Is India Retreating from its Act East to Act Indo-Pacific Policy?

Author(s): Nalanda Roy

Source: Indian Journal of Asian Affairs , June 2022, Vol. 35, No. 1 (June 2022), pp. 43-57
Published by: Manju Jain

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27146666

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 Is India Retreating from its Act East
to Act Indo-Pacific Policy?
Nalanda Roy*

Abstract
India’s Act East Policy (AEP) was adopted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at
the ASEAN-India Summit in Myanmar after his government came to power in
2014. The policy’s focus was on economic and security integration as well as on
maintaining friendly relations with Southeast and East Asian countries. In the Act
East context, India’s maritime reach started performing comparatively better
than its land outreach. Although the Modi government was successful in its
vision to strengthen regional institutional cooperation, capability, and
connectivity, many of the Act East projects have not either seen much progress
or have been hampered by delays, or many are still conceptual. However, the
AEP has created ideological precedence for Modi’s wider ambition to counter
China’s regional dominance. Scholars argue that the regional framework of the
Asia-Pacific is fast shifting to a larger geopolitical construct of the Indo-Pacific,
thereby posing serious challenges for the region. In 2018, Modi espoused a
“free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region,” and asked for
commitments based on shared values and principles. This paper will discuss
whether the ‘Act East’ trajectory is getting transformed into Act Indo-Pacific.

Keywords: Act East; India; Indian Ocean; Indo-Pacific; Indian Ocean Region
(IOR); Look East; Pacific Ocean

Introduction
India’s Act East Policy (AEP) was adopted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at
the ASEAN-India Summit in Myanmar after his government came to power in
2014. The AEP was described as marking ‘a strategic shift’ in the Indian foreign
policy and as an attempt to forge closer and deeper economic integration with
its eastern neighbours as part of the new Realpolitik evident in India’s foreign
policy. The focus of the AEP was on economic and security integration as well as
on strengthening relationships with Southeast Asian and East Asian countries. In
the Act East context, India’s maritime outreach started performing

* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Studies,

Georgia Southern University, Georgia, USA

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 IS INDIA RETREATING * INDIAN JOURNAL OF ASIAN AFFAIRS VOL. 35, JUNE 2022

comparatively better than its land reach. However, this paper argues that the
regional framework of the Act East is fast shifting to Asia Pacific and even to a
larger geopolitical construct of the Indo-Pacific, thereby posing serious
challenges for the region. In 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had espoused
a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region,” and asked for
commitments based on shared values and principles. Although the Modi
government was successful in its vision to strengthen regional institutional
cooperation, capability, and connectivity, many of the Act East projects have not
either seen much progress or have been hampered by delays, or many are still
conceptual.
Overtime, the AEP has created ideological precedence for Modi’s wider
ambition to counter China’s regional dominance and shift the gear towards Act
Indo-Pacific. The paper discusses whether the ‘Act East’ trajectory is getting
transformed into Act Indo-Pacific, and if so, how the Act Indo-Pacific Policy will
fit into India’s regional strategy. It also argues that India needs to secure a
stable maritime order and the rule of law at sea. India is even more dependent
and linked to the rest of the world, and it is time to rethink and reevaluate the
strategy and goals. Maritime diplomacy is an important part of it, and it should
not be overlooked especially when maritime security is fast becoming the
mantra of naval diplomacy and power projection in international politics. In fact,
naval diplomacy will become more important for managing both national and
international security than in the recent past.
Moving from Look East to Act East to Act Indo-Pacific Policy
After the 1991 economic crisis and the fall of the Soviet Union, Indian leaders
decided to reevaluate both their economic policy and foreign policy by
renewing their long-lost ties with Southeast Asian neighbours. It was primarily
an economic initiative that was clearly spelled out in the Singapore lecture of
Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao to mark a strategic shift in Indian foreign
policy and forge a deeper economic integration with its eastern neighbours as
part of the new Realpolitik.1 Thereby the Look East policy (LEP) came into
existence as a significant element of India’s foreign policy.2 The policy also
served as a counterweight to the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of
China in the region.3

The Look East policy became a multi-faceted and multi-pronged approach to

establish strategic links with as many individual countries as possible, evolve
closer political links with ASEAN, and develop strong economic bonds with the
region….It was an attempt to carve a place for India in the larger Asia
Pacific….The Look East policy was also meant to showcase India’s economic

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 potential for investments and trade….Last but not least, the feeling of getting
left out of the action in the Asia Pacific, whether it was the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) or the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (ASEAN-PMC)
with the Dialogue Partners of ASEAN, which had emerged as the only forum to
4
discuss regional issues, also weighed heavily in New Delhi’s thinking.

After coming to power, the Modi government announced that the ‘Look
East’ policy should be revamped into an action-oriented ‘Act East’ trajectory. In
2014, it embraced the AEP at the ASEAN-India Summit in Myanmar. Prime
Minister Modi also announced his intention to turn India into a manufacturing
hub, calling on foreign investors and launching the “Make in India” campaign. 5
The Act East initiative involved and continuous engagement with Southeast
Asian countries and the Asia Pacific region at different levels in the field
of connectivity, trade, culture, defence, and people-to-people-contact at
bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. It also involved the economic
development of the North Eastern Region (NER), which is regarded as the
gateway to Southeast Asia.
It was quite evident that the Act East trajectory would be the launchpad
for India in the Asia Pacific market and beyond. However, the AEP generated a
lot of confusion because it was never announced as an official policy. Besides,
the AEP generated several such questions as how it was different from a “free,
open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region,” or whether it would be
beneficial for India. However, it was quite obvious that India would have to be
proactive to secure the Indian Ocean region for both security reasons as well as
for competition for resources and institutional leadership. Besides, India will
have to deepen its strategic partnerships with other countries far and beyond to
manage China’s rise. China is not only willing to undertake a confrontational
approach to defend its national interests but is also considered to play Wolf-
warrior diplomatic tactics with the transition from being a “conservative and
passive to an assertive and high-profile”6 diplomatic approach. Therefore, India
will have to reevaluate its policy to reengage with other countries, especially the
United States, Japan, Australia, and Russia.
Due to the growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the
Indian Ocean, a pro-India sentiment is already visible in the region with many
ASEAN countries wanting India to balance the rise of the dragon. India has
deepened its relationship with its neighbours significantly in recent years, and
also felt the urgency to maintain the freedom of navigation and play a proactive
role in the Indian Ocean region. Accordingly, India has been engaged with the
Indo-Pacific informal grouping known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or
Quad. As mentioned above, the idea is to maintain a “free and open Indo-

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 IS INDIA RETREATING * INDIAN JOURNAL OF ASIAN AFFAIRS VOL. 35, JUNE 2022

Pacific;”7 however, the unstated objective is to build a common approach to

counter China’s growing power. It is quite obvious to reiterate the question
whether “China is the real sick man of Asia” as interpreted in The Wall Street
Journal, and discuss what would be the impact of such developments on
“China’s political stability; on its attitude toward the rest of the world, and to
[sic] the global balance of power.”8
In 2017, the National Security Strategy (NSS) defined “Indo-Pacific” as
“the region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores
of the United States.”9 Countries like the United States, Australia, Japan, India,
France, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, and ASEAN have already adopted the
“Indo-Pacific” strategy (combination of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean)
to build regional cooperation and engagement. However, it needs to be kept in
mind that values and policies might vary based on the geographical definition
of the term. For example, the United States changed its geographical definition
after President Trump officially announced a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy” (FOIP) as its new regional policy.
The Obama administration used the term “Asia-Pacific” while President
Donald Trump started using the term “Indo-Pacific” to expatiate the idea of
greater Indian influence in the region. Although the Quad was revived in 2017
by the United States under President Donald Trump, it was when Joe Biden took
over as president in January 2021, he pledged to repair America’s rough
relationships with its Asia-Pacific counterparts. Thus, Biden organized the first-
ever gathering of the Quad leaders in a virtual conference. The Quad members
were not only skeptical about China’s intentions but also concerned with
Trump’s “America First” policy and his decision to withdraw from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. Quad countries are already
performing bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral exercises with one another to
build integrated capabilities. Examples include the India-Australia biennial
AUSINDEX naval exercise, the Japan-India JIMEX exercise in the North Arabian
Sea, and the large multilateral biennial Rim of the Pacific maritime warfare
exercise.10 Gradually, the Indian government started taking steps toward
engagement with the Quad; however, there is a lot of confusion regarding the
purpose of the Quad and how it is going to help India in the long run. Another
important question is whether the Quad will fit into India’s regional strategy
and at the same time work towards maintaining the balance of power in the
Asia Pacific.
Notably, India is making major defence purchases from the United States
and extending strategic partnerships with the United States and Japan. For

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example, India has concluded a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
(BECA) to deepen military-to-military ties with Quad, purchased heavy-lift
aircraft and anti-submarine warfare platforms, and increased information and
intelligence sharing with the United States that has supplied India with “critical
military equipment and gear [and leased it] two MQ-9 armed predators”, apart
from delivering cold weather gear to support the Indian military’s deployment
along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).11 Lisa Curtis, Director of the Indo-Pacific
Security Programme at the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), added,
“it is in the US interest for India to remain the dominant power in the Indian
Ocean region and to continue to make progress with its military
modernization.”12 Likewise, Prime Minister Modi stated, “our vision for Indian
Ocean Region is rooted in advancing cooperation in our region; and, to use our
capabilities for the benefit of all in our common maritime home.” 13 He added,

We will do everything to safeguard our mainland and islands and defend our
interests. Equally, we will work to ensure a safe, secure, and stable Indian
Ocean Region that delivers us all to the shores of prosperity. And, our
capabilities will be there for those struck by the ocean’s fury. Or, caught in
distress on the seas. We will deepen our economic and security cooperation
with our friends in the region especially our maritime neighbours and island
states. We will also continue to build their maritime security capacities and
their economic strength. Collective action and cooperation will best advance
peace and security in our maritime region. It will also prepare us better to
14
respond to emergencies.

Modi’s Sagar Initiative

With globalization, the Indian Ocean is rapidly becoming the world’s busiest and
significant waterway. It is becoming obvious that the two Asian giants, China
and India, will contest to gain ownership and control in the Indian Ocean,
unveiling geopolitical trauma between themselves and their neighbours. The
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is fast becoming a hotspot following the conflicting
claims of ownership in the region. This region is highly contested for resources,
as well as for economic, energy, strategic and political reasons. The role of the
Indian Ocean in the global economy is hard to overestimate: Three-quarters of
the worldwide maritime trade and half of the world’s oil supplies pass through
its waters. Chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait in the east and the Hormuz
and the Bab el Mandeb straits in the west make much of that shipping exposed
in the case of a military conflict.
What makes the region significant? The Indian Ocean holds roughly 17%
of the world’s proven oil reserves and 28% of gas reserves. The Indian Ocean

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 IS INDIA RETREATING * INDIAN JOURNAL OF ASIAN AFFAIRS VOL. 35, JUNE 2022

economies account for 35.5% of global iron production and 18% of world gold
production. Besides, the region was responsible for 28% of the global fish
capture in 2016.15 For example, Indonesia and India accounted for around 4.5%
of global frozen fish exports in 2017. Such abundance of rich and natural
resources has facilitated trade-led growth within this region, and also created a
successful basis for export industries in a number of countries. The ocean is not
only rich in flora, fauna, fishing, minerals, and seabed mining, but is important
for the movement of goods, connectivity, and trade routes between the North
Atlantic and Asia Pacific. It is home to major sea routes connecting the Middle
East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas. These vital sea routes
facilitate maritime trade in the Indian Ocean region; carry more than half of the
world’s sea-borne oil; and host 23 of the world’s top 100 container ports.
According to the 2017 Lloyd’s List, the top Indian Ocean container ports are
Singapore, Dubai, and Port Klang in Malaysia.
Further, the Indian Ocean has played a significant role in influencing the
socio-economic and political developments of the littoral countries as well as in
the strategies of the leading powers since ancient times. It is often known as the
monsoon market, and it is the third largest body of water in the world that
contains vital sea lanes of communication. Despite its cyclones and storms, the
ocean remains in the opinion of the sailors the mildest of all oceans, and it
offers a suitable navigational environment throughout the year.
The Indian Ocean has crucial geoeconomic and geostrategic importance
for India for high energy imports and geostrategic security. India’s geographic
location at the centre of the Indian Ocean has a strategic significance and
provides distinct advantages to many chokepoints that lie almost equidistant
from the country. Although the Indian Ocean is named after India, it is
presumptuous to assume that the ocean belongs to India. The security dilemma
between China and India in the IOR is a serious matter of concern. India is
highly dependent on energy imports and has progressively sought to secure
shipping lanes for the transportation of oil from Iran, Myanmar, and Sudan. Any
disruptions in the Indian Ocean can lead to serious consequences for the Indian
economy.16
India plays an important role in the current geopolitical situation due to
its long stretch of coastline along the ocean. Hence, the security of its coastline
and its islands are important in maritime governance. Besides, India has rugged
terrain and high mountain ranges in the north, and hence, it is imperative for it
to strengthen its connectivity and trade links via the IOR. Such reasons serve as
the stage for competition among the IOR countries. Notably, in 2015, at a

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keynote address to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Prime Minister
Modi announced the “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (SAGAR)
initiative. It may be noted that the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is an
international body comprising the coastal countries that border the Indian
Ocean. At the meeting, Modi stated “our vision for the Indian Ocean Region is
rooted in advancing cooperation in our region and to use our capabilities for
the benefit of all in our common maritime home.” He talked about the vast
opportunities and the great diversity the Indian Ocean region holds. It was
obvious as India is becoming more integrated globally, it will be more
dependent on the ocean and the surrounding regions than before. Hence, Modi
mentioned that the “goal is to build a climate of trust and transparency, respect
for international maritime rules, and peaceful resolution of maritime issues.” 17
The policy is important because India is able to leverage the Blue economy
through this initiative, set up an integrated approach to face socio-economic
and environmental challenges, and counter China’s One Belt One Road strategy.
On October 26, 2015, the Indian Navy released its latest maritime
strategy “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy,” 18 which
highlights both India’s contemporary maritime security considerations and
India’s resurgence in the 21st century. This edition is a revised and updated
version of the previous strategy “Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime
Military Strategy,” published in 2007.19 The 2015 maritime security strategy
addresses the evolving security dynamics in the region and also reflects a bold
and renewed outlook on India’s maritime security needs.
India is intensifying joint naval manoeuvres with the US and its allies
while building new ships and setting up a network of coastal surveillance
outposts that would allow New Delhi to keep an eye on the Indian Ocean’s
maritime traffic. The country’s leaders began paying more attention to the
Indian Ocean over the past decade as its foreign trade grew and as China
started making inroads into smaller South Asian nations that New Delhi used to
consider within its sphere of influence. Modi also observed,

The vast Indian Ocean Region hosts over 40 states and nearly 40 percent of
the world’s population. It touches Australia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West
Asia, and the eastern seaboard of Africa. This Ocean bears two-thirds of the
world`s oil shipments, one-third of its bulk cargo; and half of its container
traffic. Over three-fourths of its traffic goes to other regions of the world.
Today, the world speaks of the 21st century driven by the dynamism and the
energy of Asia and the Pacific. But, its course will be determined by the tides
of the Indian Ocean. This is why the Indian Ocean is at the center of global
attention more than ever before. Today, 90 percent of our trade by volume

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and 90 percent of our oil imports take place through the sea. We have a
coastline of 7500 km, 1200 islands, and 2.4 million square kilometers of
Exclusive Economic Zone. India is at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean. We
seek a future for the Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR –
20
Security and Growth for All in the Region.

India’s Connectivity across the Indo-Pacific

India has conceived the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI) as a way to develop
a mechanism to cooperate with like-minded countries to pursue a ‘free, open,
inclusive and rules-based’ Indo-Pacific. IPOI is built on the pillars of India’s
‘Act East’ policy (focusing on the Eastern Indian Ocean and the Western
Pacific) and ‘Act West’ (focusing on the Western Indian Ocean). IPOI draws on
existing regional architecture and mechanisms to focus on seven pillars:
maritime security, maritime resources, maritime ecology, capacity building and
resource sharing, disaster risk reduction and management, science, technology
and academic cooperation, and trade connectivity and maritime transport.
However, India’s decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (RCEP) has disappointed some of its Asian neighbours.
The RCEP is a trade deal that was being negotiated between 16 countries.
They include the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members
(Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the six countries with which they have
free trade agreements (FTAs) — India, Australia, China, South Korea, Japan, and
New Zealand.21 The most important issue that has prevented India from getting
on board is “inadequate protection against surges in imports.” 22 India is fearful
that the RCEP agreement will flood the Indian market with cheaper products
from China. RCEP was pushed and initiated by China, and India is unlikely to go
in that direction due to her current bittersweet relations with China, and do
everything in its power to undermine the impact of a “Chinese century.” 23 The
rise of China has not only generated anxiety for India but has also opened up
new opportunities for India. Given that India has already decided to walk out of
the RCEP, the question remains whether this is going to be a problem with
Modi’s Act East Policy, which aims to open up free trade agreements with the
Southeast Asian countries.
India needs to understand AEP’s importance when it comes to the
landlocked North-East Region (NER). This region is connected with the mainland
India by a 22-km-long corridor, known as the ‘Siliguri corridor’ or the ‘chicken’s
neck.’ Due to its physical connectivity with South and Southeast Asia, North East
states like Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Tripura,
Sikkim and Nagaland expect to reap higher benefits from the AEP. However,

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such a level of cooperation to speed up regional connectivity is yet to be
achieved. Interestingly, the Modi government had come up with the dual model,
which will ‘Link West with Look East policy,’ and further enhance India’s
connectivity across the Indo-Pacific. Besides, these states cannot be easily
accessed from the mainland without the cooperation of India’s neighbouring
countries like Bangladesh, and hence, building a positive relationship with
neighbours is also an important agenda for the Modi government.
Likewise, India adopted a ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy to enhance
regional cooperation with eastern neighbours. Such policies are a priority
because if India is unable to resolve its differences with neighbours, then it
would set up an opportunity for China to run the geopolitical and strategic
show in South Asia and beyond. However, with the fall of Panjshir, and the
takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, India will continue to face
unprecedented strategic challenges in South Asia. Meanwhile, such the Taliban
is seeking to gain international relevance as a legitimate political entity. In
February 2021, Sirajuddin Haqqani, a deputy leader of the Taliban mentioned
that the Taliban would like to maintain friendly relations with all countries;
however, India is worried due to the anti-India stance of the Haqqani Network
that has affiliations to Pakistan.24
It is pertinent to mention that in 2019, China accounted for around
$266.4 billion in defence spending, and India is ready to respond to the
situation and the rise of China both along its land border as well as in the
immediate neighbourhood. Recent military standoffs like Doklam in 2017,
Chumar in 2014, and Depsang plains in 2013 as well as the Pangong Tso and
Galwan river valley incident created a hotspot in the Sino-Indian relationships.
Besides, the Chinese blocked Indian movements along the border at the
northern bank of the Pangong Tso lake, Hot Springs/Gogra, and Charding
Nala area of Demchok. After the Galwan Valley incident, India decided to put
a ban on Chinese mobile applications and restrictions on Chinese FDI. New
Delhi is also concerned due to its differences with China in the backyard since
the Indian Ocean region is fast becoming a serious issue. It merits a question
whether powerful nationalism is driving China to dominate the region. If the
answer is yes (impliedly, the force of nationalism offsets peace conditions), then
it is imperative for India to forge strong partnerships, whether economic,
security, political, or strategic, with South, Southeast Asian as well as Indo-
Pacific countries. Such moves will not only help India to end economic isolation
in the north and northeast but would also strengthen its Act East trajectory far
and beyond. After all, the Indian government advocates rules-based order in the

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 IS INDIA RETREATING * INDIAN JOURNAL OF ASIAN AFFAIRS VOL. 35, JUNE 2022

Indo-Pacific and seeks to gradually transform the AEP into Act Indo-Pacific
based on shared values and principles.
For example, the Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership
(AIIPOIP) is aimed to help shape maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to
support an open, inclusive, resilient, prosperous, and rules-based maritime
order. This is the first phase of the four-year (2020-2024) grant program under
this Partnership. The AIIPOIP initiative took place under the Australia-India Joint
Declaration on the Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
announced in 2020. Both the countries are working together bilaterally,
regionally, and multilaterally to support shared values and interests. 25 For
example, the India-ASEAN Plan of Action (2021-2025) will help the two sides to
work towards the ASEAN 2025 vision for an economically integrated and rules-
based grouping. Under the new plan of action, the idea is to strengthen the East
Asia Summit “as a premier leaders-led forum for dialogue and cooperation on
broad strategic, political and economic issues...with the aim of promoting peace,
stability, and economic prosperity in the region.” India-ASEAN will also promote
maritime security and safety, freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, the
non-use of force, and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, in
accordance with international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).26
Conclusion
The Indo-Pacific might be the new strategic reality of the twenty-first century.
Japan was the first country to use the concept of a “free and open Indo-
Pacific” across the world. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that Japan is working
towards the creation and development of new connectivity corridors. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi espoused the same vision for the region. It is
important for India to remain optimistic. India’s geographic and geopolitical
position in the Indo-Pacific region is considered essential to counterbalance
China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean region.
The rise of China across the Indian and Pacific Oceans has triggered
several challenges in the maritime domain. As Mahan says, “whoever controls
the ocean controls the world.” The Indo-Pacific space is creating bigger
geopolitical competition as well as new and emerging power dynamics in the
region. Although India plans to play a stronger role in the Indo-Pacific region to
fulfil its great power ambitions, it is important to understand that India’s
priorities will be largely motivated by its relationship with island nations like the
Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and even Seychelles. This region is considered
crucial by countries such as Australia, France, Japan, and the United States for

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their geoeconomic and geostrategic interests. India’s diplomatic footprint on its
Indo-Pacific policy will bring both geopolitical threats and strategic dilemmas
on the one hand and emerging opportunities on the other.
India should consider promoting a strong and vibrant economic
development in order to succeed with the Act ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy. However,
such initiatives will not be successful without engaging with ASEAN and East
Asian countries. India has performed quite well since the COVID-19 began by
providing immediate medical help to Italy and Iran, among others, as well as to
its immediate neighbours such as the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles.
Along with the Indian Army, the Indian Air Force launched Operation Sanjeevani
to deliver medicines and hospital consumables to the Maldives, and
INS Khatri deployed under Mission Sagar delivered medical teams and food
supplies to the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros, and Seychelles. 27 In
fact, the pandemic has provided bigger opportunities to allow major players to
tackle both pressing traditional and nontraditional challenges. 28
New Delhi has established a South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) Emergency Response Fund for COVID-19. India has also
hosted several virtual summits to fight the pandemic such as the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) web conference in 2020 and the
Extraordinary Virtual G20 Leaders’ Summit 2020. India is fast becoming the
destination for investment: in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, several
countries seek to shift production out of China and move to India due to its
large market and cheap labour. It seems like COVID-19 has amplified the Quad
framework. The United Nations predicted that China will overtake the US in
2028 despite its projected growth slowdown, while India will become the
second largest economy in the world by 2050 in PPP terms. China would be the
world’s largest economy (in PPP terms), India the second, and the US the third.
In fact, such transformation will open up a new window of opportunity for
India.29 Besides, India is a member of the seven largest emerging market
economies collectively referred to as the E7 (China, India, Brazil, Russia,
Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey), which is likely to overtake the G7 bloc by 2050,
presenting a major challenge to the West.
While there is yet to be a consensus on what constitutes the “Indo-
Pacific,” it is widely viewed as the region that covers Asia Pacific and India. The
Indo-Pacific comprises both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and is
essentially more of an ideological construct for a regional strategic framework.
It is worth pondering whether the primary focus of the Indo-Pacific is based on
oceans. If so, it is obvious that India occupies an important strategic position

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 IS INDIA RETREATING * INDIAN JOURNAL OF ASIAN AFFAIRS VOL. 35, JUNE 2022

in the IOR. Hence, maritime connectivity between India and its

neighbours/partners is important for Indo-Pacific connectivity. Prime Minister
Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy is a counterbalance with regard to the expansion of
the Chinese influence in Eurasia and Africa under President Xi Jinping’s
massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, China is the proverbial elephant
in the room. Since China has more economic presence, it is believed that Indo-
Pacific is a reflection of the rising of both China and India. It is also a reflection
of interactions and connectivity between Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. To
maintain the Indo-Pacific order, regional economic cooperation and
integration should be promoted and common challenges should be
addressed. Countries should settle their differences peacefully and also
manage their disputes in a wise manner focusing on a free, open, and
sustainable Indo-Pacific for all.
Several Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam
are playing an active role in maintaining the balance of power in the Indo-
Pacific. For example, in 2019, the USS guided-missile destroyer William P.
Lawrence joined the Indian Navy destroyer INS Kolkata and tanker INS Shakti,
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter carrier JS Izumo and destroyer JS
Murasame, and the Philippine navy patrol ship BRP Andres Bonifacio in
international waters. This indicates that besides the Quad members, other
countries are also interested in countering the rise of China in the region and
beyond. Another example is the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Agreement (LEMOA) and Communications Compatibility and Security
Agreement (COMCASA) implemented by the Indian navy in the Western
Pacific.30
To conclude, the focus should not be on managing the rise of China,
rather on encouraging greater transparency as well as meaningful cooperation
and engagement to maintain balance, peace, and order in international
relations. Besides, India needs to be attentive to enhancing regional trade,
prioritizing naval capacity, seeking foreign investments, focusing on cultural
exchanges and sustainable developments, as well as facilitating international
connectivity projects. We need to ask the question whether the Indo-Pacific
strategy is going to succeed without India. The answer might be ‘no.’ India’s
economic growth and development will not only contribute to a prosperous and
open Indo-Pacific but also counter Chinese aggression in the region and
beyond. In fact, “the India Way, especially now, would be more of a shaper or
decider rather than just be an abstainer.”31 India needs to respond to fractious
and fragile situations on its own whether it is an assertive China in Asia or

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Pakistan along its border. Every country has its own stakes when it comes to
managing foreign policy across the world. For example, the 2017 Doklam crisis
should already be an eye-opener for India, and India should maintain that
balance moving forward.
Is creating an alliance the right way to move forward? The answer might
be complicated. It looks like it will be wise if, under any situation, India does not
get entangled in matters other than its own. Rather, India should focus on
pursuing its own national interest, and strategically adjust to the fast-changing
balance of power situation in the region and beyond. The reality is that the
more India rises, the bigger opposition it will encounter both in the form of
cooperation and competition from China. Hence, India will have to work with
other powers to protect its interests not only in the neighbourhood but also
across Asia and beyond. Only time will tell whether the commitment of the
current Indian government and its ‘Act- Indo-Pacific’ verbatim was able to make
progress to a certain extent or if it was simply re-baptized to demonstrate a
glimpse of the past hangover.

Endnotes

1
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Opportunities Under UPA Rule,” Asian Affairs 48, no. 3 (2020): 642-655.
2
Roy, “Evaluating India’s Look-East Policy.”
3
Roy, “Evaluating India’s Look-East Policy.”
4
G.V.C. Naidu, “India and Southeast Asia,” International Studies 47, no. 2-4
(2010): 285-30.
5
Roy, “Evaluating India’s Look-East Policy.”
6
Zhiqun Zhu, “Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy’: What explains the
sharper tone to China’s overseas conduct recently,” The Diplomat, 2020.
7
Iain Marlow, “What Is the ‘Quad’ and Should China Fear It?” March 26, 2021,
Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-26/what-is-the-quad-and-
should-china-fear-it-quicktake.
8
Walter Russell Mead, “China is the Real Sick Man of Asia,” The Wall Street
Journal, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-the-real-sick-man-of-asia-
11580773677.
9
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

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 IS INDIA RETREATING * INDIAN JOURNAL OF ASIAN AFFAIRS VOL. 35, JUNE 2022

10
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Australia,” INFOCUS, November 2, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov.
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defence-partners.
12
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pms-remarks-on-the-commissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda-2954.
14
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Region,” Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation, 2015.
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growth-for-all-in-the-region/
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2017,https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-
topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints,
16
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Future?,” Asian Affairs (2019). DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2019.1614767
17
Modi, “Text of the PM’s Remarks.”
18
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India,” Strategic Analysis. 43, no. 4 (2019): 335–341.
19
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(February 1-15, 2016), http://www.spsmai.com/military/?id=3825&q=Ensuring-
Secure-Seas:-Indian-.
20
Modi,“Text of the PM’s Remarks.”
21
Prabha Raghavan, “Explained: Why India has Said no to Regional Trade Pact
RCEP,” The Indian Express, November 2019. Accessed June 27, 2021.
22
Raghavan, “Explained: Why India.”
23
C. Raja Mohan, “China’s Hegemonic Ambitions Mean that Beijing’s Focus is
now on Building Chinese Century,” Indian Express, July 7, 2020,
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/china-nationalism-xi-
jinping-beijing-foreign-policy-india-china-lac-row-c-raja-mohan-6493168/.
24
Aishwaria Sonavane, “Decoding India’s Taliban Outreach: Reports that India is
engaged in Talks with the Taliban Indicate New Delhi’s Growing Security
Concerns About Afghanistan,” The Diplomat, July 7, 2021,
https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/decoding-indias-taliban-outreach/.

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25
Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership: Grant Round 1,
Australian High Commission, New Delhi. Retrieved September, 2021,
https://india.highcommission.gov.au/ndli/AIIPOIPGR1.html
26
Sparshita Saxena, “’Greater Cooperation’: India, ASEAN Adopt Plan of Action
for 2021-25,” Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 2020.
27
Amrita Jash, “The Quad Factor in the Indo-Pacific and the Role of India,”
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 4, no. 2 (2021): 78-85.
28
Manoj Joshi, “Eastern Ladakh” The Longer Perspective,” Occasional Papers,
June 2021, Observer Research Foundation.
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29
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february-2015.
30
Caitlin Doornobos, “US Joins India, Japan and Philippines for South China Sea
Sail,” Starts & Stripes.com, May 2019,
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philippines-for-south-china-sea-sail-1.580241.
31
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an Abstainer: S. Jaishankar,” Observer Research Foundation, January 16, 2020,
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of-a-shaper-rather-than-an-abstainer-s-jaishankar/

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