixels (Full High Definition)
7. Zoom facility should be available to magnify the chosen area of an image sixteen times (16x)
or more. Image features shall be keyboard controllable.
8. The machine should be film/ food safe. In other words photographic films must not be
damaged due to X-ray examination.
9. The machine should have features of multi energy X-Ray imaging facility where materials of
different atomic number will be displayed in different colours to distinguish between
organic/inorganic materials. With this method it should be possible to distinguish high-
density organic materials including explosives. Machine should have variable colour or
maierial stripping to facilitate the operator to monitor images of organic materials for closer
scrutiny. All suspicious items (Explosives, High density material, narcotics) should be
displayed in one mode and that should be on line.
10. The radiation level should not exceed accepted health standard (0.1 m Rlhr.) at a distance of
S em from external housing.
11. Lead impregnated safety screens should be available at either ends of the tunnel. Idle rollers
to be provided at either ends of the tunnel to facilitate placing of baggage at the input and
output points.
12. The X-ray beam divergence should be such that the complete image of maximum size of bag
is displayed without comer cuts.
13. Fac ility for variable contrast must be incorporated to allow enhancement of lighter and
darker portion of the image.
14. If the machine fails to penetrate a particular item, then an alarm (visual and audio both)
should be generated to notify the operator.
IS. The threat image projection (TIP) system software to be incorporated in all X-BIS operation
as per details given in Annexure - 1.
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16. Control desk with security housing and locking provision should be available wherever
required. The Operator personal identification number can be entered through keyboards.
17. Facility of image enhancement should be available.
18. Conveyor belt speed should be between 0.18 and 0.3 mtrs per second for X-ray baggage
inspection system for hand and registered baggage. Lesser speed is acceptable for cargo
screening. For cargo machine input and output roller should be motor driven enabling easy
handling of the heavy cargo.
19. All software features of machine should be activated and password protected.
20. In case of defective diode array(s), scanning should be disabled and error message should be
displayed on the screen.
21. System should work on one software only. All software features should be controlled from
key board/ mouse/ touch screen of machine only. Control functions should be user friendly.
To enable / disable the software features, system should not be rebooted.
22. All models should have online recording facility and images can be recorded in
USB/Electronic storage devices. The recording should be retained for minimum 14 days.
23. All models should have software controlled diagnosis report facility and should include
following information
1. XBIS Make/ Modell Sf. No.

ll. Software/ Firmware/Algorithm Version Number
lll. Status/Values of major Power Supply Voltages
v. Generator Voltage (X-Ray ON/X-Ray OFF)
v. Generator Anode Current (X-Ray ON/X-Ray OFF)
VI. Generator Heater Current (X-Ray ON/X-Ray OFF)
Vll. Diode Array ( Raw/Calibrated) Response (X-Ray ON/X-Ray OFF)
Vlll. Grand total number of Bags scanned
IX. XBIS fault Log
x. XBIS Photoelectric Light Barrier (Tunnel Entry/Exit) Status
Xl. Emergency switches status
24. The operating temperature should be 0° C to 40° C and storage temperature 20°C to 50°C.
25. Anti-rodent and dust proof cover must be provided.
26. The company manufacturing the equipment should have ISO certification for manufacturing
and servicing of X-Ray screening machines.
27. The machine should be so designed that software enhancement can be easily implemented to
take care of new technique in image processing and pattern recognition.
28. Through put shall be minimum 400 bags per hour for hand and checked baggage and 200
bags per hour for cargo machines.
29. SAFETY: The machine must comply with requirements of health and safety regulations
with regard to mechanical, electrical and radiation hazards. Before installation of the machine,
the supplier / manufacturers should furnish NOC from Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of
India regarding radiation safety after every five years.
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30. Operator manual shall be provided with each machine in both Hard and Soft modes.
31. Machine should be capable of recalling 15 - 20 previous images. A rejected bag image shall
be transmitted to an additional monitor erected at the physical check point to facilitate the
screener and also increase through put.
32. COMBINED TEST PIECE (CTP): The manufacturer shall provide one set of CTP per
machine for checking serviceability of the machine by the operator. The details of CTP are given
below: -
1. SINGLE WIRE RESOLUTION (TEST NO.1)

1.1 The requirement is to display 40 SWG wire not covered by step wedge. A tick will
indicate the visibility of appropriate wire. A set of un-insulated tinned copper wire of size
26, 30, 35, 38, 40 and 42 SWG is placed on a Perspex sheet. The wires are laid out in S
shaped curves. The wires are placed behind varying thickness of aluminum. Metallic
marker should be provided using high-density material, so that SWG numbers in the
VDU are clearly visible.
2. USEFUL PENETRATION (TEST NO.2)
2.1 The test defines what level of details can be seen behind a thickness of known material.
The CTP has different gauges of wire behind varying thickness of aluminum. The
requirement for this test is that the 30 SWG wire is seen under second step wedge (5/16').
Tick on log sheet will indicate what wires are visible.
3. MATERIAL DISCRIMINATION (TEST No.3)
3.1 The requirement is that different colours be allocated to the sample of organic and
inorganic substances. With multi energy X-Ray it should be possible to distinguish
between materials of different average atomic number. This means that organic and
inorganic substances can be differentiated. The use of sugar and salt samples
encapsulated on the test piece and various materials used in the construction of CTP will
check the material discrimination facility. A tick will indicate that the sugar / salt samples
are shown in different colour.
4. SIMPLE PENETRATION (TEST No.4)
4.1. The requirement is that the lead be visible beneath 30 mm of steel. This test defines what
thickness of steel the machine should be able to penetrate. The steel step wedge on the
CTP has steps of 2 mm from 16 mm to 30 mm with a lead strip to check that the machine
is above or below the requirement. A tick in log sheet will indicate where a lead strip is
visible.
5. SPATIAL RESOLUTION (TEST No.5)
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5.1 The requirement is that vertical and horizontal grating to be seen. This test defines the
ability of the system to distinguish and display objects, which are close together. The
CTP has 16 copper gratings at right angles to each other. A tick in the log sheet will
indicate that gaps in the gratings are visible.
6. THIN METAL IMAGING: (Test No 6).
6.1 The requirement is to view image of steel O.lmm thick. This tests the machine's ability
to image thin metal. A number of thin metals strips of various thicknesses are placed in a
row.
7. METHOD:
7.1 The CTP should be certified by a Government Test lab for dimensions and material
composition. The CTP is to be used as a quick routine test carried out daily to ensure that
equipment is working properly and satisfactory image is obtained. The results of the tests
should be recorded.
7.2 The CTP should be placed on the belt and passed through the belt atleast once in a day
before the baggage is screened or after the X-Ray equipment is switched on to ensure that
the equipment is working properly. If the image is satisfactory the equipment may be
used.
7.3 The CTP may be viewed by using image enhancing facility till the operator is satisfied
that the machine is working properly. The optimum position of CTP on the belt will
depend on X-Ray source and detector arrangements. In case of dual view systems atleast
one view should pass CTP. This may be ascertained from the service engineer, if need
arises.
8. RESULTS:
8.1 The results of test should be recorded giving information like date. time. machine number
and type, supervisors name and other remarks.
8.2 Supervisory officer should carry out the tests once in a week and compare the results with
daily test sheets. In case the images are not up to the standard, service engineer must be
asked to rectify the fault. The machine may not be used when its performance is in doubt
or not satisfactory in the opinion of the supervisor.
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8.3 The record must be kept by the operator for one year after final entry. The records may be
checked by the inspecting officers of BCAS during airport inspection and report be
submitted to Director General, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security.
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Annexure -1
THREAT IMAGE PROJECTION (TIP)
1. TIP software facility shall be incorporated in the offered X-ray machines to assist
supervisors in testing the operator alertness and training X-ray screeners to improve their ability
in identifying specific threat object. The system will create a threat object and the same will be
superimposed on monitor screen while a bag is being screened. To acknowledge that the operator
has seen the false object, operator must press the control panel key that will cause the computer
generated threat object to disappear from x-rayed bag image on the YOU screen. Each operator's
action shall be recorded in the hard disc of the computer for the auditing purpose by the
supervisor or other authorized person.
2. Design of the system
2.1 TIP software should be compatible with other X-ray technologies such as automatic
reject unit, Dual X-ray screen technologies, automatic threat recognition system etc. All X-ray
image functions must be available at the same time along with the TIP.
3. Image library
3.1 The TIP facility should have an image library. The system shall have facility to expand
the library to incorporate additional images by user without assistance of the manufacturer as and
when required.
3.2 The image library should contain images of threats at different orientations - both plane
and end-on orientation should be used. Although these will be assigned different file names and
references, it must be possible to cross reference these as the same threat. All threat Image
Projection images must be realistic, representative and non-distinguishable from real threat
items.
4. Time Interval
4.1 Programming facility shall be available to project threat images in different intervals. The
time period for threat image as well as image mix in percentage shall be user programmable e.g.
software shall select 40% images of explosive devices, 35 % of fire arms & 25 % knives or
random etc.
4.2 Once the screener has responded to identity of the computer generated threat image, it
should remain on the screen for a predefined user programmable time for analysis. The image
should be highlighted, upon identification, and feedback message shall be visible to the screener.
5. System Administration
5.1 The threat image projection facility shall have details of user data-base such as airport
name, screener name, organization, user 10 number.
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5.2 Access to start up menu should be restricted only to the authorized individuals. A log - in
procedure by means of 'Password' or 'Security Key', could achieve restricted access to each of
the comment. The log - in procedure should not take longer than 20 seconds. The system should
have facility to by-pass the TIP facility, if programmed so by the system administrator. It is to be
ensured that the TIP software shall not be hindrance to normal functioning of X-ray Machines.
5.3 When the operator logs - in or logs - out, message should be displayed on X-Ray BIS
YOU Screen to confirm that he/she has been correctly logged - in or logged - out.
6. Feed Back Report
6.1 The threat image Projection should be capable of giving feedback HIT, MISS or FALSE
ALARM message. No message will be presented if a screener correctly passed as clear bag.
6.2 A 'HIT' message to be presented when a screener has correctly identified a Threat Image
Projection image. A 'MISS' message shall be presented when screener fails to identify the TIP
image. A 'False Alarm' message shall be given when screener incorrectly indicate TIP image
when in fact no threat image projection is present. The feedback should clearly indicate in a
screen that a TIP object has been correctly identified / TIP object has been missed / no TIP object
was present. Information should be recorded in the database.
6.4 Different colour coding shall be used for feedback to the Screener. It is recommended
that colour code 'Red for MISS', Green for 'HIT' and 'Yellow to False Alarm or interrupt' be
used.
6.5 The system shall automatically prepare the daily log of events for each shift and for each
Screener performance. TIP log shall include particulars of
6.6 Airport, XBIS, Name of Screener, Time & date of threat image, weather threat image was
successfully identified or missed etc.
6.7 The report on Threat Image Projection system may have date and time (From - To) as per
requirement, Screener particulars, and decision/outcome i.e. MISS, HIT or False Alarm in
percentage as well in absolute numbers, number of bags screened, categories such as explosive
devices knife or weapon etc.
6.8 As a standard practice, daily / weekly / monthly report shall be retrieved. Report shall be
for any given time and period, as per command.
6.9 All data should be stored on the system for a minimum of two months after it has been
down loaded. No individual, regardless of access rights to the Threat Image Projection
components would delete or amend any of threat Image Projection data or time i.e. Threat Image
Projection data on the actual X-ray machine will be read only file.
6.10 Automatic tray retrieval system with reject lane and recheck station with multiple
divestment stations may be installed by airport operators to increase throughput, wherever
required.
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6.11 X-BIS shall have automated online framing of suspicious material (eg. Explosives, high
density material, narcotics etc.) for operator. This feature should be in real time requiring no
operat: r involvement.
6.12 All the systems should be maintained by the OEMs or entities certified by them. by
whatever arrangements airport operators opt for.
6.13 The system should not be connected or accessed through internet by the OEM for any
purpose including remote diagnosis.
6.14 A non-disclosure agreement (NDA) is to be signed by the airport operators (Buyer) with
OEM (Supplier) to affect the confidentiality of the information pertaining to the system.
6.15 Service engineers of Indian origin will only be deputed by the OEM or entities authorized
by them to maintain the system. Non-Indian engineers may be deputed for major breakdowns
under .upervision.
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Appendix '8'
SPECIFICATION FOR IN-LINE CT-EDS

BAGGAGE SCREENING SYSTEM
1. INTRODUCTION
The existing X-ray machines installed at check in area in some of the airports to screen
registered baggage are in stand-alone mode and not capable of detecting 100% explosives.
Stand-alone machines occupy space at departure lounges and also cause big queues, which
disrupt passenger flow during peak hours. Keeping in view the security threat it is desirable
that multi-level CT-EDS based in-line detection system is installed at major airports. The
Inline hold baggage handling system (HBS) shall be integrated with airport baggage handling
system in order to provide complete hold baggage processing and screening system All new
terminals and airports constructed in future will have only HBS. The priority of installation of
HBS shall be decided by Airport Operator in consultation with BCAS.
2. Conceptual System Design
The system designed for multi-level screening process shall have the following features: -
2.1 Levell
Level screening is to be undertaken by a CT-EDS machine with automatic

explosives detection facilities. All baggage images will be referred to Level 2 with suspicious
area highlighted, if any, where a certified screener will accept or reject the baggage.
2.2 Level2
2.2.1 Level 2 screening is remote workstations(s) whereby operator(s) can analyze the image
generated by the Levell CT -EDS machine. The workstation is required to be equipped with
enhanced imaging / manipulation systems to assist operator to diagnose the screened image.
2.2.2 100% of level-l screened baggage images should be referred to level 2.
2.2.3 Whilst the bag is being referred to level 2, it should be 'tracked' while it travels along
the length of the conveyor such that its position and identity is known at all times.
2.2.4 In practice, it is usual to provide a conveying system that allows a programmable time
of ur to 30 seconds to queue and process the level 2 images.
2.2.5 In case of major airports with 5 MPP A or more, airport operators shall install level 2 B
so as to ensure that Level-3 is not overloaded. In case of bigger airports (higher passenger
density airport), a workstation 2B shall be introduced for longer time analysis. In this
instance, there will be enhanced image manipulation capabilities; usually a more senior /
experienced operator will view the image and have more time to interpret and take a decision.
2.2.6 In systems with multiple level 1 machines, the MUX / Matrix type set-up of several
. levelland level 2 workstations will be linked together, enabling the next un-cleared level 1
image to go to next available level-2 workstation. The MUX / matrix data communication
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shall enable any of the Level 1 X-ray systems to send rejected bag images to any of the Level
2 workstations. The proposed MUX / matrix scheme must be flexible enough to
accommodate future expansion. In all cases, any bag considered suspect by the operator are to
be flagged and routed automatically to Level 3.
2.2.7 Cleared bags shall proceed to the baggage make -up area.
2.2.8 In bigger airports any bag not cleared within a pre-determined time by the level 2A
operators, are considered 'time-outs' and automatically forwarded to level 2B. In other cases
it should be forwarded to level 3 from level 2. In addition any mis-tracked or unscreened bags
on the conveying system are defaulted to the level 3 area.
2.3 Level3
2.3.1 There are several technologies available for level 3 screening, and the selection usually
depends upon BCAS regulations and / or budget constraints. These include:
2.3.2 A workstation may be installed at level -3 to retrieve the image created by Level - I
CT-EDS. These workstations may increase as per requirement and higher density airports.
2.3.3 These workstations should be able to pull the image of the baggage created by Level-l
machine by a barcode reader/ scanner.
2.3.4 A standalone Dual Energy and dual view X-BIS shall be installed at Level-3 to screen
the baggage again. Screener shall rescreen the baggage at level-3 invariably.
2.3.5 Explosive Trace / Particle detection Check. The un-cleared / suspected bags shall be
checked with latest explosive trace detectors by using vacuum pump / specially designed filter
papers for checking the presence of explosive substances.
2.3.6 Explosive Sniffer Dogs. The dogs being the most reliable explosive detection system,
it is recommended that rejected bag at level 3 be sniffed by Explosive Detection dogs. A dog
shall be deployed for confirmation, once ETD gives a positive signal. The dog is to be turned
over everyone hour. In an 8-hour shift, there should be minimum 2 dogs with handlers.
2.4 Level 4
2.4.1 All un-cleared / suspected bags at level 3 are to be reunited with their owners for
further inspection and interview. This process is normally manual and should be done in a safe
area.
2.4.2 A workstation may be installed at level-4 to retrieve the image created by Level--l CT-
EDS to facilitate the physical inspection of the baggage by the security staff. Bag should be
accepted or rejected on the system as well as an entry in the baggage hand over register is to be
made.
2.4.3 These workstations should be able to pull the image of the baggage created by Level-l
machine by a barcode reader/ scanner.
2.4.3 Any bag that is still deemed to be suspect after passenger interview. or if the passenger
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cannot be located, are normally handled as per SOP. Once a bag is declared as threat bag, it
should be shifted through conveyor belt system/ automatic lift system.
3. System Throughputs
3.1 Normally a single inline CT -EDS at Level-l should have a throughput of 400-500
bags/hour or more, as per requirement of specific airport.
4. Approval by Regulatory agent.
4.1 Approval by Internationall ~ational regulatory agency: - The CT machines deployed at

Level- 1 must be certified and approved by TSA / ECAC standard 3.
5. REQUIREMENTS FOR LEVEL-l X -RAY INSPECTION SYSTEM.
5.1 Bag Size. The X-ray system must be capable of scanning a minimum of standard lATA
sizeo registered baggage.
5.2 Throughput. The CT-EDS system must be able to meet the throughput requirements
of the airport keeping in view the load factor. In order to guarantee a throughput capacity as
per the requirement of the airport.
5.3 Image Generation

The CT-EDS machines must generate 3 dimensional images and sliced image of each
bag. Both the images should be available to screener simultaneously either by installation of
two monitors or by single monitor of 24 Inches with two windows. All images should be
stored for a minimum period of 14 days.
5.5. Oversize Baggage.

Provisions to be made for an out of gauge (OOG) solution for large baggage and
objects. The specification and detection parameters should be the same as for the Standalone
X-BIS in level-3 of Inline systems
6. The HBS Management system shall:
(a) Provide controls for start-up and power-down.

(b) Provide controls and displays for:
(i) Current system status.
(ii) User log-in management / monitoring
(iii) System monitoring
(iv) System performance statistics.
7. Detection Systems
TSA/ ECAC Standard-3 certified algorithm settings should be available and their approval
/certification advised for the machines. These settings should be capable of selection under
secure and regulator controlled arrangements. Vendor should explain the algorithm option and
management systems available.
A management Information system is required to provide statistical information

regarding machine throughput, alarm rates and any error conditions, to the extent possible. The
management information System should provide this function for all level's workstations.
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8. Machine Statistics
1. Bag Count (since Re-set and since power-up),
II. Software version currently running on the X-ray scanner
Ill. Data available to a user with 'special' access
IV. Alarm rate since re -set,
v. Error log
0 Detailed Requirement of Automatic level! X-ray Equipment

1. Throughput per unit: 400 to 1800 bags or more per hour continuous throughput as per
requirement
ll. Maximum distributed load: 150 kg
llI. Conveyor belt height: 800 to 1000 mm.
IV. Automatic detection of: Explosives all types
Density alert
v. X-ray source: Rotating gantry (Physical or Electronic)
Dual energy
VI. System verification test:
1. Automatic
2. Performed every 8-12 hours
Vll. Power on indicators: Should be provided at both ends of the inspection tunnel
VllI. X-ray 'ON' indicators: Should be provided at both ends of the inspection tunnel
IX. Contrast sensitivity: 256 levels.
x. Overlay to highlight: Density Alert areas that are
Obscured by very dense material.
Xl. Threat objects must be identified with threat boxes / Markings.
Xll. Should be equipped with system emergency stop buttons on the machine.
XllI. Should have a modular construction so that system components can be changed easily
with minimum downtime
10. Level 2 Operator Workstations
10.1 General requirements for Level 2 Image Analysis Systems.
10.1.1 The level 2 image analysis workstations shall be located within the HBS control room.
All HBS operations shall be controlled from this point.
10.1.2 The Workstation may be used to visually detect weapons, guns knives, and explosives
to identify various components of improvised explosive devices, such as wires. detonators.
explosives, timing devices and power sources, and to detect typically hidden contraband. The
workstation interface shall be ergonomically designed, provide for ease of use. and include
imaging features that enables the operator to readily identify common items and clear most of
the suspicious items.
10.1.3 Level 2 inspections shall be carried out while the level 1 un-cleared bag is in transit
through the baggage conveyor system.
10.1.4 The time limit available to the operator to view bags must be programmable, up to 30
seconds. If this time is exceeded the bag image is classified as timed out and will move to next
level (un-cleared).
10.1.5
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10.1.6 The system must be capable of transmitting an un-cleared image to next level work
station complete with image data file.
10.1.7 The imaging system shall display data in a high resolution with threat objects outlined
by a threat box/ markings.
10.1.3 The display shall have two FULL HD monitors or a single FULL HD monitor of 24
Inches with two windows.
10.1.9 The monitor shall be adjustable via a tilt and swivel mechanism.
10.2 Level 2 Imaging Tools
Operators must be able to view bag images while accessing all imaging tools without
looking down at the console. Imaging tools provided must be configurable by a supervisor
with a key/password.
10.3 Level 2 Operator Workstation Minimum Specifications
10.3.1 Display Monitor
a) Two FULL HD monitors or a single FULL HD monitor of 24 Inches with two

windows
b) Descriptive icon based toolbar for all imaging functions must be represented on screen.
c) High performance 24-bit video display processor.
e) 60 Hz refresh rate.
D Front panel for adjustment of contrast, brightness, vertical and horizontal alignment etc.
g) Image display time.
10.3.2 Imaging modes
(a) Pre-set function with a minimum display of 5 seconds. The operator must be
able to manipulate all imaging functions without looking down at the console. All the
imaging functions should be available to the screener to detect the wires, batteries.
mechanisms besides explosives and to interpret the image correctly and take a decision.
(b) Controls.
(i) Control panel may be touch activated.
(ii) A 'Home Key' to allow a single touch to revert to a user pre-programmed default
setting.
(iii) Toolbar and imaging functions must be configurable by the end user.
(iv) 'Reject' and 'Clear' decisions should be discrete mechanical/soft push-buttons
with positive tactile feedback.
(v) Workstation should be able to be switched on-line or off-line at any time without
affecting the operation of other workstations or level-1 equipment on the same network.
10.3.3 Power indicator. A power-on indicator must be available with:
a) Operator console must have locking mechanism.

b) Access to system configuration must be a separate mode of operation for authorized
personnel only.
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c) Access to system configuration must require a mechanical key or electronic password.
10.4 Additional Requirements Level 2
10.4.1 A supervisor shall control system configuration with appropriate access. Image
processing functions, operator time out functions and default image configuration shall be
controlled by the supervisor.
10.4.2 The system shall be based on an open architecture configuration and shall run on a PC
platform. User operation at the system supervisor level shall be in a graphical user interface
and based on industry standard operating system. Access to the system shall be controlled by
PIN and passwords. The system will be on line 24 hours per day. 7 days per week.
10.4.3 The operator via discrete mechanical/soft push-buttons shall communicate reject and
clear decisions.
10.4.4 Workstation on-line and off-line switch must be provided for use at any time without
affecting the operation of other workstation or X-ray machines on the network.
10.4.5 It should have capacity for multiple workstations to be linked to a scanning machine.
10.5 Image Printing
A display printing facility must be provided to standard high-resolution colour printer.

The system must be configurable to print any image rejected by a level 2 operator and/or level
3 operators.
11. COMMUNICATION NETWORK
11.1 Images generated at level 1. shall be digitally transmitted through server based preferably
to selected level 2 image display workstation. The level 2 display workstations shall be located
in the CT-EDS control room.
11.2 The MUX / matrix system shall comprise of switching equipment. which is able to
support a fully redundant configuration. Redundant operation shall be configured in a hot
standby mode. In the event of a failure of the primary switch, the backup switch shall
automatically take over operation. At no time shall any unclear bag image data be lost.
11.3 The system shall operate on a combined fiber optic/twisted pair copper network.
11.5 MUX / Matrix Configuration
Communication network Fibre-optic Ethernet network.
Network configuration Fully redundant network configuration. The proposed

expandable MUX / matrix scheme must be expandable to
accommodate additional level I and level 2 systems in the
future.
System electronics
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Designed to facilitate the addition of industry standard

peripherals such as above but not limited to these.
11.6 Image Printer
11.6.1 High-speed optical data networking, printing and communication devices.
11.6.2 A colour printer will be attached to the Matrix network allowing the image of any bag
rejected by either the level 2 operators or the level 3 operators or both to be printed.
11.6.3 The printer will be a colour laser type. Print speed will be a minimum of 6 pages per
mint te, at 300 DPI minimum resolutions in colour. The printer spooler should be able to
handle up to 10 images simultaneously
12. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
12.1 A dedicated network monitoring PC shall be provided which displays and logs
information relevant to the levelland 2 systems. The Management information system shall
have the following capabilities:
a) On-line monitoring of all control functions.

b) On-line event, alarm outputs and reports.
c) CT-EDS status and performance statistics
d. Workstation status and performance statistics
e) Hardware faults.
f) Image recall facility.
g) User log - in management system
12.2 The Management information system shall be able to compile and print reports
summarizing the activity that has occurred on the MUX / Matrix network over a previously
defined period of time. The system will allow data to be transferred to storage devices for
analysis on a separate Pc.
12.3 A configuration program allowing the user to enter a header and a network name to
appear at the top of each report is required.
13. Data to be compiled

(a) For level 1 CT-EDS
1. Levell events (all)
II. Decisions
111. On line and off line activity
IV. Faults (and the time at which they occur)
(b) For Workstations

1. Workstation events (all)
11. Decisions
111. On line and off line activity
IV. Faults (and the time at which they occur)
14. Reports to be generated
-- -- - .- ----------
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14.1 Levell CT-EDS - System Event Data
14.1.1 This shall be a file compiled on a daily basis and shall be a summary report of the
decision data for all X-ray machines connected on this particular network (i.e. there shall be a
report collated for each network each day). It shall provide a summary for any duration as
requested by the supervisors for each mainframe, a fault log, and a result total for the entire
network.
14.1.2 Workstation event data shall be a file compiled on a daily basis and shall be a summary
report of the event date for all workstations connected on this particular network (i.e. there
shall be a report collated for each network each day). It shall provide a summary for any
duration as requested by the supervisors each workstation and a fault log for all workstations
15. Storage
Event Report files (on each network) shall be stored to the Management information
system local hard disk at the end of day. They shall be stored to a specific folder (for example
'HBS Report Data'). Each file shall be uniquely named. It should be possible to store log files
for a complete year, at which point old log files shall be overwritten.
16. Presentation
It shall be possible to call up stored event files for viewing and printing from within the
Management information system interface. The facility should allow the user to select the
current log file or to select from a list of currently stored log files.
17. Retrieval and Offline Presentation
17.1. There shall be a facility to allow a user to retrieve stored events files and copy to
storage devices, viewing and printing on an offline facility. This should offer the user the
option of copying the logs for the last day, last week, particular day, particular week, or all
currently stored log files. The logs shall be stored in such a way that the printed copy
resembles the on-screen image.
17.2 This feature shall offer the user the option of printing the logs for the last day, last
week, particular day, particular week, or all currently stored log files.
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18. Threat Image Projection (TIP) for level 2 Operators
18.1 A system shall be provided to generate and send images of virtual bags containing a
threat object to the level 2-operator workstation. These systems monitor and assist operator
performance. A range of threats must include military explosives, sheet explosives,
commercial explosives, shielded devices and improvised explosives devices and other
dangerous goods.
18.2 The TIP system shall transmit stored threat and false alarm bag images to the level 2
operator workstations, as time is available between 'live' bag images generated by the level 1
X-ray mainframes. The TIP system must provide a means for each operator to log onto the
system and subsequently record each operator's decisions for later review by a supervisor.
18.3 A set of real 'bomb bag' as well as a set of false alarm bags will be stored in the TIP
system memory. When time is available, the TIP system will choose an available workstation,
send an image to that workstation, and log the operator's decision. The security supervisors
can then use the data to monitor operator performance on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.
18.4 The system must have the ability to perform the following tasks.
a Allow operators to log onto the system through the level 2 Operator workstations
b. Maintain a database of individual operators with TIP statistics over a defined period.
c. Present TIP bag images to any 'on-line' operator workstation on the network.
d. Have the ability to select an individual workstation or send images out at a pre-defined rate.
e. Log the operator's response. Log whether the bag was properly cleared or rejected,
depending on whether the bag contained a real threat or a false alarm object.
f. Alert the operator that they have just received a TIP image and whether they cleared or
rejected the image appropriately.
g. Prepare and print out reports which will allow the supervisor to monitor operator's
performance.
19. Reports
19.1 Summary reports must be able to be generated and printed out for an individual operator
or for all individuals across periods of time.
1. The general report shall be the screeners log report.

11. Details about individual screener's performance shall be presented in the individual
screener performance summary report.
111. Detailed information that compares multiple screeners shall be presented in the screener
comparison report.
IV. The detailed information, regarding detection decisions for each fictional threat image
shall be presented in the Threat Detection by Category Report.
v. Data reports shall be viewed by calendar month.
19.2 All report levels and the database shall be read only. Thus, users will not be permitted to
modify or corrupt the information contained.
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20. TIP Bag Library
Total Volume will be 12. Each volume to contain 150 Threat Bags and 50 False Alarm
Bags (200 bags per volume, 2400 bags total). The images in these volumes must represent all
explosives categories in the FAA / TSA / BCAS EDS certification standard. Threat bags library
of TIP should be upgraded on regular basis.
21. Operating Conditions
21.1 In addition to any specific safety devices stated elsewhere in the subcontract. the design
of the system(s) shall ensure the safety of all operating and maintenance personnel together
with others in the proximity of the equipment. Particular attention shall be given to the design
of guards, belts, rollers and drives to eliminate all possibilities for trapping limbs, clothing etc.
2l.2 Rotating and other hazardous components, even if housed within total enclosures, shall
also be individually guarded. Guards shall be designed to be removable during maintenance
but shall also incorporate access panels to permit routine lubrication without the removal of
the entire guard assembles.
21.3 The systems shall be designed to prevent the possibility of human exposure to primary
beams from X-ray devices. Radiation leakage from X-ray devices shall not exceed the limits
set by the European community / Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of India.
22. Electric Power Supply
22.1 The level 1 machine shall be designed to operate from 415 volt. 50 Hz, 3-phase power
supply, voltage fluctuation ± 10%. All other equipment shall be designed to operate from 240
volt, 50Hz. Single-phase power supply, and voltage fluctuation ± 10%, frequency variation ±
5%. All electrical installations shall meet the local regulatory safety requirements.
22.2 The complete Inline Baggage Screening System including CT-EDS, computers,
workstations etc. should have a UPS provision for a minimum of 10 minutes. Servers should
have backup provisions for 30 minutes.
23. Maintenance
Mean-Time Between Failure (MTBF) and Mean-Time To Repair (MTTR) data for the
systems offered is required and must indicate an average 'uptime" of over 99% under realistic
operating conditions.
24. Option
24.1 The supplier shall include for a comprehensive maintenance service for 12 months after
system acceptance.
24.2 This maintenance requirement shall include.
i. Preventive Maintenance.
ii. Routine Maintenance.
iii. Call-Out Maintenance.
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24.3 Following every maintenance visit, the HBS contractor shall send a completion report
to the engineer.
24.4 All the systems should be maintained by the OEMs or entities certified by them by
whatever arrangements airport operators opt for.
24.5 The system should not be connected or accessed through internet by the OEM for any
purppse including remote diagnosis.
24.6 A non-disclosure agreement (NDA) is to be signed by the airport operators (Buyer)

with OEM (Supplier) to affect the confidentiality of the information pertaining to the system.
24.7 Service engineers of Indian origin will only be deputed by the OEM or entities
authorized by them to maintain the system. Non-Indian engineers may be deputed for major
breakdowns under supervision.
25. Training
25.1 The supplier shall supply comprehensive documentation in plain English to allow the
full end complete operation of the system.
25.2 A set of system verification test objects, FAT and SAT test procedures must be offered.
25.3 These objects when inspected must positively verify that the system is performing
within published specifications and agreed detection levels.
A computer assisted training package must be offered. As a minimum this package must
facilitate operator training and gauge training proficiency.
26. Climatic Conditions

The machine should be capable of operating between OoC to 40°C temperatures, relative
humidity between 0 to 95%
27. Design Loadings
For the purpose of the sizing of drivers, shaft sizes and bearing etc., the following live
loads are considered:
(a) Belt Conveyors

(i) Power curves
(ii) Structural loading
(b) Reclaim / make -up conveyors
(c) Horizontal Reclaim Carousel
(d) Walkways and Maintenance Platforms
(e) Super load
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28. Services
Main supply 415V ± 10% 3 Ph, 50 ± 5%Hz

Note the CT-EDS machine generally requires a conditioned power supply.
29. Bag conditioning pre screening
The BHS should ideally include a number of features that condition and present the bag
to the X-ray in a separate, spaced and controlled manner. This should include: -
1. Check in operator discipline e.g. tie up trailing straps, use tubs as appropriate etc.
11. Window reservation techniques at check- in Icollector conveyor
111. Use of zoned belts at transfer in feeds
IV. Automatic baggage separation
v. Spacing and pitching of bags to suit the needs of the X-ray machine.
VI. Over-height detection
Vll. Over-length detection
30. Collector System - Window Reservation technique
30.1 This feature is applied to those instances where by automatic checks in conveyors are
provided to deliver bags on to collector conveyors.
30.2 A system known as "Window Reservation" is used to control the flow of bags.
Effectively, the belt on the collector conveyor is split up into imaginary zones or "windows"
each large enough to accept the bag and these are allocated to check -in desks on a demand
basis such that all input have equal opportunity. This reduces passenger-waiting times. and
also controls the flow of bags into the handling system right from the point of in-put.
30.3 As the allocated window approaches the desk. the Dispatch conveyor will automatically
start up and the bag will be transferred onto the collector conveyor. This procedure is repeated
until all bags in a single transaction are released in to the system.
30.4 It is preferential to arrange the conveyor speed such that the bags are fired across the
collector conveyor. This encourages the bag to lie flat and also decreases the cycle time.
3 1. Transfer In feed - Marked Belt
31.1 In those instances where bags are delivered to the HBS system via a transfer in feed
line (or similar) it is much harder to control the input and flow of bags as this is operator
dependent.
31.2 There should be discipline about the type of bag to be handled and also the orientation
that the bag is placed onto the belt, such that it is in the most stable orientation for conveying
and <creening.
31.3 To help control the flow it is suggested that zones are marked onto the belt to indicate
where handlers should load bags and where they shouldnt. In this way it is possible to
encourage operators to correctly space bags from the outset, and also the throughput will be
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limited to be dictated by the belt speed and size of the zone.
32. Automatic Baggage separation
32.1 Whilst bags may be correctly spaced at point of input into the system, by the time they
have been conveyed to the screening area, usually via inclines / declines, speed changes,
merges / diverges, curves or drop - over etc., bags can quite easily become entangled with
others.
32.2 Singulation of baggage into the X-ray machine is essential for the efficient operation of
the 100% HBS system. Also the correct pitch of baggage entering the machine is important.
For ,:ownstream controls to be able to singulate and pitch baggage into the machine correctly
each item must be separate and there must be a detectable gap between successive items --an
automated baggage separation mechanism is required to achieve this.
32.3 Classically, there are 4 potential baggage patterns that can cause problems and hence
should be detected and resolved via baggage separation i.e.
I. Bags caught up with each other, nose to tail, no overlap
II. Bags partially overlapped, left hand bag leading
III. Bags partially overlapped, right hand bag leading
IV. Bags fully overlapped, i.e. side by side.
32.4 Firstly, a series of sensors are required to detect the above sequence. Secondly, a series
of queue conveyors, usually with inverter speed control and differing belt types are required.
By varying the speed differential between them it is possible to separate baggage in the first 3
sequences above.
32.5 If it is likely that bags can be fully overlapped, then these bags can normally only be
separated if they are transferred through at 45 degree Y -junction such that they naturally
become one of the first 3 sequences instead. In this case, 2 bag separation systems are to be
provided, before and after the 90-degree junction. These are normally termed 'primary' and
'secondary' baggage separation systems, but are functionally similar.
33. Over- Height Detection.
33.1 An over - height detector is required on a queue conveyor prior to the X-ray machine,
mainly to prevent damage to the machine and the bag. Ideally this should be a mechanical flap
with limit switch as these are not too sensitive to straps and labels etc. The use of photocells
for this is not so efficient.
33.2 If the limit switch on the over height detector trips, then the bag is transported onto the
next queue conveyor and stopped.
33.3 The oversized bag can now be removed or re-oriented. A visual warning beacon will
flash and an audible alarm will pulse to alert the screening staff. To re-start the conveyor
follcwing rectification / removal of the bag the operator shall depress a button upon a locally
mounted push - button station.
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34. Over -length check

34.1 The length check is performed upon a queue conveyor prior to the X-ray. This ensures
that bags which are too long are not allowed in the machine.
34.2 Whilst a bag is within the beam of the relevant photocell, pulses are counted from a star
wheel/proximity cell arrangement upon the driven roller of conveyor. The number of pulses
directly represents the length of the bag, assuming no slippage.
34.3 If the number of pulses received exceeds the pre-set quantity, then the bag is deemed over
length. This rogue bag is allowed (subject to downstream dieback conditions) to continue onto
the rext queue conveyor following the length check and stopped. A visual warning beacon
shall flash and an audible alarm pulse to alert the screening staff. After dealing with the bag
the operator presses a 're-start' push button.
35.1 Typical operation of screening line
35.1.1 Bags are spaced and pitched correctly prior to delivery into the X-ray machine. which is
integrated into the baggage handling control system. Each bag is allocated a unique code
number by the BHS control system to ensure communications between the X-ray machines
and the BHS control system are always synchronized.
35.11 As the bag exits the X-ray machine, all the images created by the CT-EDS are referred
to level-2 for manual operator decision.
35.1.3 The Level 2 X-ray image investigations will be conducted as the bag is being
transported along the transport conveyor. This ideally needs to be up to 30 seconds for the
level 2A. Another 40-110 seconds are available to level 2B for a decision to be made. The
Level 2 decision should be made by the time the bag reaches the decision point, which is
usually some form of diverting mechanism. If the operator does not make a decision. the
system will automatically default the bag to the Level 3 screening areas for further analysis.
35.1.4 The diverting mechanism will allow cleared bags to proceed to the makeup area and
route suspect bags to the level 3 area for further inspection.
35.1.5 Cleared level 3 bags shall enter into the system after the screening process through a
conveyor belt.
35.1.6 Suspect bags at this point are referred to Level 4, for passenger-baggage reunion.
35.1.7 Cleared level 4 bags are usually entered into the system after the screening process.
This can either be a manual or automated process.
35.1.8 Tracking errors are a function of both the mechanical system solution. and also the
software and commissioning process. It will not be possible to achieve this target rate; if for
example, the mechanical system is poorly designed in the first place. The following are
guidelines to consider when designing the tracking conveyor systems.
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1. Ideally keep all tracking lines straight and level whenever possible
IJ Avoid changes in direction if possible
III. If unavoidable, use belt curves rather than drop-over 90 degree transfers
IV. If conveyors cannot be level, then a maximum 7 degree up or down should be
considered
V. Keep conveying speeds to a minimum to avoid slippage, usually 0.5 to 1.6m/sec
VI. Keep speed changes to a minimum
VII. Ensure no snagging points on conveyor plate work
VIII. Careful selection of a diverter type for out sorting to level 3 area
35.2 Tracking Error Rates
35.2.1 The target rate for correct tracking is 99%. Tracking errors are defined as the
percentage of all bags that are routed to level 3 because tracking information is lost such that it
is no longer possible to securely associate the bag screening decision with the bag. In such
cases the bag is routed to level 3 as a fail-safe measure. This error rate does not make
provision for any bags to reach the makeup area that have not been specifically cleared by the
screening process. The achievement of this must be 100%.
35.2.2 There is however some tracking error causes that are out of the control of the system
and these mainly pertain to baggage types. The following examples are intended to illustrate
types of baggage induced tracking errors.
35.2.3 Tracking errors result from apparent changes in length or position with respect to the
conveyor belt, outside the defined tolerances as detected by photocells and pulse generators
placed on the tracking conveyors.
35.2.4 This is an easily understood way of explaining how baggage characteristics can cause
movement with respect to the belt, resulting in a tracking error. In this example bag 1 that
stands on a conveyor on its wheels is likely to move with respect to the belt and thus change
its position with respect to the belt. The other bag 2 indicates the possibility of its progress
being interfered with by a protrusion such as a wheel holding the joint between conveyors: this
would also move the position of the bag with respect to the belt and cause a tracking error
35.3 Length Change
The above example illustrate a way in which the length of a bag and the position of the
bag can appear to change from the perspective of the photocells that detect the baggage
36. Baggage position tracking
36.1 The purpose of baggage tracking is to accurately reconcile routing decisions made by
PLC control systems to real baggage travelling upon the conveyors. The software solution
must provide fail - safe software philosophies for tracking baggage and routine actions whilst
also being somewhat tolerant of the unpredictable travel characteristics inherent when
conveying variable baggage types.
36.2 The bag position tracking technique shall be used for tracking bags on the conveyor
with data attached to them inside the PLC System.
36.3 Each tracking conveyor is fitted with a pulse generator on a non-driven roller. The
pulse generators generate a pulse per unit of the belt movement on the conveyor.
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36.4 When a bag breaks the photocell on the first conveyor, which enters the bag into the
tracking model, the bags unique PLC allocated tag is entered into a PLC register. This happens
whilst the bag is obscuring the photocell. Thus a series of registers are created at the resolution
of the pulse generator, which create a virtual image of the bag. The pulses received from
respective conveyor causes the registers containing the bag tag to be moved. As such through
these each tracking conveyor a bag is mapped to its own dedicated set of registers and the bag
can be seen moving as the conveyor moves.
36.5 This technique allows the bag position to be monitored to the resolution of the pulse
generator that would typically be 50 mm. Thus when the bag reaches the next photocell on the
next conveyor its tracked image should also reach the photocell within a tolerance. This allows
the tracking of the bag based on its position and is thus tolerant of bags being removed without
causing a serial error to all succeeding bags.
36.6 In high security applications the registered image also provides a length measurement of
the bag to the resolution of the pulse generator. This can be used in addition to the positional
check to give some ability to detect a bag being replaced with a different bag but of a different
length within tolerances.
36.7 This technique gives rise to a degree of certainty of the bag currently at the photocell
being the proper bag to which the data in the PLC relates. This level of certainty is determined
by the tolerances. A bag that has moved with respect to the belt out side of the set tolerance
but which is not within the tolerance of another bag is uncertain as to which bag it is.
36.8 A similar concept applies where length check is also used where the position is within
tolerance but the length has changed outside of tolerance. When a bag becomes uncertain in
this way it is termed as a miss track. Bags that are miss-tracked are handled according to a set
default destination for miss-tracked bags.
36.9 This form of tracking control is to be utilized in the security element i.e. the 100% HBS.
37. Blockage Detection
37.1 Conveyor belt is required to be fitted with a photocell at its discharge end. For each of
such conveyors a blockage detection algorithm checks for blockages or bag jams on the
conveyor.
37.2 If the photocell is obscured for longer than a pre- set time period a blockage will be
deemed to have occurred. The timer will not run whilst the conveyors I are stopped.
37.3 In the event of a blockage being detected, the conveyors I affected bag will be stopped
and an alarm generated on the MIS, if fitted.
37.4 The blockage must be manually cleared and the blockage reset function on the MIS of
Mer operated where upon the conveyorls affected by the blockages will restart.
37.5 Conveyors upstream of the blockage will stop under dieback control as baggage
reaches their respective photocells.
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38. X-ray HBS Controls and Mechanical system HBS interface
38.1 The purpose of any 'HBS' baggage handling' software solution is to accurately reconcile
screening decisions made by connected systems to real baggage traveling upon the conveyor.
The solution must provide fail-safe software philosophies for tracking baggage, reconciling
decisions and routing actions, whilst also being somewhat tolerant of the unpredictable travel
characteristics inherent when conveying variable baggage types.
38.2 The very nature of HBS system suggests high accuracy tracking is paramount. However,
although a control system solution may offer very tight tracking (where the accuracy is ± one
scan of the software) in reality baggage is not and cannot be conveyed with such precision
100% of time. With broad tolerances applied to checking routines within the software, the
system can become very tolerant of the conveying inaccuracies. However, another
fundamental feature of HBS control systems should be to identify (if possible), tampering with
or exchanges of baggage. This feature requires the application of tight checking tolerances.
38.3 Thus, the situation exists where tighter the tolerances are made to satisfy 'security'
requirements greater will be the volume of bags rejected as 'miss-tracks', conversely, opening
up the tolerances will reduce reject rates but will reduce the level of security offered. BHS
efficiency is defined in terms of acceptable levels of miss-tracks and miss-directs. In general,
the target for this should be in the order of 1 - 2 %.
********

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No. CAS-iOO/07/20I7-Tech.Div/Order/Circular/Addendum/Corrigendum Dated: 041h Aug, 2017

Sub: Minimum Standards for Civil Aviation Security Equipment.

In order to prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices, articles or

(i) X-ray Baggage Inspection System (BIS) Appendix --A

2. This Circular supersedes Appendix-E and Appendix-F of AVSEC Circular No 25/2004

BUREAU OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

1. XBIS Make/ Modell Sf. No.

1. SINGLE WIRE RESOLUTION (TEST NO.1)

2. USEFUL PENETRATION (TEST NO.2)

3. MATERIAL DISCRIMINATION (TEST No.3)

4. SIMPLE PENETRATION (TEST No.4)

5. SPATIAL RESOLUTION (TEST No.5)

6. THIN METAL IMAGING: (Test No 6).

THREAT IMAGE PROJECTION (TIP)

2. Design of the system

6. Feed Back Report

SPECIFICATION FOR IN-LINE CT-EDS

2. Conceptual System Design

Level screening is to be undertaken by a CT-EDS machine with automatic

2.2.2 100% of level-l screened baggage images should be referred to level 2.

4. Approval by Regulatory agent.

4.1 Approval by Internationall ~ational regulatory agency: - The CT machines deployed at

5. REQUIREMENTS FOR LEVEL-l X -RAY INSPECTION SYSTEM.

5.3 Image Generation

5.5. Oversize Baggage.

6. The HBS Management system shall:

(a) Provide controls for start-up and power-down.

A management Information system is required to provide statistical information

0 Detailed Requirement of Automatic level! X-ray Equipment

10. Level 2 Operator Workstations

10.1 General requirements for Level 2 Image Analysis Systems.

10.2 Level 2 Imaging Tools

10.3 Level 2 Operator Workstation Minimum Specifications

10.3.1 Display Monitor

a) Two FULL HD monitors or a single FULL HD monitor of 24 Inches with two

10.3.2 Imaging modes

10.3.3 Power indicator. A power-on indicator must be available with:

a) Operator console must have locking mechanism.

c) Access to system configuration must require a mechanical key or electronic password.

10.4 Additional Requirements Level 2

10.5 Image Printing

A display printing facility must be provided to standard high-resolution colour printer.

11. COMMUNICATION NETWORK

11.5 MUX / Matrix Configuration

Communication network Fibre-optic Ethernet network.

Network configuration Fully redundant network configuration. The proposed

Designed to facilitate the addition of industry standard

11.6 Image Printer

11.6.1 High-speed optical data networking, printing and communication devices.

12. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

a) On-line monitoring of all control functions.

13. Data to be compiled

(b) For Workstations

14. Reports to be generated

14.1 Levell CT-EDS - System Event Data

17. Retrieval and Offline Presentation

18. Threat Image Projection (TIP) for level 2 Operators

1. The general report shall be the screeners log report.

20. TIP Bag Library

21. Operating Conditions

22. Electric Power Supply

24.2 This maintenance requirement shall include.