216 MESA BULLETIN 26 1992

approaches that could provide important insights to their research. This book
successfully integrates these two intellectual worlds and is accessible and valuable
to both research communities.
Telhami begins with the different roles held by positive, prescriptive and
abstractive theories in foreign policy analysis and an explanation of the role he
sees for formal bargaining theory. Part II analyzes the evolution of the political
preferences of Israel and, particularly, Egypt that led to a situation wherein, after
decades of war, a bilateral agreement became preferable to maintaining the status
quo. Telhami is a structural realist who argues that incremental changes in a
single system-level variable—the international and regional distribution of military
and economic power—provide a more compelling explanation for Camp David
than other factors such as Egypt's economic situation or the personalities of the
major leaders. I was not fully convinced by this argument: the changing distri-
bution of power was certainly important to Egypt and Israel, but the preeminent
role given it here seems overstated.
Part III analyzes the specific contents of the accords using bargaining
theory. To me, these were the most interesting and innovative chapters in the
book. Telhami examines the specific international and domestic objectives each
country hoped to maximize (in addition to those that drove them to the bargaining
table initially) and their tactical preferences regarding the bargaining situation
itself.
The final section evaluates the bargaining performance of Israel and Egypt
(and to a lesser extent the United States). Telhami suggests that two variables,
the system of government and leadership style and personality, can jointly explain
whether a state will use optimal bargaining strategies. Specifically, he argues
that "contrary to intuitive expectations, decentralized systems of government are
more conducive to optimal bargaining behavior than centralized ones. In this
regard the centralized system of government of Egypt impaired Egypt's bargain-
ing ability with Israel, and affected the outcome of the negotiations on some
specific issues in a detrimental way for Egypt... [W]hen personality traits are
taken into account, Sadat's personality proved less conducive to optimal bargain-
ing than Begin's or Carter's. Nonetheless, the outcome fell within the range
expected by the (structurally) specified preferences of the three actors at Camp
David" (p. 158).
Whatever disagreements scholars may have with specific parts of this
book, its intellectual contributions should not be overlooked. It would be interest-
ing to see this approach applied to the bilateral and multilateral Middle East peace
negotiations that began in Madrid in October 1991. DEBORAH J. GERNER
University of Kansas

Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of

Legitimacy, by AMIN SAIKAL & WILLIAM MALEY. 190 pages, index, bibliog-
raphy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. $37.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-8133-1326-0
BOOK REVIEWS: MODERN HISTORY & POLITICS 217

The fall of Kabul to resistance forces in April 1992 ended the struggle between
the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the mujahideen resis-
tance. Whether this marks the beginning of a new period of peace or the renewal
of a civil war with different opponents is still an open question. In this book
Saikal and Maley provide an analysis of the politics of Afghanistan that led to the
establishment of the PDPA regime in 1978, the rise of an Islamic opposition both
within the country and in exile, the Soviet invasion of December 1979 and the
inconclusive war that followed. It concludes with chapters on the Soviet retreat
from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent stalemate between the Kabul regime
and the mujahideen forces. While recent events have rendered a number of their
speculations on Afghanistan's future moot, the book still contains much of value.
The greatest strength of the book is its analysis of national politics in Af-
ghanistan. Despite a tendency to jargon, Saikal and Maley present a cogent
picture of the relationship between the central state and the country's rural
"micro-societies." They are more familiar with the dynamics of national politics
than with those in the countryside. The book has many details about struggles
within the PDPA regime, particularly the conflict between the Khlaq and Parcham
factions for dominance; but the micro-societies are analyzed only in general
terms. The authors cite none of the anthropological works published on rural
Afghanistan before the war began so the significant differences among the many
different ethnic groups are little explored.
The weakest part of the book is an extended attack on the Geneva Accords
and the Soviet withdrawal. Moving from analysis into polemic, the authors
excoriate the United Nations and its representative, Diego Cordovez, for failing
to achieve true peace and handing the Russians a victory. Here, the book's roots
as articles written at the time of the negotiations are all too apparent. For exam-
ple, Saikal and Maley claim that the Soviet army's negotiated "withdrawal could
hardly be seen as grossly detrimental to Soviet interests" (p. 115). With the
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent
Muslim states in central Asia, this may come as a surprise to readers in Moscow.
Much of the problem lies in the book's sources on the negotiations and Soviet
policy. The initial newspaper and radio broadcasts provided only incomplete
information and have been superseded by insider accounts, such as Riaz Khan's
Untying the Afghan Knot (1991), which present a much more complex situation.
The final section, "The Destructuring of Afghanistan," is a sobering
account of the problems that will face any new government in Kabul. Saikal and
Maley note the many changes the war has wrought, including greater urbaniza-
tion, massive loss of life, displacement of populations, destruction of agricultural
land and the fragmentation of authority. While they suggest some possible ways
to facilitate the rebuilding of government authority, they are pessimistic about any
success in the near future. THOMAS J. BARFIELD
Boston University