Consensus

4.1 The concept of consensus 53

/.) Ol lcr lnd lreceptanue........... 55
4.3 The momcnt and place of folmation of a contract 59
4.4 Consensus and defects in will 62

4.1 THE CONCEPT OF CONSENSUS

4.1.1 Consensus as the basis for contractual commitment
Consensus or true agreemcnt is thc basis fbr every valid contract. Aparl from the
other requirements that must be satislied before a contract will be legally valid and
enforceable, a contract will only come into existencc if the parties reach consensus
on the rights and duties created by their agreement.In order to detcrmine whether'
a contract exists or not, one looks lirst for consensus between the parties, which
implies a subjective inquiry. However. as consensus can mostly bc revealcd only
by external manif'estations (for example, the physical document which contains
the contract), the inquiry as to whether consensus has been reached is generally
objcctive in nature. There must be some fornr of proof that consensus exisrs
between the parties.
Under common law. consensus can be rcached only if -
(a) every party has the scrious intention to be contractually bountl
(b) the parties have a common intention in othel words. they must have in
mind the same commitment, and
(c) every party makes his or her intention known to evcry other party by means
of a declaration of intention.
These requirements will be discussed separately.
True consensus can however only be achieved if parties to a contract enjoy
equal bargaining power. Where parties do not enjoy equal power, the stronger
party can use the power that she/he has to her/his own advantage or to disadvantage
the weaker party. This turther promotes social inequality which undemrines
constitutional values of equality, human dignity and freedom. This is the reason
why legislation such as the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) was
introduced. The Act aims to bring a balance in the bargaining powers of consumers
and service providers; protect the rights of previously disadvantaged consumers;
and encourage their full participation. It also promotes fhir and honest dealings
 G(tkrul Prin.ipl!r oJ CommerLiul Law

betrveen cortracting parties and at the same time recognises the constitutional
value of ubuntu.

4.1.2 The intention to be contractually bound

Every party to a contract must have the serious intention to be contractl.tally bound.
Thus, each of the parties must have the se ous intention of creating particular
rights antl duties which will legally bind them.
Whele the parties merely have the intention to reach an understanding, or
to make an zrffangemcnt based on good faith, their arrangement will only give
rise to a 'gentleman's agreement'and not to a binding contract. For instance, if
iiiends make an afl'an_qcnent to meet at a restaurant to enjoy a mea] together.
there is nornally no intcntion on their paft to be legally bound by the agreement.
At most. thcy are morally obliged to turn up at the an'anged venue and time. lf
one of the friends cannot lreet the others as arranged he or she can normally not
be held legally liable for failing to show up as agrced. However. the situation
is compietcly different if two people agree that the one will sell his or her car
to the other for a specified sum of money. In this instance- the parties intend to
create a legal obligation which entitles them to performance and/or obliges them
to pel.form.
A statement made jokingly or merely to highlight the good qualities of thc
object of an agreement (also refened to as 'puffing') is generally not made with
the intention of creating legally enforceable obligations.

4.1.3 Common intention

The parties must also agree on the contractual obligations or commitments they
wish to create. They must therefore have a common intcntion to contracf with each
other and must intend to create the same legal relationship.
If Andreu, gives Ben rnoney by way of a deposit, and Ben accepts it b1, way of
a loan, no conesponding intention to create the same legal relationship exists, and
conseqLrently no colrtract is folmed.

4.1.4 Making the intention known

Consensus can exist only if the pafiies are aware of one another's intention. In other
words, all the parlies must be aware oftheir true agreement. The mere cxistence of
two independent but coffesponding inrentions cannot crecte c contract. For instance,
ifAndrew decides to sell his watch to Bcn for R50 and Ben, completely unaware
ofAndrew's intention. decides to offer Andrew R50 for the watch, consensus will
not exist until Andrew and Ben become aware ofone another's intention.
There are many ways in which a conracting party's intention can be made
known. lt can be done in writing. orally or by means ofconduct. The most common
method used to determine whether consensus has been reached is to look for an
offer and the acceptance of it.
4.2 OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
4.2.1 The concepts of offer and acceptance
I'hc rcaching ofcouscnsus requircs that every party Inust declare his or her intention
to crcate enlbrcetblc rights and duties. The usual lvay in rvhich p:rrties make their
intentions kno$n to oltc anothet is through ol-l-cr and.lcccptance.
An o1'1er is a declaration trade b1'a person (the offer-or) in which he or she
inclicates an intentjon to be contlactually bou d by the inere acceptance of the
ofi'er', iincl in which thc pcrson sets ont the rights ancl tiuties hc or she n'ishes lo
clerte. Thc otfcro| inyites a]rolher party or other partics (oi]'e|ee/s) to co[sent to
the creatior.r ol (an) obligation(s) between the oficror(s) and the ol'ferec(s).
An accepturcc is a cleclarllior.t bl thc offeree (the person to wholr the ofTer was
made) through which it is inclicatcd thal he or she agrees 10 thc terrrs of the olfer
exactly rs put in the Offer.

4.2.2 Requircments for the offer and acceptance

An olfel and i1n acccptance u'ill gile rise to thc fbrmation ol a valid contract onl]
if the lirllou,ing requirclnents are met:
(a) The offer must be madc with the intention tltat thc ot'feror rvill be legally
bouncl b-"- the mcrc acccptance thereof by the of'lbrer'.
This express or implicd intention ol the oll'cror to bc bound by the of'felee's
acceptirnce distinguishcs a true offer from any othel proposal. Thus an 'offer'
nrade in.jest (.iokingly) cannot be accepled ls it is not madc u,ith the intentior
ol being legally binding upon the mere acceptancc thcreof. For instalrce.
when somebody cclls oul on r vcr) hot.lay that 'l rvill trade ny bike fbr-a
glass of icy cold u'atcr'. hc or she woulcl be surprised if somebocly chims
the bic),cle upon being given a glass of wrter. If thc ofleror's intcntion is
ot expressly articulated. it must be deduced tl om his or her declaration and
the surrouncling ciLcur.r.rsl nnces. The acceptance must also he made with tlre
intention of bcing legally bouncl to the oller exactl)i as it is. Acceptance of
an offcr-is the unconditional acccptance of all the terms in the off'er. Upon
acceptance of the otler. the partics are conrmittecl to the terns exactl),as sct
out in the ofler. without any addition to. or om ission. of any terms and without
iIr\ quillilrcltlir\n5 r)r' r'c\cr\ uons.
rhr I hc oller must he complele .

It must contain all the terms by which the of1'eror is willing to abide. as rvell
as allthc temls to rvhich he or she r.vants to bind thc o11crcc. This requiremerll
flows naturally from the pler iotrs requirement.ls en incomplele ol't-er cannot
be accepted 'exactly as sct out in the offer'.
(c) The oller. as wcll as the acceptance. must be clear and certain.
Thus the intcndcd obligations must be slated unequivocallv and
unconditionallv so that the rights antl dutics intcnded by thc ol'leror are
cletermined or ascertainable. No contract can arisc if the offer is Yague or
ambiguorrs. since one of the recluirenrents 1ix il contract is that the performance
56 General Ptittiples oJ Commercial Lay'

must be certain or ascefiainable. A statement made in a vague way, such as

'Don't wory
- you will be paid', will generaliy not amount to an offer. The
acceptance, too, must be clear and certain so that there is no doubt about the
fact of acceptance. Even if the offer or acceptance is made tacitly by conduct,
the contents of the declaration of intention must be clear.
ln this rcgard. the CPA has introduced another impofiant requirement
that intbrmation given to the consumer must be in plain and understandable
language. The language must be clear and easy to understand. Infornration or
the olfer will be considered to be in plain and understandable language if it
is reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer of the class of persons
for whom the offer is intended, with average litelacy skills and very little
experience as a consumer ofthe particular goods or services. could be expected
to understand the c()ntent, signilicance and import of the offer without undue
effort.
(d) Nolmally an offer and an acceptance uray be madc cither expressly {in writing
or orally) or tacitly by means ofconduct (for example by a nod of the head, a
movement ofthe hand or the handing over of moncv).
In only a few situations does the law prescribe that the offer and acceptance
must be made in a specific manneL. For example. an offer and acceptance for
the pulchase or exchange or donation of Iand must be in writing. Irurlhermore.
if an ofl'eror's offer stipulates that the offer may be accepted in a specified
manner only, tbr example in writing. cornpliance with such requirement is
imperative. If the acceptance does not comply with this, the acccptance will
not result in the formation of a contmct.
(e) Thc offer must bc addressed either to a parlicular person or pelson\. ol jn
genelal to an unknown person or persons or to the general public.
If the offer has been addressed to a particular pcrson or persons, it can be
accepted only by that person or those persons. Thus. if Annie makes an offer to
Guy to buy Guy's farm, the offer can be accepted by Guy only. or by someone
authorised to act on his behalf. If an offer is addressed to an unkntrwn person
ol'persons or to thc general public, the offer must be addressed in such a way
that it is nevefiheless ascertainable to whom the offer was addressed. Such an
offer may be acceptcd by anyonc falling within the group to which the offer
was addressed. An example of such an offer is the promise of a reward or a
prize. In this instance the person who promises the reward or prizc makes a
public offer thar he or she will give a reward or prizc to any merrber of the
public, or to any member of a particuliu group, who performs a specific task
in a specific manner. For example, a bank makes an offer that it will pay
a reward to any member of the public who supplics information on a bank
robbery. The person who provides thc information on the robbery. and does
so with the intention of accepting the offer, has, by this act, accepted the offer.
on the basis of the person's acceptance, consensus is reached and a contract
arises, qualifying him or her for the reward. An offcr on the intemet is usually
made to the public in general, while an email offer is directed at a specif,c
person, namely, the holder ofthe email address.
 Colt.icrr.rirs

(l) The offer and acceptance must be communicated.

An offer is only completed once it has been communicated to the offeree
and an acceptance is completed when it has been communicated to the offeror
(see paragraph 4.3 below).

4.2,3 The falling away of the offer

4.2.3.1 General
The ofTer on its own, and without an acceptance, cannot give rise to a contractual
obligation. Once an offer has been made, it does not rernain open for acceptance
indelinitely, but lapses:
(a) Ifthe offer stipulates that it is valid only for a certain period of time, the offer
falls away if it has not been accepted within that period. If no time limit is
set in the offer itself, it expires if it has not been accepted within a reasonable
time.
(b) If, before the offer has been accepted, the offeror informs the offeree that he
revokes the offer, the offer is extinguished.
(c) If the offeree rejects the offer, the offer falls away and cannot be revived.
(d) lf the offeree does not accept the offer exactly as it was made, but makes
a cornter-offer, the offeree, by implication, rejects the offer and the offer
is extinguished as the counter-offer is a new offer. In respect of the new
(counter-) offer, the original off'eree becomes the offeror, and the oriSinal
offeror becomes the new offeree. For instance, where Willie offers to sell a
firrm to Hilde for R500 000 and Hilde counter-offers R400 000, Hilde is, by
implication, rejecting Willie's offer. If Willie does not accept Hilde's counter-
offer. Hilde cannot fall back on Willie's original offer. as this would no longer
be open for acceptance.
(e) lf either the offeror or the offeree dies before the offer is accepted, the offer
firlls away. No rights or duties are transferred to the deceased's estate unless
the offer cxpressly or imptiedly permits acceptance by or to the executor of
the deceased's estate. The offer falls away as an offeror normally intends to
contract with his or her chosen ofl'eree only.
When the offer has been extinguished, it can no longer be accepted by the offeree.
If the ofl'eree purports to accept the offer which has fallen away or which has been
revoked, he or she is actually making a counter-offer which the original offeror can
accept or reject. The situation is then similar to (d) above.

4.2.3.2 The cont nued existe nce of the olter: The option
The offeror can ensure the continued existence of the offer by means of an option.
Options can be given in respect of different kinds of contracts, for example,
contracts of sale and contracts oflease. The option-giver makes an offer to conclude
a particular contract (this is the substanlive offer) and, in addition, makes a further
offer to keep the first offer open fbr a specified period (the second offer being
5IJ General Principles of Co,tunerciol Law

the option). If the offeree accepts the second offer (thus, if he or she accepts the
option), the option contract comes into being. The offeror is bound to keep open
the substantive offer for the agreed period. Whar this means is that, fbr rhe duration
of the option, the offeror (option-giver) may neither revoke the substantive offer
nor conclude a contract witlr another person concerning the same subject. When
the holder of the option has exercised his or her option, the contract comes into
being in accordance with the terms contained in the substantive otler.
For example, Nomsa offcrs her horse for sale to Jacques and also undertakes to
keep that offer open for two weeks. The option arises only when Jacques accepts
the second of}er. When the option does come into being, Jacques has two weeks in
which to decicle whether or not he wjshes to accept the substantive offer. Moreover,
Nomsa may neither offer the horse to someone else nor accept another's offer in
respect of the horse unlil this period has elapsed or until Jacques has rejected
the substantive offer. The option is exercised if Jacques accepts the substantive
offer within this period and communicates his acceptlnce to Nomsa. If Jacqucs
exelcises his option, the substantive contract comes into being.

4.2.4 Special rules with regard to offer and acceptance

Various types of statements should be distinguished liom true offers. The following
are examples of statements that are not ol'fers:

4.2.4.1 An invitation to make an offer

A request or invitation to make al offel or to do business is not a true offer. ln
this regard confusion sometimes arises in respect of the adveltising of goods in
newspapers. periodicals, catalogues, and so forth, and in respect of the display of
price-marked goods in a window shop or on the shop floor. The general rule is that
an advertisement or display in itself does not constitute an offer but is rather an
invitation to do business. When a member of the public reacts to this invitation,
he or she makes the dealer an offer to buy the advertised or displayed item. If thc
advertiser or displayer accepts the offer. consensus is reached and a contract of
salc arises.
When trade is conducted via the internet, the question arises whether a website
advertising a company's products constitutes an offer. This would depend upon the
wording of the website, as a true ofl'el must clearly be made with the intent to form
a binding contract upon the acceptance thereof. Normally an adleflisement on a
website would not be regarded as an oller to contract, but rather us an invitation
l.o do business. The client who reacts to this invitation by the advertising company
on the website is deemed to make an offer to buy, and only upon acceptance of
his or her offer by the advertiser does a contract come into existence. This is the
pl€ferred position from an intemet trader's point of view, as unwanted offers
(whether because of oversubscription or a mistake in the pricing) can then merely
be rejected without further legal consequences.
 Consensus 59

4.2.4.2 Statements of intent

In the busiless world one often encounters so-called 'statements of intent'. This
refers to a document in which a party indicates his or her intention to contract, as
opposed to offering to actually do so. The distinction is a fine one and tuLns on
an offeror's intention to be bound. without further thought on the matter, on his
or her part in the case of a true offer. By contrast, the 'statement of intent' merely
forms the basis on which turther negotiations regarding the terms of the contract
are based.

4.2.4.3 Calling lot tenders

Wherc a tender is called for and the person calling for the tcnder (the advertiscr)
does not bind himself or herself to accepting the highest or lowest tender, the call
would normally be no more than a request to submit olters. which the advcrtiser
may accept or reject at will.

4.2.4.4 Auctions
At an auction certain rules relating to thesale are made known beforehand by
advertising them or by reading the rules to those present at the auction. Every
person who makes a bid at the auction (loes so subject to the conditions of the
auction. Thus a contract exists between thc auctioneer and each bona.fide bidder to
conduct the auction according to the advertised conditions of sale. These conditions
form the basis of the distinction between auctions held subject to reservation and
auctions not subject to rescrvation. If the auction rules state, for example, that the
goods will be sold only ifa pre-determincd price is fetched or exceeded, the auction
is held subject to reservation. Auctions arc usually held subject to reservation and,
if the auctioneer does not mention anything. it is presumed that the auction is held
subject to reservation. In this case. thc auctioneer extends an invitation to those
present to make an offer. The person bidding makes an offer and is the offeror.
The auctioneer can accept or re1ect any bid regardless of whether it is thc highest
bid. Only when the auctioneer accepts iln ofTer is consensus reached and a contract
arises. Conversely, an auction is not subject to reservatiol if the conditions of
auction expressly provide that the goods will be sold without reserue. In such an
event it is the auctioneer who makes an offer. The auctioneer's offer is to sell to the
highest bidder, and it is this offer which is accepted by the bidder who makes the
highest bid. The agreement of sale will be concluded subject to a condition that, if
a highcr bitl is not made within a reasonable time, the sale shall then be effective.

4.3 THE MOMENT AND PLACE OF FORMATION OF A CONTRACT

A contract arises at the moment when and, at the place, where consensus is reached.
Consensus is reached when each of the parties to the agreement becomes aware
that the other party is (rr the other parties are) in agreement with him or her.
This will take place whcre and when the offeror becomes aware of the o{feree's
acceptance of the ofter. The exact rnoment of consensus is important in order to
60 Ceneral Pritt<'i1tI<'s oJ C'onrnercittI Dtrt

decide whether the offcr can still be revoked; whether the offer has expired as a
result of the passage of 1ime, and whel the contractual dlrties become enfbrceable
- for example, the moment from which payment of interest must be calculated.
The place of fomation is important in determining, for example, the couft which
has julisdiction to hear a claim in connectiot] with the contract.

4.3.1 Where the offeror and the ofteree are in each other's
presence
If the olieror and the offeree are in cach other's presence when the ofl'er and
acceptance are made. it is usually easy to determine the time and place of tblmation
of the contract, since the offeror learns of the acceptancc of the ofl'er at the same
time and place the acceptance is made known. The contract comes into being at
the tinc when the acceptance is comrnunicated and at the place wherc the parties
happcn to be at that moment. This is l-et'emed to as the information or ascertainment
theory. according to which the contract comes into bcing when and whcre the
oft'erol leams of the acceptance of his or her offer.

4.3.2 Where the parties are not in each other's presence

If the offeror and the offeree are not in each other's presence when the offer is
accepted. the acceptancc is not comurunicated directly to the offeror, but via
another medium.
Where contracts aLe concluded over thc telephone. thc parties are consideled to
be in each other's prescncc as the offeror learns of the acceptance of the offer at
the same time it is madc. Although the offeror and offeree may not be in thc same
place, the ascertainment theory applies and a contract comes into being at the
moment when, and at thc place where. the offeror becomcs aware of thc offeree's
acceptance of the offer. lf Nabilah from Cape Town acccpts Bill's telephonic offer
from New York, Bill becomes aware ol Nabilah's acceptance in Neu' York and the
contract thus arises in New Yor-k.
The situation is different when a contract is concluded by post. Assume
that Nabitah, who is in Cape Town, mtkes an offer by letter to Gefi who is in
Johannesburg, and that Cert accepts by letter. When aud where is the contract
concludcd? As therr is no instant communication, differcnt rules apply. In these
cases the dispatch theory (also refered to as the 'expedition' theory) applies and
the contract comes into being at the placc where, and at the time when, the letter of
acceptance is posted, uuless the parties stipulate otherwise. The dispatch theory is
primalily aimed at protecting the offeree.
Can Gert, the addressee. undo his letter of acceptance by requesting Nabilah,
the offeror, by means of a speedier method of communication (such as an sms-
email ol fax), to ignore the letter of acceptance? If the dispatch theory is applied
consistently, the answer will be no. However, since the dispatch theory is primarily
directed at protecting the offeree, it is proposed that it should be allowed. To do
so will result in a truer reflection of the pafiies' consensus and will also reflect
 Consetrsus 6l

the practicalities of the situation (for example, wherc the otTerror receives the
withdrawal notice he may act upon it, and the ofTerol cannot thereafter change
his mind and attempt to cnfbrce the slower letter of acceptance). Gert could thus
undo his acceptance by a speedier means of communicatior before it (the eallier
communication) comes to Nabilah's knowlcdge.

4.3.3 Electronicagreements
In considering which rulc to apply to contracts made, fol example, by fax, sms,
email or via the intelnet, the type of machine used to transmit the acceptance is not
important when trying to determine the place and timc of fbrmation in tcrms of
the common-law principles set out abovc. It should rather be considered whcther
the circumstances of the case indicate an instantaneous method of communication
and, if that is the casc, whether a conversational situation similar to a telephone
call existed allowing uncertainties to be cleared up in.rmediately. Wherc the
communication medium allows for this typc of instantaneous and 'conversational '
communication, the panies are in a position analogous to being in each other's
presence, and the ascertainment theory should then prevail. In all other instances
the choice of theories should be influencecl by the intention of the partics, sound
business practice and, perhaps, also by a judgment of where the nsk should lil:.
In the case of cont[acts concluded over the internet. thc choice of a suitable
theory is further complicated by the fact that different services are offered on
the internet, lbr instance electronic data interchange and email. Only thc cmail
procedure will be briefly discussed here. As soon as an email has been sent, it
travels to the sender's server. The server acts as a central point for the collection
and dispatch of messages from a number of computers. The server sends the
messagc into the internet. The messagc is reassembled by the recipient's server
and placed in the recipient's mailbox, where it renains until it is retrieved by
the lecipient, whether it is minutes, days or months later. Communication is thus
usually non-instantaneous, but where thc email is sent via an intemal company
network to a recipient who is logged on at thc moment of its being mailed, it may
well takc place instantaneously. This is also the case in respect of so-called 'chat
roorns where parties are in real-time colnmunicelion.
It is clear fiom the above that the application of the commonlaw rules in an
e-commerce environment may differ from situation to situation, depending on the
facts. The Electronic Comnrunications and Transactions AcT.25 of 2OO2 addressed
some uncefiainties in this regard. It regulates contracts concluded by electronic
means where the parties fhiled to, or chose not to, rcgulate contract formation
specilically. The Act provides that, in tho absence of a different agreement between
the parties, an agreement concluded electronically is concluded at the timc when.
and the place where, the acceptance ol'the offer is received by the offeror. This
is called the 'reception theory' and it takcs precedencc over the common-law
principles. As the 'receipt' of an electronic message plays a crucial role in this
theory, this concept has been statutofi]y defined. A data message is deemed to
have been received by the addressee whcn the completc data message enters an
62 Ceneral Principles of Contmercial ktrt

information system (computer or network) designated ol used by the addressee

and is capable of being received and processed by the irdd|essee. The message
becomes legnllr eJlbctive upon such receipt as defined. without the need for
acknowledgement. (However, an acknowledgement of receipt of a message may
be,eiven by any communication or conduct by the addressee indicating that the
message has been received.) The Act also provides that a message is deemed to
be received at the usual place of business of the receivcr. or if there is no place of
business, at the usual placc of residence. This means tltat the receipt of a rnessage
on a website at a remote server will not be the place of formation of the contract.
which is linked to the phli sical place of business or residence of the rcceiver.
When contracts are concluded using a combination of traditional and clectronic
methods of communication, it is advisable that the parties should expressly indicate
the time and place of formation to eliminate uncertainty in this regard.

4.4 CONSENSUS AND DEFECTS IN WILL

In paragraph 4.1 .l above, it was indicated that true consensus is the basis for every
valid contract. It then fbllows that any circumstancc which affects consensus
will also affect the validity of the contract. If consensus is absent for ary reason
(for instance in the case of a material mistake) no valid agreement arises. and the
proposed contract is void. Conversely, if there is consensus, but it has been obtained
in an improper manner (for instance in cases of misrepresentation. undrte influence
and duress) a valid contract arises. but it will be voidable at the instance of the
prejudiced (innocent) parly. The distinction between void and voidable contracts
hinges on whether or not consensus existed between the contracting parties.
Ideally, the creation of a valid contract should result fron.r the parties'free will
and choice and without any inteference by the state. The reason behind the sanctity
of a contract is to protect the certainty thereof, hence the courts of law are reluctant
to interfere with a duly concluded contract. In other words. judges are hesitant to
tamper with the agreements the parties have voluntarily entered into.
The courts are only willing to come in where it is clear that eithel of the parties
does not want to perform in terms of the contract. In that way, the courts give effect
to what the pafties have legally bound themselves to perform by enforcing the
contract. This, unfortunately. could at times result in the couns having to enforce
contracts which are unfair and constitutionally questionable. It is therefore high
time that judges should start considering and applying constitutional values of
equality, human dignity and freedom when faced with contractual disputes in order
to ensure fairness and the protection of weaker parlies in contractual relationships.

4.4.1 Absence of consensus mistake

-
Mistake exists when one or more of the parties to a proposed contract
If such
misunderstand a material fact or legal rule relating to the proposed contract.
a misunderstanding exists, there is no consensus and consequently no contract
will arise. However, it may lead to inequitable results where the pafiies rcly on
 Cottsettstts 63

their orvn matcrial misundcrstanding 1o cscapc liabilitl. In ordcr kr lcsscn thc

Lrndesirable results of a strict application of the consensus lheory. it is acccptcd
thlt. despite the lack of consensLrs. the parties u,il] be held to their declarations of
intcntion Llnless the circunstances are such that the nristake is reasoniiblc. lf thc
mistake is unreasonablc. it is not excusc(l by the larv and thc part1, u,ho has mrde
the mistake rvill be held to his or her declaration of intention rather than to his 01'
her true intentior. This rulc is thus an e.\ception to the principle that consenslrs is
thq basis fol evcry contract and is discussed in more detail bclorv,
The harshncss ofa strict application ofthe consensus rule is also softened by the
fact that only nistakes u.ith legard to a material tact. Iegal rLrle or plinciplc will
le:td to the .rbscttr'r. ol \'olrscnsLti.

4.4.1.1 Requirements to be met betore mistake will render a

contract void
A contract u,ill be r,oid or thc ground of a mistakc if:
(a) the nistake relates to a fact. or a legal rulc or principle
(b) that fact ol rule or principle is marcrial. and
(c) the nistake (whether of fact or of lar.v) is also rcasonable.

A contracting party who wishcs to rely on a mistakc to render a contract void

uould h.rre t,r prorc rll nl thc rho\e rc(luircmcnt\.

4.4.1 .1.1 The mistake must relate to a fact, legal rule or principle
In orcler to have an el1ect on consensus. a mistake mLlst be one of fact or law. It is
unllecessarv 1(l elaborate tlrlher on mistake of fact. An examplc of a mistake in
law is where Tessa pays Elton R2 000 in the mistaken beiicf that she owes hinr the
rroney.
A mistake in lau or fact will onl1, inv:Llidate a contrilct if it is considcled to be
excusable in the circurnsttnces.

4.4.1.1.2 The mistake must concern a material fact, legal ruleor

principle
A mistake nrust bc ntaterial. A mist:rke is material and cxclucles consensus in tl.rc
follou'ing instances:
(a) A misunderstanding in respect of rhe identity of the person with whom the
agreement is leached. For example. il Andr-ew dials the lwong telephorre
number ancl offers ajob to Bennie u,ho answers the telcphone, rvhilc Andrew
is undcr the irrpression that he is talking to and off-ering thc position to Lennie.
Andrcw will labou| undcr a ntistake u,ith regarcl to the idcntity of thc o11'eree
and no consensus will exist as thc identity of thc ofleree is materiai to the
conclusion of thc contract. However. where it is irnmaterial to Ronit whethcr
she purchases a car from a specific sales person or not, and she consequently
purchases a car from Douslas. thinking it is Carol. her mistake will not be
61 General Principles of Commercial Law

matedal and will not affect consensus. Also remember that a mistake in respect
of the other person's attributes, such as his or her full names or characler,
will usually not eliminate consensus, as opposed to a mistake relating to the
identity of the other contracting party.
(b) A mistake conceming the contert of the intended contract. This may be an
error relating to the time when perfomance must be rendered, or the place
and method of delivery, or the performance itself. Mistake in respect of the
performance to be rendered occttrs, for example, whele Shoni is under the
impression that she is making an offel to buy E]na's house in Cape Town but
Elna is under the impression that the offer is being made to buy her house
in Durban. In such a case there will be a material mistake with regard to the
thing which is the subject of the agreement. the performance to be rendered,
and there can be no consensus. By confiast, a mistake about the atffibutes
of the object of performance is not a material mistake and does not affect
consensus. Consequently, if Shoni and Elna are in agreement that the offer
and acceptance are made in respect of the purchase of a speciflc house in Cape
Town, but there is a misunderstanding with regard to one of the attributcs
of the house (for example the zoned purpose of the erf, or the existence or
absence of a servitude over the erf, or the number of bathrooms in the house)
wh.ich has not been elevated to a supposition (see chapter 8), that mistake has
no beadng on the formation of consensus and does not render the contract
void.
(c) A mistake in respect of an interyretation the law attaches to the offer and
acceptance. In such an instance one or both pafiies have a particular perception
of the content of the contract (that is to say, of the rights and duties created by
the ageement), whereas the law attaches a different intelpretation to it. For
example, there can be a mistake about the nature of the conract. Mike offers
to pay Tshepo a sum of money to live in a unit in an old-age horne, thinking
that he acquires ownership of the property, whereas the law's interpretation of
the contract is such that Mite acquires only occupation for the remainder of
his life.
Mistake may sometimes be caused by a misrepfesentation by the other contracting
party. Misrepresentation will normally not void an agreement and merely gives rise
to the voidability of the contract at the option of the deceived pafiy (see paragraph
4.4.2.1 below). However, where the misrepresentation leads to a material mistake,
it results in the absence of consensus and no contract will arise.

4.4.1.1.3 The mistake in fact or law must be reasonable

If the mistake is not a justifiable (excusable) error, the contract, as it appears from
the parties' declarations of intention, will be enforced despite the fact that this may
differ from a pafiy's real intention.
Mistake will be reasonable if the reasonable person in the same situation would
make the same mistake if he or she were to judge the particular circumstances. The
test is therefore obiective.
 Cortsertstrs 65

The following is an example of an unreasonable mistake. Jo, who suffers from a

hearing problem, is under the impression that Steffi is offering her R1 million for
her old brcycle. Steffi is, in fact, offering only R100. Although no consensus exis[s
with regard to the purchase price, Jo's error cannot be excused sirce a reasonable
person would not simply assume that he or she would obtain such a high price for
an old bicycle. Jo is bound by her declaration of intention when accepting the offer
and a valid conlract i5 concluded.
It stands to reason that a reasonable person is expected to have no fault, and,
consequently, it is required that the party who wishes to lely on mistake must have
no fault in respect of the mistake. A person cannot rely on mistake to deny ihe
contract if he or she were negligent or careless, or paid insufficient attention to the
matter, for instance by not bothering to read the contract before signing. A person
can rely on misrepresentation if the other pafiy has created the (unreasonable)
mlstake.

4.4.2 lmproperlyobtained consensus

It sometimes happens that the assent of one pafiy is obtained in an inrproper
way. Several possibilities exist. First, if one of the parties makes an incorrect
representation of the true state of affairs to the other party, thereby inducing the
other pafty to conclude the contract, the other pafiy's assent is obtained in an
improper manner.
Secondly, a party who concludes a contract under duress or improper influence
does not exercise his or her free will and it is therefore not the party's independent
will which is expressed in the declaration ol intention.
The contract can be contested in all of these circurnstances. based on the fact
that the consensus was obtained in a manner which the law does nol permit.

4.4.2.1 Misrepresentation
A misrepresentation can be defined as a untrue statement or representation
conceming an existil]g fact 01'state of aff'airs which is made by one palty to ths
cortract with the aim, and result, of inducing the other party into concluding the
contract. The misrcpresentation may relate to the qualities or characteristics of the
subject of the contract.
A contract will be voidable as a result of misrepresentation if the following
requirements are satislied:
(a) There must be a misrepresentation, that is, an unfiue stateme]rt concerning
an existing fact or condition. A misrepresentation of the law will generally
not entitle the misrepresented party to a remedy. It is considered to be
similar to a statement of opinion, which, if given honestly, will not result in a
misrepresentation. Misrepresentation can be made by an express statement or
by conduct (eg gestures and actions). Misrepresentation may also be infered
from circumstances that prevailed at the time the contract was concluded, and
can even be tacitly made. It must be clear from the lepresentation that is made
66 General Principles of Cononercial ktw

that particulal mes\age \\,as conve!ed. Concealmc t of the lacts ( tix instancc
a
b,"- keepin-r: silcnt about something) can also constitutc llisrr-presentllli()n.
blrt onl), if a dLrt\, to disclose cellain relevant lacts c\ists. tbr instance u hen
appl),ing tbr an insurarce polic1,. An xpplicant s lailule to clisc]ose all rclcvrr.rt
tacts concerninc the insura[rlc risk rvoukl constitLlte r nr istepresentJtion.
Glr ing ln honest opinion or cstintate (such as a staternent aboul the lirtLrre
prolltxbilit) of a blrsincss). eren il the opinion tulns out to bc ntistaken.
does not constitutc- a mislepresentation.'fhe othcr pcrsol) riill irol htrve anv
renrecll agairst thc llerson u,hri grves an opinion. unless in dclict u,here
it can be proYen that tltc oplnior $,ls qiYen negligentlv. -fhus a dishonest
opinion as 1o a fLrtLrre event nav bc sufiicicnl 1o found i1u action fil tlauclnlcnt
misrepre\ertation in so llir as it tiilsch,rcflccts tltc state of nrincl of the partl
nraking thc Iepresentilt ion . In such a case. the palt1, \\ho wanls to rel\ on
the cipinion o1' the persol l.ic or shc is balgaining \\ ilh nLrst protect him- or'
helself bv har ins the opinion rradc a rcrm ()1 1he conrlact. The salne applics
To stat!-rncrt\ of contirienrlatiori or-pLrlhng (see also palaeraph -1.1.2 abo|c).
'l'he representation rrLrst lle thlse or untruc. f'orrcct or accurttc stitteulents
can revcr give rise to a lnisrcplcscntation. The rellresentaticltr should concern
a state ol alTairs that exists oI has c\istcd: in othcr words. it sltoLrld relate to
facts ol the part o[ present.
(b) Thc rrisrcprcsentation m,.lst be m:rde bv or)e contraciing part), to anotlter
cortritcting paft\' o[ b], somconc acting in the sen,ice. of a e,frrruetl|r!:
pafi,\'. or on his or hcr authority. or in collusion uith him or her'. lf such a
cortractirlg partv is inclirccd t0 conclirdc a contract b1,thc falsc fcpraserri,ru()u
lnaclc b! ar outsidcr. thc outsidcr's statcr-ncnt is not a nri sr cII csentation bu1 a
nrisstaterrent. \\hich has ro efl'ect on the consenslrs ofthe contracting l.irtir:s.
Rcscission is an rrbvious rcmed-v \\,hcrc parties to lhc contract lre involr,ecl.
Horvever. whele it is ln outsidel u,ho nrrkes the misreplesentation. rL-sci\5iolr
r.,uoulcl aftcct an inDoccnl conlractinll llxrl) iinal nol 1llc pcIson u,ho l]irrie the
or islcpfcscntatioll.
(c) Thc nisrcllrcscntalion mLlst be unlarr,lirl. Nor nialll- iln rct 1(n orri..lon in .Ll
instancc mcntioncd in (a) abo\,e) $,ould be unleu,ful il it is corrtrar), to thc
nolnr or stlurdalcl of a speciiic cornrrunity's idea ol acceptable conduct. [t is
not considcrc.l to b!- unlawtll mcrciv bccausc it is l'alsc: thc rcprescnLation
nrust iilso be nraterial. Thc rcpresentation js nonrrallr, rnatc al if it conecrllr
lhcts which $'ould probablii induce somebodv to coDClude a conh-act. [n
other \\'ords. the irrpoltlince ofthe nr isleplese nteal frct is weighecl against thc
contritct its a u,hole to ensule that the misreplese[tati(]n of an LLnilnpoftiult tnct
docs rlot sink thc \\holc contract.
(d) The mislcplcscntatiorr mLrst ha\,c incluccd thc contli:rcl as il stiinds. This is
rlso rcltrrcd to as thc ICq[ircment ol causa]itv. beciluse there has to he a
causal link b.l$'een the m isrepresen tal ion and the contruct. This merns
that. but tbr the nrisrepresentation. the deceiVed pa[]' \\'oul.l either not haYe
concluder:l thc contract at all oI woLll:l not hx\,e concludeal it on the sii|ne
terms. B\ irrpliciilion. this requires thrt rhe misrepresentltion should havc
 Conse tts u,s

been rnrcie during thc ncgotiations preceding the colclusion ofthe contract.A
fnlse lepresentation of tacts after the conclusir)r of x contrrct cannr:lt induce a
contracting party to conclude a contract. as it has alread), been concluded.It
starcls 1o reason that r person uho knew that the statcnrcnt rvas false cannot
allege that hc or she was induced b1, thc misrepresenlalion to concludc thc
contriict. Howcvcr. the person to whon] a represcntation is mrde is under no
ohligation to ascei'tain \\,hether the represcntation is tnle or not. The person
tlal' rcly on the misrellresentation !vithout nraking firrther enelr-ririe., eren
where the ascertainlncnt of thc trutir would have been a sirrrple thing to do.
(c) Thc misrcprcsentatior can be made intentionally, negligentl)r. or innocenllr,. .
The degree ol lauh that can be rttributcd to thc mislcadcr deterrrines the
availability of a clain for,:lanages (see paragraph 4..1.2. 1. I belorv.l.
4.4.2.1.1 The eflect of misrepresentation
N4isrepresentation does not exclude consersus between the parties ard the contract
is thcrclbre not void. This means that a \,alid contract ariscs. Misrcpresentation
causcs tlre contract to bc voidable since it is rcgardccl as impropcr to obtairl
conscnsus in this nanncr.
Thc contract is vojdablc at the instance (choicc) of thc dccci\,ed party. lle or
she may eiect to uphold o[ to lescind the coDtmct. If the irrocent party elects to
uphold thc contracl. he or she ma], claim whatcvcr rcmcdy may bc appropriate lbr
the breach of contract (see chrpter I 1). Where the innocenl parly elects l.o rescind
thc contract. the obligations are terminated. resulting in consequences similal to
those discussed under cancellation of contract in chlpter 1 I .
Tlrc innoccnt prrt),who clccts to contin[c \\,ith tl]c contract may claim specilic
pcrformancc or clarnlges. The party who matle the misrepresentation cannot rely
on his or her m isrepresentation ancl forcc thc innoccnt party to rcscind thc contract
or argue that thc innoccnt parl!'ou.sht to haVC rcscindcd the cootracl. The election
lies solelv with the innocent partv. Rescission rnust corsist of words or actions
which rvill give one palty a clear message that the other pafty irtends to r-escind the
contrrct. The date r.ll'terrninal.ion can be of -ereat irnportancc because evcn though
the contract is rcscindcd trb initirt (from the start) it continues in operation until
terminated and either one or both Parties rna1, have acquircd liabilitics unclel the
contract in thc interim pcliotl.
Whcthcr ol not the funher remedv of a claim fcrr dlrrrges is available to thc
cleceived paft), depends on the degree of lault associate-d with a spccilic t1,'pe
ofmisrepresentation, Three torms of nr isreprese ntation can be distinguishcd.
namcly. intcntional nrisrepresenlatioll. ne-cligellt r.[isrepresen {ation. ard innocent
m isrepresentation.

tat I nlcnlional rnitreprexentatiott

Intentional nisreplesentation occurs if a false statelnent of a mrterial fact is nradc
u ith the intention of ilrducing a contract. and if that state]nent is rnaclc cilher in
the awareness that it is firlse. ol tecklessll (carelessly). without regard to thc truth
6[i Gener Principle.s of ConunerL'ial LLttt

or falseness of the statement. Intentional misrepresentation is distinguished from

other kinds of misrepresentation by lhe fact that the parly misleading the other
either knows that the other party is being misled by his or her false representation
of the situation, or that he or she is reckless with regard to the truth ofthe situation
or facts being presented.
The party who was induced by intentional misrepresentation to conclude a
contract may claim damages from the guilty party irrespective of his or her choice
of upholding or rescinding the contract. The basis for damages is the delictual
conduct of the guilty party, and the deceived party must be placed in the position
he or she would have been in if the misrepresentation had not been made. A claim
for damages for intentional misrepresentation is, therefore, a claim in delict and
not in contract.

(b) Negligent misrepresentation

This kind of misrepresentation can be defined as a false statement of a material fact
which is made negligently and with the aim ofinducing a contract. Negligence will
be assumed if a person makes a statement he or she believes to be tme, without
taking the steps a reasonable pelson would have taken in the circumstances to
satisfy him- or herself that the statement was true. Here, too, the misrepresentor
is at fault and, therefore, the pafiy who has been misled will base his or her claim
for damages on delictual pnnciples. The party who has been misled may claim
damages irespective of whether he or she has decided to uphold or to rescind the
contract.

(c) Innocentmisrepresentation
If a false statement is n.rade with the intention of inducing a contract, but the
party who makes the statement is neither fraudulent nol negligent, the statement
is referred to as an 'innocent misrepresentation'. Assume that Fikile, who has
been assured erroneously by an acknowledged afi expert that his painting is e true
Picasso, and sells it as such to Willem. Fikile has taken every reasonable step that
could have been expected of him to verify who the aftist was, and, consequently,
his misstatement of the origin of the painting is neither liaudulent nor negligent.
Since Fikile, the misrepresentor, has no fault, there is no room for the application
of delictual principles. Accordingly, Willem, the deceived party, has no claim for
damages. Willem nevertheless retains his choice of upholding or rescinding the
contract.

4.4.2.2 Duress
Duress is an unlawful threat of harm or injury. made by a party to the contract or
by someone acting on his or her behalf; that causes the other pafiy to conclude
a contract. It is not necessary for the threat to be in the lbrm of expressed words
or actions. Duress can be implied, tacit, or by conduct and may also be by subtle
folms of intimidation.
 Consensus

lf a person is irrcluced to concludc a coltract by dlrless. such a pelson concludes

thc contract rilthcr than undergo the threatered itclior. The thrcatencd pcrsolt's
r.,"'ill is clirected at thc pltr-ticLrlnr agreellrent. consensus is rcechecl anil a conll:tct itt
lacl arises. except. fol cxanrplc. u hele a pelsnn phl sically liitces the hantl of the
innoccnt partv to sign l u,r'itten contr uct. in utich casc thc colttrilct rvill be r oicl aD
llllli.). Ho\\e!er, sincc thc conscnl is obtaincd improper]y. the contftIct is voidable.
The threrterle(l pafiy has tirr- choice of eithcr upholding or rescintling tlte contrlict
isee the discussion on thc cflccts 01 misleprescntation). Irlespectile of u'hether
the threatened partt- decides to upholtl or rcscind the aglecrnent, dtrmages mar'
be clairnecl f}om thc- guiltl- Irartv. calculated accoltling to the lbnner's ne-satile
inte[est. thi-]t is. he o[ she rnust be placed in thc position thcy wouJd have been in
had the tlur-ess not occurrcd.
The liliou'iug requilenrcnts n)ust bc satislic-d before a contract u ill be voiclahle
basccl on clurcss:
(a) I'here lnust be trctual ph1'sical liolcncc ol a rcasonablc feal of violence- ot'
danrage. The test is ob]ective. The feal rrust be the kinr-l that \\,ould ovcrwhclir
the lesistance of a relsorable pelson in the srrne position. A rcasonaL.rlc fcar
of violerce or damage u'ouki cxist if a tlncat is dircctctl at thc lifc or limb
or ficctlom of thc thrcxtcned pelson or his o[ hcr imr]lcdiatc tarril]'. or at thc
unlan ful ciamage of h is or hel pltrperlv. lt hns been proposed that the increase
in the inciclence ol taking hostages during tl.rc c-rccLrtion o1'a crimc shor-rlr,1
leacl to aler,ie$ ofthe reqLrirerlenl tl']at the threut 1nrrst hc dircctcd a-sainst thc
'threaleired pcrsorl or his or l.rcr inmediate fanrily'. It rral' be required [hat tlre
rulc bc brought irto operalion where the thrert is cxcrtcd ovcr stturgcrs.
A thrert of econornic danragu or |uin rnav constitlrte dL[ess arcl allou' the
avoirlnnce cl1 a colrtrltct in celtein instiLnces. Hou,eve'1. sLrch cases are likely
to be lale lil-it is not unlau'firl ir.r genelal 1o cnuse econornic harm ol ruin 1o
another in a competitive econonr\.In commetcial balglinin-l,lllc exercise of
llcc u,ill is alu'avs hrnrpclcd to sorne deglee bv the expectation of sain ol fhc
lcar of loss. Harcl bmgaining' is llot the ecluivalent of ciuress antl is ai-.o rot
runlawful. even uhere there is an imbllance of power'.'I'hus. eren though a
threat ol economic harm nrr\ . in ,.-elrlr in c iLcumstancc'. constitutc durcss. 0]rt
rl ill not neccsslrilv be urrlarvtul.
(Lr) The threit must be o1'an imminent or iner,itable evil. The questiolr will be
\\ hether the person coultl not have averted the threat other than b), acreeing to
the contract. The time that passes from when the threat is nrade to uhcn thc
cortftlct is cnncluded cirr plal, ln in]portrnt role in detelniring u,hether the
thrcat \\,as inm.iincnt or not.
(c) 'l'hc thrcat of harm or violcncc musf bc unlar'vful (.ot cotltro bonos ntores).lf
r contracting partv uses a thrert to obtain a more benelicial performancc- than
one he or she would reasonablv he ertitled to. this u'ould appiLrentlv corlply
u,ith the reqLrirement of unlarvfirlness.
(d) The' duress must be exercisetl hy one contracting partv against the other
contracting party.
 General Principles of Cctmmercial Law

(e) Thc threlt ]nlist causc the threatened pcrson to concluclc thc contract.

Thcrcfore. it rlust bc llle threatened pcrson s lear of thc impending harnt that
per suaclcs him or her to concludc the contrltct or to conclude il on pnl ticulin. tcrrns.
A person ir'ho. clespite thc threat. concluclcs the contritct foL sonte othcl.reason
crurlot cornplain of clnress.
Duress mav also be associated u.ith unequal bargaining po!\er bctween
coirtlacting partics \\here power plar, contlibutes in causilg a $cakel partv to
agrce to unlavouluble terlts intlocluced b1 a party uith rlore Lrar_eirintn-l p,'ucr.
Undcr normal circumstiinccs. a \\'eaker piul\, \vould agrcc to such ternis tbr. lelr-
ol econonric harlr that coultl |esult tlom failure to xccepr the tcrlrs ol'fered hv
a strollger partv. This is callecl economic durcss as it errlnates floln econonic
pfessulc.

4.4.2.3 Undueinfluence
Urduc influcncc is rnt, intpropcr or u1.]fair conclr-rct b1 one of tlle contractil)-q
partics by rrreatls 01 ,,r,hich the other contracting partr is persuadcrl to colclucle a
contract \\.ith the formcr. contr'lr\ 10 the latter's inclcpendent uiil.l'he influcnce
rnust \,' eakcn thc other pal tv's llo\,! el ol resistance and rrake h is or hcr l ill pliabJc.
l,Indue inflr-rence is not alwul,s easiJl, distinguishable tl'orn intentional
lnisrepresertation o| fiorn durcss. A court will be nrore r-ead ilY clisposcd to lind thrrt
tundue influcncc has bccir cxclciscd r'l'hele there is a rpccial rclationship bet\\,een
thc partics. Such a special relationship is onc u,hich exists. lix exrnrple. bet\\,cct'l
doclor and patiert. attonev and client. ancl guarclian and rninor. If such a speciiil
lelationsh ip exists. it is lelatively eas) tbr thc 'strolger' parly to abu \e tltc silualior].
This mal tiikc placc. lbr exrmple. tlrrough the abusc ol the other ptfty's ignorance
or llck of experience. physical fi'ailly. inlellectual u,elkness or nental dcpcndence
on the 'stronger' par-ty. Bl taking advantase of the spccjal rclationshill. the othcr's
will is macle pJiable so that hc or shc is influenceii 1o conclude a contract lhat
would otheru,ise not ha\,c becn concluded.
If a partl, is per-suadcd tllfougl] undue infiuence to conclude a contt'act. llis
or hel \\'ill is clilected iit the contents of the contract and a conlracl tloes indcccl
corne into existence. HoueYer. the party s asscltt lo lhe contract hts been obtaincd
inproperlt so that his or hcr indcpcncicnt rvill uls ltot exercised. ConsequcntJr.
lhc victirr rrav elect to uphold or Iescind the contract andror cl:iim damages ba:ecl
on his or lrcr nc-gativc interest. that is. to be plxced in the positior he or shc u,oukl
havc bccn in hacl thc influcnce not been exerted (see the discussiotr on thc ctlect ol'
misreprcscntation abovc: see also para-nraph l l .:l. l belou, ). The elenrents of unduc
infl uence ale the tbilorl,ing:
(a) The partr rvho has allcgcdiv exercised the undLre influence rrust have acquircd
Jn inllLrel)(( oret the rittittt.
(b) That party nust have used his or her influcnce to $ etken the victim's abilitv
io resist. so lhat the f ictim's will bccarnc susceptible.
 Consenstts 11

(c) The inllirence mnst ha\,c bccn uscd unscrupulously to persuacle the Yictitr to
corseut to a triinsaclion thc Yictim u'oulcl not hrve eirtered into of his or hcr
nolrral flee $ ill and ivhich wils to the Victim's .lisadvantage.
An cxample o1'undue influence is if Kgomotso. an cldcrlv farmcr who is ailing and
lt,eak. is indLrcccl bY Mi Lrsi. his doctor, to donirtc a farm to N,Ivusi.

FURTHER BEADING
Africu] ed (20I6).
RH Chr-istic & GB Bradlield Chrlsrir',; l-utr of Cuttrut t in .\rturh
LF virn lluyssteen. MFB Reinecke & GF Lubbc Conltu('t: Gerterul Princ'iples
5 cd (20l6).