Environmental Virtue Ethics (Ronald L. Sandler, 2013)

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Environmental Virtue Ethics

Ronald L. Sandler
Environmental ethics (see environmental ethics) is the study of the ethical rela-
tionships between human beings and the natural environment, including the non-
human individuals that populate and constitute it. It involves developing a proper
understanding of the human–nature relationship, identifying the goods and values
that are part of or emerge from that relationship, determining the norms (rules/
principles) that those goods and values justify, and applying those norms to generate
guidance on environmental issues and interactions. Environmental virtue ethics is
that part of environmental ethics that concerns character (see virtue ethics). The
core questions of environmental virtue ethics are these:
1 What makes a character trait an environmental virtue or environmental vice,

and which particular character traits (i.e., attitudes and dispositions) are envi-
ronmental virtues and which are environmental vices? That is, what are the char-
acter norms of environmental ethics?
2 What is the role of environmental virtue ethics (or an ethic of character) within
environmental ethics?
After a brief background on the history of environmental virtue ethics, this essay
addresses these questions in turn.
History of Environmental Virtue Ethics

Reflections on character and virtue are prominent in the work of early and influ-
ential environmental thinkers. For example, voluntary simplicity (or temper-
ance) is central to Henry David Thoreau’s environmental ethic (see thoreau,
henry david). According to Thoreau, simplicity is conducive to happiness
because it leads to an uncluttered life and mind, which can focus more readily on
those things that have real and lasting value, such as beauty, nature, justice, and
friendship:
Most of the luxuries, and many of the so-called comforts of life, are not only not
indispensable, but positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind. … To be a
philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school, but
so to love wisdom as to live according to its dictates, a life of simplicity, independ-
ence, magnanimity, and trust. (1951: “Economy,” Pt. 1)
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, print pages 1665–1674.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Whereas Thoreau emphasizes the relationship between character and flourishing,

Aldo Leopold emphasizes the link between character and activity. On his view,
proper treatment of the environment is only possible when we change our perspec-
tive on it and cultivate love and respect toward it:
We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see

land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and
respect … That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that land
is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics. (1968: viii–ix)
Like Leopold, Rachel Carson believes that cultivating virtue is central to appreci-
ating the value and beauty of the natural world. For her, wonder is a preeminent
environmental virtue, since “Wonder and humility are wholesome emotions, and
they do not exist side by side with a lust for destruction” (1999: 94). Like Thoreau,
Carson also believes that wonder toward nature enriches one’s life:
It is our misfortune that for most of us that clear-eyed vision, that true instinct for
what is beautiful and awe-inspiring, is dimmed and even lost before we reach
adulthood … I should ask that … each child in the world be [given] a sense of
wonder so indestructible that it would last throughout life, as an unfailing anti-
dote against the boredom and disenchantments of later years, the sterile preoc-
cupation with things that are artificial, and alienation from the sources of our
strength. (1956: 42–3)
These early and influential environmental thinkers are not atypical in their use of
virtue concepts and language. Louke van Wensveen conducted a review of the post-
1970 environmental literature and found that virtue language is diverse, dynamic,
integral, and pervasive within environmental discourse. She catalogued 189 distinct
virtue terms and 174 distinct vice terms, and did not find “a piece of ecologically
sensitive philosophy, theology, or ethics that does not in some way incorporate
virtue language” (2000: 5).
Although virtue language and concepts always have been ubiquitous and
integral within environmental discourse, recognition of environmental virtue
ethics as a distinct aspect of environmental ethics is more recent. In 1983, Thomas
Hill published an article in which he asked the reader to imagine a person who
chooses to cut down and pave over an entire wooded lot so as to avoid the costs of
maintaining it, as well as to increase the amount of sunlight coming into his home.
Hill argued that neither the language and concept of utility nor the language and
concept of rights captures fully what is disturbing about the person’s behavior. On
Hill’s view, there is something troubling that goes beyond the action itself and is
captured by the question, “What sort of person would do a thing like that?” This
suggests that virtue has significance to environmental ethics beyond its disposing
its possessor to perform right actions. Providing an account of an environmentally
virtuous person (i.e., providing substantive accounts of environmental virtues
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and vices) and articulating the relationships between environmental virtue and
right action (i.e., characterizing the roles of environmental virtue within
environmental ethics) have since become increasingly prominent projects within
environmental ethics.
Characterizing Environmental Virtue and Environmental Vice

One of the core projects within environmental virtue ethics is specifying which
character traits are environmental virtues and which are environmental vices.
A character trait is a disposition to take certain types of considerations as reasons (or
as motivational) for action or emotion under certain types of circumstances. Differ-
ent people have different character traits if they are disposed to respond differently
toward the same types of considerations. For example, a person who is moved nei-
ther emotionally nor to action by the suffering of others (when she is in a position to
help alleviate the suffering) is indifferent, whereas a person who is empathetic and
tries to alleviate the suffering (when in an appropriate position to do so) is compas-
sionate. The two people are disposed regarding the same thing – that is, the suffering
of others; however, they are differently disposed.
A character virtue (hereafter just “virtue”) is a well-justified character trait (see
virtue). It is a disposition to respond to considerations in the world in excellent
ways. If the suffering of others is bad, and one is indifferent to it (or aims to cause
it), then one fails to respond well to a morally salient fact about the world.
Therefore, cruelty and insensitivity toward the suffering of others are vices, and
compassion toward others is a virtue. To paraphrase Aristotle (see aristotle), a
virtuous person is disposed to respond to the right thing, for the right reason, and
in the right way, while also having the right desires and feelings about it (Aristotle
1985). Specifying what counts as “right” for each of these is the primary project of
virtue theory.
There are several competing virtue theories, but the most prominent ones share
this crucial feature: what constitutes right responsiveness is largely determined by
the goods and values in the world (and the nature of those values), as well as by the
relevant facts about the agent (and her situation). When a character trait is justified
as a virtue at least in part by environmental goods and values – be they instrumental
goods (e.g., natural resources, ecosystem services, or recreational opportunities),
intrinsic values (e.g., aesthetic or spiritual values), or inherent worth (i.e., the value
of environmental entities in and of themselves) – it is an environmentally justified
virtue. Care for living things, appreciativeness of natural beauty, and moderation in
use of natural resources are examples of environmentally justified virtues.
Nonmaleficence toward nonhuman living things, insensitivity to natural beauty,
and profligacy in the use of natural resources are some corresponding vices.
Different virtues have different fields or spheres of operation. Compassion, for
example, is a virtue regarding the suffering of others. It is not operative (and does
not provide guidance) in a situation where one’s activities or decisions do not impact
the well-being of sentient others. Compassion is not operative when skipping stones.
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Loyalty is a virtue that is operative only when dealing with people (or, perhaps,
places) with which one has an appropriate history. Loyalty is not operative with
strangers. A virtue is an environmentally responsive virtue if it is an excellent charac-
ter trait whose field of operation includes some aspect of the natural environment.
Wonder toward nature, compassion toward animals, and restraint regarding the
use of natural resources are examples of environmentally responsive virtues.
Incuriousness toward nature, cruelty toward nonhuman animals, and profligacy in
the use of natural resources are some corresponding vices.
Some virtues are productive. They aim at bringing something about. Compassion
aims at reducing suffering and wonder aims at increasing understanding, for
example. Other virtues, such as gratitude and appreciation, are primarily expressive
or receptive. Virtues that are productive of environmental ends – that is, that aim at
protecting or promoting environmental goods and values – are environmentally
productive virtues. Ecological sensitivity, temperance regarding material goods, and
perseverance (e.g., in the domain of environmental advocacy) are environmentally
productive virtues. Hubris regarding our ability to control the environment, apathy
regarding environmental issues, and intemperance in consumptive practices are
some corresponding vices.
Environmentally justified virtues, environmentally responsive virtues, and
environmentally productive virtues are each a (not mutually exclusive) type of
environmental virtue. Because not all environmental virtues are environmentally
responsive virtues, the environmental virtues are not just character traits operative
in natural contexts (e.g., when walking in the woods or studying barnacles). Among
the environmental virtues are traits that make for effective environmental stewards
and advocates (such as trustworthiness, loyalty, and perseverance), as well as traits
operative in our daily lives that are conducive to promoting ecological sustainability
(such as temperance, humility, and far-sightedness) (Welchman 1999; Cafaro 2001a;
Sandler 2007; Treanor 2010).
The particular character traits that an environmental ethic endorses or emphasizes
as environmental virtues and vices depends upon the environmental values that it
prioritizes, as well as upon the theoretical framework that it employs. For a utilitar-
ian (see utilitarianism) environmental ethic such as Peter Singer’s, on which the
criterion for moral standing is the capacity to experience pleasure and pain, the
virtue of compassion and the vice of cruelty are central, and a character trait is a
virtue to the extent that it is conducive to promoting pleasure and the absence of
pain (e.g., considerateness and benevolence) (Singer 1975). For a Kantian biocentric
ethic (see kantian practical ethics; biocentrism) such as Paul Taylor’s, on
which all living things are regarded as having inherent worth, the virtue of respect
for nature and the vice of nonmaleficence toward living things are central, and a
character trait is a virtue to the extent that it is conducive to allowing living things to
pursue their own goods unconstrained by human activity (e.g., restraint and won-
der) (Taylor 1986). On a communitarian (see communitarianism) environmental
ethic such as Aldo Leopold’s, on which the biological community is of primary
importance, the virtue of ecological sensitivity and the vice of hubris will be central,
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and character traits will be virtues to the extent that they promote the health, integ-
rity, or flourishing of the biotic community (e.g., love and gratitude) (Leopold 1968;
Shaw 1997).
Again, what each of the above examples demonstrates is that the virtues that an
environmental ethic advocates are the product of both the environmental values
that it endorses (including their comparative significance) and the broader norma-
tive or theoretical framework in which they are situated. The former (the values)
describes what sorts of things matter, the latter (the normative framework) describes
how they matter, and the virtues describe (based on the values and framework) how
we ought to respond to those entities that possess value. The same is true of the
corresponding vices.
Nevertheless, there are some norms of character on which theories of environ-
mental ethics tend to converge. For example, most theories recognize hubris,
indifference, apathy, greed, wastefulness, and laziness as environmental vices, and
most theories recognize humility, courage, benevolence, temperance, perseverance,
integrity, and wonder as virtues. The reason for this convergence is that ecological
degradation – e.g., unsustainable use of natural resources, habitat loss, and pollution –
tends to compromise a wide range of environmental goods and values: human health,
nonhuman flourishing, ecosystem services, natural resources, recreational and scien-
tific opportunities, and natural beauty, for example. Therefore, character traits that
promote ecological degradation tend to be detrimental to recognizing, protecting,
promoting, or acknowledging the environmental goods and values emphasized by
just about any environmental ethic. As a result, there tends to be convergence
among different types of environmental ethics – e.g., anthropocentric and nonan-
thropocentric, individualistic and communitarian, and consequentialist (see
consequentialism), deontological, and virtue ethical – in support of character
traits that promote ecological sustainability and against traits that promote ecological
degradation (Wenz 2005).
Virtue and Vice in Environmental Ethics

Environmental virtue ethics is a crucial component of environmental ethics in
several respects: virtue and vice language helps to characterize the human relation-
ship with nature and our environmental challenges; environmental virtue theory
elucidates the ways in which environmentally considerate behavior is conducive to
agent flourishing; environmental virtue disposes an agent to act according to
environmental ethics rules and principles of action; and environmental virtue helps
to identify or determine correct environmental actions and policies. In this section,
these roles are discussed in turn.
As discussed earlier, environmental virtue language is pervasive and integral to
environmental ethics. The reason for this is that the language of virtue and vice is far
more diverse and nuanced than the languages of duty and consequences. There are
hundreds of virtue and vice terms – honest/dishonest, compassion/cruelty, generosity/
miserliness, optimism/pessimism, courage/cowardice, temperance/intemperance,
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respect/disregard, gratitude/ingratitude, and so on. This allows for more subtle and
rich evaluations of both character and conduct than the standard deontological and
consequentialist categories – i.e., wrong, permissible, obligatory, and supererogatory.
This diversity and richness is crucial for environmental ethics because of the complex-
ity of the human relationship with the natural environment. Nature is a source of basic
resources, knowledge, recreation, renewal, and, for some, spiritual experience. It is
also a threat, indifferent to us, and a locus of human-independent values. Environmental
ethics needs the resources to accommodate this complexity, without homogenization
or misrepresentation, and the language of virtue and vice provides them.
Moreover, our environmental challenges are diverse and complex. The wilderness
and land-use issues that dominated early environmentalism are still prominent (e.g.,
off-road vehicle use and road building in national forests, fire suppression policy,
wolf “management” programs, and species preservation), as are the pollution issues
that first emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., industrial zoning and permit issuance,
manufacturing and consumer waste disposal, water privatization, and environmen-
tal justice). To these have been added global issues, such as climate change, ozone
depletion, and population growth, which are impersonal, distant (both spatially and
temporally), collective action problems that involve the cumulative unintended
effects of an enormous number of seemingly inconsequential decisions, as well as
issues associated with advanced technologies such as genetic modification and
nanobiotechnology. Given the wide array of environmental issues, environmental
ethics requires a dynamic and diverse set of evaluative concepts, which again
environmental virtue ethics provides.
As Thoreau and Carson emphasize, environmental virtue is beneficial to its
possessor. On Carson’s view, this is because it opens a person to beneficial experi-
ences and relationships in nature. The natural environment provides aesthetic and
recreational goods, as well as opportunities to develop physically, intellectually,
morally, and spiritually. However, these goods are more available to some people
than to others. Those who possess traits like wonder, humility, and love experience
nature and relate to it differently than those who are arrogant, lazy, and indifferent
to the natural world. For the former, nature often is a source of nurturing, renewal,
knowledge, and joy; for the latter it is less likely to be so, since they are less likely to
go into nature and explore, study, reflect, and appreciate it.
Environmental virtue is also thought to benefit its possessor by focusing her on
what is truly valuable in life. This is largely the basis of Thoreau’s advocacy for simplicity
and temperance. Moreover, for a person who embraces temperance, foregoing
unnecessary material things is not likely to be regarded as a sacrifice. From the per-
spective of a temperate person, such things are a distraction that do not add to the
quality of one’s life. She will be pleased to be without the burden of them. This is an
instance of what might be called the “integrating effect of virtue.” Environmental vir-
tues (and virtues more generally) often appear to involve sacrifice from the perspective
of a person who does not possess the relevant virtues, but from the perspective of the
virtuous person they are not sacrifices at all. For example, many people who are
environmentally committed take pleasure in the activities that this requires – e.g.,
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composting, cleaning green spaces, reducing energy use, or biking to work – even as
those who do not share their values or commitments (i.e., their virtues) would con-
sider these activities to be burdensome or sacrifices.
The role that environmental virtue plays in enriching a person’s life and integrat-
ing environmentally considerate behavior with individual flourishing complements
and, in some respects, counterbalances other aspects of environmental ethics. One
prominent area of environmental ethics concerns the value of (nonhuman) environ-
mental entities, such as species or animals. This aspect of environmental ethics
standardly emphasizes duty and restraint – i.e., the values ground obligations regard-
ing what we cannot or must do to nature. Another prominent area of environmental
ethics concerns our dependencies upon and vulnerabilities to the natural environ-
ment. This aspect of environmental ethics standardly emphasizes the harms or
losses to us that will occur if we do not change our behaviors regarding the environ-
ment. By emphasizing how ecological sensitivity, care, and concern (and other envi-
ronmental virtues) can benefit their possessor – even when she is doing her duty or
acting prudentially – environmental virtue ethics provides a positive vision for the
human–nature relationship, one in which human flourishing and environmental
flourishing not only coincide but also are intertwined with each other (Cafaro 2001b).
Another role of environmental virtue ethics within environmental ethics arises
from the fact that character is relevant to how one behaves. As Leopold (1968)
emphasizes, how people act depends upon what of the world they perceive and how
they perceive it. A person who loves and respects nature does not see a particular
landscape or run of river as merely a resource for satisfying human wants and needs.
She sees it as well as a place of beauty, where nonhuman organisms strive to flourish,
and as the product of complex ecological processes. This perspective informs how
she interacts with it. To paraphrase Carson, a person who has wonder regarding the
natural world is opposed to destruction of it. More generally, an environmentally
virtuous person – precisely because of her virtue – is disposed both to recognize
environmental values and respond to them appropriately. As a result, environmental
virtue disposes its possessor to act according to the rules, principles, or norms of
action of the correct environmental ethic. Virtue, including environmental virtue, is
conducive to right action.
In addition to disposing a person to perform right actions, environmental virtue
ethics can help to identify which actions are right. As discussed above, many of our
environmental challenges are longitudinal collective action problems. When faced
with such challenges, an ethic is needed that emphasizes sustained commitment, the
development of communities of agents, and the importance of doing one’s part even
when others fail to do theirs. The constancy and centrality of a person’s character in
orienting her life, in addition to her episodic actions, is thus conducive to an effective
environmental ethic (Jamieson 2007; Sandler 2010).
Moreover, the sensitivity to values and context (i.e., wisdom) that is part of virtue
is often instrumental in the application of action-guiding rules and principles to
concrete situations. At a minimum, sensitivity and attending to the relevant contex-
tual details are required to determine which rules or principles are applicable to
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which situations, as well as for determining what course of action they recommend
in those situations where they are operative. But these may also be indispensable in
adjudicating between conflicting demands of ethics or resolving ethical dilemmas
that arise from a plurality of sources of value and justification. Many moral philoso-
phers have argued that it is implausible and unreasonable to expect that there is
some finite set of rules or principles that can be applied by any moral agent in any
situation to determine what the proper course of action is in that situation
(Hursthouse 1999). If they are correct – if action guidance cannot always be accom-
plished by rules and principles alone – then the wisdom and sensitivity that are part
of virtue (including environmental virtue) are in some situations indispensable for
identifying right action, including environmentally right action.
The roles of environmental virtue within environmental ethics discussed so far
cast environmental virtue ethics as a crucial component of any environmental ethic,
regardless of its theoretical or normative framework (e.g., consequentialist, com-
munitarian, or deontological). However, some have suggested that virtue ethics or
virtue-oriented ethics may also provide an alternative theoretical framework to
other approaches to environmental ethics. On this view, the virtues would be the
primary evaluative concepts of the environmental ethic, and right action would be
explicated through them (Sandler 2007). On such an ethic, when determining what
action or policy to pursue, one would first identify which virtues are operative and
then determine what they would call for individually and overall. Because on this
view right action is explicated through the virtues, providing substantive accounts of
environmental virtues and vices is crucial to generating the normative resources of
the ethic.
Conclusion: The State of Environmental Virtue Ethics

Environmental virtue ethics is a vibrant area of environmental ethics. Many envi-
ronmental philosophers are doing work on characterizing the substantive disposi-
tions that constitute particular environmental virtues and vices (e.g., forgiveness,
tolerance, patience, anger, greed, and apathy). Work is also being done on the roles
of virtue in responding to particular environmental problems (e.g., global warming
and environmental injustice) and to environmental challenges more generally. In
addition, there is continued interest in whether virtue ethics provides a viable and
preferable alternative environmental ethic to those supported by other normative
theories. What appears to be settled, however, is that environmental virtue ethics is
an indispensable component of environmental ethics.
see also: anthropocentrism; aristotle; biocentrism; communitarianism;

consequentialism; environmental ethics; kantian practical ethics;
thoreau, henry david; utilitarianism; virtue; virtue ethics
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REFERENCES
Aristotle 1985. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Cafaro, Philip 2001a. “The Naturalist’s Virtues,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World,
vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 85–99.
Cafaro, Philip 2001b. “Thoreau, Leopold, and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue
Ethic,” Environmental Ethics, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 3–17.
Carson, Rachel 1956. The Sense of Wonder. New York: Harper & Row.
Carson, Rachel 1999. “Design for Nature Writing,” in L. Lear (ed.), Lost Woods: The Discovered
Writings of Rachel Carson. Boston: Beacon, pp. 93–7.
Hill, Thomas 1983. “Ideals of Human Excellences and Preserving Natural Environments,”
Environmental Ethics, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 211–24.
Hursthouse, Rosalind 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jamieson, Dale 2007. “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists,” Utilitas, vol. 19, no. 2,
pp. 160–83.
Leopold, Aldo 1968. A Sand Country Almanac. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sandler, Ronald 2007. Character and Environment. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sandler, Ronald 2010. “Ethical Theory and the Problem of Inconsequentialism: Why
Environmental Ethicists Should be Virtue Oriented Ethicists,” Journal of Agricultural
and Environmental Ethics, vol. 23, nos. 1–2, pp. 167–83.
Shaw, Bill 1997. “A Virtue Ethics Approach to Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic,” Environmental
Ethics, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 53–67.
Singer, Peter 1975. Animal Liberation. New York: New York Review Books.
Taylor, Paul 1986. Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Thoreau, Henry David 1951. Walden. New York: Bramhall House.
Treanor, Brian 2010. “Environmentalism and Public Virtue,” Journal of Agricultural and
Environmental Ethics, vol. 23, nos. 1–2, pp. 9–28.
Welchman, Jennifer 1999. “The Virtues of Stewardship,” Environmental Ethics, vol. 21, no. 4,
pp. 411–23.
Wensveen, Louke van 2000. Dirty Virtues: The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Ethics. Amherst,
NY: Humanity.
Wenz, Peter 2005. “Synergistic Environmental Virtues,” in R. Sandler and P. Cafaro (eds.),
Environmental Virtue Ethics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 197–213.
FURTHER READINGS
Cafaro, Philip 2001. “Environmental Virtue Ethics,” special issue of Philosophy in the
Contemporary World, vol. 8, no. 2.
Frasz, Geoffrey 1993. “Environmental Virtue Ethics: A New Direction for Environmental
Ethics,” Environmental Ethics, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 259–74.
Hursthouse, Rosalind 2006. “Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals,”
in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Readings in
Virtue Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 136–54.
Macintyre, Alasdair 1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues.
Chicago: Open Court.
Newton, Lisa 2003. Ethics and Sustainability: Sustainable Development and the Moral Life.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
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O’Neill, John 1993. Ecology, Policy, and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World.
London: Routledge.
Sandler, Ronald, and Philip Cafaro 2005. Environmental Virtue Ethics. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Sandler, Ronald, and Philip Cafaro 2010. “Environmental Virtue Ethics,” special issue of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 23, nos. 1–2.
Swanton, Christine 2003. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

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1

Environmental Virtue Ethics

1 What makes a character trait an environmental virtue or environmental vice,

History of Environmental Virtue Ethics

Whereas Thoreau emphasizes the relationship between character and flourishing,

We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see

Characterizing Environmental Virtue and Environmental Vice

Virtue and Vice in Environmental Ethics

Conclusion: The State of Environmental Virtue Ethics

see also: anthropocentrism; aristotle; biocentrism; communitarianism;

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