SMART 20190024 Study On Selected Issues Relating To The Application of The CRM Directive 002 1t6nLoSSteh97SGPrDKCmhLKkxs 81238

Study on selected issues
relating to the application of

the CRM Directive
Final report
Written by Visionary Analytics with support from external experts (Tarja Koskinen-Olsson,
dr. Lucie Guibault, dr. Sylvie Nérisson, dr. Gergely Békés, and Mari Wallgren).
This study was carried out for the European Commission by Visionary Analytics
with support from external experts (Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, Dr Lucie Guibault, Dr
Sylvie Nérisson, Dr Gergely Békés, and Mari Wallgren).
Internal identification
Contract number: LC-01527861
VIGIE number: 2020-658
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology
Directorate I— Media Policy
Unit I.2 — Copyright
Contact: cnect-i2@ec.europa.eu
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Study on selected issues relating to

the application of the CRM Directive
Final report
Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology

2021 EN
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STUDY ON THE SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE CRM
DIRECTIVE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... 6
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................... 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 9
1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................12
2. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................16
3. OVERALL STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS ON COLLECTIVE RIGHTS MANAGEMENT IN
EUROPE...............................................................................................................23
4. THE RELATIONS OF THE CMOS WITH THEIR MEMBERS, RIGHTHOLDERS AND
OTHER CMOS .......................................................................................................27
5. RELATIONS BETWEEN CMOS AND USERS ................................................................47
6. CMOS ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE UNION AND OPERATING IN THE UNION ................57
7. INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT ENTITIES ..................................................................68
8. ENTITIES THAT ARE ACTIVE ON THE RIGHTS MANAGEMENT MARKET BUT DO NOT
FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF EITHER CMO OR IME ............................................80
9. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN COMPETENT AUTHORITIES ...........................88
10. LEGAL DISPUTES ..................................................................................................90
11. CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................................92
12. ANNEX 1 – NATIONAL TRANSPOSITION OF THE DIRECTIVE .......................................96
13. ANNEX 2 – QUESTIONNAIRES FOR STAKEHOLDERS..................................................97
14. ANNEX 4 – LIST OF LEGAL PROVISIONS APPLIED BY MEMBER STATES TO NON-EU
CMOs, IMEs AND OTHER ENTITIES ....................................................................... 147
15. ANNEX 5 – DESCRIPTION OF LEGAL DISPUTES ...................................................... 186
16. ANNEX 6 – LIST OF IDENTIFIED THIRD-TYPE ENTITIES........................................... 198
17. ANNEX 7 – THEMATIC QUESTION BLOCKS OF RESPONDENT SURVEYS ...................... 200
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DIRECTIVE
Abbreviations
Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

The Directive/ of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright and
CRM Directive related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works
for online use in the internal market
A national authority of the EU Member State responsible for ensuring

NA
compliance with the rules stemming from the Directive
CRM Collective rights management
EU European Union
EC European Commission
The Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and

DG CONNECT
Technology of the European Commission
MS Member States
EEA European Economic Area
UK United Kingdom
CMO Collective management organization
IME Independent management entity
Non-EU CRM Collective rights management entity established outside the

entity European Union and operating in the European Union
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DIRECTIVE
Glossary
Collective Rights Management Directive – Directive 2014/26/EU of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on collective management of copyright
and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in
the internal market, OJ L84/72.
CRM entity – an organization that licenses and manages copyrighted works on behalf of
copyright owners. Two main types of CRM entities discussed in this report are CMOs and
IMEs.
Collective management organisation (CMO) – any organisation which is authorised by

law or by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual arrangement to manage
copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder, for the
collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which fulfils one or
both of the following criteria:
i. it is owned or controlled by its members.
ii. it is organised on a not-for-profit basis.
Independent management entity (IME) – any organisation which is authorised by law or
by way of assignment, licence or any other contractual arrangement to manage copyright
or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder, for the collective
benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which is:
i. neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by rightholders;
and
ii. organised on a for-profit basis.
Non-EU CMO – collective management organisation whose primary establishment is

outside of the EU and which operates on the EU collective rights management market.
Third-type (other) entity – any organisation that is active on the collective rights
management market, e. g. through the collection or distribution of royalties and that does
not fall within the definition of a ‘collective management organisation’ or ‘independent
management entity’.
Rightholder – any person or entity, other than a collective management organisation, that
holds a copyright or related right or, under an agreement for the exploitation of rights or by
law, is entitled to a share of revenue from the rights.
Member – a rightholder or an entity representing rightholders, including other collective

management organisations and associations of rightholders, fulfilling the membership
requirements of the collective management organisation and admitted by it.
User – any person or entity that is carrying out acts subject to the authorisation of
rightholders, remuneration of rightholders or payment of compensation to rightholders and
is not acting in the capacity of a consumer.
European Economic Area (EEA) – includes all of the EU countries as well as Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway.
Management fees – the amounts charged, deducted or offset by a collective

management organisation from rights revenue or from any income arising from the
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DIRECTIVE
investment of rights revenue in order to cover the costs of its management of copyright or
related rights.
Representation agreement – any agreement between collective management

organisations whereby one collective management organisation mandates another
collective management organisation to manage the rights it represents, including an
agreement concluded under Articles 29 and 30 of Directive 2014/26/EU.
Rights revenue – income collected by a collective management organisation on behalf of

rightholders, whether deriving from an exclusive right, a right to remuneration or a right to
compensation.
Statute – memorandum and articles of association, statute, rules or documents of

constitution of a collective management organisation.
Annual transparency report – a public annual report published by collective

management organisations for each financial year.
Private copying levy – a government-mandated scheme in which a special tax or levy

(additional to any general sales tax) is charged on purchases of recordable media.
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Executive summary
a. Rationale and scope of the study

The overall objective of this study is to support the Commission in its Report on the
application of the Directive pursuant to Article 40 of the Directive. Specifically, the study
aims to provide information and evidence to assess the implementation of the first
objective of the Directive – improving the way in which EU-based CMOs are managed by
establishing common governance, transparency, and financial management standards.
Another thread of work in this study relates to the various actors active on the collective
management market across the EEA, including IMEs that are subject to specific
provisions of the Directive.
In terms of thematic scope, the study focuses on the functioning of the rules of the CRM
Directive and their effect in six areas: (1) governance and transparency of collective
management organisations (CMOs) and their relationships with rightholders; (2) relations
between CMOs and users; (3) CRM entities established outside the EU, but operating in
the Union (non-EU CRM entities); (4) Independent management entities (IMEs); (5)
entities that are active on the rights management market but do not fall within the
definition of either CMO or IME; (6) collaboration and exchange of information between
competent national authorities.
b. Methodological approach
The report draws on findings collected through a range of methodological tools:
 Desk research. Exploratory desk research allowed for the mapping of CMOs,
IMEs, non-EU CRM entities, rightholder and user associations as well as other
entities present in the CRM market. It also served to describe their characteristics,
as well as legal disputes. Complementary desk research filled in the information
gaps remaining after the surveys regarding the formal application of the Directive’s
rules, the functioning of the Directive in particular countries, legal disputes,
selected case examples, and a description of organisations in the CRM market.
 Legal analysis was carried out to identify, list and analyse rules applicable to
IMEs, non-EU CRM entities and other entities in each Member State.
 Six surveys were launched that were tailored for each group of stakeholders, i.e.,
competent national authorities, CMOs, non-EU CRM entities, IMEs, rightholders,
and users. Surveys were filled out by 21 of 27 authorities, 100 out of 254 CMOs, 9
out of 32 IMEs, 10 out of 33 non-EU CRM entities, 1,219 rightholders, and 28
users.
 Interviews. Eight exploratory interviews were carried out with the
representatives of the European Commission responsible for the monitoring of the
Directive’s implementation (1), representatives of one competent national authority
(1), pan-European or international associations or networks of CMOs (4), national
CMOs (1), other stakeholders (1). 35 complementary interviews (three of which
were in written form), were carried out after the completion of the surveys with
competent national authorities (5), CMOs (national CMOs and organisations of
CMOs) (6), IMEs (5), rightholders (individual rightholders and their associations)
(6), users (individual users and user associations) (11), other stakeholders (2).
9
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c. Key findings
Governance and transparency of CMOs

The CRM Directive inter alia aimed to strengthen the protection of the interests of
members of CMOs, rightholders and third parties. Therefore, it established common
minimum requirements regarding the governance, financial management, transparency
and reporting of CMOs. The available evidence suggests that, overall, the Directive has
achieved this objective. Although with delays, the Directive has been transposed into
national legal acts and its provisions are being effectively applied. Overall, most
stakeholders consider the existing legal framework as being effective in protecting the
interests of rightholders. While the Directive has had an overall positive impact on
governance, transparency and the financial management of CMOs, its implementation
and application of its provisions differs from country to country and between specific
CMOs. Evidence collected for this study points to several challenges. These can be
grouped into two categories: issues in the application and challenges related to the
empowerment of rightholders in exercising their rights. These challenges, however, do not
negate the overall positive impact of the Directive as a benchmark for protecting the
interests of members of CMOs, rightholders and third parties.
Relations with users

The objective of Chapter 4 of Title II of the Directive was to ensure a smooth and fair
licensing environment by setting forth the rules governing the relations between CMOs
and users. In particular, it sought to ensure that licensing negotiations are carried out in
good faith and that licensing terms would be set following objective and non-discriminatory
criteria but it also set reporting obligations to the CMOs for users.. Evidence collected for
this study suggests that the Directive has achieved its objectives. Most stakeholders agree
that the system functions relatively well in the areas of tariff-setting and licensing
negotiations, and that the provisions laid down in the Directive are enforced. They also
point out that the Directive created a more systemic approach to the licensing process.
Nevertheless, users and CMOs face challenges in applying certain provisions of the
Directive related to the exchange of information. The study showed that only a third of
CMOs are satisfied with the overall reporting by users. This relates both to the timeliness,
accuracy and agreed-upon format for the reports. The study did not find evidence that this
problem is related to any particular sector or country, but rather that the quality of the
reports differs from user to user. And yet, stakeholders point out that it is more
pronounced in the case of smaller users which usually have lower administrative and
financial capacities. On their side, users point to the lack and clarity of certain information
(i.e. standard applicable tariffs and licensing contract) provided by CMOs. However, while
the problems identified may cause some delays and additional burdens to stakeholders,
they do not create severe disruptions in the overall licensing environment.
Diversity of actors on, or navigating around the CRM market in Europe
The organisational landscape of CRM entities in Europe is diverse. EEA-based CMOs are
by far the largest organisations in terms of the number of represented rightholders and
revenue. However, other types of entities are active on the rights management market or
navigate around that market. These include independent management entities (IMEs),
CRM entities established outside of the EU but operating in the Member States (non-EU
CRM entities) and other organisations active in or around the rights management market
but falling outside the definition of a CMO or IME.
The evidence suggests that the adoption of the Directive had a positive impact on IMEs.
First, it provided legal certainty for the operation of IMEs as actors in the collective
10
DIRECTIVE
management market, working alongside historically established CMOs. Second, the

Directive introduced minimum transparency requirements for the IMEs, which bolstered
the trust of rightholders in such entities and made such entities more accountable. Both of
these factors have likely contributed to the establishment of new IMEs. The increasing
numbers and variety of CRM entities fosters competition and provides the rightholders
with an increasing choice as to which organisations represent their interests the best.
The Directive as well as national legislation establishes different sets of obligations for
EEA-based CMOs and IMEs and CRM entities established outside of the EU. The study
tested whether such a regulation per se distorts competition by providing an advantage to
a specific type of organisation. We found that a minority of representatives of each of the
three types of organisations did indeed feel disadvantaged vis à vis other types of
organisations. However, on balance, we did not find evidence that applicable legislation
systematically places some types of CRM entities at a competitive disadvantage.
The study also found that the adoption of the Directive has contributed to harmonising
legal obligations faced by various types of CRM entities across the EU. This has
contributed to a deepening of the single market by facilitating the work of CMOs and IMEs
across national borders and to provide services in multiple Member States. However, the
different obligations imposed on IMEs by national legislation across Member States can
increase the costs of accessing national markets. While some Member States recognise
EU IMEs automatically, others require a separate process of notification/authorisation.
Exchange of information between competent authorities

Article 37 of the Directive introduced a formal mechanism by which competent authorities
can cooperate and exchange information between each other. The evidence collected for
this study shows that this mechanism is used by authorities when needed, albeit not
frequently. While the reasons behind the infrequent use vary, they are not related to the
design of the mechanism or a reluctance to cooperate and exchange information. The
evidence suggests that national authorities are motivated for cooperation and the
exchange of knowledge. The mechanism could be further improved by developing
common infrastructures such as databases or contact platforms for authorities for a more
systematic joint collaboration.
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DIRECTIVE
1. Introduction
This is the Final Report of the project. As such, it presents findings from data collection
and analysis and offers conclusions.
a. Context
Copyright-intensive industries1 are an important part of the economy contributing to

economic, social, and cultural development across the EU and global markets. In the
period of 2014-2016, copyright-intensive industries accounted for 5.55% of all jobs in the
EU and generated 7% of the total EU GDP.2 In the last few years, European creative
industries have been steadily growing showing an aggregate 17.1% 5-year increase in
royalties’ collection for all sectors (music, audiovisual, dramatic, visual and literary) during
2014-2018. 3 In 2019, more than half of worldwide collections were generated in Europe
constituting EUR 5.5 bn with 6.5% annual growth.4
CRM entities play a particularly important role within the ecosystem of copyright
industries. Authors, such as writers, composers, performers, artists and other creators
(rightholders hereafter) hold economic rights that enable them to get remunerated for the
use of copyright-protected material and other subject matter created and/or produced by
them.5 In many cases, it is neither effective, nor efficient for the rightholders to individually
license the content due to high transaction costs. This problem is addressed by the
collective rights management (CRM) system, whereby a CRM entity acts as a trustee of
multiple rightholders and jointly administers the rights, monitors the use, collects and
distributes royalties.6 The overarching objective of the system is to ensure an appropriate
remuneration for rightholders, while at the same time providing broad public access to the
creative works.7
To facilitate the further growth of copyright-intensive industries, in 2014 the European

Parliament and the Council adopted the Collective Rights Management Directive (the
1 Copyright-intensive industries include information services such as publishing activities (books, periodicals
and software), motion pictures, video and television programme production, sound recording and music
publishing activities, programming and broadcasting activities, computer programming, architectural and
engineering services, advertising, design activities, photographic activities, translation and interpretation
activities, creative, arts and entertainment activities.
2 https://www.boip.int/uploads/inline/WEB_IPR_intensive_Report_2019.pdf
3 CISAC (2019). Global Collections report for 2018 https://www.cisac.org/services/reports-and-
research/global-collections-report Note: data does not include collections of members of other umbrella
associations than CISAC, such as AEPO, IFPI, AGICOA and IFRRO.
4 CISAC (2019). Global Collections report for 2019. https://www.cisac.org/services/reports-and-
5 S. Dusollier, C. Ker, M. Iglesias, Y. Smits, Contractual Arrangements applicable to Creators: Law and
Practice of selected Member States, Study for the European Parliament, 2014, available at
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/493041/IPOL-
JURI_ET%282014%29493041_EN.pdf
6 On CRM in the world: J. Drexl, Collective Rights Management Organisations, chapter 11 of Copyright,
Competition and Development, Report mandated by WIPO, 2013, available at

https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/copyright_competition_development.pdf; D.
Gervais, Collective Management of Copyrights and related Rights, especially the chapter “Collective
Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age”, Kluwer Law International, 2015.
7 EPO & EUIPO (2019). IPR-intensive industries and economic performance in the European Union.
https://www.boip.int/uploads/inline/WEB_IPR_intensive_Report_2019.pdf, p. 32.
12
DIRECTIVE
Directive hereafter).8 It sought to address two key challenges – the poor standards of
multi-territorial licensing and CRM entity governance. The 2005 EC Recommendation9
showed that the market for online music service provision was being hindered because
the core services of ‘cross-border granting of licences to commercial users’ and ‘cross-
border distribution of royalties’ did not function optimally. As noted in the Directive, the
complex and difficult management of collective rights in Europe has ‘exacerbated the
fragmentation of the European digital market for online music services'.10
At the same time, collecting societies were criticised for insufficient governance and
transparency standards as well as risky financial management. During the period of 2005
– 2015 a large number of problematic issues across numerous Member States has
highlighted the need to improve governance and the transparency of CRM entities.
Problems relating to the management of CRM entities have resulted in ‘inefficiencies in
the exploitation of copyright and related rights across the internal market, to the detriment
of the members of collective management organisations, rightholders and users.11 The
problem of poor governance was exacerbated in Member States, where CMOs had a
quasi-monopoly position: the rightholders could neither join a better functioning CMO, nor
initiate changes from within the established CMO.
The Directive addresses the above-mentioned issues and sets the minimum common
standards for collective rights management in the European Union (EU). Specifically, the
Directive has three major objectives12: (1) improving the way in which EU-based CMOs
are managed by establishing common governance, transparency and financial
management standards, (2) setting common standards for the multi-territorial licensing by
authors' CMOs of rights in musical works for the provision of online services, (3) creating
conditions that can expand the legal offer of online music.
The Directive was due to be transposed to national legislations of the EU Member States
by 10 April 2016. However, all Member States except Estonia, Denmark and Slovakia
adopted the relevant national legislation after the deadline with the final countries
transposing the Directive in early 2019 (see Annex 1).
b. Objectives and scope of the Study
The overall objective of this study is to support the Commission in view of the Report on
the Application of the Directive pursuant to Article 40 of the Directive. Specifically, the
study aims to provide information and evidence to assess the implementation of the first
objective of the Directive – improving the way in which EU-based CMOs are managed by
establishing common governance, transparency, and financial management standards.
Another area of work covered in this study relates to the various actors active on the
collective management market across the EEA.
8 Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright
and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market,
24 February 2014.
9 Cited from Lodder, A. L. & A. D. Murray (eds.) (2017) EU Regulation of E-Commerce. A Commentary.
Edward Elgar Publishing.

10 CRM Directive, Recital 38
11 CRM Directive, Recital 5
12 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/collective-rights-management-directive
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DIRECTIVE
In terms of thematic scope, the study focuses on the functioning of the rules of the CRM
Directive and their effects in six areas:
 Governance and transparency of collective management organisations (CMOs)

and their relationships with rightholders
 Relations between CMOs and users
 CRM entities established outside the EU, but operating in the Union (non-EU CRM
entities)
 Independent management entities (IMEs)
 Entities that are active on the rights management market but do not fall within the
definition of either CMO or IME
 Collaboration and exchange of information between competent authorities in the
field
The CRM Directive identifies two main types of CRM entities: collective management
organisations (CMOs) and independent management entities (IMEs). CMOs are not-for-
profit organisations or are owned and controlled by their members i.e. the rightholders.
IMEs, by contrast, are for-profit commercial entities that are not owned or controlled by
rightholders.
The study is focused on CRM entities representing rightholders in five major sectors, i.e.
audiovisual, drama, music, visual arts, literary and publishing:
 CRM entities in the music sector represent rightholders such as composers,

lyricists, music publishers, performers and phonogram producers, etc.
 CRM entities in the audiovisual sector predominantly cover the rights related to
films and television programmes and represent rightholders such as film
producers, actors, and film authors (directors, authors of scenarios and dialogues,
composers, etc.)
 CRM entities in the dramatic arts sector encompass theatrical plays and operas
and represent the rights of playwrights, choreographers, composers, etc.
 Visual arts include plastic and graphic arts and photography where CRM entities
represent the rights of painters, sculptors, graphic designers, photographers, etc.
 CRM entities in the literary and publishing sector oversee the rights related to
the copying of books, newspapers, magazines and works published offline and
online, and represent authors such as writers, translators, journalists, publishers,
etc.
The study covers CRM entities of both specialised and general profiles. They may
represent any of the following:
 Rightholders of a particular category, such as music performers or phonogram

producers (exclusively),
 The entire range of rights related to a particular sector (e.g., music (composers,
lyric writes, music publishers, performers, and phonogram producers),
 Rights of rightholders in different copyright sectors (e.g., literary, dramatic, visual
and audiovisual, etc.).
Geographically, the scope of this study covers:

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DIRECTIVE
 The EU as a whole yet with a special focus on each of the 27 MS individually.

 In some Tasks, the study also refers to EEA countries, i.e., Iceland, Liechtenstein
and Norway (in particular in Task 4, but also in Tasks 3 and 5).
c. Structure of the Final Report
This report is structured based on the six thematic tasks of the study and the work
undertaken:
 Section 2: Methodology
 Section 3: Overall stakeholder views on the functioning of collective rights
management in Europe
 Section 4: The relations of the CMOs with their members, rightholders and other
CMOs
 Section 5: The relations between CMOs and users
 Section 6: CRM entities established outside of the Union and operating in the
Union
 Chapter 7: Independent management entities
 Chapter 8: Entities that are active on the rights management market but do not fall
within the definition of either a CMO or IME
 Chapter 9: Exchange of information between competent authorities
 Chapter 10: Legal disputes
Additionally, the report includes 7 Annexes:
 Annex 1: transposition timeline of the Directive in EU MS

 Annex 2: survey questionnaires of various stakeholders (national authorities,
CMOs, IMEs, non-EU CRM entities, rightholders and users)
 Annex 3: database of stakeholders
 Annex 4: list of national legal provisions applied to non-EU CMOs, IMEs and other
entities
 Annex 5: information on legal disputes
 Annex 6: list of identified other entities operating on the CRM market
 Annex 7: thematic questions for each respondent group
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DIRECTIVE
2. Methodology
This section sets out our approach and methodology for the study (see Figure 2-1 below).
Subsections below present the methodology for collecting primary data – surveys,
interviews and desk research (incl. legal analysis).
Figure 2-1. Study phases and methods

PHASE 3:
PHASE 1: MAPPING AND
VERIFICATION
METHODOLOGICAL PHASE 2: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
AND
DEVELOPMENT
FINALISATION
Exploratory desk research Complementary desk Data verification with

research Authorities
Exploratory interviews
Complementary
Surveys interviews
Operationalisation of Triangulation of
study questions collected evidence,
development of
Development of the recommendations
methodology
INCEPTION REPORT INTERIM REPORT FINAL REPORT
T0 T0+17 weeks
a. Desk research
The overall objective of desk research was twofold. The exploratory desk research was
mainly aimed at mapping CMOs, IMEs, non-EU CRM entities, and other organisations
operating in the CRM market and to collect data on their characteristics. In addition, it was
used to review the existing knowledge base and to identify legal disputes.
Complementary desk research was aimed at filling information gaps remaining after the
survey. More specifically, it was used for the following purposes:
 In-depth analysis of the formal application of the rules stemming from the Directive.
 Complementing information on the functioning of the Directive and its effects in a
particular country (if other methods failed to provide the necessary information).
 Analysis of the legal disputes and specific examples identified through the
exploratory desk research, interviews, and surveys.
 Complementing or gathering information on selected case examples.
 Description of CRM organisations identified during the survey.
b. Surveys
Overall, 6 surveys were launched for each group of the following stakeholders: Authorities,
CMOs, non-EU CRM entities, IMEs, rightholders, and users. While questionnaires do
16
DIRECTIVE
contain common questions, most of the questions are tailored for specific types of
respondents (see Table 2-1). The questionnaires are provided in Annex 2.
Table 2-1. Thematic question blocks for each group of respondents

Group of
Thematic question blocks
respondents
1. Introductory questions
2. Questions on the overall functioning of collective rights management in
the country
3. Questions on the rights of rightholders
4. Questions regarding the management of rights revenue
5. Questions regarding the transparency of CMOs
6. Questions regarding the relationships between CMOs and users
National 7. Questions on CRM entities established outside of the EU, but operating
authorities in the EU Member States
8. Questions on IMEs
9. Questions on the third-type of entities active in the collective rights
management market
10. Questions on collaboration between competent authorities from different
MS
11. Questions on legal disputes
12. Concluding questions
the country
3. Questions on a possible change in legal status for the organisation
4. Questions on the rights of rightholders (Article 5)
5. Questions on managing the rights of rightholders on behalf of other
CMOs
CMOs
6. Questions on managing the rights of rightholders
7. Questions on licensing and users’ obligations
8. Questions regarding other market players
10. Closing questions
2. Questions on the mode of operation in the EU market and reasons for
entry into the EU
Non-EU CRM
3. Questions on the applicable regulatory framework within the EU
entities
4. Questions on other non-EU based CRM entities
5. Questions about legal disputes
the country
3. Questions on a possible change of the legal status of your organisation
IMEs 4. Questions on licensing
5. Questions regarding other market players and potential issues related to
business activity
2. Questions on the overall experience with their CMO
3. Questions on the withdrawal of rights
Rightholders 4. Questions on the governance of CMOs
5. Questions on the financial management of rights revenue
6. Questions on their overall experience with their IME (if applicable)
Users
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Group of
respondents
the country
3. Questions on the exchange of information with CRM entities
4. Questions on the effects of the rightholders’ right to withdraw from CRM
entities
Identification of Survey Respondents

We have mapped and identified six groups of respondents. The mapping resulted in the
lists of Authorities, CMOs, IMEs, non-EU CRM entities, rightholder associations and user
associations (see Annex 3). The strategy for the identification of the relevant respondents
was as follows:
 Authorities. The list of Authorities available on the DG CONNECT website

provided a useful starting point. We used further desk research to identify
Authorities that were not included in the list. DG CONNECT provided the names of
respondents that have given their consent to share their contact details. The
remaining respondents were identified through desk research. The final list of
Authorities includes contact details of relevant national representatives in 27 EU
MS.
 CMOs. A list of 256 CMOs across EU MS was developed during the Inception
phase. The list of CMOs available on the DG CONNECT website provided a
starting point. To complement the list, we used desk research to identify additional
organisations. Key sources include a) information publicly provided by the
Authorities (however, this is not the case for all EU Member States); b) member
lists of pan-European umbrella CMO organisations, such as The European
Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers (GESAC), European Visual
Artists (EVA), Association of European Performers' Organisations (AEPO-ARTIS)
and similar. Wherever possible, we aimed to identify contacts for the CEO or COO
of respective CMOs. If such information was not available, we obtained the
contacts of other representatives or generic email addresses. Sectorial distribution
of the final CMOs list is the following:
- 69 CMOs operating exclusively in the music sector
- 21 CMOs operating exclusively in the visual arts sector
- 46 CMOs operating exclusively in the audiovisual sector
- 33 CMOs operating exclusively in the literary and publishing sector
- 6 CMOs operating exclusively in the dramatic arts sector
- 79 CMOs operating in multiple sectors
 IMEs, non-EU CRM entities. Lists of 32 IMEs and 33 non-EU CRM entities
operating on the EU market were compiled. Official lists publicly provided by some
Authorities provided a starting point for the identification of such organisations.
Whenever this was not the case, we used additional desk research to identify
relevant IMEs and non-EU CRM entities. Furthermore, questionnaires for
Authorities included questions asking to cross check the lists obtained through
desk research as well as to provide the names of missing organisations.
Questionnaires for CMOs and non-EU CRM entities included questions asking
them to identify non-EU CRM entities of which they know.
 Rightholders. For reaching out to rightholders, we used a mixed strategy:
reaching rightholders through CMOs and through rightholders’ associations. For
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this purpose, the surveys of CMOs included a request to distribute a link to their
members. Additionally, we collected the contacts of 341 associations representing
rightholders in different sectors (music, visual, audiovisual, literature and dramatic
arts).
 Users. We used the same approach for reaching out to users. Survey of CMOs
included requests to distribute the user survey to their users. Additionally, we
collected the contacts of 92 national user associations (e.g. national broadcasters,
associations of restaurants, hotels), 72 individual users (including individual radio
stations and TV channels, national theatres or national libraries) as well as 12
online streaming platforms (e.g. Netflix, Spotify).
Survey response rate

Table 2-2 below provides descriptive statistics on respondents targeted and the
questionnaires that were filled in. Since most questionnaires to rightholders and users
were distributed by associations and CMOs, we can only estimate the number of filled in
questionnaires.
Table 2-2. Respondents targeted and questionnaires filled in

Total respondents No. of filled in Response
Type of survey (respondents)
contacted questionnaires * rate %
Authorities 27 21 (20) 78% (74%)
CMOs 254 100 (79) 40% (31%)
Exclusive sectors, out of which: 175 55 ** 31%
Music 69 28** 41%
Visual 21 10** 48%
Audiovisual 46 13** 28%
Drama 6 0** 0%
Literary and publishing 33 10** 30%
Multiple sectors 79 24** 30%
IMEs 32 9 (9) 28% (28%)
Non-EU CRM entities 33 10 (6) 30% (18%)
Rightholders*** - 1219 (871) -
Number of CMOs who agreed to
forward questionnaires to 34 - -
rightholders
Number of rightholders’
341 - -
associations
Users**** - 28 (14) -
Number of CMOs who agreed to 14
- -
forward questionnaires to users
Online streaming platforms 12 - -
National user associations 92 - -
Individual users 72 - -
Notes: * the first number indicates all responses: partial and fully completed. The figure in the brackets
contains the number of fully completed questionnaires. ** numbers of filled in questionnaires for CMOs of
different sectors indicate both partial and complete responses ***total number of respondents contacted for
users and rightholders cannot be established due to the indirect targeting strategy.
Note on survey responses and respondent distribution by sector

20 representatives of national authorities filled in the survey. We carried out additional
desk research including an in-depth legal analysis of the relevant legislative provisions to
complement missing data, particularly for the MS that did not respond to the survey.
Due to the particularly strong dissemination activities of French Rightholders’

Associations, the share of French respondents in the rightholders’ survey is very high
(60%). In order not to distort the bigger picture, we have separated out the responses of
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French rightholders and treated them as a separate group. This group of responses was
then compared to the responses provided by the remaining part of respondents. This
process led to the conclusion that French rightholders’ responses do not produce any
statistical differences and do not distort trends observed in the general survey, i.e. they
are methodologically reliable and should not be analysed separately.
In the survey of rightholders13, the music (33%), audiovisual (27%), and literature sectors
(39%) have been covered relatively well. However, rightholders from the visual arts sector
(14%) and, particularly, from the dramatic arts sector (6%) have not been particularly
active. The relative size of the dramatic arts sector is quite small if compared to the other
sectors, which could explain the lower number of total responses.
A similar situation was observed in the survey of users. While the musical sector (68%)
and audiovisual sectors (46%) have been well-covered; there are fewer users of the visual
arts (25%); literature and publishing (18%), as well as of dramatic arts (14%).14 To
address this issue, we interviewed the association of users in the literature and publishing
sectors. No users in the dramatic sector responded to our inquiries.
c. Interviews
Two groups of interviews have been carried out. Exploratory interviews aimed to provide
an overview of successes and challenges in the application of the CRM Directive across
the EU. The collected information was used to further develop operational questions and
survey questionnaires. Table 2-3 below summarises the details of eight exploratory
interviews conducted with the following groups of respondents:
 Representatives of the European Commission who are responsible for monitoring

the Directive
 Representatives of competent German national authorities
 Pan-European or international umbrella associations or networks of CMOs
 National CMOs
 Other stakeholders
Table 2-3. Exploratory interviews

Organisation/institutional affiliation Date
The European Grouping of Societies of Authors and July 28, 2020
Composers (GESAC)
European Visual Artists (EVA) July 29, 2020
The International Confederation of Societies of Authors July 29, 2020
and Composers (CISAC)
The European Commission (DG Connect) July 30, 2020
Lithuanian Neighbouring Rights Association (AGATA) August 3, 2020
13 The question on sectors in which a responding rightholder works had multiple choice answers. Therefore,
the percentages of responses by sector exceed 100%. Percentages indicated reflect the proportion of
rightholders that selected a particular sector to the total number of rightholders’surveyed.
14 Percentages indicated reflect the proportion of users who selected a particular sector to the total number of
users surveyed.
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Organisation/institutional affiliation Date

Das Deutsche Patent- und Markenamt (DPMA) / The August 4, 2020
German Patent and Trademark Office
Association of European Performers' Organisations August 5, 2020
(AEPO-ARTIS)
Pace rights management LLP September 21, 2020
The second group of interviews was carried out after the completion of the surveys (see
Table 2-4 below). In total, 35 interviews (3 of which were in written form) were conducted
with the aim of supplementing the information that had been collected through the
surveys. Interviews were carried out with the following groups of respondents:
 National authorities – 5
 CMOs (interviews with national CMOs and the umbrella organisations of CMOs) –
6
 IMEs – 5
 Rightholders (interviews with individual rightholders and rightholder associations) –
6 (one of which in written)
 Users (individual users and user associations) – 11 (two of which were in written
form)
 Other stakeholders – 2
Table 2-4. Complementary interviews

Organisation/institutional Sector Date
affiliation (country)
National authorities
Supervisory authority for November 23, 2020
collective management
organizations (Austria)
Ministry of the Economy November 23, 2020
(Belgium)
AGCom (Italy) December 3, 2020
PRH – Patent and Registration December 10, 2020

Office / Ministry of Culture
(Finland)
Ministry of Justice (Estonia) December 3, 2020
CMOs
SAA Authors (umbrella CMO, audiovisual December 3, 2020
Belgium)
SIAE (Italy) Music, drama, November 26, 2020
audiovisual, literary
GEMA (Germany) music November 25, 2020
VISDA (Denmark) visual arts December 3, 2020
PERGAM (Romania) literature and December 3, 2020

publishing
ADAGP (France) visual arts December 10, 2020
IMEs
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Organisation/institutional Sector Date

affiliation (country)
VideoRights (Italy) audiovisual November 20, 2020
Jamendo (Luxembourg) music November 19, 2020
Soundreef (Czechia) music November 20, 2020

Cloudcasting (Hungary) music November 25, 2020
Unison Rights (Spain) music November 30, 2020
Rightholders
IMPALA - Independent Music music November 23, 2020
Companies’ Association
La Guilde française des literature and November 19, 2020
scénaristes (France) publishing
Member of a CMO and an IME music, visual, November 20, 2020
(Lithuania) audiovisual
European Composers’ and music December 8, 2020
Songwriters’ Alliance
French Publishers’ Association / literature and November 30, 2020 (in writing)
European Publishers’ Association publishing
SMM Sweden / Versity Music music November 26, 2020
(Rightholders’ agent)
Users
Association of Commercial TV in music, audiovisual November 19, 2020
Europe
Rock Werchter music November 23
Amazon music, audiovisual, December 10, 2020
visual, literature and
publishing
Sveriges Television Ab, (SVT) music, audiovisual November 25, 2020
Motion Picture Association music, audiovisual November 26, 2020
SKY and ACT Alliance Members music, audiovisual December 2, 2020
SKY music, audiovisual December 3, 2020
Romanian Publishers’ visual, literature and December 7, 2020
Association publishing
Association of European Radios music December 11, 2020
BOUYGUES music, audiovisual December 11, 2020 (in writing)
FOOTPRINT Music music December 11, 2020 (in writing)
Other
Digital Europe (European Trade association November 30, 2020
umbrella association, Brussels)
Univideo (Italy) Audiovisual December 2, 2020
producers’
associations
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3. Overall stakeholders’ views on collective rights

The processes of transposition of the Directive were different in every Member State.
Some countries had to introduce entirely new legal requirements on collective rights
management in their legal systems. This, in turn, might have affected the ways in which
CRM entities organise and carry out their daily activities. This section provides the views
of national authorities (NAs), collective management organisations (CMOs), rightholders
and users on the CRM system in their respective countries and the effects of the Directive,
drawing on the results of the surveys and interviews of these stakeholders.
Box 3. Main takeaways: Overall stakeholders’ views on collective rights

 Overall, stakeholders believe that the Directive and additional national regulation
that came with it improved the functioning of the CRM system.
 Stakeholders believe that the national legal frameworks in MS are generally
effective in protecting the interests of rightholders as they facilitate effective
functioning of CMOs.
 Stakeholders evaluate the introduction of the Directive and the changes it catalysed
(e.g. provision of legal protection for users and rightholders, introduction of a right
to monitor CRM entities for NAs, increased transparency of CMOs, etc.) positively.
 In this sense, the Directive has fulfilled its objective to ensure that CMOs act in the
best interest of rightholders via introducing common governance, financial
management and transparency standards.
The majority of NAs (18 out of 21) claim that a national legal framework effectively
protects the interests of rightholders (see Figure 3-1 below). In addition, almost all
respondents agree that CMOs are transparent and democratically governed, and act in
the best interests of their rightholders.
Figure 3-1. NAs’ perception of the collective rights management system in their
country
Overall, national legal framework is effective in
6 12 2 1
protecting the interests of rightholders
Overall, CMOs act in the best interests of rightholders

3 16 1 1
when collecting and distributing royalties
Overall, governance of CMOs is democratic and

transparent
5 12 2 1 1
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree, nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Do not know
Note: National authorities survey, N=21, values in absolute numbers.
In line with NAs views, the majority of CMOs also agree that the national legal framework
effectively protects the interest of rightholders. Most of them also agree that it facilitates
the effective functioning of CMOs (see Figure 3-2 below).
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Figure 3-2. CMOs’ perception of the collective rights management system in their
country
Overall, the national legal framework is
effective in protecting the interests of 17,6% 59,3% 9,9% 13,2%
rightholders
Overall, the national legal framework

facilitates the effective functioning of CMOs 14,4% 50% 15,6% 15,6%4,4%
in a country
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree, nor disagree
Note: CMO survey, N=91 for the first question, N=90 for the second question.
A relatively small share of CMOs think that a national legal framework is not so effective in
protecting the rights of rightholders and facilitating the effective functioning of CMOs. For
example, several smaller CMOs argue that, considering their size, the requirements they
are subjected to are disproportionate. Other CMOs maintain that national laws are very
extensive, ambiguous and lack clarity. In addition, new provisions have resulted in
additional burdens for CMOs (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion) and created a
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis IMEs (see Chapter 7).
Similarly to CMOs and NAs, the majority (64%) of rightholders agree or strongly agree that
the national legal framework is effective in protecting their interests (see Figure 3-3
below). Rightholder representatives indicated during the interviews that the Directive has
brought about important changes such as increased competition in the CRM market,
better representation of CMOs in decision-making bodies and transparency in the
collection and distribution of royalties.
Figure 3-3. Rightholders’ perception of the national legal framework in their

countries
Overall, national legal

framework is effective in 22,19% 42,38% 11,67% 11,09% 22,19% 4,88%
protecting my interests
Note: Rightholder survey, N=1208.
While most surveyed rightholders are satisfied, a third of them (33.28%) are sceptical
about the effectiveness of their respective national legal frameworks on collective rights
management. As indicated by their survey comments, among the most-voiced concerns
are those related to the exploitation of their rights abroad and via online platforms as well
as the management of their rights by respective CMOs and, in some cases, a lack of
transparency in the system (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 4).
Contrary to other stakeholders, users hold somewhat less positive and more diverging
views on the effectiveness of the national legal frameworks in protecting their interests
(see Figure 3-4 below). While 6 users, or 30% of the respondents, think that the national
legal framework is effective, there are just as many who either disagree or are indecisive.
Regarding less positive views, a few users noted the lack of competition between CMOs
in certain countries which affects tariff settings and licensing negotiations (for a more
detailed overview, see Chapter 5). On the other hand, two interviewed users indicated the
positive impact of the Directive itself. According to them, it provided for a more systematic
approach in the CRM system, fostered competition among CMOs and subjected them to
more transparent governance.
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 3-4. Users’ perception of national legal framework in their country

Overall national legal framework is
effective in protecting the interests of 1 5 6 4 2 2
users
Note: User survey, N=20. Values in absolute numbers.
According to the majority of NAs, the transposition of the CRM Directive has led to positive
changes in national legal frameworks. Compared to NAs, CMOs expressed more
moderate views on the impact of the Directive, with half of them (48.4%) claiming that the
CRM system itself has not changed much in light of the transposition of the Directive (see
Figure 3-5 below). These trends are consistent throughout all sectors.
Figure 3-5. The impact of the Directive on the functioning of the collective rights
management system in MS according to NAs and CMOs
National
68,0% 23,0% 9,0%
authorities
CMOs 34,1% 48,4% 13,2% 4,4%
The system has improved The system has not changed much
The system has become less effective I do not know
Note: National authorities survey, N=21; CMO survey, N=91.
Several surveyed NAs noted that the Directive had a transformational impact because its
transposition had completely reformed the collective management field by introducing new
or more detailed provisions concerning the operation of CMOs. Two NAs claimed that the
system improved because of the legal protection for users and rightholders, a right to
monitor CRM entities for NAs, and increased transparency of CMOs. In contrast, another
NA claimed that the transposition of the Directive did not result in major changes because
the pre-existing national system in that country was already relatively strict. Nevertheless,
the same NA still noted the added value for governance rules provided by the Directive.
In terms of the reasons behind the changes in the CRM system, 6 NAs (or 40% of
respondents) and 45.2% of CMOs credit the Directive. Around one fifth of NAs (2 NAs)
and some CMOs (19%) think that it is the additional national regulations that went beyond
the provisions of the Directive that catalysed the changes in the CRM market (see Figure
3-6 below).
Figure 3-6. The main reasons behind changes in the collective rights management
system in MS according to NAs and CMOs
Transposition of the Directive
6 45,2%
Transposition of the Directive and
introduction of additional national regulation
6 28,6% Introduction of additional national
regulations that go beyond what is strictly
19% necessary for the Directive
2
Other
1 7,1%
National authorities CMOs
Note: National authorities survey, N=15, values in absolute numbers; CMO survey, N=42.
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DIRECTIVE
Conclusions
Overall, stakeholders think that the Directive and the additional national regulation that
came with it improved the functioning of the CRM system. In their views, the national legal
frameworks in MS are generally effective in protecting the interests of rightholders as they
facilitate the effective functioning of CMOs. Stakeholders evaluate the introduction of the
Directive and the changes it catalysed (e.g. provision of protection for the interests of
rightholders and the licensing process towards users, introduction of a right to monitor
CRM entities for NAs, and increased transparency of CMOs) positively. In this sense, the
Directive appears to have had a positive impact via introducing common governance,
financial management and transparency standards. However, contrary to other
stakeholders, users expressed fewer positive views about the Directive. Only 30% of them
think that the national legal framework is effective in protecting their interests. While some
of the users claim that the Directive has provided for a more systematic CRM system and
increased the transparency of CMOs, others argue that the competition between CMOs is
not yet sufficient.
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DIRECTIVE
4. Relations of CMOs with their members, rightholders and

other CMOs
The Directive has introduced a number of rules related to the governance, financial
management and transparency of CMOs. For example, it subjected CMOs to act in the
best interest of rightholders, to allow them to easily terminate or withdraw their rights from
a CMO, to diligently collect and manage revenue from rights, and other. This chapter
starts with an overview of CMOs established in the EU. It then discusses how the selected
provisions in Title II of the Directive have functioned in practice and what the key concerns
and experiences are of stakeholders, drawing on the results of surveys and interviews
with CMOs and rightholders.
Box 4. Main takeaways: The relations of CMOs with their members, rightholders
and other CMOs
 CMOs have a necessary mechanism in place for rightholders to terminate or

withdraw their rights.
 The majority of CMOs reported that in the last three consecutive years (2017-
2019) the total number of rightholders (~80% CMOs) and total number of works
(~70% CMOs) for which the authorization was terminated or withdrawn was less
than 1% per year.
 The majority of surveyed national authorities agree that the governance of CMOs
is transparent. However, rightholders express fewer positive views. Only 44% of
the surveyed rightholders think that their CMO is transparent, and just around a
half of them feel they can influence the decisions made by CMOs (47%) and can
hold the CMO leadership accountable (52%). At the same time, most of
rightholders agree that they can participate in the governance of their CMO (75%)
and have all the information on how to do that (69%). 74% of surveyed rightholders
stated that their CMO acts in their best interest when collecting and distributing
royalties. However, only 42% of CMOs reported to have distributed more than 90%
of amounts due to rightholders within the indicated period. One of the key reasons
is that not all users provide necessary and relevant information in a timely manner
and in an agreed format.
 Overall, CMOs are satisfied with how the rights of their rightholders are managed
by other CMOs. While they point to certain issues as regards information provision,
they are not systematic and are usually quickly resolved.
a. Mapping CMOs
Mapping resulted in the identification of 254 CMOs established across the EU. As
evidenced in Figure 4-1 below, almost a third (79) of the CMOs manage the rights of
rightholders from multiple sectors. Out of them, the largest share of CMOs offer services
simultaneously for rightholders in the music and audiovisual sectors. Regarding CMOs
that operate exclusively in one sector, the music and audiovisual arts sectors are the
biggest, with 69 and 46 CMOs respectively. At the opposite end, only 6 of the identified
CMOs work exclusively in the dramatic arts sector.
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 4-1. CMO distribution by sector

Multiple sectors; 79
Music; 69
Audiovisual art; 46
Dramatic arts; 6
Visual art; 21 Writing/publishing;

33
Note: Visionary analytics, values in absolute numbers (N=254).
The number of CMOs varies significantly across MS. Smaller countries such as Malta or
Cyprus have only one and two CMOs, respectively. On the other hand, there are over 20
CMOs operating in countries such as Belgium (20), the Netherlands (21) and France (24).
The size of membership in identified CMOs ranges from tens to hundreds of thousands.
For instance, a CMO in Greece operating in the audiovisual sector has only 14 members
and, similarly, a Croatian CMO in music represents 23 rightholders. On the other hand,
Germany and Denmark have CMOs that count as many as 160,000 members. The
number of members of a CMO does not appear to depend exclusively on a particular
country or sector.
b. Rightholders’ freedom to authorise, withdraw or terminate their

rights
Article 5 of the Directive establishes that rightholders have the right to authorise a CMO of
their choice to manage their rights (paragraph 2). Additionally, it gives them the right to
terminate such authorisation and to withdraw certain rights (categories/types thereof)
(paragraph 4). These provisions aim to empower rightholders to choose CRM entities that
meet their needs as well as to foster competition between CRM entities. The effectiveness
of these provisions largely depends on whether the appropriate mechanisms are in place
and how long it takes to terminate, withdraw and/or authorise the management of rights.
This section explores these issues by drawing on the results of the surveys of national
authorities, CMOs and rightholders, as well as follow-up interviews with these
stakeholders.
Nearly all national authorities (NAs) agree or strongly agree that CMOs provide effective
mechanisms for rightholders to authorise a CMO of their choice and to withdraw their
rights or categories/types of rights from CMOs as well as to terminate their authorisation
(see Figure 4-2 below).
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 4-2. National authorities’ evaluation on whether CMOs provide effective

mechanisms for rightholders to authorise, withdraw or terminate their rights
CMOs provide an effective mechanism for the
rightholders to authorise a CMO of their 5 12 3 1
choice to manage their rights

rightholders to withdraw from a CMO any of 5 14 2
their rights or categories/types of their rights…

rightholders to terminate the authorisation to 4 15 2
manage rights, or categories/ types of rights
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree, nor disagree Strongly disagree
Note: National authorities’ survey, values in absolute numbers (N=21).
In line with that, 9 NAs claim that there are no particular challenges with regard to the
mechanism for terminating authorisation or withdrawing.15 The majority of them (14
NAs) consider the process to be carried out in a timely manner and that CMOs do have
and apply the necessary procedures and do not impose financial sanctions or other
deterrents for withdrawing. Only a few NAs named a prolonged withdrawal or termination
process (1 NA), rightholders’ fear of financial repercussions or other deterrents (1 NA) and
ineffectively applied internal CMOs procedures (3 NAs) as potential challenges.
Additionally, while one NA pointed out the issue of CMOs unilaterally deciding which of the
categories/types of rights rightholders can withdraw, another highlighted the ambiguous
formulation of the relevant article in the Directive. More specifically, it was noted that there
is ambiguity in the calculation of time limits: rightholders can withdraw their rights by giving
a notice of six months, but the CMO can decide whether or not that withdrawal will take
effect at the end of the calendar year. Accordingly, in some cases this implies that the
withdrawal takes effect more than one year after notification by the rightholder.
The results of the CMO survey reveal that the mechanisms for withdrawing and
terminating rights vary between the CMOs and across countries. In some CMOs the
termination or withdrawal of rights takes effect in as little as one to three working days (as
indicated by one CMO), at end of the month or within three months from the submission of
a request. However, with some CMOs it can be a lengthier process. This is because most
CMOs require more than three months of prior notice (see Figure 4-3 below).
Furthermore, in practice, the termination or withdrawal does not take effect immediately
after the period of notice has been served: in nearly half of the CMOs (45.1%) rightholders
need to wait until the end of the financial year (see Figure 4-4 below). For example, in one
MS the law foresees that a withdrawal that takes place during the first half of the financial
year will only take effect from January 1st of the following year. Withdrawals that occur
during the second half of the financial year will take effect from the 1st of January of the
subsequent year. This results in terminations or withdrawals that can only take effect after
a year or even more.
15 Questions on (1) the challenges for terminating or withdrawing rights from CMOs, and (2) reasons why the
mechanism is effective were multiple choice questions. Accordingly, national authorities were asked to select
all the main challenges and reasons as to why the mechanism is effective.
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 4-3. The period of notice Figure 4-4. Time when

rightholders have to give to CMOs on termination/withdrawal of rightholders’
the termination/withdrawal of their rights to takes effect
rights
17,1% At the end of the financial year

Within the nearest financial
7,3% accounting period 45,1%
Immediately upon serving the
period of notice for termination of
More than 6 months
withdrawal of rights
Next end-quarter of the year
58,5% 19,5%
Between 3 months and 6
Next end-semester of the year
months 8,5%
Less than 3 months Other

25,6%
17,1%
Note: CMOs survey, N=82.
Most of NAs also claim that there are no particular challenges with regard to the
mechanism of authorisation of rights, as indicated by nine of the surveyed NAs.16
CMOs have all of the necessary procedures in place and apply them effectively.
Rightholders are free to choose and authorise CMOs for their (categories/types of) rights
for territories of their choice, as stated by 14 NAs. 12 NAs claim that CMOs do not
discriminate against any rightholders (based on their nationality, place of residence or
legal status, etc.) with regard to authorisation and subsequent management of their
rights.17 On the other hand, a small proportion of NAs pointed out obstacles such as
regulatory issues (1 NA), insufficient or ineffectively applied internal CMO procedures (3
NAs) and discrimination against certain rightholders (1 NA).
In their comments, some NAs have also stressed that the rightholders’ freedom to choose
a CMO is constrained by the fact that there might only be one national CMO that manages
specific rights. These limitations might be related to several factors. In some countries the
number of CMOs in one sector is limited. This is the case in Austria for example.
In certain MS, CMOs might encounter difficulties to get established in the market due to
the presence of one or several (large) CMOs. The study found that this situation can be
observed both in larger and smaller MSs. Interview and survey results suggest that the
CRM market in certain larger MSs is long-standing and well-established with the presence
of several large CMOs. While the aim of the Directive was to foster competition on the
CRM market, it appears that it is still not easy for new entrants to compete with long-
established CMOs.
A somewhat similar situation may be observed in smaller MSs as well. Based on the
answers of some surveyed and interviewed CMOs and NAs, it can be stated that in at
least some MSs there are natural monopolies in the collective management of rights. It
16 Questions on (1) the challenges for authorising of CMOs and (2) reasons why the mechanism of authorising
a CMO is effective were multiple choice questions. Accordingly, national authorities were asked to select all of
the main challenges and reasons of why the mechanism is effective.
17 Please note that these were multiple-choice questions and that the selected answers only indicate the main
reasons as to why NAs consider the mechanism to be effective. This does not mean that NAs which did not
select this or another answer think the opposite. A separate question was asked to identify the key challenges
for authorising a CMO.
30
DIRECTIVE
can be argued that this is due to the smaller size of the market that usually there is one
CMO for each type of work and subject matter. Although in one smaller MS, for instance,
there were attempts to establish alternative CMOs even before the Directive, but they
were not successful, according to one interviewed CMO. Rightholders can, of course,
entrust the management of their rights to a foreign CMO. However, this practice is quite
rare, as argued by one interviewed CMO from a smaller MS. In their experience,
rightholders almost never withdraw all of their rights (categories, types of rights) from their
home CMO and transfer them to a foreign CMO. Usually, this is only the case for certain
types/categories of rights and only when/if they become used more extensively in foreign
countries. In such circumstances, it becomes economically beneficial to mandate a CMO
of that country to manage those types/categories of rights. However, the market structure
can work both to the benefit and the detriment of rightholders, as argued by some
interviewed CMOs. On one hand, the existence of multiple collecting societies presents
rightholders with more alternatives to entrust their rights to entities that might serve their
needs best. On the other hand, fragmentation might reduce the collective bargaining
power of collecting societies vis-à-vis users and affect indirectly the rightholders.
The absolute majority (91% out of 928) of the surveyed rightholders stated that they have
not withdrawn or wanted to withdraw their rights from their CMOs over the past four years.
Out of 991 rightholders, 705 claimed that they are satisfied with their CMOs, which could
indicate why they do not wish to change it. A few rightholders expressed satisfaction with
their CMO in the survey comments, noting that its performance has improved. A couple of
rightholders claimed that they are very happy with their CMOs and have no interest in
replacing them with private companies or by managing their rights on their own. On the
other hand, representatives of some rightholders in the interviews revealed that
sometimes one cannot switch CMOs, which is a reason for the lack of mobility of
rightholders. This refers to cases when a MS provides for mandatory collective
management and rightholders have a limited choice in terms of CMOs or no choice at all if
only one specific CMO is mandated to manage certain rights. Another interviewed
rightholder from a different country claimed that the established number of CMOs means
that rightholders prefer to stay with their own CMO because they are bigger and more
efficient than a number of smaller CMOs. The interviewee also claimed that the
rightholders lack information about the fact that they can leave or change their CMO
because they have been members of these organisations for so long. Another rightholder
also complained that a request to withdraw rights was refused by the CMO.
In turn, only 3% of rightholders claimed to have withdrawn all of their rights and only 6% to
have withdrawn some of their rights but remained members of their CMOs. Rightholders
who have withdrawn all or some of their rights indicate various reasons for withdrawing all
or a part of their rights. Most often, those reasons are related to either a preference for
managing their rights individually or concerns related to the governance of CMOs, i.e.,
lack of transparency and democratic governance or not acting in the best interests of
rightholders in collecting and distributing royalties (see Figure 4-5).
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 4-5. Rightholders’ reasons for withdrawing their rights from CMOs
I wanted to make my works freely accessible to all (e.g. under
4,3% creative commons license)
7,9%
I wanted to manage my rights (or some categories of rights)
7,3%
myself
I felt that my CMO did not act in my best interest when
12,0% collecting and distributing royalties
14,0% I felt that governance of my CMO was not sufficiently
democratic or transparent
A different entity (CMO/IME) was more appealing to me
17,0%
Other
Note: Rightholders’ survey, N=61, multiple choices were allowed. The question was asked only of those
rightholders who had indicated that they had withdrawn all or some of their rights from a CMO.
In general, the majority of rightholders (60%) who had withdrawn their rights (or some
types/categories of rights) claim that overall it was an easy process. Most of them also
indicated that they could withdraw the types of rights they wanted to and were not
financially sanctioned in relation to the withdrawal (see Figure 4-6).
Figure 4-6. Rightholders’ satisfaction with the process of rights withdrawal by

aspect
I was not financially sanctioned for
28% 35% 8% 15% 3% 10%
withdrawing my rights
I could withdraw the types of rights I
14% 52% 7% 12% 7% 9%
wanted to
I could withdraw my rights without undue
14% 32% 20% 17% 10% 7%
delays
Overall, it was easy to withdraw my rights
18% 42% 9% 19% 6% 6%
(or some categories of rights)
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree, nor disagree
Note: Rightholders’ survey, N=67 for the first question; N=59 for the second; N=58 for the third; N=60 for the
fourth.
However, some rightholders expressed concerns about the delayed process of

withdrawal. More specifically, 17% disagreed and 10% strongly disagreed that they were
able to withdraw their rights without undue delays. The following are the most recurring
issues that rightholders put forward in their survey comments:
 Having to repeat the process of withdrawal every year and for each
category/type of right. In addition, as one rightholder put it, they have to be vigilant
as to deadlines for terminating mandates with certain CMOs. If a deadline has
passed, the mandate is automatically extended for another year.
 Related to that, rightholders also claimed that there are time limits as to when they
can issue their notice of withdrawal. They pointed out that, in general, the period
falling within the year in which they can issue the notice for withdrawal is too
short or that they can only do it before a specific date each year. Although it was
not specified what these particular dates relate to, it might be assumed that this
refers to the CMOs’ financial accounting periods as discussed above.
 If a CMO operates on the Extended Collective Licensing basis, which is often
equated with mandatory collective rights management, the opt-out procedure is
only possible in theory but can take up to several years in practice, as
indicated in the interview with one French rightholders’ association. In countries
where a certain CMO is the only CRM entity allowed to manage certain rights, in
practice rightholders have no other option but to remain with that CMO if they wish
to have their rights managed collectively. In their responses to the survey
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DIRECTIVE
rightholders note cases where CMOs have refused their request to opt-out,
hesitated or have not paid them the royalties due to them after they had withdrawn
their rights. The survey also revealed that there are instances where rightholders
are not aware whether or not they can withdraw their rights from CMOs in the first
place. This is illustrated by a comment of one rightholder claiming that artists do
not know that they can withdraw rights because ‘CMOs make artists believe it is
compulsory to work with them’. One interviewed rightholder representative also
noted that rightholders are not very educated about the fact that they can leave or
change their CMOs because they have been members of these organisations for
such a long time.
c. Effects of rightholders’ freedom to authorise, withdraw or

terminate their rights
The implementation of the provisions of Article 5(4) may have had diverging effects on
different stakeholders across MS. For example, this may have resulted in CMOs’
repertoire fragmentation as well as additional burdens for CMOs, or, on the contrary, more
incentives for CMOs to become more transparent or efficient. This subsection explores the
positive and negative effects of these provisions as reported in the surveys of NAs and
CMOs.
The majority of the surveyed NAs (16) claim that the introduction of the right for
rightholders to freely choose a CMO and to terminate or withdraw certain rights or
categories/types of rights from a CMO did not bring about any change because
rightholders do not use these rights actively. This is corroborated by the rightholder survey
results where only 9% of them indicated to have withdrawn all or part of their rights from
CMOs as discussed in the previous section.
In the same vein, while around 74% of CMOs declare an increase in the number of
rightholders they represent since the transposition of the Directive, only around 37% of
them stated that it was due to the transposition of the Directive (see Figure 4-7 below).
Figure 4-7. CMOs: how transposition of the Directive affected change in the number
of new rightholders
5,6% 31,5% 52,8% 1,1% 9%
Increased a lot Increased somewhat Stayed the same Decreased domewhat Do not know
In general, more than half of the CMOs (52.8%) claim that the number of new rightholders
stayed the same since the transposition of the Directive. This suggests that the Directive
had no direct impact on the number of new rightholders for CMOs. In the survey, out of 26
CMOs that provided explanations behind the increase in rightholders, 19 state explicitly
that the increase is not linked to the Directive. They explain that either they experience
regular yearly increases or that the increase is the result of their efforts to attract
rightholders. The latter include active efforts by CMOs to offer a more transparent
management of rights (40.4% of CMOs), a more efficient distribution of royalties (42.7%),
competitive management costs (21.3%), wider territories of coverage (20.2%) and lists of
users (13.5%). In their comments, the CMOs also noted their efforts to offer new or
additional services, such as legal advice, assistance in marketing, digital distribution,
supply of technological tools, free venues, etc. Some CMOs from the music sector also
noted that the increase in the number of rightholders they represent might be related to
new and easier ways to ‘put out’ the music, hence new rightholders emerge naturally.
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DIRECTIVE
Based on the CMOs’ comments, the trends in new mandates and withdrawals or
termination of rights show that the numbers of rightholders or works CMOs represent are
not related to rightholder migration between different collecting societies. Rather, as
CMOs suggest, overall, they did not experience a major increase in the number of new
mandates over the last few years. The majority of CMOs reported that the total number of
rightholders (~80% CMOs) and total number of works (~70% CMOs) for which the
authorization was terminated or withdrawn was less than 1% in the last three consecutive
years (2017-2019).
Among positive changes, as described by the NAs, is the increased competition on the
CRM market which results in both lower management fees applied by CMOs as well as
the rightholders’ freedom to choose an organization that suits their needs best, the
possibility for non-commercial licensing as well as possibilities for rightholders to withdraw
only some of their rights or categories/types of rights or to terminate the authorisation.
However, some NAs claim that the transposition of the Directive has had little effect as it
did not change the basic practices of CMOs on the withdrawal process but has generated
additional administrative and managerial burdens. This claim is also corroborated by the
CMOs. While 42% of them suggest that the implementation of Articles 5(2) and 5(4) has
not resulted in a higher administrative burden, around 48% of CMOs claim it has
increased (see Figure 4-8 below).
Figure 4-8. Changes in CMO administrative burden with regard to withdrawals and
new mandates
13,3% 34,9% 41% 2,4% 8,4%
Increased a lot Increased somewhat Stayed the same Decreased somewhat Do not know
Note: CMO survey; N=83.
CMOs which claimed that the administrative burden increased a lot or somewhat in
relation to withdrawals and new mandates did not provide many detailed comments on the
specific administrative issues they face. A small proportion of CMOs highlighted two major
reasons for the increase of the administrative burden related to the withdrawals and new
mandates from rightholders:
 Additional investments into automatization and IT. As one CMO noted,

withdrawals of online rights have required more IT investments from CMOs in
order to be able to claim rights for separate types/categories of rights. Due to the
high volume of transactions, this requires an extensive IT capacity. One other
CMO seconded this by commenting that the administrative burden arises from the
lack of automatization for which CMOs have to pay themselves. This was also
mentioned by another CMO that claims to have managed to avoid increasing its
considerable administrative burden because it has developed technological tools
to enable the digital signing of contracts and communications through electronic
means already in place before the transposition of the Directive.
 Fragmentation of the CRM system. In some cases (particularly in the field of
public performances) users cannot be granted full coverage through a blanket
license. This is due to the fact that rightholders may choose which rights (types or
categories thereof) they choose to mandate to a CMO. This creates situations
wherein CMOs can only license some or parts of the rights of certain rightholders.
This, in turn, requires additional efforts for CMOs in monitoring exploitation of the
works. This fragmentation also affected the calculation of fees for the works
licensed and makes the royalty distribution process more costly.
Overall, according to the majority of surveyed CMOs, the withdrawals did not much affect
either rightholders or CMOs (see Figure 4.7). However, the increase in administrative
burdens that CMOs face appears to be a notable exception (see Figure 4-8.)
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DIRECTIVE
d. Rightholders’ knowledge on the management of their rights and

the governance of their CMOs
An effective and efficient management of rights requires technical, legal and

administrative knowledge. Rightholders’ rights are managed by CMOs or other CRM
entities that act as intermediaries between rightholders and users. Despite the collective
approach, rightholders still have individual interests and needs. To pursue them, a
rightholder should possess sufficient knowledge of the CRM system in general and the
operational/governance principles of their CMOs in particular. This section explores the
availability of information related to the management of their rights, as well as the
awareness and interest of rightholders in this information, drawing on the survey results
and interviews with the stakeholders.
More than half of the surveyed rightholders claim to have sufficient knowledge concerning
the management of their copyright or related rights. However, 25% of them disagree (see
Figure 4-9 below).
Figure 4-9. Rightholders’ knowledge necessary for the management of their

copyright or related rights
I have sufficient knowledge

necessary for management
14,2% 40,3% 14,8% 17,7% 7,8% 5,3%
of my copyright or related
rights
Note: Rightholders’, N=1195.
Overall, the surveyed rightholders expressed the need to better understand how they
could exploit and license their copyrights and, subsequently, the royalties they could
receive. In their opinion, many rightholders are not sufficiently aware of their rights and
how to manage them properly. Judging from the rightholder survey comments, the issues
they have brought forward relates not to a lack of available information but to a lack of
knowledge or understanding of certain processes. More specifically, the most recurring
concerns were the following:
 Lack of knowledge about the exploitation of their rights abroad. Rightholders

considered their rights to be protected only within the territory of their respective
MS. They claim that when legally used abroad, the use of their rights is not
sufficiently and accurately monitored which may result in lower income. While
rightholders did not provide detailed comments, they mentioned issues related to
the calculation of taxes and royalties when their rights are managed by a foreign
CMO on behalf of their own CMO. According to the rightholders’ opinion, the role
of national CMOs in that respect is somewhat limited as they cannot ensure proper
protection and remuneration of copyrighted material used abroad.
 The surveyed rightholders also raised the issue of the exploitation of their rights by
online platforms, stating that they do not receive proper remuneration and that
the legal framework lacks sufficient protection of rightholders in their dealings with
these platforms. As noted by one rightholders’ association in an interview, these
platforms do not always disclose all revenue sources from the use of copyrighted
material and have numerous non-disclosure agreements which make it difficult to
audit the actual use of copyrighted material. In addition, in some instances CMOs
experience issues related to metadata from the user-generated and entertainment
content in some of these platforms. More specifically, it can sometimes be not fully
comprehensive or may even be incorrect, as indicated in an interview with one
CMO.
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DIRECTIVE
 It was the view of several rightholders that the national legal provisions in some
MSs can be vague or contradictory. For example, rightholders frequently argued
that due to the complexity of the system they lack sufficient legal knowledge and
would like to receive legal advice on this matter. This is in line with concerns raised
by multiple CMOs in the survey as to the lack of clarity and the ambiguity of certain
provisions. Several of these CMOs claimed that many provisions are up for
interpretation and therefore users interpret them in the light of their own interests
that are contrary to the rightholders' interests. A few (3) CMOs explicitly argued
that their national legal frameworks do not provide for the detailed and clear
regulation of obligations for users. In addition, one CMO claimed that the legal
framework does not help to create a level playing field for rightholders. More
specifically, an inequality in negotiations as well as a buy-out of rights puts
rightholders in an unfavourable position. The CMO explained that CMOs rely on
users agreeing to ‘make use of such CMOs and licensing schemes’ and that more
often than not these users ‘oppose the role of CMOs and reject such management
of rights’. Likewise, one rightholder in the survey commented that rightholders are
harmed by the current trends of increasingly more inequitable demands from
buyouts and ‘coerced publishing deals.’ However, the survey did not find any other
evidence that this issue is systematic across sectors or Member States. In
addition, several rightholders pointed to the increasing use and new forms of digital
technology. In their opinion, certain parts/provisions of national laws are somewhat
outdated in this regard and are not adapted to reflect the technological changes
taking place. The surveyed rightholders, however, did not provide any further
comments or more details as to which parts of the national legislation they were
referring to.
 Rightholders also mentioned that they would benefit from a centralized IT-based
system with digital information on royalty collection and distribution as well
as simplified educational information in their national language on the (legal)
rights of rightholders.
Another important observation that can be drawn from the rightholders’ survey and follow-
up interviews is that rightholders do not always distinguish between IMEs and CMOs, or
between IMEs and other CRM market actors. To give a few examples, one rightholder
who indicated membership in an IME, specified the name of the entity (IME) he was
referring to. That entity is actually a CMO operating in one of the MS. Additionally, during
a discussion about IMEs in an interview with one rightholders’ association, reference was
made to an entity which is in fact a royalty-free music vendor. However, this study has
limited data to identify the actual scale of this problem. See Chapter 8 for a more detailed
discussion on royalty-free music vendors.
There are two diverging trends on whether individual rightholders are satisfied with their
CMOs’ governance, based on the rightholders’ survey results. On the one hand, the
majority of rightholders believe that they have the necessary opportunities to participate in
the governance of their CMOs and that they are well-informed when it comes to such
participation. On the other hand, around half of all rightholders seem to be more sceptical
about whether they can actually influence the decisions of their CMOs and hold the
CMOs’ leadership accountable (see Figure 4-10). This also correlates with a lower level of
trust in their CMOs’ transparency, which was one of the key concerns voiced both in their
survey comments and interviews.
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 4-10. Rightholders’ satisfaction with CMO governance

I can influence the decisions made by my CMO 12% 35% 14% 13% 10% 11%
I can hold the leadership of my CMO

16% 36% 20% 10% 6% 12%
accountable
If I want to, I can participate in governance of my
32% 43% 10% 6% 6%
CMO
I have all the necessary information on decisions
20% 42% 18% 10% 5%
4%
made by my CMO
I have all the information necessary to participate
22% 47% 16% 9% 4%
in the governance of my CMO
Overall, governance of my CMO is transparent 22% 20% 32% 16% 5%
Note: Rightholders’ survey, N=645 for the first question; N=847 for the second; N=848 for the third; N=849 for
the fourth; N=852 for the fifth; N=859 for the sixth.
As the figure above illustrates, the key areas of rightholders’ concerns are transparency,
accountability, and their power to influence the CMOs’ decisions. Based on rightholder
survey comments and follow-up interviews, the most recurring issues are the following:
 Rightholders are concerned with the lack of information on how the rights
revenues are distributed by the CMO. In their comments, some of them point out
that they want the CMOs’ accounting to be more detailed (e.g. that there should be
individualised breakdowns of management fees with a clear calculation
methodology). In line with that, rightholders would also like to better understand
how exactly the money is distributed among the CMO members. As one of the
rightholders pointed out in the comments section, the fact that ‘blanket’ licenses
are becoming increasingly common in CMOs hinders his/her understanding of
what remuneration he/she is entitled to, when compared to other rightholders.
Furthermore, rightholders note that certain types of remuneration (e.g. royalties for
novels; stories; comic books; film scripts) have to be shared between authors and
publishers before being distributed to individuals, which causes additional
complications in their understanding of the money flow. This problem might also be
of a sector-specific nature. Rightholders from the book and publishing sector
pointed out in the survey comments that they feel their CMOs favour publishers in
the contractual agreements.
 A related problem in the area of governance is that some rightholders are not
aware of how to hold their CMOs accountable. This issue has a rather specific
educational angle, as indicated in interviews and survey comments. According to
one of the interviewed rightholders’ associations’ representative ‘members of the
General Assembly normally have no clue what is going on in their CMO’ because
professionally they do not have an administrative or financial background.
Rightholders stated in the comments that they lack the knowledge and information
to hold their CMOs accountable, while 3.5% out of 847 said that their attempts to
do so were futile. Consequently, these rightholders explained that they feel
powerless and/or experience a sense of frustration with their CMOs’ governance.
 Finally, some rightholders also point out that they are unhappy with the opaque
decision-making processes in their CMOs. This is further exacerbated by the
fact that in certain cases important decisions are made by the Board without
consulting individual members (since General Assembly meetings do not take
place that often). One interviewed rightholders’ association argued that this can
also happen when the General Assembly transfers some of its decision-making
37
DIRECTIVE
capacity to the Board (e.g. regarding investments made by the CMO). This, in turn,
upsets individual rightholders who want to be more proactive in CMO governance.
 Apart from the issues of collection and distribution, rightholders would like to better
understand why and how their collected revenue is invested for other
purposes and how CMOs negotiate with specific users (particularly with big
players like Google or Spotify) because they feel that their rights are not sufficiently
protected in those negotiations. The last point is particularly important for them as
they need to be aware of how their works are being used not only at home but also
abroad. Both of these points have also been raised in the context of a lack of
specific knowledge, as well as the provision of information and the management of
revenue by CMOs.
The majority of rightholders believe that they have all of the necessary information
regarding the collection and distribution of rights revenue (25% strongly agree and 44%
agree) as well as management fees applied (24% strongly agree and 39% agree).
However, they seem to be less certain (17% strongly agree and 33% agree) of the
investments that their CMOs make from the collected revenue. As the in-depth interviews
have shown, representatives of two rightholders’ associations are particularly concerned
about the investments made from the non-distributable amounts collected by their CMOs.
Overall, however, only around half of the rightholders confirmed that they show an active
interest in the information they receive (see Figure 4-11). But none of the rightholders who
claimed that they are not interested in the information provided by their CMOs commented
further on that matter.
Figure 4-11. Rightholders’ satisfaction with the information provision by CMOs

I have all the information I need regarding
25% 44% 11% 13% 4%
collection and distribution of my revenues.
17% 33% 20% 12% 7% 10%
investments made by my CMO
24% 39% 15% 11% 5% 6%
the management fees of my CMO
I receive the above-mentioned information
5% 16% 25% 26% 22% 6%
but I am not interested in it
the fourth.
However, there is still a perceived need from rightholders to receive relevant information
from CMOs, as indicated in their survey comments. More specifically, most recurring
issues are the following:
 In line with their demands about the necessity to make the decision-making
processes in CMOs more transparent, rightholders would also like to receive more
personalised and simplified information. This particularly relates to such
categories of information as the calculation methodology for the distribution of
revenues used in their CMOs as well as clear and concise documents about their
rights as individual rightholders. Rightholders restated their demands made in the
questions about transparency, stressing that they would need more information
about the CMOs’ accounting details (e.g. information about how deductions are
applied to them individually, data on pension contributions, taxes) and
management (e.g. salaries of the Board members, human resources expenses).
 Rightholders were also particularly interested in the details of the deals that their
CMOs negotiate with users. They noted that they would at least like to receive
access to the details of the contracts negotiated with specific users.
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DIRECTIVE
 Following-up on their concerns related to the distribution of rights, rightholders

noted that it would be useful for them to access the calculation methodology for
administrative charges. Such rightholders point out that they often do not
understand why their CMO sets its administrative charge in that specific way (e.g.
why the charge is 15% and not 10%).
e. Management of rights revenue due to rightholders
Chapter 2 of Title II of the Directive lays down the rules regarding the management of
rightholders’ rights revenue by CMOs. Among other things, these provisions subject
CMOs to having their accounts duly audited and not to apply unduly high management
fees or additional deductions that cannot be justified. Additionally, Article 13(1) foresees
that CMOs ‘must distribute amounts due to rightholders no later than nine months from the
end of the financial year in which the rights revenue was collected, unless objective
reasons relating in particular to reporting by users, identification of rights, rightholders or
matching of information on works and other subject-matter with rightholders prevent the
collective management organisation or, where applicable, its members from meeting that
deadline’. This sub-section presents the findings on issues related to the management of
the rightholders’ rights revenues drawing on the results of the survey of NAs and CMOs.
NAs generally hold positive views over rights revenue management by CMOs, claiming
that the majority of CMOs distribute rights revenue in a timely manner and duly audit their
financial accounts. The majority of NAs also maintain that none or only a few CMOs have
established unduly high management fees or applied additional deductions (see Figure 4-
12 below).
Figure 4-12. Management of rights revenue by CMOs according to NAs

CMOs applied additional
1 2 13 4
deductions
CMOs established unduly high

management fees that cannot be 1 5 11 3
documented and justified
CMOs financial accounts were duly

7 6 1
audited
CMOs distributed the rights

revenue to rightholders in a timely 6 9 1 4
manner
All CMOs Most CMOs Approx half of CMOs Few CMOs None of the CMOs Don't know
When asked about the timely distribution of royalties (i.e. within nine months from the end
of a financial year), CMOs reported the following: only 42% report to have distributed more
than 90% of the amounts due to rightholders within the period foreseen in Article 13(1) of
the Directive. While the distribution within a year shows more positive trends, still just
around 49% of CMOs distribute the amounts due within this period (see Figure 4-13
below).
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 4-13. Share of amounts due to rightholders distributed by CMOs
Within a year 9,9% 3,8% 7,5% 30% 48,8%
Within 9
8,6% 8,6% 14,8% 25,9% 42%
months
Less than 30% From 30 to 50% From 50 to 70%
Note: CMOs survey, N=80 for answer ‘within a year’, N=81 for answer ‘within 9 months’.
Among the reasons for not distributing the amounts due to rightholders on time, both NAs
and CMOs named issues such as reaching out or identifying the rightholders and
insufficient amounts of royalties collected, i.e. some CMOs only distribute royalties when a
certain level of income is reached. However, it was also noted that rightholders have the
right to demand that their royalties be paid out, nevertheless. Furthermore, sometimes
users do not provide all of the necessary information to the CMOs on time, which also
leads to delays. Other reasons include reservations for claims from rightholders,
difficulties with data processing and obtaining the necessary documentation from foreign
rightholders.
The majority of rightholders themselves are satisfied with the way their CMOs collect and
distribute revenues from their rights (respectively 71%and 65% agree or strongly agree) .
The majority of rightholders (69% agree or strongly agree) also stated that they normally
receive their revenue without delay (see Figure 4-14).
Figure 4-14. Rightholders’ satisfaction with revenue management by CMOs
The administrative expenses my CMO charges for

23% 35% 19% 7% 6% 11%
managing my rights are fair
I am satisfied with the way my CMO invests part of
18% 30% 24% 7% 5% 17%
revenue from my rights
My CMO transfers the revenue from my rights to me
28% 41% 13% 10% 6%
without delays
I am satisfied with the way my CMO distributes
24% 41% 15% 9% 5%6%
I am satisfied with the way my CMO collects
27% 44% 13% 8% 4%
Overall, my CMO acts in the best interests of
33% 41% 13% 6%4%
rightholders when collecting and distributing…
the fourth; N=769 for the fifth; N=772 for the sixth.
However, in line with their previous answers on governance and information provision,
rightholders tend to have questions about the administrative charge(s) applied by their
CMOs as well as about how their CMOs invest parts of their rights revenue. Based on
their survey comments and follow-up interviews, the most recurring issues are the
following:
 As can be seen from Figure 4-14 above, around a half of the rightholders are not
sure about the investments that their CMOs make, even though just 12%
expressed their open dissatisfaction. In their comments to the survey, some
rightholders commented on cases when their CMOs would suddenly make rather
expensive purchases (e.g. buying new premises/buildings or investing in new IT
management systems) but notifying them only post-factum about the investment
made. During one of the in-depth interviews, a rightholders’ association
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representative explained that in certain CMOs these competences are transferred

from the General Assembly to the Board, which can make such decisions more
quickly but in a less transparent manner. Rightholders admitted that they are
aware of such decisions but think that they are not made in the best interests of
rightholders as they do not see any personal benefit from such investments or
because other actors (e.g. publishers) have a very stark influence on the
investment process. While the Directive does not require CMOs to inform
rightholders prior to making an investment, still the concerns raised by rightholders
evidence their wish to be more closely included in the decision-making process
regarding potential investments.
 Following-up on their previous comments regarding transparency and information
provision, rightholders stressed the fact that they do not understand how the
administrative charges are calculated in their CMOs. This strongly correlates with
their demand to have published the calculation methodology referred to above.
Several rightholders also noted that although, in reality, charges for different kinds
of work tend to vary somewhat, they are often presented by CMOs as merely one
charge. The lack of understanding on how a charge is calculated and applied is
further exacerbated by what rightholders perceive as unjustifiably high salaries for
the management.
f. Management of rights on behalf of other CMOs
An important part of CMOs’ activities is related to managing the rights of foreign

rightholders on behalf of other CMOs of which these rightholders are members. For this
reason, CMOs from different countries conclude (mutual) representation agreements, by
which they grant licenses, collect and distribute payments due to foreign rightholders for
the works and other subject-matter used within their territories.
Articles 14 and 15 of the Directive lay down the rules for such instances to ensure that
there is no discrimination against the rightholders whose rights are managed under
representation agreements and that the financial management of their rights is diligent,
accurate and regular. In addition, Article 19 of the Directive lays down the rules on the
information provided to those CMOs on the management of rights under representation
agreements. This section presents the findings on how these provisions work in practice,
drawing on the survey of CMOs.
Generally, around half of the surveyed CMOs have not encountered significant problems
with other CMOs that manage the rights of their rightholders. Another half, however, claim
to have issues such as delayed, irregular or inaccurate payments and not being provided
with necessary information by the other CMOs (see Figure 4-15).
Figure 4-15. Causes of concern for CMOs when other CMOs manage the rights of
their rightholders
4% We experience no issues with other CMOs which
manage the rights of our rightholders
17% The tariffs they set for the works of your rightholders
47%
19% Unduly high management costs
31% 4% Additional deductions other than management fees

without our consent
3%
24% Payments take too long
8%
We are not provided with the necessary information
Note : CMOs survey, N=81; multiple choice question.

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Most of the CMOs that provided additional comments to the survey note that they consider
other CMOs that operate in the EU trustworthy and while there are still day-to-day issues
remaining to be solved, these do not evolve into large-scale conflicts. While almost a third
of CMOs (31%) report issues with information provision by other CMOs, only a small
proportion of them claim it to be a systematic event. In most cases, whatever issues they
face are not due to shortcomings in their partner CMOs. Most challenges arise due to
external factors such as user reporting or differing national legal frameworks. Based on
the CMO survey comments, among the most recurring issues are the following:
 Double-taxation. The income CMOs receive from managing the rights of

rightholders on behalf of other CMOs is taxed both in the country of a proxy CMO
and the country of the beneficiary CMO. In addition, when a CMO is not treated as
a beneficial owner under national legislation, this excludes the application of
reduced tax rates resulting from the treaties on the avoidance of double taxation.
While only a few CMOs pointed out this issue, they claimed that it is a common
one across the EU and is faced by many other EU CMOs. This issue was also
brought forward during an exploratory interview with the representative of one
CMO who claimed that the double-taxation matter is a European-wide issue.
 Reporting by users. Another recurring issue noted by CMOs is the level of detail
in statements received from other CMOs, which, in turn is dependent on the
information that they receive from users and not all users provide equally detailed
information (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 5).
 Differences in internal CMO procedures and/or national legal frameworks.
Normally, CMOs have bilateral agreements with many other CMOs. The various
CMOs have distinct organisational rules and procedures which in some instances
might result in reporting inconsistencies and delays. According to the surveyed
CMOs, there are also differences in national rules as to which information CMOs
are obliged to provide and in what detail. This also contributes to reporting issues
and delays.
 Non-EU CMOs. Some surveyed CMOs noted that, in general, CMOs established
in the EEA adhere to the information provision and other provisions of the
Directive. On the other hand, European CMOs experience issues with information
provision from third-country CMOs. As one CMO noted, this problem is often
related to CMOs in emerging markets. Several CMOs have noted that these issues
are partly solved via umbrella CMO associations, such as CIAGP, SCAPR,
CISAC18. These bodies contribute to governing the relations between CMOs by
serving as a platform for information exchange, the collective development of
uniform templates for bilateral agreements, setting professional standards and
rules, and similar matters. As some CMOs noted, the meetings or databases of
these umbrella associations enable them to gather missing information about the
other CMOs.
Overall, in accordance with Article 19 of the Directive, the majority of CMOs (72%) claim
that they receive all or most of their needed information on the rights revenue attributed to
their rightholders. Most CMOs receive all or most of their needed information on
deductions made in respect to management fees (74% of CMOs) and deductions other
than management fees (67%). However, only half of the CMOs claim to receive all or most
18CIAGP - The International Council of Creators of Graphic, Plastic and Photographic Arts; SCAPR – The
Societies’ Council for the Collective Management of Performers’ Rights; CISAC – The International
Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers.
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of the information related to relevant General Assembly resolutions or licensing related

information (see Figure 4-16 below).
Figure 4-16. Provision of information from other CMOs

General assembly resolutions relevant to the
28% 20% 7% 6% 36%
management of the rights under the…
Information on any licences granted or refused
30% 20% 9% 6% 35%
in relation to the works of your rightholders
Deductions other than management fees 37% 30% 6% 21%
Deductions in respect of management fees 43% 31% 4% 17%
The rights revenue attributed, the amounts

36% 36% 12% 14%
paid per category of rights and per type of…
Receive all the information they need Receive most of the information they need
Receive only some of the information they need Receive very little of the information they need
They do not receive any information they need Do not know/not applicable
Generally, it can be deduced from the comments of CMOs that the non-provision of
certain information is not a systematic issue that occurs with most CMOs but rather a
problem related to a few CMOs from time to time. In their comments, 5 CMOs noted that
there is no clear-cut way to evaluate the information exchange because of the differences
of CMOs in different countries. The most recurring issues in the comments were related to
the differing reporting formats and use of technology. More specifically:
 Three CMOs explicitly referred to the different reporting formats as the source of
the problem. They report having problems with, for instance, the interpretation of
data. They noted that if the format for reports was followed it would be much
easier.
 Another CMO stressed the importance of the technology that should be employed
when exchanging information. According to that CMO, the lack of information has
come from CMOs that have not utilised technology to collect, use and share data.
Related to that, another CMO claimed that the non-provision of certain information
occurred mostly in the case of small CMOs due to their insufficient administrative
capacity and the lack of efficient systems for data exchange. Larger CMOs usually
provide all of the necessary data, according to this CMO.
g. Transparency of CMOs
Articles 21 and 22 of the Directive lay down transparency rules for CMOs. More
specifically, these provisions mandate CMOs to regularly publish the most important
information related to their activities (e.g., statutes, membership terms, standard licensing
contracts and standard applicable tariffs, policies, annual transparency reports). Such
provisions are aimed to set common transparency standards for CMOs so that the most
important information would be easily accessible and that both national authorities and
rightholders could hold CMOs accountable. This section examines how these provisions
have been implemented in practice drawing on the results of the national authorities’
survey as well as in-depth interviews and parts of the rightholders’ survey. It has to be
noted that the rightholders’ survey contained more targeted questions about transparency
and governance in CMOs, i.e. did not specifically focus on transparency reports.
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DIRECTIVE
Figure 4-17 below illustrates NAs’ evaluation on how duly and what portion of the CMOs
publishes the most important information on their websites.
Table 4-17. Public provision of information by CMOs
Standard licensing contracts and/ tariffs 12 5 2 1
Annual transparency report (including the audit

11 8 1
report)
Lists of persons who manage the CMOs and
representation agreements with other CMOs 13 6 1
(including their names)
General policies on financial management
(distribution of amounts due to rightholders, 13 5 2
management fees, other deductions and the use…
Their statutes, membership terms and the terms of
termination of authorisation to manage rights and 11 7 2
complaint handling and dispute resolution…
All CMOs Most CMOs Approx. half of CMOs None of the CMOs
Note: National authorities survey, values in absolute numbers (N=20).
Overall, according to NAs, most CMOs across the entire EU make the necessary
information publicly available. Non-provision is certainly not a systematic issue, according
to NAs’ comments. The perception of some authorities is that the issue may be more
frequent with either individual CMOs or is related to the non-provision of very specific
types of information. This partially correlates with evidence from the rightholders’ survey,
where individual rightholders pointed out the lack of ability to access CMO contracts with
distributors, agreements with online platforms and DSPs or CMOs’ accounting and
detailed financial logs. However, such cases are rather sporadic. One of the NAs also
questioned the need for smaller CMOs to publish policies on financial management (see
Chapter 5 and previous sections of Chapter 4, for transparency evaluations of CMOs by
users and rightholders respectively).
There are two more issues that were reported by NAs with regard to transparency. Firstly,
two NAs noted that the information is sometimes provided with delays, but this is usually
solved when CMOs receive a notification from the NA. One of the NAs also noted that,
while this has been an issue for several years, they have the impression that lately CMOs
place all of the necessary information on their websites. Indeed, only four rightholders
indicated in their comments that the slow provision of information is a major issue for
them.
Secondly, during an in-depth interview with a different NA, its representatives admitted
that the under-provision of information (rather than non-provision) is a problem for them.
They illustrated this with an example of some CMOs in their MS that tend to produce
different versions of transparency reports. According to this NA, the CMOs retain the most
detailed ones for their management while the less detailed ones are sent to the NA and
the least detailed ones are published on the websites. However, the study did not find
evidence that this is a wider trend across CMOs in different Member States.
Rightholders showed that only half of them (42%) perceive that overall the governance of
their CMOs is transparent. In their survey comments, rightholders argued that insufficient
information and, specifically, a lack of transparency with regard to CMO management is
one of the key reasons for dissatisfaction with their CMOs (for a more detailed discussion,
see the previous subsections of this chapter).
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DIRECTIVE
Naturally, CMO transparency is relevant not only for rightholders and NAs, but also for
users. As the next chapter shows, some of the issues on the users’ end such as questions
about the tariff calculation methodology or dispute handling procedures in CMOs are
connected with the question of transparency. One NA also confirmed in its comments that
CMOs in their MS are not very specific in defining the dispute handling procedures. On the
other hand, the question of tariff-setting methodology, which is closely connected with
remuneration, presents a point of interest for rightholders too. These questions are
explored in greater detail in the chapter below from the perspective of CMO-users’
relations.
h. Conclusions
Overall, the evidence collected suggests that the CMOs operating on the EU CRM market
are functioning in accordance with the transparency, governance and financial
management standards introduced by the Directive. CMOs appear to provide rightholders
with the necessary information, allowing them to participate in the governance of the
organization, and, according to rightholders, CMOs generally act in their best interest
when collecting and distributing royalties. Nevertheless, rightholders expressed some
doubts as to what extent their CMOs are transparent, whether they can influence CMOs’
decisions or hold their CMOs accountable.
CMOs appear to have the necessary mechanisms in place that allow for the withdrawal of
rights /termination of authorisation by rightholders. The fact that only a few rightholders
have used this opportunity may indicate that they are not always aware of the possibility or
experience the procedure to be complex. It can also indicate that they are satisfied with
the activities of their CMOs. Indeed, rightholders are overall satisfied with the way their
revenue is managed by CMOs with 74% of them stating that their CMO acts in the best
interests of rightholders when collecting and distributing royalties. On the other hand, this
might also be the result of the lack of alternative CMOs or other entities that could manage
their rights in the national CRM market. Such a situation occurs in both larger and smaller
MSs, where there is only one or several CMOs responsible for their respective sectors.
Despite the general satisfaction among rightholders regarding the management of their
revenues, according to the data provided by CMOs themselves, they struggle to distribute
all of the amounts due to rightholders on time (i.e., within nine months from the end of the
financial year as foreseen in Article 13(1) of the Directive). Only 42% reported to have
distributed more than 90% of amounts due to rightholders within the indicated period. One
of the key reasons is that not all users provide the necessary and relevant information in a
timely manner and in an agreed-upon format.
Only half of the surveyed rightholders (48%) said that they show an active interest in the
information regarding financial management that they receive from CMOs. In addition to
that, only half of them think they have sufficient knowledge to manage their own rights
(54%), which is further supported by the expressed need for simplified information on their
rights and the financial processes of CMOs. It is possible that, at least for some of these
rightholders, transparency and opaqueness issues stem precisely from their lack of
necessary knowledge and an overall disinterest in the information provided by their
CMOs. However, the study did not find a direct link between rightholders’ lack of interest
or knowledge and the perceived transparency of CMOs or the ability to influence decision-
making processes within CMOs.
Transparency as one of the key objectives of the CRM Directive functions fairly well, as
indicated by the National Authorities. However, only 44% of the surveyed rightholders
think that their CMO is transparent, and just around a half of them feel that they can
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influence the decisions made by CMOs (47%) and can hold the CMO leadership
accountable (52%). The key issues they point to are the lack of information on how the
rights revenues are distributed, administrative charges calculation methodology, revenue
investments, negotiations with users and opaque decision-making processes without
consulting individual rightholders. At the same time, most of rightholders agree that they
can participate in the governance of their CMO (75%) and have all of the information
necessary on how to do that (69%).
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DIRECTIVE
5. Relations between CMOs and users
Chapter 4 of Title II of the Directive establishes, among other things, principles that should
guide the licensing process, including negotiations between CMOs and users. In
particular, negotiations should be carried out ‘in good faith’ and licensing terms should be
based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria. Moreover, users should provide CMOs
with any information at their disposal on the use of the rights managed by the CMO within
an agreed time frame and in a pre-established format. These provisions are aimed at
addressing a number of deficiencies: insufficient transparency in tariff setting, the potential
for abuse of a dominant position during negotiations, and insufficient user reporting.19
Therefore, this chapter examines how the rules set out in the Directive function in practice
and whether they have had a positive impact on the market. The analysis relies on the
results of national authorities’ (NAs), users’, and CMOs’ surveys as well as in-depth
interviews conducted with selected representatives of these groups.
Box 5. Main takeaways: Relations between CMOs and users
 Overall, a majority of the surveyed stakeholders NAs and users agree that
the CRM system is functioning relatively well in the areas of tariff-setting and
licensing negotiations. While relations between users and CMOs have
somewhat improved since the transposition of the Directive, there are still
unsettled issues on both sides.
 Users point out the lack of information about how CMOs set tariffs and about
the exact contents of their licenses and repertoires, as well as the absence of
standard tariffs on the CMOs’ website as key problems on their end.
 CMOs express dissatisfaction with the insufficient accuracy and timeliness of

user reporting.
 The study has identified a variety of diverging approaches to CMO-user

dispute settlement and tariff-setting across various MS. This difference in
approaches, especially in the area of dispute settlement, sometimes causes
problems for users that are operating in multiple MSs (e.g., with regard to
jurisdiction).
a. Tariff-setting practices across EU Member States
This subsection elaborates on different types of tariff-setting practices that exist across the
EU MSs, based on the national authorities’ survey and desk research. After providing a
general overview, it describes each of the national tariff-setting models in greater detail
and provides specific illustrations.
19 COM(2012) 372 final; See also, for example, https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-7-3-

2016/4507/hviid_schroff_street_regulating_collective_management_organisations_by_competition_jiptec_7_3
_2016_256.pdf
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DIRECTIVE
As can be seen from the table below, there are four main approaches to setting tariffs
across the EU. These are: (i) negotiations-based approach when tariffs are established
based on negotiations between CMOs and users in different formats20 (ii) unilateral
approach when CMOs set the criteria and establish the tariffs (iii) supervisory approach
when CMOs set the tariffs but these must be approved by the NA and (iv) state-driven
approach when the NA or another government institution is responsible for setting the
tariffs. In this subsection, we will briefly discuss each of these models, outline the main
characteristics, and provide illustrations.
Table 5-1. Tariff-setting practices across the EU Member States.

(i) Negotiations- (ii) Unilateral approach (iii) Supervisory (iv) State-driven
based approach (13) (7) approach (6) approach (1)
 Austria  Belgium23  Czechia  Malta

 Croatia  Cyprus  Bulgaria
 Denmark  Greece  Poland
 Estonia  Ireland  Spain
 Finland  Lithuania  Hungary
 France21  Luxembourg  Netherlands24
 Germany  Portugal
 Italy
 Latvia
 Slovakia
 Sweden
 Slovenia
 Romania22
Source: Visionary Analytics (2020), based on the survey of NAs (N=20) and information provided by the EC.
First, the most wide-spread approach is the one based on (i) negotiations between
users and CMOs. These negotiations, however, may differ in their form. In eight Member
States (specifically, in Croatia, Germany, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia), tariffs
are normally negotiated between CMOs and major users’ associations. In certain cases,
the format of the negotiations is outlined in greater detail in the respective national
legislation. For instance, the Romanian legislation prescribes that every time the tariffs are
changed, representatives of users and CMOs establish a special Negotiation Commission.
In the five remaining MS (Austria, Finland, Denmark, Slovakia, and Sweden), negotiations
take place with associations and also include individual negotiations. For example,
according to the interview with a Finnish NA, negotiations between CMOs and both
individual users and user associations exist in the country and the application of various
approaches depends on the sector.
20 In certain MSs, negotiations are conducted on an individual basis (i.e. between individual users and CMOs).
In others, they are conducted between CMOs and users’ associations. There are also some MSs that combine
both approaches (e.g. Finland).
21 In some cases of mandatory collective management of the right to remuneration, the copyright act itself sets
the tariff (e.g. art. L. 133-3 French Intellectual property code about the fee for the public lending of books) or
entrusts the tariff setting to an administrative body (art. L. 311-5 French IPC).
22 If the parties do not agree on the tariffs in 45 days, the Romanian Copyright Office establishes a special
panel that rules on the establishment of the tariff.

23 The NA is partially involved in the process but has no power to overturn the tariff, unless the case concerns
legal licenses (des licences légales).

24
Currently, Dutch legislation is being reviewed to reduce the need for authorisation. Consequently, the
current approach to classifying the Netherlands might change; on the potential changes to the legislation, see
here:https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads/document?id=a16f4a5b-25fa-4525-a34e-
5f395d1ef296&title=Advies%20Afdeling%20advisering%20Raad%20van%20State%20en%20Nader%20rappo
rt%20.pdf
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The second most common approach is that of (ii) unilateral decision-making by CMOs.
In this model, users can only challenge the tariffs post-factum. While this approach is used
in eight MS, the means of challenging the set tariffs vary from country to country. For
example, in Cyprus and Lithuania NAs offer mediation services before the parties proceed
to arbitration or the filing of a lawsuit. In Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg disputes,
however, can only be settled by means of arbitration or court proceedings.25 As one of the
users from Belgium pointed out during the interview, this model severely restricts the
negotiating power of users, because most will seek avoidance of high litigation costs.
The third approach relies on a (iii) more pro-active role of NAs that have to certify tariffs
submitted by CRM entities. The degree of the NA’s involvement, however, also varies
from country to country. For example, in Spain the government outlines the general
methodology for tariff calculation and sets up negotiation committees, while in Czechia the
NA’s approval is necessary when the tariffs are set by a higher margin than the current
inflation rates. In Poland the Copyright Commission may approve or demand changes to
the draft tariffs proposed by CMOs, while in Bulgaria negotiations between users and
CMOs take place first and, if those had achieved a positive result, the NA has to then
approve the tariffs. In Hungary, the NA has to preliminarily consult with major users and
user associations as well as with the Ministries of Economy and Culture before making a
final decision on whether it approves or rejects the draft tariffs.
The last model, which is used only in Malta, is (iv) a state-driven approach. In that
model, the NA plays a key role in setting the tariffs itself. In this system, CMOs have to
submit draft tariffs to NAs on a regular basis and the NAs then make adjustments and
change them, whenever they deem it necessary to do so.
b. Assessment of tariff-setting practices and licensing

negotiations by different stakeholder groups
This subsection presents the assessments of the tariff-setting practices and licensing
negotiations across the EU MSs based on surveys of the key stakeholders – NAs and
users. It outlines two key issues in the processes of tariff-setting and licensing
negotiations based on the results of the surveys and individual interviews. Illustrative
examples are provided along with the argumentation and justifications used by
stakeholders.
Seventeen surveyed NAs argue that the criteria for setting tariffs are objective. A large
majority of NAs that responded to the survey (13 out of 20) also believe that negotiations
between CMOs and users are carried out in good faith. This is also confirmed in the
results of the users’ survey, where eight out of ten users working with CMOs agreed that
licensing terms are usually based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria. During the
interviews, some users indicated a positive impact of the Directive itself in that it provided
for a more consistent approach in the CRM system, fostered competition among CMOs
and required more transparent governance.
However, compared to other NAs and CMOs, users hold somewhat less positive and
more diverging views on the effectiveness of the national legal frameworks in protecting
their rights according to the survey results. Half of the surveyed users (10 out of 20) noted
25The means of dispute settlement in the Netherlands and Portugal are unclear; neither participated in the NA
survey that was conducted during the study.
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DIRECTIVE
that the CRM system in their particular country has not changed much since the
transposition of the Directive. This was also confirmed during individual in-depth
interviews. Many interviewed users attributed the issues they experience to the way
national laws are implemented. Reportedly, this is especially true for smaller MSs, where
lack of transparency on the side of CMOs still persists, according to a large group of users
from the audiovisual sector. Three out of ten interviewed users said that the way the
Directive had been implemented so far makes it not as effective as it could have been.
Specifically because of the lack of clarity on available dispute resolution methods and the
scope of CMO mandates.
Users mainly point out two recurring problems. Firstly, the lack of information on how
CMOs set tariffs as well as/or the absence of standard applicable tariffs on the CMOs’
websites have been described as a problem by eight out of ten interviewed users. During
an interview, one of the users also complained that CMOs often use a justification for not
publishing any tariffs by arguing none of their rates are “standard”.26 Overall, the users
argue that this lack of information impairs their negotiating power.
Secondly, due to the ongoing fragmentation of the licensing repertoires, seven out of ten
interviewed users have expressed their frustration with the lack of information about the
exact contents of their licenses and CMO repertoires. Users noted that they normally
attempt to purchase ‘blanket’ licenses27 to make sure that they cover the entire repertoire,
but often encounter situations when a certain work/several works are missing from the
license they purchased. As one user pointed out during the interview, they are not always
aware of the fact that rightholders might withdraw some of their rights with the CMO or not
place all of their rights with just one CMO. The user simply does not receive this
information and does not have time to check on whether the CMO administers every
single individual work belonging to a specific artist. Hence, the user sometimes ends up
using works that are not covered by the license while being unaware of it. Consequently,
they have to purchase additional licenses to cover it, resulting in additional financial
expenses, which could have been prevented if they had known more about the contents of
the license. This, in turn, can be the result of market fragmentation and competition.
These problems are also reflected in the legal disputes arising between users and CMOs
in certain Member States, especially in those where CMOs can set tariffs unilaterally. A
particularly illustrative example that has reached the CJEU is the Belgian case of festival
organizers suing a local CMO for, what they argue, was unlawfully increasing tariffs
without any reason and for not abiding by the principle of proportionality.28 As the in-depth
interviews have revealed, some sector-specific disputes have also been caused by the
lack of clarity about how tariffs are set or imposed. For example, in Finland and Belgium,
litigation is still ongoing in the area of cable retransmission rights (a similar case was
recently settled in Norway, even though the country has not yet transposed the CRM
Directive). Such litigation is largely centered around whether TV service providers as
users can carry out original broadcasts on behalf of television broadcasters (by virtue of
the rights acquired by broadcasters) or whether they are actually breaching retransmission
rights that CMOs represent. For more details on these and other legal disputes, see
Annex 5.
26 The Directive states that CMOs must publish “standard applicable tariffs, including discounts”.
27 As defined by CISAC, blanket licences are licences granted in respect of all the works under the
management of a particular CMO: the CMO’s repertoire. See:
https://fr.cisac.org/content/download/1135/19647/file/CISACUniversity_The_Role_of_CMOs_FINAL.pdf
28See opinion of the Advocate General on the case here:
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228701&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=r
eq&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12281529
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DIRECTIVE
c. Impact of the licensing terms and processes on relations

between CMOs and users and on the remuneration of
rightholders
This subsection discusses the key impacts that the licensing terms have on relations
between CMOs and users and on the remuneration of rightholders based on the survey
results supplemented by evidence provided in the in-depth interviews. It also elaborates
on the key issues that users face, specifically related to the CMOs’ repertoire and the
content of the licenses they purchase. Whenever possible, this section also compares the
perspectives of CMOs and users on these issues.
The assessment of the licensing terms and processes by stakeholders shows two rather
different trends. On the one hand, the majority of stakeholders tend to agree that licensing
terms offered by CRM entities are objective with 16 out of 18 respondents in the users’
survey stated that the terms are usually based on objective and non-discriminatory
criteria. This is confirmed by the results of the NA survey where 13 respondents out of 20
stated that the licensing negotiations between CMOs and users are conducted in good
faith. Furthermore, 17 out of 20 NAs stated that they believe the tariff-setting criteria to be
objective.
On the other hand, 13 representatives of NAs reported that the licensing processes in
their Member States have largely stayed the same (i.e. they have not improved or
deteriorated since the implementation of the Directive). Only five NA representatives said
that the licensing process has improved in their countries. This is further supported by the
evidence from the users’ survey and in-depth interviews. Five surveyed users stated that
they are not sure whether the licensing process is transparent, while five more stated that
the process is not transparent at all (together representing half of the respondents to that
question in total).
The in-depth interviews with individual stakeholders showed that there are recurring
issues about the licensing process on the users’ end. First, eight users out of ten noted
that due to the lack of comprehensive information on licensing (i.e. tariffs, contracts), they
feel that their negotiating position is much weaker than that of the CMOs. Some users also
mentioned that they do not know what conditions their competitors receive, which causes,
in their view, doubts about whether CMOs really treat all users equally. Secondly, five
users out of ten argued that often there are no alternatives for them on the markets where
they operate due to the dominant positions of certain CMOs (specifically in Italy, Belgium,
Austria, and Romania). Finally, seven out of ten interviewed users have noted that due to
the fragmentation of repertoires, they do not always have the exact information about the
contents of the repertoire and the licenses they purchase. Two out of ten interviewed
users also argue that the fragmentation problem is especially exacerbated by the lack of
communication between CMOs and IMEs. The most illustrative cases are those of Italy
and Spain, where groups of rightholders withdrew their rights from the biggest national
CMOs (SIAE and SGAE, respectively) and transferred them to newly-established IMEs
(Soundreef and Unison). This created a layer of additional complexity in clearing rights for
users, in particular in assessing the relative size and value of the respective repertoires
controlled by respective CMOs and IMEs. Hence, it is difficult for users to distinguish
clearly the respective repertoires and to avoid having the users being charged twice for
the same rights.
Collecting and distributing remuneration for private copying or copyright levies is another
important concern for both users and CMOs, where opinions diverge. CMOs argue that
private copying levies significantly contribute to the remuneration of rightholders and the
funding of cultural activities. Two interviewed CMOs confirmed that they consider the
private copying levy system relevant today, referencing the decisions of the European
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Court of Justice. At the same time, they agree that the system might be somewhat
complex, but they believe that this happens due to legal differences at the MS level.
Several CMOs also argued that the current system of private copying levies should be
modernised and include modern copying devices, such as smartphones or tablets. Two
out of ten interviewed users, on their part, argued that the current private copying levies
are unnecessary and excessive. One of them noted that in situations where a CRM is not
mandatory, the legislator in some MSs has unduly extended CRMs (e.g. cases of private
copy levies over-spilling into digital services, e.g. nPVR in France and cloud services in
the Netherlands). Another user representative pointed out that although the obligation for
the levy payment should rest with the private user, all MSs impose indiscriminate
application of levies at importation, which creates an unnecessary burden both for the
importer and the user. In addition, some CMOs do not provide information on how much of
the money collected from levies is actually allocated to rightholders, as claimed by the
interviewed user.
Finally, apart from the issues mentioned above, there seems to also be an additional
sector-specific problem. Specifically, three users from the audiovisual sector argued that
the Directive and the current CRM system seem to be somewhat skewed towards the
musical sector from their point of view (even though the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive outlines a separate legal framework for the audiovisual sector). Sector
representatives particularly lamented the absence of audiovisual ‘hubs’ (e.g. similar to ICE
Services for music) and a lack of clarity in the area of cable retransmission rights. For
example, in Belgium there is a long-lasting dispute around the question of whether users
should pay for the used audiovisual rights twice, when their cable operators receive
broadcasts and retransmit them into their cable networks. While users argue that such
retransmission constitutes a non-public broadcast because it is not communicated to the
public, CMOs disagree and argue that the users have to pay for the retransmission as
well. Both general and sector-specific issues result in occasional disputes between users
and CMOs, which we discuss in the subsection below.
d. Dispute settlements between users and CMOs
This sub-section presents the results of the desk research and surveys conducted among
NAs on the topic of user-CMO dispute settlement approaches. The findings are also
supplemented by the results of targeted interviews. Concrete examples and classification
of these and other legal disputes are presented in a separate chapter (see Chapter 10).
There are three prevalent methods for settling disputes between users and CMOs on
licensing tariffs (see Table 5-2 below). The most widespread method of solving such
disputes involves referring the case directly to the courts. This is particularly relevant for
the Member States where CMOs set tariffs unilaterally (see previous section, Table 5-2).
The second type of dispute settlement involves the NAs first. In these Member States,
NAs are responsible for receiving complaints from the CMOs and users if disputes
between them arise regarding licensing tariffs. However, the average annual number of
complaints across almost all these countries is very low – approximately 2-3 complaints a
year. The major exception in that respect is Germany, where the NA received 164
inquiries in 2017, 159 inquiries in 2018, and 143 inquiries in 2019. In a follow-up comment,
the German NA clarified that this high number is explained by the fact that the NA does
not track the number of CMO and user complaints but rather the overall number of
inquiries sent to their dispute resolution body.
Finally, the remaining five MSs have various different approaches to settling disputes that
to a certain extent combine the features of the first and second approaches. For example,
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in Belgium and France complaints can be submitted to either a court or the NA already at
the first stages of the dispute (i.e. the CMO does not have to go the NA first but could if it
wanted to). Usage of arbitration is an established measure in Greece and Austria, while in
Czechia the dispute settlement procedures have not been clearly defined yet.
Table 5-2. Approaches to settling disputes between CMOs and users regarding
licensing tariffs and terms across the EU Member States.
Disputes are resolved in Court; CMOs and/or users submit a Other types of dispute
NA does not interfere in disputes complaint to a designated NA; the settlement (25%)
between CMOs and users (40%) decision may be challenged in
Court (35%)
 Slovakia  Germany  Austria
 Latvia  Lithuania  Czechia
 Finland  Croatia  Belgium
 Italy  Spain  France
 Estonia  Sweden  Greece
 Poland  Malta
 Hungary  Ireland
 Romania
Note: National Authorities’ survey, N=20.
Interviewed users who operate across the EU argued that the lack of clarity on methods
for dispute resolution create additional uncertainty and costs. One such user provided a
very illustrative example. When the user faced a dispute with a licensor based in the UK
that issued licenses on a pan-EU basis, the user could not understand to which jurisdiction
the dispute would belong (to the UK or to any MSs where the user provides its services).
A few users also noted that establishing specialized courts and tribunals that could
address their questions about interpretation and application of the Directive in individual
MSs would help alleviate the situation.
e. Users’ reporting obligations
The information exchange between CMOs and users constitutes another important
element of the CRM system, in particular the reporting by users, which is an obligation
outlined in Article 17 of the Directive. This subsection presents the findings of the CMO
and user surveys with regard to user reporting and information exchange. It demonstrates
that there are still some systemic issues with user reporting as less than half of the CMOs
are satisfied with the current state of reporting. The findings are further supplemented with
the comments provided by individual stakeholders and the results of targeted interviews.
As Figure 5-1 below shows, there is no consensus among CMOs with regard to the
question of satisfaction by user reporting. Around a third of the polled CMOs are satisfied
with the user reporting, while another third are dissatisfied. In their comments on the
question, several CMOs complained that it is hard for them to receive certain types of data
in user reports (esp. with regards to information on licensing amounts and numbers of
titles played). Some of the CMOs that felt ambivalent about the question clarified in the
comments that reporting differed significantly from user to user, which is why they
struggled to choose their response.
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Figure 5-1. CMOs’ satisfaction with reporting by users

Do not know; 5% Very satisfied;
Very dissatisfied; 10%
7,5%
Dissatisfied; Satisfied; 21,3%

23,8%
Neither satisfied,
nor dissatisfied ;
32,5%
Note: CMO survey, N=80.
Some of the surveyed CMOs were dissatisfied with the quality of the data provided in user
reports. For example, users were struggling with reporting accurate numbers for venue
capacity and providing data only on titles or authors of work, thus confusing the CMO. In
addition to that, two CMOs said that the users to which they license were not informing
them of internal copying of copyrighted material in the reports while two more noted that
the users would purposely change the format of the report template and/or their answers.
Almost half of the polled CMOs stated that the information they receive is often inaccurate
or does not cover what they need, which can also impact the process of tariff-setting (see
Figure 5-2). One of the interviewed CMOs also regretted that the user reporting obligation
under Article 17 is difficult to enforce in practice, noting that even if the quality of reporting
is very bad, CMOs cannot do much about it.
It is also worth mentioning that in their follow-up comments to the survey, several CMOs
also acknowledged that the process of reporting could be a major administrative burden
for specific types of users such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This also
corresponds with the concerns that some users voiced during the interviews. Furthermore,
one of the interviewed CMOs admitted that in certain cases they prefer to turn a blind eye
on SMEs underreporting certain works. Explaining its response, the CMO said that
potential litigation costs in such cases (e.g. suing a small restaurant) would usually
outweigh the benefits.
Figure 5-2. CMOs’ assessment of the information provided by users: information is

often inaccurate and/or does not cover all of the information needed
12,5% 30% 25% 17,5% 7,5% 7,5%
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree, nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Do not know/not applicable
One more issue that was often reported by the dissatisfied CMOs was that they do not
receive user reports on time. This is also reflected in responses to the follow-up question
on the timeliness of the reports. As Figure 5-3 below demonstrates, around a quarter of
CMOs (23.8%) stated that they do not receive required information in a timely manner.
Nevertheless, this issue is not as strongly pronounced as the accuracy of the information
discussed above, since 42.6% of the surveyed CMOs stated that they normally receive
the reports on time. This was further confirmed by interviews where none of the
interviewed CMOs referred it as a major problem.
Regarding users’ adherence to pre-established reporting formats, the survey responses

are quite similar to those about the timeliness of the report submissions. Less than half of
the CMOs stated that they receive information in a pre-established format as can be seen
from the Figure below. This is also in line with the results of the in-depth interviews, where
a few individual CMOs admitted that they invest into innovative solutions that would help
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DIRECTIVE
users with the submission of reports electronically. Some CMOs design electronic
reporting software. One German CMO explained that they encourage the clubs that they
license to install special music-tracking boxes29 by offering tariff discounts for that. Overall,
using digitalisation and innovative technologies helps users to improve their effectiveness
and efficiency in reporting.
Figure 5-3. CMOs’ satisfaction with timeliness and format of user reporting
We receive the information within the
pre-established time 11,3% 31,3% 27,5% 17,5% 6,3% 6,3%
We receive the information within the

pre-established format 15% 25% 28,8% 17,5% 6,3% 7,5%
Stongly agree Agree Neither agree, nor disagree

Disagree Strongly disagree Do not know/not applicable
On the users’ side, there have been no major concerns about the information exchange
with CMOs. All but two respondents to the users’ survey said that the CMOs provide some
opportunities to communicate with them online. Furthermore, based on the survey results,
there is no evidence of any systemic problems with the provision of information regarding
rights management, territories of coverage and reasons for the refusal to license a specific
user. Some users, however, have expressed dissatisfaction with the information provision
regarding the content of the licenses they purchase (which was discussed in the previous
section).
f. Key factors influencing the remuneration of rightholders

according to CMOs
When asked about the key factors influencing that rightholders receive remuneration
which is proportionate to the economic value of respective rights, the CMOs largely
favoured their own internal rules and procedures as a key factor (with 78.8% of them
either agreeing or strongly agreeing on that). Outcomes of licensing negotiations (with
50.1%) and national regulation (with 45.1%) were distant second options, while the
information provided by users to CMOs received only 33.8% (landing on the last place). In
the opinion of the CMOs, the low level of importance of users’ reports by the CMOs should
be understood in the framework of the timeliness and accuracy issues discussed above.
Figure 5-4 below presents the details of the responses for each factor (national regulation,
internal CMO rules, outcomes of licensing negotiations, and information provided by users
to CMOs).
29 A device that automatically recognises what music is being played in the vicinity.
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Figure 5-4. Factors ensuring that rightholders receive remuneration, which is

proportionate to the economic value of respective rights, according to CMOs
6,3%
National regulation 13,8% 31,3% 27,5% 17,5% 3,8%
3,8%
Internal CMO rules and
27,5% 51,3% 3,8% 10% 3,8%
procedures
1,3%
Outcomes of licensing
13,8% 36,3% 31,3% 11,3% 6,3%
negotiations
2,5%
The information provided by
7,5% 26,3% 33,8% 22,5% 7,5%
users to your organisation
g. Conclusions
Overall, the findings of the study demonstrate that there has been some progress thanks
to the Directive, but some challenges still remain in the users’ relations with CMOs. On
the one hand, most users believe that the licensing terms are usually based on objective
and non-discriminatory criteria. Most NAs also note that licensing negotiations in their MSs
are conducted in good faith, while the survey of CMOs shows that such negotiations are
the second-most important factor in ensuring the proper remuneration of rightholders. On
the other hand, a majority of NAs have also noted that not much has yet changed about
the licensing processes in their MSs since the implementation of the Directive.
Furthermore, CMOs are still somewhat dissatisfied with the quality of reports that they
receive from users, even though they acknowledge the administrative burden that
reporting might pose for certain user categories such as SMEs. Some CMOs are also
dissatisfied with the absence of enforcement mechanisms for the reporting obligation. The
users, on their end, would like to see more transparency on CMOs’ tariffs. While the users
tend to agree that the licensing terms are generally objective, they also demand
improvements to the licensing process and information exchange with CMOs. In
particular, the users want to know what the licenses that they purchase contain and
whether they are treated in a similar fashion compared to their competitors. Finally, the
need to have clear and comparable systems of dispute settlement across different MS is
equally important to both users and CMOs.
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6. CRM entities established outside the Union and

operating in the Union
CRM entities established outside the EU but operating in the Member States (hereafter
non-EU CRM entities) are attracted by the European market. Creative industries, the main
copyright-intensive industries, have generated 3% of the EU-27 employment in 2008.30
During 2014-2016 this number increased to 5.5%.31 Accordingly, Europe is consistently in
the lead in terms of revenue collections as European CMOs collect around €6 billion every
year.32 This amounted to more than half (56.4%) of the global total collections in 2018.33
Moreover, CMOs from Europe collected 54.4% of the total CISAC revenues in 2019,
followed by CMOs from Canada/USA that generated only half as much (24.3%)34,
revealing a significant gap and signalling the advanced state of the European market.
According to CISAC estimates, the European audiovisual sector has generated 91.7% of
global revenues in 2018, and 93.6% in 2019. A similar situation can be observed in the
visual arts sector. In 2018 and 2019, European CMOs also collected more than half of the
global music revenues.35 These trends highlight the attractiveness of Europe to CRM
entities established outside the EU, as the European market holds the promise of potential
clientele and revenues.
For the purpose of this study, we have gone beyond the task indicated – i.e., to cover
CMOs established outside the Union but operating in the Union and have also covered
any non-EU CRM entities. Non-EU CRM entities are CRM entities established outside EU
countries but operating in the EU. These entities can be CMOs or other entities that are
part of the overall collective management system, e.g., subsidiaries of CMOs or IMEs that
carry out revenue collection, distribution or other specific services. The collected evidence
suggests that these entities operate in the EU via representation agreements with EU’s
CMOs or through subsidiary CRM entities or offices registered in certain MSs. The
Directive does not regulate non-EU CRM entities. However, specifically as regards CMOs,
Recital 10 of the Directive indicates that Member States can apply the same or similar
provisions to non-EU CMOs as those that they apply to their national CMOs.
This chapter discusses the non-EU CRM entities that are operating in the EU. It then
presents an overview of the regulation applicable to them based on the legal analysis and
information provided by national authorities (NAs). Finally, the chapter assesses the
impact such regulation has had on non-EU CRM entities, on the rightholders, and,
consequently, on competition in the market, drawing on the results of the surveys and
interviews with stakeholders.
30 European Commission (2010). The European Competitiveness Report 2010

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/cedadcfd-2eda-47d4-a04c-739acc2b70b2
31 EPO& EUIPO (2019). IPR-intensive industries and economic performance in the European Union.
https://www.boip.int/uploads/inline/WEB_IPR_intensive_Report_2019.pdf
35 CISAC (2020). Global report for 2019// CISAC (2019). Global report for 2018.
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Box 6. Main takeaways: CMOs established outside the Union and operating
in the Union
 Evidence collected for this study suggests that the most common way non-EU
CRM entities operate in the Union is through representation agreements with
EEA-based CMOs. However, in some MS non-EU CRM entities have
established subsidiary CRM entities or have registered offices.
 In the majority of the MS the legislation does not explicitly state which provisions
are applied to the non-EU CMOs, creating ambiguity as to how they are
regulated. However, NA survey answers compared to the legal analysis suggest
that it is possible that in most MS non-EU CMOs are regulated similarly or
exactly like national CMOs.
 According to the NAs and EEA-based CMOs non-EU CRM entities are not more
attractive to rightholders than EU CMOs, nor they have a competitive advantage,
can work more efficiently or can enter the market more easily than the EU
CMOs.
 Generally, NAs are rather indecisive about the position of non-EU CMOs in
comparison to EU CMOs in the European CRM market as evident from the
survey results. Out of 20 surveyed NAs, seven agree or strongly agree, only one
disagrees, three are indecisive and nine do not know whether non-EU CMOs are
more difficult to control and hold accountable. A large share of NAs (seven to
eleven depending on the question) indicated that they do not know if non-EU
CMOs are more competitive, attractive and efficient, or how easy they can enter
the market and be held accountable.
 The study found no evidence that non-EU CRM entities have a significant
competitive advantage over EU based CRM entities.
a. Mapping the non-EU CRM entities
Based on the stakeholder survey responses and desk research, this subsection
introduces the identified non-EU CRM entities and the ways that they are present in the
EEA.
According to the initial desk research and additional comments by NAs, around 20 CRM
entities based outside of the Union are present in the EU market.36 37 The respondent list
36 Motion Picture Licensing Corporation (US-based), Church Video License International (US), Copyright
Clearance Centre (US), AMRA (US), PRS for Music (UK), NLA Media Access (UK), RadioPro Ltd (UK), DACS
(UK), ACS (UK), ALCS (UK), Swissperform (Switzerland), FMAA (Albania), BECS (UK), ARTISTI (Canada),
ABRAMUS (BR), Permission Machine (US), Suisa (CH), SESAC (US), Fjölís (Iceland), Norwaco (Norway),
BONO (Norway), Gramo (Norway). Due to a lack of accessible information and the low response rate to the
survey, it cannot be confirmed that all of these organizations are CMOs as defined in the Directive. These
organisations are included in the list relying on the survey responses of NAs, CMOs and non-EU CRM entities.
These respondents indicated that the following organizations operate in the EEA in one way or another.
However, the list should be read with caution, considering that the respondents have understood the question
on non-EU CMOs in a variety of ways, i.e., most of the mentioned CRM entities have representation
agreements with EU CMOs, which does not mean they are directly operating in the EEA market as it is
understood in this study.
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of the non-EU CMOs’ survey also included other CMOs established outside the EU as
potentially active in one or multiple MS since they are the members of the European
umbrella organisations38 (for the full list, see Annex 3).As shown in figure 6-1 below, a
third of surveyed NAs indicated that they are unaware of non-EU CRM entities operating
in their countries. More than half of NAs note that non-EU CRM entities are present inthe
EU, i.e., through a network of representation agreements whereby CRM entities from
different countries ‘grant each other the right to license their repertoires in each other's
territory’. 39 That is the case in Croatia, Finland, Spain, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Estonia,
Poland, Romania, Hungary, France, and Germany according to NAs. However, it can be
safely assumed that CMOs have representation agreements of some kind in nearly all
Member States. 40 Indeed, 7 out of 8 non-EU CRM entities that answered the question
indicated that they are present in EU through representation agreements. The exception
was a CMO that operates through a subsidiary entity established in the EU.
According to the non-EU CRM entities themselves, they cover at least 24 EU MSs, most
of them through representation agreements. For example, Norwegian and Swiss CRM
entities indicated in the survey that they have reciprocal representation agreements
throughout all of Europe.
Figure 6-1. The ways in which non-EU CRM entities are present in EU Member
States
To NAs knowledge, non-EU CRM entities
3 do not operate in their country
4 Through reciprocal representaiton
agreements with EU CSs
Through CSs that they establish in the
12 1 EU
Through IMEs that they establish in the
6 EU
Other ways
Note: National authorities survey, values in absolute numbers (N=20).
Only six NAs (Spain, Poland, Malta, Estonia, Italy and Hungary) stated that non-EU CRM
entities operate in their national market through subsidiary CRM entities established in the
EU. However, the desk research shows that non-EU CRM entities have established
subsidiary IMEs, CMOs and/or other licensing bodies in at least 10 Member States,
namely Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Poland, and Spain (see Box 6-1 below for examples). With their presence in the EU
Member States via registered offices, these subsidiaries become local CRM entities and
are not considered to be non-EU entities, as a few NAs stressed. Desk research and
stakeholders in their survey responses did not identify non-EU CRM entities that operate
in the Union in other ways than via entities established in MS or via representation
agreements.
37 Note that the last four CMOs i.e., Fjölís (Iceland), Norwaco (Norway), BONO (Norway), Gramo (Norway),
are EEA- based CMOs which were included in the list for exhaustiveness.
38 For example,the European Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers (GESAC), Society of
Audiovisual Authors SAA, Association of European Performers’ Organisations (AEPO-ARTIS) and similar, or
are linked with bodies such as the European Writers Council EWC.
39 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_14_79
40 For example, during exploratory interviews one Lithuanian-based CMO confirmed having reciprocal
agreements with several CMOs based outside of the EU and noted this to be a common practice among
CMOs.
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Regarding the reasons for operating in any given way on the EU market, four out of the six
non-EU CRM entities present in the EU through representation agreements41 claimed that
they wanted to be more accessible to European rightholders, two indicated that they
wanted an easier access to a broader range of users, and one said that the overall legal
environment is more favourable for CMOs in the EU than in the country of their primary
establishment. In addition, three CMOs from Norway, UK and Switzerland commented
that the longstanding tradition of reciprocity between them and CMOs from Europe is the
reason that they are present in the European market. For example, the Swiss CMO
explained that the Swiss Copyright Act obliges CMOs to conclude reciprocal
representation agreements with foreign CMOs whenever possible.
Box 6-1. Case study: examples of non-EU CRM entities operating in MSs
through subsidiaries
PRS for Music Limited42 is a British music copyright collective, made up of two collecting
societies: the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS) and the Performing Right
Society (PRS) which collect and distribute royalties for the mechanical rights (reproduction
of recorded music) and performing rights of their rightholders43. Currently, PRS for Music
Limited has subsidiary CMOs in two EU countries – Cyprus and Malta in which they are
registered and operate as CMOs for musical works.44 In the remaining EU MS, except
Luxembourg, and in Norway and Switzerland, PRS for music operates through
representation agreements with local CMOs. For instance, in Austria PRS members’
royalties are licensed and collected by AKM, whereas another local CMO, Austro-
Mechana, licenses and collects royalties of MCPS members. In Belgium, PRS and MCPS
members’ royalties are licensed and collected by SABAM, in Croatia by HDS-ZAMP, in
Czechia by OSA, in Denmark by KODA and NCB, respectively, etc.45
Motion Picture Licensing Corporation (MPLC) is an international private copyright

licensing agency based in the US. MPLC issues umbrella licenses for the public
performance of copyrighted motion pictures and other programmes. MPLC represents
thousands of major Hollywood studios (e.g. Columbia Pictures, Disney, Sony Pictures,
Warner Bros Pictures), independent film studios as well as distributors.46 It provides
services directly or through affiliates or subsidiaries in over 40 countries worldwide, 9 of
these countries are in the EU.47 MPLC has subsidiary IMEs established in 6 of them:
Denmark, Germany, Spain, Poland, Hungary and Ireland, while it also has registered
offices in Italy, Romania and Austria.
Copyright Clearance Centre (CCC), a US-based CRM entity providing collective
41 Only 6 non-EU CRM entities answered the question on the reasons behind being present in the EU market.
All of the 6 respondents were non-EU CRM entities that are present in the EU market through representation
agreements. Therefore, there is no data to offer insights as to why non-EU CRM entities operate in the EU
through subsidiaries or other legal entities.
42 The subsidiary CMOs in Malta and Cyprus of PRS for Music Limited were established while the UK was still
a member of the EU. However, after Brexit they become the subsidiaries of non-EU CRM entities.
43 https://www.prsformusic.com/what-we-do/prs-and-mcps
44https://www.prsformusic.com/-/media/files/prs-for-music/research/submissions-archive/2019/eu/prs-for-
music-questionnaire-for-collective-management-
organisations.ashx?la=en&hash=5E64523D383423B3E3EA504072F6D83609B125C2
45 https://www.prsformusic.com/our-global-network/partners
46 https://www.mplc.org/
47 https://www.mplc.org/page/worldwide-directory
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copyright licensing services for corporate and academic users of copyrighted material has
established an IME RightsDirect in the Netherlands.48 It also has offices in Romania
and Spain.49
In some Member States non-EU CMOs operate through joint ventures. For example,
Swiss CMO SUISA and US CMO SESAC operate in the EU through their joint venture
MINT.50 Apart from having representation agreements and subsidiary CMOs in Europe the
above mentioned PRS for Music also operates in Europe through ICE, its joint venture
with Swedish CMO STIM and German CMO GEMA51 (see chapter 8).
Sources: www.prsformusic.com, www.mplc.org, www.rightsdirect.com, www.copyright.com,

www.minstervices.com
b. Regulation of non-EU CMOs across EU Member States
The Directive does not regulate CRM entities established outside of the EU that operate in
the Union. However, Recital 10 of the Directive indicates that the Directive does not
preclude Member States from applying the same or similar provisions to CMOs which are
established outside of the Union, but which operate in those Member States. The Directive
leaves it up to the MSs to decide if and how the national implementing rules are applied to
non-EU CMOs. This section provides an overview of non-EU CMO regulation across EU
Member States by drawing on the results of NAs, CMOs and non-EU CMOs surveys as
well as legal analysis.
Member States have chosen a variety of ways to regulate non-EU CMOs. The national
legislations may be categorized into five different groups as regards the application of the
legislation:
 The same provisions are applied to all CMOs regardless of their place of
establishment, i.e., when compared, non-EU CMOs are treated in the same
manner as national/EU/EEA CMOs.
 Similar provisions are applied to all CMOs regardless of their place of
establishment, i.e., as compared, non-EU CMOs are treated in a similar manner as
national/EU/EEA CMOs.
 National legislation regulating collective rights management only applies to
EU/EEA CMOs.
 National legislation regulating collective rights management only applies to
national CMOs.
 National legislation regulating collective rights management does not refer to the
status of non-EU CMOs and thus, this matter remains unclear.
1. Non-EU CMOs are subject to the same provisions as national/EU/EEA CMOs.

Certain Member States apply the same rules to CMOs established outside of the EU but
operating in the Union as they do to CMOs established in a Member State of the EU or in
the EEA. More specifically, this is the case in Denmark, Hungary and Greece, where the
application of the legislation to CMOs established outside the European Union is clearly
stated.
48 https://www.rightsdirect.com/about-rightsdirect/
49 http://www.copyright.com/about/
50 https://www.mintservices.com/#/
51 https://www.prsformusic.com/what-we-do/who-we-work-with/ice
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According to the Lithuanian legislation, non-EU CMOs with branches or representative

offices established in Lithuania are subject to the same provisions as Lithuanian CMOs.
According to collected information, non-EU CRM entities are subject to the same rules as
EU CRM entities in the survey. However, it is not clear how non-EU CMOs that do not
have branches or representative offices established in Lithuania are regulated. According
to available information, there are currently no such non-EU CMOs operating in their
market.
2. Non-EU CMOs are subjected to similar provisions as national/EU/EEA CMOs.

Certain MSs apply similar rules to CMOs established outside the EU but which operate in
the Union as to CMOs established in the EU/EEA. According to available information, this
is the case in Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and Spain. In some cases, the
difference between applying the same rules as opposed to similar rules is almost non-
existent. For example, under Finnish law there is no specific mention of non-EU CMOs.
We understand that regulation is very neutral vis-à-vis third countries and that they
basically have to obey the same rules as EU CMOs.
In French law the provisions applicable to non-EU CMOs are explicitly mentioned and
they exempt non-EU CMOs from publishing transparency reports and registering with the
NA. In Irish regulations (SI No 156 of 2016 European Union Regulations), provisions are
applicable to all CMOs established in the country while non-EU CMOs are not mentioned
at all. However, we understand that non-EU CMOs can be established in Ireland and they
are bound to follow the registration and renewal processes stipulated in the Copyright and
Related Rights Act that applies to all CMOs. However, application of other provisions of
the law is unclear.
The study found that non-EU CRM entities must oblige to Belgian legislation. In case the
non-EU CMO is established in another EU MS, it can operate in Belgium but if its activities
are permanent and durable in Belgium, the entity has to have an establishment in
Belgium. However, in the Belgian legislation CMOs are defined as organizations
established in another MS and IMEs are defined as entities established in one of the MS.
There is no mention of non-EU CMOs in Belgian law. Thus, there is some uncertainty
about the applicable legislation. In any event, according to available information, there are
currently no non-EU CMOs operating in the Belgian market.
3. Legislation applies only to EU/EEA CMOs. In Portugal, the legislation applies

only to CMOs established within the EEA. According to available informaton, in Croatia
different provisions are applied to non-EU CMOs than to those CMOs established in the
EU or in the EEA. Authorization to operate as a CMO in Croatia can only be given to EU
CMOs, therefore, foreign rightholders are represented via representation agreements. In
the case of Italy, there is no specific mention of non-EU CMOs in the legislation as
regards the application of the provisions in the law. However, we understand that different
provisions apply to non-EU CMOs since they can only operate through reciprocal
representation agreements with EU CMOs.
It seems that in Czechia the same provisions apply to non-EU CMOs, however, only
EU/EEA CMOs are mentioned in the legislation. Since there is no specific mention of non-
EU CMOs, there is some uncertainty about whether the legislation applies to them.
4. Legislation applies only to national CMOs. According to the legislation in some

MSs, i.e. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta52, national provisions only apply to CMOs
52The NA from Malta indicated that non-EU CMOs are subject to exactly the same rules as EU CMOs,
suggesting that, albeit it is not explicitly mentioned in the legislation, non-EU CMOs are subject to the same
regulations.
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established within that MS. In Dutch legislation, CMOs and IMEs are defined as
organizations established in the Netherlands, so even without the explicit mention of a
non-applicability of the legislation to CMOs established in another MS or in a third country,
it may be assumed that the legislation only applies to national organizations. It is,
however, not certain that this is how the legislation is actually interpreted and there may
also be rules outside of the CRM legislation that apply in such cases.
5. No mention of applicability of the legislation/status on non-EU CMOs

unclear. In some MS’ legislation, i.e., Austria, Latvia Sweden, Estonia, Germany and
Romania, there is no specific mention of the application of the provisions to non-EU
CMOs. According toavailable information, non-EU CMOs in these countries are regulated
in exactly the same way as national CMOs. This suggests that in these MSs the legislation
may be applied uniformly to all CMOs regardless of their place of establishment or only to
national or EU/EEA CMOs. The legislations are ambiguous about this. In Slovakian
legislation, there is no mention of the general application scope of the provisions. It is
stated in the legislation that CMOs with a registered office in another country are allowed
to also manage rights in Slovakian territory if they fulfil certain requirements set out in the
law. However, it is not stated whether and to what extent Slovakian legislation applies to
these entities. In Bulgaria, the legislation states that CMOs based in third countries must
submit an application and notify the NA in order to operate in the country. However, the
legislation does not mention what other provisions are applied to non-EU CMOs or other
CRM entities.
The Polish and Slovenian legislations contain a definition of foreign CMOs. However, in
the actual provisions foreign CMOs are mentioned only in conjunction with representation
agreements. There are no provisions on the application or non-application of the
provisions of the law to foreign CMOs.
c. The impact of non-EU CMO regulation in EU Member States
Different regulatory provisions applied to European and non-EU CRM entities might have
had various effects. For example, it could have allowed non-EU CRM entities to attract
more European rightholders and to gain a competitive advantage over European CRM
entities. In contrast, the credibility of national CMOs reinforced by the governance and
transparency rules imposed on them might have weakened the competitive situation of
non-EU CRM entities. What should be kept in mind, however, is the general trend
underlined above. More specifically, non-EU CRM entities generally are present in the EU
through representation agreements and only rarely operate directly on the market. A non-
EU CRM entity that has a representation agreement with a CMO or multiple CMOs in a
MS is not subject to the national provisions applicable to non-EU CMOs of that MS. Only
the subsidiary entities of non-EU CRM entities (i.e., CMOs, IMEs, third-type entities) that
are established in a MS are subject to the relevant national rules in that MS. Bearing that
in mind, this section provides an overview of the impact of non-EU CRM entities’
regulation through the lens of EU CMOs, non-EU CRM entities and NAs.
Market entry
When it comes to regulating non-EU CMOs, the Directive leaves it to the discretion of
individual MS. As a result, a number of national regulations have emerged.
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Five out of six non-EU CRM entities that participated in the survey indicated that they are
regulated the same way as national CMOs in the countries that are the most important for
their operations in the EU53. These CRM entities referred to Sweden, France, Germany
and Spain. This is in line with responses from respective NAs, indicating that non-EU
CMOs are treated the same as EU CMOs although there is no mention of this in the
legislation. This again suggests that in these MSs all CMOs are regulated in the same way
regardless of their place of establishment. This is also at least partially true for France and
Spain, since legislation in these countries subject non-EU CMOs to similar regulations as
national/EU/EEA CMOs. Non-EU CMOs are exempt from publishing a transparency report
in Spain and France. The latter also exempts them from registering with the NA.
Organizations operating in the CRM market may be required to notify the authorities or
apply for a permit to operate. From the legal analysis it is clear that non-EU CMOs must
communicate the commencement of their activities to the NA in Spain and Bulgaria.
According to available information, non-EU CMOs are subject to the requirement of
registration in Ireland as well.
Regarding other countries, legislation in Hungary, Lithuania, Greece, Denmark and

France explicitly mention non-EU CMOs and state the rules they must oblige to. The legal
analysis shows that France is the only one of these countries where non-EU CMOs are
not required to register or notify the NA. The case of Denmark is unclear as the legislative
act does not entail provisions on the authorization of CMOs.
There is no mention of what provisions apply to non-EU CMOs in Austria, Belgium,

Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. Therefore, no conclusion can
be reached as to whether non-EU CMOs are subject to requirements regulating their
market entry in these MSs.
Nevertheless, although the legislation does not mention non-EU CMOs in Austria,
Czechia, Germany, Malta and Romania, we understand that they are treated in the
same way as EU CMOs. In this case, non-EU CMOs should be required to receive
authorization from competent authorities in order to operate in these MS.
If the legislations in most of the MSs indeed subject non-EU CMOs to the same or similar
provisions as national or EU/EEA CMOs, then it could be assumed that they are required
to inform the NA about their activities in one way or another. In that case, non-EU CMOs
would not have a significant competitive advantage in terms of market entry.
Nevertheless, due to differences in the requirements, it might be slightly easier for non-EU
CMOs to enter the market in cases like Spain, where an authorization to operate is
required from the CMOs with an establishment in Spain whereas only a notification to the
authorities is required from a CMO without an establishment in Spain. However, it is
unlikely that this specific difference would play a major role for the organizations or
significantly affect the competition between EU CMOs and non-EU CMOs
53 As indicated by the CRM entities themselves, these five CRM entities do not operate through subsidiaries
established in the EU. Instead, they are present in the EU market via representation agreements with EU
CMOs. As such, they should not be subject to national provisions. It might be assumed, however, that
responding entities referred to the regulation of activities (i.e. managing the rights of rightholders represented
by these non-EU CRM entities) carried out by EU CMOs on behalf of these non-EU CRM entities on the basis
of representation agreements. They operate through representation agreements.
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Competitive advantage and attractiveness to rightholders

This study aimed to gather information on the impact that non-EU CRM entities might
have on rightholders. However, only a small share of the surveyed rightholders (i.e., 16
out of 1219 or 1.3%) indicated that they have entrusted their rights or parts of their rights
to non-EU CMOs. Therefore, since there is not enough data to analyse the rightholders’
perspective on non-EU CRM entities, the following paragraphs rely on NA and EU CMO
survey responses.
NAs and EU CMOs do not think that non-EU CMOs are more attractive to rightholders
than those based in the EU. Out of 20 NAs, six disagreed and two strongly disagreed and
out of 11 CMOs, one strongly disagreed and three disagreed with such a statement. (see
Figure 6-3 below). As for the reasons behind that, respondents mentioned the possibility
for rightholders represented by EEA CMOs to participate in decision-making and to control
their national CMOs. Only one CMO agreed that non-EU CRM entities are more attractive
to rightholders, stating that they have more flexibility and are better at attracting high value
authors through advances and guaranteed payments. One CMO also suggested that non-
EU CRM entities might have more freedom to offer customized solutions for some
rightholders. According to a few CMOs, the attractiveness of non-EU CRM entities might
also increase if they are popular among rightholders in their country of origin. In theory the
existence of non-EU CRM entities in the market may spark competition between them and
national CMOs leading to better and more efficient service to rightholders. However,
based on the information gathered from stakeholders, there is no strong evidence that
non-EU CMOs affect competition in the European CRM market in a significant way.
Presumably, the application or non-application of certain provisions for different types of

CMOs is seldom the decisive factor when a rightholder chooses its CMO. It could be
assumed that more important factors are the amount of remuneration rightholders expect
to get from a certain organization, the reputation of an organization, recommendations
from other rightholders, personal experience etc. However, in cases where there is any
kind of uncertainty regarding the operations of non-EU CMOs (e.g., whether they should
submit a transparency report or be supervised by the NA), it is possible that non-EU
CMOs might be less appealing to rightholders than EU CMOs. As discussed above, due
to the uncertainty regarding which provisions apply to non-EU CMOs and which provisions
apply only to EU CMOs, it is hard for rightholders to know what obligations and rights the
non-EU CMOs have. This situation may also have a negative impact on the authorities’
possibilities to monitor the compliance of non-EU CMOs and thus, non-EU CMOs might
appear less reliable for rightholders.
Figure 6-3. Perceptions of non-EU CRM entities’ competitiveness and attractiveness

by NAs and CMOs
Non-EU CRM entities have a competitive advantage against EU CMOs
EU CMOs 3 4 2 2
Authorities 3 5 1 11
Non-EU CRM entities are more attractive for rightholders than EU CMOs
EU CMOs 1 6 3 1
Authorities 2 6 2 10
Note: National Authorities’ survey (N=20), CMOs’ survey (N=11); values in absolute numbers.
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Our research shows that NAs and EU CMOs do not think that non-EU CMOs have a
competitive advantage (see Figure 6-3 above). Out of 20 NAs, five disagree and one
strongly disagrees with such a statement. Out of 11 CMOs, two disagree and two strongly
disagree. There is no consensus regarding this question amongst CMOs, and between
CMOs and NAs. For example, representatives of one French CMO indicated that non-EU
CMOs have a competitive advantage, while another CMO stated that since the majority of
rules are the same for French and non-EU CMOs, the former bears no competitive
advantage. Similarly, while one German CMO stated that non-EU CMOs have a
competitive advantage, other collected information suggests that their power is quite
limited. It seems that the German market is well-covered by national CMOs, which leaves
little incentives for any other organisations to enter. Likewise, a Dutch CMO also believes
it holds a competitive disadvantage over non-EU CMOs. However, it is unclear in what
way national CMOs in Netherlands would have a competitive disadvantage against CMOs
from outside of the Union , i.e., Dutch legislation applies only to Dutch CMOs and there is
no mention of non-EU CMOs, leaving ambiguity as to how they are regulated.
Figure 6-4: Non-EU CRM entities’ efficiency, control and entrance to the market
according to NA
It is easier to enter the CRM
2 7 4 7
market in your country for non-…
It is more difficult to control and
2 5 3 1 9
hold non-EU CRM entities…
Non-EU CRM entities can work
2 5 1 10
more efficiently than EU CRM…
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree/nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Do not know
Note: national authorities survey, values in absolute numbers (N=20).
Regarding other aspects possibly impacted by differences or similarities in regulation (see

Figure 6-4 above), NAs do not think that non-EU CRM entities can work more efficiently
than EU ones. Out of 20 NAs, five disagree and one strongly disagrees with such a
statement. Also, NAs do not think that non-EU CRM entities enter their CRM market more
easily. Seven NAs disagree and four strongly disagree with such a statement. In addition,
seven out of 20 NAs indicated that non-EU CRM entities are more difficult to control and
hold accountable than EU CRM entities (two strongly agree and five agree with such a
statement). However, the majority of CMOs and NA survey respondents remain indecisive
as to the competitiveness, attractiveness and overall functioning of the non-EU CRM
entities. Out of 20 NAs, seven NAs do not know if non-EU CRM entities can enter the
market more easily, nine NAs do not know if they are more difficult to control and hold
accountable, ten NAs do now know whether they can work more efficiently than EU CRM
entities. These results suggest that the status of non-EU CRM entities in these countries
might be unclear and point towards possible uncertainty about the applicability of national
legal provisions or is possibly due to the fact that not many non-EU CRM entities are
present on these markets. This situation might also lead non-EU CRM entities to be
subject to less supervision by authorities.
It is important to note once again that being represented via a reciprocal agreement does
not constitute operating in the EU market in the sense that it would make the
organizations subject to the national CRM provisions where they are applicable to non-EU
CMOs. However, in cases when non-EU CMOs establish subsidiary CMOs or other
entities in the EU, they are governed by national rules to which respective entities are
subject to in any given MS.
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d. Conclusions
In sum, the most common way non-EU CRM entities operate in the Union is through
representation agreements based on the findings of this study. They also form
subsidiaries which lead them to establish themselves in the EU. It seems that it is very
rare that non-EU CRM entities would operate on the market in other ways, e.g., operating
in the EU without any establishment or a representation agreement.
In terms of regulation, legislation in the majority of the MSs does not refer to non-EU
CMOs and the provisions that are applied to them are not clearly stated, leaving ambiguity
as to how they are regulated. Difficulty in controlling and holding non-EUCMOs
accountable are reported as seven out of 20 NAs agree, only one disagrees and nine are
indecisive as to whether non-EU CMOs are more difficult to control and hold accountable.
These results suggest that CMOs based outside of the EU lack specific means of
monitoring and clear provisions on what rules apply to them in MSs. However, a
comparison of the responses of the NAs with our legal analysis suggests that CMOs
established outside of the EU but operating inside of the EU are likely to be subject to the
same or similar provisions of national legislation as the EU-based CMOs.
The rightholders survey aimed to gather information about the impact non-EU CRM
entities have on rightholders. However, only 16 out of 1,219 surveyed rightholders (i.e.,
1.3%) indicated that they have entrusted their rights or parts of their rights to non-EU
CMOs. Therefore, there is not enough data for analysis of the impact non-EU CMOs have
on rightholders and their choice. A few EU CMOs suggested that some non-EU CRM
entities use advances and guarantee payments and have the freedom to offer customised
solutions to attract rightholders, possibly because of the non-applicability of the Directive.
However, NAs and EU CMOs do not think that non-EU CRM entities are more attractive to
rightholders, have a competitive advantage or can work more efficiently and enter the
market more easily when compared to the EU CMOs. This study found no evidence to
prove that the applicability or non-applicability of the CRM Directive rules to non-EU CRM
entities has had any significant impact on rightholders. It can be presumed that non-EU
CRM entities might be less appealing to rightholders than national CRM entities in cases
where there is any kind of uncertainty regarding the operation of an organisation (e.g.,
should it be supervised by the NA, or governed the same way as national CRM entities).
So, despite national differences in regulation, substantive evidence that non-EU CRM
entities have a significant competitive advantage over EU based CRM entities (CMOs and
IMEs), or that they can affect rightholders and the management of their rights in any
significant way, was not found.
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7. Independent management entities
Before the adoption of the CRM Directive, entities that would manage rights for the
collective benefit of rightholders were commonly referred to as collecting societies.
The Directive introduced separate definitions of what constitutes a CMO (which were the
main target of the CRM Directive) and referred for the first time to a notion of independent
management entities (IMEs) in the EU copyright acquis. According to the Directive, IMEs
‘are commercial entities which differ from collective management organisations, inter alia,
because they are not owned or controlled by rightholders’. IMEs manage and administrate
copyright or related rights54 entrusted to them through management agreements by more
than one rightholder for the collective benefit of those rightholders as its sole or main
purpose. While, generally, the Directive does not provide explicit examples of IMEs,
Recital 16 indicates that the definition excludes audiovisual producers, record producers,
broadcasters and publishers. Managers of authors and performers also fall outside of the
scope of definition of IMEs as they only act as intermediaries and do not engage in tariff-
setting, license-granting or royalty collecting activities. This chapter starts with an overview
of the IMEs established in EEA countries. It then reviews how IMEs, including non-EEA
based ones, are regulated based on the legal analysis and information from the national
authorities (NAs). Lastly, this chapter aims to assess the impact of IMEs’ regulation on the
rightholders and the competition between CMOs and IMEs, drawing on the results of the
surveys and interviews of different stakeholders.
Box 7. Main takeaways: Independent Management Entities
 Introduction of a reference to IMEs in the Directive appears to have catalysed the

creation of new organisations in the market.
The study identified 32 IMEs that are registered or recognized as IMEs by the NAs.
Most of the identified IMEs entered the market in 2016-2018. Most of them operate
exclusively in the music and audiovisual sectors.
 Most of the MS subject IMEs to at least some additional provisions compared to
what is applicable to them in the Directive (Art.3(4)). The additional provisions are
related to the market entry (i.e., obligation to notify or register with the NA) or
transparency (i.e., obligation to provide certain information to stakeholders,
compile and publish a transparency report). Thus, generally, at least in theory,
IMEs are subject to further regulations than those provided specifically for them in
the Directive.
 On the one hand, due to more lax regulations regarding the market entry (e.g., less
stringent or no obligation at all to notify or register with the NA,), IMEs might have
a competitive advantage. On the other hand, this advantage is minimized by the
various different rules applicable to them across MS, which pose challenges for
IMEs, excluding them from certain parts of the market (e.g., when mandatory
collective management applies) or making the market entry difficult.
 In terms of transparency, IMEs are generally subject to less administrative burden
54 Managing of rights according to Recital 2 in the Directive’s preamble means ‘the granting of licenses to
users, auditing of users, monitoring of the use of rights, enforcement of copyright and related rights, collection
of rights revenue derived from the exploitation of rights and the distribution of the amounts due to
rightsholders’.
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DIRECTIVE
and costs than CMOs (for example, because they are exempt from annual
transparency report in most of the MS). However, fewer provisions on
transparency and governance could potentially sway rightholders towards more
regulated organisations—CMOs.
 Only 3.6% of all the surveyed rightholders had ever mandated their rights to an
IME, indicating that these entities are still a small competition to CMOs.
a. Mapping the IMEs
This subsection presents the IMEs that were identified through desk research and in the
survey by NAs. The characteristics of these IMEs are discussed, including the sectors that
they operate in, their size and year of establishment. The limitations of mapping IMEs are
noted, particularly difficulties arising from the lack of clarity regarding the legal status of
certain organisations. As a result, it is likely that the mapping does not include all of the
organizations that could possibly qualify as IMEs and are established in the EU.
By defining IMEs, the Directive aimed to capture entities that engage in collective rights’
management but do not meet the criteria of CMOs and to subject them to certain
obligations regarding transparency and accountability (see Article 2(4) of the Directive).
Indeed, some organisations that could be characterized as IMEs existed as early as 2000.
Before the adoption of the Directive, their operation was not regulated by EU law and thus,
they lacked the trust of rightholders and users, as indicated by interviewed IMEs. In
addition, many new IMEs entered the market in 2016-2018 (see Annex 3 for the year of
establishment of identified IMEs)
The study identified 32 IMEs that are registered or recognized as IMEs by the NAs. This
includes 29 IMEs in the EU’s MSs, and 3 IMEs that have been established in the
remaining EEA countries or the UK55. The IMEs can be categorised into three groups
based on how and where they operate in the market:
1. National IMEs, which operate only in their country of origin. This is the largest
group of IMEs. They emerged as an alternative to local CMOs, (e.g.,
AudioMarketing in Poland, ALMO in Belgium, Unison in Spain, IBVA in
Netherlands). Almost half of the identified bodies (18) are registered as IMEs only
in their country of origin.
2. European IMEs established in one MS with offices or subsidiary IMEs in other

European countries (e.g. Luxembourg based Jamendo with a subsidiary IME in
Spain; Italian Soundreef with subsidiary IMEs in Czechia and Spain).
3. Non-EU CRM entities which operate in the European market through subsidiary
IMEs established in the EU or EEA countries (e.g., US-based Motion Picture
Licensing Company (MPLC) which has subsidiary IMEs in Denmark, Germany,
Spain, Poland, Ireland and Hungary, US-based Christian Copyright Licensing
International (CCLI) with subsidiary IMEs in Netherlands and Denmark).
Subsidiaries of non-EU CRM entities comprise around one-third (11) of all the
identified IMEs that operate in the European CRM market.
55 The UK is included in this research as it was part of the EEA until its official withdrawal from the European
Union on 31 January 2020.
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Regarding the non-EU EEA countries specifically, no IMEs were identified in Iceland and
Liechtenstein56. In Norway, there is one IME, i.e., MPLC Norge AS, a subsidiary of US-
based MPLC, which limits its activities to the Norwegian market.57 The Norwegian
authorities also indicated that once the Directive is transposed into the national legislation,
some photo agencies may qualify as IMEs as well. 58 Two IMEs operating in the UK were
identified: Soundreef which was recognized as an IME in 2018 and CreaCollect which was
established as an IME in that same year.
Most of the identified IMEs operate in the music and audiovisual sectors i.e. 17 and 8
IMEs respectively. Far fewer IMEs offer services to rightholders from the visual, drama
and literature/publishing sectors (see figure 7-1 below).
Figure 7-1. IMEs distribution by sector

Multiple
sectors (4)
Visual (1)
Music (17)
Drama (2)
Audiovisual (8)
Note: Visionary Analytics, values in absolute numbers (N=32).
Identifying IMEs active in the European market has limitations. There is often no clear
validated indication that an organisation operates as an IME. Such difficulties are mostly
caused by the lack of clarity on the part of NAs and IMEs themselves. Organizations often
do not explicitly state their legal status on their public websites. More importantly, NAs are
often unaware of the presence of IMEs in their territories or not certain about the legal
status of entities that could qualify as IMEs. For example, one NA signalled uncertainty
about whether a certain organisation could be added to the list of IMEs operating in the
country. Similarly, another NA commented that “there is a possibility that there might be
some IMEs or […] some third-type entities […] it is unclear if they are IMEs or not”. Further
illustrating a certain confusion surrounding IMEs, one NA referred to an organization as an
IME, while it is in fact a CMO. Another illustrative case is when a certain IME appeared on
the official IME list in a certain country, whereas the IME claims that it does not operate in
that country, as indicated in an interview. Moreover, in the interview one NA noted that it is
difficult to identify IMEs without external information and that they are normally discovered
only when other stakeholders flag their existence. Such difficulties and inconsistencies
signal confusion arising from different stakeholder interpretations as to what organizations
are recognized as IMEs and are included in national registers. Therefore, taking into
account the limitations in mapping IMEs, it is more likely than not that not all of the
organisations that would qualify as IMEs were identified by this study.
56 Based on e-mail correspondence with NAs from Iceland and Liechtenstein.

57 Based on MPLC consultation response on the Norwegian implementation of the EU Directive on Collective
Rights Management, 2020 February 7: http://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/horing---gjennomforing-
direktiv-kollektiv/id2680857/Download/?vedleggId=cce28174-6551-425d-8524-d99a2aa5db68
58 Based on e-mail correspondence with the Norwegian NA.
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b. Regulation of IMEs across the EU
According to the CRM Directive Article 16(1), Articles 18 and 20, points (a), (b), (c), (e), (f)
and (g) of Article 21(1) and Articles 36 and 42 apply to all IMEs established in the Union.
These provisions obligate IMEs to conduct negotiations with users in good faith, provide
information regarding the management of their rights to rightholders, provide information
to rightholders, CMOs and users on request, disclose information to the public, are subject
to the monitoring of their compliance with the provisions in the Directive by national
authorities, and to process personal data in line with Directive 95/46. This subsection
overviews the regulations that are applied to IMEs across MSs based on the legal analysis
and the NA survey.
Member States have chosen various approaches of how to regulate IMEs. Some
countries subject IMEs only to the relevant provisions set out in the Directive pursuant to
Article 2 (4), while others subject them to more extensive regulation (Table 7-1; see Annex
4 for a detailed list of provisions in each MS).
Table 7-1. Regulation of IMEs in EU MSs according to National Authorities

MS that subject IMEs to the
provisions of the Directive MS that subject IMEs to
MS that subject IMEs only to the
applicable to IMEs plus some more extensive national
relevant provisions of the
additional provisions that regulation than the
Directive
would be only applicable to Directive
CMOs
Hungary
Luxembourg Belgium Austria
Czechia Italy
Malta Bulgaria Finland
Denmark Latvia
The Cyprus Greece*
Germany Poland
Netherlands Croatia Lithuania
Greece* Portugal
Slovakia Estonia Slovenia
Ireland Romania
Sweden France
Spain
Notes: National Authorities’ survey (N=20) and legal analysis. *In Greek legislation, there is a distinction made
between IMEs and IMEs in a dominant position whereby IMEs without a dominant position are subject only to
the specific IME-related provisions stemming from the Directive, while IMEs with a dominant position must
oblige with provisions applicable to CMOs (see Box 7-1 below).59
More than a third of MSs have transposed the requirements set out in the Directive into
their national legislation without any additions (i.e. Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden) or with an additional provision related
to IMEs but not subjecting them to more obligations (i.e. Czechia, Germany). More
specifically, the only additional provision in the legislation of Czechia and Germany is that
it enables NAs to conduct cross-border cooperation to enforce the monitoring of IMEs (not
just CMOs as foreseen in Article 37 of the Directive).
13 MSs have added either a single but significant provision or multiple additional
provisions that were only applicable to CMOs in the Directive or pursuant to national
rules. These relate to either a notification of the commencement of activity or the
disclosure of certain internal procedures to the public. More specifically:
 A requirement for an IME to notify the NA prior to the commencement of its

operation in the country was added to legislation in Belgium, Latvia and Estonia.
59 Since NAs from Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Slovenia Bulgaria, Portugal did not
respond to the survey, these countries are included in the table based on the legal analysis of experts.
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Similarly, the only additional requirement in Poland and Romania is for IMEs to
register in order to operate in these countries.
 An additional provision in Portuguese legislation requires IMEs to ensure the
existence of procedures that allow each rightholder whom they represent to access
by electronic means the complaint handling procedures and available dispute
resolution.
 Italian60 legislation includes an obligation for IMEs to respond to complaints within
45 days and obliges them to provide effective and timely procedures for handling
complaints, a provision stipulated in Article 33 of the Directive that is only
applicable to CMOs.
 Legislation in Hungary requires IMEs to notify the authorities prior to the
commencement of their operation and to publish additional information on their
website (i.e., list of its members and the rightholders that it represents, the names
of the organizations with which it has concluded representation agreements and
the names of all senior officials).
 In Croatia, IMEs are required to notify the NA. There is also a provision enabling
NAs to share information about them in order to monitor their operation.
 In Bulgaria, IMEs are bound to register with the NA and to the provisions related
to the exchange of information between competent authorities across MSs apply to
them.
 IMEs are required to register with the NA and to publish information related to the
complaints review and dispute resolution procedures in Cyprus.
 The legislation of Spain61 stipulates that IMEs must notify the authorities before
starting their activities and they are also subject to the provision on sectorial
agreements, obliging them to negotiate and enter into contracts with user
associations provided that they request them. IMEs then have to submit those
contracts that they have concluded with user associations along with the models of
management contracts to the NAs.
 French IMEs, like CMOs, must adhere to the provisions on granting test licenses
to users that provide a new type of online service for less than three years. In
addition, French IMEs are subject to provisions on dispute handling.
Few MSs subject IMEs to more extensive regulation than the one required in the CRM
Directive. More specifically:
 IMEs in Austria62 and IMEs with a dominant position in Greece63 are subject to the
same or almost the same rules as applicable to CMOs.
60 It was indicated that IMEs in Italy are subject to Directive provisions only. However, Chapter 4 of the
Legislative Decree n.35 subjects IMEs to provisions regarding dispute resolution.
61 According to the legal analysis, IMEs in Spain must notify the authority at the start of their operation and
give access to general contracts concluded with user associations.

62 Most provisions applicable to CMOs are applicable to IMEs in Austria, including an obligation to obtain an
authorization permit and to publish an annual transparency report, to name a few. Thus, Austria subjects IMEs
to more extensive regulation than in the Directive, based on the legal analysis.
63 The status of an IME determines what kind of regulation is applicable to it. IMEs with a dominant position
are bound to all of the provisions applied to CMOs and are allowed to manage rights subject to mandatory
collective management. This appears to provide them with an advantage against regular IMEs and could be
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 In other countries, legislation treats IMEs similarly to CMOs. For example, in

Slovenia, they must apply for a collective management permit, provide information
regarding agreements with user associations, present a list of representation
agreements that it has entered into with foreign CMOs, their general policy on the
use of non-distributable amounts, publish their annual report and audit report, etc.
 Similarly, in Finland, the national legislation subjects IMEs to similar provisions as
CMOs including, for instance, the submission of a notice of the collective
management of copyrights and a publication of information regarding the
organizational structure of an IME.
 In Lithuania, IMEs, like CMOs, must prepare a transparency report and ensure
that it is accessible to the public via their website.64
Article 36 of the Directive obliges MS national authorities to monitor the compliance of
CMOs and IMEs with all applicable rules. All MSs are supposed to establish procedures
allowing CMOs, rightholders, users and other stakeholders to notify NAs of suspected
breaches of the national legislation, impose sanctions or take other measures. However,
half of the responding NAs (ten NAs) indicated that they are unaware whether IMEs
comply with the rules (see Figure 7-2 below).
Figure 7-2. IMEs’ compliance with the national rules applicable to them
4 4 1 1 10
To a large extent To a moderate extent To some extent To small extent Do not know
This corresponds to the concerns expressed by one NA in the survey, claiming it has
received concerns from a supervisory body about their difficulties in identifying and
controlling IMEs. The same concerns were expressed by another NA in the survey. The
lack of awareness by a large share of NAs regarding the existence of IMEs or their
compliance with the rules also suggest that:
 Uncertainties remain regarding the implementation of the definition of an IME in

practice, and as to whether and how to regulate IMEs’ activities. Since the
Directive where the concept of an IME has been used for the first time and has
been transposed relatively recently, regulatory practice is still evolving. This could
lead to uncertainty and inconsistencies in the perceptions of key stakeholders
regarding applicable legal norms and how to interpret them in practice.
 National legislation in some MSs may lack effective procedures that would allow
NAs to monitor IMEs and their compliance with the law, i.e., a simplified
authorization process for IMEs or the absence thereof, which complicates their
identification and thus also encumbers the monitoring and enforcement process.
These implications are reinforced by the fact that almost half of the NAs that responded to
the survey indicated that they neither agree, nor disagree or do not know how the
regulation applicable to IMEs in their countries affects the competition of IMEs and CMOs,
the attractiveness of IMEs to rightholders or market entry for IMEs (see Figure 7-4 in the
interpreted as opposing Recital 19 of the Directive, which states that only CMOs can manage rights subject to
mandatory collective management (Sources: Synodinou (2018), Sotiropoulou (2017)
64 The legal analysis shows that IMEs are obliged to publish a transparency report just like CMOs. Hence,
Lithuania has been assigned to the group of MSs applying extensive regulation to IMEs.
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next section). Generally, as the concept of IMEs is a new one and the regulatory practice
is still evolving, this may create challenges for NAs in monitoring IMEs in the same way as
CMOs. In turn, it may provide some loopholes for the IMEs and grant them a potential
competitive advantage. On the other hand, IMEs may suffer from the legal uncertainty and
confusion about the rules applicable to them and the monitoring of their operations since
rightholders might view them as being less reliable than CMOs.
c. The impact of regulation
The Directive might have stimulated competition between different types of organisations,
although both CMOs and IMEs existed prior to the adoption of the Directive. The main
‘currency’ that both IMEs and CMOs compete for are rightholders and the possibility to
manage their rights. The application or non-application of certain provisions to IMEs may
potentially have an impact on a variety of issues ranging from the ease of entering the
market and the handling the management operations to the distribution of amounts due to
rightholders and compliance with applicable rules as well as holding the organizations
accountable. It may also affect the competitive position of CMOs and IMEs, as generally,
the latter have less provisions to comply with, which might lead to a competitive
advantage. This section provides an analysis of regulatory effects on the competition
between CMOs and IMEs, as well as potential impacts the regulation has on rightholders,
drawing on the results of stakeholder surveys as well as a legal analysis.
As discussed in the section above, most MSs do not subject IMEs to more extensive
regulation than provided in the Directive. Different rules for market entry (i.e., the process
of registering or notifying the NA about the commencement of the activity) and
transparency (i.e. the obligation to publish a transparency report or to disclose certain
information to the public and stakeholders), are the two aspects in which IMEs and CMOs
differ the most. They may have an effect on IMEs’ image vis-à-vis rightholders. Indeed,
39% of the surveyed CMOs claim that IMEs hold a competitive advantage over them (see
Figure 7-3 below). CMOs argue in their comments that this is driven by the fewer or less
strict provisions applicable to IMEs as compared to CMOs. Four out of nine surveyed
IMEs also agree that they have a competitive advantage against CMOs.
Figure 7-3. Impact of IME regulation according to CMOs

IMEs are generally more attractive to 3,8% 26,6% 24,1% 17,7% 27,8%
rightholders than CMOs
IMEs have a competitive advantage against 10,1% 29,1% 11,4% 15,2% 10,1% 24,1%
CMOs
IMEs can enter the market more easily than 13,9% 26,6% 13,9% 12,7% 10,1% 22,8%
CMOs
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree/nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Do not know
Note: CMO survey (N=79).
Market entry
The requirement to notify, register and be allowed to operate by the NA entails an effort
which may be qualified as an administrative burden. Therefore, lax regulation regarding
IMEs’ market entry or no regulation at all might create a more favourable environment for
IMEs. In more than half of the MSs IMEs are exempt from any interaction with NAs before
the commencement of their operation. In countries where such interaction is required (i.e.
Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia and Spain) it does not equate with the complex authorization process that CMOs
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must undergo. For example, while in Poland IMEs are required to register with the NA,
CMOs still believe that the market entrance is much easier for IMEs in the country
because requirements are not as complex as for CMOs, as indicated in the survey.
Similarly, Slovenian CMOs claim that IMEs can enter the market more easily despite the
fact that provisions for both types of organizations are similar. This could be because
IMEs do not have to provide information such as rules on the distribution of royalties,
operating cost rules, rules on the use of undistributed royalties and similar information
which must accompany the application for an authorisation to operate for CMOs.
Therefore, national provisions regulating market entry are likely to have an effect on
competition between IMEs and CMOs. Indeed, 40.5% of CMOs and seven out of 20
surveyed NAs think that it is easier for IMEs to enter the market (see Figures 7-3 and 7-4).
Figure 7-4. Impact of IME regulation according to NAs

IMEs are generally more attractive to rightholders
4 8 2 6
than CMOs
Due to lower regulation, IMEs tend to be more
3 3 5 2 7
flexible and efficient in managing the rights of…
IMEs apply lower administrative and processing
2 4 5 9
costs than CMOs
It is easier for IMEs to enter the collective rights
1 6 4 1 1 7
management market than CMOs
IMEs face difficulties when trying to enter the market 2 6 4 1 7
Note: national authorities survey, values in absolute numbers (N=20).
The market entry of IMEs is shaped by the situation in the national CRM market. As
mentioned before, the study results show that some national CRM markets are well-
established and well-covered. As a result, other CRM entitiesmight not have many
incentives to enter. However,as one NA indicated, in cases where they may want to, IMEs
could enter the market more easily than CMOs. In one smaller MS, CMOs argued that
IMEs can enter the market more easily. However, the NA strongly disagreed with such a
statement, explaining in the interview that market entrance for IMEs depends on the ‘good
will of CMOs working in the same field’.
Despite the quite common view that IMEs are more agile in terms of setting up, they face
limitations in entering the market in cases where they aim to operate in multiple MSs.
The lack of a unified system across MSs implies that IMEs must undergo a resource-
consuming process to study the foreign legislation in order to understand what provisions
are applicable to them, as indicated by IMEs during the interviews. In some countries,
IMEs are recognized as such automatically, while in other MSs they have to go through a
process of being recognized as an IME.
Furthermore, in some cases market entrance rules are still evolving. For example, one
interviewed NA stated that while IMEs are not subject to mandatory registration in that
country, they must nevertheless notify the NA about the commencment of activities. In
other cases, a market entrance for IMEs can be resource-consuming. During the
interviews, a few IMEs commented on the burden caused by such provisions: in Romania,
for example, IMEs are required to translate all of the necessary documentation into
Romanian. There are also differences across the MSs in terms of whether IMEs must
have a local establishment in order to operate in a country. For example, IMEs wishing to
operate in Belgium must have an office in the country, whereas to operate in France there
is no such requirement, according to an IME. Disparate, costly and time-consuming
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prerequisites might prolong the process or prevent IMEs from expanding their business
and offering services in multiple MSs.
Once in the market, IMEs may find themselves restricted regarding what rights they are
allowed to manage, since certain parts of the market are reserved for CMOs only. The
main limitation to their operation is related to the mandatory collective management
regime.
Recital 19 of the Directive dictates that only CMOs can manage rights subject to
mandatory collective management. As a result, the surveyed IMEs highlighted that they
are prohibited from managing the types of rights regulated by mandatory collective
management. These rights tend to be different in different MSs. To give a few examples,
IMEs in Spain cannot manage the right to equitable remuneration, in France - the right to
equitable remuneration for communication to the public of phonograms published for
commercial purposes, in Czechia - the right to private copying remuneration, the right to
use work through cable retransmission, the right to appropriate remuneration for renting a
work and the right to remuneration for lending work in public libraries and educational
institutions.65
There are also other kinds of limitations in practice. For example, in Italy, IMEs working
in the audiovisual sector are not allowed to manage the private copying levies of
audiovisual producers since this right is reserved only for producer associations.
Furthermore, the latter are not obliged to constitute themselves as either an IME or a
CMO and do not appear to be bound by the same regulatory provisions (see Chapter 8).
In some cases, the result of the uncertainties regarding the entry by IMEs results in their
looking for other ways to reach rightholders. A good example of that is the case of
Soundreef, an IME in Italy that created the CMO Liberi Editori ed Autori (LEA) in order to
be able to administer authors’ rights in music with certainty.
In some cases, IMEs can face difficulties in entering the market and cannot reach certain
rightholders. This is troublesome for rightholders who would prefer that all of their rights be
managed by an IME. This also leads to a situation where it is not clear what repertoire
IMEs represent, as noted by some users and one NA in the surveys.
Transparency
While the Directive subjects both CMOs and IMEs to the disclosure of certain information
on the management of rightholders’ rights to other stakeholders and the public,
transparency-related provisions applied to IMEs are less stringent. For example, contrary
to CMOs, IMEs are not required to disclose to the public such information as all the
representation agreements it has entered into, contacts of managers, and the general
policy on the use of non-distributable amounts. Most importantly, as opposed to CMOs,
IMEs are not obliged to submit detailed transparency reports in any MSs except Austria,
Lithuania and Greece (only applicable to IMEs in a dominant position).
Lack of full transparency regulation is one of the reasons why 41.8% of CMOs and half of
the NAs claim that IMEs are not necessarily more attractive to rightholders (see Figures 7-
3 and 7-4 above). This is mostly equated with the fact that IMEs are exempt from
compiling and publishing a transparency report in almost all MSs. This lack of a
transparency requirement is also cited by 39% of CMOs, which indicated this as one of
the reasons why IMEs hold a competitive advantage over them. Even in countries where
65This is not an exhaustive list of rights subject to mandatory collective management in these countries and
not an exhaustive list of countries where mandatory collective management is provided.
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IMEs are bound to publish transparency reports, CMOs and NAs suggest that IMEs are
exempt from strict provisions on transparency.
On the one hand, detailed reporting might bring about a certain administrative burden and
additional costs. Therefore, IMEs might be considered to be in a more advantageous
position by being spared from full accountability to the authorities and other stakeholders.
On the other hand, this might have an adverse effect and sway rightholders towards
CMOs. Organisations that provide rightholders with the information entailed in the
transparency report might seem more reliable and therefore more attractive to the
rightholders. The complaints related to the transparency of CMOs suggest that the
transparency of an organisation can impact a rightholder’s choice and is important for
rightholders. Nevertheless, the role of the publication of a transparency report in
influencing a rightholder’s choice between a CMO and an IME should not be overstated.
Regarding other procedures ensuring transparent operation, NAs in the survey brought
forth cases where stakeholders complained about IMEs failing to provide the information
that they are bound to give. For example, one NA commented that IMEs have difficulties
in providing evidence that they are duly authorized by rightholders. Another NA explained
that an entity with a pending status for an IME had not provided all of the necessary
information to be authorized to operate in the country as it was missing proper
documentation proving that it was authorized to act on behalf of rightholders and clearly
stating the scope of rights it represents. Similarly, yet another NA noted that users voiced
concerns about the transparency of IMEs in general.
The fact that IMEs are not bound by the obligation to compile and publish a transparency
report means that certain information they disclose to other stakeholders, especially
rightholders, might only depend on their internal procedures. It is more or less easy for
small IMEs to control and account for their money flows. However, with larger IMEs
representing more rightholders, the complexity of their financial operations might increase.
In such cases, tools like a transparency report could act as a safeguard preventing IMEs
from becoming organizations lacking transparency and accountability.
Attractiveness to rightholders
Less than 4% of CMOs and none of the NAs think that IMEs are more attractive than
CMOs to rightholders (see Figures 7-3 and 7-4 above). Apart from the lack of full
transparency, CMOs also note that IMEs do not offer rightholders the possibility to
participate in the decision-making of an organization, making them possibly less appealing
than CMOs.
On the other hand, in their survey comments CMOs noted that some aspects of the IME
operation might be appealing to rightholders. For example, the Directive does not subject
IMEs to any provisions related to tariff setting, meaning that they are not bound to treat all
rightholders equally and their pricing policies are less regulated than those of CMOs. To
this end, IMEs are able to adopt a cherry-picking strategy that allows them to concentrate
on the most lucrative rightholders. Similarly, the absence of standard tariffs across the
works represented allows IMEs to offer lower prices for a less attractive repertoire, which
would make them more attractive to users. In addition, the limitations to IMEs’ operations
(e.g. in the case of mandatory collective management) can indirectly benefit them as well.
The potential exclusion of IMEs from the market of mandatory collective management is
counterbalanced by their ability to select from rightholders and works. While CMOs are
bound to represent all rightholders equally, IMEs have the flexibility and freedom to
choose. CMOs noted in the survey that this freedom allows IMEs to avoid managing the
most burdensome and non-profitable parts (rightholder groups) of the market.
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According to IMEs themselves, they do have some features that, compared to CMOs,
make them more attractive to rightholders, as indicated by survey results and interviews
with IMEs. More specifically:
 Smaller size of IMEs as compared to CMOs could attract rightholders that seek
more individual attention from their management, as highlighted by a few CMOs
and IMEs themselves.
 They provide more transparent management services and offer a more
efficient distribution of revenues. Such appeal is frequently the result of IMEs
using more innovative technologies, such as reporting systems that ensure that
rightholders are paid appropriately, effectively, and in a transparent manner.
In total, only a small proportion of rightholders (44 rightholders or 3.6%) who responded to
the survey reported to have mandated their rights (or categories/types of rights) to IMEs.
Among the most usual reasons for entrusting the management of their rights to IMEs are
the efficiency and transparency of these entities, as indicated by 8 and 7 rightholders
respectively. Another five rightholders indicated that they chose IMEs because they have
wider access to user audiences and pay royalties upfront in a lump sum. From the
responses provided, the majority of rightholders seem to be more satisfied than not with
the way IMEs collect and distribute their royalties (see Figure 7-5 below). 66
Figure 7-5. Rightholder evaluation of their IMEs
I am satisfied with the way my IME

2 7 2 3
distributes revenue from my rights
I am satisfied with the way my IME

3 6 3 1 4
collects revenue from my rights
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree, nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree
Source: rightholder survey; N=14 for first statement, N=17 for second statement, values in absolute numbers.
Nevertheless, any appeal that IMEs might have to rightholders is minimized by the
restrictions to their operation. That is the main reason why half of the surveyed IMEs
indicated that it is difficult or very difficult for them to attract rightholders. If, due to
such restrictions, a rightholder entrusts one type of rights to a CMO and other types of
rights to an IME, he or she is represented by both types of entities. In such cases,
management of the rights might get difficult and cumbersome, bringing down negative
effects on the rightholder, as indicated by an IME in the survey. Indeed, one NA reported
that rightholders believe that such a simultaneous operation of IMEs and CMOs impinges
on the circle of revenue to which a rightholder is entitled.
Another reason behind difficulties in attracting rightholders for IMEs is the process of
switching CRM entities, which is described as difficult by IMEs. As claimed by six out of
nine IMEs, rightholders do not actively use their right to withdraw their rights from CMOs
66 Rightholders’ responses about IMEs should be read with caution. Based on several survey comments and
follow-up interviews with rightholders or rightholder associations, it is evident that rightholders do not always
distinguish between IMEs and CMOs, or between IMEs and other CRM market actors. For example, one
rightholder who indicated being a member of an IME filled in its responses regarding IMEs and indicated the
name of the entity (IME) he was referring to. That entity is actually a major CMO operating in one of the MSs.
Additionally, during a discussion about IMEs in an interview with one rightholder association, a reference was
made to an entity which is in fact a royalty-free music vendor (see Chapter 8 for more information on these
entities). It is safe to say that the same applies to NAs, and to some extent to CMOs, as some of them are not
entirely familiar with legislation applicable to IMEs, IME operations etc. which is reflected in their survey
answers as well.
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and transfer them to another management entity. Presumably, one of the reasons for that
could be the sometimes difficult and lengthy process which might discourage them (see
Chapter 4 for more details). On the other hand, rightholders not using the right to transfer
their rights from CMOs to IMEs might also indicate that they are satisfied with the
organization that currently manages their rights.
d. Conclusions
In sum, our survey and research indicate that the introduction of a reference to IMEs by
the Directive might have catalysed the creation of such organisations that act for the
collective benefit of rightholders in the CRM market. The study identified 32 IMEs that are
registered or recognized as IMEs by Member States across the EEA. Most of them
operate exclusively in the music and audiovisual sectors. However, the list of identified
IMEs has limitations because some entities might not have been captured within that term.
Often, there is no clear indication whether the identified CRM entity is an IME. This is due
to several reasons, such as the lack of an indication of its legal status on an entity’s
website and, in some cases, the NAs’ lack of information as to whether an entity qualifies
as an IME and should be included in national registers.
Most of the MSs subject IMEs to at least some additional provisions that are only
applicable to CMOs according to the Directive and thus, generally, at least in theory, IMEs
are regulated more than provided for in the Directive. Provisions concerning the market
entry and transparency of IMEs have an impact on an IME’s attractiveness to rightholders,
and consequently, shape the competition in the CRM market. Our research suggests that
in comparison to CMOs, IMEs can enter the market more easily in most cases, due to
more lax or the absence of regulations and this provides them with a competitive
advantage which might lead to an uneven level-playing field. However, the fact that
applicable rules might differ from MS to MS poses challenges for IMEs and excludes them
from certain parts of the market or by making their entry difficult or uncertain. In terms of
transparency, IMEs are generally subject to less of an administrative burden and costs
than CMOs because they are exempt from an annual transparency report and other
obligations in most of the MSs. However, fewer provisions on transparency and
governance are also cited by stakeholders as one of the reasons why IMEs are not more
attractive to rightholders than CMOs. Only 3.6% of all the surveyed rightholders had ever
mandated their rights to an IME, indicating that these entities are still small competitors to
CMOs.
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8. Entities that are active on the rights management market

but do not fall within the definition of either a CMO or
IME
The Directive defines two types of CRM entities: CMOs and IMEs. In our research, we
investigate whether there are other organisations which are active on and are part of the
overall collective management process, but do not satisfy the criteria that define CMOs or
IMEs. Such entities (hereafter – third-type entities) might not fall within the definitions of a
CMO or an IME because their members or rightholders do not own or control them or
because they do not have any members and are only in charge of distributing revenues
collected by another entity. Hence, in principle, such entities are not within the scope of
the CRM Directive but may have been regulated in some Member States. While some of
these entities fall within the regulatory scope of the CRM Directive (e.g., entities owned or
controlled by CMOs), others, such as royalty-free music vendors and representative
agencies, have not been regulated by the Directive or by national provisions. This chapter
provides an overview of such entities and examines whether they have been regulated by
Member States, drawing on the results of interviews and surveys of NAs, CMOs, IMEs, as
well as desk research.
Box 8. Main takeaways: Entities that are active on the rights management
market but do not fall within the definition of either a CMO or an IME
 The study identified four main types of entities that do not fall within the definition
of either CMO or IME but are still active on the CRM market. Those are (i)
entities, partially or fully, owned or controlled by sCMOs; (ii) certain rightholders’
associations; (iii) royalty-free music vendors; and (iv) representative agencies.
 Entities partially or fully controlled by a sCMOsand performing a dedicated
function, such as invoicing of users or the distribution of amounts due to
rightholders. Rightholders associations that carry out some of the functions
typically performed by CMOs. Royalty-free music vendors are companies, which
offer users fixed subscription fees under which they can use the musical works.
Representative agencies are intermediary for-profit companies that can be hired
by rightholders to oversee and administer collection of remunerations from
multiple CMOs, producers, and publishers on the rightholders’ behalf.
 Legal provisions stemming from the CRM Directive as transposed by the
national laws apply only to the first two types of entities, although both royalty-
free music vendors and representative agencies carry out similar royalty
collection and distribution functions.
a. Entities, partially or fully, owned or controlled by CMOs
The Directive allows CMOs to delegate some of their activities, such as the invoicing of
users or the distribution of amounts due to rightholders to subsidiaries or other entities that
they control (Recital 17). The subsection below first presents the key findings of the
examination of legal provisions applied to such entities. Furthermore, it elaborates on the
key functions of such entities and explains the rationale of CMOs when establishing them.
Several brief case studies of such entities (incl. ZPÜ; ICE Services; and Network Music
Partners) are provided to illustrate the findings.
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The Directive outlines the broad legal framework for regulating the subsidiaries or other
entities that CMOs may control. According to the Directive, the relevant provisions apply to
entities directly or indirectly owned or controlled, wholly or in part, by a CMO, provided that
such entities carry out an activity which, if carried out by the CMO, would be subject to the
provisions of the Directive (Article 2(3)). There are also provisions concerning the timely
distribution of amounts due to rightholders (Article 13) as well as information provided to
rightholders on the management of their rights (Article 18 (2)), which apply to entities other
than CMOs or IMEs when they are involved in the distribution of amounts due to
rightholders.
National regulatory provisions for third-type entities focus on organisations that are
partially or fully controlled by CMOs (directly or indirectly) and fulfil functions that other
CMOs carry out themselves. These entities may be (non-profit) organisations, companies
or other types of entities active in the rights management market. All MSs’ national
legislations contain provisions concerning the activities of such entities, except one (see
Annex 4 for list of provisions applied to these entities in MS).67
At the core of all of the national provisions is that whenever a third-type entity handles
tasks belonging to a CMO or an IME, the same provisions apply to that entity as would to
a CMO or an IME. In most cases, such entities are regulated, but they do not have a
dedicated title. Legislation simply states that, in accordance with Article 2(3) of the
Directive, it also applies to entities that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in
whole or in part, by a CMO, provided that these entities carry out an activity which, if
carried out by a CMO, would be subject to the provisions of the law. MSs that do
separately identify these entities, have taken different approaches in the legislation:
 Some MSs, i.e., Austria, Germany, Latvia and Spain, identify these entities as
dependent management entities (DMEs).
 Some MSs, i.e., Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, make a
reference to members/member bodies/member organisations of CMOs. In Finland,
for instance, rightholders associations can be members of a CMO, but it is usually
the same associations that control the CMO. These associations receive
remuneration collected by the CMO and then further distribute it to rightholders
(see Section below for more information).
 Under Slovenian law, these entities are referred to as outsourced service
providers. Under Finnish law, there is also a provision referring to the
responsibility for outsourced collective management duties performed by other
corporate entities or foundations.
 Under Portuguese law, an association of collective management entities is
mentioned and regulated. This type of entity may be considered to fall into the
category of entities active in the rights management market but not falling into the
category of either a CMO or an IME.
Under Romanian legislation, common collectors and joint collection bodies are mentioned
and regulated. These types of entities may be considered to fall into the category of
entities active in the rights management market but not identified as either a CMO or an
IME.
67 In Slovakia, collecting societies need authorisation from the Ministry of Culture to operate. Slovakian law
states that the rights and obligations of a CMO arising from issued authorisation may not be transferred or
passed onto another person.
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There seems to be two main reasons why CMOs establish such entities. First, in some
MS (e.g., Germany), regulation of such entities is less prescriptive, based on the
interviews with CMOs and desk research. For instance, while CMOs are bound to conduct
negotiations and user licensing on the basis of good faith and non-discrimination, these
third-type entities have no such obligations. Hence, establishing such a ‘subsidiary’ can be
a way for CMOs to be more flexible, according to one CMO. That is especially true when it
comes to providing additional services to influential rightholders that otherwise might leave
a CMO in the pursuit of more favourable options for the management of their rights.
Another reason is that several big CMOs sometimes choose to delegate a rather specific
task that is too complex or time-consuming for them to perform individually to jointly
established entities.68 The scope of services provided by such entities is varied. Based on
the information provided on their websites, normally these entities carry out one or several
of the following activities:
 Collection of payments from a very specific user group/collection of a very

specific type of payments – when faced with these tasks, multiple CMOs working
in the same sector could establish a ‘joint venture’, as one of the interviewees put
it, in order to delegate the task of collecting payments more efficiently. These
entities are then granted access to their parent CMOs’ collection-related data, so
that it can avoid information overlaps and also ensure a more cohesive and time-
saving approach, as compared to just one CMO handling such technical collection
issues alone.69
 Distribution of collected royalties – upon collecting payments, these entities
usually distribute them to the parent CMOs, which then distribute them to their
rightholders.70 However, they could also distribute the revenue directly to
rightholders as long as this function is indicated in their statute and the national
legislation allows that.71
 Provision of tailored services to major rightholders – in certain cases, major
rightholders (e.g., particularly renowned performers) could demand more flexible
contractual relations with a CMO. CMOs, which have a legal obligation to treat all
of their rightholders equally, cannot do that within their own legal framework. In
that case, a separate entity might be established by a CMO in order to continue
working with these rightholders, who usually bring the biggest shares of collected
revenue (a rather illustrative case here is ARESA, which is a subsidiary of GEMA
and represents only the mechanical rights in the Anglo-American repertoire of
BMG Rights Management for online and mobile distribution within the EEA72).
 Administrative/processing services – certain administrative practices such as
invoicing or business intelligence could also be delegated to these entities by its
parent companies (see e.g., below).
 Cooperation and information exchange – CMOs could also use these entities
as platforms of institutionalised cooperation with other major CMOs working in the
68 This is evident from the websites of such entities that focus on very specific and narrow tasks. See e.g.
Zentralstelle Bibliothekstantieme; Zentralstelle Fotokopieren an Schulen; Zentralstelle für private
Überspielungsrechte; Zentralstelle für die Wiedergabe von Fernsehsendungen
69 Heine R., Holzmueller T. (2019). Verwertungsgesellschaftengesetz. Kommentar, pp. 47-50.
70 See e.g. ZWF http://zentralstelle-wiedergabe-
fernsehsendungen.de/files/ZWF_Transparenzbericht_2019.pdf or ZBT https://www.zentralstelle-
bibliothekstantieme.de/fileadmin/pdf/ZBT/2020/ZBT_Gesellschaftsvertrag_041219.pdf
72 ARESA (2020). ARESA License Agreement. Data available at: https://www.aresa-
music.com/downloads/ARESA-Vertragsgrundlagen.pdf
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same sector.73 This is a way in which they can create and maintain common
copyright databases (i.e., on works that belong to the rightholders who are
members of the parent CMOs), which improves the administrative efficiency of
their parent organisations.
 Broad (online) licenses – such entities could also license users on behalf of their
parent companies. This option allows the parent CMOs to attract more users by
working together, since several CMOs can offer a much broader selection of works
than just one. On the other hand, the user does not have to obtain multiple
licenses from different CMOs, which makes the services of such a “one-stop-shop”
rather attractive.
Box 8-1. Case studies: Examples of entities owned by CMOs in different MSs.
The ZPÜ (Zentralstelle für private Überspielungsrechte) is a joint venture of several

German CMOs – GEMA, GÜFA, GVL, GWFF, TWF, VFF, VGF, VG Bild-Kunst, and VG
Wort created for the sole purpose of joint licensing in private copying and collection of
private copying levies. ZPÜ collects the fees for the fair compensation for limitations to the
reproduction right pursuant to Art. 5 (2) (a) and (b) of the Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC
jointly for all German CMOs that are entitled to this compensation74.
As one of the interviewed CMOs put it, it is not convenient for users to pay to different
CMOs when it comes to private copying, which is why the aforementioned CMOs pulled
the rights of their rightholders together to offer a one-stop shop. While for the users ZPÜ
functions like a CMO, it does not have the relevant governance structure (e.g., General
Assembly, Supervisory board) and is largely seen as an administrative body by its parent
companies.
Network Music Partners (NMP) is a joint venture between the UK-based PRS for Music
and Nordisk Copyright Bureau (NCB), an umbrella organisation of Nordic CMOs. The
organisation provides back-office administrative services to its members (such as online
and offline invoicing, business intelligence, networking and lobbying), while front-office
activities like licensing and member services remain in the hands of individual CMOs. In
its activities, the NMP largely focuses on digital service providers (DSPs, such as Spotify,
iTunes and YouTube). When music transactions are made online, NMP is responsible for
invoicing DSPs so that the rightholders get paid for identified music used online.
ICE Services is a joint venture between three major CMOs – PRS For Music (UK), STIM
(Sweden), and GEMA (Germany). ICE is a multi-territorial copyright hub which provides
multi-territory, multi-rights, and copyright administration services for its CMO customers.
ICE provides services to CMOs and users in the following areas:
 Online licensing – ICE Services provides a multi-territory one-stop licensing

solution for digital service providers (DSPs) covering the online rights owned or
controlled by its parent companies PRS, GEMA, STIM (which collectively have
over 290,000 members).
 Processing copyright data – the company offers this service using the
aggregated data provided by its CMO customers (which it claims represent over
two thirds of the European market). The company’s database contains over 33
73 Ibid, pp. 49-52.

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million works.
 Online processing – this includes a variety of services such as managing DSP
usage reports; matching; online related copyright services (e.g., repertoires);
royalty calculations, invoicing, finance services, distributions, and business
intelligence.
In line with its parent companies, ICE Services adopts a non-profit business model. Since
2018, the company has performed 11,168,390 registrations, documented 40,756,499
works and distributed €1,000,000,000 in royalties.75 While registered as a DME in the
German DPMA database, ICE Services also has offices in the UK and Sweden. The
company also foresees the provision of new services through the development of
additional databases that will help CMOs to better process the use of copyrighted music in
audio-visual productions.76
Sources : http://zpue.de/; https://www.nmp.eu/; https://www.iceservices.com/
The services provided by these entities are of significant importance to the CRM system.
In most cases, they are at the core of the money flow process through the activities that
they carry out (e.g., royalty collection and distribution). This is also evidenced by legal
disputes related to the workings of these entities. For example, one of the most prominent
cases in 2019-2020 involved TikTok, which launched legal proceedings against ICE and
one of its parent CMOs, PRS for Music (for more details on that case and its settlement,
see Annex 5).
According to the survey answers, only a few NAs have recognised the existence of third-
type entities operating in their respective markets and informed them that they are subject
to the same provisions and control as CMOs. As these entities may have very different
legal statuses, tasks and roles in the CRM market, difficulties may arise in identifying them
in each MS. The application of relevant provisions of the law to these entities may not
always be clear either. This may mean that it is not so easy for NAs to monitor compliance
with applicable rules. This may also create uncertainty about the legal status of such
entities. Thus, there might be a risk in certain cases that the rights of rightholders would
not be respected in the way that they should and that there would be no supervision. For
example, the more influential rightholders that generate more income could pressure
CMOs to provide better services to them through such entities rather than directly, which
would discriminate against the rights of the less profitable rightholders who are members
of the original entity. This would be impossible within a CMO legal structure but could work
if a third-type entity is created. However, the use of these types of entities is mostly done
on the basis of effectiveness or for the economic benefit of certain arrangements.
Therefore, rightholders may also benefit from these third-type entities operating in the
CRM market.
b. Rightholder associations
This subsection presents our key findings on the role that rightholders’ associations with
collection/distribution functions may play on the CRM market. The findings of this
subsection are based on the detailed case studies of two MSs – Italy and Finland, where
the role of rightholders’ associations differs somewhat from other MSs. Specifically, Italy
75 https://www.iceservices.com/
76 https://www.iceservices.com/innovation/av/
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and Finland are the only two MSs that have legislative provisions that regulate the
activities of other third-type entities which do not fall under the category of entities
stemming from Article 2(3) of the Directive. In both cases, these entities are rightholders’
associations. However, the provisions that are applied to them as well as their activities on
the market differ significantly. This subsection presents an overview of these two entities
and their role in the collective management process, based on interviews with NAs, desk
research, and legal analysis.
In Finland, all CMOs are registered associations to which the Finnish Associations Act
applies. Chapter 3, Section 10 of the Act states that ‘an association may have private
individuals, corporations, and foundations as members.’77 Thus, CMOs may have as
members both individual rightholders as well as rightholders’ associations. An individual
rightholder may therefore be affiliated with a CMO either directly or via the rightholders’
association. In the latter case, the rightholder gives its mandate to the rightholders’
association which then transfers its mandate to the CMO.
CMOs license the works of rightholders represented by their member associations and
collect the money from the users. They then distribute part of the collected money as lump
sums to the member associations for further distribution and part of the money directly to
individual rightholders.78 After member associations receive the money from the CMO,
they further distribute it to individual rightholders in the form of grants and awards. Part of
this money is also used for organising legal advice to members of the associations. The
associations have bilateral agreements with the CMO on the use of the collected money.
They are also accountable to the CMO for the use of this money. Member associations
must report back to the CMO on a yearly basis on how the money has been used. Thus,
considering the role that they play in the collective management process, Finnish
rightholders’ associations can be considered third-type entities as well. In these activities,
they fall within the scope of the legal provisions stemming from the CRM Directive.
In Italy, there is a specific situation whereby there are producer associations that operate
in the field of private copying and they distribute remuneration to authors and producers
collected by the CMO SIAE. However, these associations appear not to be subject to the
provisions of the Directive as they are not considered either CMOs or IMEs.
c. Royalty-free music vendors and representative agencies
This last subsection elaborates on the entities that are not explicitly defined or regulated in
the relevant national legislation but are nevertheless related in one way or another to the
CRM market. These are royalty-free music vendors and representative agencies. The
sub-section describes each of these entity types in more detail and provides examples of
their activity, drawing on comments from the CMO survey, interviews and desk research.
77https://www.prh.fi/en/yhdistysrekisteri/act.html
78 An example of this is Kopiosto (the Joint Copyright Organization in Finland). In the text-and-image based
sector, agreements about the division of remuneration collected by Kopiosto are concluded first between the
remuneration from authors’ associations and the publishers’ associations (i.e. a certain percentage goes to
authors and a certain percentage goes to the publishers). After this initial division, remuneration is further
divided between the different organisations. This division between the different author organizations is based
on surveys on the usage of different types of works (i.e., fiction, non-fiction, journals, images etc.) as well as
negotiations between the different organizations. The publishers’ associations usually divide the money based
on their market share.
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Royalty-free music vendors are companies that offer users fixed subscription fees under
which they can use the musical works. The vendor, for its part, acquires the rights to
songs via lump-sum payments from rightholders or receives a nonexclusive transferable
license with the right to sublicense from them. These vendors are a rather widespread
phenomenon in the EU with many of them operating across different Member States (see
Annex 6 for a full list of entities identified). Examples of such entities include – Storever
(BE), Abydos Musique (FR), Tribe of Noise (NL), FreeStore Music (DK), Mood Media
(US/NL), Epidemic Sound (SE).79
Occasionally, these companies get involved in legal disputes with CMOs and rightholders’
associations due to their ‘vendor-to-user’ business model, which effectively cuts out CMOs
from the operation scheme. For example, one such vendor in Sweden got involved in a
debate with a CMO umbrella organisation and with a European rightholders’ association.
According to a statement issued by the umbrella organisation together with the
association, the upfront-compensation arrangement used by the vendor inhibits the
earning potential of its clients in the long term. In an in-depth interview, association
representatives argued that this model particularly damages the long-term career
prospects of young authors who are not well aware of how the CRM system functions and
who release their rights too easily for a quick upfront payment.
A different example was a case about commercially licensed phonograms that were also
published under Creative Commons non-commercial licences and whether these can be
classified as ‘phonograms published for commercial purposes.’ 80 The case involved
several such entities and a Luxembourgish IME (Jamendo), eventually landing in the
French Supreme Court (see Annex 5 for more details).
Representative agencies are intermediary for-profit companies that can be hired by

rightholders to oversee and administer the collection of remuneration from multiple CMOs,
producers, and publishers on the rightholder’s behalf. These entities manage the
neighbouring (i.e., related) rights of their clients in the musical and audio-visual sectors.
They use a range of sources including third-party performance information, their own
statistical predictions for covered territories, and the rightholders’ income data to monitor
collections. To ensure broader coverage, they also register their client rightholders with
multiple CMOs.81 Examples of such entities include Kobalt Rights (DE/UK), AllrightMusic
(FR), WriteHereMusic (FR); Rightback Collections (FR); Global Master Rights (NL); and
Media IP Rights (FR). See Annex 6 for a full list of such agencies.
Box 8-2. Case study in Media IP Rightholders as a representative agency.
Media IP Rightholders is a representative agency established in Paris, which also has

international presence in London, Los Angeles, and Rio de Janeiro. Its main functions are
to collect and distribute income from the neighbouring rights of their clients from different
CMOs and other CRM entities around the globe. The agency works in audio and audio-
79 Several CMOs referred to some of these entities as IMEs in their survey responses. However, after a
careful examination of the survey responses of NAs and national lists of IMEs, we have found no evidence
confirming this statement. For example, Belgium-based Storever, which also operates in France, has not been
registered as an IME either by France or Belgium. Nevertheless, according to some of the NAs (BE/FR), some
of these companies might de facto operate as IMEs, even though they are not de jure registered as such.
These NAs noted that it is hard to detect IME activity unless an IME voluntarily registers itself.
80 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40319-020-00948-5 https://academic.oup.com/grurint/article-
abstract/69/8/866/5827719?redirectedFrom=fulltext
81 See e.g. https://www.mediaipr.com/
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visual sectors.
When serving a new client, the company first registers the person with all CMOs that
match their professional profile. After that, the agency takes over maintenance and
registration of the client’s performances and catalogue with these CMOs. The agency
guarantees monthly distributions after receipt of royalties. The administrative fee charged
by the company is undisclosed.
Source : https://www.mediaipr.com/
Based on their activities, it is evident that these agencies have collection and distribution
functions and that they operate on a for-profit basis. Nevertheless, they have not been
subject to any regulations stemming from the Directive. Even though several of these
agencies operate in multiple EU Member States, the NAs have not reported on any of
them in their survey responses (which might be considered normal given that these are
not CMOs or IMEs). However, several CMOs have referred to them as third-type entities
active on the CRM market in their survey responses.
Conclusions
As the analysis above demonstrates, there are different types of organisations with
differing roles and tasks on the CRM market or navigating around that market – not only
CMOs and IMEs. Applicable regulation is not always clear given the uncertainty about the
exact scope of activities of some of these organisations, which are not always known to
the NAs. Some of these entities are the joint ventures of several CMOs, while others
function on a for-profit basis (royalty-free music vendors, representative agencies).
However, given their business model, third-type organisations active in or around the
CRM market are not always recognised by other stakeholders such as the national
authorities.
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9. Exchange of information between competent authorities
The activities of CRM entities may go beyond national borders as they engage in multiple
bilateral representation agreements with CRM entities from other MSs, carry out multi-
territorial licensing activities, and, in some cases, operate in multiple countries across the
EU. In such cases, they might need to consult or cooperate with their counterparts in other
MSs. For this reason, the Directive provides for a formal mechanism under Article 37 by
which NAs can cooperate and exchange information on several matters of compliance, in
particular when it comes to the activities of CRM entities established in their respective
MSs. This chapter provides an overview of how this mechanism has been used in
practice, by drawing on the survey and interviews with NAs.
Box 9. Main takeaways: Exchange of information between competent

authorities
 NAs do not actively use the existing information exchange mechanism but are
largely satisfied with it as it is.
 Some NAs suggested potential improvements such as stronger
institutionalisation of the mechanism as well as development of common
infrastructure (i.e., databases / contact platforms).
NAs do not use a formal mechanism for information exchanges on a regular basis. The
majority of them reported to have neither sent nor received any requests in the previous
year (2019). While several NAs did report the exchange of formal requests, they are rather
infrequent with up to 5 sent or received requests in most cases (see Figure 9-1 below).
Figure 9-1. Frequency of requests sent and received by NAs in 2019

Requests received Requests sent
6-10
requests 1-5
(1) request
(5)
1-5
requests
(7)
None (15)
None (12)
Note: Survey of NAs, values in absolute numbers, N=20.
Responding to a follow-up question on why they have not been using the mechanism,
the majority (13) of the responding NAs said that the need for information exchange did
not arise. Two other NAs indicated that this is due to a lack of human resources or a
preference for informal consultations, which do not require the launching of an official
information exchange procedure. It is possible that the remaining five NAs that are
exchanging information more actively also have some established informal communication
channels that they use to quickly receive information on legislation or matters relevant to
the implementation of the Directive. Finally, as one of the authorities pointed out during
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the interview, the short time period since the transposition of the Directive could also
explain the infrequent use of the information exchange mechanism.
The small number of legal disputes involving CRM entities and other relevant stakeholders
from several MSs (see Chapter 10 and Annex 5 for more information on legal disputes)
might also explain the low level of formal cross-border cooperation between the NAs. This
further supports the NAs’ claim that they have not had an opportunity to use the
mechanism because there has not yet been an urgent need to do so. In turn, day-to-day
inquiries can be handled via informal communication methods.
The NAs that did engage into formal information exchange did so to obtain
information about a certain CRM entity and to get information on national regulatory
provisions in certain MSs. For example, in 2017/2018, one NA sought advice from other
NAs and the EC in relation to a particular Licensing Body and queried if that body was
registered as a CMO or an IME in its respective MSs. Another NA indicated that it
requested another NA to take action against a particular CRM entity based on the
provisions of Article 37(2). This NA did not, however, disclose the contents of the request.
Conclusions
Overall, most NAs are satisfied with the functioning of the Article 37 mechanism as well as
opportunities for the exchange of information during expert meetings held pursuant to Art.
40 of the Directive. However, in interviews, individual NAs proposed a number of possible
improvements. Specifically, some of the NAs suggested that the mechanism could be
more institutionalised. For instance, it could follow the practice of the meetings of
competent authorities in the framework of the General Data Protection Regulation. Such a
framework could also be used as a platform for developing common guidelines for all NAs,
which would further harmonize CRM regulations across MSs. Other NAs suggested
additional mechanisms at the European level to facilitate information exchanges among
NAs such as common databases and a common NA contact platform.
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10. Legal disputes
This chapter presents the results of desk research, the CMO survey and the legal analysis
by systemising the findings with regard to types and rates of occurrence of legal disputes
between various CRM stakeholders (with a particular focus on CMOs). A detailed
summary of major legal disputes that took place after the implementation of the Directive
is presented in Annex 5. The annex provides an overview of major disputes with users as
well as some other major disputes (i.e. disputes between different CMOs and IMEs or
disputes between rightholders’ and CRM entities).
Box 8. Main takeaways: Legal disputes
 Legal cases between CMOs and users are the most common type of identified
disputes with most of them focusing on tariff-setting practices and evasion of
payments by certain users.
 No clear pattern was established with regard to disputes between CMOs and other
stakeholders. However, there are some indications that IMEs and other entities
increasingly challenge the dominant position of CMOs in certain Member States
through legal means.
According to the CMO survey results, the most often encountered major legal disputes are
those involving users. While more than a half of the CMOs (57%) claimed that they were
not involved in any legal disputes, around a third reported that they were involved in some
sort of dispute with users (30%). Other types of disputes were not as prevalent: disputes
with other CMOs, IMEs, and with rightholders are all around 8-10% of the responses. (see
Figure 10-1 below).
In disputes with users, the most widespread cases are those dealing with (i) payments (4
cases) and (ii) tariff-setting practices (3 cases). Disputes related to payments also referred
to questions of international jurisdiction in CRM matters (see e.g., PRS for Music vs. Qatar
Airways or AKM vs. Nordsee). Decisions on these and similar cases create new good
practices on adjudication, as the courts draw the barriers of multi-territorial activity more
sharply. With regard to tariff-setting, such disputes were taking place even before the
adoption of the Directive. According to one of the legal experts, however, it might be that
the obligations of tariff-setting in Article 16 and specifically in Recital (31) of the Directive
created new challenge points for users, thus causing more disputes on tariff-setting
practices.
It is hard to recognise any clear patterns when analysing other disputes. One of the only
noticeable trends is that six out of ten disputes revolved around CMOs being sued by their
competitors in the market (such as IMEs or third-type entities). Three of these cases were
about the alleged unfair monopolistic behaviour of CMOs. While not conclusive, this trend
might be an indication that new market players such as IMEs are more likely to challenge
traditional forms of rights administration since the adoption of the Directive.
Finally, we have not identified any major disputes between rightholders (or their
associations) and CMOs since the adoption of the Directive.
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Figure 10-1. Distribution of CMOs who were (are) involved in legal disputes with
other stakeholders
With another CMO
9%
Has not been With an IME 8%
involved in legal
disputes 57% With rightholders
10%
With users 30%

With other
stakeholders 4%
Sources: Survey of CMOs, N=93.
A detailed summary of major legal disputes that took place after the implementation of the
Directive and which we have identified throughout the study through various
methodological means is presented in Annex 5.
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11. Conclusions
a. Governance and transparency of CMOs
The CRM directive inter alia aimed to strengthen the protection of the interests of
members of CMOs, rightholders and third parties. Therefore, it established common
minimum requirements regarding governance, financial management and transparency of
CMOs. The available evidence suggests that overall, the Directive has achieved this
objective. Although with delays, the Directive has been transposed into national legal acts
and its provisions are being effectively applied. Overall, most stakeholders consider the
existing legal framework as being effective in protecting the interests of rightholders. While
the Directive has had an overall positive impact on the governance, transparency and
financial management of CMOs, its implementation and the application of its provisions
differs from country to country and between specific CMOs. Evidence collected for this
study points to several challenges. These can be grouped into two categories: issues in
the application and challenges to maximising the positive impacts of the Directive. The
issues of the application of specific provisions in certain MSs include:
 Timely distribution of revenues to rightholders. Only 42% of surveyed CMOs

reported to have distributed more than 90% of amounts due to rightholders within
nine months from the end of the financial year as foreseen in Article 13(1) of the
Directive. CMOs argue that not all users provide the necessary and relevant
information in a timely manner and in an agreed-upon format, which impedes
timely allocations to rightholders. To address this issue, CMOs are increasingly
investing in digitalisation and innovative solutions to help users improve their
reporting. A digital reporting system could also increase CMOs’ transparency in the
eyes of rightholders, especially if complemented with revenue collection and
reporting on distribution use.
 Notice of period for termination or withdrawal of rights. Only 46% of surveyed
rightholders claimed that they could withdraw their rights without undue delays.
While Article 5(4) foresees that the period of notice to be served should not exceed
6 months, in practice the effective withdrawal may take longer should a CMO
decide that, in line with the same Article, such termination or withdrawal is to take
effect only at the end of the financial year.
The second group of challenges refer to the empowerment of rightholders. Evidence

suggests that the provisions of the Directive safeguarding the rights of rightholders and
imposing obligations on CMOs are duly implemented and enforced. However, their impact
on the governance of CMOs depends on the extent to which members of CMOs actually
exercise these rights. The evidence presented in this report suggests that the willingness
and capacity of rightholders to do so differs significantly. Members need to invest time,
acquire and develop relevant knowledge in order to effectively participate in the decision-
making process of their CMO. While some rightholders are very actively engaged, others
are less inclined. Furthermore, the Directive ensures that rightholders can affect
governance of a CMO by ‘voting with their feet’, i.e. choosing a different CMO or an IME.
However, in a number of countries, there is only one CMO representing the rightholders of
a specific sector and most rightholders do not appear to be willing to join CMOs operating
in other countries or IMEs.
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The above discussed challenges, however, do not negate the overall positive impact of
the Directive as a benchmark for protecting the interests of members of CMOs,
rightholders and third parties.
b. Relations with users
The objective of Chapter 4 of Title II of the Directive is to ensure a smooth and fair
licensing environment by setting forth the rules governing relations between CMOs and
users. In particular, it sought to ensure that licensing negotiations would be carried out in
good faith and that licensing terms would be set following objective and non-discriminatory
criteria but it also set reporting obligations to the CMOs for users. Evidence collected for
this study suggests that the Directive has achieved its objectives. Most stakeholders agree
that the system functions relatively well in the areas of tariff-setting and licensing
negotiations and that the provisions laid down in the Directive are enforced. They also
point out that the Directive created a more systemic approach to the licensing process.
Nevertheless, users and CMOs face challenges in applying certain provisions of the
Directive related to the exchange of information. The study showed that only a third of
CMOs are satisfied with the overall reporting by users. This relates both to the timeliness,
accuracy and agreed-upon format of the reports. The study did not find evidence that this
problem is related to any particular sector or country, but rather that the quality of the
reports differs from user to user. And yet, stakeholders point out that it is more
pronounced in the case of smaller users which usually have lower administrative and
financial capacities. On their side, users point to the lack and clarity of certain information
provided by CMOs. More specifically:
 Evidence collected suggests that the system could benefit from improvements in
the transparency and disclosure of information on the side of CMOs, as foreseen
in Article 21 of the Directive. More specifically, the CMOs’ provision of standard
applicable tariffs and licensing contracts would improve the overall licensing
process.
 Many users rely on blanket licenses through which they purchase the entire
repertoire licensed by a CMO. However, they are not always made aware that
certain rightholders may have withdrawn certain rights (categories or types thereof)
or did not place all of their rights with one CMO and that results in the illegal use of
a repertoire that they did not purchase. The system could thus benefit from a clear
and full provision of the scope of CMOs’ mandates.
However, while the problems identified may cause some delays and additional burdens to
stakeholders, they do not create severe disruptions in the overall licensing environment.
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DIRECTIVE
c. Diversity of actors on, or navigating around the CRM market in

Europe
The organisational landscape of CRM entities in Europe is diverse. EEA-based CMOs are
by far the largest organisations in terms of the number of represented rightholders and
revenue. However, other types of entities are also active on the rights management
market or navigate around that market. These include:
 Independent management entities. While such entities existed prior to the

Directive, the Directive included a definition of what these entities are. We have
identified over 30 such entities. As was just noted, some of them existed prior to
the adoption of the Directive, but were not regulated, while others emerged after
the transposition of the Directive and compete with CMOs in certain sectors in
particular.
 CRM entities established outside of the EU, but operating in the Member States.
The study has identified 33 such organisations, although it is not certain in all
cases that they can really fit under the title of ‘CMO’ in all cases. They operate in
most EU Member States either through reciprocal representation agreements or
through subsidiary IMEs/CMOs. Such entities established outside the Union are
not regulated by the Directive, but Recital 10 states that EU Member States are
not precluded from applying the same or similar provisions to such CMOs as those
that they apply to their national CMOs. Member States have adopted varying
approaches to regulating these entities - while some apply the same or a
comparable regulatory framework as the one applicable to the EU-based CRM
entities, others do not regulate such entities or are not aware that they operate
within relevant jurisdictions. Overall, such entities do not represent significant
competition to EEA based CRM entities.
 Other organisations active in or around the rights management market but falling
outside the definition of CMO or IME. The study results have shown that there are
other types of entities that may be active or navigate around the rights
management market but that they do not fall within the boundaries of the
CMO/IME definitions. These include:
o Entities partially or fully controlled by a CMO that performs a dedicated
function, such as the invoicing of users or the distribution of amounts due to
rightholders. These are referred to in Article 2(3) of the Directive.
o Rightholders’ associations that carry out some of the functions typically
performed by CMOs.
o Royalty-free music vendors are companies that offer users fixed
subscription fees under which they can use the musical works.
o Representative agencies are intermediary for-profit companies that can be
hired by rightholders to oversee and administer the collection of
remunerations from multiple CMOs, producers, and publishers on the
rightholder’s behalf.
The evidence suggests that the adoption of the Directive had a positive impact on IMEs.
First, it provided legal certainty for the operation of IMEs as actors in the collective
management market that would be working alongside the historically established CMOs.
Second, the Directive introduced minimum transparency requirements for IMEs, which
bolstered the trust of rightholders in such entities and made such entities more
accountable. Both of these factors have likely contributed to the establishment of new
IMEs. The increasing numbers and variety of CRM entities fosters competition and
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DIRECTIVE
provides the rightholders with an increasing choice as to which organisations represent

their interests the best.
The Directive as well as national legislation establishes different sets of obligations for
EEA-based CMOs and IMEs and CRM entities established outside of the EU. The study
tested whether such a regulation per se distorts competition by providing an advantage to
a specific type of organisation. We found that a minority of representatives of each of the
three types of organisations did indeed feel disadvantaged vis à vis other types of
organisations. However, on balance, we did not find evidence that applicable legislation
systematically places some types of CRM entities at a competitive disadvantage.
The study also found that the adoption of the Directive has contributed to harmonising the
legal obligations faced by various types of CRM entities across the EU. This has
contributed to a deepening of the single market by facilitating the work of CMOs and IMEs
across national borders and to provide services in multiple Member States. However, the
different obligations imposed on IMEs by national legislation across Member States can
increase the costs of accessing national markets. While some Member States recognise
EU IMEs automatically, others require a separate process of notification/authorisation. In
addition to administrative burdens associated with familiarisation with national legislation,
national regulations may include a number of additional requirements, such as translating
all documentation into the national language or the setting-up of a physical office.
d. Exchange of information between competent authorities
Article 37 of the Directive introduced a formal mechanism by which competent authorities

can cooperate and exchange information between each other. The evidence collected for
this study shows that this mechanism is used by authorities when needed, albeit not
frequently. While the reasons behind the infrequent use vary, they are not related to the
design of the mechanism or a reluctance to cooperate and exchange information. The
evidence suggests that national authorities are motivated for cooperation and the
exchange of knowledge. The mechanism could be further improved by developing
common infrastructures such as databases or contact platforms for authorities for a more
systematic joint collaboration.
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12. Annex 1 – National Transposition of the Directive
The figure below presents the timeline of national transposition of the Directive by year.
The Member States that transposed the Directive on time (by 10 April 2016) are Estonia
(11 March 2016), Denmark (10 April 2016) and Slovakia (5 August 2015).
Figure 1. The timeline of national transposition of the Directive by year
Source: Visionary Analytics, based on national transposition measures communicated by the Member States.
*Not a member of the EU as of 31 January 2020. **The process of transposition started in 2017, however, the
date of the last officially submitted Directive-related legislation is April 2019.
96
13. Annex 2 – Questionnaires for Stakeholders
a. Questionnaire for national competent authorities
Thank you very much for your participation in the survey.
All your answers will be treated confidentially, and the data will be used for conducting the Study on
selected issues related to the Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU) for the European
Commission only. Filling out the questionnaire will take approximately 30-45 minutes. If possible,
please complete the survey in one sitting. However, if you need to pause and continue later, you will
be directed to the point where you paused the survey if you use the same computer or mobile device.
When answering the questions, we kindly ask you to think and/or refer to your most recent
experiences since the transposition of the Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU) in
your country.
For your convenience, we also attach the following reference materials below:
1. Letter of introduction from the European Commission

2. Our data protection policy excerpt
3. Glossary and timeline of the Directive transposition
Q1. Which country do you represent?

 Austria  Germany  Poland
 Belgium  Greece  Portugal
 Bulgaria  Hungary  Romania
 Croatia  Ireland  Slovakia
 Cyprus  Italy  Slovenia
 Czechia  Latvia  Spain
 Denmark  Lithuania  Sweden
 Estonia  Luxembourg  Other, please specify
 Finland  Malta
 France  Netherlands
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON OVERALL FUNCTIONING OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS MANAGEMENT IN YOUR
COUNTRY
Q2. Overall, to what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding collective rights management
in your country?
1– 3 – Neither 5–
2– 4– Do not
Strongly agree, nor Strongly
Agree Disagree know
agree disagree disagree
Overall, national legal framework Q2.1
is effective in protecting the
interests of rightholders
Overall, collective management Q2.1
organisations (CMOs)act in the
best interests of rightholders
when collecting and distributing
royalties
Overall, governance of CMOs is Q2.1
democratic and transparent, i.e.
rightholders can receive
necessary information,
participate in governance bodies,
etc.
Q2.1. Please explain your answer to the question below.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………….……
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Q3. Transposition of the Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU) (hereafter Directive) in many
EU Member States has resulted in changes to their legal framework. In some countries the changes have
gone beyond what is strictly necessary for transposition of the Directive. To what extent have all these
changes improved the functioning of collective rights management system in your country?
 Collective rights management system has improved ( Q3.1)
 Collective rights management system has not changed much/stayed the same
 Collective rights management system has become less effective ( Q3.1)
 I do not know
Please use this space to provide any other question-related comments you might have:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q3.1. Would you say that these changes predominantly resulted from:
 Transposition of the Directive
 Introduction of additional national regulations that go beyond what is strictly necessary for
transposition of the Directive
 Transposition of the Directive and introduction of additional national regulation
 Other (please specify)
QUESTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF RIGHTHOLDERS
Article 5 of the Directive stipulates that:
5(2) Rightholders shall have the right to authorise a collective management organisation of their
choice to manage the rights, categories of rights or types of works and other subject-matter of their choice, for
the territories of their choice, irrespective of the Member State of nationality, residence or establishment of
either the collective management organisation or the rightholder. Unless the collective management
organisation has objectively justified reasons to refuse management, it shall be obliged to manage such rights,
categories of rights or types of works and other subject-matter, provided that their management falls within the
scope of its activity.
5(4) Rightholders shall have the right to terminate the authorisation to manage rights, categories of
rights or types of works and other subject-matter granted by them to a collective management organisation or
to withdraw from a collective management organisation any of the rights, categories of rights or types of
works and other subject-matter of their choice for the territories of their choice.
The following questions are for us to understand how the mechanisms of authorisation or withdrawal of rights
work in practice in your country.
Q4. Would you agree that CMOs in your country provide an effective mechanism for the rightholders to:
4– Do not
Strongly 2 – Agree agree, nor Strongly
Disagree know
Authorise a CMO of Q5.3 Q5.1&Q5.3 Q5.1 Q5.1 Q5.1 Q6
their choice to
manage their rights
Withdraw from a  Q5.4 Q5.2 & Q5.4 Q5.2 Q5.2 Q5.2 Q6
CMO any of their
rights or
categories/types of
their rights of their
choice for the
territories of their
choice
Terminate the  Q5.4 Q5.2 &Q5.4 Q5.2 Q5.2 Q5.2 Q6
authorisation to
manage rights, or
categories/ types of
rights
Q5.1 What are the main challenges for rightholders to authorise a CMO of their choice to manage their rights?
Check all that apply.
 There are no particular challenges and the system works well

 Not all necessary procedures within the CMOs are in place to allow the rightholder to choose another
CMO
 Necessary procedures are in place but not effectively applied
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 There are regulatory obstacles to the effective exercise of the freedom of choice
 Some CMOs do not accept certain rightholders as members (such as foreign rightholders, certain
types of rightholders l(e.g. music publishers are not accepted to authors’ CMOs)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q5.2 What are the main challenges for rightholders with regard to terminating the authorisation or withdrawing
their rights from a CMO? Check all that apply.
 In some cases, the process takes longer than the legal framework foresees
Article 5(4) of the Directive foresees that rightholders might terminate or withdraw their rights from a CMO
upon serving reasonable notice not exceeding six months. The CMO may decide that such termination or
withdrawal is to take effect only at the end of the financial year.
 Necessary procedures within CMOs are not in place
 Necessary procedures are in place but not effectively applied
 Some rightholders fear financial repercussions or other deterrents after withdrawing
 There are no particular challenges and the mechanisms of withdrawal and termination work well
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q5.3. What are the main reasons for you to consider that the mechanism for authorising a CMO of
rightholders’ choice to manage their rights is effective?
 CMOs have all the necessary procedures in place and apply them effectively
 CMOs do not discriminate against any rightholders (based on their nationality, place of residence or
legal status, etc.) with regard to authorisation and subsequent management of their rights
 Rightholders can freely chose to authorise their rights or categories/type of rights for the territories of
their choice
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q5.4. What are the main reasons for you to consider that the mechanism for terminating the authorisation or
withdrawing the rights from a CMO is effective?
 The process is carried out in a timely manner as foreseen in the legal framework
Article 5(4) of the Directive foresees that rightholders might terminate or withdraw their rights from a CMO
upon serving reasonable notice not exceeding six months. The CMO may decide that such termination or
withdrawal is to take effect only at the end of the financial year.
 CMOs have all the necessary procedures in place and apply them effectively
 There are no financial sanctions or other deterrents for withdrawing
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
With regard to Articles 5(2) and 5(4), one of the objectives of the Directive was to allow the freedom of
choice for rightholders to authorise their rights with their preferred CMO and/or to terminate or
withdraw their rights from a CMO.
Q5.5. Did the introduction of the right for rightholders to freely choose a CMO bring any positive or negative
effects?
 None, because rightholders do not use this right actively

 Yes, it has positive effects (please specify…)
 Yes, it has negative effects (please specify…)
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Q5.6 Did the introduction of the right to terminate or withdraw certain rights or categories/types of rights from a
CMO bring any positive or negative effect?

QUESTIONS REGARDING MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS REVENUE
Articles 11-13 of the Directive stipulate that CMOs shall manage the rights revenue diligently,
regularly, and accurately.
Q6. Approximately what share of CMOs in your country during the past financial year performed the following:
3 –Approx. 5 – None Do
1 – All 2 –Most 4 – Few
half of of the not
CMOs CMOs CMOs
CMOs CMOs know
CMOs distributed the rights  Q6.1
revenue to rightholders in a
timely manner (no later than 9
months at the end of financial
year)
CMOs financial accounts were  Q6.1
duly audited
CMOs established unduly high  Q6.1

management fees that cannot be
documented and justified by the
costs incurred while managing
the rights
CMOs applied additional  Q6.1
deductions (other than
management fees or deductions
related to social, cultural or
educational service provision)
without rightholders consent
Q6.1 Please explain your answer to the question ……. below:

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Article 13(1) of the Directive foresees that collective management organisation must distribute
amounts due to rightholders no later than nine months from the end of the financial year in which the
rights revenue was collected, unless objective reasons relating in particular to reporting by users,
identification of rights, rightholders or matching of information on works and other subject-matter with
rightholders prevent the collective management organisation or, where applicable, its members from
meeting that deadline.
Q7. On average, what share of collected amounts have CMOs distributed to rightholders:
Please answer this question while thinking about the last financial year that was closed.
National
Authority
1 – Less than 2 – From 30 3 – From 50 to 4 – From 70 to 5 – More does not
30% to 50% 70% 90% than 90% collect
such
information
Within nine  Q8  Q8  Q8  Q8
months from the
end of the financial
year in your
country
On an annual  Q9  Q9  Q9  Q9
basis
Q8. What were the reasons for not distributing all the amounts due to rightholders within nine months from the
end of the financial year?
100
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q9. What were the reasons for not distributing all the amounts due to rightholders?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS REGARDING TRANSPARENCY OF COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS
Articles 21 and 22 of the Directive foresee that CMOs make the necessary information about their
activities public (e.g. statutes, membership terms, standard licensing contracts and standard
applicable tariffs, policies, etc.) and submit annual transparency reports.
Q10. Approximately what share of CMOs in your country has provided the following information on their
websites and transparency reports?
3– 4 – Less
5 – None of
1 – All CMOs 2 – Most CMOs Approximately than half of
the CMOs
half of CMOs CMOs
Their statutes,  Q12  Q11  Q11  Q1  Q11
membership terms 1
and the terms of
termination of
authorisation to
manage rights and
complaint handling
and dispute
resolution
procedures
General policies on  Q12  Q11  Q11  Q1  Q11

financial 1
management
(distribution of
amounts due to
rightholders,
management fees,
other deductions and
the use of non-
distributable
amounts)
Lists of persons who  Q12  Q11  Q11  Q1  Q11

manage the CMOs 1
and representation
agreements with
other CMOs
(including their
names)
Annual transparency  Q12  Q11  Q11  Q1  Q11

report (including the 1
audit report)
Standard licensing  Q12  Q11  Q11  Q1  Q11

contracts and/ tariffs 1
Q11. Thinking about your answer to the question …. Could you provide additional comments? For example,
whether non-provision of information is systematic or ad hoc, what specific kind / type of information was not
provided or maybe the information was provided in a difficult-to-access manner?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
101
Q12. Are there any further points you would like to mention in terms of transparency and governance of CMOs
established in your country?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS REGARDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS

AND USERS
Article 16 of the Directive, among other things, foresees that licensing terms must be based on
objective and non-discriminatory criteria and negotiations carried out in good faith. The Article also
provides that the tariffs for exclusive rights and rights to remuneration shall be reasonable in relation
to their economic value.
Q13. Which of the following provides the best description on tariff-setting procedure in your country?
 CMOs establish the criteria /set the tariffs
 The tariffs are established based on negotiation between CMOs and users
 CMOs set the tariffs after consultation with your organisation (or other designated authority) (
Q13.1)
 Your organisation or other designated authority sets the tariffs ( Q13.2)
 Other, please write in…
Q13.1. In the last question you have indicated that CMOs set the tariffs after consultation with your
organisation (or other designated authority). Does this refer to criteria regarding the tariffs for:
• Renumeration rights based on a legal licence
• Exclusive rights
• Both
• Other rights (please, specify)
Q13.2. In the last question you have indicated that your organisation or other designated authority sets the
tariffs. Does this refer to criteria regarding the tariffs for:
 Renumeration rights based on a legal licence
 Exclusive rights
 Both
 Other rights (please, specify)
Please use this space to provide any other comments you might have, in particular a description of the tariff
setting procedure in your country:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q14. To what extent do you agree that the licensing negotiations are conducted in good faith?
3 – Neither
1 – Strongly 5 – Strongly
2 – Disagree agree, nor 4 – Agree Do not know
disagree agree
disagree
Q15 Q15 Q14.1 Q14.1 Q14.1 Q15
Q14.1. What are the typical issues/concerned raised by stakeholders related to licensing negotiations that you
are aware of?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q15. In your opinion, how objective and/or non-discriminatory are the criteria for setting the tariffs?
5 – Not
1 – Very 2 – Generally 3 – Somewhat 4 – Not very
objective at Do not know
objective objective objective objective
all
Q16 Q16 Q15.1 Q15.1 Q15.1 Q15.1
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Q15.1. What are the typical issues/concerns that you have been made aware of related to licensing terms
since the transposition of the rules in your country?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q16. Do you consider that, in general, rightholders receive appropriate remuneration as a result of the
licensing terms agreed between CMOs and users?
 Yes
 No
 I do not know
Q17. In general, has the licensing process, including the negotiations between CMOs and users, improved
since the transposition of the Directive in your Member State?
 It has improved
 It has not changed much/stayed the same
 It has become less effective
 I do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q18. How are disputes between CMOs and users regarding licensing tariffs and terms typically settled in your
country?
 CMOs and / or users submit a complaint to a designated national authority. If the decision of the
authority is not satisfactory to one of the parties, it may be challenged in Court ( Q18.1)
 Disputes are resolved in Court; national authority does not interfere in the disputes between CMOs
and users
Q19. What number of complaints from CMOs and / or users regarding licensing negotiations, tariffs and terms
did you receive in the period 2017-2019?
 2017 (please write in)
 2018 (please write in)
 2019(please write in)
QUESTIONS ON COLLECTING SOCIETIES ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE EU, BUT OPERATING IN THE
EU MEMBER STATES
Some collecting societies that are established outside the EU (non-EU CS) operate in the EU collective
rights management market. Recital 10 of the Directive indicates that Member States can apply the
same or similar provisions to non-EU CSs as those that they apply to their national collecting
societies (CS).
Q20. Does the legislation in your country apply the same or similar rules to national CSs and non-EU CSs?
 Yes (Q21)
 Yes, to some extent ( Q20.1)
 No ( Q20.1)
Q20.1 Please briefly describe how are the rules applied to non-EU CSs:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q21. How do non-EU CSs operate in your country’s market? Please select all that apply
 Through reciprocal representation agreements with EU CSs
 Through IMEs that they establish in the EU
 Through CSs that they establish in the EU
 Through other entities that they establish in the EU (please specify what kind of entities they are)
 Other ways (please specify)
Q22. Thinking of how non-EU CSs are regulated by your national laws, how strongly you would agree or
disagree with the following statements:
1- 3- Neither 5-
4- 6 - Do not
Strongly 2- Agree agree, nor Strongly
Disagree know
103
1- 3- Neither 5-
4- 6 - Do not
Strongly 2- Agree agree, nor Strongly
Disagree know
Non-EU CSs are more
attractive for rightholders
than EU CSs
Non-EU CSs can work
more efficiently than EU
CSs
Non-EU CSs have a
competitive advantage
against EU CSs
It is more difficult to control
and hold non-EU CSs
accountable
It is easier to enter the
collective rights
management market in
your country for non-EU
CSs than for the EU CSs
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q23. We have identified the following list of non-EU CSs that operate in your country. Could you please check,
if this list is complete and insert additional non-EU CMOs that are missing? If some of the listed non-EU CSs
do not operate in your country, could you identify them in the comments section?
 Non-EU CS 1
 Non-EU CS 2
 Non-EU CS 3
 Please list additional non-EU CSs operating in your country / mention the non-EU CSs identified
above that do not operate in your country (…)
QUESTIONS ON INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT ENTITIES (IMEs)
Article 1 of the Directive defines IMEs as an “organisation which is authorised by law or by way of
assignment, licence or any other contractual arrangement to manage copyright or rights related to
copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its
sole or main purpose, and which is: (i) neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in
part, by rightholders; and (ii) organised on a for-profit basis.” Only certain articles of the Directive
apply to IMEs.
Q24. In your national legislation are IMEs subject to more extensive regulation than the one provided in the
Directive?
 Yes (--> Q24.1)
 No ( Q25)
Q24.1. Please briefly outline the additional requirements for IMEs established in the national legislation:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q25. In general, to what extent do you consider that IMEs comply with the national rules applicable to them?
2 – To a
1 – To a large 3 – To some 4 – To small
moderate 5 – Not at all Do not know
extent extent extent
extent
Q26 Q26 Q26 Q26 Q26 Q26
Q26. Have there been any concerns voiced by rightholders as regards the management of their rights by
IMEs?
 Yes (Q26.1)
 No (Q27)
Q26.1. Please explain in more detail what are the typical issues/concerns of rightholders as regards the
management of their rights by IMEs?
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………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q27. Have there been any concerns voiced by users as regards IMEs?
 Yes (Q27.1)
 No (Q28)
Q27.1. Please explain in more detail what are the typical issues/concerns of users as regards IMEs?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q28. Have there been any concerns voiced by other relevant stakeholders as regards IMEs?
 Yes (Q28.1)
 No (Q29)
Q28.1. Please explain in more detail what are the typical issues/concerns of other stakeholders as regards
IMEs?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q29. Thinking of how IMEs are regulated by your national laws and its effect on IMEs, how strongly you would
agree or disagree with the following statements:
Neither
Strongly Strongly Do not
Agree agree, nor Disagree
agree disagree know
disagree
IMEs are generally more
attractive for rightholders
than CMOs
Due to lower regulation,
IMEs tend to be more
flexible and efficient in
managing the rights of
rightholders than CMOs
IMEs apply lower
administrative and
processing costs than
CMOs
It is easier for IMEs to enter
the collective rights
management market than
for CMOs
IME’s face difficulties when
trying to enter the market
Q28. We have identified the following list of IMEs that operate in your country. Could you please check, if this
list is complete and insert additional IMEs that are missing? If some of the listed IMEs do not operate in your
country, could you identify them in the comments section?
 IME 1
 IME 2
 IME 3
 Please list additional IMEs / mention the IMEs identified above that do not operate in your country…
QUESTIONS ON THIRD-TYPE OF ENTITIES ACTIVE ON THE COLLECTIVE RIGHTS MANAGEMENT

MARKET
The CRM Directive defines two types of collecting societies – CMOs and IMEs. However, some
countries have in their market sub-types of these organisations or entities which are active on the
collective management market but do not fit within the definition of either CMO or IME.
For example, the German law distinguishes between CMOs, IMEs and dependent management entities
(DMEs), which are subsidiaries of CMOs defined in the Section 3 of the Collecting societies Act:
(1) “Dependent management entity” means an organisation whose shares are at least indirectly or in part held
by at least one collecting society or which is at least indirectly or in part controlled by at least one collecting
society.
(2) In so far as the dependent management entity carries out the activities of a collecting society, the
provisions applicable to those activities under this Act shall apply mutatis mutandis […].
105
Q29. Does the legislation in your country distinguish any such sub-types or third-type of entities (partly) active
in collective management that are neither CMOs, nor IMEs?
 Yes (  Q30)
 No ( Q33)
Q30. Please, provide us with the legal terms and definition(s) of such entities type(s) (e.g. Dependent
management entity - an organisation which [….]):
*You may quote the relevant legislation in your national language
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q31. Please list the names of these entities. If there is more than one type, please also indicate the type of
entity in brackets.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q32. How are these third-type or sub-types of entities regulated?

I do not know/not
1 – Yes 2 – No
relevant
They are subject to the same regulation
requirements as those applicable to CMOs.
They are subject to the same regulation
requirements as those applicable to IMEs.
They are not subject to the rules stemming
from the CRM Directive.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q32.1. Does your institution supervise how these sub-types or third-type of entities comply with the existing
national rules stemming from the CRM Directive despite these entities not falling within the definition of either
CMO or IME?
 Yes
 No
QUESTIONS ON COLLABORATION BETWEEN COMPETENT AUTHORITIES FROM DIFFERENT

MEMBER STATES
Article 37 of the Directive provides for a mechanism of information exchange between the national
competent authorities in different Member States. It foresees that competent authorities can send
requests for information to competent authorities in other EU MS or ask these authorities to take
action against a CMO.
Q33. How many requests for information (using the mechanism stipulated in Article 37 of the Directive) did you
receive from competent authorities from other EU Member States in 2019?
 Not a single request
 1-5 requests
 6-10 requests
 11-15 requests
 More than 15 requests
Q34. How frequently did you use the information exchange mechanism (as stipulated in Article 37 of the
Directive) with competent authorities in other EU Member States in 2019?
 Never ( Q35)
 We have sent 1-5 requests ( Q36)
 We have sent more than 15 requests ( Q36)
Q35. Why has your organisation not engaged in exchange of information with competent authorities in other
EU Member States? Please select all that apply
106
 The mechanism of information exchange is too complicated
 Language barriers
 Lack of human resources
 The need for information exchange did not arise
 Other reasons (please specify)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
Q36. What were your reasons for using the information exchange mechanism? Please select all that apply:
 Need for information about a particular collecting society
 Need for information on rules relating to collective management organisations applied in particular
EU Member States
 Request to take action against a particular collecting society based on Article 37(2)
Article 37(2) stipulates that in case a competent authority considers that a collective management organisation
established in another Member State but acting within its territory may not be complying with the provisions of
the national law of the Member State in which that collective management organisation is established, it may
issue a request to the competent authority of that Member State that it take appropriate action within its
competence.
Other matters relevant to the application of the CRM Directive (please specify)
Please, use this space to provide any other question-related comments you might have:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q37. Do you have any suggestions on how to improve exchange of information / collaboration between
competent authorities? If yes, please outline them here.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON LEGAL DISPUTES
Processes of transposition of the Directive were different in every Member State. Some countries had
to introduce new legal requirements on collective rights management in their legal systems. These
new requirements and their implementation might have caused legal disputes between the key
stakeholders (i.e. CMOs, IMEs, rightholders, users, and other entities). We would like to know whether
you are aware of any such major disputes.
Q38. Since the date of transposition of the Directive in your country, have there been any major legal disputes
in the area of collective management? How were they resolved? Please tick all that apply.
Resolved through
Complaint notified
alternative dispute
Resolved in Court under Article 36(2) of
resolution mechanisms
the Directive*
(e.g. mediation)
Legal disputes between
CMOs and rightholders
IMEs and rightholders
CMOs and users
IMEs and users
collecting societies
*Article 36(2) of the Directive foresees that Member States shall ensure that procedures exist enabling
members of a collective management organisation, rightholders, users, collective management organisations
and other interested parties to notify the competent authorities designated for that purpose of activities or
circumstances which, in their opinion, constitute a breach of the provisions of national law adopted pursuant to
the requirements laid down in this Directive.
Q39. Please, briefly describe the major disputes and/or provide online references to them:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
CONCLUDING QUESTIONS
107
Q40. May we contact you again in case of additional questions?
 Yes (Q41)
 No (Q42)
Q41. Please, provide us with your email address in the space below:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
Q42. This is the end of the survey. Would you like to add any further comments or information?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
108
b. Questionnaire for CMOs
selected issues regarding the application of the Collective Rights Management (2014/26/EU) for the
European Commission only. Filling out the questionnaire will take approximately 20-30 minutes. If
possible, please complete the survey in one sitting. However, if you need to pause and continue later,
you will be directed to the point where you paused the survey if you use the same computer or mobile
device.
your country.
You may have already received an e-mail inviting you to participate in this survey. If you have already
completed the questionnaire, please accept our thanks and delete this e-mail as no further
involvement is required. If you have not completed the questionnaire, please take the time to consider
participating in the survey.

Q1. In which sector does your organisation predominantly work (check all that apply)?
 Music (author's rights)
 Music (related rights)
 Visual arts
 Audiovisual
 Literature and publishing
 Drama
Q2. Please select the country of your primary establishment (check one):
Q2.1. In total, how many rightholders does your organisation represent?

Reasonable estimates are sufficient.
 Please write in…
Q2.2. Approximately, what percentage share of your members are foreign rightholders, i.e. residing in a
different country than primary place of establishment of your organisation?
 Less than 1%
 1-10%
 11-20%
 21-30%
 31%-50%
 More than 50%
 Nearly all of our members are foreign rightholders
 CMO does not collect this information
Q2.3. What percentage share of your repertoire is from foreign rightholders?

 Less than 1%
 1-10%
109
 11-20%
 21-30%
 31%-50%
 More than 50%
 CMO does not collect this information
QUESTIONS ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS MANAGEMENT IN YOUR

COUNTRY
in your country?
2– 4– Do not
Agree Disagree know
Overall, the national legal Q3.2 Q3.2 Q3.1 Q3.2
framework is effective in
protecting the interests of
rightsholders
Overall, the national legal Q3.2 Q3.2 Q3.1 Q3.2
framework facilitates the
effective functioning of CMOs
in your country
Q3.1. Please explain your answer to the question in the space below (Q3.2)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q3.2. Transposition of the Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU) (hereafter Directive) has
resulted in changes to the national legal frameworks in EU Member States. To what extent have these
changes improved the functioning of the collective rights management system in your country?
 The collective rights management system has improved ( Q3.3)
 The collective rights management system has not changed much/stayed the same
 The collective rights management system has become less effective ( Q3.3)
 I do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q3.3. Would you say that these changes have predominantly resulted from:
 Introduction of additional national regulations that went beyond what was strictly necessary for
 I do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON THE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF LEGAL STATUS OF YOUR ORGANISATION
Article 3 of the Directive differentiates between two types of collecting societies:
(1) Collective management organisations (CMOs) which are: (i) owned or controlled by their members and
(ii) organised on a not-for-profit basis.
(2) Independent management entities (IMEs) which are: (i) neither owned nor controlled, directly or
indirectly, wholly or in part, by rightholders and (ii) organised on a for-profit basis.
Q4. Has the legal status of your organisation changed from what is now considered an IME to a CMO since
the date of the transposition of the Directive in your country (e.g. this could include change in status from
being a for-profit organisation not owned or controlled by rightholders to a non-profit organization controlled by
rightholders)?
 Yes ( Q4.1)
 No ( Q5)
110
Q4.1. Why have you changed your legal status to that of a CMO? Check all that apply.
 Our organisation falls under the definition of a CMO as defined by the national laws of the Member
State we operate in following the transposition of the Directive
 CMOs face more favourable regulation than IMEs
 CMOs are more attractive to rightholders
 The status of CMO better reflects the mission of our organisation
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF RIGHTHOLDERS

RIGHTHOLDERS’ FREEDOM OF CHOICE TO AUTHORISE A CMO FOR THE TERRITORIES OF THEIR
CHOICE
According to Article 5(2), rightholders have the right to authorise a CMO of their choice to manage the
rights, categories of rights or types of works and other subject-matter of their choice, for the
territories of their choice, irrespective of the Member State of nationality, residence or establishment
of either the collective management organisation or the rightholder
Q5. Since the transposition of the Directive, have any new rightholders entrusted some or all of their rights to
your organisation?
 Yes
 No
Q6. In your opinion, has the number of rightholders who decided to entrust their rights with your organisation
increased following the transposition of the Directive in comparison with the period prior to that?
 Has increased a lot (Q6.1)
 Has somewhat increased (Q6.1)
 Has stayed the same
 Has somewhat decreased
 Has decreased a lot
 Do not know
Q6.1 Please indicate the various reasons behind this increase that you may be aware of:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q7. Has the number of foreign rightholders increased over the last few years?
 Has increased a lot
 Has somewhat increased
 Has stayed the same
 Has somewhat decreased
 Has decreased a lot
 Do not know
Q8. Does your organisation do any of the following to attract new rightholders from other CMOs or IMEs? Tick
all that apply.
 We do not actively try to attract rightholders (*if selected, additional answer options not possible)
 We offer a more transparent management of their rights
 We offer a more efficient distribution of amounts due to rightsholders
 We offer more competitive management costs
 We have a wider list of users to offer
 We have wider territories of coverage to offer
 Don’t know
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW THEIR RIGHTS FROM CMOs OR TERMINATE THE AUTHORISATION
According to Article 5(4) of the Directive, rightholders can decide to withdraw (some) their rights or
categories of their rights from their current CMO or to terminate the authorisation to manage rights
given to the CMO. The following questions aim to understand the frequency and reasons of such
decisions.
111
Q9. Since the transposition of the Directive, have any rightholders withdrawn some or all of their
rights/categories of rights/type of works from your organisation?
 Yes (Q10)
 No (Q13)
Q10. For each of the following years, please indicate approximately the percentage share in the total number
of works, for which any authorisations were terminated or any rights withdrawn from your organisation:
Less than More than Do not
1-10% 11-20% 21-30%
1% 30% know
2017
2018
2019
Q11. For each of the following years, please indicate the percentage share in the total number of
rightholders, for which any rights were withdrawn from your organization:
Less than More than Do not
1-10% 11-20% 21-30%
1% 30% know
2017
2018
2019
Q11.1. For each of the following years, please indicate the percentage share in the total number of
rightholders, for which the authorisation was terminated:
Less than 1% 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% More than 30% Do not know
2017
2018
2019
Q12. Since the transposition of the Directive in your country, what were the most common reasons for
termination of authorisation or withdrawal of rights? Check all that apply:
 Some rightholders decided to manage all or some of their rights individually (Q13)
 Some rightholders withdrew all or some of their rights and transferred them to another CMO/IME
(Q12.1)
 Some rightholders withdrew all or some of their rights but only for the purposes of multi-territorial
licensing (Q13)
 Some rightholders did not specify the reasons for termination or withdrawal of rights (Q13)
 We do not collect information on the reasons for such decisions of rightholders (Q13)
 Other (please specify) (Q13)
Q12.1. In the answer to the previous question you have indicated that some rightholders withdrew all or some
of their rights and transferred them to another CMO/IME. Please provide any further details you may want to
share in this regard:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
112
The implementation of Articles 5(2) and 5(4) might have had a negative effect on your organisation in
terms of withdrawals but also a positive effect in terms of new works or rightholders registering with
you. The following questions aim at understanding further how you perceive the effect of these rules.
Q13. Taking into account all the withdrawals and new mandates from rightholders, which option best
describes the following aggregate effects on your organisation since the transposition of the Directive:
1 – Has 2 – Has 3 – Has 4 – Has 5 – Has
Do not
increased increased stayed the decreased decreased
know
a lot somewhat same somewhat a lot
Effect on additional Q14 Q14 Q14 Q14 Q14 Q15
administrative burden
1– 2 – Agree 3 – Neither 4– 5– Do not

Strongly agree, nor Disagree Strongly know
Created incentive for
your organisation to
become more
transparent and/or
efficient in managing the
rights of your
rightholders
Q14. Please explain your answer to the question in the space below:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q15. The right for rightholders to authorise their preferred CMO to manage their rights and/or to withdraw their
rights from a CMO may have impacted your relationship with users with whom you conclude licences. Would
you consider that there has been an impact on them? Please explain in what way.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q16. What is the period of notice from rightholders for the termination or withdrawal of rights that your
organisation requests?
 Less than 3 months
 Between 3 months and 6 months
 More than 6 months
 Within the nearest financial accounting period (Q17)
Q17. How many financial accounting periods your organisation has in one year?
 One
 Two
 Four
 More than four
Q18. In your organisation, the termination or withdrawal of rightholders’ rights takes effect:
 Next end-quarter of the year
 Next end-semester of the year
 At the end of the financial year
 Immediately upon serving the period of notice for termination or withdrawal of rights
QUESTIONS ON MANAGING THE RIGHTS OF RIGHTHOLDERS ON BEHALF OF OTHER CMOs
CMOs may manage the rights of rightholders on behalf of other CMOs based on representation
agreements. Articles 14 and 15 of the Directive lay down the rules on the management of rights on
behalf of other collective management organisations. The following questions are to understand your
experiences in that regard.
Q19. Do you have a representation agreement with CMOs in the European Union?
 Yes ( Q19.1)
 No ( Q20)
113
Q19.1. Are any of the following issues a cause of concern for your CMO, when other CMOs manage the rights
of your rightholders? Check all that apply.
 The tariffs they set for the works of your rightholders
 Unduly high management costs
 Additional deductions other than management fees without our consent
 Payments take too long
 We are not provided with the necessary information
 Distribution of the revenue due to our rightholders is not regular and/or accurate
 We experience no issues with CMOs which manage the rights of our rightholders
 Do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………
Article 19 of the Directive lays down the rules on the information provided to those CMOs on the
management of rights under representation agreements. CMOs which manage the rights of
rightholders on behalf of other CMOs must not less than once a year and by electronic means provide
the following information:
(a) the rights revenue attributed, the amounts paid by the collective management organisation per
category of rights managed, and per type of use, for the rights it manages under the representation
agreement, and any rights revenue attributed which is outstanding for any period;
(b) deductions made in respect of management fees;
(c) deductions made for any purpose other than in respect of management fees as referred to in
Article 15;
(d) information on any licences granted or refused with regard to works and other subject-matter
covered by the representation agreement;
(e) resolutions adopted by the general assembly of members in so far as those resolutions are
relevant to the management of the rights under the representation agreement.
Q20. To what extent do you receive the following information from CMOs with whom you have concluded
representation agreements?
3 – I only 4 – I receive
1 – I receive 2 – I receive 5 – I don’t
receive very little of Do not
all the most of the receive any
some of the the know/not
information I information I information I
information I information I applicable
need need need
need need
The rights  Q22  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q22
revenue
attributed,
the
amounts
paid per
category of
rights and
per type of
use of the
works of
your
rightholder
s (incl. any
outstandin
g)
Deduction  Q22  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q22
s in
respect of
managem
ent fees
Deduction  Q22  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q22
s other
than
managem
ent fees
114
Informatio  Q22  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q22
n on any
licences
granted or
refused in
relation to
the works
of your
rightholder
s
General  Q22  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q22
assembly
resolutions
which are
relevant to
the
managem
ent of the
rights
under the
representa
tion
agreement
Other  Q22  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q21  Q22
(please
specify)
Q21. Thinking about your answer to the question above, could you provide additional comments? For
example, whether non-provision of information is a systematic or one-off event, what specific kind / type of
information was not provided or maybe the information was provided in difficult to access manner?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON MANAGING THE RIGHTS OF RIGHTHOLDERS
Article 13(1) of the Directive foresees that collective management organisation must distribute
amounts due to rightholders no later than nine months from the end of the financial year in which the
rights revenue was collected, unless objective reasons relating in particular to reporting by users,
identification of rights, rightholders or matching of information on works and other subject-matter with
rightholders prevent the collective management organisation or, where applicable, its members from
meeting that deadline.
Q22. On average, what share of collected amounts due to rightholders has your organisation distributed within
nine months from the end of the financial year? Please answer this question while thinking about the last
financial year that was closed.
 Less than 30% (Q22.1)
 From 30 to 50% (Q22.1)
 From 50 to 70% (Q22.1)
 From 70 to 90% (Q22.1)
 More than 90%
Q22.1. What were the reasons for not distributing all the amounts due to rightholders within nine months from
the end of the financial year?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q23. On average, what percentage of collected royalties does your organisation distribute to rightholders on
an annual basis? Please answer this question while thinking about the last financial year that was closed.
 Less than 30%
 From 30 to 50%
 From 50 to 70%
 From 70 to 90%
 More than 90%
QUESTIONS ON LICENSING AND USERS’ OBLIGATIONS
115
Article 17 of the Directive lays down provisions on users’ obligations to provide CMOs with relevant
information on the use of the rights these CMOs represent. The following questions concern licensing
negotiations and information you receive from the users to whom you license the works of your
rightholders
Q24. In general, how satisfied are you with the reporting by the users?
1 – Very 2– 3 – Neither satisfied nor 4– 5 – Very Do not
satisfied Satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied dissatisfied know
Q25 Q24.1 Q24.1 Q24.1 Q24.1 Q25
Q24.1 Please explain your answer to the question below:

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q25. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements on receiving information on the
use of the rights from the users?
1– 3 – Neither 5– Don’t know/

2– 4–
Strongly agree, nor Strongly not
Agree Disagree
agree disagree disagree applicable
We receive the
information within the pre-
established time
We receive the
information in the pre-
established format
The information we
receive is often
inaccurate and/or does
not cover all information
we need
Other issues (please
specify)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q26. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the extent to which rightholders
receive appropriate remuneration for their rights?
1– 3 – Neither 5– Do
2– 4–
Disagree Agree
disagree disagree agree know
National regulation ensures that
rightholders receive remuneration,
which is proportionate to the
economic value of respective rights
Internal CMO rules and procedures
ensure that rightholders receive
remuneration, which is
proportionate to the economic
value of respective rights
Outcomes of licensing negotiations
remuneration, which is
proportionate to the economic
value of respective rights
The information provided by users
to your organisation ensure that
rightholders receive remuneration,
which is proportionate to the
economic value of respective rights
116
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS REGARDING OTHER MARKET PLAYERS
CMOs can face competition from various entities, including IMEs and non-EU CMOs (i.e. CMOs or
equivalent organisations established outside the EU, but operating in the EU market through their
subsidiary entities). The following questions are to understand your views about all of these actors
and the possible issues you might be facing.
Q27. Are you aware of such non-EU CMOs operating in your country?
This does not cover non-EU CMOs with which you have mutual representation agreements.
 Yes (Q27.1)
 No (Q29)
Q27.1 Please provide us with the names of such entities:

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q28. Thinking of how non-EU CMOs are regulated by your national laws, how strongly you would agree or
disagree with the following statements:
1- 3- Neither
2- 4- 5- Strongly Do not
Strongly agree, nor
Agree Disagree disagree know
agree disagree
Non-EU CMOs are more
attractive to rightholders than
EU CMOs
Non-EU CMOs have a
competitive advantage against
EU based CMOs in the EU
market
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q29. Thinking about the differences of how CMOs and IMEs are regulated in the country of your
establishment, how strongly would you agree or disagree with the following statements:
3 – Neither 5–
1 – Strongly 2 – 4– Do not
agree, nor Strongly
disagree Disagree Agree know
disagree agree
IMEs are generally more Q30 Q30 Q30 Q30 Q30 Q31
attractive to rightholders
than CMOs
IMEs have a competitive Q31 Q31 Q31   Q30.1 Q31
advantage against CMOs Q30.1
IMEs can enter the Q31 Q31 Q31   Q30.2 Q31
market more easily than Q30.2
CMOs
Q30. In your answer to the previous question you have indicated that you agree/do not agree that IMEs are
more attractive to rightholders. Please briefly explain your reasoning:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q30.1. In your answer to the previous question you have indicated that you believe IMEs to have a
competitive advantage against CMOs. Please briefly explain your reasoning:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
117
Q30.2. In your answer to the previous question you have indicated that you believe IMEs can enter the market
more easily than CMOs. Please briefly explain your reasoning:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
There can be other entities that are active on the rights management market but do not fall strictly
within the definition of either CMO or IME. Nevertheless, these entities are to some extent involved in
the rights management.
Q31. Are you aware of such entities operating in your country?

 Yes ( Q32)
 No ( Q33)
Q32. Please, provide us with the names of such entities and briefly describe their activity:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
The transposition process of the Collective Rights Management Directive varied between Member
States. However, all of them had to introduce a number of new legal requirements in their legal
systems. The new rules might have led to legal disputes between the key stakeholders (e.g. CMOs,
IMEs, rightholders, users). We would like to know whether you are aware of any such major disputes.
Q33. Have you been involved in any major legal disputes regarding collective rights management since the
date of the transposition of the Directive in your country? Check all that apply
 Yes, with another CMO (Q33.1)
 Yes, with an IME (Q33.1)
 Yes, with rightholders (Q33.1)
 Yes, with users (Q33.1)
 Yes, with other (please specify) (Q33.1)
 No (Q34)
Q33.1. Please briefly describe the major disputes and/or provide (online) references to them:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
CLOSING QUESTIONS
Q34. In the context of this study on Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU), we will also carry
out a survey of rightholders and users. Would you be willing to distribute this survey to your members
(rightholders) and users of works that you manage?
 Yes, to rightholders (members) (Q35)
 Yes, to users (Q35)
 Yes, to both (Q35)
 No (Q36)
Q35. Please provide us with the contact details of the person whom we should contact regarding the
distribution of surveys:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….

 Yes (Q37)
 No (Q38)
Q37. Please provide us with your email address in the space below:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
118
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
119
c. Questionnaire for non-EU CMOs
Collective Rights Management for the European Commission only. Filling out the questionnaire will
take approximately 10 minutes. If possible, please complete the survey in one sitting. However, if you
need to pause and continue later, you will be directed to the point where you paused the survey if you
use the same computer or mobile device.
experiences since the date of transposition of the Collective Rights Management Directive in your
country.
Q1. In which sectors does your organisation predominantly work? Check all that apply.
 Visual arts
 Audiovisual
 Drama
Q2. Please select the country of your primary establishment outside the European Union:
 Drop-down list of all non-EU countries
Q3. Please select all the EU countries where your organisation operates:
 Estonia  Luxembourg
Q3.1 Which of the EU countries would you consider as the most important for your operations in the EU?
Please check one.
Q4. In total, how many EU rightholders does your organisation represent?

 Not applicable: our organisation does not directly represent rightholders ( Q5)
QUESTIONS ON MODE OF OPERATION IN THE EU MARKET AND REASONS FOR ENTRY IN THE EU

120
We would like to understand, how your organisation operates in the EU market, either directly
(including through the creation of a subsidiary) or through other CMOs or IMEs
Q5. How does your organisation operate in the EU market? Please check all that apply.
 Through reciprocal representation agreements with EU based collecting societies
 Through your subsidiary / affiliate IME established in the EU
 Through your subsidiary / affiliate CMO established in the EU
 Through other type of subsidiary entity established in the EU
Q6. Why did you decide to enter the EU market? Please check all that apply.
 We wanted to have easier access to a broader range of users
 We wanted to be more accessible to European rightholders
 The overall legal environment for CMOs is more favourable in the EU
QUESTIONS ON THE APPLICABLE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WITHIN THE EU
Recital 10 of the Directive states that the EU Member States may apply the same or similar provisions
to the non-EU CMOs (i.e. CMOs established outside the Union, but operating in EU Member States), as
the ones applied to CMOs established in the EU. We would like to know to what extent this is the case.
Q7. If your organisation operates in more than one EU Member State, does it face different national regulatory
obligations?
 Yes, the regulatory obligations imposed by different EU countries on our organisation significantly
differ
 No, regulatory obligations imposed by different EU countries on our organisation do not differ
significantly
 Not applicable to us, we operate only in one Member State
Q8. Thinking about the EU country that you consider as the most important for your operations in the EU,
would you say that your organisation:
 Is regulated in the same way as national CMOs (Q11)
 Faces stricter regulatory obligations than national CMOs (Q9Q10)
 Faces fewer regulatory obligations than national CMOs (Q9Q10)
 Your organisation is out of the scope of national regulation applicable to CMOs established in that
Member State ( Q10)
Q9. In which areas does your organisation face different regulatory obligations in comparison to the national
CMOs? Please answer this question thinking about the EU country that you consider as the most important for
your operations in the EU. Please tick all that apply.
 Rights of rightholders to terminate authorisation to manage rights, categories of rights or types of
works or to withdraw authorisation
 Membership rules and requirements
 Composition and functions of governance bodies (e.g. who can participate in general assembly,
scope of functions of general assembly, supervisory functions, etc.)
 Collection, management, and distribution of rights revenue
 Deductions, management fees, and investments
 Relations with users
 Transparency and reporting obligations
 Disclosure of information to the public
 Multi-territorial licensing of online rights in musical works
Q10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements, regarding the effects of different regulatory
framework faced by your organisation and CMOs established in the EU Member State where you mainly
operate?
Neither
agree disagree know
disagree
Due to different regulatory
obligations, EU-based CMOs have
a competitive advantage against
121
Neither
agree disagree know
disagree
non-EU CMOs like ours
Due to different regulatory
obligations, non-EU CMOs, like
ours, have a competitive
advantage over EU based CMOs
Our organisation is more attractive
to rightholders than EU-based
CMOs
We work more efficiently than EU-
based CMOs
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………
QUESTIONS ON OTHER NON-EU BASED CMOS
Q11. Do you know of any other non-EU CMOs operating in the EU?
 Yes ( Q12)
 No ( Q13)
Q12. Could you provide us with the names of those non-EU CMOs in the text box below?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Transposition process of the Collective Rights Management Directive varied between Member States.
However all of them had to introduce a number of new legal requirements on collective rights
management in their legal systems. Amongst others, the changes in the collective management
system might have caused legal disputes between the key stakeholders (i.e. CMOs, IMEs, rightholders,
users, and other entities). We would like to know whether you are aware of any such major disputes.
Q13. Over the past 4 years, has your organisation been involved in any major legal disputes regarding
collective rights management in the EU?
 Yes, with a CMO (Q13.1)
 Yes, with rightholders ( Q13.1)
 No (Q14)
Q13.1. Please briefly describe these disputes and/or provide online references to them:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
CLOSING QUESTIONS

 Yes (Q15)
 No (Q16)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….…….….
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
122
d. Questionnaire for IMEs
Collective Rights Management (2014/26/EU) for the European Commission only. Filling out the
questionnaire will take approximately 15-20 minutes. If possible, please complete the survey in one
sitting. However, if you need to pause and continue later, you will be directed to the point where you
paused the survey if you use the same computer or mobile device.
When answering the questions, we kindly ask you to think of and refer to your most recent
experiences since the date of transposition of the Collective Rights Management Directive in your
country.
Q1. In which sector does your organisation predominantly work (check all that apply)?
• Music (author's rights)
• Music (related rights)
• Visual arts
• Audiovisual
• Literature and publishing
• Drama
Q2. Please select the country of your primary establishment:

 Estonia  Luxembourg  United Kingdom
 Finland  Malta  Norway
 France  Netherlands  Iceland
 Liechtenstein
 Other, please specify
Q2.1. In which of the following EEA countries does your organisation also operate (e.g. has established
subsidiary enterprises):
 Estonia  Luxembourg  Iceland
 Finland  Malta  Liechtenstein
 France  Netherlands  United Kingdom
 Norway
 Other, please specify
 None
Q3. In total, how many rightholders does your organisation represent?
 Not applicable: our organisation does not directly represent rightholders ( Q5)
Q4. Approximately, what percentage share of your members are foreign rightholders, i.e. residing in a different
country than the primary place of establishment of your organisation?
 Less than 1%
123
 1-10%
 11-20%
 21-30%
 31%-50%
 More than 50%
Q4.1. What percentage share of your repertoire is from foreign rightholders?

 Less than 1%
 1-10%
 11-20%
 21-30%
 31%-50%
 More than 50%
 We do not collect this information

COUNTRY
in your country?
2– 4– Do not
Agree Disagree know
Overall, national legal framework Q5.2 Q5.2 Q5.1 Q5.2
interests of rightsholders
Q5.1. Please explain your answer to the question in the space below.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q5.2. Transposition of the Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU) (hereafter Directive) has
resulted in changes to Member States’ legal frameworks. To what extent have all these changes improved the
functioning of the collective rights management system in your country?
 I do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
 Other, please specify……
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON THE POSSIBLE CHANGE OF LEGAL STATUS OF YOUR ORGANISATION
124
Upon the transposition of the Directive into national laws, collecting societies in EU Member States
either predominantly fell under one of the types of collecting societies or, possibly, had an opportunity
to rearrange their internal organisation as to acquire a legal status of either an IME or a CMO.
Q6. Has the legal status of your organisation changed from what is now considered as a CMO to an IME since
the date of the transposition of the Directive in your country (e.g. this could include change in status from
being a non-profit organisation controlled by rightholders to for-profit organisation not owned or controlled by
rightholders)?
 Yes ( Q6.1)
 No ( Q7)
Q6.1. Why has your legal status changed to that of an IME? Check all that apply.
 Our status has not changed but our organisation falls under the definition of IME as defined by the
national laws of the Member State we operate in after following transposition of the Directive
 IMEs have better regulation than CMOs
 IMEs are more attractive to rightholders
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q7. With respect to your legal status, are you also recognized as an IME in other EU Member States?
 Yes (Q7.1)
 No
 Do not know
Q7.1. Which EU countries recognise you as an IME? Tick all that apply.
 Finland  Malta  We are recognised as
 France  Netherlands IME in all EU countries
 We do not have
information on our legal
status for all EU
countries
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q.7.2. Does the fact that you are not recognised in some or all EU countries as an IME create any barriers to
the activity of your business?
 Yes, please specify…
 It creates no barriers to the activities of our business
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON LICENSING
Article 16(1) of the Directive foresees that negotiations for the licensing of rights must be carried out
in good faith and that collecting societies and users shall provide each other with all necessary
information.
Q8. To what extent do you agree that users conduct licensing negotiations in good faith?
1 – Strongly 2– 3 – Neither agree, nor 4– 5 – Strongly Do not
agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree know
125
Q9 Q9 Q8.1 Q8.1 Q8.1 Q9
Q8.1. Could you provide additional information? What are your typical issues/concerns as regards licensing
negotiations with users?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q9. To what extent do you receive all necessary information from users with whom you carry out licensing
negotiations?
3 – I only
2 – I receive 4 – I receive 5 – I don’t
1 – I receive all receive some Do not
most of the very little of the receive any
the information of the know/not
information I information I information
I need information I applicable
need need I need
need
Q10 Q9.1 Q9.1 Q9.1 Q9.1 Q10
Q9.1. Could you provide additional comments on the lack of information you receive from users? For example,
whether non-provision of information is a systematic or one-off event, what specific kind / type of information
was not provided?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q10. To what extent do you agree with following statements regarding the extent to which rightholders receive
appropriate remuneration for their rights?
1– 3 – Neither 5– Do
2– 4–
Disagree Agree
disagree disagree agree know
National regulation ensures that
rightholders receive remuneration, which
is proportionate to the economic value of
respective rights
Outcomes of licensing negotiations
remuneration, which is proportionate to
the economic value of respective rights
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS REGARDING OTHER MARKET PLAYERS AND POTENTIAL ISSUES RELATED TO YOUR
BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Some provisions of the Directive grant the right to rightholders to freely choose their preferred CMO
and/or to withdraw their rights/terminate the authorisation with a CMO. These rights conferred upon
the rightholders may have had impact on your business activity.
Q11. How easy or difficult it is for your organisation to attract new rightholders?
3 – Neither
5 – Very
1 – Very easy 2 – Easy easy, nor 4 – Difficult Do not know
difficult
difficult
126
Q21.1 Q21.1 Q21.1 Q21.1
Q11.1. Please explain your answer to the question below:

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q11.2. Does your organisation do any of the following to attract new rightholders from other entities, including
CMOs? Tick all that apply.
 We do not actively try to attract new rightholders (*if selected, additional answer options not possible)
 We offer a more transparent management of their rights
 We offer a more efficient distribution of amounts due to rightsholders
 We offer more competitive management costs
 We offer better system of withdrawing rights
 We have a wider territory of coverage to offer
 Do not know
Q12. In your opinion, how easy or difficult it is for rightholders to freely authorise IMEs to manage their rights?
3 – Neither
5 – Very
1 – Very easy 2 – Easy easy nor 4 – Difficult Do not know
difficult
difficult
Q12.1 Q12.1 Q12.1 Q12.1
Q12.1. Please explain your answer to the question below:

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q12A. Are there any positive or negative effects for your organisation as a result of possible withdrawals by
rightholders of their rights from other entities, including CMOs since the transposition of the Directive?
Q13. IMEs and CMOs might usually face different regulatory regimes in EU Member States. Thinking about
the way you are regulated in the country of your establishment; would you agree or disagree with the following
statements:
3–
1– 5–
2– Neither I do not
Strongly 4 – Agree Strongly
Disagree agree, nor know
disagree agree
disagree
IMEs are generally more Q13.1 Q13.1
attractive to rightholders
than CMOs
IMEs have a favourable Q13.2 Q13.2
regulatory environment in
the country of our
establishment
IMEs have a competitive Q13.3 Q13.3
advantage against CMOs
IMEs can enter the market Q13.4 Q13.4
more easily than CMOs
Q13.1. In your answer to the previous question you have indicated that you believe IMEs to be more attractive
to rightholders than CMOs. Please briefly explain your reasoning:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
127
Q13.2. In the previous question you have indicated that you are not completely satisfied with the regulatory
environment of IMEs in the country of your establishment. Please indicate what specific regulatory issues you
face:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q13.3. In your answer to the previous question you have indicated that you believe IMEs to have a
competitive advantage against CMOs. Please briefly explain your reasoning:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q13.4. In your answer to the previous question you have indicated that you believe IMEs can enter the market
more easily than CMOs. Please briefly explain your reasoning:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q14. Are there any other barriers to your business activity?

 Yes (Q14.1)
 No (Q15)
Q14.1. Please indicate what specific barriers to your business activity you face:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………….
There can be other entities that are active on the rights management market but do not fall strictly
within the definition of either CMO or IME. Nevertheless, these entities are to some extent involved in
the rights management.
Q15. Are you aware of such entities operating in the country of your establishment?
 Yes (proceeds to Q15.1)
 No (proceeds to Q16)
Q15.1. Please, provide us with the names of such entities:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
IMEs, rightholders, users). We would like to know whether you are aware of any such major disputes.
Q16. Have you been involved in any major legal disputes regarding collective rights management since the
date of the transposition of the Collective Rights Management Directive in your country? Check all that apply
 Yes, with another CMO (Q16.1)
 Yes, with rightholders (Q16.1)
 Yes, with other (please specify) (Q16.1)
 No (Q17)
Q16.1. Please briefly describe the major disputes and/or provide (online) references to them:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
CLOSING QUESTIONS
128
Q17. In the context of this study on Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU), we will also carry
out a survey of rightholders. Would you be willing to distribute this survey to rightholders whose rights you
manage?
 Yes(Q18)
 No (Q19)
Q18. Please provide us with the contact details of the person whom we should contact regarding the
distribution of survey:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
 Yes (Q20)
 No (Q21)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
129
e. Questionnaire for users
selected issues regarding the application of the Collective Rights Management (2014/26/EU) for the
European Commission only. Filling out the questionnaire will take approximately 10-15 minutes. If
possible, please complete the survey in one sitting. However, if you need to pause and continue later,
you will be directed to the point where you paused the survey if you use the same computer or mobile
device.
your country.
Q1. Which type of works do you predominantly use? Check all that apply.
 Musical works
 Visual works
 Audiovisual works
 Literary works
 Dramatic works
 Other: please specify
Q2. In which European Union Member States does your organisation provide/offer services which require you
to obtain an authorisation/license for the use of works or other subject-matter?

 Estonia  Luxembourg  We also provide
 Finland  Malta services outside the EU
 [For users which select more than one country] Q.2.1. You have selected more than one country in
which your organisation provides services. For the purpose of this survey, please select one EU
country which you will use as a basis for your answers the following questions.

The Directive on Collective Rights Management (2014/26/EU) defines two types of entities involved in
rights management:
(1) Collective management organisation (CMO) which is (i) owned or controlled by its members
and (ii) it is organised on a not-for-profit basis. (Article3(a) of the Collective Rights Management
Directive)
(2) Independent management entity (IME) which is (ii) organised on a for-profit basis. (Article 3(b) of
the Collective Rights Management Directive)
130
Since these two types of organisations work based on different business models and since they may
be regulated differently by national laws, your experiences with them might be also different.
Q3. With which kind of organisations do you have licensing agreements? Check all that apply.
 At least one CMO (proceeds to the questionnaire for users of rights managed by CMOs)
 At least one IME (proceeds to the questionnaire for users of rights managed by IMEs)
 With both (at least one CMO and at least one IME) (proceeds to the questionnaire for users of rights
managed by CMOs and IMEs)
 I do not know the difference between them, but I do have licensing agreements with at least one
rights’ management organisation (proceeds to questionnaire for users of rights managed by collecting
societies in general)

COUNTRY
in your country?
2– 4– Do not
Agree Disagree know
Overall, national legal framework  Q4.1
interests of rightsholders
Overall national legal framework  Q4.2

interests of users
(entities/organisations like yours)
Q4.1. Please explain why you think that the national legal framework is not effective in protecting the
interests of rightholders in the space below:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q4.2. Please explain why you think that the national legal framework is not effective in protecting the
interests of users (entities/organisations like yours) in the space below:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q5. Transposition of Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU) (hereafter Directive) resulted in
changes to legal frameworks of Member States. To what extent have all these changes improved the
functioning of collective rights management system in your country?
 I do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
 Other, please specify……
Questionnaire for users of rights managed by CMOs and IMEs
[Users that indicate that they have licensing agreements only with IMEs or CMOs will receive the same
questionnaires except that it will only focus on IMEs or CMOs respectively; users that indicate that are unsure
with which organisation (IME or CMO) they have licensing agreements with will receive the questionnaire
focused on collecting societies in general]
QUESTIONS ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH COLLECTING SOCIETIES
131
Article 16(1) of the Directive foresees that CMOs and users should provide each other with all the
necessary information. Additionally, pursuant to Article 16(3) if CMOs do not offer a licence, they
should indicate to you why it does not intend to do so.
Moreover, Article 20 provides that CMOs and IMEs have to make the following information available
electronically:
(1) the works or other subject-matter it represents, the rights it manages, directly or under
representation agreements, and the territories covered; or
(2) where, due to the scope of activity of the collective management organisation, such works or other
subject- matter cannot be determined, the types of works or of other subject-matter it represents, the
rights it manages and the territories covered;
Q6. In general, to what extent do you receive the following information that you request from CMOs. Please
reflect on your experiences from the past three years:
If you deal with more than one CMO, when answering the question think about the CMO, with which you deal
the most often.
1 – We 2 –We 3 – We 4 – We 5 – We do
receive all receive receive receive very not receive Do not
the most of some of little of any know/not
information information information information information applicable
I need I need I need I need I need
Which repertoire
CMO manages
Which rights
CMO manages
Which territories
are covered
The reasons why

the CMO did not
intend to license
you
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q7. In general, to what extent do you receive the following information from IMEs. Please reflect on your
experiences during the past three years:
If you deal with more than one IME, when answering the question think about the IME, with which you deal the
most often
1 – We 2 –We 3 – We 4 – We 5 – We do
information information I information information I information applicable
I need need I need need I need
Which repertoire
IME manages
What rights IME

manages
Which territories
are covered
The reasons why

the IME did not
intend to license
you
Article 21 stipulates that collective management organisations should make available by electronic
means and without undue delay or to make public at least the following information:
132
1) standard licensing contracts and standard applicable tariffs, including discounts.
2) the complaint handling and dispute resolution procedures.
Q8. In general, to what extent do you receive the following information that you request from CMOs. Please
reflect on your experiences from the past three years:
If you deal with more than one CMO, when answering the question think about the CMO, with which you deal
the most often
1 – We 2 –We 3 – We 4 – We 5 – We do
informatio informatio information information information applicable
n I need n I need I need I need I need
Information on
standard
licensing
contracts
Information on
standard tariffs,
including
information on
discounts
Information on
complaint
handling and
dispute
resolution
procedures
Q9. In general, to what extent CMOs provide for the possibility to communicate with them by electronic means,
including reporting on the use of rights?
 To a large extent
 To a moderate extent
 To some extent
 To small extent
 Not at all
 Do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q10. In general, to what extent do you receive the following information from IMEs. Please reflect to your
experiences during 2019:
If you deal with more than one IME, when answering the question think about the IME, with which you deal the
most often
1 – We 2 –We 3 – We 4 – We 5 – We do
receive all receive receive receive not receive Do not
the most of some of very little of any know/not
information information information information information applicable
I need I need I need I need I need
Information on
standard licensing
contracts
Information on
standard tariffs,
including
information on
discounts
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
133
Article 17 of the Directive stipulates that users have to provide a CMO, within an agreed or pre-
established time and in an agreed or pre-established format, with such relevant information at their
disposal on the use of rights as is necessary for the collection of rights revenue and for the
distribution and payment of amounts due to rightholders.
Q11. Do you report to CMOs on the use of rights in your business activity in the agreed or pre-established
time and format?
 Yes
 Mostly yes (Q11.1)
 Mostly no (Q11.1)
 No (Q11.1)
 Do not know
Q11.1. Please briefly explain the reasons why you do not always report to CMOs on the use of rights in the
agreed or pre-established time and format
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Article 16(2) of the Directive foresees that tariffs for exclusive rights and rights to remuneration shall
be reasonable in relation to, inter alia, the economic value of the use of the rights in trade, taking into
account the nature and scope of the use of the work and other subject-matter, as well as in relation to
the economic value of the service provided by the collective management organisation.
Q12. In your opinion, to what extent are the tariffs for the use of works and other subject-matter reasonable in
relation to the economic value of the use of the right in trade (taking into account the nature and scope of the
use of the works) as well as in relation to the economic value of the service provided?
2 – To a
1 – To a 3 – To some 4 – To small 5 – Not at Do not
moderate
large extent extent extent all know
extent
For works
licensed by
CMOs
For works
licensed by
IMEs
Q11.1. Please briefly explain your answer to the question below:

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Licensing terms are the terms and conditions that govern the use of works or other subject-matter
managed and licensed by CMOs or IMEs to users. Article 16(2) of the Directive foresees that licensing
terms shall be based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria. When answering the following
questions, please think of the situation in your country of establishment or country of main operation
in the EU.
Q13. In your opinion, are the licensing terms usually based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria?
1 – Yes 2 – Mostly yes 3 – No Do not know
With CMOs Q14 Q13.1 Q13.1 Q14
With IMEs Q14 Q13.1 Q13.1 Q14
Q13.1. In your answer to the last question you have indicated that you are not completely satisfied with the
licensing terms. Please briefly explain the main concerns or issues you are facing:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
The licensing process involves negotiations in view of an agreement between users and collecting
societies.
134
Q14. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the licensing process:
3 – Neither 5–
1 – Strongly 4– Do not
2 – Agree agree, nor Strongly
agree Disagree know
disagree disagree
The licensing Q15 Q15 Q15 Q15 Q15 Q15
process is very
costly in terms of
administrative
work (e.g.
human/time
resources)
required

process takes too
much time

process lacks
transparency with
regard to
repertoire and
territories covered
The licensing Q14.1 Q14.1 Q15 Q15 Q15 Q15

process is
discriminatory
and/or not
objective
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q14.1. In the previous question you have indicated that the licensing process is discriminatory and/or not
objective. Could you please briefly explain in which regard it is discriminatory and/or not objective?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q15. In general, has the licensing process improved since the transposition of the Directive in your Member
State?
 It has improved
 It has not changed much/stayed the same
 It has become worse
 I do not know
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF RIGHTHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM COLLECTING

SOCIETIES
Article 5(4) of the Directive provides rightholders with the right to withdraw (some of) their rights from
a collecting society or terminate the authorisation given to a collecting society. We would like to know
whether this might have had any negative or positive effects on users.
Q16. Since the transposition of the Directive in your country, have such withdrawals of rights/termination of
authorisation from collecting societies had substantial consequences on your organisation with regard to the
use of works and other subject-matter?
 Yes (Q16.2 Q17)
 No (Q16.1Q18)
135
Q16.1. Please briefly explain why withdrawals have not affected your organisation with regard to the use of
works (Q18)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q16.2. To what extent withdrawals have affected your organisation with regard to the use of works and other
subject-matter in terms of:
1 – Has 2 – Has 3 – Has 4 – Has 5 – Has
Do not
increased increased stayed the decreased decreased
know
a lot somewhat same somewhat a lot
Fragmentation
in the
repertoires
offered by
collecting
societies
Transaction
costs
Licensing fees
Volume of works
you use
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q17. Have the withdrawals affected your organisation with regard to the use of works in any other ways?
 Yes (Q17.1)
 No (Q18)
Q17.1. Please briefly explain in what other ways the withdrawals have affected your organisation with regard
to the use of works:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
IMEs, rightholders, users). We would like to know whether you are aware of, or have been involved in
any such major disputes.
Q18. Have you been involved in any licensing disputes since the transposition of the Directive in your Member
State? Check all that apply.
 Yes, with a CMO (Q18.1Q18.2)
 Yes, with an IME (Q18.1Q18.2)
 Yes, with rightsholders (Q18.1Q18.2)
 Yes, with others (please specify) (Q18.1Q18.2)
 No ( Q18.2)
Q18.1. Please briefly describe the major disputes and/or give online references to them:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
Q18.2. More generally, are you aware of any other major licensing disputes and what exactly the dispute was
about? If yes, please include any reference that you may have on this (users which selected more than one
country Q19; users which selected just one country Q21)
136
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………
 [For users which select more than one country]
At the beginning of the survey you have indicated that your organisation provides services in more
than one EU Member State. We would like you to answer a couple of questions on the possible
differences across EU Member States in which you operate in terms of licensing environment.
Q19. In terms of licensing rules, how different are national legal frameworks in EU Member States in which
your organisation provides services?
 They are the same
 They are more or less the same
 In some or all EU Member States they differ to a large extent, therefore we have to adjust accordingly
 Do not know
Q.20. Thinking about licensing process, to what extent it differs across EU Member States in which you
provide services in terms of:
2 – To a
1 – To a 3 – To some 4 – To small 5 – Not at Do not
moderate
large extent extent extent all know
extent
Licensing
procedures
applied by
CMOs
Tariffs applied
by CMOs
The cost of
licensing
process in terms
of administrative
work required
CONCLUDING QUESTIONS

 Yes ( Q22)
 No (Q23)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
137
f. Questionnaire for rightholders (members and non-members of
CMOs and IMEs)
selected issues related to the Collective Rights Management Directive (2014/26/EU) for the European
Commission only. Filling out the questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes. If possible, please
complete the survey in one sitting. However, if you need to pause and continue later, you will be
directed to the point where you paused the survey if you use the same computer or mobile device.
experiences within the last 4 years.
[Demographic questions and introductory question to distinguish between CMO members, IME members and
non-members of neither CMO nor IME]
Q1. In which sector do you predominantly work? Check all that apply.
 Visual arts
 Audiovisual arts
 Drama
Q2. What is your primary place of residence?

 Estonia  Luxembourg  Other, please specify…
In Europe there are two main types of collecting societies that manage copyright or rights related to
copyright on behalf of multiple rightholders:
1) Collective management organizations (CMOs), which work on a non-for-profit basis or are
controlled by their members (the rightholders).
2) Independent management entities (IMEs), which are usually for profit and are neither owned
nor controlled by their members.
Q3. Which type of organisation are you a member of? Select all that apply.
1. A CMO established in the country of your primary place of residence ( questionnaire for CMO
members)
2. A CMO established in another EU Member State ( questionnaire for CMO members)
3. A CMO established outside the EU, but operating in the EU market ( questionnaire for CMO
members)
4. An IME ( questionnaire for IME members)
5. I am not a member of either a CMO or an IME ( questionnaire for non-members)
IF any CMO + IME ( questionnaire for CMO members plus additional questions regarding IMEs –
QA1-QA3)
Q3.1 Overall, to what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding collective rights
management in your country?
2– 4– Do not
Agree Disagree know
138
2– 4– Do not
Agree Disagree know
Overall, national legal framework Q4 Q4  Q3.2 Q4
is effective in protecting my
interests
I have sufficient knowledge Q4 Q4  Q3.3. Q4
necessary for management of my
Q3.2 Please explain, why do you think that the national legal framework is not sufficiently effective in
protecting your interests.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q3.3. Please elaborate, what kind of knowledge you would need for more effective management of your
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
139
Questionnaire for NON-MEMBERS
Q4. Why are you not a member of a CMO or IME established in the EU? Check all that apply.
 I do not trust CMOs/IMEs to act in the best of my interests (end of survey)
 I prefer to manage my rights on my own (end of survey)
 My works are mostly used in non-EU countries therefore I am a member of non-EU CMO which
operates in these countries (end of survey)
 I wanted to join a CMO or IME but I was not able to do that ( Q4.1.)
 Other (please specify below) (end of survey)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q4.1. Why were you not able to join a CMO or IME? Check all that apply.
 My works are not being used publicly
 The process of joining was too complicated
 I did not receive enough information on how to join
 I did not fulfil the requirements
 My application to join was rejected due to unclear reasons
 There was no CMO or IME suitable for me in my country
 There are regulatory obstacles to joining a CMO from another EU country
 I was removed from CMO/IME
 Other (please specify below)
This is the end of the questionnaire. If you would like to provide additional comments or information, please
use the space below.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
140
Questionnaire for CMO MEMBERS
QUESTIONS ON YOUR OVERALL EXPERIENCE WITH YOUR CMO
We would like you to answer some questions about the collective management organisation (CMO)
you are a member of. If you are a member of more than one CMO, please think about your overall
experiences in dealing with CMOs when you answer the questions.
Q4. How satisfied are you with collective management organisation(s) (CMO) you are a member of?
3–
1– 5–
Neither 4– Do not
agree, nor Disagree know
agree disagree
disagree
I am very satisfied with my Q5 Q5  Q4.1. Q5
collective management
organisation (CMO)
The way in which my CMO Q5 Q5  Q4.2 Q5
manages my rights has
improved over the past 4 years
Q 4.1. Please elaborate why are you not entirely satisfied with your CMO?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q4.2. Please elaborate, why do you think that performance of your CMO has not improved?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON WITHDRAWAL OF RIGHTS
Every CMO has to provide an effective mechanism in case you wish to withdraw your rights. This
could include:
 Change of CMO, i.e. withdraw all your rights from a CMO and entrust them to a different entity
or manage them yourself
 Withdraw only some categories of rights from a CMO, so that you could manage them
yourself or entrust them to a different entity
The following questions are to understand whether you have used this right and how easy the process
was.
Q5. Over the past 4 years, have you ever withdrawn or wanted to withdraw your rights?
 Yes, I have withdrawn all my rights/categories of rights ( Q6)
 Yes, I have withdrawn some rights or categories of my rights, but remained a member of my CMO
(Q5.1)
 No ( Q8)
Q5.1. Could you indicate, which types of rights or categories of rights you have withdrawn?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

3–
1– 5–
Neither 4– Do not
agree disagree
disagree
Overall, it was easy to
withdraw my rights (or some
categories of rights)
I could withdraw my rights
without undue delays
I could withdraw the types of
rights I wanted to
I was not financially sanctioned
for withdrawing my rights
141
Q6.1. Were there any other factors that made withdrawal of rights easy or difficult? Please elaborate
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q7. Why did you want to withdraw your rights from your CMO? Please check all that apply.
 I wanted to make my works freely accessible to all (e.g. under creative commons license)
 I wanted to manage my rights (or some categories of rights) myself
 I felt that my CMO did not act in my best interest when collecting and distributing royalties
 I felt that governance of my CMO was not sufficiently democratic or transparent (e.g. I did not receive
necessary information, could not participate in governance, etc.)
 A different entity (CMO/IME) was more appealing to me
QUESTIONS ON GOVERNANCE OF COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS
CMOs have a legal obligation to provide the necessary information and include their members in the
governance and decision-making process. The following questions seek to understand whether you
feel that you have the possibility to influence or participate in the decisions taken by your CMO.
Q8. How involved are you in the governance of your CMO(s)?

 I am a member of the governance body (for example, management board or similar)
 I am not involved but I am interested and/or follow the way my CMO is governed
 I am not involved and not interested in the way my CMO is governed
Q9. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding transparency and governance of
your CMO
3–
1– 5–
Neither 4– Do not
agree disagree
disagree
Overall, governance of my Q10 Q10  Q9.1 Q10
CMO is transparent
I have all the information Q10 Q10  Q9.1 Q10
necessary to participate in the
governance of my CMO
I have all the necessary Q10 Q10  Q9.1 Q10
information on decisions made
by my CMO
If I want to, I can participate in Q10 Q10  Q9.1 Q10
governance of my CMO (e.g.
general assembly,
management board, etc.)
I can hold the leadership of my Q10 Q10  Q9.1 Q10
CMO accountable
I can influence decisions made Q10 Q10  Q.9.1 Q10
by my CMO
Q9.1. In the previous question you did not fully agree with the statement that … What specific problems have
you encountered?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
QUESTIONS ON FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF RIGHTS REVENUE
CMOs have the obligation to:

 Diligently collect and manage rights revenue
 Regularly, diligently, and accurately distribute and pay the amounts due to the rightholders
 Set management fees that do not exceed justified and documented costs of managing
copyright and related rights
 Provide their members with information on collected and distributed revenue, management
fees, investments, and other financial decisions
Q10. To what extent to you agree with the following statements regarding the information provided by your
CMO?
1– 2– 3– 4 – Agree 5 – Do not
142
Strongly Disagree Neither Strongly know/ not
disagree agree, agree applicable
nor
disagree
I have all the information I need Q11 Q11  Q10.1 Q11
regarding collection and
distribution of my revenues.
regarding the management fees
of my CMO
regarding investments made by
my CMO
I receive the above mentioned Q11 Q11 Q11 Q11
information but I am not
interested in it
Q.10.1. What specific information do you need, but do not receive from your CMO:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
 AT THIS POINT THE QUESTIONNAIRE SPLITS INTO TWO VERSIONS: FOR CMO MEMBERS
AND FOR CMO+IME MEMBERS
(i) Questionnaire for CMOs members
Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding financial management of your
CMO?
3–
1– 5– Do not
2– Neither
Strongly 4 – Agree Strongly know/ not
Disagree agree, nor
disagree agree applicable
disagree
Overall, my CMOs acts in the Q12 Q12  Q11.1 Q12
when collecting and
distributing royalties
I am satisfied with the way my Q12 Q12  Q11.1 Q12
CMO collects revenue from my
rights
CMO distributes revenue from
my rights (e.g, shares revenue
between writers and
publishers; composers and
lyricists; producers, authors
and performers; etc)
My CMO transfers the Q12 Q12  Q11.1 Q12
revenues to me without delays

CMO invests part of revenue
from my rights.
The administrative expenses Q12 Q12  Q11.1 Q12
my CMO charges for
Q11.1. In the previous question you did not fully agree with the statement that … What specific problems /
issues have you encountered?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
CLOSING QUESTIONS

 Yes (Q12.1)
143
 No (Q13)
Q12.1. Please provide us with your email address in the space below:
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
(ii) Questionnaire for CMO + IME Members: questions about IMEs for rightholders who are members of
CMO and IMEs
Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding financial management of your
CMO?
3–
1– 5– Do not
2– Neither
Disagree agree, nor
disagree
Overall, my CMOs acts in the QA1 QA1  Q11.1 QA1
when collecting and
distributing royalties
I am satisfied with the way my QA1 QA1  Q11.1 QA1
CMO collects revenue from my
rights
CMO distributes revenue from
my rights (e.g, shares revenue
between writers and
publishers; composers and
lyricists; producers, authors
and performers; etc)
My CMO transfers the QA1 QA1  Q11.1 QA1
revenues to me without delays

CMO invests part of revenue
from my rights.
The administrative expenses QA1 QA1  Q11.1 QA1
my CMO charges for
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
You have indicated that you are not only a member of a CMO but also a member of an independent
management entity (IME).
QA1. Why did you decide to entrust management of your rights or categories of your rights to an IME?
 It is very efficient in managing certain categories/types of rights
 It is transparent
 It can access wide user audiences
 It pays royalties upfront in a lump sum
 Other reasons (please specify)…
QA2. Was it easy to entrust your rights or categories of your rights to an IME?
 Yes ( Closing questions of questionnaire)
 No ( QA3)
QA3. What were the key issues?

 I had difficulties withdrawing my rights from CMO
 I experienced legal obstacles when entrusting my rights to an IME
 The process of entrusting my rights to an IME was unclear and/or difficult
144
 Other issues (please specify)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
CLOSING QUESTIONS

 Yes (Q12.1)
 No (Q13)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
145
Questionnaire for IME Members
QUESTIONS ON OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH YOUR IME
Q4. Why have you entrusted your rights or categories of your rights to an IME? Please check all that apply.
 It is very efficient in managing certain categories/types of rights
 It is transparent
 It can access wide user audiences
 It pays royalties upfront in a lump sum
Q5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding your IME?
3–
1– 5– Do not
2– Neither
Disagree agree, nor
disagree
IME collects revenue from my
rights
IME distributes revenue from
my rights
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
Q6. Before entrusting management of your rights to an IME, have you been a member of CMO?
 No, never ( Closing questions)
 Yes, more than four years ago ( Closing questions)
 Yes, less than four years ago ( Q7)
Q7. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

3–
1– 5–
Neither 4– Do not
agree disagree
disagree
Overall, it was easy to
withdraw my rights (or some
categories of rights) from CMO
I could withdraw my rights from
CMO without undue delays
I could withdraw the types of
rights I wanted to
I was not financially sanctioned
for withdrawing my rights
Q7.1. Were there any other factors that made withdrawal of rights easy or difficult? Please elaborate
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………
CLOSING QUESTIONS

 Yes (Q8.1)
 No (end of questionnaire)
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………
146
14. Annex 4 – List of legal provisions applied by
Member States to non-EU CMOs, IMEs and other
entities
a. CMOs established outside the Union and operating in the Union
Member
List of provisions Additional information
State
Austria Law on the Regulation of Collecting Societies / No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
Federal Act on Collecting Societies in the legislation as regards the
application of the provisions in the law.
§ 1. Subject of this federal law
(2) It regulates the requirements for the collective
exercise of copyrights and related rights.
Belgium Code of Economic Law No mention of non-EU CMOs in the
legislation as regards the application
Art. XI.247: Collective management organizations of the provisions in the law.
are organizations established in a regular manner in
one of the Member States of the European Union, According to the Belgian legislation
other than Belgium… CMOs are organizations established
in another EU member states and
The independent management entities are IMEs are organizations established in
organizations duly established in one of the one of the EU member states.
Member States of the European Union…
Note on translation:
In the Belgian legislation, there is a
distinction between Belgian CMOs
(management company = société de
gestion) and CMOs (collective
management organization= organisme
de gestion collective) established in
another EU member state
Bulgaria Law on Copyright and Related Rights (SG, issue Registration and authorization are
56/1993, as amended as of December 13, 2019) required for CMOs in order to carry
out collective management activities in
Conditions for registration Bulgaria.
Art. 94b. SUP> 1. (New, SG No. 28/2018, effective
29.03.2018) (1) The registration shall be carried out Non-EU CMOs are mentioned as
after submission of an application by: eligible for the application for
2. a person who has the right to collectively manage registration provided that they have a
copyright or related rights in accordance with the right to collectively manage copyright
legislation of --- a third country. or related rights in accordance with
the legislation of their country of
establishment.
Croatia The Croatian Law on Copyright; Act on Foreign rightsholders are represented
amendments to the Copyright and Related via reciprocal agreements with EU
Rights Act CMOs.
Article 157 (1): Collective management of rights on Authorization to operate as a CMO in

the territory of the Republic of Croatia may be Croatia can only be granted to CMOs
carried out by a collective management with a principle place of establishment
organization which has the authorisation granted by in the EU.
the State Intellectual Property Office (hereinafter:
the Office) for performing such activity.
(2) the authorisation referred to in paragraph (1) of
this Article shall be granted by the Office to an
association or another collective management
organisation on request which fulfils the following
requirements:
a) has its principle place of establishment in the

European Union,
b) has adequate material and human resources to

147
perform the activity of collective management,
whereby minimum resources are represented by
adequate premises, equipment and technical
service with at least one employee with an
undergraduate and graduate university degree in
law, and
c) is engaged in the collective management of

rights as its sole or main activity.
Cyprus Law of 2017 on the Collective Management of No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
Intellectual Property Rights and Related Rights in the legislation as regards the
as well as on the Granting of Multi-Territorial application of the provisions in the law.
Licenses for the Online Use of Musical Works
(65 (I) / 2017)
Field of application
4. (1) The provisions of the articles contained in
Parts I, IV and VI of this Law, with the exception of
the provisions of paragraph (2) of article 44 apply to
all collective management organizations located in
the Republic.
Czech Act No. 121/2000 on on Copyright, on Rights Only EU/EEA CMOs mentioned in the
Republic Related to Copyright and on Amendments to law.
Certain Acts (the Copyright Act)
No mention of non-EU CMOs in the
Authorization for collective management legislation as regards the application
§ 96 Application for authorization of the provisions in the law.
(1) The Ministry shall decide on the granting of
authorization for collective administration on the
basis of a written application.
(4) In the case of an applicant established in the

territory of another Member State of the European
Union or of one of the states forming the European
Economic Area who performs collective
management in the territory of another Member
State of the European Union or of one of the states
forming the European Economic Area under the
legislation of that state, shall attach to the
application only a document certifying that it
exercises collective management in accordance
with the legislation of that State.
Denmark Act on collective management of copyright and Same provisions apply to non-EU
related rights CMOs.
Section 1 Scope
5. Subsections 1-3, 6 and 7 similarly apply to any
collective management organisation established
outside the European Economic Area, but which is
active in Denmark, and subsection 4 similarly
applies to any independent management
organisation established outside the European
Economic Area, but which is active in Denmark.
Estonia Copyright Act Only EU/EEA CMOs mentioned in the
legislation.
§ 76 (3) An organisation founded in any legal form
in any other Member State of the European Union No mention of non-EU CMOs in the
or a state which is a contracting party to the EEA legislation as regards the application
Agreement, which meets the characteristics of a of the provisions in the law.
collective management organisation, shall be
deemed, within the meaning of this Act, as a
collective management organisation that is entitled,
inter alia, to collectively exercise the rights of the
rightholders also in case of mandatory collective
management.
Finland Act on the Collective Management of Copyright No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
(1494/2016) in the legislation as regards the
148
Section 2
Scope of application
This Act lays down provisions on the collective
management of copyright by the collective
management organisations referred to in section 4,
subsection 1.
France Intellectual Property Code There are provisions that apply to all
non-EU CMOs and in addition to that,
Article L321-4.2: Collective management certain provisions which apply only to
organizations established outside the European non-EU CMOs managing the
Union managing the exploitation rights in France of exploitation rights of protected musical
works or other protected subject matter are subject works in France.
to the provisions of the first, second and fourth
paragraphs of Article L. 324-6, of Articles L. 324-7,
L. 324-8, L. 324-12 to L. 324-14, the second
paragraph of article L. 326-2, articles L. 326-3 and
L. 326- 4.
They are subject to the control of the control

commission of the bodies of management of the
royalties and the neighboring rights under the 2 ° of
article L. 327-1. The mediation provided for in a of 3
° of article L. 327-1 is also applicable to them.
Article L321-4.4: Collective management

organizations established outside the European
Union managing the exploitation rights in France of
protected musical works are also subject to the
provisions of Articles L. 325-1, L. 325-2, L. 325-5 at
L. 325-7.
Germany Act on the Management of Copyright and No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
Related Rights by Collecting Societies in the legislation as regards the
(Collecting Societies Act) application of the provisions in the law.
Section 1
Scope
This Act regulates the management of copyright

and related rights by collecting societies, dependent
and independent management entities.
Greece LAW 4481/2017 (Official Government Gazette A΄ Same provisions apply to non-EU
100/20.07.2017) on collective management of CMOs as to EU CMOs.
copyright and related rights, multi-territorial
licensing in musical works for online use in the
internal market and other issues falling within
the scope of the Ministry of Culture and Sports
Art. 2.8.: Articles 1 to 54 shall apply to collective

management organisations established outside the
European Union (EU) but operating within the
Greek territory.
Hungary 2016. XCIII. Act on the Joint Management of
Copyright and Copyright-Related Rights
§ 2. (1) This Act shall apply:

b) for the joint management of rights to the territory
of Hungary by a joint rights management
organization established abroad, unless otherwise
provided by this Act.
Ireland SI No 156 of 2016 European Union (Collective Application of the regulations to CMOs
Rights Management) (Directive 2014/26/EU) established in Ireland mentioned in the
Regulations 2016 regulations.
1 (3) These Regulations apply to all collective No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
management organisations established in the State. in the regulations as regards the
The Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000
181.—(1) Any body operating as a licensing body
149
within the meaning specified in section 38 or 149
shall be obliged to register in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter Chapter 17: Registration
of Copyright Licensing Bodies, and to remain
registered for so long as it continues to operate in
this capacity.
Italy LEGISLATIVE DECREE 15 March 2017, n. 35 No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
Implementation of Directive 2014/26 / EU on the in the legislation as regards the
collective management of copyright and related application of the provisions in the law.
rights and on the granting of multi-territorial
licenses for rights in musical works for online
use in the internal market
Art. 3 Scope of Application

For collective management organizations, Chapters
I, II, IV, V and VI and, in the event that they grant
multi-territorial licenses for rights to online musical
works, also Chapter III.
Latvia Law of Collective Management of Copyright as No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
of 2020 in the legislation as regards the
Section 2 Purpose of the Law and Scope of
Application
(2) The Law governs activity of collective

management organisations, independent
management entities, and dependent management
entities by managing the rights of the holders of
copyright and related rights in the collective
interests of the abovementioned holders of
copyright or related rights, and also prescribes the
procedures for supervising the activity of collective
management performers and special provisions for
the settlement of disputes.
Lithuania COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS LAW NO. Non-EU CMOs with branches or
VIII-1185, Consolidated version representative offices established in
the Republic of Lithuania are subject
Art. 66: Entities of collective administration to the same provisions as Lithuanian
CMOs.
1.The following are considered to be subjects of
collective administration:
3) branches or representative offices of collecting
societies of third countries established in the
Republic of Lithuania, performing collective
administration activities in the Republic of Lithuania.
2. This chapter Chapter V: COLLECTIVE

ADMINISTRATION OF COPYRIGHT AND
RELATED RIGHTS first, second, third, fourth, fifth
and seventh sections of the provisions (with the
exception of the Law 72 of 28 Article 2, paragraph 4,
5 and 6, the provisions of paragraphs 72
and 30, paragraph 2) apply to all collective
management organizations.
Luxembourg Law of 25 April 2018 on collective management Application of the legislation only to
of copyright and related rights and multi- organizations established in
territorial licensing of rights in musical works Luxembourg.
for online use in the internal market and
amending the Law of 18 April 2001 on copyright, No mention of non-EU CMOs in the
related rights and databases legislation as regards the application
of the provisions in the law.
Art. 2. Scope
(1) Titles I, II, IV and V of this law, with the
exception of article 34, apply to all collective
management organizations established in the
territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Malta Control of the Establishment and Operation of Application of the legislation only to
Societies for the Collective Administration of organizations established in Malta.
150
Copyright Regulations, 2016 (Legal Notice No.
239 of 2016) No mention of non-EU CMOs in the
legislation as regards the application
3. (2) These regulations apply as follows: of the provisions in the law.
(a) Titles I, II, IV and V with the exception of

regulation 41(2) apply to all collective management
organisations established in Malta.
Netherlands Supervision and Dispute Settlement of CMOs and IMEs are defined as
Collective Management Organizations for organizations established in the
Copyright and Related Rights Act Netherlands.
Art. 1 No mention of non-EU CMOs in the

In this Act and the provisions based on it, the legislation as regards the application
following definitions apply: of the provisions in the law.
c. collective management organization: any
organization established in the Netherlands and
which is authorized by law or by means of transfer,
licensing or other agreement by more than one
rightholder with the main purpose of managing
copyright or related rights for the benefit of one or
more of them, in the common interest of these
rightholders and which is controlled by its members
or is organized not for profit;
d. independent management organization: any

organization, other than a collective management
organization, which is established in the
Netherlands and which is authorized by law or by
means of transfer, licensing or other agreement by
more than one rightholder with the main purpose of
managing copyright or related rights, for for one or
more rightholders, in the common interest of these
rightholders and that is not directly or indirectly,
wholly or partly under the control of rightholders and
is organized for profit;
Poland Law of June 15, 2018 on collective management No mention of non-EU CMOs in the
of copyright and related rights legislation as regards the application
of the provisions in the law.
Art. 3. [Definitions]
Whenever this Act refers to: Foreign CMOs mentioned in
3) foreign collective management organization - it conjunction with representation
shall be understood as an entity recognized as an agreements.
organization for collective management of copyright
or related rights abroad in the country of its seat.
Portugal Law No. 26/2015 on Collective Rights Application of the law only to CMOs
Management with incorporated amendments of established in Portugal or an EU
2017/2019 member state or EEA country.
Art. 1: This law regulates the collective No mention of non-EU CMOs in the
management entities of copyright and related rights, legislation.
including as regards the establishment in national
territory and the free provision of services by
entities previously established in another member
state of the European Union or the European
Economic Area.
Romania Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (No. No specific mention of non-EU CMOs
8 of March 14, 1996 – 2018 version) in the legislation as regards the
Article 151
(1) The collective management bodies provided in
this chapter are established under the law, with the
approval of the Romanian Copyright Office, and
operate according to the regulations on non-profit
associations and according to the provisions of this
law.
Slovakia Act No. 185/2015 Coll. on Copyright and Related CMOs with registered office in another
Rights country are allowed to manage rights
151
also in the Slovak territory under
Section 144 certain requirements.
(2) Legal person with registered office in another
country performing collective management of rights No mention of the application of the
may perform collective management of rights at the Slovakian legislation to non-EU
territory of the Slovak Republic, provided that CMOs.
a) its management and control is performed with
participation of rightholders or
b) performs collective management of rights on
non-profit basis.
Slovenia Act regulating collective management of No mention of the application of the

copyright and related rights (2016) legislation to non-EU CMOs.
Art 3 Definitions Foreign CMOs mentioned in

"foreign collective management organisation" shall conjunction with representation
mean a collective management organisation with no agreements.
registered office or subsidiary in the Republic of
Slovenia.
Spain Law 2/2019, of March 1, which modifies the The law sets out certain requirements
revised text of the Intellectual Property Law, for management entities without an
approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996, of establishment in Spain. These may
April 12, and by which they are incorporated include both CMOs established in
into the Spanish legal system Directive 2014/26 / another member state as well as non-
EU of the European Parliament and of the EU CMOs.
Council, of February 26, 2014, and Directive
(EU) 2017/1564 of the European Parliament and Requirements for notification of
of the Council, of September 13, 2017 operations, obligation to comply with
certain provisions of the Spanish law
Article 151. Requirements of management entities and supervision of the activities apply
without establishment in Spain. to CMOs without establishment in
Spain.
1. Legally constituted management entities that do
not have an establishment in Spanish territory but
intend to provide services in Spain in accordance
with the provisions of this law, must notify the
Ministry of Culture and Sports of the start of their
activities in Spain.
The communication must contain, at least, your

contact information, including your tax identification
data, the characteristics of the services to be
provided, the documents proving compliance with
the requirements established in your country of
establishment to operate as a management entity.
and a version in Spanish of its current statutes.
Likewise, they must communicate any variation with
respect to the data contained in the communication
within the month following the one they take place.
3. The management entities referred to in section 1

that have an establishment outside the European
Union must comply, in relation to the services they
provide in Spain and in the same terms as the
management entities authorized by the Ministry of
Culture and Sports, with the obligations provided for
in articles 163 to 166; 170 to 174; 177, paragraphs
1, except the fourth paragraph; 2 to 5; 179 to 184;
185, except the obligation to publish the annual
transparency report; and 186, letters c) to f).
4. The management entities referred to in this

article may exercise the intellectual property rights
conferred on their management by their owners by
means of a management contract and on behalf
and for the collective benefit of all of them. In order
to enforce the rights to equitable remuneration and
compensation in the different cases provided for in
this law and to exercise the right to authorize cable
152
distribution, they must request the authorization
provided for in article 147.
5. The management entities referred to in this

article shall be subject to the supervisory powers of
the competent administrations and to the fulfillment
of the obligations provided for in article 154.
Sweden Act on Collective Management of Copyright No specific mention of the application
of the legislation to non-EU CMOs.
Chapter 1, Section 1: This Act applies to collective
rights management and collective management
organizations.
153
b. Independent management entities
Member Additional
List of provisions
State information
Austria Law on the Regulation of Collecting Societies / Federal Act on More extensive
Collecting Societies regulation than in the
Directive.
§ 2.2 Definition of IME (independent collecting organization)
§ 4. The provisions of this Federal Act applicable to collecting

societies shall apply to independent collecting organizations, with
the exception of Sections 6, 12 to 22, 76 and 92 (2).
1. General section
§ 1 Subject of this federal law
§ 2 Definitions
2. Section: Authorization for Perception

§ 3 Requirement and prerequisites for the perception permit
§ 4 Independent management organizations
§ 5 Full-time management
§ 7 Monopoly principle
§ 8 Procedure
§ 9 Duration and announcement of permits
§ 10 Delimitation of perception permits
§ 11 Transfer of rights of administration and merger of collecting
societies
4. Section: Rights and obligations towards Rights holders and

Beneficiaries
§ 23 Obligation to observe
§ 24 Administration agreement
§ 25 Perception presumption
§ 26 Permits for non-commercial use
§ 27 Termination of the management agreement
§ 28 Information obligations prior to the conclusion of a
management agreement
§ 29 Rights management
§ 30 Collection and administration of revenue
§ 31 Non-discrimination of beneficiaries of other collecting
societies
§ 32 Prints
§ 33 Social and cultural institutions
§ 34 Distribution
§ 35 Non-distributable amounts
5. Section: Rights and Obligations towards Users

§ 36 Issuance of usage permits
§ 37 Conditions and tariffs for usage permits and remuneration
clauses
§ 38 Tariffs for devices and storage media
§ 39 Advisory board for device and storage media remuneration
§ 40 Response to inquiries, electronic communication
6. Section: Transparency and Reporting Obligations

§ 41 Billing to rightsholders
§ 42 Accounting to other collecting societies
§ 43 Information about repertoire
§ 44 Publication obligations
§ 45 Transparency report
§ 46 Review and disclosure of the transparency report
7. Section: General contracts

§ 47 Total contracts
§ 48 Overall contractability
§ 49 Normative effect
154
§ 50 Form and content
§ 51 Publication and entry into force
§ 52 Validity period
§ 53 Contracts with the ORF and with the federal government
8. Section: Special provision for Collecting Societies that

Issue Multi-territorial Licenses for Online Rights to Musical
Works
§ 54 Requirements for collecting societies that grant usage permits
for online services in several countries
§ 55 Referral to the supervisory authority
§ 56 Information about the repertoire
§ 57 Collection and backup of data
§ 58 Monitoring, usage reports, billing
§ 59 Distribution and accounting
§ 60 Contracts between collecting societies
§ 61 Obligation to observe
§ 62 Exception for online rights musical works for radio and
television programs
9. Section: Complaint Management, Dispute Resolution and

Supervision
§ 63 Complaint management
§ 64 Mediation by the supervisory authority
§ 65 Dispute settlement by the arbitration committee
§ 66 Statutes
§ 67 Appeal to the arbitration committee
§ 68 Entry into force and publication of statutes
§ 69 Content of supervision
§ 70 Notification requirements
§ 71 Regulatory measures
§ 72 Revocation of the permission to view
§ 73 Effects of the revocation of the authorization
§ 74 Control of the conditions for management agreements
§ 75 Publications of the supervisory authority
§ 77 Cooperation with the Commission
§ 78 Punishment
§ 79 Copyright Senate
§ 80 Fees and remuneration for the Copyright Senate
§ 81 Proceedings before the Copyright Senate
§ 82 Arbitration Committee
§ 83 Supervisory authority for collecting societies
§ 84 Financing the supervisory authority
10. Section: Final and Transitional Provisions
§ 85 Tax exemption
§ 86 Come into effect
§ 87 Continuation of legal acts
§ 88 Adaptation of the organizational regulation and management
contracts
§ 89 Information obligations about the management of rights
§ 90 Transitional provisions for transparency and reporting
obligations
§ 91 Access to multi-territorial licensing
§ 92.1 Cooperation with the Commission
Belgium Code of Economic Law Provisions of the
Directive plus few
Art.I.16 Definitions additional
6 °: Definition of IME requirements.
Art. XI.246 The independent management entities established in

Belgium are subject to Articles XI.261, § 1, XI.266, 1 °, 2 °, 3 °, 5 °,
6 °, 7 °, XI.267 and XI.269.
Art. XI.261
§ 1 Negotiations in good faith
Art. XI.266 Information to the public

Without prejudice to other legal provisions, each management
company publishes on its internet page in a clearly legible place
155
and with clear reference in the main menu of the internet page at
least the following information and keeps it up to date:
1 ° its statutes;
2 ° its membership conditions and the conditions for termination or
withdrawal of the authorization to manage rights, if these are not
included in the statute;
3 ° standard license agreements and normally applicable rates,
including discounts;
5 ° its general policy regarding the distribution of the amounts due
to rightholders;
6 ° its general management fee policy;
7 ° its general policy on deductions, for purposes other than those
relating to management fees, from rights income and from any
other income arising from the investment of rights income,
including deductions for social, cultural and educational purposes;
Art.XI.267 Information provided upon request
Art.XI.269 Information to rightsholders
Independent management entities established in another Member

State of the European Union and having a branch office in
Belgium are subject to Articles XI.261, § 1, XI.266, 1 °, 2 °, 3 °, 5 °,
6 °, 7 °, XI.267 and XI.269. § 2. for the exercise of their activities
on Belgian territory.
Bulgaria Law on Copyright and Related Rights (SG, issue 56/1993, as Provisions of the
amended as of December 13, 2019) Directive plus few
additional
Art. 94 a. Definition of IME requirements.
Registration certificate
Personal data protection
Authorization
Art. 94 b Conditions for registration

Art. 94 c Information provided to rightsholders
Art. 94 t Information provided upon request to rightholders, other
collective management organizations or users
Art. 94 y Information that must be made public
para 2
The independent rights management companies shall disclose on
their website at least the information under para. 1, items 1 -3,
items 5 -7, as well as the information under Art. 94c, para. 3. (3)
The organizations for collective management of rights and the
independent companies for management of rights shall keep up-
to-date the information under para. 1 and 2.
Chapter Eleven I “Control over the collective rights management”

Art. 94ш. Control
Art. 94шт. Actions for control
Art. 94шт.SUP>1. Exchange of information

Croatia The Croatian Law on Copyright; Act on amendments to the Provisions of the
Copyright and Related Rights Act Directive plus few
additional
Art. 5 d) Definition of IME requirements.
Chapter 10 Independent Management Entities.

The provisions referred to in Article 162 paragraph (1), Articles 168
and 168b, Article 168c points a), b), c), f), g) and h), Article 168t
and Article 171a of this Act shall be accordingly applied to the
independent management entities
Art. 162 (1) Price for the use of subject matter of protection
Art. 168 Information provided to rightsholders on the management

of their rights
156
Art. 168 b Request for information
Art. 168 c (a, b, c, f, g, h) Disclosure of information to the public

A collective management organisation shall make public on its
website and continuously update at least the following information:
a) its statute;
b) its membership terms and the terms of termination of
authorisation to manage rights, if these are not included in the
statute;
c) standard licensing contracts;
f) its general policy on distribution of amounts due to rightholders;
g) its general policy on management fees;
h) its general policy on deductions, other than in respect of
management fees, from rights revenue and from any income
arising from the investment of rights revenue, including deductions
for the purposes of social, cultural and educational services
Art. 168 t Protection of personal data
Art. 171 a Cooperation with competent authorities in other Member

States of the European Union and the European Commission
Art. 171b Notification of collective management organisations
Art. 171c Supervision of the operation of independent

management entities and measures taken by the Office
Cyprus Law of 2017 on the Collective Management of Intellectual Provisions of the
Property Rights and Related Rights as well as on the Granting Directive plus few
of Multi-Territorial Licenses for the Online Use of Musical additional
Works (65 (I) / 2017) requirements.
Art. 3 Definition of IME

Art. 11 Register of CMOs and IMEs
Art. 12 Registration
Art. 13 Obligation to register
Art. 43 Complaints review procedure
Art. 45 Dispute resolution
Art. 49 Exchange of information between competent authorities
According to Art. 4 of the Law the provisions of Articles 26 (1), 28,

30, 31 (1) (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), and (g), 46, 47 and 48 apply to all
independent management entities established in the Republic.
Art. 12 (b) (2) Criteria for registration in the Registers
Art. 26 (1): Licensing; negotiations in good faith and exchange of

necessary information with each other
Art. 28: Providing information to beneficiaries on the management

of their rights
Art. 30: Providing information to beneficiaries, other collecting
societies and users upon request
Art. 31 Disclosure of information

Collective management bodies shall make public at least the
following information:
(1) (a): Their Articles of Association;
(b): the conditions of membership and expiry of the authorization
to manage the rights, if not included in the Articles of Association;
(c): standard licensing agreements and standard applicable
charges, including rebates;
(e): their general policy on the distribution of amounts due to
beneficiaries;
(f): their general management expenditure policy; and
(g): their general policy on deductions, other than management
costs, on revenue from royalties and on investment income,
including deductions for social, cultural and educational services
Art. 46: Compliance

157
Art. 47: Hierarchical appeal
Art. 48: Compliance checks
Czech Act No. 121/2000 on on Copyright, on Rights Related to Provisions of the
Republic Copyright and on Amendments to Certain Acts (the Copyright Directive only.
Act)
104 § Definition of IME (independent rights administrator)
104 a § Provisions of § 97b, § 98 par. 2, § 98a, § 99f par. 1 let. a)

to c) and f) to h), § 99j, § 102 and § 102a shall apply to the
independent rights administrator similarly.
§ 97b: information provided to rightsholders
§ 98 par. 2: concluding contracts with users / providing necessary

information
§ 99f par. 1: Information provided to the public

a) statutes
b) conditions of membership and conditions of termination of the
authorization to perform collective administration,
c) model license agreements,
f) accounting rules,
g) rules for determining the average amount of deductions to cover
the costs of rights management, if these rules are not regulated in
the budget rules,
h) rules for determining the amount of deductions from income
from the exercise of rights and from income from the investment of
income from the exercise of rights for purposes other than the
payment of rights management rights
§ 99j: Information provided to the Ministry

§ 102: Supervision of collective management
§ 102a: Cross-border cooperation between supervisors

Denmark Act on collective management of copyright and related rights Provisions of the
Directive only.
Section 1 (4). Sections 19 and 21; section 22 (1-3) and 22 (5-7);
and sections 38 and 39 apply to all independent management
entities established in Denmark.
Section 2.2 Definition of IME
Section 19: Information provided to rightholders on the

management of their rights
Section 21: Information provided to rightholders, other collective

management organisations and users on request
Section 22: Disclosure of information to the public

1) its statute;
2) its membership terms and the terms of termination of
statute;
3) standard licensing contracts and standard applicable tariffs;
5) its general policy on distribution of amounts due to rightholders;

6) its general policy on management fees;
7) its general policy on deductions, other than in respect of
management fees, from rights revenue.
Section 38: Supervision
Section 39: Sanctions

Estonia Copyright Act Provisions of the
Directive plus few
§ 76.4: Definition of IME additional
requirements.
158
§ 78: Application of provisions
(2) §§ 77, 7912and 7914, clauses 7915 1), 2), 4), 5) and 6) and §§
7926 and 7927of this Act apply to the activities of independent
management entities.
§ 77: Notification obligation

§ 7912: Information provided to rightholders regarding exercise of
their rights
§ 7914: Information provided to rightholders, other collective

management organisations and users at their request
§ 7915: Disclosure of information to public

A collective management organisation shall make public at least
the following information and update it on its website:
1) its statutes and the documents approved on the basis of the
statutes, including the information deriving from subsection 791(1)
and subsections 792(1) and (2) of this Act;
2) the standard licence agreements and standard applicable
tariffs, including discounts;
4) the general policy on distribution of amounts due to
rightholders;
5) the general policy on determination of management fees;
6) the general policy on deductions, other than in respect of
management fees, from rights revenue or from any income arising
from the investment of rights revenue
§ 7926: State supervision
§ 7927: Specific state supervision measures

Finland Act on the Collective Management of Copyright (1494/2016) Provisions of the
Directive plus few
Section 2.2: The provisions of sections 5–9, 22, subsection 1, additional
sections 24, 25, 33–39, section 40, subsection 1, paragraph 1 and requirements.
paragraphs 3–9, and sections 53–62 of the Act on the Collective
Management of Copyright (1494/2016) shall apply to the
independent management organisations referred to in section 4,
subsection 2.
Section 4.2: Definition of IME (independent management

organization)
Section 5: Rightholders’ right to choose the collective

management organisation
Section 6: Prohibition to impose unnecessary obligations on the

rightholders
Section 7: Rightholders’ independent right to grant licences
Section 8: Rightholders’ right to revoke a mandate for collective

management
Section 9: Rightholders’ right to be informed of their rights related

to mandates and the terms and conditions of revocation
Section 22 subsection 1: Management fee and other deductions
Section 24: Obligation regarding the timely settlement of copyright

remuneration due to rightholders
Section 25: Information to be provided to rightholders in

connection with settlement
Section 33: Obligation to offer a licence

Section 34: Obligation to conduct licensing negotiations in good
faith
Section 35: Requirements for licensing terms

159
Section 36: Licensing on a trial basis
Section 37: Users’ rights related to interaction and communication
Section 38: Reporting use
Section 39: Obligation of collective management organisations to

provide information about the repertoire
Section 40 subsection 1 paragraph 1 & 3–9: Obligation of

collective management organisations to publish information on
their website
Collective management organisations shall publish and maintain

the following information in Finnish and Swedish on their website:
1) the rules or articles of association of the collective management
organisation
3) the terms of revocation of mandate to manage rights;
4) the names of the members of the supervisory body;
5) the name of the managing director or other person referred to in
section 17;
6) the standard licensing terms and the applicable standard tariffs,
including any discounts;
7) the general policy on the settlement of copyright remuneration
due to rightholders;
8) the general policy on management fees;
9) the general policy on deductions, other than in respect of
management fees, from copyright remuneration and from any
revenue arising from the investment of remuneration;
Section 53: Notice of collective management of copyright
Section 54: Supervisory authority
Section 55: Cooperation between authorities
Section 56: Pendency of a supervisory matter
Section 57: Priority and inadmissibility of matters
Section 58: Right of access to information and right of inspection
Section 59: Auditor’s right to provide information to the supervisory

authority
Section 60: Admonition, warning and notice of conditional fine
Section 61: Request for review
Section 62: Advisory board for the development of collective

management
France Intellectual Property Code Provisions of the
Directive plus few
Art. L. 321-6. para 1: Definition of an IME additional
requirements.
Art. L. 321-6. para 2: Independent management bodies
established in France are subject to the provisions of the second
paragraph of article L. 322-1, the first, second and fourth
paragraphs of article L. 324-6, of articles L. 324-7 , L. 324-8, L.
324-12 to L. 324-14, the second paragraph of article L. 326-2,
articles L. 326-3, L. 326-4 and L. 328- 1. They are subject to the
control of the control commission of copyright and related rights
management bodies under points 1 and 2 of article L. 327-1. The
mediation provided for in a of 3 ° of article L. 327-1 is also
applicable to them.
Art. L.322-1, para 2: Information to rightsholders on management

fees and other deductions
160
Art. L. 324-6, para 1, 2 & 4: Conditions for granting authorizations
for the exploitation of rights; remuneration criteria; remuneration
for new services (test licenses)
Art. L324-7: Communication with users
Art. L324-8: Communication by the users
Art. L324-12: Payment of sums due to rightsholders
Art. L324-13: Non-distributable amounts
Art. L324-14: Identification and locating rightsholders
Art. L326-2, para 2: Publication of information to the public
Art. L326-3: Information to the rightsholders
Art. L326-4: Information upon request
Art. L328-1: Dispute handling procedure

IMEs managing rights in musical works
Art. L. 321-6. para 3: The independent management bodies
established in France managing the exploitation rights of protected
musical works are also subject to the provisions of Articles L. 325-
1, L. 325-2, L. 325-5 to L. 325- 7. The mediation provided for in
point 3 ° of article L. 327-1 is also applicable to them.
Art. L325-1: Authorization for the multi-territorial exploitation of

online rights to a musical work
Art. L325-2: Conditions for authorization for the multi-territorial

exploitation of online rights to a musical work
Art. L325-5: Mediation
Art. L325-6: Limitation of application of certain provisions
Art. L325-7: Limitation of application of provisions of Art. L. 324-12.
Art. L-327-1, point 3 °: Mediation mission
IMEs established outside the EU

Art. L. 321-6. para 4: The independent management bodies
established outside the European Union managing the exploitation
rights in France of works or other protected subject matter, are
subject to the provisions of the first, second and fourth paragraphs
of article L. 324-6, Articles L. 324-7, L. 324-8, L. 324-12 to L. 324-
14, the second paragraph of article L. 326-2, article L. 326-3 and
Article L. 326-4. They are subject to the control of the control
commission of the bodies for the management of copyright and
related rights under point 2 of article L. 327-1. The mediation
provided for in a of 3 ° of article L. 327-1 is also applicable to
them.
Art. L324-7: Communication with users
Art. L324-8: Communication by the users
Art. L324-12: Payment of sums due to rightsholders
Art. L324-13: Non-distributable amounts
Art. L324-14: Identification and locating rightsholders
Art. L326-2, para 2: Publication of information to the public
Art. L326-3: Information to the rightsholders
161
Art. L326-4: Information upon request
Art. L-327-1, point 2 °: monitoring compliance
Art. L-327-1, point 3 °: Mediation mission
IMEs established outside the EU managing rights in musical works

Art. L. 321-6. para 5: Independent management bodies
established outside the European Union managing the exploitation
rights in France of protected musical works are also subject to the
provisions of Articles L. 325-1, L. 325-2, L. 325- 5 to L. 325-7
Art. L325-1: Authorization for the multi-territorial exploitation of

online rights to a musical work
Art. L325-2: Conditions for authorization for the multi-territorial

exploitation of online rights to a musical work
Art. L325-5: Mediation
Art. L325-6: Limitation of application of certain provisions
Art. L325-7: Limitation of application of provisions of Art. L. 324-12

Germany Act on the Management of Copyright and Related Rights by Provisions of the
Collecting Societies (Collecting Societies Act) Directive only.
Section 4 (1): Definition of IME
Section 4 (2): Sections 36, 54, 55 and 56 (1) nos 1 to 4 and 7 to 9

shall apply mutatis mutandis to independent management entities.
Section 91 shall apply in respect of supervision.
Section 36: Negotiations
Section 54: Provision of information to entitled persons
Section 55: Information regarding works and other subject matters
Section 56 (1) nos 1 to 4 and 7 to 9:

(1) The collecting society shall publish at least the following
information on its website:
1. its statute,
2. the conditions of management, including the conditions for the
termination of the management relationship and the withdrawal of
rights,
3. the standard license agreements,
4. the tariffs and standard rates of remuneration, in each case
including discounts
7. the distribution plan,

8. the general policy on deductions made from the rights revenue
in respect of management fees,
9. the general policy on deductions made from the rights revenue
for purposes other than in respect of management fees, including,
where applicable, deductions made to promote culturally important
works and contributions and for the establishment and operation of
welfare and assistance schemes
Section 91 (supervision): Supervision of independent management

entities
Sections 75, 76, 85 (1) to (3) and sections 86 and 87 shall apply
mutatis mutandis to independent management entities (section 4).
Section 75: Supervisory authority
Section 76: Scope of supervision
Section 85 (1 to 3): Rights of the supervisory authority

162
Section 86: Powers of the supervisory authority in the case of
collecting societies established in another Member State of the
European Union or another Contracting Party to the Agreement on
the European Economic Area
Section 87: Exchange of information with supervisory authorities in

other Member States of the European Union or other Contracting
Parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area
Greece Law 4481/2017 (Official Government Gazette A΄ In the Greek legislation,
100/20.07.2017) on collective management of copyright and there is a distinction
related rights, multi-territorial licensing in musical works for made between IMEs
online use in the internal market and other issues falling and IMEs in a dominant
within the scope of the Ministry of Culture and Sports position. Almost all
provisions applicable to
Art. 3.1 c): Definition of IME CMOs apply to IMEs in
dominant positions
Art. 2.6: Article 22 par. 1, Articles 25 and 27, items(a), (b), (c), (f), (therefore, more
(g) and (h) of paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of Article 28, Article extensive regulation
32, Article 43, Articles 46 and 47 and Article 49 shall apply to all than in the Directive)
independent management entities established in Greece. whereas regular IMEs
are less regulated than
Art. 22: Licencing, determination of remuneration and equitable CMOs (provisions of
remuneration the Directive only).
par. 1: negotiations in good faith
Art. 25: Information provided to rightholders on the management of

their rights
Art. 27: Information provided to rightholders, other collective

Art. 28: Disclosure of information

1. The collective management organisation shall publish on its
website at least the following information:
(a) its statute;
(b) its membership terms and the terms of termination of
authorization to manage rights, if these are
not included in its statute;
(c) standard licensing contracts and standard applicable tariffs,
including discounts, if they exist;
f) the method of distribution of the amounts due to rightsholders

and the regulation concerning the rights distribution per category
of rightsholders, in which the exact method of distribution is
stipulated;
g) the management fees and the method for their calculation;
h) the deductions, other than concerning the management fees,
from rights revenue and from any income arising from the
investment of rights revenue; and par. 3: 3. The collective
management and the collective protection organisations shall
publish the information above in a machine-readable format and at
a fixed place of storage and shall keep it updated.
Art. 32: Independent management entities
Art. 43: Notification of potential violations
Art. 46: Sanctions
Art. 47: Collection of the fine
Art. 49: Protection of personal data
IMEs in dominant position

Art. 2.7: The provisions on collective management organisations,
as set out in Articles 1 to 54, with the exception of paragraphs 1
and 4 of Article 32, shall apply to the independent management
entities referred to in Article 50, unless otherwise specified in this
163
Law.
Art. 50 Collective management by independent management

entities in dominant position
Art. 1: Purpose
Art. 2: Scope
Art. 3: Definitions
Art. 4: Operating License
Art. 5: Establishment of a unitary collective management
organisation
Art. 6: Competencies
Art. 7: Presumptions
Art. 8: General provisions – Operation and Organisation
Art. 9: General Assembly of Members
Art. 10: Supervisory Board
Art. 11: Relationships between the CMOs and rightsholders –
general principles
Art. 12: Management Authorization
Art. 13: Admission of Members
Art. 14: Licenses for non-commercial uses
Art. 15: Rights of rightsholders who are not members of a CMO
Art. 16: Obligation to inform of the rightsholders’ works
Art. 17: Rights revenue
Art. 18: Deductions
Art. 19: Distribution of amounts due to rightsholders
Art. 20: Rights management under representation agreements
Art. 21: Deductions and payments in representation agreements
Art. 22: Licensing, determination of remuneration and equitable
remuneration
Art. 23: Tariffs
Art. 24: Users’ obligations
Art. 25: Information provided to rightsholders on the management
of their rights
Art. 26: Information provided to other collective management
organisations on the management of rights under representation
agreements
Art. 27: Information provided to rightholders, other collective
Art. 29: Annual transparency report
Art. 30: The content of the transparency report
Art. 31: Obligations of the persons who manage the business of
the CMO
Art. 32, paras. 2, 3 & 5: Independent management entities
2. If an independent management entity operates in the Greek
territory in the form of a public limited company, its shares shall be
registered in their entirety. If a shareholder of such an independent
management entity is another public limited company, with a stake
of at least 1% in its share capital,
the shares of that company shall also be registered in their
entirety, up to the last identified registered natural person. In case
of participation of companies of a legal form, other than the form of
public limited company, in which public limited companies
participate or hold shares with a stake of at least
1%, their shares shall be registered in their entirety, up to the last
identified registered natural person.
3.The obligations under paragraph 2 shall also apply to foreign

public limited companies, which have a branch in Greece or
operate through established agents, provided that the law of the
country of their registered office provides for the registration of
their shares in their entirety up to the last
identified registered natural person, in respect of their activities in
whole or in part. If there is no such obligation according to the law
of the country in which they have their registered office, they shall
produce a relevant certificate from the competent authority of that
country, to the extent it is provided for by a legal provision,
otherwise the foreign company shall provide a declaration of
164
similar content and a detailed list of shareholders up to the last
identified registered natural person, as provided for in paragraph
2, which shall apply accordingly.
5.For the entry of an independent management entity into a

collective management organisation, pursuant to Article 13 (1), the
following is required: (a)the lack of any conflict between the
interests of members and/or shareholders and/or partners and/or
management members of the independent management entity
and those of the collective management organisation and of their
members or their rightholders respectively, (b)the prohibition on
the simultaneous potential exercise of anti-competitive practices
by the independent management entity, and c) the approval of the
entry by an increased majority of 75% of the members present at
the general meeting and/or of the supervisory board of the
respective collective management organisation.
Art. 33: Conditions for multi-territorial licencing for online rights in

musical works
Art. 34: Transparency of multi-territorial repertoire information
Art. 35: Accuracy of information on multi-territorial repertoires
Art. 36: Accurate and timely reporting and invoicing
Art. 37: Accurate and timely payment to rightsholders
Art. 38: Agreements between CMOs for multi-territorial licensing
Art. 39: Obligation to represent another CMO for multi-territorial
licensing
Art. 40: Access to multi-territorial licensing
Art. 41: Specific arrangements
Art. 42: Complaint procedures
Art. 43: Notification of potential violations
Art. 44: Alternative dispute resolution procedures
Art. 45:
Art. 46: Sanctions
Art. 47: Collection of the fine
Art. 48: Exchange of information between the competent
authorities
Art. 50: Collective management by IMEs in dominant position
Art. 51: Commissioner for Reorganisation
Art. 52: Rights infringement on the internet
Art. 53: Transitional provisions
Art. 54: Repealed and amended provisions of Law 2121/1993
Hungary 2016. XCIII. Act on the Joint Management of Copyright and Provisions of the
Copyright-Related Rights Directive plus few
additional
§ 4.4: Definition of IME (independent collecting society) requirements.
§2 (4) For the purposes of this Act, joint rights management or

rights management by an independent rights management
organization is directed to the territory of Hungary, if such activities
of the foreign organization relate to use in the territory of Hungary.
§ 3.2 (2) The Civil Code (hereinafter: the Civil Code) on the
establishment, operation, organization and management of
domestic collecting societies or independent collecting societies in
matters not regulated by this Act, as well as on domestic collecting
societies on the right of association, public benefit status and civil
law The provisions of the Act on the Operation and Support of
Organizations (hereinafter: Civil Act) shall apply.
THIRD PART
RULES APPLICABLE TO INDEPENDENT RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS
42. Notification of rights management activity
§ 71. The notification obligation pursuant to § 33 (1) shall also
apply to the independent collecting society.
43. Data provision, transparency

Section 72 The obligation to provide information pursuant
165
to Section 53 (1), Section 54 (1) a) -c) , e) , f) , h) and j) and
Section 56 shall apply to the independent rights manager. shall
also apply to an organization, provided that for the purposes of
Section 54 (1) ( a) , the articles of association shall mean the
memorandum of association of the independent collecting society.
44. Establishment and application of tariffs in the field of

rights management
Section 73 Section 57 (1) shall also apply to the independent
collecting society.
216/2016. (VII. 22.) Government Decree laying down detailed

rules for the operation of collective management
organizations and independent management entities and
procedures for the management of rights.
Ireland SI No 156 of 2016 European Union (Collective Rights Provisions of the
Management) (Directive 2014/26/EU) Regulations 2016 Directive only.
2. Interpretation
Definition of IME
1 (5) The following provisions of these Regulations apply to

independent management entities established in the State:
(a) Regulation 14: Licensing
(1) A collective management organisation or independent
management entity and a user shall conduct negotiations for the
licensing of rights in good faith.
(2) A collective management organisation or independent
management entity and a user shall provide each other with all
necessary information.
(b) Regulation 16: Information provided to rightholders on the

(c) Regulation 18: Information provided to rightholders, other

collective management organisations and users on request
(d) Regulation 19 Disclosure of information to public:
3) An independent management entity shall make public at least

(a) its statute;
statute;
(d) its general policy on distribution of amounts due to rightholders;
(e) its general policy on management fees;
(f) its general policy on deductions, otherwise than in respect of
for the purposes of social, cultural and educational services
Italy LEGISLATIVE DECREE 15 March 2017, n. 35 Provisions of the
Implementation of Directive 2014/26 / EU on the collective Directive only.
management of copyright and related rights and on the
granting of multi-territorial licenses for rights in musical
works for online use in the internal market.
Art. 2.2 Definition of IME
Art 3.2. The independent management entities referred to in article

2, paragraph 2, must satisfy the requirements set forth in article 8,
with the exception of paragraph 1, letter c), of the same article,
and are subject to the provisions of articles 22, paragraph 1, 24,
26, paragraph 1, letters a), b), c), e), f) and g), 27, as well as
Chapter IV of this decree.
Art. 8 Requirements for collective management organizations and

166
independent management entities carrying out activities
administration and mediation of rights related to copyright
(exc. paragraph 1, letter c)
Art. 22 Grant of licenses; negotiations in good faith
Art. 24: Information to rightsholders on the management of their

rights

1. Collective management organizations make public, keeping
them updated on their website, at least the following information:
a) the statute;
b) the conditions of membership and the conditions of withdrawal
of the authorization to manage the rights, if not specified in the
statute;
c) standard licensing agreements and the applicable standard
rates, including reductions;
e) the general policy for the distribution of amounts due to
rightsholders;
f) the general policy relating to management fees;
g) the general policy on deductions, other than that relating to
management fees, royalties and any income from expenses
management, including those aimed at performance
social, cultural and educational services;
Chapter IV: Dispute Resolution, supervision and sanctions

Latvia Law of Collective Management of Copyright as of 2020 Provisions of the
Directive plus few
Definition of IME additional
Section 1. Terms Used in this Law requirements.
6) independent management entity
Section 2. Purpose of the Law and Scope of Application

(4) The provisions of Section 30, Paragraph one, Sections 36, 37,
and Section 38, Clauses 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 of this Law shall be
applied also to independent management entities. Their
supervision shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions
of Section 65 of this Law.
Section 30, para. 1: Entering into an Agreement
Section 36: Information to be Provided to the Represented Holders

of Copyright or Related Rights
Section 37: Information to be Provided upon a Request Regarding

Works and Other Subject-matter
Section 38: Disclosure of Information to the Public

A collective management organisation has an obligation to post
the following information on its website and to update it not later
than within 30 days after the day of making changes:
1) its articles of association;

2) standard licensing contracts, rates for remuneration, including
discounts specified by the collective management organisation,
and justification for determination of the size of rates for
remuneration;
6) general regulations for distribution of rights revenue and other

provisions for distribution of remuneration;
7) general regulations regarding deductions from rights revenue,
including regarding management fees and deductions for the
provision of social, cultural and educational services;
8) general regulations for rights revenue not to be disbursed;
Section 65: Supervision of Activities of Independent Management

Entities
167
(1) The provisions of Sections 52, 53, 60, 61, 62, and 63 of this
Law with corresponding changes shall be applied to the
supervision of the activities of independent management entities,
except for the provisions of Section 60, Paragraph one, Clause 3
and Section 61, Clause 3.
(2) An independent management entity which operates in Latvia

shall notify regarding commencement of collective management of
economic rights in accordance with Section 57 of this Law. If such
notification is not submitted, the provisions of Section 59 and the
relevant provisions of Section 60 of this Law shall be applied.
Lithuania COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS LAW NO. VIII-1185 More extensive
Consolidated version regulation than in the
Directive.
Art. 2
25. Definition of IME (independent entity for collective
management)
Art. 66
5. The provisions of Articles 72 12, 72 15, 72 17, 72 18 (1), 1, 2, 3, 5,
6, 7, 72 19, 72 28 and 72 31 of this Chapter shall apply mutatis
mutandis to independent entities of collective management.
Art. 7212: Collective management organization licenses and

conditions for their issue
Art 7215: Holders of collectively administered rights are provided

with information on the administration of their rights
Art. 7217: Information provided at the request of collecting

societies, other collecting societies and users
Art. 7218: Disclosure of information of a collective management

organization to the public
(1) The collective management organization must make the
following information publicly available on its website:
1) its articles of association;
2) the conditions of their membership and the conditions of
revocation or cancellation of the permit to administer rights, if they
are not provided for in the articles of association;
3) the standard terms and conditions of licensing agreements
provided for in the description of the licensing procedure approved
by the collective management organization and the wage rates
approved by the collective management organization or
determined by collective bargaining (including wage rate discounts
and the conditions for their application);
5) a description of the procedure for distribution of amounts

payable to holders of collectively administered rights;
6) a description of the collective administration deduction
procedure;
7) a description of the procedure for other (non-collective
administration) deductions from the income of the collective
administration and any income received from the invested income
of the collective administration, including deductions for social,
cultural and educational services.
Art. 7219: Collective management organization transparency report
Art. 7228: State supervision of the activities of collective

administration organizations

Luxembourg Law of 25 April 2018 on collective management of copyright Provisions of the
and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in Directive only.
musical works for online use in the internal market and
amending the Law of 18 April 2001 on copyright, related
rights and databases
168
Art. 2 (4) Article 17, paragraph 1, Articles 19 and 21, Article 22,
paragraph 1, letters a), b), c), e), f) and g), and Article 37 s apply
to all independent management entities established in the territory
of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Art. 3 (2) Definition of IME
Art. 17 Tariffs and licensing

paragraph 1: Negotiations in good faith and exchange all
necessary information between the organizations and users.
Art. 19: Information provided to rights holders on the management

of their rights
Art. 21: Information provided on request to rightholders, other

collective management organizations and users
Art. 22 Publicity of information

Any collective management organization shall keep the following
information up to date on its public website:
a) its statutes;
b) its membership conditions and the conditions for terminating or
withdrawing the authorization to manage rights,
if these do not appear in the articles of association;
(c) model license agreements and its applicable standard tariffs,
including discounts
e) its general policy for the distribution of amounts due to rights
holders;
f) its general policy on management fees;
g) its general policy on deductions, other than those concerning
management fees, made on income from rights and any revenue
resulting from the investment of income from rights, including for
the provision of social, cultural and educational services
Art. 37 Compliance
Malta Control of the Establishment and Operation of Societies for Provisions of the
the Collective Administration of Copyright Regulations, 2016 Directive only.
(Legal Notice No. 239 of 2016)
2. Definition of IME
3 (d) regulation 20(1), regulations 26. and 28, paragraphs (a), (b),
(c), (e), (f) and (g) of regulation 29(1) and regulation 43 apply to all
independent management entities established in Malta.
Regulation 20(1): Negotiations in good faith and provision of

necessary information
Regulation 26: Information to rightsholders
Regulation 28: Information provided upon request
Regulation 29 (1): Disclosure of information to the public

A collective management organisation shall make public at least
(a) its statute;

statute;
(e) its general policy on distribution of amounts due to rightholders;
(f) its general policy on management fees;
(g) its general policy on deductions, other than in respect of
for the purposes of social, cultural and educational services.
169
Regulation 43: Compliance / Copyright Board
Netherlands Supervision and Dispute Settlement of Collective Provisions of the
Management Organizations for Copyright and Related Rights Directive only.
Act
Art. 1 d: definition of IME
Art. 25 d: Articles 21, first paragraph, article 2m, article 2o, article
2p, first paragraph, under a, b, c, e, f, and g, article 25b, apply
mutatis mutandis to independent management organizations
Art. 2 m: Disclosure of information to every entitled party to whom

it has allocated rights to income or payments
Art. 2 o: Disclosure of information upon request to any rightholder

or user or to the collective management organization whose rights
it manages on the basis of a representation agreement
Art. 2 p: Disclosure of information to the public:

(para. 1 a, b, c, e, f, & g)
The Supervisory Board ensures that a collective management
organization discloses at least the following information:
a) its statutes;
b) its membership conditions and the conditions for termination of
the authorization to manage rights, if these are not included in the
articles of association;
c) standard license agreements and normally applicable rates,
e) its general policy on the distribution of amounts due to
rightholders;
f) its general management costs policy;
g) its general policy on deductions, for purposes other than
administrative costs, on rights income and on any other income
arising from the investment of rights income, including deductions
for social, cultural and educational services;
(Art. 21 para. 1: This part has not yet entered into force)
Art. 25 b: Procedure for informing about possible violations

Poland Law of June 15, 2018 on collective management of copyright Provisions of the
and related rights Directive plus few
additional
Art. 2. [Scope of application] requirements.
1. The provisions of the Act apply to:
3) legal persons or organizational units that are not legal persons
to whom the law grants legal capacity, who do not act as an
authorized entity or are not an organization for collective
management of copyright or related rights, which perform activities
in the field of copyright or related rights management on the basis
of a legal title granted to them by entitled entities, hereinafter
referred to as "independent managing entities".
Portugal Law No. 26/2015 on Collective Rights Management with Provisions of the
incorporated amendments of 2017/2019 Directive only.
Art. 2. e) definition of IME
Art. 1.3
Paragraphs a ) , b ) , e ) to h ) and n ) of paragraph 2, paragraphs
4, 5 and 7 of article 28, paragraph 1 of article 36 and article 49 of
this law, as well as the legislation on protection of personal data,
apply to all entities of independent management established in
national territory.
Art. 28.
2. The collective management entities publish the following
information on their website:
a) Statutes or equivalent legal instrument;
b) Conditions of membership and terms of revocation of rights
management mandates;
170
e) Tariffs charged with mention of all relevant and necessary
elements for their application;
f) Rules on the distribution of the amounts due to the rights
holders;
g) Rules on management fees;
h) Rules on deductions from rights receipts for the purposes of
social, cultural and educational services and other purposes
approved by the general meeting;
n) Standard licensing contracts or general licensing terms and
conditions;
4. In relation to the rights holders, the collective management

entities ensure the existence of procedures that allow each rights
holder they represent, access, by electronic means, to the
following information:
a) Any personal data that have authorized the collective
management entity to use, including data on their identification
and location;
b) Rights receipts collected in your name or, in the case of
collective licensing or remuneration rights that do not allow the
individualization of the rights receipts in the collection act, the
amount due after distribution, including pending receipts ;
c) Amounts owed by category of rights managed and type of use,
paid and payable by the collective management entity;
d ) Deductions from management fees made in the period in
question as well as deductions made for any purpose other than
those related to management fees, including the amounts
deducted for the social and cultural function provided for in article
29;
e ) Complaint handling procedures and dispute resolution
available;
f ) The period during which the use was made for which the
amounts were allocated and paid to the rights holder, unless
reasoned reasons associated with the communication of
information by users prevent the collective management entity
from providing this information in due time .
5: Collective management entities shall provide the information

referred to in the preceding paragraph, preferably at the time of
the distribution of rights, or annually, to each rights holder who is
the recipient of rights receipts or to whom payments have been
made in the period to which the information relates.
7: Without prejudice to the provisions of article 48-B, collective

management entities must, in response to duly substantiated
requests, make available to rights holders, the other collective
management entity with which they have representation
agreements or to users, at least one of the following information,
via electronic means and without undue delay:
a ) The works or other services they represent, the rights they
manage, directly or under representation agreements and the
territories covered;
b ) The types of works or other services they manage, the rights
they represent and the territories covered, in cases where such
works or other services cannot be determined due to the scope of
activities of the collective management entity.
Art. 36.1 negotiations between users and collective management

entities must obey the principles of good faith and transparency,
including the provision of all necessary information to allow the
effective collection of the corresponding revenues.
Art. 49: Scope of inspection

1 - The inspection of the provisions of the present law is the
responsibility of IGAC.
2 - Without prejudice to civil and criminal liability, collective
management entities incur administrative offense for violations
committed in the exercise of their functions, in violation of the
provisions of this law.
171
3 - In the exercise of its supervisory function, IGAC may request
the intervention of the General Inspection of Finance and the Tax
and Customs Authority, whenever there is a need to investigate
matters related to indications of financial or material infractions.
specific measures whose supervision and intervention
competence falls to the referred entities.
4 - IGAC is the competent entity to receive and evaluate the
questions submitted by members, rights holders, users, collective
management entities and other interested parties, whenever they
consider any activities or circumstances that violate any the
Romania Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (No. 8 of March 14, Provisions of the
1996 – 2018 version) Directive plus few
additional
Art. 149 requirements.
1. Authors or rightholders may entrust, by contract, the
management of their rights to independent management entities.
Art. 149.2 & 149.3: Definition of IME
Art. 149.4: Obligation to inform the Romanian Copyright Office in

order to be registered
Art. 149.5: Producers of audiovisual works, producers of sound

and audiovisual recordings, broadcasting and television bodies,
publishers, managers or contractors may not operate or act as
independent management entities.
Art. 149.6: Right to conclude representation contracts
Art. 149.7: Representation rights
Art. 149.8: Obligations of IMEs
Art. 171: Information to rightsholders
Art. 184: Non-compliance & rights of the Romanian Copyright

Office
Slovakia Act No. 185/2015 Coll. on Copyright and Related Rights Provisions of the
Directive only.
Section 142.1: Definition of IME
Section 142.2: Independent management entity is subject to

obligations under Section 165 paragraph 1 and 2, Sections 178,
180 and Section 181 (a) to c) and (f) to (h). Supervision over
performance of obligations pursuant to the first sentence is
provided by the Ministry; Section 155 applies accordingly.
Section 155 Supervision (obligations set out in Sections 165, 178,

180, 181 a to c, f to h)
Section 165: Relationships with Users / negotiations
Section 178: Information Provided to Rightholders
Section 180: Information Provided Upon Request
Section 181: Providing of Information to the Public

Collective management organisation shall publish at its website at
least the following information
a) statute,
b) agreement templates pursuant to Section 165 paragraph 1, c)
tariffs list,
f) general policy on collection, distribution and payment of revenue
from collective management of rights,
g) general policy on claiming reasonable costs in the course of
collective management of rights,
h) general policy on collective valorisation of revenue from
collective management of rights, including general policy on risk
172
management.
Slovenia Act regulating collective management of copyright and More extensive
related rights (2016) regulation than in the
Directive.
Art. 5.1: Definition of IME
Art. 5.3: The first and third paragraphs of Article 13, the second
and fourth paragraphs of Article 14, Article 38, points 2, 3, 6, 9, 10,
12 and 13 shall apply to an independent management entity. the
first paragraph of Article 39, the fifth paragraph of Article 44 and
Articles 69 to 72 of this Act.
Art. 13 Application for a permit.
Art. 14: Collective management permit
Art 38: Provision of information to rightholders and foreign

collective management organisations
Art 39: Informing the public

para. 1
A collective management organisation shall publish on its website
the following information, which shall be freely accessible to the
public:
1. the permit to collectively manage copyrights;
2. its repertoire, the copyrights under its management and, in the
case of multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for
online use, the territories it covers;
3. its membership requirements, a sample authorisation form and
the requirements
regarding the termination of authorisation;
4. any common agreements concluded with the representative
associations of users;
5. a sample of the contract with users and the tariffs for particular
types of use;
6. the names of the foreign collective management organisations
with which it has
concluded representation agreements and a list of such
agreements;
7. the information about its membership in international
associations;
8. its statute;
9. the rules on distribution of collected rights revenue due to
rightholders;
10. the rules on the use of undistributed amounts of rights
revenue;
11. the rules on the investment policy with regard to rights revenue
investment in bank
deposits and the use of resulting income;
12. the rules on operating costs;
13. the rules on the dedicated funds;
14. the risk-management rules;
15. data on the persons authorised to represent it;
16. a list of members of its bodies, except the general assembly;
17. the information referred to in paragraph three of Article 35 of
this Act;
18. the number of its members and the total number of voting
rights;
19. provisional tariffs;
20. its adopted annual report and an audit report;
21. the criteria used for setting tariffs; and
22. the method of resolving disputes between the collective
management organisation and its members, rightholders, foreign
collective management organisations and users.
Art. 44 para. 5: Negotiating in good faith and provision of

information
Art. 69: Control competence

173
Art. 70: Powers of the supervisory authority
Art. 71: Obligation of collective organizations (to submit

information to the competent authorities)
Art. 72: Measures in case of violations of collective organizations

Spain Law No. 2/2019 of March 1, 2019, on Amendments to the Provisions of the
Consolidated Text of the Law on Intellectual Property, Directive plus few
approved by Legislative Royal Decree No. 1/1996 of April 12, additional
1996, and on the Transposition into the Spanish Legal System requirements.
of Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 February 2014 and Directive (EU) 2017/1564 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September
2017
Art. 153 Requirements of independent management operators

1. Notification to the authority
2. Definition
3. Independent management operators must comply, in the same
terms as management entities authorized by the Ministry of
Culture and Sports, with the obligations set forth in articles 163.1,
165, 166, 181, 183, section 1, letters a ) and b), and 186, letters c)
and e)
4. Information to the public (published on the website)
Art. 163.1: Granting of non-exclusive authorizations, negotiations

in good faith
Art. 165: Obligation to enter into general agreements with user

associations
Art. 166: Exceptions with respect to singular use that require the
individual authorization of the owner
Art. 181: Information provided to the holders of rights on the

Art. 183: Information provided upon request
Art. 186: Obligation to notify the competent Administration

c & e (The management entities are obliged to notify the
competent Administration in a diligent manner in accordance with
article 155:
c) The models of management contracts and their modifications)
e) General contracts concluded with user associations
Sweden Act on Collective Management of Copyright Provisions of the
Directive only.
Section 4.4: Definition of IME
Section 2.2: The provisions in ch. 9 § 1 and ch. 10 §§ 1, 2 and 4

and § 5 1-4, 6 and 7 also apply to independent administrative
organizations.
9 § 1: Contract negotiations
10: Information to rightsholders

10 § 1: Information about compensation and deductions
10 § 2: Providing information to the member organization of the

CMO
10 § 4: Repertoire information
10 § 5: Information to the public

A collective management organization shall keep the following
information available on its website:
1. the organisation's articles of association,
2. the terms of membership,
174
3. the conditions for terminating a management assignment,
4. the general conditions for licensing
6. the general principles for distribution to rightholders,
7. the general principles for deductions.
175
c. Other entities that are active on the market but do not fall under
definition of CMO/IME
Additional information, e.g.

Member
List of provisions definition/name of the third
State
type entities
Austria Federal Act on Collecting Societies (Collecting Societies Dependent management
Act 2016) entities (DMEs)
Dependent management entities
1 § 3 par. The provisions of this Federal Act applicable to

collecting societies shall also apply to institutions which,
even if only partially, are owned by a collecting society or
controlled by a collecting society and which, if carried out by
a collecting society, carry out activities that would comply
with the provisions of this Federal Act subject.
Belgium Code of Economic Law No specific name for this type
of entities.
Art. XI.246 § 2: The relevant provisions of this chapter apply
to entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole In their survey answers the
or in part, by a management company or a collective authorities also categorized
management organization, provided that these entities carry CMOs established in another
out an activity which, if it were carried out by a management member state, but which have
company or a collective management organization, would be a branch in Belgium, as these
subject to the provisions of this chapter. third type entities.
Art. XI.246 § 1: Collective management organizations, which Note on translation:

have a branch in Belgium, are subject, for the exercise of management company =
their activities on Belgian territory, to Articles XI.248 (general société de gestion (Belgian
principles), XI.248 / 6 (transparency reports), XI.248 / 7 collective management
(absence of criminal record requirements for management), organization)
XI.248 / 9, § 3 (accounting requirements), XI.248 / 12
(impartiality principle), XI.249 to XI.253 (rules on collection, collective management
distribution, and deductions), XI.255 to XI.257 (rules on organization= organisme de
administrative deductions), XI.261 to XI.267 (rules on gestion collective (collective
licensing negotiations and tariff-setting), XI.269 (rules on the management organization
provision of information to rightholders related to established in another EU
distribution), XI.271 to XI.273 / 1 (rules on financial reports), member state)
and XI .273 / 13 to XI.273 / 16 (additional obligations on
accounting, finances and audit).
Bulgaria Law on Copyright and Related Rights (SG, issue No specific name for this type
56/1993, as amended as of December 13, 2019) of entities.
Art. 94a. SUP> 2. (New, SG No. 28/2018, effective

29.03.2018) The provisions of this Act shall also apply to
organizations and companies owned or controlled directly or
indirectly, in whole or in part by organizations for collective
management of rights or by independent rights management
companies when exercising collective rights management
activities.
Croatia Copyright and Related Rights Act; Act on amendments In the Croatian Act, there are
to the Copyright and Related Rights Act two types of entities that do
Art. 154.1 c) specialized legal entity for the management of not fall into the category of
copyright and related rights is a company or another legal CMO or IME but are
person having individual management of copyright and somehow active in the rights
related rights as its main activity and employing minimum management market:
one person with an undergraduate or graduate university Specialized legal entity and
degree in law; other entities (natural or legal
persons) that don’t have a
Art. 158.3 specific name.
The collective management 176organization may entrust the
performance of certain administrative, technical or ancillary
tasks (for example, invoicing of users or distributing amounts
due to rightholders) under its control to another natural or
legal person, in the form of a written contract. Such contract
shall not influence the duty of the collective management
176
177organization to fulfil all the obligations pursuant to this
Act.
Cyprus Law of 2017 on the Collective Management of No specific name for this type
Intellectual Property Rights and Related Rights as well of entities.
as on the Granting of Multi-Territorial Licenses for the
Online Use of Musical Works (65 (I) / 2017)
Field of application
4 (3) The provisions of this Law shall apply to the entities
that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole
or in part by a collective management body, provided that
these entities carry out an activity that if carried out by the
collective management body would be subject to the
provisions hereof.
Czech Act No. 121/2000 on Copyright, on Rights Related to No specific name for this type
Republic Copyright and on Amendments to Certain Acts (the of entities.
Copyright Act)
§ 97 General conditions
(5) In order to make collective management more efficient, a
collective manager may carry out certain activities, such as
issuing invoices or distributing amounts due to rightholders,
through a person in which it has a controlling interest or is
directly or indirectly controlled in whole or in part by the
collective manager administrators. Title IV, with the
exception of Parts 2 and 3, shall apply mutatis mutandis to
this person; the collective manager or the collective
managers who establish it shall be responsible for the
exercise of collective management by that person.
§ 97 b Information provided to rightholders

(2) If a member of the collective administrator is a person
responsible for the distribution and payment of income from
the exercise of rights to rightholders, the collective
administrator shall provide him with the information referred
to in paragraph 1. obligations under paragraph 1 by analogy.
§ 99 c
(2) The collective administrator is obliged to distribute and
pay income from the exercise of rights and income from
investment of income from the exercise of rights to
rightholders in accordance with the accounting rules without
undue delay, no later than 9 months from the end of the
accounting period in which it collected such income, unless
objective reasons, in particular those relating to user
reporting, the determination of rights, the designation of the
rightholder or the assignment of information on works and
other subject matter to rightholders, prevent the collective
manager from complying with this time limit. This obligation
applies similarly to a person who is a member of a collective
administrator and is responsible for the distribution and
payment of income from the exercise of rights to
rightholders.
Denmark Act on collective management of copyright and related No specific name for this type
rights of entities; Member
organizations of CMOs.
Chapter 1
Section 1.3: The relevant provisions of this Act apply to
entities established in Denmark, directly or indirectly owned
or controlled, wholly or in part, by a collective management
177organization, provided that such entities carry out an
activity which, if carried out by the collective management
177organization, would be subject to the provisions of this
Act.
Section 19
2. Where a collective management 177organization
attributes rights revenue and has as members entities
which are responsible for the distribution of rights revenue to
177
rightholders, cf. section 24, the collective
management 178organization shall provide the information
listed in subsection 1 to those entities, provided that they do
not have that information in their possession.
3. The member organisations shall make at least the
information listed in subsection 1 available, not
less than once a year, to each rightholder to whom they
have attributed rights revenue or made payments in the
period to which the information relates.
Estonia Copyright Act No specific name for this type
of entities.
Chapter IX Collective Exercise of Rights
§ 78. Application of provisions
(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall be applied to the
entities controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by
a collective management 178organization, provided that the
substance of the activities of such entities is collective
exercise of rights
Finland Act on Collective Management of Copyright Member bodies of CMOs;
outsourced collective
25 § 2 par. The provisions of subsection 1 also apply to management duties handled
member bodies of collective management organisations that by other corporate entities or
forward settle copyright remuneration with rightholders. foundations.
63 § Responsibility for outsourced collective management

duties
The provisions of this Act concerning the activities of a

collective management organisation or an
independent management organisation also apply to other
corporate entities or foundations engaged in activities
covered by this Act that are either directly or indirectly,
wholly or in part under the ownership or control of a
collective management organisation or an independent
management organisation.
If a collective management organisation or an independent

management organisation transfers,
under an agreement or another, similar arrangement, any
duties assigned to it by this Act to a corporate entity or
foundation not under its ownership or control, the
transferring organization answers for the performance of
these duties in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
France Intellectual Property Code Legal person who is a
member of the CMO.
Article L326-3 II: When the income from the exploitation of
rights is distributed or paid to the holders of rights by a legal
person who is a member of the organization, to which the
latter has allocated the income, the organization
communicates the information mentioned in I unless this
legal person already has this information.
This legal person is required to make the information

mentioned in I available to the holders of rights that it
represents, under the same conditions.
(Reference from Article L326-3 II

Article L326-3 I.- The organizations make at least once a
year, in accordance with the terms defined by the statutes or
the general regulations, available to each of the rights
holders to whom they have distributed or paid income from
the exploitation of their rights during the previous fiscal year,
information relating to the management of these determined
by decree of the Council of State.)
Germany Act on the Management of Copyright and Related Rights Dependent management
by Collecting Societies entities (DMEs)
Definition and applicable provisions
178
Section 3
(1) “Dependent management entity” means an
179organization whose shares are at least indirectly or in
part held by at least one collecting society or which is at
least indirectly or in part controlled by at least one collecting
society.
(2) In so far as the dependent management entity carries out

the activities of a collecting society, the provisions applicable
to those activities under this Act shall apply mutatis
mutandis. The provisions referring to the management in
section 21 (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis,
irrespective of which activities of a collecting society the
dependent management entity carries out. Section 90 shall
apply in respect of supervision.
Greece LAW 4481/2017 (Official Government Gazette A΄ No specific name for this type
100/20.07.2017) on collective management of of entities.
copyright and related rights, multi-territorial licensing in
musical works for online use in the internal market and
other issues falling within the scope of the Ministry of
Culture and Sports
Art. 2.4 4. Provisions of Articles 1 to 54 shall apply to entities

owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part,
by a collective management organization, provided that
those entities conduct an activity which, if conducted by a
collective management organization, would be subject to the
provisions of this Law.
Hungary 2016. XCIII. Act on the Joint Management of Copyright No specific name for this type
and Copyright-Related Rights of entities.
§ 7. (1) A joint rights management organization may, in

justified cases on the basis of reasonableness or economy,
also carry out certain joint rights management activities
carried out by it through a legal person that is its sole owner.
(2) The legal person referred to in subsection (1), its

management and operation, as well as the joint rights
management activities performed by it (including the
reporting obligations under this Act) shall be subject to the
provisions of this Act in the same way as the owner
collecting society itself.
That legal person:

(a) may only engage in collective management activities to
which and to what extent the owner collecting society is
entitled,
(b) it may be owned only by a collecting society authorized

to carry out that collective management activity,
c) may not make a decision regarding the determination of

royalties and the use of collected royalties, in particular
distribution, deductions, investments, its activities decisions,
and
d) the provision of § 21 concerning the organizational form

shall not apply.
3. Such a legal person and the owner collecting society shall

be jointly and severally liable for the claims of the
rightholders against the legal person referred to in
paragraph 1.
Ireland SI No 156 of 2016 European Union (Collective Rights No specific name for this type
Management) (Directive 2014/26/EU) Regulations 2016 of entities; entities which are
members of a CMO or IME.
1 (4) Where an entity which is established in the State and is
directly or indirectly owned or controlled, wholly or in part, by
179
a collective management organization carries on an activity
which, if carried on by a collective management
180organization, would be subject to provisions of these
Regulations, those provisions apply to that entity.
16 (2) Information provided to rightholders on the

Where a collective management 180organization or

independent management entity attributes rights revenue
and has as members entities which are responsible for the
distribution of rights revenue to rightholders, the collective
management 180organization or independent management
entity shall provide the information listed in paragraph (1) to
those entities if they do not have the information in their
possession.
(3) Entities which are members of a collective management

180organization or independent management entity and are
responsible for the distribution of rights revenue to
rightholders shall make the information listed in paragraph
(1) available, not less than once a year, to each rightholder
to whom they have attributed rights revenue or distributed
amounts in the period to which the information relates.
Italy LEGISLATIVE DECREE 15 March 2017, n. 35 CMOs’ members who
Implementation of Directive 2014/26 / EU on the represent rightsholders.
collective management of copyright and related rights
and on the granting of multi-territorial licenses for rights
in musical works for online use in the internal market.
Art. 17
Distribution of amounts owed to right holders
1. Collective management organizations distribute regularly

and with the necessary diligence and precision the amounts
due to holders of rights in compliance with the provisions of
this document section and in line with the general policy on
distribution established pursuant to article 10, paragraph 4,
letter to).
2. Collective management organizations, or their members

who represent the rights holders, proceed with the
distribution and to payments of such amounts due to right
holders quickly, on the basis of economic criteria and in a
way how much analytically as possible, in relation to the
individual uses of works. The distribution must take place in
any case no later than nine months from the end of the
financial year in the course of which such proceeds were
collected, unless this is not possible respect the
aforementioned deadline for related objective reasons, in
particular, to the communication obligations by users, the
identification of the rights or holders of rights or attribution of
works and other protected materials to their respective
owners.
Art. 24 Information to holders of management rights of their

rights
2. The collective management organizations they have in

turn as members persons in charge of the distribution of the
proceeds to rights holders provide the information referred to
above paragraph 1 to these subjects, unless the latter are
already in possession. These entities provide at least once a
year the information referred to in paragraph 1 to the holders
of the rights to which they have allocated income or made
payments during the year previous one.
Latvia Law of Collective Management of Copyright as of 2020 Dependent management
entities (DMEs)
Section 1.1: Definition
180
1) dependent management entity – a legal person which is
controlled by a collective management 181organization and
is operating in Latvia. Within the meaning of this Law, the
control is direct or indirect implementation of the control on
the basis of the Law or an agreement with voting rights, the
right to appoint or revoke members of an administrative
body
Purpose of the Law and Scope of Application
Section 2
(1) The purpose of the Law is to create legal preconditions
for efficient performance of collective management of
copyright and related rights.
(2) The Law governs activity of collective management

organisations, independent management entities, and
dependent management entities by managing the rights of
the holders of copyright and related rights in the collective
interests of the abovementioned holders of copyright or
related rights, and also prescribes the procedures for
supervising the activity of collective management performers
and special provisions for the settlement of disputes.
(3) The provisions of this Law shall be applied to dependent

management entities insofar as they carry out the activities
characteristic to a collective management 181organization.
Regardless of what activities characteristic to a collective
management 181organization are carried out by dependent
management entities, the provisions of Section 14,
Paragraphs one, two, three, and four of this Law are applied
to them, and their supervision is carried out in accordance
with the provisions of Section 64 of this Law.
Conflict of Interest
Section 14, par. 14
Section 14. Inadmissibility of a Conflict of Interests of a
Member of the Executive Board
Supervision
Section 64
(1) The provisions of this Chapter (XI) shall be applied for
the supervision of the activities of dependent management
entities, except for that laid down in Sections 54, 55, and 56
of this Law.
(2) The dependent management entity shall notify regarding

commencement of collective management of economic
rights in accordance with Section 57 of this Law.
Section 57
Section 57. Notification Regarding Performance of Collective
Management of Economic Rights
If a collective management 181organization in accordance

with Section 54 of this Law does not need an
181organization181 for the performance of collective
management of economic rights, it shall, immediately after
commencement of collective management of economic
rights, notify the Ministry of Culture if:
1) it is established in another European Union Member State

or European Economic Area state and operates in Latvia;
2) it is established in Latvia and operates in another

European Union Member State or European Economic Area
state.
Lithuania COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS LAW NO. VIII-1185 No specific name for this type
amending the Republic Of Lithuania Law On Copyright of entities.
And Related Rights, 1999
181
Art 66 Entities of collective administration
4. In cases where the separate functions of collective
administration provided for in Paragraph 2 of Article 67 of
this Law are performed on behalf of collective management
organizations by entities managed or controlled by them, the
provisions of this Chapter shall apply to them insofar as they
apply to collective administration organizations directly
performing those functions.
Art. 72 Distribution and distribution of collective

administration income
2. The collecting society, as well as its member collecting
societies, shall distribute the collecting society’s income and
pay the amounts due to rightholders no later than nine
months after the end of the financial year in which the
collecting society’s revenue was collected, unless the
collecting society has no possibility to comply with this
deadline for objective reasons relating to notifications by
users of collectively administered works or subject matter of
related rights of the use of works and subject matter of
related rights, identification of rights related to such use,
identification and search of rightholders, information
enabling works and related rights to be classified rights
holders, search.
Luxembourg Law of 25 April 2018 on collective management of No specific name for this type
copyright and related rights and multi-territorial of entities.
licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the
internal market and amending the Law of 18 April 2001
on copyright, related rights and databases
Art 2. Scope
(3) The provisions of this law apply to entities established in
the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by a
collective management organization, provided that these
entities carry out an activity which, if carried out by a
collective management organization, would be subject to the
Malta Control of the Establishment and Operation of Societies No specific name for this type
for the Collective Administration of Copyright of entities.
Regulations, 2016 (Legal Notice No. 239 of 2016)
3.1 (c) The relevant provisions of these regulations apply to

entities directly or indirectly owned or controlled, wholly or in
part, by a collective management 182organization, provided
that such entities carry out an activity which, if carried out by
the collective management o182rganization, would be
subject to the provisions of these regulations
11 (3) Companies, business concerns or other organisations

which perform the functions of collecting societies according
to the provisions of the Act and these regulations, shall be
considered collecting societies for the purposes of the Act
and these regulations and shall be subject to the relevant
provisions thereof.
Netherlands Supervision and Dispute Settlement of Collective Organizations that are
Management Organizations for Copyright and Related members of the CMOs;
Rights Act Organizations that are directly
or indirectly owned or
Art 2i.3 Collective management organizations or their supervised in whole or in part
members which are organizations representing rightholders, by a collective management
distribute and pay these amounts to rightholders as soon as organization performing the
possible. Payment and distribution shall in any event take tasks of the CMO.
place no later than nine months after the end of the financial
year in which the rights revenue was collected, unless No specific name for these
objective reasons prevent the collective management types of organizations.
organization or, where appropriate, its members from
complying with this deadline.
182
Art 2m.2 When a collective management organization
allocates rights revenues and has organizations as
members that are responsible for the distribution of rights
revenues to rightholders, the collective management
organization shall provide the listed information, referred to
in paragraph 1, to these organizations, unless the collective
management organization does not provide this information
in its owns. The Board ensures that these organizations
disclose at least once a year, at least the information
referred to in the first paragraph, to any entitled party to
whom they have allocated income from rights or made
payments in the period to which the information relates.
Art. 5.3 The College supervises organizations directly or

indirectly owned or supervised in whole or in part by a
collective management organization, provided that such
organizations carry out an activity that, if performed by the
collective management organization, would be subject to
supervision of the College.
Art. 5.4 If a collective management organization cooperates

with or has work performed by a third party in connection
with the collection and distribution of fees under the
Copyright Act and the Related Rights Act, it remains
responsible for the performance of these tasks. In that case,
it will ensure the availability to the Supervisory Board of the
financial data that may be relevant to the performance of its
duties.
Art. 16.1 If a collective management organization

cooperates with or has work performed by a third party
established in the Netherlands, in connection with the
collection or distribution of fees under the Copyright Act or
the Neighboring Rights Act , this third party shall, without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 5, third paragraph, is
obliged to immediately provide the Board of Supervision at
its request with all information that the Board deems
necessary for the performance of its duties.
Poland Law of June 15, 2018 on collective management of No specific name for this type
copyright and related rights of entities.
Art. 2. [Scope of application]
1. The provisions of the Act apply to:
2) entities that perform activities in the field of collective
management of copyright or related rights on the basis of a
legal title granted to them by an organization for collective
management of copyright or related rights.
Portugal Law No. 26/2015 on Collective Rights Management with Associations of collective
incorporated amendments of 2017/2019 management entities may be
regarded as third-type
Article 14 entities.
Association of collective management entities
1 - The legally constituted and registered collective

management entities may associate with each other,
whether or not they constitute a new legal person, under any
of the forms provided for by law, to jointly pursue some of
their purposes, jointly representing the respective
rightsholders.
2 - The legal person constituted under the terms of the

previous number must register with IGAC and is subject to
the rules of organization and operation provided for in this
law, with the necessary adaptations.
3 - The corporate bodies of the legal person referred to in

paragraph 1 may include, in addition to the collective
management entities that constitute it, any natural or legal
person, regardless of whether or not they are the holder of
rights.
183
4 - The collective management entities that are members or
holders of the capital of the legal person constituted under
the terms of paragraph 1 are responsible for its acts, under
the same terms in which the principal is responsible for the
acts practiced by the commissioner.
5 - The business plan and budget of the legal person

constituted under the terms of paragraph 1 must be
previously submitted to the general meetings of the
collective management entities that constitute it.
6 - Whenever the activity of the legal person constituted

under the terms of paragraph 1 consists of the licensing and
collection of remuneration for rights receipts, the collective
management entities that constitute it are responsible for
distributing the amounts received, they are also responsible
for compliance the provisions of Article 29.
Romania Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (No. 8 of Common collectors and joint
March 14, 1996 – 2018 version) collecting bodies may be
regarded as third-type
Art 168 (9) entities.
(9) The collective management bodies may agree by a
protocol to be published in the Official Gazette of Romania,
Part I, by decision of the Director General of the Romanian
Copyright Office, the designation of a common collector on a
field of payers, on remuneration due to the categories of
rights holders represented by them. Also, the collective
management bodies may set up, with the approval of the
Romanian Copyright Office, joint collection bodies for
several domains, operating according to the legal provisions
regarding the federations of legal persons of private law
without patrimonial purpose, as well as according to the
express provisions regarding the organization and
functioning of the collective management bodies of this law.
Slovakia Act No. 185/2015 Coll. on Copyright and Related Rights According to the Slovakian
Act, the rights and obligations
Section 152 of CMOs set out in the
(3) Rights and obligations of collective management authorization documents, may
organisation arising from issued authorisation may not be transferred or passed
not be transferred or passed to another person. to third parties.
Slovenia Act regulating collective management of copyright and Outsourced service providers
related rights (2016)
Article 17
(Outsourced service providers)
(1) A collective management organisation may transfer
administrative and technical tasks related to the collective
management of rights referred to in points 5 to 7 of
paragraph one of the preceding Article to another collective
management organisation or company (hereinafter:
outsourced service provider). The outsourced service
provider shall not transfer those tasks to another person.
(2) The collective management organisation shall be held
accountable for the performance of the tasks transferred to
the outsourced service provider.
(3) An outsourced service provider other than another
collective management organisation shall be controlled by
the collective management organisation.
(4) A contract with an outsourced service provider shall
include the tasks transferred by the collective management
organisation to the outsourced service provider. The
contract and any amendments thereto shall enter into force
when approved by the general assembly with a majority of at
least three-quarters of voting rights present. Cancellation of
the contract with the outsourced service provider shall be
decided on by the
management.
(5) The collective management organisation shall inform the
competent authority about any conclusion, amendment or
184
cancelation of a contract with an outsourced service provider
within 14 days of its enforcement.
(6) The provisions of this Act relating to the supervision of
collective management organisations shall apply mutatis
mutandis to outsourced service providers.
Spain Law 2/2019, of March 1, which modifies the revised text Dependent management
of the Intellectual Property Law, approved by Royal entity (DME)
Legislative Decree 1/1996, of April 12, and by which they
are incorporated into the Spanish legal system Directive
2014/26 / EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council, of February 26, 2014, and Directive (EU)
2017/1564 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, of September 13, 2017
Article 152. Requirements of the entities dependent on a

management entity.
1. When an entity dependent on a management entity

develops in Spain an activity regulated in this title that is
specific to the management entity on which it depends, it will
be subject to compliance with that regulation in the same
terms as the entity itself would be.
A dependent entity of a management entity shall be

understood to be the legally constituted entity that, directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, is owned or controlled by a
management entity.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of

article 178 and the regulations regarding the control of the
statutes of the legal entity provided for in article 25.10 and
the one that manages the single billing and payment window
of article 168, The management entities will notify the
Ministry of Culture and Sports of the constitution of a
dependent entity or the integration into an existing entity.
Sweden Law (2016: 977) on collective management of copyright No specific name for this type
of entities.
Scope of the law
Chapter 1 Section 2
If a collective management organization instructs another
legal person owned or controlled by the organization to
perform a task regulated in this Act, what would have
applied to that task, if it had been performed by the
collective management organization, applies to the other
legal person.
185
15. Annex 5 – Description of legal disputes
How was Relevant

Relevant Involved Method of
Title / Status MS Brief description it articles of the References
Task stakeholders resolving
identified? Directive
Legal disputes with users
Disputes regarding tariff setting
Specific Users (several BE Task 2 In 2019, a number of Belgian festival and public Desk CMO Courts Article 16 Link 1 (EN);
example festival event organisers sued a Belgian CMO research (SABAM); (national
No. 1 organisers) vs. (SABAM), accusing it of unfair market practices Users and ECJ) Link 2 (EN)
SABAM and abusing its dominant position by unlawfully (Festival
increasing the tariffs for festivals; refusing to organisers)
deduct any costs other than reservations costs
from its tariff calculation basis; and applying
very high minimum tariffs. After SABAM
appealed the case to the Brussels Commercial
Court, the Court sought a non-binding opinion
from the EC.
In the meantime, two more festivals sued

SABAM for tariff malpractices in the
Commercial Court of Antwerp. The court
decided to refer the case to the CJEU for a
preliminary ruling on how Article 16 of Directive
should be read in conjunction with Article 102
of the TFEU. Consequently, in July 2020, the
Advocate General Pitruzella delivered his
opinion to the CJEU. His opinion was that
applying a flat-rate tariff in tranches on the
basis of the revenue of the receipts from ticket
sales or the artistic budget does not constitute
an abuse of a dominant position, unless,
amongst other things, there is another method
for identifying and quantifying the number of
protected works played at the festival more
186
accurately and provided that such a method
does not lead to a disproportionate increase in
the costs incurred for the management of the
contracts and the supervision of the use of
musical works played during the festival.
Specific Koda vs. DK Task 2 The case revolved around the payment Survey of CMO (Koda); Court Article 16(2) Link 1 (DK);
example HBO/Danmarks principles regarding the use of music in a CMOs; User (HBO; (Danish
No. 2 radio video-on-demand service, HBO. HBO wanted a desk Danmarks Copyright Link 2 (DK)
fixed price per seen minute, while the licensing research radio) Tribunal)
CMO (Koda) wanted a model where the
payment is a percentage of the service's
turnover, similar to the model that Koda has
agreed with other video-on-demand services.
Koda argues this to be the commonplace
practice in the European market.
The tribunal offered a compromise decision: a

pricing model as the sum of three different
elements (a payment for the number of
streamed music minutes; a payment as a
percentage of the turnover; a payment per user
per month). However, Koda appealed the
decision in 2020; the decision is about to be
published.
Disputes regarding distribution of royalties
Specific Anonym. HU Task 1/2 In the case at hand, the plaintiffs published Survey of Anonymous Courts Article 13 Pfv.IV.20.233/2019/8
example Hungarian sound recordings, which were sold in gross to a CMOs; publisher; summarised by legal
No. 1 CMO vs. third party. The ownership of the CDs was later desk Anonymous experts
anonym. transferred to the participants of musical research CMO
Hungarian concerts free-of-charge. The plaintiff provided
publisher82 the relevant data regarding the gross sale of
CDs to the defendant, a CMO managing the
82 All officially published Hungarian court cases are anonymised in Hungary.
187
public performance right of composers and
private copying remuneration of authors. The
CMO declined to pay a share of royalties
regarding private copying and public
performance. The defendant claimed that under
the Copyright Act and the CMO’s statutes those
royalties are due regarding such copies of
recordings that were directly sold to individuals
who are able to use the recordings to make
private copies therefrom. The case eventually
reached the Supreme Court, which agreed with
the lower courts both in the factual and the
legal interpretation of the case. Factually, the
Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiff failed to
provide evidence that the CDs (sold en masse
to third parties) were ultimately provided to
individuals; indeed, the plaintiff separately
confirmed that the CDs were provided to
attendees of concerts free-of-charge.
Consequently, the Supreme Court confirmed
that the two distinct types of royalties are only
due if the copies are provided to individuals
who are able to create private copies thereof.
As the plaintiffs failed to provide any proof of
that, their claim had no ground, and was
denied.
Disputes regarding evasion of payments
Specific AKM vs. AT Task In the summer of 2019, an Austrian CMO Survey of CMO (AKM); Court Article 16 Link, p. 7 (DE)
example Nordsee 2/3/4 (AKM) sued a major fish fast food chain CMOs; User (Higher
No. 1 (Nordsee) for using the licenses provided by desk (Nordsee); State Court
the collecting societies that have not been yet research IME of Vienna)
officially registered in Austria (i.e. Soundreef via (Soundreef)
its German intermediary, S12 GmbH).
The Higher State Court of Vienna sided with

AKM and concluded that since Soundreef had
no operating license in Austria, Nordsee was
not allowed to play music licensed by it in the
premises of its restaurants. Furthermore, the
188
Court noted that collecting societies without
licenses for operation in Austria are not allowed
to license Austrian users.
Specific PRS For Music UK Task 2 A British CMO (PRS For Music) sought Desk Non-EU CMO High Court Article 16 Link (EN)
example vs. Qatar damages from Qatar Airways for using its research (PRS for of Justice
No. 2 Airways members’ repertoire without a music licence in Music); User in London
place. The airline has offered music as an (Qatar
integral part of its in-flight services for decades, Airways)
but has not properly remunerated the CMO’s
rightholders, PRS argues. The dispute is still in
progress but the British court has already
confirmed its jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.
Specific TikTok vs. PRS UK, Task 2/5 The music industry and collecting societies for Desk Other entity Court / Article 16 Link (EN)
example for Music/ICE DE, rights in musical works have been trying to research (ICE); CMOs arbitration
No. 3 SE negotiate agreements with a social media (PRS For tribunal
platform (TikTok), threatening legal action Music;
against it for copyright infringement in the GEMA,
absence of such an agreement. They wanted to STIM); User
see their rightholders remunerated for the use (TikTok)
of their songs on the social media platform by
way of royalty payments. The problem is that
the terms and conditions of TikTok (unlike other
social media) state that by uploading a sound
recording, users grant TikTok the right to
reproduce it, publicly perform and communicate
it to the public on a royalty-free basis, including
to. This led to a dispute with major European
collecting societies.
Consequently, in 2019 ICE (which represents a

joint venture between GEMA, PRS, and STIM)
attempted to negotiate an agreement with
TikTok, which ended up in the British Copyright
Tribunal. By the end of 2019, TikTok dropped
the case and agreed to solve the issue by the
means of arbitration. While the outcomes of
arbitration are still unclear, in July 2020, TikTok
signed a number of licensing deals with
independent distributors and the UK National
189
Music Publishers Association.
Specific Anonym. HU Task 2 In the case at hand, the CMO managing the Anonymous Court Article 16 Pfv.IV.20.233/2019/8
example Hungarian public performance right of composers carried user; summarised by legal
No. 4 CMO vs. out an investigation at the premises of the anonymous experts
anonym. user defendant (which was a restaurant of a hotel, CMO
open to the public). The plaintiff found out that
a laptop is located in the premises of the
defendant, which was capable to perform
sound recordings publicly. The plaintiff also
found out that the defendant missed to inform
the plaintiff of its intention to use the machine
and also missed to pay the necessary fees for
such use. The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court, which sided with the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court confirmed that the laptop is
capable to carry out acts of public performance;
the premises of the defendant were open to the
public; and the user of such machine shall
inform the plaintiff CMO in advance about the
use of any such device. Should the defendant
fail to do so, the CMO in entitled to enforce the
relevant fees for the use.
Other legal disputes
Legal Temporary EL Task 1/2 The rightholders were unhappy with the Survey of CMO National Articles 5, 8, Link (GR)
dispute revocation of untransparent management of the CMO authorities; (Autodia); authority 10, 13, 22
No. 1 the CMO (Autodia) and sued it for violating the principles desk Rightholders; (HCO)
operating of collection and distribution as well as poor research National
license of general management. Authority
Autodia
Consequently, the national authority
temporarily revoked the operating license from
Autodia and demanded that Autodia brings its
operational practices into conformity with the
legal standards.
Legal Unart vs. RO Task 1 This is a series of legal disputes between Survey of CMOs Court Article 19 Link 1; (RO)
dispute Credidam UNART and CREDIDAM, which is the main CMOs; (Credidam (Bucharest
collecting CMO for mandatory collective desk Court of
190
No. 2 managementThat means CREDIDAM collects research vs. Unart) Appeal) Link 2; (RO)
the royalties under these sources and
afterwards they distribute the amount to other Link 3; (RO)
CMOs, including to members of UNART.
UNART claims that this is often done with little
or no transparency and that they have
difficulties in verifying the information given.
However, the Bucharest court of appeal so far
has sided with CREDIDAM.
Legal Greece vs. EL Task 1 After the allegations of corruption/misuse of Desk National National Articles 11-13 Link 1 (EN);
dispute AEPI revenue and investigation by the country’s research authority; authority
No. 3 Public Prosecutor, the country’s biggest CMO – CMO (AEPI) (HCO); Link 2 (GR)
AEPI was officially deprived of its license in Courts
2018. The Greek government created another
temporary CMO, EYED, to ensure proper
compensations/distribution of royalties.
Legal Cloudcasting HU Tasks In this case, Cloudcasting, a Hungarian IME, Survey of IME (Cloud Court Article 11 Case BDT 2020.85
dispute vs. Artisjus 1/4 issued a pro-forma invoice to Artisjus, a IMEs casting); of the Budapest
No. 4 Hungarian CMO, claiming that there are CMO Municipal Court of
machines such as laptops, HIFI systems, and (Artisjus) Appeals summarised
HDMI-projectors that are located in the central by legal experts
and regional headquarters of Artisjus and that
they are capable to publicly perform musical
works belonging to Cloudcasting. The plaintiff
argued, therefore, that the defendant is obliged
to pay remuneration for the use of its repertoire.
The Municipal Court of Appeals found the
plaintiff’s appeal against the refusal of the claim
unfounded. The Court argued that IMEs
“cannot be treated as representatives, they can
only act on behalf of the rightsholders who
mandate them to do so. [IMEs] cannot provide
for rights management with an extended effect
(that is, for the benefit of rightsholders who
have not mandated them). IMEs can solely
authorise the use of and collect remunerations
related to such contents for which the
rightsholders who mandated the IMOs gave
191
express authorisation”.
As such, Cloudcasting lost the case as it could

not provide evidence for its standing (active
legitimation) in the proceedings. This means
that the burden of proof to show that the
defendant had used exactly the content for
which the respective rightsholder gave a
mandate to the IME lies on the IME itself.
Legal Kopiosto vs. FI Task 1 Both CMOs (Tuotos and Kopiosto) were Survey of CMOs Court; Emerged Internal summary
dispute Tuotos (APFI) approved in 2015 by the Finnish ministry of CMOs (Kopiosto; Arbitration before the provided by legal
No. 5 education and culture as extended collective Tuosto/APFI) tribunal Directive; experts
licensing organisations. Kopiosto ry is a relates to
copyright organisation representing authors Article 13
and performers of copyrighted publications and
audiovisual works. APFI (Audiovisual
Producers Finland) is representing the
producer side in the same subject matter and
was established in 2018 by merger of Tuotos
ry, Elokuvantuottajat ry, SATU ry and
Audiovisual Finland ry. The original issue
emerged between them in 2015 after the
reformation of Finnish Copyright Act
(404/1961).
Both parties also received contractual license

fee revenues based on their licenses but had
not been able to agree on the distribution of the
fees for Finnish audiovisual products. The
parties had also entered into an agreement in
which they had not agreed on the distribution of
the compensations between themselves.
Tuotos first tried to settle the matter in the
Finnish Market Court in 2017. The market
court, however, viewed that the distribution of
compensation in this dispute was a contractual
matter and dismissed the case.
After the case was dismissed, Tuotos moved to

grassroot level activities along production
192
companies trying to persuade authors of
audiovisual field to terminate their contracts
with Kopiosto through various campaigns.
Eventually, in spring 2019 Kopiosto and
merged APFI agreed to arbitrate on the matter.
The arbitration body gave its decision in 2019,
which will be in force from 1.7.2015 to
30.6.2021. According to the decision, Kopiosto
was to pay €4.9 million to APFI starting from
2015. Kopiosto will receive 60% of the
revenues and APFI 40%.
Legal SACEM and FR Task The dispute opposed a group of European Desk CMO Court - (other Link
dispute SPRE vs. 1/4/5 companies specialised in offering background research (SACEM and entities;
No. 6 Music Matic music services to businesses with premises SPRE as an royalty-free
group receiving the public (e.g. shops, hotels, fitness umbrella music
clubs) and French CMOs involved in the CMO); IME vendors)
collection of remuneration for communication to (Jamendo);
the public of phonograms. The group of related Other entities
companies will henceforth be referred to as the (Audiovalley
“MusicMatic Group”. and Storever
France)
In 2009, MusicMatic France concluded a

contract with Tapis Saint Maclou, a company
having over a hundred stores around France,
specialised in the sale of decoration of floors
and interiors of houses. Under the terms of the
contract, MusicMatic France undertook to
provide against payment the stores of Tapis
Saint Maclou with devices enabling
personalised programmes of background music
“free of public communication rights.
MusicMatic’s business model was based on
licensing music released under Creative
Commons (CC) non-commercial licences and
offered through the Jamendo Licensing
platform with additional permissions enabling
commercial use.
193
In 2013, Tapis Saint Maclou received a claim
from SACEM, a French CMO, for over 100,000
euros for communication to the public of music
phonograms in the company’s stores.
MusicMatic France became involved because,
according to the terms of the mentioned
contract, it provided Tapis Saint Maclou with a
guarantee against copyright claims by SACEM,
specifically, or any other party. Other members
of the MusicMatic Group joined the dispute.
The case eventually landed in the French
Supreme Court. Essentially, the court analysed
three questions:
(i) Are phonograms published through a CC+

commercial licensing construction considered
as being “published for commercial purposes”?
(ii) Can performers contractually waive their
right to an equitable remuneration for
communication to the public of commercial
phonograms? (iii) Is mandatory collective
management of the right to an equitable
remuneration for communication to the public of
phonograms published for commercial
purposes compatible with EU law?
The Supreme Court established that

businesses using on their premises devices
provided by third parties for making background
music are performing an act of communication
to the public in the sense of Art. L214-1 of the
French Intellectual Property Code. The Court
qualified commercially licensed phonograms,
also published under CC non-commercial
licences (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) on the Jamendo
online platform, as “phonograms published for
commercial purposes”. According to the Court,
194
the right to remuneration for communication to
the public of phonograms published for
commercial purposes cannot be contractually
waived by performers. The right to
remuneration is subject to mandatory
management by a CMO regardless of whether
rightholders have explicitly contractually
entrusted the exercise of their rights to the
CMO. Mandatory collective management of the
right to remuneration for communication to the
public of phonograms published for commercial
purposes is compatible with EU law. The
Supreme Court declined to refer the question of
the compatibility of mandatory collective
management to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU), considering that the
law is sufficiently clear in this regard.
Legal UNISON vs. ES Task 1/4 UNISON, a Spanish IME, filled a complaint in Survey of CMO National Article 5 Link (ES)
dispute SGAE 2016 for alleged abuse of dominant market IMEs (SGAE); IME competition
No. 7 position by a Spanish CMO, General Society of (UNISON) authority
Authors and Editors (SGAE) in several
markets. These are the markets for collectively
managing the intellectual property rights of
authors and publishers of musical and
audiovisual works, and the markets for granting
authorisations and remunerating the public
reproduction and broadcast rights for the same
works respectively. The Spanish competition
authority, CNMC, found evidence of a
continued infringement of Law on Free
Competition and of Article 102 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
by the SGAE:
(i) by imposing on its partners conditions that

unjustifiably restrict both the initial attribution to
the SGAE of the partial management of
property rights, as well as the revocation or
partial withdrawal of the management of said
195
rights.
(ii) through the joint sale, with no itemised

breakdown, of the audiovisual and musical
repertoire when granting authorisations and
remunerating the public reproduction and
broadcasting rights in the lodging sector.
(iii) through the joint sale and a price structure

that makes it difficult to compare and contract
with other operators in the granting of
authorisations and remuneration of public
reproduction and broadcasting rights in the
catering sector.
For these reasons, the CNMC imposed a fine

of 2.9 million euros on the SGAE.
Legal UNISON vs. ES Task 1/4 Having won the case referred to above, Survey of CMO Court Article 5 Link (ES);
dispute SGAE UNISON filed a lawsuit and requested interim IMEs (SGAE); IME Documents provided
No. 8 measures for the CNMC resolution to be (UNISON) by legal experts
applied as a matter of urgency, compelling (AJM B 113/2019)
SGAE to allow the owners to withdraw their
rights from the society in accordance with the
CNMC decision, Directive 2014/26/EU and the
recent reforms of the Intellectual Property Act.
In its resolution of December 20, 2019,
Barcelona Commercial Court No. 3 upheld the
urgent measures requested by UNISON, on the
understanding that, despite the CNMC's
resolution, acts of abuse of dominant position
and unfair competition by SGAE continue to
occur in the marketplace. The main lawsuit is
still in process, while the interim measures are
in place.
Legal Kopiosto vs. FI Task 2 This is a longstanding dispute regarding Interview CMO Court - (cable Link (EN); Link (FI)
dispute Telia transmissions of TV broadcasts by an internet with NA (Kopiosto); retransmission
service provider. The case was between the dispute
196
No. 9 local collective society Kopiosto, which User (Telia) specific to the
represents authors and performers in the audio-visual
audiovisual sector, and a major internet service sector)
provider in the Nordic region, Telia83.
The case concerned Telia’s operations in

Finland as it provides its broadband customers
with the possibility of receiving a number of TV
channels via their internet subscription. The
case was limited to such TV channels which
are broadcasted simultaneously free to air.
The dispute revolved around two key questions

of (i) whether collecting societies have standing
to sue for copyright infringement; and (ii)
whether internet access providers commit acts
of communication to the public when they give
access to their customers of TV programs that
are also broadcasted simultaneously free to air.
The Finnish Market Court found that, first,

Kopiosto did not have standing to sue for
infringement and, secondly, that the Telia did
not provide retransmissions of broadcasts but
original transmissions for which the rights had
already been cleared by the broadcasters.
However, according to the Finnish NA, the
ruling was appealed and the case is currently in
the Finnish Supreme Court.
Source: Visionary Analytics (2020).
83 A similar case landed in the Norwegian Supreme Court and was ruled out in favour of the user in 2016, see
197
16. Annex 6 – List of identified third-type entities
Entities, partially or fully, owned or controlled by collecting societies
Germany
ARESA – Anglo-American Rights European Service Agency
ICE – International Copyright Enterprise Services
SOLAR Music Rights Management
Zentralstelle Fotokopieren an Schulen
Zentralstelle Bibliothekstantieme
Zentralstelle für die Wiedergabe von Fernsehsendungen
Zentralstelle für private Überspielungsrechte
Austria
Raw Rechte84
Rightsholder associations
Italy
ANICA – Associazione Nazionale Industrie Cinematografiche Audiovisive E Multimediali
APA – Associazione Produttori Audiovisivi
UNIVIDEO – L'Agenzia per lo sviluppo dell'Editoria Audiovisiva
Finland* (this list contains some examples and is not exhaustive)

The Finnish Book Publishers’ Association
The Finnish Association of Translators and Interpreters
Finnish Music Creators FMC
The Finnish Music Publishers’ Association
The Finnish Union of authors writing for children, youngsters and young adults
Finnish Playwrights and Screenwriters Guild
The Society of Finnish Composers
Finnish Association of Technical Publishers
Finnish Association for Scholarly Publishing
Finnish Association of Science Editors and Journalists
The Association of Finnish Non-fiction Writers
Royalty-free music vendors

Belgium
Storever
France
Abydos Musique
84 The legal status of this entity is currently disputed due to an ongoing investigation by the NA.
198
EasyTrax
Denmark
FreeStore Music
Netherlands
Tribe of Noice
Sweden
Epidemic Sound
Non-EU royalty-free music vendors operating across different MS

Mood Media
Representative agencies
France
AllRightMusic
WriteHereMusic
Rightback Collections
Media IP Rights
Netherlands
Global Master Rights
Non-EU agencies operating across different MS

Kobalt Music
199
17. Annex 7 – Thematic question blocks of respondent
surveys
Group of
respondents
2. Questions on overall functioning of collective rights management in the country
3. Questions on the rights of rightholders
4. Questions regarding management of rights revenue
5. Questions regarding transparency of CMOs
6. Questions regarding relationships between CMOs and users
National
7. Questions on collecting societies established outside the EU, but operating in the EU
authorities
member states
8. Questions on (IMEs
9. Questions on third-type of entities active on the collective rights management market
10. Questions on collaboration between competent authorities from different MS
2. Questions on the overall functioning of collective rights management in the country
3. Questions on the possible change of legal status of organisation
4. Questions on the rights of rightholders (Article 5)
5. Questions on managing the rights of rightholders on behalf of other CMOs
CMOs
6. Questions on managing the rights of rightholders
7. Questions on licensing and users’ obligations
8. Questions regarding other market players
2. Questions on mode of operation in the EU market and reasons for entry in the EU
Non-EU 3. Questions on the applicable regulatory framework within the EU
CMOs 4. Questions on other non-EU based CMOs
3. Questions on the possible change of legal status of your organisation
4. Questions on licensing
IMEs
5. Questions regarding other market players and potential issues related to business
activity
2. Questions on the overall experience with their CMO
3. Questions on withdrawal of rights
Rightsholders 4. Questions on governance of CMOs
5. Questions on financial management of rights revenue
6. Questions on the overall experience with their IME (if applicable)
3. Questions on exchange of information with collecting societies
Users
4. Questions on the effects of rightsholders’ right to withdraw from collecting societies
200
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU
In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find
the address of the centre nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en
On the phone or by email
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact
this service:
– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls),
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or
– by email via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU

Online
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the
Europa website at: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en
EU publications
You can download or order free and priced EU publications at:

https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained
by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-
union/contact_en).
EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1952 in all the official
language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
Open data from the EU
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en) provides access to datasets from the
EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial
purposes.
201
KK-02-21-854-EN-N
doi: 10.2759/91877
ISBN 978-92-76-39970-4

SMART 20190024 Study On Selected Issues Relating To The Application of The CRM Directive 002 1t6nLoSSteh97SGPrDKCmhLKkxs 81238

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SMART 20190024 Study On Selected Issues Relating To The Application of The CRM Directive 002 1t6nLoSSteh97SGPrDKCmhLKkxs 81238

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Study on selected issues

relating to the application of

Study on selected issues relating to

Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology

PDF ISBN: 978-92-76-39970-4 Doi: 10.2759/91877 Catalogue number: KK-02-21-854-EN-N

Manuscript completed in 06/2021

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021

© European Union, 2021

Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

A national authority of the EU Member State responsible for ensuring

CRM Collective rights management

The Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and

EEA European Economic Area

CMO Collective management organization

IME Independent management entity

Non-EU CRM Collective rights management entity established outside the

Collective Rights Management Directive – Directive 2014/26/EU of the European

Collective management organisation (CMO) – any organisation which is authorised by

Non-EU CMO – collective management organisation whose primary establishment is

Member – a rightholder or an entity representing rightholders, including other collective

Management fees – the amounts charged, deducted or offset by a collective

Representation agreement – any agreement between collective management

Rights revenue – income collected by a collective management organisation on behalf of

Statute – memorandum and articles of association, statute, rules or documents of

Annual transparency report – a public annual report published by collective

Private copying levy – a government-mandated scheme in which a special tax or levy

a. Rationale and scope of the study

The report draws on findings collected through a range of methodological tools:

Governance and transparency of CMOs

Relations with users

Diversity of actors on, or navigating around the CRM market in Europe

management market, working alongside historically established CMOs. Second, the

Exchange of information between competent authorities

Copyright-intensive industries1 are an important part of the economy contributing to

To facilitate the further growth of copyright-intensive industries, in 2014 the European

Competition and Development, Report mandated by WIPO, 2013, available at

b. Objectives and scope of the Study

Edward Elgar Publishing.

 Governance and transparency of collective management organisations (CMOs)

 CRM entities in the music sector represent rightholders such as composers,

 Rightholders of a particular category, such as music performers or phonogram

Geographically, the scope of this study covers:

 The EU as a whole yet with a special focus on each of the 27 MS individually.

c. Structure of the Final Report

 Annex 1: transposition timeline of the Directive in EU MS

Figure 2-1. Study phases and methods

Exploratory desk research Complementary desk Data verification with

INCEPTION REPORT INTERIM REPORT FINAL REPORT

Table 2-1. Thematic question blocks for each group of respondents

Identification of Survey Respondents

 Authorities. The list of Authorities available on the DG CONNECT website

Survey response rate

Table 2-2. Respondents targeted and questionnaires filled in

Note on survey responses and respondent distribution by sector

Due to the particularly strong dissemination activities of French Rightholders’

 Representatives of the European Commission who are responsible for monitoring

Table 2-3. Exploratory interviews

Organisation/institutional affiliation Date

Table 2-4. Complementary interviews

PRH – Patent and Registration December 10, 2020

VISDA (Denmark) visual arts December 3, 2020

PERGAM (Romania) literature and December 3, 2020

Organisation/institutional Sector Date