Biology Organisms and Adaptations

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Chapter 2—Evolution and the Diversity of Life

MULTIPLE CHOICE

1. As a transitional form, Archaeopteryx is important because it provides insight into

a. the evolution of birds into reptiles.
b. the relationship between dinosaurs and birds.
c. adaptations for animals moving from an aquatic to a land environment.
d. all of these
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Knowledge
OBJ: Describe several characteristics of the Archaeopteryx that support this animal as a transitional
form between reptiles (dinosaurs) and birds.
TOP: 2.1 Archaeopteryx and the Evolution of Birds KEY: Evolution

2. All of the following are adaptations associated with flight that are first seen in Archaeopteryx
EXCEPT
a. feathers.
b. a wishbone.
c. backward facing claws for perching.
d. a toothed beak.
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Knowledge
OBJ: Describe several characteristics of the Archaeopteryx that support this animal as a transitional
form between reptiles (dinosaurs) and birds.
TOP: 2.1 Archaeopteryx and the Evolution of Birds KEY: Adaptations

3. Which of the following is an example of an organism’s niche?

a. a tortoise that lives on the African savannah eating grasses and living in deep burrows
b. the thick mane of a male lion
c. the camouflage coloration of zebras as they stand in the shade of acacia trees
d. a flock of turkey vultures
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Moderate REF: Application
OBJ: Describe several characteristics of the Archaeopteryx that support this animal as a transitional
form between reptiles (dinosaurs) and birds.
TOP: 2.1 Archaeopteryx and the Evolution of Birds
KEY: Ecological interactions; Niche

4. Which group of organisms played an important role in shaping Earth’s atmosphere?

a. prokaryotes
b. eukaryotes
c. animals
d. cyanobacteria
ANS: D PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Knowledge
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Ecological interactions

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5. What role did cyanobacteria play in shaping Earth’s environment?
a. They are single-celled organisms that are detritivores.
b. They produced oxygen, which led to changes in Earth’s atmosphere.
c. They evolved into the first plants that colonized land.
d. They are the ancestral form of all life on Earth.
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Comprehension
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Ecological interactions

6. As prokaryotes, which structure is found in cyanobacteria?

a. nucleoid
b. mitochondrion
c. nucleus
d. all of these
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Analysis
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Cell types

7. Which structure originated from cyanobacteria?

a. A
b. B
c. C
d. D
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Moderate REF: Application
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Cell structure and function NOT: Figure 2.22a
 8. Which of the following correctly lists the terms in hierarchical order from the most inclusive
to the least inclusive?
a. kingdom, domain, class, phylum
b. species, kingdom, order, family
c. class, order, family, genus
d. order, phylum, family, species
ANS: C PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Comprehension
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Hierarchy

9. All living organisms

a. belong to one of three domains.
b. belong to the same kingdom.
c. belong to the domain Eukarya.
d. are composed of the same type of cell..
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Comprehension
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Hierarchy

10. Two organisms are very similar both in terms of molecular and physical characteristics.
However, there is at least one characteristic that is not shared by these organisms—each
organism has at least one evolutionary novelty that is not present in the other organism and
thus these organisms do not interbreed. As a result, what is likely the lowest taxonomic
classification that is shared by these organisms?
a. species
b. genus
c. family
d. order
ANS: B PTS: 1 DIF: Moderate REF: Analysis
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Hierarchy

11. Which of the following domains contain prokaryotic cells?

a. Archaea and Bacteria
b. Eukarya and Archaea
c. Bacteria and Eukarya
d. Archaea, Bacteria, and Eukarya
ANS: A PTS: 1 DIF: Easy REF: Knowledge
OBJ: Describe why and how the diversity of life is classified.
TOP: 2.2 The Diversity of Life Is Cataloged and Classified by Evolutionary Relationships
KEY: Hierarchy
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Government. After 15 March, the entry into Prague, we knew that we
were sitting on a powder keg. In this European problem there were two
possibilities of conflict; one was the Polish problem, where I could do
nothing; the other was the southeast problem which had become acute
through the occupation of Albania. I felt that I could do something here
and could contribute to the maintenance of peace in Europe. For that
reason I offered to go to Ankara at this moment.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: First you went to Ankara to obtain
information; you obtained a picture of the situation there, and then in an
oral and a written report you explained your opinion. Please comment on
this.
VON PAPEN: In Ankara I immediately obtained a picture of the
whole situation because I knew all the leading personalities there.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you aren’t proposing to take the
defendant through all the intricacies of Turkish politics, are you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not my intention. The problem is
dealt with in a report which the defendant made in Berlin not only to
Hitler but also to other offices. The making of this report and its contents
show a positive activity for the maintenance of peace. That is why I have
gone into this affair briefly. And, Witness, I ask you to outline...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this report is also in the files of the
Foreign Office to which I do not have access.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you had better deal with the subject,
but deal with it shortly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, please continue.
VON PAPEN: I will be very brief, My Lord. I came back from
Turkey, and told Hitler in a report what had to be done in order to
maintain European peace. I sent this memorandum also to Keitel and
Brauchitsch. I stated in this report that it was necessary, in order to keep
the situation in the southeast under control, for Italy immediately to give
positive promises indicating that her military forces would be withdrawn
from Albania and her relations with Turkey would be adjusted, in order
to remove there any doubt in the sincerity of Italian policy. A very heated
discussion on this advice followed between Count Ciano and myself.
Count Ciano was in Berlin on that day to sign the German-Italian
Alliance. When I made my suggestions to him, he was most indignant at
these demands and complained about me to Herr Von Ribbentrop. A very
heated discussion then took place with Herr Von Ribbentrop who told me
that he was in charge of German foreign policy and not I, and that it was
after all not my task to make suggestions for keeping the peace. Then I
offered my resignation to Herr Von Ribbentrop and told him it was
useless under the circumstances to send me to Ankara; but Herr Von
Ribbentrop withdrew his statement, and I returned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this report, did you warn in general against
a war adventure and what reasons did you give for this warning?
VON PAPEN: The memorandum which I gave also to General
Keitel and General Brauchitsch also contained a military presentation of
the situation, in which I stated that to begin a war over the Polish
Corridor would of necessity lead to a world war. If such a world war
were to break out, Germany’s position would be hopeless, for there was
no doubt that England would keep its promise to Poland and that
England and France would come to Poland’s aid.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was your reaction to the news about the
outbreak of war on 1 September 1939?
VON PAPEN: When the news of the outbreak of the Polish war
reached me in Ankara, I was profoundly shocked. I had, of course, hoped
that Hitler would avoid this step which must plunge us into the greatest
misfortune.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 14, Page 62, an affidavit
of the lady who was for long years private secretary of the witness Von
Papen. I will quote a brief passage from Page 64, the second paragraph
from the end:
“I heard the radio announcement of the outbreak of war in the
Embassy at Ankara with the Ambassador and the entire staff.
Afterwards I walked in the Embassy park with the
Ambassador. The Ambassador was extraordinarily excited and
shaken. I had never seen him like this, not even after the
darkest days of June 1934 and not even after the murder of his
friend Ketteler.
“That is why I can recall exactly every word which the
Ambassador said to me on that occasion: ‘Remember my
words: To have provoked this war is the greatest crime and the
greatest madness which Hitler and his people could have
committed. Germany cannot win this war. All will be buried
under the ruins.’ ”
 Witness, what were your decisions for the future?
VON PAPEN: What could I do? I could either protest—then, in
order not to be shot as a traitor in Germany, I would have to remain
abroad. I could emigrate. I would never have done that, for I have always
believed that one can work better in one’s own country than as an
emigrant. I could resign; then I would return to Germany and become a
soldier. The best thing, it seemed to me, was to remain where I was and
where I could best help my fatherland.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now I come to discuss your various efforts
toward peace. Please describe first your negotiations with the Dutch
Minister, Dr. Visser.
VON PAPEN: Immediately after the Polish campaign I had
negotiations with the Dutch Minister in Ankara, at that time Dr. Visser,
who declared himself willing to have his Foreign Minister mediate in
London. The condition for a peace would, of course, have been the
restoration of Poland with a corresponding adjustment of the Corridor
problem, the problem of the German sections.
I reported this possibility for peace negotiations to Herr Von
Ribbentrop, but it seemed to me that it was not followed up in Berlin;
and therefore in November 1939 I went to Berlin myself. Herr Von
Ribbentrop told me, “The Führer does not want to hear anything of peace
negotiations; please do not undertake any further steps.”
Nevertheless I went to Hitler, reported the Dutch offer to him, and
expressed the wish of the Dutch Minister, Dr. Visser, to come to Berlin
personally. Unfortunately Hitler rejected all my arguments.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I wish to point out that with the approval of
the Court an interrogatory on this subject was sent to Minister Dr. Visser,
but the interrogatory has not yet been received.
Did you make further suggestions as to ending the war in 1939? I
am thinking in this connection of a report on the restoration of legal life
in Germany.
VON PAPEN: Yes. In December of 1939 I sent a detailed report for
Hitler to Herr Von Ribbentrop, and in this report I said that the first
condition for any conclusion of peace and for any readiness abroad to
conclude a peace would be the renunciation of the present government
methods in Germany; that is, a return to constitutional conditions in
Germany. Then I told Hitler, “If you do this, you will have more credit
abroad; and it might be possible to prepare the way for peace
negotiations.”
 DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the instruction which you received
from Berlin in regard to peace efforts, and what did you do nevertheless?
VON PAPEN: The Reich Foreign Minister repeatedly issued strict
orders to the chiefs of missions under no circumstances to extend any
peace feelers. In the opinion of the Foreign Office, such attempts would
be a sign of weakness.
I did not observe this ruling because I was determined on my own
initiative to do everything to shorten the war. For that reason, in the
spring of 1941 before the Balkan crisis, I addressed myself to His
Majesty the King of Sweden with the request to begin a peace mediation.
I also asked the President of Turkey, Ismet Inönü, to consider the
possibilities of mediating. President Inönü agreed to do so, while His
Majesty the King of Sweden refused, saying that the situation did not
seem to him suited to such efforts. The Turkish President asked only that
he be officially requested to mediate. That, of course, was not done.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you think about the events of 10
May 1940, the entry of German troops into Holland and Belgium; and
what statement, did you make in this connection?
VON PAPEN: On 10 May 1940 I visualized the impression which
had dominated the whole first World War, the question of why Germany
had violated Belgian neutrality. It was completely incomprehensible to
me that this psychological error should be repeated a second time and I
expressed this opinion of mine in a letter which I sent to the Dutch
Minister, Dr. Visser, on 10 May.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do in order to check the spread
of the war to the Balkans?
VON PAPEN: When the Yugoslav crisis broke out and our troops
marched through Bulgaria, I had Hitler send a personal letter to the
Turkish President. In this letter he assured the Turkish President that
under no circumstances did he intend to fight Turkey, and for that reason
he had ordered German troops to keep at 40 kilometers distance from the
Turkish border.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In June 1941 you concluded a treaty of
friendship with. Turkey. Will you state briefly the reasons for that?
VON PAPEN: The reasons were very simple: To limit the war.
Turkey was to know that in spite of our alliance with Italy, in spite of the
war in the Balkans, in spite of the war with Greece, we would never
threaten Turkey. Turkey was also to know that we would not attempt to
advance through Turkey to the Suez Canal. The negotiations were very
long and difficult, because Herr Von Ribbentrop did not want in this
treaty any mention of Turkey’s contractual obligations to the Allies. I
then pointed out to Herr Von Ribbentrop by cable that the Turks were
faithful to their treaties.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know of Hitler’s intentions against
Russia? What did you think about this war?
VON PAPEN: The beginning of the war with Russia was, of course,
a complete surprise to us. We had heard of the massing of troops on both
sides, but of course I assumed and hoped that Hitler would keep his pact
with Russia and that he would not begin this war. I considered the
beginning of the war against Russia a crime, from the point of view of
German as well as European interests.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, after you returned from a visit to
Germany in the fall of 1943, continue your efforts toward peace?
VON PAPEN: In the fall of 1943, after Stalingrad, it had become
clear that no peace could be established with the Hitler Government.
Regarding this, there was much discussion between me and my friends,
including my military friends. In the fall of 1943 I was initiated into the
so-called Beck Plan, which has been mentioned here by the witness
Gisevius. At that time this plan did not intend to eliminate Hitler through
an attack on his life, but the intention was to have his headquarters
surrounded by troops and then to put Hitler on trial. The reasons for this
were obvious. Even if many generals were of the opinion that this war
had to be stopped, they were afraid of taking action against Hitler
because they were of the opinion that Hitler still enjoyed very great
prestige. Moreover, there was the further difficulty that if Hitler were
removed, no one knew what the Allies would do with us.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this should be taken more
shortly, Dr. Kubuschok.
VON PAPEN: As a result of all these considerations, I attempted to
learn what the Allies would do with Germany in such a case; and for this
purpose I turned to the American Minister, at that time Mr. Earle, who
reported on the matter in the press, too.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 93, Page 214.
This is the interrogatory of Freiherr von Lersner, whom I wanted to call
as a witness but who could not come here because of transportation
difficulties. On Page 214, the answer to Question 7 is:
 “My activities for the mediation of peace negotiations were
always based on my own initiative and extended to the attempt
to mediate general world peace between all belligerent states.
Prior to all peace measures, I engaged in detailed discussions
with Ambassador Von Papen and was always warmly
supported by him to the utmost, although every peace measure
was forbidden him and was at least as perilous for him as for
me.
“He also made me acquainted with a number of foreigners,
above all with the Apostolic Delegate to Istanbul, Archbishop
Roncalli.
“When in 1942 I resolved to go to the Vatican, not only did
Ambassador Von Papen urgently advise me to make the trip;
but he also personally procured for me all the necessary papers
and passports for Rome, where in spite of the express
prohibition of the Reich Government I suggested to Cardinal
Maglione and the diplomatic director of the Curia, Bishop
Montini, a world peace drive by Pope Pius XII with all
belligerent powers.
“When in April 1944 I had the opportunity to establish contact
with Mr. George Earle, the former American Minister to
Vienna and Sofia, the friend of President Roosevelt, with
whom I had long been personally acquainted, Papen again
helped me in every way. He even took it upon himself....”
THE PRESIDENT: These are details. Is it not sufficient to say that
the defendant said that he endeavored in every way to make peace? Then
you can refer, if you like, to any interrogatories or affidavits which
confirm what the defendant says.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I will dispense with any further
reading of this answer to Question Number 7, and I refer then to
Document 94, Page 217, a letter of the witness Lersner to Mr.
Kirkpatrick. He makes reference in the letter to the fact that as early as
1939 the Defendant Von Papen intended to bring Lersner to Turkey, so
that on the basis of his international connections he could work for
peace. He describes the difficulties in connection with this plan, which,
however, was carried out by Papen. The letter also mentions further
peace efforts with Admiral Von Horthy and with King Boris of Bulgaria.
I should like briefly to give documentary corroboration to the questions
raised by the witness Gisevius. I wish to present evidence that Von Papen
was by no means unfavorably received in the circle of the conspirators of
20 July, but that on the contrary he was scheduled for the office of
Foreign Minister. I refer to the affidavit of Count Bismarck, Document
Number 90, Page 201. Count Bismarck, in the course of the events
following 20 July, was sent to a concentration camp. This indicates the
character of the witness. In Document Number 90 Bismarck points out
that in case of a change of government Papen would have placed himself
at their disposal. There was an agreement to send communications
through Herr Von Trott, who worked in the Foreign Office. Trott was
condemned to death following the events of 20 July.
Finally I refer to Document Number 89, Page 199, a letter from
Pfeil to the son of the witness Papen. Pfeil points out that Colonel Count
von Stauffenberg, the would-be murderer of 20 July, had proposed to the
defendant that he serve as Foreign Minister later. The Court has already
admitted this letter.
Witness, what was your position as regards the Party during your
period in Turkey?
VON PAPEN: My position as regards the Party was exceptionally
bad. For years I waged a battle with the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party
in Turkey. This man told my Embassy officials, “Herr Von Papen
belongs in a concentration camp, or he must be shot.” I had to struggle a
long time to have this man removed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you do during this time regarding
Church matters?
VON PAPEN: During the war I did everything in my power to
counteract an intensification of the fight against the Church. That means
that I took all such institutions in Turkey under my personal protection.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer here to Document Number 53, Page
141, and Document Number 51, Page 138.
What did you do with respect to the Jewish problem during your
period in Turkey?
VON PAPEN: I opposed all measures of the German Government
against German Jews. A long Party trial took place because German
members of my Embassy had consulted a Jewish doctor. I defended these
officials of mine against this charge, and I refused to take away the
passports of the German Jews in Turkey and to deprive them of their
citizenship.
 DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 227, the
interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. In Questions 4, 5, and 6 he
discusses this problem. In the answer to Question 6, the last paragraph is
very noteworthy, and as the witness Von Papen has not yet mentioned it I
should like to quote it. Page 229, the last paragraph of the answer to
Question 6:
“I remember particularly clearly an incident in the spring of
1944, when I called upon Herr Von Papen at the request of Mr.
Barlas, the Refugee Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, in
order to request his assistance in saving 10,000 Jews in France
from deportation to Poland for extermination. These Jews had
formerly held Turkish nationality but they had later given it up.
Herr Von Papen complied with my wish and through his
intervention the lives of these Jews were saved, as I learned
later from Mr. Barlas himself.”
I continue to quote:
“Details of this incident, on which Mr. Steinhardt, then United
States Ambassador in Ankara, and Numan Menemencioglu,
then Foreign Minister of Turkey, were also informed, can be
obtained by questioning Mr. Barlas.”
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to point out to you again, Dr.
Kubuschok, that you have taken very much longer than you said you
were going to take.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a very short time, in a few minutes, I will
be through.
I ask the last question of the witness: When, on 2 August 1944
Turkey broke off relations with Germany, you returned to Germany, why
did you not remain in Turkey and separate finally from Germany?
VON PAPEN: I can state that on the day of the severance of
relations between Turkey and Germany the British Prime Minister Mr.
Churchill said the following in the House of Commons: “The breaking-
off of relations between Turkey and Germany will have many
consequences, including consequences for Herr Von Papen. On 30 June
he escaped the blood bath. This time he will not succeed.”
As a result, I received requests from the Allies to remain in Turkey.
I refused to do so. I said, “I shall return to Germany where I belong. I
will not emigrate, for perhaps I might still do something for my
fatherland.” Thus I returned to Germany. When I arrived there I observed
that as a result of the terror methods which had been launched after 20
July there was no possibility at all of doing anything. For the rest of the
time a Gestapo guard was placed before my door.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document Number 95, Page 226,
which has already been mentioned, the interrogatory of Professor
Marchionini. I refer to the answer to Question 3 and I should like very
briefly to read the last half of this answer in connection with the problem
just mentioned by the witness:
“The last conversation on this subject took place on 2 August
1944, on the day before his final departure from Ankara after
the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between Germany and
Turkey.
“To my advice not to leave Turkey, but to address an appeal
from here to the German people and the German Army to
overthrow Hitler and discontinue the senseless war
immediately, Von Papen answered in substance as follows:
“ ‘I have learned from history that dictatorships cannot be done
away with from a foreign country; one must be in the country
itself in order to fight the regime effectively. Therefore, I have
determined to return to Germany and to conduct the fight
against the Hitler regime there and thus hasten the end of the
war.’ ”
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have finished questioning the witness Von
Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of Defense Counsel
want to ask any questions?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Papen, I should like to ask
you a few questions, with the permission of the Court.
How long have you known Herr Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: Since 1932.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Is it true that it was the express wish
of the then Reich President Von Hindenburg that Herr Von Neurath was
to be taken into the Government which you formed in 1932, as Reich
Foreign Minister?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that is entirely true.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you aware, or did you know
from previous activities of Herr Von Neurath in his various positions as
Ambassador but especially in his last post in London, that Herr Von
Neurath was a faithful follower and an impassioned champion of a
policy of peace?
VON PAPEN: That was known to me and to everyone in Germany.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And you yourself approved of this
also?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little too fast. Go on.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself also approve of
this peace policy?
VON PAPEN: Of course I approved of this policy. Otherwise we
would not have found ourselves side by side in this Cabinet engaged in
common work.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath, a few
months later, take any part in the negotiations leading to the transfer of
the Reich Chancellorship to Hitler?
VON PAPEN: In no way.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But do you know that Reich
President Von Hindenburg made the express condition that Herr Von
Neurath was to remain as Reich Foreign Minister also in the new Hitler
Government?
VON PAPEN: I have already mentioned here that this was an
express condition of Hindenburg’s.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was Hitler’s attitude to
that in principle? Did he accept it only in order to be able to form the
Government at all, or did he approve of Hindenburg’s choice?
VON PAPEN: I believe that Hitler approved completely of the
choice of Neurath as Foreign Minister.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself ever talk to Hitler
about this?
VON PAPEN: Yes, frequently. And I learned from Hitler that he
thought highly of Herr Von Neurath’s personality and capacity.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And did you ever talk to Herr Von
Neurath himself about it?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he make the decision to form
this Cabinet readily?
 VON PAPEN: I imagine that Herr Von Neurath also had the same
inner reservations I had at that time.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, according to your knowledge,
as far as you could learn from statements of Hitler’s, what were Hitler’s
foreign political aims and efforts at that time?
VON PAPEN: Hitler’s foreign political aims at that time were quite
limited: Abolition of discrimination by peaceful means and by
strengthening Germany’s position in the world.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Until the end of 1937, did you ever
hear any statements from Hitler indicating that he might be determined
to use armed force if his peaceful efforts did not have the desired result?
VON PAPEN: I never heard from Hitler of any such intentions.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then it is always asserted that
in leading Party circles he expressed such sanguinary intentions?
VON PAPEN: I never heard that in the Party, even among the most
radical National Socialists, anyone ever spoke of the idea of a war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then to sum up, you agreed fully
with the aims of a peaceful policy that were intended and advocated by
Herr Von Neurath?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now the charge is made against
Herr Von Neurath of having co-operated in the rearmament of Germany.
What was Hitler’s reason and motive for this rearmament, which it may
be supposed started before the actual taking over of the military
sovereignty?
VON PAPEN: I stated yesterday that the actual rearmament began
only after I had resigned from the Cabinet. But as far as I am informed,
all of my former colleagues held the view that a rearmament was only to
serve the purpose of giving Germany a defensive protection for her
borders.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I come to the problem of
Austria. Do you know the attitude of Herr Von Neurath concerning the
Austria problem?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath’s attitude concerning the Austria
problem was the same as mine. Like myself, he constantly protested in
the Cabinet against the terror measures staged by the Party in 1933 and
1934.
 DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you yourself, when Hitler sent
you on an extraordinary mission to Vienna, under Herr Von Neurath?
And did you receive your instructions from him or only from Hitler?
VON PAPEN: I was not subordinate to Herr Von Neurath but had
asked that I might be directly subordinate to Hitler. But, of course, I
reported all steps which I took to Herr Von Neurath and the Foreign
Office, as is proved by the documents submitted here.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s
attitude toward the negotiations in the summer of 1936 which led to the
Agreement of 11 July between Germany and Austria?
VON PAPEN: Herr Von Neurath had exactly the same opinion as I
had, that this agreement was to serve and had to serve the cause, once
and for all, of peace between these two peoples of the same race.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did he influence Hitler in this
direction, too?
VON PAPEN: I do not know, but I certainly assume he did.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that he was honest and sincere
in this agreement? What is your opinion? I point out here that the
Prosecution asserts and makes it a charge against Herr Von Neurath that
this agreement was concluded with a treacherous intention.
VON PAPEN: I spoke in detail on that point yesterday, and
protested against the Prosecution’s charging us with treacherous
intentions. Herr Von Neurath had such intentions just as little as I did.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I have two more brief
questions.
Do you know what attitude Herr Von Neurath took as to Germany’s
leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in
1933?
VON PAPEN: Yes, I know that very well. Herr Von Neurath was of
the opinion that it was advisable to leave the Disarmament Conference.
But, like me, he was of the opinion that it was a mistake to leave the
League of Nations. With his approval, as I told the Court yesterday, I
followed Hitler to Munich at that time in order to persuade him not to
leave the League of Nations.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions, Mr.
President.
DR. SEIDL: With the approval of the Court, substituting for my
absent colleague, Dr. Stahmer, I should like to ask a question on behalf
of the Defendant Göring.
Witness, this morning you said that in connection with the murder
of your friend Ketteler in 1938 you turned to Göring because he was in
charge of the Gestapo. Is it not a fact, and were you not aware of this
fact, that from 1936 on, at the latest, the Gestapo was exclusively under
Himmler and was formally under the Reich Minister of the Interior?
VON PAPEN: It is possible that through my 4 years’ absence from
Germany in Austria I did not know that fact. It has been established here,
of course. In any case, I had the feeling when I turned to Göring that he
was in a position to defend me against the Gestapo; and after Hitler had
refused to speak to me on this matter, it was only natural that I should
turn to him as the second man in Germany.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
Sir David, would you prefer to start after the adjournment?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was thinking that I
might have the documents arranged then and it might be more
convenient for the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 5 minutes to 2.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged, Your
Lordship.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1355 hours.]

 Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember

saying in your interrogation on 19 September of last year that your
present view was that Hitler was the greatest crook that you had ever
seen in your life?
VON PAPEN: That is quite true. That is the opinion which I arrived
at after I learned here of all the crimes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was on 19 September
1945. But I am more interested in your next answer. Was that not when
you were asked when you made your mind up that Hitler was the
greatest crook you had ever seen in your life, “only after I have known
the facts after which he started to go to war”?
Do you remember saying that?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was not that rather a long time for
you to discover that somewhat obvious truth after your close co-
operation with Hitler?
VON PAPEN: My opinion about Hitler and his inner political
significance was completely clear after 30 June 1934. But, like all other
human beings, I could assume that in the field of foreign politics at least
he would be sensible and I was of this opinion until after the Munich
Agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let us see whether
you had not had an opportunity of forming that view much earlier. When
you were Reich Chancellor in 1932 it was necessary for you to acquaint
yourself with the personalities and aims and methods of the Nazi Party,
was it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you did so, did you not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember—I do not
want to delay by referring to the document, but you may take it as an
exact quotation—that on 16 November 1932 Hitler wrote to you and
said: “You must be aware of my attitude and the attitude of my Party.”
 VON PAPEN: Of course, I knew the aims of his Party; but I may
add, if a party forms a coalition with another party it has to eliminate a
great deal from its program and form a coalition program. That was what
Hitler did on 30 January.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before we come to 30
January I want to ask you—get your view in 1932. You had very little
doubt in 1932, during the period of your Chancellorship, that if Hitler got
into power Germany was in danger of being ruled by violent and
unconstitutional methods, had you not, if Hitler got into power?
VON PAPEN: Doubtless the program of the National Socialists was
revolutionary in this connection, but I explained in detail to the Court
that when we came to this forced solution of 30 January we established a
number of safeguards and drew up a joint coalition program which in our
opinion eliminated the points of danger which you have mentioned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was very strongly the view of
President Von Hindenburg in the middle of 1932 that it would be most
dangerous to put power into Hitler’s hands, was it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes, that was indeed his opinion, that Hitler had to
be controlled by restricting his power.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just will give you one sentence
from the affidavit of Herr Meissner, which the Tribunal will find in
Document Book 11a on Page 43. This will be GB-495. The number is
3309-PS.
This was after, in August 1932. According to Meissner:
“Hindenburg stated that because of the tense situation he could
not with a clear conscience risk transferring the power of
government to a new party, such as the National Socialists,
which did not command a majority and which was intolerant,
noisy, and undisciplined.”
That is a very moderate statement of the Reich President’s views at
that time, is it not?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you know, Defendant—I am
not talking about a coalition, I am talking about if the National Socialists
came into power themselves—it was obvious to you that they had few
scruples and would make short work of their political opponents, is that
not so?
 VON PAPEN: One cannot say that. In political life it always
happens that a radical party—any party, but particularly a radical party—
if it comes to power and is made responsible, has to eliminate much of
its program. For example, we have seen that in the case of the socialist
parties of all countries.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, is it true, as the Defendant
Göring stated under oath, that he told you in 1932 that whatever else the
Nazis would do Hitler would not become a “Vice” or second man; that
he would oppose any political set-up which did not give him the first
place? Is that correct?
VON PAPEN: Yes, Hitler always told me that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And therefore you realized that
Hitler and his accomplices wanted a full opportunity to put their program
and intentions into effect, did you not?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that. That is a statement which
you make here which does not reflect the conditions at that time. You
need only read the government program, our coalition of 1 February.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do not be afraid that I
am not coming to the period of your coalition of 30 January. For the
moment I am just asking you one or two questions about your view of
Hitler, and Hindenburg’s view of Hitler in 1932 because I want to take it
by very quick but very clear stages.
I am still asking you about 1932. The question I put to you was: Did
you realize that if Hitler and his accomplices came into power they
wanted, and would be content only with, a full opportunity of putting
their program and intentions into effect?
VON PAPEN: No, I did not know that; otherwise I would not have
made the attempt in 1933 to bring them into a joint coalition program.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you have told us, I think,
but I just want to get it quite clear, that your views as to what was
necessary for Germany in the second half of 1932 was an easing of the
political differences and strife internally, and an adjustment of relations
with the Western Powers to ease the requirements of Versailles. I am
trying to put it quite shortly as I understand it from you. That is right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And were these aims—I think
your first approach was to invite Hitler to be Vice Chancellor in your
Government in August 1932, was it not?
 VON PAPEN: That is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Hitler refused that and he refused
a repetition of your offer in November 1932, is that not right?
VON PAPEN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, in order to save time I just
want to see if Herr Meissner puts the position correctly in Paragraphs 6
and 7 of his affidavit. I will summarize it for you, and believe me, I will
be most pleased to read anything of which you have any doubt. He puts
it in this way: That in November 1932 you thought that the general
situation and the Nazi Party, in particular, could be controlled if the
President gave you the power to make decrees under Article 48 and you
had the support of the Reichswehr and the Police, and at that time
General Von Schleicher disagreed because he thought that the
Reichswehr was not capable of keeping order in Germany. Is that right?
VON PAPEN: It is incorrect insofar as this process cannot be
covered by any paragraph of the Constitution, but constitutes a breach of
the Constitution. Otherwise it is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That he might have had to use
ultra-constitutional methods to keep control, is that what you mean?
VON PAPEN: Yes. As I have said here he gave me this assignment
on 1 December.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but originally, is Meissner
right in saying that you desired, after you had failed to get Hitler into
your Government, to rule by decree and by keeping control with the
Reichswehr, and General Von Schleicher said that it could not be done?
VON PAPEN: Now, that is not true. After President Von
Hindenburg had decided that he did not want to break the Constitution he
appointed General Von Schleicher Reich Chancellor, as is well known.
At that time Herr Von Schleicher wanted to create a majority by splitting
the Party and, of course, I supported this attempt of Herr Von
Schleicher’s.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just in case it is any mistake of
mine may I just give you Meissner’s own words. It is Paragraph 5, Page
44 of Document Book 11a. I think, Defendant, it would be convenient
for you to follow it, if you do not mind, so that there is no possibility of
mistake.
VON PAPEN: Yes.
 SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 5 of Herr
Meissner’s statement:
“Papen’s reappointment as Chancellor by President
Hindenburg would probably have taken place if he had been
prepared to take up an open fight against the National
Socialists, which would have involved the threat or use of
force. Almost up to the time of his resignation Papen and some
of the other ministers agreed on the necessity for pressing the
fight against the Nazis by employing all means at the disposal
of the State and taking recourse to Article 48 of the
Constitution, even if this might lead to armed conflict. But the
other ministers believed that such a course would lead to civil
war.
“The decision was provided by Schleicher who earlier had
recommended energetic action against the National Socialists
even if this meant the use of the Police and the Army. Then in
the decisive Cabinet meeting he abandoned this idea and
declared himself ready for an understanding with Hitler.”
Is that correct?
VON PAPEN: In part it is correct, and in part it is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell us as shortly as you can
the part which is not correct.
VON PAPEN: My reappointment as Chancellor by Hindenburg, as
Herr Meissner puts it, would have been possible if I had been ready to
wage an open battle against the Nazis. That is completely false
historically. On 1 December I suggested to Hindenburg that he violate
the Constitution and thereby wage open battle against the Nazi Party.
Herr Von Schleicher contradicted that. That is the historical truth.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just so that we will have it in
sequence, if you will look at Paragraph 6 of the same document, about
the second sentence, it begins:
“When it became clear that Hitler was not willing to enter
Schleicher’s Cabinet, and that Schleicher on his part was
unable to split the National Socialist Party as he had hoped to
do with the help of Gregor Strasser, the policy for which
Schleicher had been appointed Chancellor was shipwrecked.
Schleicher was aware that Hitler was particularly embittered
against him and would never agree to co-operate with him.
 Therefore he changed his mind and decided to fight against the
Nazis, which meant that he now wanted to pursue the policy
which he had sharply opposed a few weeks before, when
Papen had suggested it.”
Is that right?
VON PAPEN: That is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you see—I want to get the
position quite clear. You told us that you had approached Hitler first in
August; before you approached Hitler you had already legalized the
position of the SA and the SS, which had been made illegal by
Chancellor Brüning. You did that on 14 June, did you not?
VON PAPEN: I had lifted the prohibition, yes, but only for 4 weeks.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it was a good thing
to lift the prohibition against the SA, the terror of the streets?
VON PAPEN: I stated expressly to the Court how the lifting of this
prohibition came about. The intention was to bring Hitler and his Party
to tolerate my Cabinet. The second reason was that the prohibition of
these formations was one-sided, if the socialist and communist fighting
formations were not also prohibited.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on 20 July you had forcefully
got rid of the Braun-Severing Government and got control of Prussia and
the Prussian police under your own hand?
VON PAPEN: It cannot be expressed in that way, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you had got rid of the
Braun-Severing Government and got power over Prussia and the
Prussian police under your own hands, had you not?
VON PAPEN: I did not have the Prussian police in my hands. The
Reich Commissioner for Prussia, whom I had appointed—a very
moderate man—now had charge of the Prussian police.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And under the Weimar
Constitution you, as Chancellor, had the right to dictate all lines of broad
policy, and the Commissioner for Prussia and every other minister had to
take his broad policy from you; was that not right?
VON PAPEN: After I had appointed a commissioner, I had the right
to determine the general lines of policy for Prussia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to look
at a speech of yours which you made at Essen in November 1933, where
you speak about this time.
It is Document Book 11, Page 54, and it is Page 47 of the German
document book.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, you see the introductory words:
“Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer
of the national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I
have tried to support with all my strength the work of the
National Socialist movement and its leader.”
Is that true?
VON PAPEN: Absolutely, yes, that refers to...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just asked you if it is true. I may
come back to it again.
“Just as I, when I took over the Chancellorship”—that refers to
you, your taking over the Chancellorship—“advocated paving
the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement.”
Was your work in paving the way to power for the young fighting
liberation movement to legalize the SA and to turn out the moderate
Government in Prussia and centralize the control of the police?
VON PAPEN: No, that would have been a very bad comparison.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause there and tell me if that
was not what you had done. Tell the Tribunal how you had paved the
way to power for the young fighting liberation movement, if it was not
by doing that.
VON PAPEN: Yes, I will say that very exactly. The program of the
National Socialist Party provided for the liberation of Germany from the
discrimination to which we were subjected by the Versailles Treaty. I
have spoken here in detail about this. I have explained what efforts I
made to obtain the co-operation of the big powers in this connection. We
wanted to become a big power again, after being a second-rate nation.
That was the meaning of it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I do not want to stop
you, and the Tribunal will give you every opportunity of repeating what
you said on that point, but I do want you to answer my question. If I am
wrong in what I have put to you as the two things you have done to pave
the way, just tell us quite shortly: What else had you done to pave the
way for this fighting liberation movement? That is the question. What
had you done?