WHY DID THE BAGDHAD PACT FAIL?

Iker Caperochipi

Las Relaciones Internacionales de los países del Mediterráneo

y América Latina
 1) INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION

During and in the aftermath of Second World War, the importance of the Middle East
exponentially increased due to its oil reserves. Nevertheless, the decolonization spirit
was increasingly powerful, and nationalist movements sought to gain independence
and autonomy from their colonial rule. Great Britain and France, the colonial powers,
assumed this natural phenomenon, but tried to keep their influence in those
territories. Controlling the region was vital for the United States, worried about
communist influence in the region. The ”domino theory”, developed during the 1950s
in response to the expansion of communism in Indochina, contemplated that was
paramount avoiding that any important country fell under communist rule.

This preventive concern would turn into a grave concern when Nasser ascended to
power in 1954 and gained considerable popularity among the Arab community. The
United States and Great Britain saw the emerging pan-Arabism movement as a major
threat to its national interests, as they considered it as a close ideology to communism.
The Baghdad Pact therefore came as an ambitious solution that could deter the spread
of communism and protect the interests of Western power and its Asian allies in the
region. Its origin came from the defensive agreement signed between Iraq and Turkey
in February 1955. The US and Great Britain persuaded Pakistan to incorporate, and
then the latter would also join along Iran. The United States would not join officially
due to the Israeli-Arab conflict and the lack of political support but would sign treaties
with each country and take part in the meetings.

The fast-moving dynamics of that time brought diplomatic successes but also tensions
and difficulties that polarized the region regarding this pact. The accord was one of the
most ambitious political processes built during the Cold War, but finally fell under its
own weight and went down in history as a resounding failure. This paper aims to
expound the different key events in relation to the construction of the pact and its
evolution. However, the focus of the research is on the analysis of the key reasons that
explain the eventual failure of the accord, exploring the different variables and factors
that hindered its effectiveness.
 2) LITERATURE REVIEW

Many writers and specialist have analyzed the attempt of the Baghdad Pact to build an
unprecedented alliance between different regional powers. This is one the most
important phenomenon of the regional dynamics of the Cold War during its beginning
and it is usually mentioned, explained, and well known among scholars. However, its
unsuccessful fate diminished the interest on the topic, and it is commonly perceived as
a irrelevant event in the books of history. This perception is absolutely wrong, as the
pact became one of the most controversial issues of that time and altered the political
regional dynamics. It is also key in order to understand the main events on the
sidelines of Cold War, and it was decisive in some issues that came afterwards.

In relation to the bibliography, aimed at exploring the most relevant events regarding
the pact and its negotiation, “The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defense Policies in
the Middle East” is a fundamental book. Written by Behçet Kemal Yesilbursa, analyzes
chronologically how major events evolved. Even though there are many books based
on the defense policies of Britain and US, or others that focus on the main regional
events and the specific history of members of the pact during the Cold War, this is the
only book that is particularly specialized in the pact, apart from the one that was
published by the own organization in 1961. Yesilbulsa’s book, which was published in
2005 and is opened to free read, offers better historical perspective. It is also vital to
understand the internal structure of the organization and the regulations that guided
its functioning.

In general, it focuses on the role of the Western power on the pact, exploring the
interests and the moves of Great Britain, and notably the United States. It tries to
assert the defense policies of the US during Cold War, explaining how they fitted with
their regional interests and possibilities, outlining too the possibilities and the goals of
the Soviet Union.

Regarding the origin of the pact, one of the concepts that this paper aims to describe is
“The Northern Tier”, an important concept among US policy makers and analysts
referred to the countries that geographically divide Soviet Union and the Middle East.
Donald N. Wilbern (1958) exposes how The Baghdad Pact was pursued by the United
States following this geostrategic plan. The US was seriously concerned after the
victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war, due to the large territory that
communist countries covered and their aim to expand the influence. It is described
how key was controlling the countries that were adjacent to the Soviet Union. While in
Europe West Germany and the neutral Austria could block the communist expansion,
in Asia countries such as Turkey, Iran, Afganisthan or Pakistan (Wilbern, 1958:385) were
key to the US interests, so the pact was very strategic. The paper is of great value to
describe the origin of the pact, the role of US, and the theoretical framework and
strategy that hides.

Relative to this US role, Brew (2015) analyzes in detail the foreign policy in the region
following the Eisenhower Doctrine. The US and its interests are what makes the topic
particularly relevant after all. His work is especially useful for my research, in which is
explained how the Americans put into practice this Cold War doctrine, in order to
prevent Soviet penetration in the region. It shows very accurately the grade of concern
of the US after Nasser’s ascent to power, and how they find a provisional solution to
the Soviet threat attempting to isolate Syria and Egypt and uniting the conservative and
royalist regimes of the region (Brew, 2015:89). These last two studies are highly
valuable to clarify the position and the strategies of the US, and therefore to describe
the Cold War nature of the pact.

Another point of tension that arose in the creation of the pact came from the different
perspectives that US and Great Britain share (Ashton, 1993). The struggle between
both powers hindered the attempt to shape the political interests in the decolonized
region, where the United States set as the ultimate goal the deterrence of communist
expansion, and Britain aimed to keep its economic ties. This is essential to understand
the lack of consistency of the agreement, where interests diverge in many areas.

On the other hand, one of the main sources of inspiration for this research came from
the article “The struggle over Arab hegemony after the Suez Crisis”, written by Elie
Podeh for the Middle Eastern Studies. This study is highly essential as it illustrates
accurately all the main events that took place in Arab community during 1955 and
1957. The Suez War was the conflict that symbolized the division of the Arab
community, between nationalists and leaders that were friendly to the West, and it got
eventually mixed with the controversial accord.

The paper focuses on Egypt’s role, which is significantly important due to the influence
that Nasser had in the process of negotiations. As a new leader of the Arab world and a
foe for the US, he confronted the key country of the pact, Iraq, suspecting of its real
interests. He tried to isolate Iraq from the Arab community, taking advantage of its
neutral positioning during the Suez Crisis and towards Israel (Podeh, 1993:96). He
portrayed that supporting the agreement was equal to befriend Iraq. The relations with
other royalist states as Saudi Arabia and Jordan were also tricky, and Nasser managed
to move cleverly and persuade the Arab community and some of the leaders to reject
the accord. In this way, this study is key to appreciate the leading role of Nasser as the
main critic and opposition leader to the agreement and to analyze the tumultuous
negotiations that took place.

Elie Podeh’s work shows the importance of the contraposition between Egypt and Iraq
for the final resolution of the negotiations. While Iran was a natural ally for the US after
the military coup in 1953 and was not usually involved in Middle East affair, Iraq’s role
was particularly key, as it became of the main regional powers after a serious recession
during 2WW. The Hashemite dynasty and their large population made Iraq very
influential and the main rival for Egypt, being the leader of one political side of the
public debate in the Arab community, as it is describe by Wolfe-Hunnicut (2015). The
paper illustrates how the negotiations were affected by the instability of the Iraqi
regime. The internal politics of the country led to different events as the 14 July
Revolution in 1958 which became a turning point to the future of the pact, explained in
detail in this work, and truly relevant for my study.

In relation to the rest of the members, it is not less important to consider their role as
regional powers. Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey were highly populated countries that
shared religious, historical, and political features, and strategic and national interests.
Hasan (1964) explains how these countries benefitted from the agreement with diverse
economic projects, and how they all shared a feeling of disappointment and
dissatisfaction towards the Western countries, which finally resulted decisive for the
future of the pact. This was caused by different national issues where the countries did
not find the support of its “Western allies”, such as the Turkish conflict in Cyprus or the
Pakistani claims in Kashmir (Hasan, 1964:281). After being loyal allies especially for the
US, they believed that the favor was not returned back.

As it was stated before, the real turning point for the pact came from the Iraqi
revolution, which brought the restructuration of the pact, renamed CENTO. This led to
a new final period of the agreement, described by Göktepe (1999), where the US lost
interest due to the stabilization of bilateral relations with Nasser, despite the political
differences. The writer also explains how the final period was characterized by the
divergence between priorities, policies, and national interests. The expectations of
economic and political support from the US and Great Britain would not match their
commitment will (Göktepe, 1999:121). The members used the organization as a forum
where they could ideas and debate political decisions, but the credibility of CENTO as a
military and defensive alliance lost all credibility. The group did not have any add value
anymore.
 3) CONCLUSION

The Baghdad Pact was an ambitious solution for the threat of Western national
interests in the region, as an alliance that could contribute to the deterrence of
communism. But the study demonstrates that the interests of the Western countries,
particularly the US, were wider. The Northern Tier allowed to deter communism from
expanding and to have influence in key countries that were regional powers and whose
geographic position were strategic. After decolonization and the loss of influence of
countries as France and Great Britain, it was vital filling that gap before the Soviets
attempted to. Isolating Syria and Egypt, promoters of the new threatening pan-Arabist
ideology, was therefore of high priority. As they would do successfully in the next
decades, the US wanted to bring the Arab conservatives to its side, but they did not
consider the diverse points of confrontations between those countries that would
hinder the agreement.

Power interests between different monarchies such as Iraqi Hashemites and Saud, or
ideological differences between pan-Arabist countries and royalists were big obstacles
for the consensus. Iraq did not manage to bring their fellow Hashemites of Jordan to
the pact, as king Husayn wanted to keep the country neutral in their position towards
Nasser. So the “domino” that would push the rest of the Arab countries to join after
Jordan had signed, did not happen. Due to its historic enmity with Hashemites, Saudi
Arabia positioned itself totally against Iraq, aligning with Egypt in the opposing side of
the agreement. However, this artificial alliance was not solid and soon hostilities would
begin between both countries, especially once the civil war in Yemen had started.

The decolonization spirit was increasingly powerful, and nationalist movements sought
to gain independence and autonomy from their former colonizers. Because of that, the
narrative that tried to legitimize the agreement was quite weak, as many actors saw
the accord as post-colonial, fostered by Western interests. The governments that were
interested to join faced a strong opposition.

The Western powers underestimated the power of Nasser, which became the main
obstacle for the progress of the pact. While the Arab community saw him as the new
leader of the region, his message of pan-Arabism and opposition to the alliance
became extremely powerful, and Arab countries therefore found severe difficulties lo
legitimize their incorporation. No regime wanted to take unpopular decisions,
especially in such a political turmoil era. In addition, during the key moment of the
negotiations for the accession of many Arab countries to the pact, the Suez Crisis
would divide the region in 1956. The different national interests mentioned before
would arise and crash, hindering the diplomatic efforts. The region was a powder keg
due to the power struggle between diverse groups, and Nasser’s message of unity
became stronger than ever.

It is also important to consider that the actors that were interested to join the alliance
were young countries, where the ruling government did not have the support of all
sectors of the population. The regional unrest brought destabilizing events that altered
the national interests of the states. These weak governments could not avoid some
dramatic events from happening, such as the 14 July Revolution that overthrew the
Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, and which became a considerable turning point for the
alliance. Without them, the accord seemed an artificial alliance between countries with
few in common. Iraq was key, due to its geographically strategic position between Iran
and Turkey, and because it was the only Arab country. Without them, no Arab country
would be willing to join. The organization, renamed CENTO, therefore lost its
significance.

The lack of US commitment with the alliance, moreover, diminished its influence and
effectiveness. NATO was the central political strategy for the Americans, which did not
find enough internal political support and faced a brutal opposition from the influential
Jewish lobby. They expected to take advantage from the alliance but without making any
relevant effort. However, the main incentives from the members were the benefits they
could take from cooperating with the US. And over time the alliance seem increasingly
artificial, as the members did not share many interests and reach common points, and
they could anyway reach their goals through bilateral means, without the need of the
alliance. Doomed to irrelevancy, the organization would find its death sentence with the
Iranian Revolution.
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