Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp.

607–629, 2011
0160-7383/$ - see front matter  2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Printed in Great Britain
www.elsevier.com/locate/atoures
doi:10.1016/j.annals.2010.11.015

COOPERATION AMONG PROMINENT

ACTORS IN A TOURIST DESTINATION
Pietro Beritelli
University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

Abstract: Cooperative behavior in tourism destination communities is a condition for sus-

tainable planning and development. However, evidence is lacking on how actors choose to
cooperate. Previous research in institutions, organizations, and communities show that for-
mal, contract-based as well as informal, relation-based cooperation occur jointly or in substi-
tution, depending on the context and the subject of research. However, neither the
approaches nor their underlying dimensions have been tested for the reality of tourist desti-
nation communities. For a European Alpine tourism destination the results show that only
relation-based items, in combination with communication variables, strongly positively influ-
ence cooperative behavior. The paper suggests a series of implications for tourism destination
planning and concludes with indications for further research. Keywords: contract-based
cooperation, relation-based cooperation, social network analysis, tourism destina-
tion.  2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION
Cooperation plays a central role for tourism destination communi-
ties. Cooperation is a central requirement for sustainable planning
and development of destinations (Bramwell & Lane, 2000), for the
advancement and realization of projects (Vernon, Essex, Pinder, &
Curry, 2005), and for the establishment and operation of destination
governance structures (Yüksel, Bramwell, & Yüksel, 2005). In this con-
text, the communities comprise a variety of stakeholder groups that
interweave across networks of actors of private and public institutions
(Dredge, 2006), and must find at least partial consensus (Bramwell &
Sharman, 1999). The literature on cooperative action among stake-
holders in tourism communities describes conceptualizations (Selin,
1993), then provides first empirical evidence (Selin & Chavez, 1995),
and finally improves the notions from different perspectives and
institutional angles, mainly with the help of case studies (Aas,
Ladkin, & Fletcher, 2005; Getz, Anderson, & Sheehan, 1998; Presenza,
Sheehan, & Ritchie, 2005; Sheehan & Ritchie, 2005).

Pietro Beritelli is Assistant Professor at the University of St. Gallen and Deputy Director at
the Institute for Public Services and Tourism (Dufourstrasse 40a, 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland.
Email:< pietro.beritelli@unisg.ch>), where he studies Business Administration.

607
608 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

Thus far, most of the research on cooperation and cooperative

behavior, in tourism destinations as well as in other industries, analyzes
the institutional level and centers on the firms and stakeholder groups
as the object of research. This paper is novel in two respects. First, the
paper extends research on this topic to the level of the individual. The
study in this report analyzes a network of 42 prominent actors with re-
spect to their formal connections, their relational preferences, their
communicative and their cooperative behavior, revealing the underly-
ing dimension of institutional cooperation. Second, the research
empirically applies social network analysis to the prominent actors’ net-
work. With the help of network data the study tests the relevance of two
cooperation approaches which are often used as either complementary
or substitutive, namely the formal, contract-based and the informal,
relation-based approach. The paper investigates the importance of
interpersonal versus professional connections and identifies the role
of communication in the initiation and realization of cooperative ac-
tion. The results show that cooperative behavior in tourism destination
transpires via interpersonal preferences, which likely override institu-
tional agreements. Embedding an actor’s behavior in the destination
community context and therefore taking account of the multiple rela-
tions that affect him and the various cooperation processes he’s in-
volved in, extends the current research on organizational and
institutional cooperation to the individual level with respect to both
professional and personal conditions.

LITERATURE REVIEW
For a purposeful approach, this section first explains the need for
cooperation and highlights the peculiarities of cooperative behavior
in tourism destinations with the help of selected literature. While coop-
eration research in tourism destinations offers numerous contribu-
tions, theoretical foundations are meager. Therefore, in the second
section the prevalent theories which explain cooperative behavior pro-
vide a differentiated picture of the phenomenon. In the third section,
the constructs and items derived from the theories set the basis for the
empirical research presented in the subsequent section. Figure 1 ex-
plains the logic of the three parts of literature research by emphasizing
the main purposes and pointing out that cooperative behavior takes
place in three different contexts (regions and communities, organiza-
tions/firms, institutions/administrative and governing bodies) and at
three different levels (individual, groups, organizations).

Cooperation in Tourism Destinations

In communities, three phenomena constrain cooperative behavior
among stakeholders and their institutions (Ostrom, 1991). The first
one is the tragedy of the commons, with no incentive for institutions
to avoid the overexploitation of common resources (e.g. natural
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 609

…deriving the
distinguishing the
constructs and items
theories underlying
for the empirical
cooperation and…
research

2.2. Theories explaining 2.3. Determinants and

identifying the need cooperation constructs of
and the peculiarities cooperative
of cooperation in behavior
tourist destinations

objects of research
• regions and communities
• organizations/ firms
2.1. Cooperative behavior • institutions/ administrative and governing bodies
in tourist destinations
level of research
• individual
• groups
• organizational

Figure 1. Connection Between the Three Parts of Literature Research

landscape, cultural assets) (Hardin, 1968), and therefore the lack of

pricing of public goods due to missing property rights. The second
one is the prisoner’s dilemma, which induces the actors, under the
conditions of limited information and non-repeated rounds, not to
cooperate even though they would be better off if they cooperated
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). The third one is the challenge of collec-
tive action, whereby collective failure and the individual’s inability to
acknowledge the importance of collective goods increases with the size
of the groups, their homogeneity, and the lack of institutional
structures that promote collective action (Olson, 1965). Hence, coop-
eration among stakeholders in tourism destination communities is
necessary but per se neither obviously occurs nor is formally estab-
lished (e.g. through public authorities).
Cooperative behavior is multilayered and fluid when firms and insti-
tutions act with public goods and within the public space. In fact,
shared beliefs and preferences, stable membership, and continued
and direct relationships are typical characteristics for local and regio-
nal communities (Singleton & Taylor, 1992). Nee describes this in
the following way:
Formal rules are produced and enforced by organizations such as the
state and firms to solve problems of collective action through third-
party sanctions, while informal norms arise out of networks and are
reinforced by means of ongoing social relationships, to the extent that
members of networks have interests and preferences independent of
610 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

what rulers and entrepreneurs want. The respective contents of

informal norms and formal organizational rules are likely to reflect
opposing aims and values (Nee, 1998, 86–87).
Consequently, in light of community-based tourism planning, cooper-
ation ‘‘is a process of joint decision making among autonomous, key
stakeholders of an inter-organizational, community tourism domain’’
(Jamal & Getz, 1995).
Empirical research on cooperation among stakeholders in tourism
destinations is rather recent and presents a wide range of issues and
challenges. A substantial body of literature deals with community plan-
ning and the role of local institutions and local residents (Getz &
Jamal, 1994; Gill & Williams, 1994; Ritchie, 1999; Robson & Robson,
1996). Although community planning approaches are criticized
(Taylor, 1995), they are an expression of what happens in everyday life
in tourist communities: people meet in their professional environment
or privately; talk about issues and about other people; form a view
on something; have disputes or form friendships; and make decisions
at a personal and institutional level. While earlier contributions in this
field focused on the community as a social system consisting of local
residents, recent empirical research discusses community planning
with a more strict classification of stakeholder groups, of which the
local residents are at most one (Byrd, 2007; Huybers & Bennett,
2003; Reed, 1997; Ryan, 2002; Timothy, 1998; Wang & Fesenmaier,
2007).
While stakeholder theory addresses morals and values in managing
an organization (Freeman & McVea, 1984), it does not help under-
stand why individuals, stakeholder groups and organizations cooperate
or not. In fact, gathering stakeholders at a round table is no guarantee
for initiating collective action, launching joint projects or sealing alli-
ances. The mechanisms and conditions for cooperation are specified
in a number of different theories.

Theories Explaining Cooperation

Cooperation studies at different levels (i.e. between institutions/
administrations, between firms/organizations, and in communities)
distinguish six major theories/approaches: (1) game theory, (2)
rational choice theory, (3) institutional analysis, (4) resource depen-
dence theory, (5) transaction cost economics, and (6) social exchange
theory. While they could all be used as a single research approach,
today they complement one another and contribute jointly to the
understanding of the complex phenomenon of cooperation.
Perhaps the first most specific theory laying the fundaments of coop-
erative behavior is game theory, whereby a set of players carries out a
set of moves and attains payoffs for each combination of moves (i.e.
strategies). Cooperative games have been described early in the devel-
opment of game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Not
surprisingly, game theory was the first approach to help forge a theory
of cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Even until recently, some
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 611

empirical research on cooperative behavior rests on pure game

theoretical assumptions, between institutions (Dinar & Wolf, 1994),
between organizations (Heide & Miner, 1992; Holländer, 1990),
and between individuals in communities (Bardhan, 1993; Carpenter,
Daniere, & Takahashi, 2004).
Compared to the other approaches, game theory could be seen as
the stem out of which the younger branches have evolved. The first
main branch, tightly linked to game theory, is rational choice theory.
It assumes that the behavior of individuals maximizes personal advan-
tage (Arrow & Hahn, 1971). Rational choice theory has become popu-
lar to explain cooperative behavior in studies of interest groups,
coalitions and bureaucracy (Dinar & Wolf, 1994; Dunleavy, 1991;
Gately, 1974; Lang, 2002).
However, individuals act as members of organizations as well; and
organizations originate and affect cooperative behavior with given
rules and norms. Hence, institutional analysis helps understand the
structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperative behavior
(North, 1971). Like rational choice, institutional analysis is predomi-
nantly used for cooperation studies between administrative bodies
and international institutions (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Martin &
Simmons, 2005), as it offers direct access to questions regarding the
development of strategies at an institutional level.
Additionally, in order to specify imbalances in cooperation, resource
dependence theory implies that organizations have different resources
which are a basis of power. Hence, organizations are dependent on
each other because of different endowments due to their differing
environments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Contributions on coopera-
tion referring to resource dependence theory are found not only at
the institutional/national level (Christiansen, 2001; Remmer, 1998)
but also at the organizational (Lee, Chen, & Kao, 2003; Lusch &
Brown, 1996) and at the tourism community level (Jamal & Getz,
1995; Timothy, 1998).
Following the thread of rationality laid by game theory, we come to
transaction cost economics. In contrast to rational choice, which ex-
plains the maximization of advantages or profit, transaction cost eco-
nomics assumes that individuals and organizations minimize all the
costs incurred in economic exchanges (including cooperation pro-
cesses). Transaction costs are determined by their frequency, specific-
ity, and uncertainty as well as by the limited rationality and the
opportunistic behavior of the involved actors and organizations
(Williamson, 1979). In cooperation studies, transaction cost economics
is valuable particularly at the organizational level (Fritsch & Lukas,
1999; Gulati, 1995; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Luo, 2002; Morgan & Hunt,
1994; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998).
However, all the above mentioned studies have combined transac-
tion cost economics with the sixth major theory: social exchange
theory. Related to rational choice theory, social exchange theory
emphasizes social traits of cooperative games like anticipated
reciprocity, expected gain in reputation and influence, altruism and
612 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

perception of efficacy as well as direct reward (Blau & Alba, 1982; Ekeh,
1974; Emerson, 1962; Homans, 1962). Empirical research on coopera-
tive behavior based purely on social exchange theory could be found in
the field of inter-organizational cooperation (Mavondo & Rodrigo,
2001; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Rodrı́guez & Wilson, 2002) and in tour-
ism networks and communities (Aas et al., 2005; Pesämaa & Hair Jr.,
2007, 2008).
Beside these six major theories/approaches, there are single contri-
butions that highlight specific facets of cooperative behavior. For
example, cooperation research may focus on contractual dimensions
and hence ground itself in contract theory and negotiation theory
(Ness & Haugland, 2005) or may look at cultural differences by con-
fronting individualism with collectivism (Chen, Chen, & Meindl,
1998). Other research stems from organizational theories, such as
organizational learning (Doz, 1996), the resource-based view (Denicolai,
Cioccarelli, & Zucchella, 2009), communicative rationality (Innes, 1996),
or a purely structuralist perception (Williams, 2005).
To summarize, cooperative behavior is worthwhile if there is a payoff
based on a strategy (game theory) that maximizes advantages (rational
choice theory). Actors must take into account that cooperative games
take place in an institutional context with different norms and rules
(institutional analysis) and different resource endowments, which
cause different distribution of power (resource dependence theory).
Cooperative behavior is also convenient if costs incurred over the
whole process are minimized (transaction cost theory). Finally, cooper-
ative behavior takes place in a social context in which the actors strive
to gain reputation and rewards (social exchange theory). The next sec-
tion derives a set of constructs and items from the discussed theories
which help develop the measurement construct and the variables for
the empirical study.

Determinants and Constructs of Cooperative Behavior

Literature on cooperation repeatedly combines and sometimes con-
trasts (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006) two main types/approaches, namely the
formal, contract-based and the informal relation-based one. Both ap-
proaches could be seen as complementary or alternative perspectives
in the discussion of cooperation (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). While formal
contract-based cooperation is often a subject of research for coopera-
tive behavior between institutions and administrative and governing
bodies (Christiansen, 2001; Dinar & Wolf, 1994; Martin & Simmons,
2005; Remmer, 1998), informal relation-based cooperation is
distinctive for cooperation in regions and communities (Aas et al.,
2005; Bardhan, 1993; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Denicolai et al.,
2009; Timothy, 1998). The first one regards cooperation as a formal
agreement which originates in institutional and organizational
resources and assets (Fritsch & Lukas, 1999; Lee et al., 2003; Lee &
Cavusgil, 2006), economic dependencies (Poppo & Zenger, 2002;
Remmer, 1998; Rodriguez, Langley, Beland, & Denis, 2007), and
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 613

explicitly expected mutual gains (Gately, 1974; Lusch & Brown, 1996;
Ness & Haugland, 2005). The formality of contracts relates not only
to the results of the cooperative actions but also to the governance
of relationships established in the course of the cooperation process
(Ness & Haugland, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Hence, it originates
in the professional and institutional context, in which individuals and
organizations operate.
In contrast, informal relation-based cooperation emphasizes mutual
trust (Bardhan, 1993; Denicolai et al., 2009; Pesämaa & Hair Jr., 2007;
Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), personal commitment (Mavondo & Rodrigo,
2001; Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), and interrela-
tionships (Chen et al., 1998; Innes, 1996; Rodriguez et al., 2007). These
dimensions could drive cooperative behavior in an organizational
context, in which formal contracts govern as well. However, they are
so important that they could substitute the role of formal contracts
(Gulati, 1995; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Both approaches take
into account that cooperation is a multiple-round game at organiza-
tional (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) as well
as individual levels (Carpenter et al., 2004; Doz, 1996; Luo, 2002;
Rodrı́guez & Wilson, 2002), and that cooperative behavior is supported
by effective communication (Aas et al., 2005; Morgan & Hunt, 1994;
Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
Figure 2 illustrates the connection between the six theories and the
formal contract-based versus the informal relation-based cooperation

rational transaction resource social

institutional
choice cost dependence game theory exchange
analysis
theory economics theory theory

formal contract- informal relation-

based cooperation
• institutional,
organizational resources
• economic
interdependencies
• explicit mutual gains
based cooperation
• mutual trust
• personal commitment
• interrelationships

• effective communication
• multiple rounds

communities of
individuals
institutions/
administrative and organizations/ firms
governing bodies

cooperation at various levels and with different

intensities in tourist destinations

Figure 2. Linking Theories, Cooperation Approaches, and the Application to

Destinations
614 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

approach. While institutional analysis, rational choice theory, and

transaction cost economics clearly point to the importance of formal
contract-based cooperation, social exchange theory relates to the infor-
mal relation-based approach. Research based on the resource depen-
dence theory as well as the game theory applies for formal as well as
for informal cooperation. Reading Figure 2 from top to bottom, the
theory level indicates the specific mechanisms that are relevant in
cooperation. The formal and the informal approach relate both to
the dimensions which account for the theoretical mechanisms. Analyz-
ing these dimensions helps operationalize the variety of possible coop-
eration mechanisms which occur in tourist destination communities,
because as we see in the bottom circle, cooperation involves institu-
tions, organizations, and individuals and cooperative behavior pro-
duces various forms and intensities of cooperation.
As indicated above, for tourism destination communities there may
be both formal contract-based as well as informal relation-based types
of cooperation approaches, depending on the specificity of the agree-
ment and the conditions and circumstances under which the actors
convene. As the actors represent institutions and organizations, they
are not only rational in their decision to cooperate but they also show
a propensity to cooperate in a professional environment. Hence, we
can assume that on one hand cooperative behavior is supported by pro-
fessional acquaintance and institutional/organizational connections.
On the other, we must assume that actors are likely to cooperate if they
trust and understand each other, sometimes independently from their
institutional/organizational affiliation. But which of the two assump-
tions is valid? Or are both equally relevant? These issues underlie the
fundaments of the empirical research.
While the theories presented in the previous section help explain
the broader context of cooperative behavior and serve as cornerstones
for the final discussion section, the differentiation between formal con-
tract-based and informal relation-based cooperation defines the item
selection for the empirical study.

METHOD
Research Questions and Measurement Construct
In the empirical part, the research hypothesizes and tests four con-
structs for cooperative behavior derived from the literature research:
formal contracts; relational preferences; communication behavior as
modulating construct between the first two; and cooperative behavior
as the dependent construct. Eleven variables represent the constructs:
The first three relate to formal contracts. They are (1) institutional
connection (actors cooperate because their institutions are formally
connected to each other) (Gulati, 1995; Lusch & Brown, 1996;
Mavondo & Rodrigo, 2001), (2) professional contact (actors cooperate
because of professional reasons, even if they would not want to; work-
ing together is explicitly not formulated as cooperation) (Innes, 1996;
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 615

Lee & Cavusgil, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2007; Timothy, 1998), and (3)
political contact (actors cooperate because they share common politi-
cal interests or are obliged to work together at the political level, e.g.
municipal authorities, commissions) (Benson, 1975; Yeung, 1997).
The next three reflect communication behavior, namely (4) commu-
nication intensity (actors communicate with some people more inten-
sely than with others) (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Mohr & Spekman,
1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Rodrı́guez & Wilson, 2002), (5) contact
ease (actors have easier access to some people than to others, e.g. if
they want to discuss something with them or if they want to initiate a
collective action) (Christiansen, 2001; Rodrı́guez & Wilson, 2002),
and (6) information exchange (actors share information about the
destination and about other people, including gossip) (Heide &
Miner, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
Three other variables refer to relational preferences, which are (7)
sympathy (actors like some people more than others) (Bardhan,
1993; Pesämaa, Örtqvist, & Hair, 2007), (8) trust (actors trust some
people more than others) (Gulati, 1995; Mohr & Spekman, 1994;
Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Zaheer et al., 1998), and (9) understanding
(actors get along with some people better than with others) (Gulati,
1995; Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). Finally, (10) starting initiatives (actors
launch initiatives and projects more easily with some people than with
others) (Carpenter et al., 2004; Ness & Haugland, 2005; Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994; Zaheer et al., 1998), and (11) success of initiatives (imple-
mented initiatives are more or less successful) (Doz, 1996; Lee et al.,
2003; Ness & Haugland, 2005), describe cooperative behavior.
The context of cooperative behavior among actors and organizations
in tourist destination communities comprises various areas of cooper-
ation (e.g. the formal creation of a marketing pool, the development
of a jointly owned sport facility, the establishment of a sales deal with
the help of travel packages) and various intensities of cooperation
(e.g. the formulation and the development of a common price strategy
in the committee of a transport association, the shuttle service between
a hotel and a ski school). Additionally, cooperative behavior takes place
between and among public institutions and private organizations as
well as between single individuals and therefore in a setting in which
the term ‘cooperation’ assumes different meanings depending on
the role of the respondents and the organizational context in which
they operate. The research of this paper is not to investigate which type
of cooperation is originated and founded on which dimensions. It does
neither categorize nor evaluate any type of outcome from cooperative
behavior. As a matter of fact, it focuses on the drivers of human behav-
ior that lead to establish every kind of cooperation. Independently
from the abovementioned differentiations of cooperation, the herein
presented study assumes that cooperative behavior leads through for-
mal or informal conditions to more or less successful results. Hence,
the variables ‘starting initiatives’ and ‘success of initiatives’ reflect the
whole universe of cooperative processes as understood by various
respondents in various settings. By asking them about the success of
initiatives, the study takes into account that every respondent could
616 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

consider more than one initiative and therefore more than one coop-
erative process. Thus the answers comprise the individual’s perception
of possible multiple rounds, a dimension which is only explicitly oper-
ationalized in longitudinal studies.
Based on the abovementioned considerations, two null hypotheses
guide the empirical research of this paper:

1. The approaches of formal contract-based and informal relation-based

cooperation are not valid for the case of a tourist destination
community.
2. Cooperative behavior is not depending on variables referring to formal
or to informal cooperation.

Figure 3 presents the constructs relating to the hypotheses. Institu-

tional connections, professional contact, and political contact are as-
sumed to refer to formal ties (named here formal contracts) while
sympathy, trust, and understanding represent relation-based variables
(named relational preferences). The construct communication behav-
ior could relate both to formal contracts and/or relational preferences,
because communication intensity, ease of getting in contact, and infor-
mation exchange are observable in either environment. Hence, this
construct acts as a modulating dimension between the other
constructs. Finally, starting initiatives and success of initiatives reflect

formal contracts communication

behavior

institutional connection professional contact contact ease

(My institution and X's
institution are connected.
valued -2, -1, 1, 2)
communication intensity
(I have professional contact (It's easy for me to get in
(I often have contact with X.
with X. contact with X.
valued 1, 2, 3, 4)
valued -2, -1, 1, 2) valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

political contact information exchange

(I have political contact with X. (I exchange information with X.

valued -2, -1, 1, 2) valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

relational cooperative behavior

preferences

starting initiatives
sympathy trust
(I could start initiatives/ projects
(I find X likeable. (I trust X.
well with X.
valued -2, -1, 1, 2) valued -2, -1, 1, 2)
valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

success of initiatives
understanding
(My initiatives/ projects with X
(I get along well with X.
have been successful.
valued -2, -1, 1, 2)
valued -2, -1, 1, 2)

Figure 3. Hypothesized Constructs and Variables

 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 617

the effect of cooperative behavior. In Figure 3, the sentences in paren-

theses refer to the question as formulated in the questionnaire.

Research Site
The case for the empirical research is a midsized tourist destination
in the European Alps. The destination consists of ten small municipal-
ities and in 2005 had a population of approximately 17.000 people as
well as a total area of 563.18 km2. The destination is well-known as a
winter sport resort for visitors from German-speaking countries
(Germany, Austria, Switzerland) and has recently gained popularity
in further European markets like the BENELUX countries. While
the destination still counts only approximately two million tourist over-
nights per year and the local economy is not solely depending on tour-
ism, local and regional authorities consider investments in tourism a
key issue for the next generation. Hence, public authorities are ab-
sorbed with issues regarding land use planning, road and traffic, and
public costs due to strong seasonality. Simultaneously tourism entre-
preneurs are challenged by workforce recruitment from bordering
regions and staff professionalization, price positioning and differentia-
tion as well as day tourism and alliances and current mergers between
the four ski area companies and numerous small hotels and guesthouses.
These central issues have stimulated a series of planning projects and
workshops over the past five years or so with the aim of increasing joint
collaboration between the destination’s organizations and institutions.
Hence, the analyzed destination is an ideal case study for capturing
the facets of cooperative behavior currently happening at different
levels for different reasons and among different actors representing
different stakeholder groups and institutions.

Survey Instrument and Data Collection

The field work for this study includes in-depth interviews supported
by a semi-structured questionnaire. In a first step, twelve prominent ac-
tors were interviewed from a group of private companies and public
authorities, which a year earlier had participated in a process of desti-
nation strategy development. Among other questions, the respondents
could name a maximum of five other prominent actors, thus produc-
ing a snowball sample (Scott, 2000, 56), which ended with 42 complete
interviews and two non-participants. The snowball sample ended with
the last respondent naming other actors which had already been inter-
viewed. Returning back to all the 42 actors and confronting them with
the relationships to the other 41 would have not been purposeful be-
cause of the following reasons. First, nominating prominent actors im-
plies a minimal acquaintance with the named individual and hence a
high probability that the respondent could answer reliably and com-
pletely. As a matter of fact, few respondents named some individuals
whom they did not know personally (12 out of 171 nominations).
618 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

Confronting the respondents with relationship oriented questions

referring to all the 41 actors would unnecessarily prolong the research
as well as the duration of the interviews and yield useless data. Second,
we can assume that nominating other individuals implies a particular
relationship. One that is in fact related to some kinship, possibly orig-
inated from a cooperative process. Hence, by asking the respondents to
name other actors they reckon to be important, we have a reliable indi-
cation not only for acquaintance but also for previous and/or current
formal and/or informal cooperation.
For the named actors, every respondent could either confirm (2, 1)
or reject ( 2, 1) the attribute (i.e. the variable) with regard to the
named person (see Table 1). The variable communication intensity
is coded with a slightly different scale (4 = daily, 3 = weekly,
2 = monthly, 1 = yearly). The data collected in the eleven network
matrices all refer to the same relations among actors. So, the networks
form a set of multiplex data, with simultaneous multiple relations
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
The respondents could choose whether to fill out an online survey to
which they had direct access or to be interviewed personally or by tele-
phone. The majority of the respondents preferred to be interviewed by
phone. This approach proved to be effective, because the respondents
mostly preferred to deliver information if they could speak personally
and explain their answers, which at the end delivered a clear and dis-
tinct choice along the Likert-scale.

Data Treatment and Analysis

The subsequent analyses used the eleven asymmetric, valued net-
works with the original codification from the interviews. Obviously,
not every link between actors implies an initiative/cooperation. In 12
out of 171 nominations the respondents had never cooperated with

Table 1. Rotated Factor Loadings for Out-Degree Centralities

Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

(eigenvalue (eigenvalue (eigenvalue
41.9%) 18.8%) 9.3%)

Institutional connection fi factor 2 .07 .73 .24

Professional contact fi factor 2 .10 .74 .14
Political contact fi factor 2 .09 .69 .26
Communication intensity fi factor 3 .12 .34 .80
Contact ease fi factor 3 .25 .15 .82
Information exchange fi not assignable .50 .49 .31
Sympathy fi factor 1 .80 .07 .18
Trust fi factor 3 .47 .12 .74
Understanding fi factor 3 .59 .02 .70
Starting initiatives fi factor 1 .72 .04 .53
Success of initiatives fi factor 1 .74 .24 .35
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 619

the named persons before. Thus, missing data are not valued and are
represented with a zero in the analyses.
The analysis consists of three steps. First, for the eleven asymmetric,
valued matrices, Freeman’s centrality degrees produced distinct out-de-
gree and in-degree centrality lists. The merged out- and in-degree lists
for the eleven variables generated two separate lists, one with only out-
degree and one with only in-degree values. A factor analysis with prin-
cipal component analysis and VARIMAX factor rotation yielded three
factors for out-degrees and two factors for in-degrees. For the research
at hand, the results from the factor analysis provided the empirical
background to discuss the hypothesized constructs and define the vari-
ables for the third analysis.
Second, an average transformation procedure merged the original
asymmetric, valued matrices assigned to the respective factors resulting
from the factor analysis. The average transformation procedure added
the cell values of the matrices and divided them by the number of
matrices, reducing two or more matrices to one.
Third, regressions and correlation analyses of the network matrices
used a QAP (quadratic assignment procedure). The algorithms adopt
quadratic assignment procedures to develop standard errors to test for
significance of association. In a first step, they compute coefficients
and related measures between the cells of the two data matrices by con-
sidering the cell values in the rows as well as in the columns of the
respective matrices. In a second step they synchronously and randomly
permute rows and columns of one matrix and recalculate the correla-
tions or the regressions as well as the other measures (Borgatti, Everett,
& Freeman, 2002; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Step-wise elimination of
non-significant variables for the multiple regression produced a dis-
tinct model, while the correlations between the variables allowed to ex-
clude covariance of independent variables in the regressions. The final
model presents all independent variables having significant values, the
model fit producing a significant value (at least p < 0.01), and the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the two independent

Table 2. Rotated Factor Loadings for In-Degree Centralities

Variables Factor 1 Factor 2

(eigenvalue 81.0%) (eigenvalue 9.8%)

Institutional connection fi factor 1 .74 .22

Professional contact fi factor 1 .93 .27
Political contact fi factor 1 .97 .10
Communication intensity fi factor 1 .98 .04
Contact ease fi factor 1 .98 .12
Information exchange fi factor 2 .10 .98
Sympathy fi factor 1 .89 .40
Trust fi factor 1 .97 .14
Understanding fi factor 1 .95 .23
Starting initiatives fi factor 1 .94 .07
Success of initiatives fi factor 1 .90 .21
620 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

variables being <0.3. All analyses were executed with the UCINET 6
package (Borgatti et al., 2002).

RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 display the rotated factor loadings for the out-degree
and in-degree matrices. The factor analysis for the out-degrees with a
cumulative eigenvalue percentage of 70% produces three factors;
and the analysis for the in-degrees with a cumulative eigenvalue per-
centage of 90.8% identifies two factors. The more differentiated pic-
ture of the factor analysis for the out-degrees reflects some basic
consideration of the hypothesized constructs. Factor 2 corresponds
to the construct formal contracts, and factor 1 adds to the construct
cooperative behavior the item sympathy. Factor 3 combines the
remaining variables of the construct relational preferences (i.e. trust
and understanding) with two variables of the modulating construct
communication behavior, namely communication intensity and con-
tact ease. According to the out-degrees, the variable information ex-
change is not clearly assignable to any factor. However, the factor
analysis for the in-degrees identifies information exchange as one sin-
gle factor.
Based on the factor analyses above and referring to the second re-
search question, the QAP regression model is based on one dependent
and three independent variables, just as illustrated in figure 4: one ma-
trix with the merged variables sympathy, starting initiatives, and success
of initiatives, named ‘cooperation and sympathy’ and used as a depen-
dent variable, one matrix with the merged variables institutional con-
nection, professional contact, and political contact, named as the
original construct ‘formal contracts’ and used as the first independent
variable; one matrix with the merged variables trust, understanding,
communication intensity, and contact ease, named ‘relational commu-
nication’ and used as the second independent variable; and one matrix
with variable information exchange, named ‘information exchange,’
used as the third independent variable.
Table 3 presents the results from the regression model. In the first
regression model, the variable formal contracts produces a non-signif-
icant result (p. 0.154) and hence is eliminated. The second regression
yields the model as presented in Table 3 with a strongly positive influ-
ence of relational communication and a weakly negative effect of infor-
mation exchange on trust and cooperation.
Table 4 displays the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the
dependent and independent variables, proving that the final model

Table 3. Regression Model for Trust and Cooperation Model and Coefficients Significant at p < 0.01

Adj. R2 0.76 Standardized coefficients

Relational communication 0.88
Information exchange 0.05
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 621

Table 4. QAP Correlation Coefficients all Coefficients Significant at p < 0.01

Variables (1) (2) (3)

Cooperation and sympathy (1)

Formal contracts (2) 0.15
Relational communication (3) 0.87 0.18
Information exchange (4) 0.17 0.36 0.25

with the independent variables interpersonal communication and

information exchange passes the test against covariance.

DISCUSSION
Validity of Hypothesized Constructs
The results from the factor analysis show that not all the hypothe-
sized constructs are valid. While formal contracts in the factor analysis
of the out-degree lists consist of exactly the three items hypothesized in
Figure 3, the other constructs look slightly different. As expected, the
variables in the construct communication behavior relate to different
factors. In particular, information exchange plays its own separate role,
as indicated by the factor analysis from the out-degree list and
confirmed by the factor analysis from the in-degree list. In contrast,
communication intensity and contact ease refer to trust and under-
standing. Hence, for the case of the tourism destination, the variables
with regard to information and communication do not connect to the
formal, contract-based environment but rather to the informal, rela-
tion-based environment of the prominent actors. Finally, cooperative
behavior is a stand-alone construct, however, with the addition of sym-
pathy, a variable expressing social affinity and bridging to the strong
influence of relation-based collaboration. Figure 4 visualizes the final
results.
In summary, contrasting the contract-based approach with a relation-
based approach proves to be a valid and useful differentiation.
Whereas the relation-based approach shows a strong effect on cooper-
ative behavior, the contract-based one is not influential. Hence, in the
tourism destination, relevant actors cooperate with one another de-
tached from formal professional or political bonds, on the basis of mu-
tual trust and understanding reinforced by efficient and frequent
communication.

Effects on Cooperation and Sympathy

The adjusted constructs after the factor analysis and the QAP regres-
sion results deserve a thorough discussion.
First, sympathy goes along with starting initiatives and success of ini-
tiatives and not with trust and understanding. Two phenomena explain
622 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

formal contracts information exchange

institutional professional
connection contact
information
exchange

political contact

relational communication cooperation and sympathy

trust understanding + starting initiatives

success of
initiatives

communication sympathy
contact ease
intensity

Figure 4. Confirmed Constructs and Influence on Cooperation and Sympathy

this rather counter-intuitive result. For one, trust and understanding

are different from sympathy because they are part of cooperation as
a recurring and reinforcing process (Doz, 1996; Ring & Van de Ven,
1994). In fact, trust and understanding (slowly) evolve with the help
of supporting and facilitating communication and therefore must con-
stantly pass the test against betrayal and misunderstanding. In contrast,
sympathy expresses a subjective feeling or emotion towards another
person, and is suggested it is a component for cooperative behavior
(Frank, 2001), not a condition or outcome of the cooperation process.
In fact, from an economic point of view, sympathy is an inverse
function of distance (Sally, 2002; Smith, 1759) and therefore an inter-
dependent utility function (Fontaine, 2008), while trust and under-
standing persist despite distance. Recent behavioral game theory
takes into account that interdependencies during the games lead to
sympathy, just as cooperation processes occur (Binmore, 1998; Camerer,
1997; Green, 2002; Sally, 2001).
Second, information exchange relates neither to communication
intensity nor to contact ease. As operationalized in the in-depth inter-
views and presented in the method section information exchange in-
cludes the following additional explanations: ‘exchanging information
about things happening’. . .’or about people’. . .’maybe gossip as well’.
Combined with the fact that information exchange has a weak negative
influence on cooperation and sympathy, this activity is less a process of
enforcing relations or socializing and more a stand-alone rule, induced
by the community as a social system. The rule of information exchange
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 623

requires the actors to (regularly) adhere to it, as in a sort of ritual. In

this sense, information exchange is attributable to the norms and obli-
gations occurring in the development of social capital theory (Burt,
1995; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Putnam, 2000), and more
specifically as ‘‘shared codes and language’’ as part of the cognitive
dimension of social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). This helps ex-
plain the variable’s slightly negative effect on cooperative behavior and
sympathy, suggesting that (self-)imposed rules in order to maintain
one’s personal integration in a community do not necessarily increase
sympathy towards others. In fact, they increase distance because one
feels obliged to exchange information with people one dislikes or even
with people perceived as rivals (Mauss & Evans-Pritchard, 1954). Con-
currently, the less people exchange information with others, the less
they may be biased and therefore the higher the tendency to initiate
an unbiased cooperation.
Third, the variables in the new construct relational communication
correspond to the notions presented in the literature research about
relation-based cooperation. Communication intensity and ease of get-
ting in contact support trust and understanding. All of them are a
strong fundament for cooperative behavior. Thus, for the surveyed ac-
tors, cooperation inside the destination is subject to interpersonal
bonds and their development.

CONCLUSION
Implications
The results in this paper point to a series of implications for practice
and for research. Although an analysis of the six major theories on
cooperative behavior could not be carried out systematically, some spe-
cific results refer directly to them.
First, cooperative behavior among actors and stakeholder groups in
tourism destinations is an interpersonal business. Cooperative behav-
ior is not based on clinical games and does not follow pure rational
theoretic principles. This explains why alliances, mergers or simply
collective initiatives and projects are not realized despite the logic
based on rational economic principles. Hence, when selecting and
approaching the appropriate constellation of representatives e.g. for
destination planning and development, considering the people first,
and secondly the institutions they represent, is an effective and prom-
ising approach.
Second, tourism destination communities distinguish themselves less
by formal rules and norms of cooperation and more by autonomous
key actors, a phenomenon described in policy research with the help
of actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf, 1997) or collective memory
(Rothstein, 2000), where past individual experiences affect future
behavior more than the individual’s affiliation to his institution. For-
mal, contract-based connections and cooperation may permeate small
communities such as tourist destinations as well. In fact, companies
624 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629

develop and install cooperation agreements, while public institutions

like municipalities create their norms and laws. Institutions are defined
as ‘‘the rules of the game in a society, or, more formally, the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction’’ (North, 1990).
However, the origin of effective cooperation is ‘‘produced spontane-
ously in the course of social interactions in networks of personal rela-
tions,’’ a less complex structure of personal interactions which
generally occurs in smaller groups (Nee, 1998, 87). Communication
intensity reinforced through multiple rounds of cooperation as well
as effectiveness of getting in contact (in line with transaction cost eco-
nomics) foster collaboration. Hence, in order to increase cooperation
or launch collective action, planners must pay attention to previously
installed bonds of trust and understanding among actors, recognizable
through intense communication; a fundamental condition which has
been described in an exploratory study, so far (Saxena, 2006).
Third, information exchange among actors leads neither directly to
cooperation nor indirectly to trust or understanding. Launching a col-
lective action between companies whose actors already exchange infor-
mation but do not exhibit kinship would likely fail. The rule of social
exchange theory, according to which anticipated reciprocity leads the
actors to offer information in order to gain reputation and influence
and a reward, works inversely. The more information exchange takes
place, the less the involved actors will exhibit cooperative behavior,
as they already feel that they have complied with the social norms, or
they think that exchanging information with perceived competitors is
the rule to follow if one wants to be accepted in the community. As
a matter of fact, information exchange is a formal process under cir-
cumstances of interdependencies (Levine & White, 1961), in order
for the actors to stay up to date.
Fourth, cooperation processes require reciprocal sympathy. Identify-
ing and highlighting interdependencies among the actors and their
institutions helps induce cooperative behavior. In fact, resource depen-
dence plays a central role as cooperative actions take place. However,
before and after the cooperative games occur, actors are locked in
bounded rationality and are required to repeatedly learn from every
experience with their counterparts. The interdependencies which lead
to the necessary sympathy during the process are characteristic to com-
munity-structured tourism destination, as organizations and institu-
tions are embedded in a system built on and affected by goods with
public character (Olson, 1965).

Limitations and Further Research

The paper has its limitations. First, the results are valid for one des-
tination and could reflect the idiosyncratic behavior of individuals in a
local/regional culture that is different from those in other destina-
tions. Second, the research in this paper reflects only a point in time.
No longitudinal data are available.
 P. Beritelli / Annals of Tourism Research 38 (2011) 607–629 625

Further research in this field could address the following topics:

First, the application of the research in this paper or similar ap-
proaches to other destinations could increase the external validity of
the results presented herein. Second, longitudinal studies that observe
particular dimensions like trust and understanding as well as commu-
nication could help describe the mechanisms that foster or hinder
cooperative behavior. Third, in this paper, information exchange is dis-
cussed as a possible rule adopted in communities. Further research on
why and how people exchange information could reject or confirm the
observation presented herein and reinforce the importance of social
exchange theory. Fourth, analyses of interdependencies among local
actors and their need to cooperate combined with sympathy as a con-
trol variable could reject or confirm the behavioral game theory con-
text, in which cooperation occurs among actors in communities.

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Submitted 26 October 2009. Resubmitted 12 August 2010. Final version 10 November 2010.
Accepted 23 November 2010. Refereed anonymously. Coordinating Editor: John Tribe

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com