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The Taliban, religious revival and

innovation in Afghan nationalism
a b
Mariam Raqib & Amilcar Antonio Barreto
a
The Afghanistan Samsortya, 200 Swanton Street, Winchester,
MA, 01890, USA
b
Political Science Department, Northeastern University, Boston,
MA, 02115, USA
Published online: 23 Oct 2013.

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To cite this article: Mariam Raqib & Amilcar Antonio Barreto (2014) The Taliban, religious
revival and innovation in Afghan nationalism, National Identities, 16:1, 15-30, DOI:
10.1080/14608944.2013.843517

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 National Identities, 2014
Vol. 16, No. 1, 15–30, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2013.843517

The Taliban, religious revival and innovation in Afghan nationalism

Mariam Raqiba and Amilcar Antonio Barretob*
a
The Afghanistan Samsortya, 200 Swanton Street, Winchester, MA, 01890, USA; bPolitical Science
Department, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, 02115, USA
Downloaded by [Florida International University] at 03:08 27 December 2014

Policy analysts and academics have portrayed the Taliban as a religious revival
campaign and a part of a larger Islamic counteroffensive against the West. The Taliban
themselves concur, adding that they are the true guardians of Afghan national identity.
If so, why did the Taliban defy long-established facets of Afghan customary law and
introduce a different interpretation of Islamic law, thus countering the status quo ante?
This article will examine the Taliban movement and ask how we should assess
nationalist movements’ claims of antiquity.
Keywords: Afghanistan; Islam; nationalism; religious revival; Salafi; Taliban

During its five-year reign the Taliban, a name derived from the Pashto word meaning the
‘students,’ earnestly employed the instruments of the Afghan state to implement
a strict interpretation of Sharia, Islamic law. Utmost on its agenda was restoring Afghans
to the rightful path laid down by the Prophet Muhammad. Ousted from office in the wake
of the 11 September 2001 attacks by the USA this heavily armed corps steadfastly
maintains that Afghans must return to true Islam. This restorative duty, say the Taliban, is
undermined by the Karzai administration — a collaborationist government owing greater
loyalty to non-believing foreigners than to Afghans. In and out of office, it presented
itself as an authentically Afghan institution dedicated to reinstating the status quo ante,
and that goal could be achieved only with the Taliban at the helm of state.
Taliban assertions of a spiritual renaissance resonate with Westerners who see
the contemporary politicization of Islam as a series of restorative movements engaged in
an age-old conflict with Christianity. And yet, in its drive to return to the past
the Taliban implemented policies and adopted an interpretation of their religion
inconsistent with the way Islam and customary law have been construed in Afghanistan
for centuries. Such fundamental incongruities put into question the Taliban’s claims of
historic authenticity. This article will examine an alternative hypothesis. Rather than
perceive this organization as one bent on restoring a bygone era the Taliban is a modern
movement wrapped in the shawl of antiquity. This study, we suggest, could shed light on
other cases where movements allege historic continuity.

The source of religious conflict

An array of policy analysts and western scholars perceived the Taliban’s ascent, tenure,
and attempt to oust Karzai as part and parcel of a religious revival movement. Among the

*Corresponding author. Email: a.barreto@neu.edu

© 2013 Taylor & Francis
 16 M. Raqib and A.A. Barreto

most notable western academics who staked such a position were Bernard Lewis and
Samuel Huntington. The Taliban’s rise was an essential part of a protracted conflict
pitting Islam against Christendom. The post-cold war era inaugurated a global Clash
of Civilizations, argued Huntington (1996). The primary fault lines in this assortment
of colliding civilizational plates were confessional (Huntington, 1996, p. 66). Thus,
mounting tensions between Muslim and Christian blocs were, from his perspective, a
‘natural consequence of the Islamic Resurgence’ (Huntington, 1996, p. 213). And perhaps
not coincidentally, the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s marked the opening salvo in the
kulturkampf heralding the eventual demise of the cold war era (Huntington, 1996, p. 246).
As a rule, religious organizations are uncooperative team players in the arduous process
of building stable political institutions (Huntington, 1968, p. 239). And in the case of
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Islam, Huntington (1996, p. 175) contended, primary political loyalties eschewed the
state in favor of the tribe or the Umma – the worldwide community of believers. Thus, the
inexorable Islamization of global politics omitted any promises of future political
stability. Assessments like those of Huntington boiled down the Taliban campaign to an
undifferentiated Islamic essence and ignored important differences between Islamic
attitudes and practices of the state and the popular religion of ordinary Afghans
(Roy, 1986).
In contrast to Huntington, Bernard Lewis (2002) set back this conflict from the
twilight of the cold war to the protracted and agonizing decline of the Ottoman Empire
and the concurrent ascent of Western and Christian Europe. Islam, particularly under
Istanbul’s Sultans, had been at the vanguard of global achievement and civilization for
centuries (Lewis, 2002, p. 3). That preeminence waned as Europe embraced
technological advancements that ultimately allowing the Christian West to surpass the
Muslim East, providing Europeans with the wherewithal to establish colonial beach-
heads across the globe, including Muslim realms (Lewis, 2002, pp. 31, 81). In the
aftermath of World War I Christianity’s dominance over Islam was complete except for
remote locales on the Arabian peninsula and Afghanistan (Lewis, 2002, pp. 60–61).
What is the solution to halting and reversing the Islamic decline? Lewis claimed that
there are two paths. One option is for the East to embrace Western notions of a secular
state à la Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Alternatively, there is the course laid by the Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini – a commitment to reclaiming the glorious past through the
restitution of Islam at the apex of national life (Lewis, 2002, pp. 158–159). Lewis’s
perspective centers on the power of resentment to fuel political conflict. Among the
panoply of human emotions this was the one most associated with inter-group,
particularly inter-ethnic, conflict (Petersen, 2002).
Huntington and Lewis’s perceptions might be dismissed as the whimsical attitudes of
the ivory tower elite were it not for the political operatives who share their perspective.
This influence is most pronounced among western conservatives, particularly in the
USA. For former US presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan (2011, p. 83) Turkish and
Maghrebi immigration to Europe represent attempts to reverse the Muslim expulsions
from the Balkan and Iberian peninsulas centuries ago. Other US presidential aspirants
hold no bars when referring to Iran as a country of ‘fanatic ayatollahs’ (Perry, 2010, p.
128) and ‘mad mullahs’ (Gingrich, 2011, p. 175). Edward Said (1994, p. 285) suggested
that the exotic Orient was transformed into the menacing East in the wake of the 1973
October War between Israel and Egypt and the concurrent Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo. The American variant of Islamophobia – a
phenomenon linked to profound apprehensions over domestic and foreign policy issues
 National Identities 17

(Sheehi, 2011, p. 32) – perceives a largely undifferentiated and homogenized Muslim

menace. Its Israeli counterpart, on the other hand, centers much of its focus on Iran as the
region’s greatest source of instability and danger (Ram, 2009, p. 5). Orientalism, in the
style of Huntington and Lewis, has impacted policy-making circles as well as the
academy.
Within Political Science assumptions that the Taliban’s rise was a segment of a more
significant religious restoration fall in line with the Political Culture framework. This
school of thought held considerable sway in the discipline in the decades immediately
following World War II. Political systems are entrenched in discernible modes of
orientation toward politics (Almond, 1956). Culture itself, contended this school’s
proponents, is the primary factor impacting political systems and shaping dissimilar
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political outcomes (Ross, 1997, p. 42). For example, embedded cultural differences
explained the stability of Anglo-American democracies – the so-called civic cultures – as
opposed to other regimes (Almond & Verba, 1963). These dissimilarities can also lead to
intrastate conflict. Loyalties to different language communities, for instance, were
responsible for fueling political conflict in North America (Huntington, 2004; Laponce,
1987). Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis – one formulated to explain inter-state
conflict – was, therefore, an integral part of a broader conjecture regarding intra- and
inter-state discord.
Scholars of nationalism and ethnicity – a broader cohort of interdisciplinary
researchers – situate the Huntington–Lewis proposal and Political Culture within the
primordialist school of thought. Connor (1994, p. 103) noted that primordialists typically
start with the work of Geertz and Shils. Geertz (1973, p. 89) defined culture as a ‘…
historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate,
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.’ Historical
transmission, an open-ended statement, leaves open the possibility that one is dealing
with a phenomenon with exceptionally deep roots. Shils (1957, p. 131) assumed that the
fundamental ties linking today’s society were forged in the ancient past. The Taliban’s
own statements seemingly corroborate the primordialist thesis regarding Islam’s long
enduring and inevitable conflict with the West.
Geertz’s notion shared many attributes with an earlier tradition. Tylor (1970, p. 1)
noted that culture was part of a ‘…complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art,
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member
of society.’ While Tylor explicitly imbued law and spirituality with greater prominence,
both he and Geertz described culture as the multifaceted lens through which we perceive
and interact with society. Indeed, Gellner (1983) went a step further. He insisted: ‘Modern
man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture’
(Gellner, 1983, p. 36).
Religion is one of the several cultural traits that nationalists may employ to
distinguish us from them (Connor, 1994, p. 44). Durkheim (1965, p. 62) described
religion as ‘…a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to
say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single
moral community…’ Despite claims of historic continuity scholars acknowledge that
nationalist movements can survive even fundamental changes in the features drawn upon
to define the collective (Barth, 1969, p. 38; Eriksen, 1993, p. 73), and that includes
religion.
 18 M. Raqib and A.A. Barreto

Those penning the nationalist saga may differentiate their community from those with
dissimilar convictions, or set apart true believers from those deficient in moral practices.
Fundamental crises open the door for new elites, in the name of the downtrodden, to
install themselves as the righteous rulers (Pareto, 1991, p. 36). Such ruptures, brought on
by major upheavals, mark a ‘crisis of authority’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210). And these
calamities have proliferated throughout the Middle East. ‘The appeal of nationalism, just
as of religious fundamentalism, in the Middle East is thus to a large extent a reflection of
the crisis of dignity, that is, of individuals’ sense of self-worth, honor and esteem’ (Razi,
1990, p. 82). In the final analysis these emotions, and not the pursuit of material gain,
motivate ordinary members to join nationalist causes (Barreto, 2009, pp. 47–51).
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Taliban self-perception
How do the Taliban’s leaders describe their movement and overarching mission? First,
they anointed themselves Mujahideen – fighters in a Jihad, or holy war, against the
enemies of Islam (M. Mujahid, 2012). Taliban officials regularly invoke the antiquity of
their bellum sacrum. Much of the Taliban’s success in sustaining a decade-long
insurgency against Karzai’s government is attributable to their effective use of religious
symbols, discourse, and terminology to express the discontent of a grieving population.
Many of their public statements repeat: ‘O Allah, retaliate upon them, afflict them like
you did to Pharaoh and his nation’ (e.g., M. Mujahid, 2007). Such proclamations
endeavor to symbolically fasten the Taliban’s mission directly to celebrated struggles for
spiritual and political redemption in monotheism’s age-old contest against polytheism. It
also symbolically grafts current hostilities onto liberation struggles from millennia ago.
Such imagery is emblematic of Islam’s clash with other faiths in Afghanistan’s long
history.
Taliban authorities boast that they are the only rightful spokespersons for their
people. They insist that the ‘Islamic Emirate is the legitimate representative of the Afghan
people,’ and go on to claim that, following Islamic obligation, they will continue an
'armed jihad and struggle against the occupying forces' and their Afghan allies (‘Islamic
Emirate’, 2012). The Americans are occupiers and the incumbent is the ‘puppet Hamid
Karzai,’ the manager of a ‘stooge regime’ (‘Islamic Emirate’, 2012; M. Mujahid, 2012).
The Taliban also brand a host of Muslim rules in other states as betrayers and the ‘greatest
enemies of Islam’ for supplanting their peoples’ needs with the interests of their ‘Western
masters’ (H. Mujahid, 2011). The Taliban called on all Muslims to liberate themselves
from foreign occupiers and their native-born marionettes (M. Mujahid, 2012). Blending
faith and nation they insisted it was a ‘religious and national obligation to liberate the
country from the occupation’ (M. Mujahid, 2013). Toward this end they viewed their ally,
Al-Qaeda, as an integral part of this global struggle against the West and a valued partner
in pursuing their ultimate political aim: ‘the establishment of the mighty Islamic State’
(Mokhaddab, 2007).
Interestingly, the presence of US forces on Afghan soil is the latest link in a chain of
recurring struggles against colonialists and their Afghan turncoat allies. Amanullah Khan,
Afghanistan’s sovereign from 1919 to 1929, played a critical role as both hero and villain
in the Taliban’s liberation narrative. On the one hand he is the redeemer of the Third
Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 (M. Mujahid, 2007). This conflict failed to displace the
Durand Line which divided Pashtuns into British India and Afghanistan. Still, his reign
heralded the demise of the Treaty of Gandamak – the accord signed at the end of the
 National Identities 19

previous Anglo-Afghan conflict which gave Britain control over Afghanistan’s foreign
policy. Still, celebrating the country’s independence coincides with an avalanche of
westernizing influences. An Atatürk contemporary, Amanullah Khan also looked to the
West to refashion the Afghan state and remold his people. But religious conservatives
challenged these influences and their displeasure lead ultimately to Khan’s dethronement
(Farivar, 2009, p. 19). According to the Taliban: ‘The king resorted to issuing laws and
Western statues upon Islam and the traditions of its Mujahid people’ (Kabuli, 2012).
Those un-Islamic influences included Democracy, an unacceptable ideology because
‘Democracy rejects being guided by divine revelation’ and it also dares to claim ‘all
religions are equal’ (Kabuli, 2012).
Westernization under Amanullah Khan continued under the country’s last monarch,
Zahir Shah. His 1973 overthrow was the prelude to Communism – another western
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import into Afghanistan (Kabuli, 2012). In this point the Taliban and Karzai can agree.
The Soviet-installed government of 1979 inaugurated a regime lacking in any semblance
of popular support (Amin, 1984). For the Taliban, the past and the present are interwoven
into a common narrative of spiritual and political liberation.
Articulating a glorious historic saga is not merely a matter of remembering, but also
intentionally forgetting. Trouillot (1995) referred to it as ‘silencing the past.’ Behdad
(2005) described this process as ‘historical amnesia.’ The Taliban’s version of earlier
events omits the degree to which the USA bankrolled the Mujahideen rebellion against
the Soviets in the 1980s. Instead, Russians and Americans are clumped together as
occupiers and corrupters of Islamic values (Rashed, 2011). The Mujahideen’s failure to
establish a stable government in keeping with Islamic principles was blamed on
communist infiltration following the collapse of Najibullah’s Soviet-backed government
(‘Islamic Emirate’, 2008). And Western conspiracies against Afghans only accelerated
with the ascent of the Taliban: ‘When the Afghan established Islamic rule represented by
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the West did not hesitate but began to plot by every
method and means to eradicate this young Islamic government’ (Kabuli, 2012). Despite
this setback the Taliban intend to return to power and implement proper Islamic and
Afghan values.
What will be the shape of a future Taliban administration? The Taliban define
their philosophy and approach to governance as one rooted squarely in Islamic law
(M. Mujahid, 2012). As is typical of many faiths, there is more than one approach to
reading core texts. Differing interpretations can lead to distinct political and administrat-
ive outcomes. How will the Taliban deal with this theological diversity? They respond
that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will adhere to ‘pure historical Islamic origins’
(Aghakhan, 2009). Those parts of the country under their control put Sharia into ‘full
practice’ and they intend to spread that philosophy of governance throughout the entire
country (‘Islamic Emirate’, 2008). Taliban leaders insist that Islamic restoration is on its
way for all Afghans.
The way in which the Taliban describe themselves may be problematic for students of
nationalist movements. On the surface it would appear that the Umma and the nation are
at odds with one another (Wedeen, 2008, p. 9). After all, the focus of any nationalist
campaign is supposed to be the nation. By definition, nations cannot be universal; they
are innately limited (Anderson, 1983, pp. 15–16). And yet their rhetoric hinges on the
universality of the Umma and they repeatedly describe their cause as an integral part of a
global Jihad. How can one conflate parochial and universal elements into a cohesive
identity?
 20 M. Raqib and A.A. Barreto

Interestingly the Taliban are not trailblazers when it comes to combining such
elements. Other societies have endeavored to blend the seemingly contradictory
categories of finite and global. For instance, in the late Ottoman era, Sultan
Abdülhamid stressed his role as caliph in a bid to unite Arab, Kurd, and Turk in a
common Muslim front in the face of growing Christian imperialism (Kayali, 1997, p.
35). Since the dawn of the republican era secularism has been employed to define
official Turkish nationalism. However, its primary purpose was not to differentiate
Turk from non-Turkish minorities, but to distinguish the modern state and its people
from the Ottoman past (Özyürek, 2005). Civic principles of liberty, democracy, and
egalitarianism have been used in several official national discourses in the West. Unlike
the Turkish case, these western examples – e.g., American (Hobsbawm, 1983b, p. 279),
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Australian (Lee, 2003), Canadian (Lee, 2003), and French (Dikeç, 2007, p. 117)
national identities – have failed to completely shaking off their ethnic origins. Pan-
Islamic, tribal, and other identities ‘reinforce nationalism’s ideological premises’
(Wedeen, 2008, p. 10). In this case that which is universal is used by political actors
to imbue greater legitimacy on their unique interpretation of the nation. In the Afghan
context, the role of the Umma in the Taliban’s discourses shares some interesting
parallels with notions of the secular and the modern in Turkey, à la Özyürek’s analysis,
but in reverse. The Taliban contrast a spiritual and legitimate Afghanistan with a
secular, western, and illegitimate deformity.

Pashtunwali and Sharia

The Taliban’s claims that it is on a restorative mission are rather fascinating. It insists that
all ethnic communities — Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, and others — will unite in a
genuinely Islamic regime. It is the only organization capable, so it claims, to bring about
national unity and restore religious righteousness. As Mullah Omar stated:

Our manifesto is that Afghanistan should have a real Islamic regime which is acceptable to
all people of the country. All ethnicities will have participation in the regime… Such
dispensation will entirely focus on conduits to recover the spiritual and material losses that
have been caused by the three decades-long war. (M. Mujahid, 2011)

A bona fide yesterday is juxtaposed to an inauthentic, and hence corrupt, today (Scott,
1985, p. 178). But, national salvation – recovery – lies not in any random bygone era.
Only a return to an appropriate time of yore is acceptable. For the Taliban, the righteous
past was laid in Afghanistan’s Islamic past. Other spiritual and historic epochs –
Zoroastrian, Buddhist, and Hindu – were judged heretical and cast out from the bosom of
a suitable Afghanistan. The Taliban deemed these phases in Afghan history Jahiliyyah – a
period of ignorance preceding the divine grace of Islam. Equally unacceptable was the
more recent period under westernizing kings, the era of godless Soviet domination, and of
course Hamid Karzai’s American-backed government. Although Karzai’s administration
identifies with Islam, its Taliban adversaries insist that his regime is corrupt and propped
up by un-Islamic and foreign powers. If true to their word, the Taliban’s rule would have
brought the Afghan people back to a genuine past. And yet, their tenure displayed a
remarkable deviation from critical facets of the country’s Islamic history. This was the
same criticism the Taliban laid upon Amanullah Khan for promoting the dissemination of
foreign notions and suppressing the ‘traditions of its Mujahid people’ (Kabuli, 2012). Let
 National Identities 21

us examine two pivotal aspects of the Afghan past pushed aside by the Taliban:
Pashtunwali and Afghans’ time-honored Hanafi interpretation of Sharia.
Outside the state-sanctioned system there are a myriad of time-honored dispute
resolution mechanisms. These take on greater exigency where the central polity’s
authority is ineffective and perceived as corrupt. Customary norms exist and thrive in
both modern and traditional societies. But the contrast between modern and pre-modern
forms of administration and jurisprudence bring to mind the broader question of
modernity. Certainly, dramatic changes in the past couple of centuries coincided with
accelerated geographic mobility. Hence, Lindholm (2008, p. 3) described modernity as
‘…the condition of living among strangers.’ Beyond matters of cohabitation, modernity
also implied a new way of thinking. Starting in the seventeenth century, western thought
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shifted from the realm of the spiritual to a world fixated on ‘rational’ thought (Toulmin,
1990, pp. 6–12). This philosophical wave had profound impacts on politics. In this realm,
what most distinguishes the modern state from its predecessors is its vigorous attempt to
supplant non-state or extra-state, albeit conventional, codes with the exclusive force of the
central administration (Migdal, 2001, p. 63; Toulmin, 1990, p. 15). Concurrently,
traditional folk notions of culture are restrained under the weight of a new official and
centralized national culture (Gellner, 1983, p. 76). The heterogeneity of the past gives
way to the strait-jacketed uniformity of modernity.
Traditionally, Afghans lived with three concomitant legal codes: local customary law,
religious law, and the state’s official legal code (Barfield, 2008, p. 351). The most
renowned traditional non-religious legal code in Afghan society is Pashunwali – the
Pashtun code of conduct. For over a century Afghans have resisted efforts by a
modernizing central state to displace Pashtunwali and other local conventions with a
uniform set from Kabul (Barfield, 2008, pp. 349, 352). Additionally, Afghans commonly
preferred to eschew a state system many deemed corrupt (Barfield, 2008, p. 361).
Pashtunwali was based on a different premise from the one imposed by Kabul. The
Pashtun system was frequently employed to resolve quarrels over the three words that
began with the letter ‘z’ in Farsi: zar, zan, and zamin – gold, women, and land (Barfield,
2008, p. 356; Farivar, 2009, p. 83). Rather than focus on imposing and collecting fines or
incarcerating offenders Pashtunwali’s main objective was to restore social harmony
(Barfield, 2008, p. 356). ‘In addition to seeking compensation that will make a victim
whole (to the extent that is possible), Pashtun customary law also attempts to make the
offender publicly and personally accountable for his deeds’ (Barfield, 2008, p. 357).
More than just a legal code, Pashtunwali also regulated interpersonal behavior and
required all to show hospitality; but it also inculcated a strong sense that wrongs
demanded retribution (Farivar, 2009, p. 13). This last quality meant that fulfilling
Pashtunwali, particularly in cases of grievous offenses of any one of the three z’s, could
result in a blood feud (Barfield, 2008, p. 360).
Pashtunwali differed from the state’s system in terms of its outlook and the types of
sanctions it deemed appropriate. But Pashtun conventions also differed from Sharia. For
example, the Fifth Sura of the Quran states that the appropriate punishment for theft is the
amputation of a hand. Under Pashtunwali a robber could merely repay the goods seized
rather than suffer the loss of a body part (Farivar, 2009, p. 13). Punishments differed, but
so too did the reach of these distinct legal traditions. Masood Farivar (2009, p. 12), a
former Mujahid, observed:
 22 M. Raqib and A.A. Barreto

Meanwhile, in matters both important and banal, tribal ways often prevailed despite the
injunctions of Islamic law. Murders were largely unpunished. Few, if any, thieves had their
hands chopped off. Women only occasionally received the legal right to inherit property
promised to them by the new, egalitarian religion.

Incongruities between Pashtunwali and Sharia could have created deep fissures in Afghan
society, but throughout most of the country’s history that was not the case. The peaceful
coexistence of these two systems was possible thanks to the accommodations some
Islamic traditions reached with traditional and non-religion-based norms.
This brings us to another important Taliban deviation from the Afghan past – its
interpretation of Sharia. Doctrinal interpretation is one of the primary goals of the corpus
of religious scholars, the Ulama. Beyond the religious realm Ulama have traditionally
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enjoyed considerable political and social power in Afghanistan (Nawid, 1997).

Historically, their considerable political influence increased during national crises and
aggression by foreign powers. Among Sunni Muslims there are five major schools of
religious law: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Zahiri. Most Afghans followed the
Hanafi legal tradition (Barfield, 2008, p. 352). This was also the most prevalent legal
tradition among South Asian Muslims (Sikand, 2007, p. 96), Ahmad Shah Durani, in the
eighteenth century, established Hanafism as Afghanistan’s official interpretation of Islam
(Nawid, 1997, p. 582).1 Although it is quite conservative Hanafi interpretations of the
Quran made room for local codes such as Pashtunwali (Farivar, 2009, p. 99). This stands
in stark contrast to the ultraorthodox interpretations of the Hanbali school which prevails
throughout most of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the Salafi and Wahabi movements based on the
Arabian peninsular committed to Hanabli interpretations looked down on numerous local
practices and customs tolerated under Hanafism as incompatible with their literalist
interpretation of Islamic scriptures (Farivar, 2009).
Interestingly Pashtunwali’s relationship with Afghan law and Sharia deteriorated
sharply during the Taliban’s tenure. After taking Kabul in 1996 the Taliban pushed aside
the Hanafi tradition in favor of a severe Salafist interpretation of the Quran (Barfield,
2008, pp. 349, 366–367). Rather than seek a peaceful rapprochement among Afghani-
stan’s multiple and well-established legal traditions – both Sunni and Shia – the Taliban
shunned all except for their reading of Sharia and empowered a new Shura of clerics
based in Kandahar, followers of Taliban leader Mullah Omar (Barfield, 2008, pp. 353,
367). This theological interpretation – one new in the Afghan context – branded anything
that did not conform to their standards of appropriate Islamic behavior as blasphemous.
Despite the petition of Imams from other countries the Taliban proceeded with the
demolition of the centuries-old Bamiyan Buddhas in their bid to stamp out idolatry
(Barfield, 2008, p. 367). A more grisly set of examples were on display in the early days
of the Taliban’s incumbency – its take on gender norms. During, and even preceding, the
Soviet occupation women could work outside the home, attend school, and they were not
stoned to death for adultery. All that changed once the Taliban came into power. How did
the new regime justify such a sweeping set of changes, radical alterations to prior Afghan
practices? They did so in the name of the ancient past. As Mullah Amir Khan Mutaqi, the
Taliban’s Minister of Information and Culture stated: ‘There is no possibility of a change
in Islamic principles, which have not changed in the last 1,400 years… These principles
are eternal, and they will remain eternal’ (Burns, 1996). The Taliban movement claimed it
was rooted in Afghan society and tradition. And yet, their tenure marked a profound clash
 National Identities 23

with Pashtunwali and a divergence from the Quranic interpretation most common to
Afghans.
Where were the Taliban trained in the Salafism? Barfield (2008, p. 367) noted that
most of the organization’s leaders were not educated in Afghan madrassas, but in
religious schools in neighboring Pakistan. Religious education in Afghanistan and
Pakistan followed the Deobandi movement followed the Hanafi school of jurisprudence
(Reetz, 2007, p. 140). This movement originated in mid-nineteenth century British India.
The Deobandi movement may have been dominant in South Asian madrassas, but
Salafism had already been introduced into the region before the mid-nineteenth century
(Allen, 2005, pp. 87–88). ‘Ever since Wahhabism took root in Indian soil its adherents
have consistently denied being Wahhabis’ (Allen, 2005, p. 87). Thus, we have a situation
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whereby many schools self-identify as Deobandi all the while they refute assertions of
Salafi influence.
Following the Soviet invasion millions of Afghans fled to Pakistani refugee camps.
The rank and file of the Taliban movement comprised Afghan refugees educated in
religious schools in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (Ewans, 2002,
p. 182; Maley, 1998). During the 1980s Saudi Arabia and Kuwait financed much of the
Afghan resistance, including the new Islamic schools in Pakistan which accepted strong
Salafist influence (Shahzad, 2011, p. 2). Exporting Salafism was part of a Saudi project to
bolster internal legitimacy, particularly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Sikand, 2007,
pp. 95, 99). This collection of foreign-funded school became ‘the nursery from where the
Taliban was raised’ (Samad, 2002, p. 70). Saudi-financed madrassas sidestepped the
Hanafi interpretation of the Afghans in favor of Salafism – the dominant Islamic school
of thought in the Saudi Kingdom (Farivar, 2009, pp. 99, 176). The curriculum in these
madrassas differed from their Afghan counterparts in terms of theological approach and
the time dedicated to teaching religious topics (Farivar, 2009, p. 93). Regardless of the
topic in any class, noted Farivar, the subject of Holy War continually resurfaced (Farivar,
2009, pp. 106–107). For the majority of Afghans jihad centered on liberating their
country from Soviet rule; in contrast, the Arabs invested in the Afghan resistance had a
loftier goal – hoisting the ‘green flag of Islam’ over the USA and Russia (Farivar, 2009,
pp. 5, 6).

A new Afghan nationalism

Appearances can be deceiving. Particularly in the realm of nationalism, phenomena
which appear to have naturally evolved may be artificially selected and facets we
assumed to be ancient can be quite novel. Official narratives are not mere recitations of
the past; rather they are selective and in so doing present a contrived integrated and
shared past (Foster, 1991, p. 242). Societies continuously undergo soul searching with
regards to the ambiguities of the present. The past, in contrast, is romanticized into more
clear-cut categories of uplifting and dark chapters. ‘Ultimately, nationalism rests its
legitimacy on a pseudo geritocracy – the older a claim to primordial origin the greater the
legitimacy of the nationalist claims’ (Barreto, 2009, p. 17; emphasis in the original text).
Thus, nationalist leaders have a vested interest in making claims rooting their cause in the
far past regardless of their narrative’s historic accuracy.
Commonly leaders exploit potent time-honored symbols to camouflage the novelty of
their movements in the validating embrace of antiquity. Indeed, in the nineteenth century
Karl Marx discussed image making in Oliver Cromwell’s Glorious Revolution and Martin
 24 M. Raqib and A.A. Barreto

Luther’s Protestant Reformation. Regarding those important events in European history

he commented:

Thus the awakening of the dead in those revolutions served the purpose of glorifying the new
struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given task in imagination, not of
fleeing from its solution in reality; of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of
making its ghost walk about again (Marx, 1963, p. 17).

Greece envelops itself in symbols over two millennia old to make the claim it is the lone
legitimate heir to the classical Hellenic past (Danforth, 1995). Soon after its inception, the
Israeli state began promoting the study and excavation of key archeological sites to
underscore the region’s ancient Jewish history in a bid to reinforce the assertion that Jews
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were the land’s autochthons (Zerubavel, 1995). The Hashemite state glorified Bedouins in
a bid to forge a new national myth and present itself as an indigenous institution despite
the ruling family’s origins hundreds of kilometers away in the Hijaz (Massad, 2001).
Mexico’s creoles, the white descendants of Spanish immigrants which may include the
offspring of Conquistadores who killed the Emperor Cuauhtémoc, swathe themselves in
icons undeniably linked to the Aztec past (Lafaye, 1976). As Hobsbawm (1983a)
accentuated, the appearance of antiquity does not inoculate traditions from being modern
or even fabricated.
Akin to artists, mythmakers are free to lavish the canvas with the hues and colors of
their choice. Artistic liberty has its limits, however, for these creatives are bound by the
pigments on their pallets. Roosens (1989) emphasized the inventiveness inherent in
nationalist mythmaking. Elites have a wide range of options when forging the great
narrative. They can emphasize one historic phase or icon more than others. And where
popular knowledge is faint, or their rivals are too weak, nationalist mythmakers can even
resort to unbridled historic falsehoods (Roosens, 1989, pp. 160–161). Alternatively,
Motyl (2001) underscored its bounded nature. ‘We cannot invent or imagine ex nihilo’
(Motyl, 2001, p. 59). While they have great flexibility, mythmakers are restricted to
preexisting building blocks. Thus, essential to the nationalist project seems paradoxical:
the production of something synthetic that seems natural (Wilson, 1997, pp. 182–183).
And creating a nationalist narrative is not a one-shot phenomenon; over time this process
of creation and reinvention repeat and evolve (Shelef, 2010).
Infused throughout their rhetoric the Taliban looked longingly to a glorious yesterday –
a time when Afghans were free of foreign domination and lived blissfully according to
the unadulterated dictates of Islam. They are describing their take on an Afghan golden
age – a feature Herzfeld (1997, p. 109) described this important feature as structural
nostalgia. ‘The memory of the golden age signifies the possibility and hope of national
regeneration’ (Smith, 2004, p. 76). The quest to fulfill the purity of an earlier pristine
epoch, a mission aggravated by the innate corrupt of our time, is part and parcel of the
pursuit for authenticity (Smith, 2004, p. 221). In a state of highly unequal balance of
power, attacking the moral caliber of one’s rival is a logical tactic for weaker parties
(Plumb, 1970, p. 48). It is a classic weapon of the weak (Scott, 1985). But that past need
not be historically accurate. Regarding the contemporary politicization of Islam Ayubi
(1991, p. 34) commented: ‘It is one of the ironies of Utopia that nostalgia can indeed be
aroused for things that have never really existed.’ The Taliban juxtaposition of the pure
Islamic Afghan past to the iniquitous foreign-dominated present is reminiscent of
Chatterjee’s (1993, p. 6) discussion of how nineteenth-century Indian nationalists bisected
 National Identities 25

their world into two realms: the spiritual wholesomeness of the domestic inner-sanctum
and the besmirched British-dominated public and governmental spheres. This process
helped to generate an Indian nationalism with a ‘distinctly conservative attitude toward
social beliefs and practices’ (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 116).
As mentioned earlier, the Taliban promoted Salafi Islam. This school of thought
differs from the Hanafism – an interpretation that was deeply engrained in Afghan culture
and made room for customary law such as Pashtunwali. Of course, bypassing
Pashtunwali was a logical move for a movement bent on forging a new pan-ethnic
Afghan identity decoupled from what was perceived as an older Pashtun-centered
national counterparty.
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The predicament of the Taliban is that they use two contradictory sets of legitimacy (the
shariah and Afghan/Pakhtun nationalism) and refuse to address the real issue, that of
ethnicity, except in words. By doing that, they are in tune with the way that Afghan
monarchs had built the State. (Roy, 2002, p. 158)

Still, their marginalization of Pashtunwali and the Hanafism represent a significant

divergence from the status quo ante on such a fundamental issue as the appropriate
interpretation of the Quran is a clear sign that the Taliban cannot be accurately described
as a nationalist movement rooted in the Afghan past, nor is it an indigenous religious
revival movement. Rhetoric aside, the Taliban is a modern nationalist movement wrapped
tightly in the style of a non-native Islam. Their take on Islam was internalized not in their
native land but, as Farivar (2009) witnessed, in Pakistani refugee camps. Regimes are
profoundly scarred by the crises in which they emerge (Dogan & Higley, 1998, p. 5) and
in the past half century the greatest calamity in Afghanistan was the 1979 Soviet
invasion. This calamity led to the deaths and exile of millions of its citizens. It was in
Saudi-financed schools found in Pakistani refugee camps that the Taliban movement
germinated.
Pakistan’s distinctiveness, the raison d’être for its founding, was as a state for
Muslims. Founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a leader with a rather secular outlook, was
known for his ‘ambiguous’ appeals to religion (Jalal, 1994, p. 5). Despite such a
proclivity Jinnah adapted his campaign style and learned to make more strident appeals to
his constituents’ Islamic attitudes as a means to foment support for creating a separate
government for British India’s Muslims (Nasr, 2001, p. 47). Following independence,
secular leaders faced continued pressured to accommodate the religious proclivities of its
populace. These pressures intensified in the wake of Pakistan’s 1965 war with India and
the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, conflicts which gnawed at the legitimacy of the
country’s secular elites (Nasr, 2001, pp. 64, 74). The pendulum harshly swung against
them following the overthrow of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government at the hands of
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. In a bid to legitimize his rule Zia, a known sympathizer
with the Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Party), turned to religion (Nasr, 2001, pp. 97, 135).

What Zia and the military in the end aimed for was to parade the postcolonial state as an
Islamic state, and thereby to enjoy the powers that an Islamic state would have without
bringing about fundamental changes in state institutions. (Nasr, 2001, p. 137)

Zia ruled as Afghan refugees started pouring across the border into Pakistan’s Pashtun-
majority North-West Frontier Province. His administration openly welcomed foreign
 26 M. Raqib and A.A. Barreto

humanitarian supplies for the refugees which included Saudi support for the Mujahadin
war effort and their generous contribution to the madrassas instilling a Salafist
interpretation of the Quran (Farivar, 2009, pp. 99, 176–177). By wrapping his
administration in the cloak of Islam Zia hoped the faith’s legitimating aura would cast
a favorable light on his regime and thus help bolster what had been a weak state (Nasr,
2001, pp. 4, 159). But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with the Iranian
Revolution, antagonized existing tensions between Pakistan’s Sunni majority and its Shia
minority (Nasr, 2002, pp. 87–88; Zahab, 2002, p. 117). Some Sunni political leaders,
particularly in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, viewed these two major events as tremendous
threats and in response supported Pakistan’s new madrassas as bulwark (Nasr, 2002, p.
92). The Pakistan–Taliban connection would also serve the purpose of bringing
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Afghanistan into the Pakistani sphere of influence (Dorronsoro, 2002, p. 170). As an

American ally, Zia also received billions of dollars in military aid during this period.
Thus, Zia was a direct beneficiary of the increased Saudi influence over these schools.
This led, over time, to the Salafization of Taliban education and also to increased
sectarian violence in Pakistan. While claiming to represent an ancient and authentic
Afghan sense of being the Taliban’s idealization of their society is deeply rooted in the
traumatic experiences of an exodus to Pakistan and indoctrination into an Arabian, hence
extraneous, way of interpretation of the Quran.

Conclusion
The adage that appearances can be deceiving is alive and well in the realm of nationalist
mythmaking. Afghanistan’s Taliban are not exempt. Some prominent western academics,
politicians, and especially the Taliban themselves, have portrayed this organization as an
Islamic restoration movement. Boasts of age-old connections do not convert any
organization, or entity for that matter, into an antique. The Taliban is a very modern
movement. Rather than looking back to the founding of Islam in order to find the
Taliban’s roots one is best served by examining the flood of refugees pouring into
Pakistan following the Soviet invasion and Saudi-financed madrassas dotted along the
border. Beyond historic novelty the Taliban movement reveals a great deal about the
orientalist perceptions of many in the West who continuously perceive Muslims as a
homogeneous mass.

Note
1. As is the case with most Shia in Iran, Afghanistan’s Shia minority follow the Jaferi school
(Barfield, 2008, p. 352, n.16).

Notes on contributors
Mariam Raqib, Ph.D., is the Director of the Afghanistan Samsortya. She teaches and lectures in the
greater Boston area is engaged in a reforestation project in Afghanistan.

Amilcar Antonio Barreto is Associate Professor of Political Science at Northeastern University. He

is the author of several books on nationalism including Nationalism and Its Logical Foundations
(2009) and co-editor of American Identity in the Age of Obama (2013).
 National Identities 27

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