746019

research-article2017
NVSXXX10.1177/0899764017746019Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector QuarterlyGazley and Nicholson-Crotty

Article
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
2018, Vol. 47(2) 262­–285
What Drives Good © The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions:
Governance? A Structural sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0899764017746019
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764017746019
Equation Model of Nonprofit journals.sagepub.com/home/nvs

BoardPerformance

Beth Gazley1 and Jill Nicholson-Crotty1

Abstract
The study of nonprofit governance is coming into its theoretical heyday by
incorporating a sophisticated understanding of its contingent and multidimensional
nature. A systems view of governance acknowledges the interplay of internal and
external dynamics on board performance. But empirically, large-scale, generalizable
data that can test these concepts on board performance have been scarce.
This study helps to fill that gap with a structural equation analysis of a national
representative survey of member-serving organizations. The results suggest that
board performance is associated with complex organizational and labor dynamics,
and that performance metrics themselves are multidimensional. Furthermore, not
all relationships with strong boards are directly measurable. Some appear related
to indirect external market dynamics or healthy internal dynamics such as learning
and self-evaluation.

Keywords
governance, performance, associations, structural equation model

Introduction
All U.S. nonprofits of any tax status require a governing board, and all depend on the
ability of their boards to succeed at governance. “Good governance” practices describe
board activities and expectations that are both externally imposed and self-imposed to
ensure a board’s duties of care, loyalty, and obedience are met. These practices, in turn,
shape the way board members are selected, trained, and deployed.

1Indiana University Bloomington, IN, USA

Corresponding Author:
Beth Gazley, Indiana University Bloomington, 1315 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA.
Email: bgazley@indiana.edu
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 263

The external and sometimes coercive imposition of expectations by regulators,

donors, members, and other stakeholders on boards results in normative pressures to
behave similarly across the nonprofit sector (Heugens & Lander, 2009; Miller-
Millesen, 2003). However, while U.S. public law has some specific mandates for
boards, such as a certain level of transparency, objectivity, and due diligence, the
details on implementing most legal expectations are left to boards to decide. The
board’s internal discretionary power over adoption of governance practices results in
substantial variance in adopted practices (BoardSource, 2012; Brown & Guo, 2010;
Ostrower, 2007).
One outcome of this ambiguity is myriad books for practitioners (mostly focused
on charities) often with heavily prescriptive overtones. But the challenges caused by
ambiguity about governance also complicate the efforts of those researchers seeking
to understand what really drives board performance, including in noncharitable con-
texts. The potential for a range of external and internal influences on board structure,
activities, and outcomes, and the ambiguous nature of the expectations imposed on
boards of directors are well-known and widely discussed in nonprofit scholarship (see,
for example, Brown, 2005; Cornforth, 2012; Doherty & Hoye, 2011; Herman & Renz,
1997; Stone & Ostrower, 2007). To offer just one example, boards themselves operate
on multiple dimensions: as a group of individuals, as a team, and as a legal body.
Theories of human, group, and organizational behavior may then be relevant to under-
standing them.

Literature Review: What Influences Nonprofit Board

Performance?
What observers tend to believe drives nonprofit board performance is heavily influ-
enced by the anecdotal and subjective normativism of the field, and its narrow lens on
charitable organizations. One result is a strong mimetic pressure on other boards to
follow prescribed practices. This situation, in concert with an understanding that each
organization’s context shapes board behavior, results in some confusion in the field,
driving Salipante’s (2014) call for more finely grained analysis and much greater
attention to the details of each board’s situation.
Miller-Millesen (2003) offered one of the first frameworks, suggesting that a series
of environmental factors (funding, regulations), organizational factors (age, stability,
and professionalization), and board composition (demographics, recruitment prac-
tices) all influence board behavior. These factors do so by influencing the board’s
stewardship and boundary-spanning activities, such as the extent to which board activ-
ity is needed to reduce environmental uncertainties or to raise money. In other words,
not only must a range of theories be used to understand board behavior (e.g., agency,
resource dependence), but data collection must also be able to capture the contingent
and dynamic aspects of the governance function.
Miller-Millesen (2003) also observed a clear pattern of advice in the prescriptive
literature, suggesting that, anecdotally at least, experts agree on a common set of board
264 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

desirable governance practices, albeit focused on charities. This list continues to

evolve: BoardSource updated its “Ten Responsibilities” document in 2015, calling for
a greater focus on advocacy. Adding other current literature, both practitioner and
scholarly, boards are expected to screen members for qualifications (Lakey, Hughes,
& Flynn, 2004; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012), recruit for diverse
skills and perspectives (Brown, 2002; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Gazley,
Chang, & Bingham, 2010), assure healthy turnover by operating under term limits
(Bradshaw, Murray, & Wolpin, 1992), educate themselves (BoardSource, 2012;
Brown, 2007; Brown & Guo, 2010; Renz, 2013), self-assess (Lichtsteiner & Lutz,
2012), operate transparently (Ostrower, 2007), avoid conflicts of interest (Association
Forum of Chicagoland, 2012), fulfill their duty of care by monitoring finances and
supervising staff (Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, 2007), align their activities according
to the organization’s strategic priorities (Brown, 2005; Herman & Renz, 2000; Ingley
& Van Der Walt, 2005), be accountable for their actions (Green & Griesinger, 1996),
achieve strong interpersonal relations with stakeholders (Chait, Ryan, & Taylor, 2011),
and be able to resolve or avoid conflicts with staff or among board members (Bradshaw
et al., 1992; Engle, 2013).
While Millesen’s model conceptually reinforces the multi-theoretical basis for
board performance, tests of its predictive strength have been infrequent. Agreement on
the multidimensionality of governance is far ahead of success in measuring it.
Empirical tests to understand which aspects of prescribed board behavior actually
make a difference in board outcomes are also still limited in their generalizability due
to recurrent sampling bias. This is not a challenge faced only by governance scholars;
Sowa, Selden, and Sandfort (2004) acknowledged the broader challenge of testing
contingent outcome frameworks in the more general study of nonprofit organizational
performance.
But some empirical efforts do pay off. Brown (2005) not only found empirical sup-
port for the multidimensionality of board outcomes but also observed the limitations
on an overly “structural” perspective on boards (e.g., an emphasis on board size and
other visible characteristics). Brown also noted the relationship between interpersonal
and strategic board dynamics and outcomes. Similar results were found by Iecovich
(2005) although with less success at determining the logic of interrelationships
between board characteristics and outcomes. Engle (2013) used a finely grained mixed
methods study to conclude that the quality of board members’ strategic decision-mak-
ing processes and the quality of internal culture were related to board members’ assess-
ment that they reached better decisions. And Boesso, Cerbioni, Menini, and Parbonetti
(2015) found connections between healthy board dynamics and philanthropic perfor-
mance in Italian foundations.
A characteristic of these various efforts is their attempt, although not always
explicit, to differentiate between board structure and board functions (Iecovich, 2005).
This distinction is helpful in separating not only the more passive but also potentially
more visible characteristics of boards, such as meeting frequency and board size, from
more dynamic but potentially more empirically challenging board characteristics such
as task differentiation and role identity. For example, some structural variables such as
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 265

board size are easy to capture from the annual tax return. However, scholars now are
beginning to find evidence that functional characteristics are more important than
structural characteristics in explaining board quality (Brown, 2005; Cornforth &
Simpson, 2002). Such findings support a long-held belief by expert practitioners that
successful boards rely on successful interpersonal dynamics (Axelrod, 2015; Chait
et al., 2011).

A Systems Perspective on Board Performance

As noted, institutional theory scholars also observe the contingent nature of organiza-
tional behavior as well as the dearth of empirical observation of nonprofit performance
(Heugens & Lander, 2009; Lecy, Schmitz, & Swedlund, 2012; Renz, 2013). Board
behavior reflects variations in organizational culture, life cycle, human dynamics, and
market dynamics, in addition to the previously noted voluntary nature of a board’s
governance choices. Board outcomes also depend on staffing and other measures of
organizational capacity, a factor already well understood to influence overall organiza-
tional performance (Eisinger, 2002).
In such cases, a contingent or systems view of boards can be useful, defined as an
approach to evaluating board performance that takes into account all of the possible
influences on organizational development (Bradshaw & Toubiana, 2014; Cornforth,
2012; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Ostrower & Stone, 2010). By controlling for multiple
internal and external circumstances known to be associated with organizational perfor-
mance, a systems model can offer a more fully specified model with greater precision
in hypothesis testing. Lecy et al. (2012) observed that a central challenge to any mul-
tidimensional model is whether an accessible, user friendly, and understandable sys-
tem of evaluation is available (Ebrahim, 2005); whether the latent behaviors are
measurable; and whether aggregation assumptions can be made (e.g., to simplify the
proposed behavioral model; see also Kaplan & Elliott, 1997).

Study Design
Structural equation models (SEMs) offer one type of contingency framework for
testing multidimensional models of organizational performance. A SEM brings
cross-sectional analysis closer to the point of causal inference, and is also well-
suited to identifying the reciprocal and latent relationships that characterize non-
profit board performance. Reciprocal relationships can be found, for example, in
the connection between board self-assessment and performance. A high performing
board is expected to self-assess, but the self-assessment in turn influences board
actions respecting performance measurement. With respect to latent factors, evi-
dence relating board size to performance is weak and inconclusive, as noted above
(Doherty & Hoye, 2011; Hu, Tam, & Guo-Sze Tan, 2010; Iecovich, 2005). But
Brown (2005) has suggested that an indirect association between board size and
strategic performance may exist, as board size may offer opportunities for a board
to have a greater strategic orientation.
266 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

Researchers have also observed that board performance is related to CEO job satis-
faction, which may in turn influence how CEOs rate their boards (Nobbie & Brudney,
2003). Structural equation modeling, therefore, is well-suited to examining simultane-
ous dependent relationships and testing simultaneously the multiple theories that
might explain them (Hair et al., 2010). SEMs can also test the influence of external
characteristics on internal behavior, a key ingredient in socio-ecological models (see,
for example, Ostrom, 2009). For example, Mausolff and Spence (2008) observed asso-
ciations between organizational effort at performance measurement and stakeholder
assessments of program effectiveness.

Data and Method

Although boards comprise a group of individuals, governance itself is based on group
actions. To understand how boards perform as a unit, a common practice in board
research is to ask the CEO or Executive Director to assess the board as a whole (see,
for example, BoardSource, 2012; Ostrower & Stone, 2010). This approach has its
limitations as it relies on one perspective and cannot discern variations in how indi-
viduals on the same board perform. It is, however, theoretically sound in cases where
a CEO is expected to be more objective about performance than board members them-
selves, and when CEO characteristics will be included in the analysis.1 In such cases,
possible sources of CEO bias should be included as control variables.
This analysis uses a dataset of 1,585 U.S.-based member-serving nonprofit organi-
zations whose CEO participated in an extensive 2013 survey of governance practices
(Gazley & Bowers, 2013). Associations are the common name for private sector orga-
nizations serving some collective interest (e.g., recreational clubs, fraternities and
sororities, professional and learned societies, producer cooperatives, credit unions).
Most are tax exempt under different sections of the U.S. Tax Code depending on the
primary nature of their mission. They can serve individuals (many are professional and
occupational societies), businesses or other nonprofit organizations (often as trade
associations), or both. Despite this diversity, most associations hold in common three
characteristics: a dues-paying membership base, nonprofit status, and a mission
focused on some form of collective action serving the interests of its members.
The data came from a national survey of 13,391 tax-exempt member-serving orga-
nizations matched with 990 Form financial data, the annual tax form for charitable
organizations. This sample was drawn from all 21,326 U.S. member-serving associa-
tions using a random, stratified design. A total of 1,585 responses were analyzed, for a
response rate of 12% (margin of error < 2.4% at 95% confidence; a small amount of
missing data may reduce analyzed sample sizes further). The criteria for eligibility in
the larger dataset of U.S. 990 tax form filers are available from the American Society
of Association Executives Foundation.2 In the survey, the CEO or executive director
of each nonprofit organization was asked to describe both the organization’s external
environment and a broad range of governance characteristics, including board struc-
ture, selection procedures and challenges, deliberative processes, and meeting charac-
teristics. They also assessed their boards on board relations with staff or with members,
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 267

Legal Dynamics (e.g., Board Dynamics (e.g.,

tax classification, self-assessment, learning)
structure, sub-sector)

Organizational Capacity
Industry Dynamics (e.g., size, staff support for Board Performance
(e.g, membership board, professionalization)
growth, competition)

Labor Dynamics (e.g.,

CEO, staff turnover)

Figure 1. Hypothesized model of board performance indicators.

the board’s performance of fiduciary duties, its strategic orientation, and board devel-
opment and self-assessment practices.
In the systems model hypothesized in Figure 1, organizational characteristics such
as board dynamics, organizational capacity, and labor dynamics (center of figure) are
hypothesized to be associated with key legal and industry dynamics (left side of figure).
These all, in turn, are hypothesized to be associated with board performance (right side
of figure). The relationships are expected to be complex and multilateral. For example,
nonprofit tax status could be associated with the extent to which boards self-assess,
with charities (501(c)(3)s in the United States) possibly more likely to self-assess due
to the greater transparency expected of the charitable part of the nonprofit sector. In
another example, trade associations might impose different representational expecta-
tions than, say, learned societies, resulting in different board selection criteria.
Organizational characteristics and behaviors such as tax status might shape a board’s
choice of structure and operating norms (Coombes, Morris, Allen, & Webb, 2011).
These choices, in turn, lead to intermediate outcomes such as board development and
self-assessment, reflections of the amount of internal emphasis on good governance
practices. These good governance practices, in turn, could shape the board’s perfor-
mance outcomes. And all CEOs might rate the board of a thriving organization more
highly than a struggling one regardless of these other internal considerations.
As we note above, the structural dynamics of board performance are likely to be
quite complex, but as a first cut at these processes, this article implements a relatively
simple form of structural equation modeling commonly known as path analysis. Path
analysis can reveal direct and indirect effects of exogenous factors on outcomes like
board performance, through mediators such as board dynamics, capacity, and so on.
Path analysis imposes the assumptions that the errors across these equations are uncor-
related and that causality is unidirectional, meaning that it cannot reveal any reciprocal
relationships, say, between performance and board dynamics. Despite this circum-
stance, it is a good place analytically to begin investigating the complex processes that
we are interested in and provides a solid foundation for future research.
268 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

This path analysis uses a two-stage process to first examine, in separate models, the
degree to which Legal Structure and Industry Dynamics (e.g., tax status, structure, and
membership characteristics) relate to the latent constructs Board Dynamics,
Organizational Capacity, and Labor Dynamics. A second stage then investigates the
direct association between the first set of (industry and legal) characteristics and board
performance when the impact of the latent factors is accounted for. The remainder of
this section describes the measurement of these variables. All of these models are esti-
mated as ordinary least squares regressions that include sample weights and calculate
robust standard errors.

Dependent Variable
Board performance is operationalized as a multi-faceted concept, measured using
multiple indicators. The survey asked CEOs to rate their boards on 19 separate
performance measures, based on a comprehensive scan of the governance literature
with refinements offered by survey pretesters. Each measure could be rated on
“needs improvement (score of 1),” “satisfactory (2),” or “excellent (3).” These
measures were analyzed in two ways: as an aggregate single performance measure,
and in thematic subgroupings of performance characteristics, created via a princi-
pal components analysis (displayed in Table 1, along with descriptive statistics).
Table 1 suggests that boards are rated by their staff leadership in distinct but related
areas of performance. While the results show that ratings vary depending on the
performance measure, they also reveal four clusters: (a) a set of performance indi-
cators related to the board’s Culture Orientation (e.g., its attention to interpersonal
relationships and to fostering a culture of responsibility), as well as (b) a group of
indicators related to Strategic Orientation, (c) to Performance Orientation, and (d)
to Membership Orientation. Naturally, these groupings will vary study by study as
they depend on researcher choice in the variable design. But these findings rein-
force the point that board performance does not occur on a single dimension as
boards serve a variety of fiduciary, political, and strategic roles (Axelrod, 2015;
Chait et al., 2011).

Independent Variables
Board Characteristics and Operation
Descriptive statistics of all independent variables are displayed in Table 2. As noted,
board performance is in part a function of dynamics among board members, the capac-
ity of the board to make good decisions, and the industry and labor dynamics with
which it must contend. These are latent constructs in that they cannot be measured
directly but must instead be proxied with observable variables that represent the under-
lying construct. A factor analysis creates these three internal characteristics of boards.
As in this case, when indicators included in the creation of a factor variable are dichot-
omous, a polychoric principal components analysis is used (Kolenikov & Angeles,
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 269

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Principal Components Analysis for Dependent Variable
“Board Performance” (Rotated, Varimax With Kaiser Normalization, 59% Variance
Explained, selected factors boldfaced for emphasis).

Culture- Strategy- Performance- Member-

Dependent variable (scale = 1-3) M (SD) oriented oriented oriented oriented
Overall quality of board relations 2.49 (0.659) .671 .256 .046 .216
with staff
Overall quality of relations 2.46 (0.664) .761 .143 .063 .201
among board members
Overall quality of board relations 2.08 (0.800) .482 .094 .036 .621
with the membership
Accountability to members 1.89 (0.860) .228 .182 .160 .740
Direct outreach and engagement 1.60 (0.801) .131 .227 .143 .737
of membership
Stewardship over the 2.48 (0.713) .583 .294 .064 .172
organization’s resources
Willingness to take responsibility 2.34 (0.773) .645 .335 .083 .135
for difficult decisions
Ability to make decisions based 2.37 (0.758) .702 .300 .080 .075
on organizational interests
Collegiality of the board 2.49 (0.741) .775 .134 .069 .012
atmosphere
Board’s ability to set 1.11 (0.777) .114 .123 .863 −.016
performance standards for
itself
Board’s record of enforcing 1.00 (0.896) .127 .103 .861 .067
self-imposed performance
standards
Securing feedback on its 0.97 (0.811) −.019 .078 .710 .300
own performance from key
constituencies
Effectiveness at strategic thinking 1.78 (0.809) .257 .742 .158 .036
Board participation in advocacy/ 1.53 (1.014) −.021 .442 .031 .345
public policy
Effectiveness at aligning 1.97 (0.787) .262 .705 .075 .174
resources with strategic needs
Ability to serve as a catalyst for 1.85 (0.797) .301 .669 .107 .147
change
Understanding of organization’s 2.02 (0.789) .280 .646 .067 .188
external environment and
trends
Leading in a way that maintains 2.34 (0.797) .398 .473 −.025 .242
the public trust in nonprofits
Ability to achieve strategic plan 1.87 (0.918) .204 .710 .089 .045
Sum of all performance factors 36.65 (8.842)
(range 2-57 on a possible scale
of 0-57, normally distributed)
270 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables.

Variable n M SD Minimum Maximum

Board dynamics 1,574 −0.01039 0.898246 −3.24315 1.709302
Organizational capacity 1,560 −5.94E-10 1 −3.31728 5.260643
Labor dynamics 1,584 −1.37E-08 1 −2.21114 0.781555
Trade association 1,585 0.329338 0.470121 0 1
501(c)(3) 1,585 0.490852 0.500074 0 1
501(c)(6) 1,585 0.425868 0.49463 0 1
National organization 1,585 0.319874 0.466575 0 1
International organization 1,585 0.090221 0.286588 0 1
Chapter organization 1,585 0.378549 0.485179 0 1
Public sector organization 1,585 0.028391 0.16614 0 1
Education organization 1,585 0.123028 0.328574 0 1
Membership growth 1,585 0.388644 0.487596 0 1
Competition for members 1,585 0.786751 0.409732 0 1

2004). When measures include dichotomous and continuous variables, the modeling
uses a standard regression-based principal components analysis.

Board Dynamics
The latent construct for “Board Dynamics” was built on 11 survey questions
describing board actions that can influence performance (producing an eigen-
value of 2.20). The survey captured the following structural characteristics: board
size, whether the CEO serves as the president, and whether the board has term
limits (weakly but positively associated with performance in Gazley & Bowers,
2013). Selection criteria include whether the board entertains external nomina-
tions or direct external appointments (found to be associated with weaker perfor-
mance in Gazley & Bowers, 2013). Positively related selection criteria include
whether board nominees are screened before election, and whether bylaws permit
competitive elections.
Variables also reflect the strength of board dynamics once elected, including
whether board members assess their own performance, the amount of attention paid
to board training and development, the board’s willingness to report its performance
to members, and the amount of board time spent on strategic-level decision making.
Experts consider strategic leadership and team learning to be among the key dimen-
sions of organizational learning. They also suggest that organizational learning is a
complex and dynamic process and the links to outcomes are multidimensional, thus
best captured through SEM and similar modeling (Yang, Watkins, & Marsick, 2004).
Research has also attempted, although with limited success due to small samples, to
identify relationships between task environment and resulting board structure and
activities (Iecovich, 2005).
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 271

Organizational Capacity
A latent measure of “Organizational Capacity” was developed, with heavy emphasis
on the staff’s ability to support healthy board dynamics. Human capital capacity mea-
sures include number of full time equivalent staff (logged to reduce outlier effects),
whether staffing is mainly paid (vs. volunteer), and whether staff have association
management training. This variable also includes whether the organization is operat-
ing under a strategic plan that would guide staff. These last three factors were posi-
tively related to performance in Gazley and Bowers (2013). Finally, respondents were
asked to estimate the total time (in hours per week) staff spend supporting the board.
These variables produced an eigenvalue of 1.43.

Labor Dynamics
The latent variable of “Labor Dynamics” is built on two survey questions, the stability
of the staff (i.e., low turnover) and whether the CEO is contemplating leaving the
organization. Numerous board studies find a strong relationship between staff turn-
over and staff satisfaction with the board (BoardSource, 2012; Ostrower, 2007). This
construct returned an eigenvalue of 1.42.

Legal and Industry Dynamics

Working next on relationships between variables in the center and the left side of
the hypothesized model, an additional research question examines ways in which
“Legal” and “Industry” dynamics influence board performance through their influ-
ence on the latent board characteristics described above. These include eight vari-
ables reflecting tax classification, structure, and subsector characteristics. The first
point of comparison is whether an organization has 501(c)(3) status, has 501(c)(6)
status, and/or is classified as a trade association. Second, under “structure” is
whether an organization focuses activities exclusively in the United States or if
some activities and resources are located in other countries. International associa-
tions were found to have lower performing boards in Gazley and Bowers (2013),
perhaps due to greater leadership and management challenges associated with geo-
graphical diversity.
Also included is whether the organization has a single or centralized membership
structure versus local chapters, a dynamic that might influence governance choices.
For subsector characteristics, associations representing primarily public employees
and those serving educational professionals are compared with all other associations,
based on Gazley’s (2014) finding that these organizations appear to have stronger
board performance, perhaps due to a stronger public service ethos. Finally, organiza-
tions that report high recent membership growth, and those that report significant
competition for members, are compared, in both cases because these situations might
demand greater effort from their boards.
272 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

Table 3. Relationships of Sector and Legal Factors to Board Dynamics, Organizational

Capacity, and Labor Dynamics.

Variables Board dynamics Organizational capacity Labor dynamics

Trade Association −0.0916 0.00542 0.0798
(−1.61) (0.10) (1.28)
501(c)(3) 0.00558 −0.142 −0.186*
(0.06) (−1.17) (−1.72)
501(c)(6) 0.155 0.246* −0.0602
(1.56) (2.07) (−0.57)
National 0.302*** 0.387*** 0.0783
(6.01) (7.29) (1.39)
International 0.241** 0.596*** 0.0530
(2.96) (6.59) (0.57)
Chapter organization 0.208*** 0.298*** 0.0247
(4.57) (5.86) (0.46)
Public sector 0.0971 0.241* 0.0376
association
(0.79) (2.08) (0.24)
Education association 0.123* −0.123 0.0535
(1.73) (−1.58) (0.65)
Membership growth 0.181*** 0.142** 0.0680
(4.00) (2.86) (1.29)
Competition for −0.0268 −0.0674 0.0324
members
(−0.48) (−1.14) (0.53)
Sample weights −0.0845 0.0151 0.0360
(−1.88) (0.25) (0.71)
Intercept −0.229 −0.336** −0.0441
(−1.75) (−2.05) (−0.30)
n 1,574 1,560 1,584
R2 .08 .12 .01

Note. Values in parentheses represent t statistics.

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

Findings
The results of the analyses are presented in Tables 3 and 4 and in Figure 2. The discus-
sion of the findings begins with the signs and significance levels for key predictors,
then turns to the path diagram to discuss substantive effects. The first table presents the
findings from models of the influence of legal and industry factors on Board Dynamics
(column 1), Organizational Capacity (column 2), and Labor Dynamics (column 3).
As noted earlier, some factors are associated with more than one of these latent
constructs. For example, an organization that operates on a national or international
scale (compared with a regional or local organization) is both positively and
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 273

Table 4. Relationships of External Factors and Board Dynamics, Organizational Capacity,

and Labor Dynamics With Performance.

Variables Coefficient (T-score)

Board dynamics 1.888***
(8.51)
Capacity 0.915***
(4.56)
Labor dynamics 0.949***
(5.23)
Trade association 1.894***
(4.19)
501(c)(3) 0.210
(0.25)
501(c)(6) 0.0292
(0.04)
National −0.822*
(−1.95)
International −1.797**
(−2.70)
Chapter organization 0.207
(0.53)
Public sector association 2.201**
(2.03)
Education association 0.586
(1.00)
Membership growth 2.660***
(6.94)
Competition for members 0.756*
(1.70)
Sample weights −0.423
(−1.09)
Intercept 27.95***
(25.07)
N 1,479
R2 .14

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

significantly associated with “Board Dynamics” and “Organizational Capacity.”

Similarly, a chapter structure is associated positively with both constructs. Together,
these results suggest that larger more complex organizations may have boards that
receive more training, greater levels of transparency, and better leadership along with
the other factors hypothesized to contribute to positive board dynamics. Similarly,
they may have greater internal organizational capacity, including a larger and more
274 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

.15*** Board
National
Dynamics
.07***
.21***
International .11***
-.04*
.04*
Chapters .10***
-.05**
.18*** Board
Membership Performance
Growth .14***
.11***
Educational .13*** .05***
Assoc.
.12***
.04*
Public Sector .12***
Assoc.

Trade Assoc. .13***

-.04* Organizational
Capacity
Mship Comp.
-.09*
.12*
501(c)(3)
Labor Dynamics
.09*
501(c)(6)

Figure 2. Path analysis of relationship between external factor and board dynamics,
organizational capacity, and labor dynamics, and aggregate board performance.

professionalized staff and a stronger strategic orientation, among others. High mem-
bership growth was also positively associated with both “Board Dynamics” and
“Organizational Capacity,” and there is likely to be a reciprocal relationship between
these variables in the sense that these two dynamics support one another. Having a
501(c)(6) tax status was also positively associated with “Organizational Capacity” but
did not reach the traditional threshold of statistical significance in the “Board
Dynamics” model.
Just one of the left-hand variables predicted “Labor Dynamics.” Although all
boards of directors must deal with labor volatility, structure and subsector status do not
in themselves have a direct relationship to staff and CEO turnover. However, tax status
was a significant predictor of this latent construct in that 501(c)(3) public charities
appear to experience greater staff volatility, possibly arising from higher turnover in
their leadership.
Table 4 also displays associations between board performance and legal and indus-
try dynamics, in addition to latent constructs. The results suggest that being a trade
association is positively and significantly associated with board performance, as is
serving mainly public sector members. The results suggest that both of these member-
ship subsectors expect higher performance from their boards.
The findings also indicate that both membership growth and strong competition for
members are positively associated with board performance. The first of these
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 275

characteristics may, admittedly, be somewhat endogenous to the dependent variable in

the sense that CEOs may reward boards for membership growth in their ratings. The
latter finding suggests that boards may improve their performance to make their orga-
nizations more attractive to members in competitive environments.
The findings presented in Table 4 also suggest that Board Dynamics, Organizational
Capacity, and Labor Dynamics are all highly significant and positively associated with
Board Performance. This result, coupled with those presented in Table 3, provides
support for expectations that (a) board dynamics, capacity, and labor issues relate to
performance and that (b) some legal and industry factors also relate to board perfor-
mance both directly and indirectly through their influence on the operation and capac-
ity of those boards. Therefore, much of the earlier literature that takes a multiplex view
of board performance is supported. The path diagram presented in Figure 2 makes it
easier to visualize and precisely estimate both the direct and indirect associations. The
paths are labeled with standardized coefficients, signifying the SD change in the
dependent variable given a 1 SD change in the independent variable, or a 0 to 1 change
in the case of dichotomous variables. Direct effects are represented by the beta coef-
ficient on a single path; indirect effects are the product of all the paths linking two
variables; and total impacts are calculated as the sum of direct and indirect effects.
Only paths found to have statistically significant effects are displayed.
This section explains how to interpret the direct and indirect effects displayed in
Figure 2. One sees, for example, that being an organization that is National in scope
has a negative direct relationship to Board Performance (.04*, p < .10). However, the
variable can still have an indirect relationship with Board Performance that is positive.
This effect is seen through the positive relationship between “National” and both
“Board Dynamics” (.15***, p < .01) and “Organizational Capacity” (.11***, p < .01).
The analysis suggests that being a National organization indirectly predicts an increase
in Board Performance by .03 SDs (.15 × .21) through its positive impact on Board
Dynamics, plus an increase of .01 SDs (.11 × .12) through Organizational Capacity. In
other words, despite its negative direct effect, being a National organization has a
small positive relationship to Board Performance overall (.03 + .01 – .03 = .01),
because it is associated with better Board Dynamics and increased Organizational
Capacity.
In the case of internationally focused organizations, their negative direct relation-
ship to Board Performance (.05 SD) overwhelms positive indirect effects through
Board Dynamics and Organizational Capacity. Specifically, the analysis suggests that
being an international organization predicts higher Board Performance indirectly by
.016 SDs due to a positive association with Board Dynamics (.14 × .12) and by .014
SDs due to the relationship with Organizational Capacity (.07 × .21). However, that
still leaves a negative total relationship of .01 SDs (.016 + .014 – .05 = –.01).
Organizational structure, as measured by having Chapters versus a more central-
ized structure, appears to have only an indirect association with Board Performance.
Having chapters is related to better Board Dynamics, which is in turn positively asso-
ciated with Board Performance, creating an indirect positive relationship between
Chapters and Board Performance of .02 SDs. Similarly, the Chapter variable has an
276 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

indirect positive relationship of .013 SDs through its association with higher
Organizational Capacity.
As the lack of a path straight from Chapters to Board Performance indicates, there
is no direct relationship between these variables once the mediating influence of Board
Dynamics and Organizational Capacity are controlled for. Thus, the total impact for
having a Chapter structure is .033 SDs. Membership Growth, reflecting not only a
healthy organization with more resources but also possibly higher member expecta-
tions of boards, has both a direct and an indirect positive association with Board
Performance. The variable first has a positive and significant association with Board
Dynamics, which in turn has a positive association with Board Performance. Taken
together, these suggest that a 1 SD change in Membership Growth indirectly predicts
higher Board Performance by .01 SDs through Board Dynamics. Even after control-
ling for that impact, however, Membership Growth still has a positive and significant
direct relationship to performance of .18 SDs. That result creates a rather large total
predictive effect for this variable, of .19 SDs. Quite interestingly, this Membership
Growth variable does not have a direct association with Organizational Capacity or
Labor Dynamics. Future research should test why that absence of an effect might
occur, but it may simply be that this model’s inclusion of other variables associated
with Membership Growth has already captured the statistical impact.
Interestingly, variables measuring the subsector or industry in which an organiza-
tion operates tended to have fewer paths of connection to Board Performance than
those measuring structure, scope, and resources. Being an education organization had
only a small indirect effect of .02 SD through Board Dynamics. Alternatively, being a
public-serving association was not associated with Board Dynamics, Organizational
Capacity, or Labor Dynamics and, thus, had only a small direct relationship to Board
Performance (.05 SDs).
Turning to variables measuring tax status of organizations, the path running directly
between Trade Association and Board Performance indicates a relatively large direct
relationship (.12 SDs). However, being a Trade Association was negatively associated
with Organizational Capacity, which means it had a small, but negative (–.005) indi-
rect relationship to Board Performance through that variable. Nonetheless, taking both
direct and indirect influence together, it suggests a relatively large positive total effect
of .115 SDs for being a Trade Association.
Having 501(c)(3) charity status has only a small indirect positive relationship (.01
SDs) with Board Performance through Labor Dynamics, though it is interesting to
note that this is the only variable in the model which had a direct association with
Labor Dynamics. The results suggest that charities are more sensitive to labor dynam-
ics than are noncharitable tax-exempt organizations, although reasons must still be
determined (controlling for budget size, which, we do not, might help). Finally, statis-
tically significant effects for having 501(c)(6) status (vs. all other tax statuses) and
Competition for Members was not found and those variables are not displayed in this
model.
Moving from right to left, Figure 2 also displays the direct relationship between
Board Dynamics (e.g., board functions and characteristics) and Board Performance.
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 277

National .15*** Board

Dynamics
.07***

International .11*** .11***

.04*
Chapters .1***

.11** Culture Oriented

Mem. Growth
.14***
.11***
.13***
Education .07**

Government .12***

.14***
Trade Assoc. -.04* Organizational
Capacity
-.09*
501(c)(3) .12*

.09* Labor
Mem. Comp. Dynamics

Figure 3. Relationship between external factor and board dynamics, organizational capacity,
and labor dynamics, and culture orientation.

Compared with Table 2, the relative substantive connection of these variables to Board
Performance is easier to assess in the path diagram because it presents standardized
coefficients. Those coefficients suggest that Organizational Capacity and positive
Labor Dynamics have positive relationships with Board Performance that are rela-
tively large but significantly smaller than the total impact observed for Board Dynamics
(as well as for Membership Growth). A 1-SD improvement in Board Dynamics is
associated with a .21-SD increase in Board Performance, giving this measure the larg-
est impact in the analysis.

Exploring the Components of Performance

As noted above, our aggregate measure of board performance comprises four distinct
factors: the degree to which the board cultivates an effective culture, maintains a strate-
gic orientation, focuses on member relations, and/or effectively sets performance goals
and responds to performance information. Because these components reflect different
foci and competencies, it is likely that they are related to different external factors such
as tax status and sector, and internal characteristics such as board dynamics, organiza-
tional capacity, and labor dynamics. Four additional path diagrams (Figures 3 to 6)
explore the impact of these factors on the various components of board performance.
278 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

National .15*** Board

Dynamics
.07***

International .11*** .27***

.04*
-.1**
Chapters .1*** -.06***
Strategy Oriented

Mem. Growth
.14*** .1**
.11*** .05**
.13***
Education

.12***
Government .06*
.17***

Trade Assoc. -.04*

Organizational .08***
Capacity
501(c)(3) -.09*

.09*
501(c)(6) Labor
Dynamics

Mem. Comp.

Figure 4. Relationship between external factor and board dynamics, organizational capacity,
and labor dynamics, and strategic orientation.

To facilitate the analysis, only direct effects are displayed (indirect effects will be
identical to Figure 2). The main overall finding is that while all direct relationships
remain positive, as found in Figure 2, the strength of the effect varies according to
changes in the performance dimension. For example, with respect to an effective board
culture (Figure 3), we also see fewer exogenous factors predicting this component of
performance. Only two such factors, being a trade association and reporting signifi-
cant membership growth, continue to have a direct positive relationship to board cul-
ture. However, these variables continue to have an indirect relationship to a healthy
board culture through their relationship to board dynamics and organizational capac-
ity, although we also note that the effect of board dynamics weakens. In other words,
capturing board dynamics helps to capture an elusive latent construct of “board cul-
ture,” a useful finding for governance scholars.
When examining how a CEO rates a board on its strategic performance, Figure 4
presents a path diagram with a set of relationships quite similar to the paths presented
in Figure 2. This is not surprising given that strategic orientation is the largest single
contributor to the total measure of performance. The major change is that two addi-
tional exogenous factors, including being an internationally focused organization and
reporting significant competition for members, have a direct relationship to the strate-
gic component of performance. This result suggests that market dynamics play a
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 279

National .15*** Board

Dynamics
.07***
.11***
International .11***
.04*

Chapters .1***

.11** Performance Oriented

Mem. Growth
.14***
.11***
.13***
Education

.07**
Government
.12***

Trade Assoc. -.04* Organizational

Capacity .14***
501(c)(3) -.09*

.09*
501(c)(6) Labor
Dynamics
Mem. Comp.

Figure 5. Relationship between external factor and board dynamics, organizational capacity,
and labor dynamics, and performance orientation.

stronger direct effect on a board’s strategic orientation. The substantive effect of these
variables is quite small, however.
In Figure 5, the strength of a board’s performance measurement orientation depends
much more heavily on indirect effects than on direct effects. Being a nationally focused
or public-sector-serving organization cease to have a direct influence on the disaggre-
gated component of total performance, although the former continues to have an indi-
rect effect via its influence on board dynamics. The effects of the other endogenous
factors, including organizational capacity and labor dynamics, shrink by about 50%
relative to the aggregate model of performance in Figure 2. Finally, Figure 6 presents
the path diagram for the component of total performance that captures the Board’s
attention to member relations. Here, again the pattern of relationships is essentially
unchanged from those in Figure 2.
The biggest takeaway from these additional analyses is that the direct and indirect
effects of both exogenous and endogenous predictors of Board performance are surpris-
ingly consistent across the different subcomponents of that construct. We also identify
four unique components of performance, including the creation of a productive culture,
a strategic orientation, effective collection and use of performance information, and
attention to member relations. Also of note is that effects are generally positive across
the board, with few exceptions. If there are organizational circumstances that cause a
280 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

National .15*** Board

Dynamics
.07*** .25***
International .11***
.04*
-.08*
Chapters .1***

.09** Member Oriented

Mem. Growth
.14***
.11***
.13***
Education
.07**

Government .05***

.06***
Trade Assoc. -.04* Organizational
Capacity

501(c)(3) -.09*

.09*
501(c)(6) Labor
Dynamics
Mem. Comp.

Figure 6. Relationship between external factor and board dynamics, organizational capacity,
and labor dynamics, and membership orientation.

negative drain on board performance, they are not captured in these models. The con-
sistency of predictions across the different components of performance suggests that
board dynamics, organizational capacity, and labor dynamics are important for all
rather than only certain elements of performance.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study has taken a careful approach to sampling and weighting survey data to
produce fairly generalizable conclusions about board leadership in a variety of mem-
ber-serving nonprofit associations. The usual limitations researchers encounter when
using only filing nonprofits still apply, for example, that smaller and non-filing orga-
nizations are left out. The chief analytical limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the
data, which precludes causal arguments. However, the model does capture temporally
exogenous organizational characteristics such as tax status and membership character-
istics that certainly precede board dynamics in their causal order. Future researchers
might consider including these relationships as causal hypotheses in panel studies. On
the contrary, some relationships found here may be reciprocal, in the sense that boards
are being rated as successful because they have achieved certain healthy dynamics but
are also pursuing healthy dynamics so that they will be successful (to put it another
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 281

way, a board not only conducts a self-assessment to improve itself but also might
improve itself due to the self-assessment). So a second limitation must be acknowl-
edged, the potential for common method bias.
Another important limitation is the variation among respondents regarding their
expectations of their boards. We have provided what the literature suggests is a good
effort at an objective list of board expectations. However, while all nonprofit CEOs/
executive directors are in a position to evaluate their boards, they will not necessarily
agree on what represents success. This study does not compare expected performance
with realized performance, but this effort has rarely been attempted in any governance
research. In addition, we cannot determine cases where boards are being rated as high
performing by their CEOs simply because the organization is healthy, although this
systems model goes further than much of the prior research by attempting to control
for such response bias by including the chief influences on such a response in the
model (including CEO intentions to quit and an objective variable, membership
growth).
Three conclusions can be made from this analysis. First is the empirical reinforce-
ment of a widely held conceptual and practical view of board performance as a com-
plex phenomenon. While this fact is practically self-evident in this era of increasingly
sophisticated governance research, empirical evidence on specifically how and where
board performance is influenced has been harder to produce, as noted in this article’s
literature review. These results suggest that systems models of board performance are
worth the effort, particularly when compared with simpler analytic approaches where
indirect effects cannot be identified.
Second is the finding that, while some of the more visible structural and legal char-
acteristics of boards do matter, there are also latent influences on board performance
that are more challenging to measure and observe, but worth the effort. We note, for
example, the lack of a direct connection between charitable tax status and board per-
formance, yet the mediating effect of tax status on both an organization’s capacity to
support a healthy board and on healthy labor dynamics. This finding also reinforces
the value in studying boards of directors across different parts of the tax-exempt legal
spectrum. We suggest that the choice of tax status, not to mention other legal and struc-
tural choices, may change stakeholder expectations of their boards of directors.
In contrast to organizations serving the education sector, associations that primarily
serve government employees, a subsector with distinct expectations of public service
and transparency, realize their positive connection to board performance directly,
rather than through the mediating effect of board dynamics (also see Gazley, 2014).
Also, an indirect effect is found between chapter structure and board performance via
the mediating effect of board dynamics. This finding will be of interest to association
leaders because chapters are considered anecdotally to be more challenging to lead
and manage (Gazley & Kissman, 2015). The lesson that can be learned here is that
chapter-based associations may need to invest more heavily in board dynamics to
achieve their representational and strategic goals related to supporting a healthy chap-
ter structure—but the greater effort pays off in a stronger board overall.
282 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

Third is the finding that, after comparing direct and indirect effects on performance
of a variety of legal, structural, and functional dynamics of membership associations,
the strongest independent effect comes from the ways in which boards design their
own internal dynamics. In a word, investing in board development pays off, as does
related efforts to be careful with board member selection and self-assessment.
Organizational capacity, particularly investing in professional staff development, does
support strong boards. But the ways in which boards support themselves perhaps have
the greatest impact on their ability to meet their fiduciary obligations.

Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the ASAE Foundation to produce the original
data on which this and other publications are based, and the helpful comments of anonymous
reviewers.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article: The ASAE Foundation funded the survey on which this analy-
sis is based.

Notes
1. Brown (2005) has found, for example, that nonprofit board members rate themselves more
positively than CEOs do.
2. Email addresses could be obtained for 70% of the stratified random sample. There is no
evidence that those organizations without an email address were distributed nonrandomly.
Subjects received five advance or reminder emails and postal letters, and were incentivized
by the offer of access to study results. The survey was preceded by cognitive interviews,
consultation with contracted governance experts, and a field pretest, and took place under
university human subjects review. The response rate of 12% is a conservative estimate
as nonreachable and nonresponding subjects were all treated as eligible, although some
certainly represent organizations that are no longer operating. To further strengthen the
generalizability of results, cases were weighted in the analysis on the known population
characteristics used in the stratified sampling (tax status, budget size, organizational type,
industry field, geographic region). Stratified sampling and weighting of results allows even
smaller datasets to produce generalizable results assuming that these organizational char-
acteristics are correlated with the characteristics of interest in the study (Gazley & Bowers,
2013).

References
Association Forum of Chicago. (2012, March). Fiduciary and management duties for the asso-
ciation executive and governing body. Chicago, IL: Association Forum.
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 283

Axelrod, N. R. (2015). The governing board: Key responsibilities for boards and board mem-
bers. Washington, DC: ASAE Association Management Press.
BoardSource. (2012). Nonprofit governance index 2012: CEO survey of BoardSource members.
Washington, DC: Author.
Boesso, G., Cerbioni, F., Menini, A., & Parbonetti, A. (2015). Philanthropy by decree. Nonprofit
Management and Leadership, 25, 197-213.
Bradshaw, P., Murray, V., & Wolpin, J. (1992). Do nonprofit boards make a difference?
An exploration of the relationships among board structure, process, and effectiveness.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 21, 227-249.
Bradshaw, P., & Toubiana, M. (2014). The dynamics of nested governance: A systems perspec-
tive. In C. Cornforth & W.A. Brown (Eds.), Nonprofit governance: Innovative perspectives
and approaches (pp. 231-248). New York, NY: Routledge.
Brown, W. A. (2002). Inclusive governance practices in nonprofit organizations and implica-
tions for practice. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 12, 369-385.
Brown, W. A. (2005). Exploring the association between board and organizational performance.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 15, 317-339.
Brown, W. A. (2007). Board development practices and competent board members: Implications
for performance. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 17, 301-317.
Brown, W. A., & Guo, C. (2010). Exploring the key roles for nonprofit boards. Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39, 536-546.
Chait, R. P., Ryan, W. P., & Taylor, B. E. (2011). Governance as leadership: Reframing the
work of nonprofit boards. Washington, DC: BoardSource.
Coombes, S. M. T., Morris, M. H., Allen, J. A., & Webb, J. W. (2011). Behavioural orientations
of non-profit boards as a factor in entrepreneurial performance: Does governance matter?
Journal of Management Studies, 48, 829-856.
Cornforth, C. (2012). Nonprofit governance research: Limitations of the focus on boards and
suggestions for new directions. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41, 1116-1135.
Cornforth, C., & Simpson, C. (2002). Change and continuity in the governance of nonprofit
organizations in the United Kingdom: The impact of organizational size. Nonprofit
Management and Leadership, 12, 451-470.
Doherty, A., & Hoye, R. (2011). Role ambiguity and volunteer board member performance in
nonprofit sport organizations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 22, 107-128.
Ebrahim, A. (2005). Accountability myopia: Losing sight of organizational learning. Nonprofit
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34, 56-87.
Eisinger, P. (2002). Organizational capacity and organizational effectiveness among street-level
food assistance programs. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31, 115-130.
Engle, M. (2013). The strategic decision-making process of the board and its impact on decision
outcomes (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH.
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., & Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of director diversity and firm
financial performance. Corporate Governance, 11, 102-111.
Gazley, B. (2014). Good governance practices in professional associations for public employ-
ees: Evidence of a public service ethos? Public Administration Review, 74, 736-747.
Gazley, B., & Bowers, A. (2013). What do high performing boards look like? Results from
ASAE’s national study. Washington, DC: ASAE and the Center for Association Leadership.
Gazley, B., Chang, W. K., & Bingham, L. B. (2010). Board diversity, stakeholder representa-
tion and collaborative performance in community mediation centers. Public Administration
Review, 70, 610-620.
284 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 47(2)

Gazley, B., & Kissman, K. (2015). Transformational governance: How boards achieve extraor-
dinary change. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Green, J. C., & Griesinger, D. W. (1996). Board performance and organizational effective-
ness in nonprofit social services organizations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 6,
381-402.
Hair, J. F., Black, W., Babin, B. J., & Aderson, R. (2010). Multivariate data analysis (7th ed.).
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. (1997). Multiple constituencies and the social construction of
nonprofit organization effectiveness. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 26, 185-206.
Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. (2000). Board practices of especially effective and less effective
local nonprofit organizations. American Review of Public Administration, 30, 146-160.
Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., & Lander, M. W. (2009). Structure! Agency! (And other quarrels):
A meta-analysis of institutional theories of organization. The Academy of Management
Journal, 52, 61-85.
Hu, H. W., Tam, O. K., & Guo-Sze Tan, M. (2010). Internal governance mechanisms and firm
performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27, 727-749.
Iecovich, E. (2005). Environmental and organizational features and their impact on structural
and functional characteristics of boards in nonprofit organizations. Administration in Social
Work, 29, 43-59.
Ingley, C., & Van Der Walt, N. (2005). Do board processes influence director and board per-
formance? Statutory and performance implications. Corporate Governance, 13, 632-653.
Kaplan, D., & Elliott, P. R. (1997). A didactic example of multilevel structural equation modeling
applicable to the study of organizations. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary
Journal, 4, 1-24.
Kolenikov, S., & Angeles, G. (2004). The use of discrete data in PCA: Theory, simulations, and
applications to socioeconomic indice. Chapel Hill: Carolina Population Center, University
of North Carolina.
Lakey, B. M., Hughes, S. R., & Flynn, O. (2004). Governance committee. Washington, DC:
BoardSource.
Lecy, J. D., Schmitz, H. P., & Swedlund, H. (2012). Non-governmental and not-for-profit orga-
nizational effectiveness: A modern synthesis. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary
and Nonprofit Organizations, 23, 434-457.
Lichtsteiner, H., & Lutz, V. (2012). Use of self-assessment by nonprofit organization boards:
The Swiss case. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 22, 483-506.
Mausolff, C., & Spence, J. (2008). Performance measurement and program effectiveness: A
structural equation modeling approach. International Journal of Public Administration, 31,
595-615.
Miller-Millesen, J. L. (2003). Understanding the behavior of nonprofit boards of directors: A
theory-based approach. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32, 521-547.
Nobbie, P. D., & Brudney, J. L. (2003). Testing the implementation, board performance, and
organizational effectiveness of the policy governance model in nonprofit boards of direc-
tors. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32, 571-595.
Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing the sustainability of social-ecological
systems. Science, 325, 419-422.
Ostrower, F. (2007). Nonprofit governance in the United States: Findings on performance
and accountability from the first national representative study. Washington, DC: Urban
Institute.
Gazley and Nicholson-Crotty 285

Ostrower, F., & Stone, M. M. (2010). Moving governance research forward: A contingency-
based framework and data application. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 39,
901-924.
Panel on the Nonprofit Sector. (2007). Principles for good governance and ethical practice.
Washington, DC: Independent Sector.
Renz, D. O. (2013, January 1). Reframing governance II. Nonprofit Quarterly. Retrieved from
http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/governancevoice/21572-reframing-governance-2.html
Salipante, P. (2014). Lessons for governance research and practice: Examining behavioral pro-
cesses and conceptual resources. In C. Cornforth & W.A. Brown (Eds.), Nonprofit gover-
nance: Innovative perspectives and approaches (pp. 272-288). New York, NY: Routledge.
Sowa, J. E., Selden, S. C., & Sandfort, J. R. (2004). No longer unmeasurable? A multidimen-
sional integrated model of nonprofit organizational effectiveness. Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 33, 711-728.
Stone, M. M., & Ostrower, F. (2007). Acting in the public interest? Another look at research on
nonprofit governance. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 36, 416-438.
Van Puyvelde, S., Caers, R., Du Bois, C., & Jegers, M. (2012). The governance of nonprofit
organizations: Integrating agency theory with stakeholder and stewardship theories.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41, 431-451.
Yang, B., Watkins, K. E., & Marsick, V. J. (2004). The construct of the learning organization:
Dimensions, measurement, and validation. Human Resource Development Quarterly, 15,
31-55.

Author Biographies
Beth Gazley is professor, Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs. Her
research addresses nonprofit management and governance, volunteerism, and intersectoral
relations.
Jill Nicholson-Crotty is associate professor, Indiana University School of Public and
Environmental Affairs. Her research focuses on both public and nonprofit management and the
role of those sectors in the policy process.