Australasian lournal of Philosophy

Vol. 46, No. 2; August, 1968

IAN HACKING

A T H E O R Y OF INDEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS WITH AN

APPLICATION TO PROBABILITY

The indefinite article can be used to express regularities that do not hold
universally. For example, by saying 'A man of 40 can be expected to live
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

to 50' you can state a regularity about men of 40 without implying that
all men of 40 can be expected to live to 50. This paper analyses that
sort of regularity. The resulting 'theory of indefinite descriptions' is then
applied to probability statements where the indefinite article is used that
is, statements like, 'The probability of heads on a toss of this coin is
about 0.5'. The results bear on the relation between frequency and prob-
ability. The connection between probability and the indefinite article has
already been exploited by Professor Brian Ellis in his recent book, Basic
Concepts of Measurement, so his work provides a convenient springboard
for further suggestions. I shall start with his ideas about probability,
then lead through his theory of what he calls indefinite referring ex-
pressions, and out to a different theory which claims to be more compre-
hensive than his; finally I shall return to probability.
Ellis" theory
The views on probability found in Ellis' final chapter will be con-
troversial for some time, but I think they are largely correct. He holds
that 'there is a crude order of probability, which, in many respects, is like
the prethermometric temperature order'. He believes probability 'is a
quality possessed b y propositions',--a doctrine which directs him to his
theory of indefinite referring expressions. It is, he argues, a problem of
probability theory to devise objective procedures for ordering propositions
in respect of probability. Then, applying his theory of measurement, we
should 'devise a suitable scale for the measurement of probability'. He
urges that the different ways of determining non-logical probabilities do not
prove that there are different kinds of probability; and he argues that there
is no more a logical concept of probability as opposed to an empirical one,
than there is a logical concept of temperature as opposed to an empirical
one.
Ellis' doctrines are not crucial to the following discussion, which could
be set against a very different background. But since we owe to his book
the examination of the indefinite article and its bearing on probability,

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 A Theory o] Indefinite Descripttota

I shall play out my enquiry on his stage. I am directly concerned only

with his thesis that probability is a quality possessed by propositions. His
proof of this thesis occupies Ch. XI, part B. It is art old problem, whether
there are several kinds of probability, applying to several different kinds of
things. Ellis' way of stating his solution is so brief that it may prevent some
readers from noting all that is novel in his work. Hence I shall qualify his
thesis in a way which, I hope, Ellis would not find objectionable.
Evidently a proposition like, 'the probability of his defeat is negligible',
ascribes probability to a possible event, namely his possible defeat. But
this is no counterexample to Ellis' thesis. He speaks of a 'reduction' of
all probability statements to statements ascribing probability to proposi-
tions. Perhaps we should think of equivalence rather than of reduction;
at any rate, 'The probability of his defeat is negligible' is logically equiva-
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

lent to 'there is a negligible probability that he was, is, or will be, defeated'.
The latter ascribes probability to a proposition; Ellis is contending that
every proposition ascribing probabilities is logically equivalent to a pro-
position ascribing probabilities to propositions.
A notorious difficulty for this thesis concerns sentences like,
The probability that an A is a B is p.
,r There is a p probability that an A is a B.
The A and B are to be filled by anything grammatical, and p is a fraction
or proportional adjective like 'small'. Perhaps such sentences have two dis-
tinct senses, independent of any alleged ambiguity of the noun 'probability'.
For perhaps they can be used not only to express some generalization
about A's (which is the sense Ellis has in mind), but also to express a
purely existenial assertion, in which they mean, 'There is a p probability
that at least one A is a B'. Henceforth we ignore such a possible use,
and consider those sentences only when used to assert a generalization or
regularity about A's" one often analysed wrongly analysed, in Ellis'
opinion in terms of the relative frequency of B's among A's. Assertions
made by this common use of the sentences will be called assertions of the
form rr. These assertions give Ellis some trouble.
By the ]requency theory about the word "probability' I shall mean the
theory which holds that every assertion of the form r: means, roughly,
that the long run frequency, or the relative frequency, with which A's are
B is p. The label 'frequency theory of probability' is often used as a
theory about how such assertions are analysed further, say in terms of
limiting frequencies among Kollectivs; yon Mises, for example, held both
the German equivalent of the frequency theory about the word 'prob-
ability', and also held the frequency theory of probability; the two theories
are logically distinct, and I am concerned only with the former.
Ellis rejects the frequency theory about the word 'probability'. That
theory says that every assertion of the form rr is to be analysed in terms of
frequency. Unfortunately Ellis may seem to be pushing his denial too far,

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and to be claiming that in English no assertion of the form 7r is to be so

analysed. I call this unfortunate because there is no doubt that in some
scientific work assertions o f the form 7r are assertions about frequencies;
indeed, some psychological papers appear to make assertions of the form
~r in order to state nothing more than the actual observed proportion of
A's that are B. It is lamentable but true. But it is consistent to admit this
truth, and yet to deny the frequency theory about the word 'probability'.
Such, I think, is Ellis' intention. Yet he means to do more: he means to
contend that aside from some scientific dialects, assertions of the form ~r
do not mean something about relative frequency, but are equivalent to
assertions ascribing probability to propositions. It is this qualified thesis
which I shall, in the future, refer to as Ellis' thesis.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

Indefinitely referring expressions

Ellis urges that assertions of the form ,r are equivalent to assertions
ascribing probability to propositions. This is just the same sort of prob-
ability that we ascribe to any definite proposition like 'I shall be home
late tonight'. Now when I assert, 'It is very probable that I shall be home
late tonight', it is clear what proposition is in question, namely, 'I shall be
home late tonight'. What is the parallel proposition for assertions of the
form ~?
Ellis is certain that the proposition involved in an assertion of the
form ,r, e.g. 'Theprobability that an A is a B is p', is not the proposition
of the form 'An A is a B'. For according to Ellis, when I commit myself
to a proposition of that form, 'I usually imply that ( x ) ( A x D Bx)'. But
when I say it is probable that an A is a B, I do not mean to assert or
'imply that' it is probable that all A's are B's. Given his premise that
an A is a B 'usually' implies (x) ( A x D Bx), this argument is sound, though
I shall later challenge the premise of this argument. First let us see
where his conclusion leads.
Ellis must cast around for another proposition to which an assertion
of the form ~r ascribes probability p. He catches at the idea of an indefinite
proposition. He maintains that 'the propositional function "x is mortal"
may be evaluated in either of two distinct ways: (i) by replacing x by
some urtiquely referring expression such as a proper name or a definite
description; (ii) by replacing x by an indefinite referring expression and
indicating its range'. The result of (ii) is an indefinite proposition. Ellis
offers no English examples of 'indefinite referring expressions'. He intro-
o

duces the symbol x; apparently this does not stand for an indefinite refer-
ring expression, but simply is one; for all he tells us, it may be the only one.
An example of an indefinite proposition is, { ( x is a man); (x is mortal)}.
If we say this is probable, we are, says Ellis, ascribing probability to a
proposition--an indefinite one. And what we are saying is said in English

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 ,4 Theory o] Indefinite Descriptions

by saying, 'It is probable that a man is mortal'. The new symbolism is

said to be better than that of the predicate logic; a suitable marker in
front of {(x is a man); (x is mortal)} gives the universal proposition, 'All
men are mortal'.
Whatever be the logical merits alleged for this scheme, some doubts may
remain. It has long been known that the frequency theory about the word
'probability' can be expressed by saying that assertions of the form rr are
about propositional functions. Russell argued this in Human Knowledge.
Ellis is at pains to show his indefinite propositions are not propositional
functions but values of them. Very well. But some cynics may feel that
indefinite propositions are too unlike what we have been calling proposi-
tions for a few hundred years. Why, even the 'conjunction' of two
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

indefinite propositions will not in general make sense. What sort of pro-
positions can't be conjoined? Cynics will insist that the difference between
old-fashioned propositions and indefinite propositions is enough to vindicate
the dualists of probability: there are two kinds of probability applying to
two different kinds of things, call them propositions and indefinite proposi-
tions if you will.
Even the sympathetic reader, who is not inclined to a frequency theory
about the word 'probability', may find himself in the dark. He admits
he has what Ellis calls a 'crude order of probability' among definite, old-
fashioned propositions. But where do indefinite propositions fit in? He
had thought that to call a proposition probable is to say something about
how likely it is to be true--how well the evidence supports the claim
that the proposition is true---even how reasonable it is to believe the
proposition. (I'm not saying he analyses probability that way, just that
he acknowledges those connections.) Yet indefinite propositions, says Ellis,
are typically neither true nor false, only probable. Hence the probability
of an indefinite proposition is not concerned with how likely it is to be
true what is it concerned with? No use to say, 'The same thing that
'the probability that an A is a B' is concerned with, and you know
what that is!', for such probabilities are the very thing Ellis was out to
explicate. Indeed we have seen probability used as a measure of things
neither true nor false, but that wa~ in Reichenbach's account of quantum
theory, and there an explicitly frequentist view is adopted, which makes
good sense of neither-true-nor-false. I doubt if many sympathetic readers
will make much sense out of the probability of indefinite propositions--
unless they hop back to the frequency theory, and, with merely verbal
changes, adopt Russell's theory that probability can be possessed by
propositional functions.
To these arguments, which, I trust, I cannot be accused of understating,
a satisfactory answer can, I think, be found. That is, an answer which
preserves the basic insight that led Ellis to speak of 'indefinite referring
expressions', and an answer which confirms Ellis' thesis that common

101
 lan Hacking

assertions of the form ~r are logically equivalent to assertions ascribing

probability to propositions. The answer demands a more thorough analysis
of one use of the indefinite article. The answer does not lead us to a new
kind of proposition, but is couched solely in terms of old-fashioned
propositions; it needs no new logic. It deduces the meaning of assertions
of the form rr from a theory of indefinite descriptions.

Indefinite descriptions
Some statements using an expression of the form, a + noun phrase, are
true if the corresponding statement using an expression of the form
at least one + noun phrase, is true. Thus 'A man stood on the kerb'
is true if at least one man did. I shall call this an existential use of the
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

indefinite article.
The indefinite article may also be used to indicate that a definition is
being given or relied upon. Heath's translation of Euclid's definition,
'A point is that which has no parts' is of course not existential. Element-
ary books on logic often invite us to construe Heath's translation as, Every
point is a thing which has no part, or, No point is a thing with parts.
This device has merit in letting Heath's translation stand at the head of a
piece of syllogistic or other formalized reasoning, but 'No point is a thing
with parts' would be out of place in Heath's rigorous translation, for it
would veil the fact that a definition is being stated. When the article is
used to indicate that one is defining or otherwise conveying a fact about
words, I shall say it is being used definitionally. When so used it has
universal import: Euclid's definition is logically equivalent to the universal
proposition, Every point is a thing which has no parts.
The indefinite article is also commonly used to express regularities
that do not hold universally. I have already given one example: 'A man
of 40 can be expected to live to 50'. Now we need more examples. A
match when struck will light, or so we say. The sentence could be used
existentially, to mean that at least one match when struck will light. But
it can also be used to state a genuine regularity about matches. The
regularity is not, every match when struck will light. Matches don't
always light when struck; not wet matches, nor matches struck on
voluptuous velvet. Even so a typical match when struck in a well under-
stood way will ignite.
Perhaps it is careless to say that a match when struck will light.
Shouldn't we specify the conditions under which struck matches catch
fire? Dare we utter more than a sentence of the form, 'Every match
satisfying conditions M when struck under conditions S will light? Yes,
we dare say more because no human can ever fill in the M and the S
so as to yield a universal statement that is both true and informative. We
can get truth by using an M and an S which make the whole thing analytic.

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 A Theory ot Indefinite Descriptions

We can get informativeness with many an M and S, but then we will not
state the truth.
It may be worthwhile to proliferate examples. A bag of coal from an
English coal merchant weighs an English hundredweight. That is a sound
regularity even though there are crooked salesmen and alsokind ones who
slip a little extra into the widow's sack. But if you ask me, how much coal
in an English coal sack, I will reply, a hundredweight: I do not mean
that by law it is so much; I do not even know if there is such a law.
We need not attend only to sentences beginning with the indefinite
article. I know a Renoir when I see one. Not just at least one Renotr.
Nor every Renoir, for there are non-standard Renoirs, childish doodlings
and adult pranks. But I do know a Renoir when I see one.
We can also find related examples. A man is better for this job
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

than a woman. Not every man nor every women: there are Amazons
and pipsqueaks. But aside from cases which we can explain away, a man
is better for this job than a woman.
There is no brief name for the constructions I have in mind. Compare
the two statements, 'I saw a hen's egg', and 'At sea level a hen's e g g boils
soft in three minutes'. In making the first statement ! may be referring
to one or more hen's eggs that I saw. But in making the second statement
one is not referring to any particular egg. The phrase, 'a hen's egg', as
it occurs in the first statement, has been called an indefinite description.
Skeptics from Bradley on have poked fun at this Russellian label:
if I saw an egg I saw a particular egg and there is nothing indefinite
about it. Although it misses the point there is something in the Bradley
criticism. Certainly the phrase, 'a hen's egg' in the statement, 'A hen's
egg boils soft in three minutes', seems more literally to deserve the title of
indefinite description.
Unlike its opposite, 'definite description', there is little current use of
the tag 'indefinite description', so I shall employ it for describing the use
of the indefinite article under study. We could have taken Ellis' 'indefinite
referring expression' but shall not, partly because he has pre-empted that
for the symbol 'x' and partly because it makes good literal sense to speak
of a description being indefinite, b.ut I can make no literal sense of some-
one or something 'referring indefinitely'.

Definitions
Let S be a sentence that can be used to make a statement, and which
contains a noun phrase beginning with the indefinite article. Represent
this phrase by the form 'a + N'. Suppose further that a grammatical
sentence results from replacing the indefinite article in question by 'at
least one'. Then we define as follows:
Definition: When S is being used to make a statement conveying facts
about the meanings of words in the nominal part N, then the indefinite
article is being used deOnitionalIy.

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 fan Hacking

Definition: L e t S* be the result of replacing the indefinite article in question

by 'at least one'. If S is used to make a statement which is entailed by the
corresponding statement which would be expressed by S*, then the indefi-
nite article in question is being used existentially.
Definition: When S is being used to make a statement in which the
indefinite article is not used existentially or definitionally, then the article
is being used in the indefinite mode, and a + N is an indefinite
description.
Definition: Let M be any denoting phrase which, in a particular context ol
utterance, denotes the object x. Then if in that context of utterance the
sentence of the form 'M + is -~- a + N' is a sentence which could have
been used to express a true statement, then x is an instance of N.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

A theory ol indefinite descriptions

There seems to be only one strict logical equivalence for eliminating in-
definite descriptions. The equivalence is of no help. We know that if a + N
is an indefinite description in some statement, the statement is logically
equivalent to one in which the plural of N replaces the indefinite description
and both tense and number are amended accordingly. I know Renoirs
when I see them; Hens' eggs boil soft in three minutes; Matches when
struck light; Men of 40 can be expected to live to 50. These equivalents
do not clarify the logic of indefinite descriptions.
If the statement, 'I know a Renoir when I see one', doesn't mean that
I can recognize every Renoir, it is tempting to suppose it means I can
recognise most Renoirs. That won't do. If you present me with an
altogether standard work of the master, and I don't recognize it, then
you have refuted my claim to know a Renoir when I see one. I can't
protest that though I know most Renoirs, I don't know this one--that
does not defend my claim to know a Renoir when I see one. Yet I do
have a line of defence. For if you show me an artistic joke in the style
of Poussin, which onhistorical evidence is known to be a jest of Renoir's,
then my claim to know a Renoir when I see one is not necessarily refuted.
Thus, what happens in the majority of cases is relevant to the indefinite
description, but the concept of being a typical or standard case is crucial.
Apparently I know a Renoir when I see one, if I can recognize most
Renoirs, and if, for any Renoir I don't recognize, there is an available
explanation of why I don't recognize it--an explanation which doesn't
imply inability to recognize the general run of Renoirs. Let us call an
explanation of this sort, which does not imply anything about the majority
of Renoirs, or anything about standard or typical Renoirs, a local explana-
tion.
We can now hazard a theory of indefinite descriptions. T o give the
idea, consider only sentences which have the form a + N + P, where

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 A Theory of Indefinite Descriptions

P is some predicate. Suppose that this sentence is used to make a state-

ment in which a + N.is used as an indefinite description, and in which P
expresses a certain property. Then the statement means roughly: Most
instances ol N possess the property in question; for any instance which
doesn't, there is available a local explanation ol why not. Now we put
the matter more generally.
A theory of indefinite descriptions. Let S be a sentence used to make
a statement in which the noun phrase a + N is used as an indefinite
description. Now consider the open sentence that results from replacing
a + N by a blank. Let if(x) be the propositional function that corre-
sponds to the open sentence in the way that the statement in question
corresponds to S. Then the statement in question means, roughly, that
for most x, if x is an instance of N, then ff ( x ) ; for any x of which this is
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

not true, there is available a local explanation of why not.

This formulation has the same defect as the analysis of universal state-
ments in predicate logic. If there are no or hardly any instances of N,
then the first clause of our t h e o r y - - f o r most x, if x is an instance of N,
then ~ ( x ) - - m a y be vacuously true. There is no satisfactory simple way
of solving the problem of so-called existential commitment even for
ordinary universal statements. But I shall leave the matter untouched. It
is not contended that our theory provides an exact elimination of indefinite
descriptions, but only that we can say roughly the meaning of statements
in which they are used. So far as I can see, they are indefinable. Nothing
else does the work they do.
What work do they do? Not the work of truly universal propositions,
be~nning all or any or every, a n d w h i c h have, as it were, clearly defined
boundaries. Although the late Professor Austin argued to the contrary
when marking an Analysis competition, it seems best to hold that 'All S
are P' is false, if there is one S that isn't P. Hence universal propositions
are invaluable to learning by experience and for the methodology we have
learned from Professor Popper. In contrast, indefinite descriptions are
largely worthless in the dialectic of conjecture and refutation. They can
be refuted, as an earlier example makes clear, but their boundaries are
not well defined. Perhaps we should say they assert quasi-regularities
rather than regularities. Their purpose is not for learning general truths
but for conveying imperfectly understood regularities to people who want
to apply them in what they take to be typical situations.
lnde/inite descriptions o] propositions
When the sentence 'I know that he is at home' is uttered in a suitable
context, the noun clause, 'that he is at home', denotes a definite proposition.
Hence the clause could be called a 'denoting clause' by analogy with
Russell's term, 'denoting phrase'. I shall now argue that some noun
clauses can be used as indefinite descriptions. We must extend our theory

8 105
 lan Hacking

of indefinite descriptions, for until now, it fits denoting phrases only. The
extension is trivial, for we do little more than insert 'or noun clause' after
'noun phrase' in the rubric of our theory. First let us see why it is neces-
sary to do so. Consider the sentence,
a: It is possible that a man who reaches the age of 120 will live to
be 130.
A majority of non-philosophical informants, when asked what this means,
reply to the effect, 'It means that if a man reaches the age of 120, then
it is possible that he will live to be 130'. This answer, which I think is
sound, is puzzling from a grammatical point of view, for it is not com-
monly the case that when 'possible' qualifies a 'that' clause, the 'possible'
can be moved inside. Our theory of indefinite descriptions will explain
this phenomenon, and a good deal else besides.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

I do not think a is ambiguous, but it may be, and we must guard

against that possibility. Perhaps the indefinite article in a can be used
in an entirely existential way, so that a is implied by 'it is possible that at
least one man who reaches the age of 120 will li~¢e to be 130'. I doubt
if a would be so understood, but we note the possibility in order to put it
aside.
The sentence a may have another unexpected meaning. Suppose some-
one asserts the quasi-regularity, 'A man who reaches the age of 120 will
live to be 130'. According to the theory of indefinite descriptions, he is
asserting, in part, that most men who reach the age of 120 will live to be
130. Now someone hearing the quoted assertion might protest, 'Well,
what you say is possible, but I doubt if it is really true'. Perhaps we could
have conveyed the same thought, with extreme verbosity, by uttering a.
This possible use of a will also be ignored in the future. Note that both
in this use, and in the existential one, we are saying of some particular,
definite, proposition, that it is possible. In the existential case, the definite
proposition is an existential one; in the second case, it is a proposition
propounding a quasi-regularity.
The sentence a bears another sense more readily than the two eccentric
ones just noticed. It is the sense which tempts people to say a means,
'If a man reaches the age of 120, it is possible that he will reach the age
of 130'. For complete clarity, let us record a context where a could be
used in this sense. Suppose we are discussing whether a particular 120-
year old will live to be 130. We haven't much data but the man seems to
be in good health. I could say, 'It is possible that he will live to be 130'.
But I may not want to go so far. After all, the man may only seem to be in
good health. Perhaps closer examination would prove he has only a few
more months in hand. In brief, I fear it is not possible that he will live to be
130. Yet I suppose, perhaps erroneously, that it is characteristically true
of 120-year olds, that it is possible that they will live to be 130. I
could use a to express this characteristic. Moreover, that is the natural

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 A Theory o/Indefinite Descriptions

sense of a; that is, if someone is given a without a context, he will typically

tell you that is what a means. However, a might be used to mean other
things. So I shall want a label for the assertion made when a is used
'naturally', that is, when it is used to express a characteristic of men of
120. I shall call that assertion as.
We have two options in trying to analyse as. We could pretend that
there is a grammatical transformation which yields sentence a from the
sentence 'If a man has reached the age of 120, then it is possible that he
will live t o be 130'; we would then claim that the a3 sense of it is defined
by this transformation. But I see no reason to believe that any grammar
should include this transformation except as an ad hoc device. I believe
we have another option which does not treat as in an ad hoc way. This
option construes the noun clause, 'that a man who reaches the age of 120
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

will live to be 130' as an indefinite description of a proposition, and then

applies our analysis of indefinite descriptions. In calling the noun clause
an indefinite description of a proposition we do not mean that it denotes
(or indefinitely refers to) an indefinite proposition. T o say that would,
I think, be as absurd as to say that the indefinite description 'a hen's egg'
denotes (or indefinitely refers to) an indefinite hen's egg.
Our theory of indefinite descriptions is stated only for noun phrases.
We now extend the notion of an indefinite description to cover noun clauses
of the form that + S, where S is a sentence in which the indefinite article
occurs. We shall have to say that when the noun clause is used in a state-
ment as an indefinite description, subordinate parts of S, of the form
a @ N, are not indefinite descriptions, but only part of an indefinite
description. We shall then extend our account of an instance of an
indefinite description, defining it for indefinite descriptions of the form
that + S. Let there be given a statement in which the noun clause
that + S is used as indefinite description. Now consider each token
of the indefinite article in S which is used in the indefinite mode. Each
will occur in a noun phrase of the form a -[- N. Let S* be the result
of replacing each such a + N by a denoting phrase M which denotes an
instance of N. Then that + S* designates a definite proposition. Every
definite proposition denoted by such a that + S* is an instance of S.
According to our theory of indefinite descriptions, a statement applying
predicate P to an indefinite description means, roughly, that most instances
have the property expressed by P, and for any which do not, there is
available a local explanation of why not. Hence the assertion as means
that most instances of the proposition 'a man of 120 will live to be 130'
are possible, and for any instances which are not possible, there is avail-
able a local explanation of why not. This can be further unravelled. For
to say that the proposition 'this man who reaches the age of 120 will live
to 130' is possible, is to say of this m a n of 120, that it is possible that he
will live to be 130. Hence our analysis of as unravels to: ' F o r most x,

107
 fan Hacking

if x is a man who reaches the age of 120, then it is possible that he will
live to 130; for any such x of whom this is not true, there is available a
local explanation of why not'. What would be local explanations? This man
of 120 has advanced lung cancer; that man of 120 is about to be gored by
a bull.
Before proceeding to probability, we had best mention a rival analysis
of ~. I do not know if anyone has actually propounded this rival, but
there are hints in Aristotle which may suggest it. It could be called a
frequency theory about the word 'possibility' and its cognates. On this
theory, aa would mean simply that some men who reach the age of 120
live, lived, or will live to be 130. A refutation of this theory is mentioned
in my paper 'Possibility' (Philosophical Review, LXXVI, p. 159). The
theory's falsehood can be seen by consulting the Guiness Book ol Records,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

which assures us that no man is known to have reached the age of 130.
We have little reason to think anyone ever will, though we do think
it is possible that someone should do so. Hence it is consistent both to
doubt, 'some men who reach the age of 120 live, or lived, or will live to
130', and yet to be sure of %. Hence the two cannot mean the same,
and the frequency theory about the word 'possibility' is refuted.

Application to probability
Quite aside from the theory of indefinite descriptions the preceding
paragraph lends itself to a refutation of what I called the frequency theory
about the word 'probability' and its cognates. Consider the long sentence
which expands on a:
13: It is possible that a man who reaches the age of 120 will live to be
130, but it is not at all probable.
Let f13 be the statement that corresponds to the sentence /3 as a3 is the
statement corresponding to the sentence a. The 'probable' and the 'pos-
sible' of B~ are in the same line of business: whatever is said to be possible
is said to be not probable. On the frequency theory about the word 'pro-
bability' and its cognates, the 'not probable' of B3 would be used to deny
a high relative frequency to a class of events. Hence 'possible' would be
ascribing some frequency to this class; that is to say, the frequency theory
about the word 'probability' implies the frequency theory about the word
'possibility'. We have refuted the latter.' Hence the former is false too.
Now for the constructive task of applying our theory of indefinite
descriptions to assertions similar to ~. Let us take a concrete example,
say,
~: There is a good probability that a man who reaches 40 will live
to be 50.
Perhaps ~, displays the same ambiguities I considered in the case of a ;
to make clear what we are talking about, let "/3 be the assertion which

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corresponds to ~, in the way in which as corresponds to a. Thus, Y3 is

the 'natural' sense of .'r; it asserts a regularity about men of 40.
In ys the noun clause, 'that a man of 40 will live to be 50' is an
indefinite description. Paralleling our analysis of an, we obtain: "r3 means
roughly that for most x, if x is a man of 40, then there is a good prob-
ability that he will live to be 50; for any such x of whom this is not true,
there is available a local explanation of why not.
Our analysis came from a mechanical application of the theory of
definite descriptions. It is certainly not ad hoc. Is it sound? It does
accord with the following puzzling fact about -/.~. On the one hand, if it
is in question whether a man of 40 will live to be 50, it is perfectly in order
to adduce ys as evidence; indeed, if there is available no local explanation
of why this man won't live to be 50, we can infer from y3 that 'it is probable
that this man will live to be 50'. On the other hand, despite the familiarity
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

of this inference, we know equally well that there are some men of 40
of whom it is not probable that they will live to be 50. It has seemed a
problem about Ya, how its two aspects are reconciled. The theory of
indefinite descriptions gives an automatic solution.
For a quite different piece of evidence, consider the quasi-universal
assertion with which I began this paper, namely,
~: A man of 40 can be expected to live to 50.
and -/~ certainly look and sound dissimilar in structure, yet they have
roughly the same force. I don't mean they are synonymous, but only
that, in a great many contexts, it would be a matter of indifference whether
one asserted one or the other. Any analysis must explain how the dis-
similarity of structure is compatible with similarity in meaning. Our
analysis does so. ~, on our theory, means roughly that for most x, if x is
a man of 40, then he can be expected to live to 50; for any such x of
whom this is not true, there is available a local explanation of why not.
This is of the same form, and has roughly the same force as our analysis
of ~'3. Hence our analysis of Y3 is confirmed.

Comparison with Ellis' theory

Ellis wants to 'reduce' all assertions of the form ~r to assertions ascribing
probability to propositions. We qualified this by saying he has to show
that, aside from certain dialects, assertions of the form ,r are logically
equivalent to assertions ascribing probability to propositions. Our theory
of indefinite descriptions achieves this end. So does his theory of indefinite
propositions. Hence we agree on the end result. But we disagree on
means.
Ellis begins as we do, focussing on the indefinite article. But he attends
only to assertions of the form ~-, and to some strictly universal statements.
He does not start with an overview of the indefinite article. He is led to
the concept of 'indefinite propositions' whose logic cynics will find obscure,
and whose usefulness may be doubted even by the sympathetic reader.

! ~' 109
 fan Hacking

In our work we apply a general theory of the indefinite article to the

special case of assertions of the form ~r. We too 'reduce' such assertions
to assertions ascribing probability to propositions, but the cynic cannot
urge, as he does against Ellis, that we are still dualists applying probability
to two different kinds of things. Nor can he laugh at our logic, for it is
the classical logic. Hence our theory of indefinite descriptions may com-
plete Ellis' programme to better effect than Ellis' own theory of indefinite
referring expressions. The crucial difference is, I suppose, that we treat
the noun clause in an assertion of the form r as an indefinite description
like other indefinite descriptions; he takes the noun clause to denote a
radically new kind of proposition, an indefinite proposition.
I have overlooked one virtue which Ellis finds for his theory. He says
indefinite propositions may be neither true nor false, but only probable.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

He makes this sound good by reflecting on art interesting example: '(c) if I

had thrown this coin on the table an hour ago it would have landed tails'.
Ellis argues that (c) might be true or false--'there might have been some
special device under the table which would have affected the coin mechani-
cally so that it would have landed t a i l s . . . But then again, it might be
neither true nor false. If the coin in question is a fair one, and there are
no special mechanical devices, then perhaps the only true statement we
can make about the assertion (c) is that it has a probability 1/2'.
As an argument to prove that (c) might be neither true nor false,
Ellis' remarks commit the fallacy of equivocation. His premise, 'the only
true statement that we can make about the assertion (c) is that it has a
probability of 1/2' may mean one of two things. It may mean 'the only
true statement which we can have good grounds for making is that (c)
has a probability of 1/2'. Then the conclusion that (c) might be neither
true nor false is a non sequitur. Or his premise may mean that the only
truth about (c) which can be stated in English is that (c) has a probability
of 1/2; both the statement '(c) is true' and the statement '(c) is false' are
false. If that is what his premise means, his argument is a petitio principii.
Despite the fallaciousness of the argument, Ellis' opinion may be correct.
The argument that (c) is neither true nor false would be very long, but
might follow the lines of Mr. Dummett's paper, 'Truth' (Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, L I X ) . It is certainly not the one-paragraph
affair Ellis makes out. But suppose we accept the conclusion of a Dum-
met-style argument. Must we then have a concept of 'indefinite proposi-
tion' which is neither true nor false? Must we reject the theory of
indefinite descriptions as applied to probability? I think not. All we need
do is embed our theory in an intuitionist logic rather than the classical one.
The singular inference
It is a classic problem in the logic of probability, how assertions of the
form 7r, 'The probability that an A is a B is p', are related to 'The prob-
ability that this A is a B is p'. Often, though not always, we would like

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to infer the latter from the former. This trivial inference has seemed
inexplicable on nearly every theory of probability; we have remarked
above how the theory of indefinite descriptions displays the trivial nature
of this trivial inference.
To solve the problem of the 'singular inference' in this way is not to
say that all earlier discussion was pointless. The problem was merely
miscast. There really is a deep problem about the connection between
frequency and probability, on which Ellis, among others, has many useful
things to say. I would express the most manageable facet of the problem
in the following way. We must analyse the concepts of probability and
long run frequency so as to derive the following principle: let h be the
proposition that E occurs on trials of some kind, and e the proposition that
the long run relative frequency of E on trials of that kind is p. Then p
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1968.46:98-111.

measures the probability which e, and e alone, confers on h. Something

like this was called a frequency principle in my book, Logic of Statistical
Inference, where the principle was shown to be much less vacuous than
it looks. The book may give some reason, in terms of deductive fruitful-
ness in statistics, for accepting the principle, but a quite different sort of
work, perhaps a more linguistic analysis of probability, is needed to com-
plete the chore. It is a merit of the theory of indefinite descriptions to shift
us to a study of this principle, and away from idle, verbal problems about
inferring singular statements of probability from general ones.
Makerere University College,
Uganda.

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