Re-Imagining Collective Action Institutions: Pastoralism in Mongolia

Author(s): Sandagsuren Undargaa

Source: Human Ecology, Vol. 45, No. 2 (APRIL 2017), pp. 221-234
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44202547
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 Hum Ecol (2017) 45:22 1-234 /g'
I ■■ I CrossMark
DOI 1 0. 1 007/s 1 0745-0 1 7-9898- 1 ^

Re-Imagining Collective Act

Pastoralism in Mongolia
Sandagsuren Undargaa 1

Published online: 1 March 2017

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Abstract Strengthening collective action institutions in- insights from common property literature, provides perspec-
volves recognizing local community or user group land rights tives on the myriad ways in which people gain de facto access
particularly through formal property mechanisms. However, to resources. Many if not most development organizations
policy initiatives based on collective action theories can be promote community-based natural resource management
highly prescriptive and difficult to apply in developing con-(CBNRM) and self-governing collective action institutions by
texts. Employing a qualitative case study methodology, I ex-organizing local communities or groups and formalizing their
plore the ways in which donor organizations in Mongolia property rights. However, the application of a collective action
attempt to strengthen common property or collective action approach appears to be difficult in many developing context
institutions by engineering socioeconomic units and formaliz- (Hall et al. 2014; Johnson 2004; Saunders 2014). Collective
ing property rights to pastureland. These initiatives face diffi- action proponents point out the existence of local actors devel-
culties in defining group social and resource use boundaries oping a self-regulating capability to pursue exclusion and to
and the herders' vision of pastureland management. Using an regulate joint use to avoid open access.During periods of rapid
access approach, this study reveals various legal and extra- socioeconomic change, however, state ownership or state-led
legal mechanisms that have historically persisted to enabletransitional policies can result in a breakdown of self-governing
the state and local community to manage state territories, pas-community institutions. Therefore, strengthening community
toral production, and resources. Overestimating the capacity self-governing institutions is critical in addressing the problem
of formalized property rights obscures the importance of other of exclusion in managing common pool resources (CPR)
mechanisms in strengthening state and local community co- (Basurto and Ostrom 2009; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990).
management and collective action institutions. It involves re-instating or re-engineering a complex set of his-
torical, customary or existing local self-governing institutions
into durable collective action institutions that have the capacity
Keywords Collective action Common pool resource (CPR)
to adapt and cope with changing socio-political, economic and
rights • Pastureland management • Pastoralism • Mongolia
climatic conditions (Agrawal 2010; Basurto and Ostrom 2009;
Feeny et al. 1990). There are two issues. On one hand, the
devolution of resource use rights of the local community by
Introduction
supporting specific customary tenure appears challenging due
to the dynamism and flexibility inherent in customary tenures
Employing an access approach, I examine past and present(Fitzpatrick 2005), particularly when diverse customs of differ-
patterns of co-management and collective action in the context
ent groups are re-defined (Berry 1993). In many cases, the na-
of Mongolian pastoralism. This approach, while drawing onture of customary institutions has been contested as these are
often based on an uneven mixture of old rules and norms with

El Sandagsuren Undargaa new arrangements (Cleaver 2001). On the other hand, achieving
undarga@hotmail.com a 'principle of exclusion' through universal design principles
remains challenging due to high levels of heterogeneity in insti-
1 The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia tutional durability and between contexts (Ostrom 2007).

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 222 Hum Ecol (201 7) 45:22 1-234

Indeed, CPR management diffic

rights for herder groups in a draft of the new pastureland law1
achieving collective
by allowing groupaction.
'pasture possession rights ( Accordin
ezemshih erkh )'
(Scott 1976; Sen
modeled 1981), creating
on CBNRM groups organized by donors (Fernandez- e
been a historical struggle
Gimenez as differs
et al. 2015: 62). However, this approach formal
from
result in the earlier
unequal land law (Law of Mongolia
access to on Land 2002), which
CPRs (Jo
universal design prohibits ownership of pastureland. Additionally,
principles totheself-go
draft law
theorists raises multiple issues
emphasize the regarding equal
need access to the basics
to of rec
and a wider enabling institutional
pastoral production (here sheep, goat, cattle, horses and camels) se
torical contexts (Ostrom
within 1990,
and between different groups and of course, non- 200
attempts to member households
merge the (Addison et al. 2013; Fernandez-
scientific app
ratives are Gimenez et
limited inal. 2008b;
theUpton et al.sense
2013). Even successful
that
ities of historical events
herder groups to
may face challenges arising from the
land degrada- logi
(Johnson 2004: tion
427). Moreover,
and risk management in the absence of adequate formal for
credible mechanisms and
institution enforced by local
its officials regulating cross
historicall
important than boundary
the and cross-level
actual dynamics of herding
form movement of
Policies derived from
(Fernandez-Gimenez the
et al. 2015). collect
I examine issues facing
prescriptive in organized
nature, collective action or scaling up of herder groups
whereas bo
tory property relations
and have
argues that attempts to apply property emer
rights to pastoral
specific resources based
historical on a narrow application of collective
processes action
(Benda-
is also difficult theory may
to not solve problems associated
specify typeswith collective pas-
of pr
is ineffective tureland management.
government enforceme
cultural norms of property relation
property rights (Sturgeon and Sik
2004). In fact, some people benefit
natural resources
Study irrespective
Sites and Research Methods of the
1998; and Ribot
Peluso 2003). Thus e
This case study was conducted in three rural micro-districts
are just one mechanism among man
to access (bags) in two neighboring
resources provinces ( aimag ) surrounding
(Berry 1983;
Peluso 2003). Herlen Bayan-Ulaan
An access (HBU) Mountain approach
(Map 1) in 2010.
Although a longitudinal study was necessary for examining
resource regulatory mechanisms be
the process of forming herder groups (Upton 2008), there have
approach (Ribot 1998; Ribot and
been no subsequent changes at the field site.2 Qualitative
Lund 2009). Therefore, a comprehe
research was carried out in the same area as a World Bank
prior resource institutions is criti
management.
Sustainable Livelihood Project (SLP) to scale up herder
In Mongolia
group formation. During collective
organized
severe weather, many herders act
from the central and southern parts of Mongolia overwinter
ficult after the collapse of the forma
collectives
in this longstanding reserve
(Appendix).
pasture area (RPA).analys
Policy
Herlen
ory of collective
Bayan-Ulaan
action
(HBU) and Dolood
to
(DD) bags
examine
belong to the t
Delgerhaan rural district (soum), Hentii aimag and Ulaan-
management such as land degradati
and disputed Uhaa (UU) bag(Fernandez-Gim
use belong to Bayanjargalan soum in Tuv
aimag. These areas are significant for understanding prob-
Although in general the insights pro
lems in pastureland management because first, the bags
theory are critical in understandin
differ in their historical governance of state territorial adminis-
applicability of this approach in p
tration and the ways in which they manage pastureland. HBU
questions (Undargaa and McCarthy
has the combined status of bag and village (settlement) due to
National and international advocat
its former status of HBU RPA during the socialist period. HBU
customary institutions and re-engi
that are nested within the state territorial administration. bag territory also includes the territory of the RPA, which was
re-established and is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
In particular, they promote forming and scaling up small-
Food, Agriculture and Light Industry (MFALI or MFA) since
size herder groups with clearly defined social and resource
use boundaries. This requires technical and financial sup- 2007. In contrast, DD and UU bags are under governance of
port of a third party and legal recognition of these groups
1 See Law on pastureland, law of Mongolia, No 187 (3577), Daily News
(Femandez-Gimenez et al. 2015; SDC 2010; Upton et al. 2010.08.09.
2013). Advocates also proposed to legalize exclusive grazing Key herder informants from HBU, DD & UU bags, 2016.

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Hum Ecol (2017) 45:221-234 223

Map 1 The Herlen Bayan Ulaan

Reserve Pasture Area and the Ecology Range
aimag/municipalrty mountain >1400m
surrounding bags , 2010, The
Australian National
S0l,m hill 1250-1 400m
University
[
steppe 1200-1 250m
Reserve Pasture
Area (RPA) "ver <1200m
BAGANUUR 0 10 ?0lt!TI
municipality

Tsenher-mandal
,f "~v '
/• ' X
: ^ .. • • . *

...... J' ' '

- 4 - " '
f* Nugaar , ' ' Jargalthaan
' / v ' - '• ' : 47t30'Nj
/ : x v . ' s

Bayandelger H E N T
r" ' P ■ A - " ' ' ' '{
Herfen

.y. y Bayan-Ulaan
Delģerhaan
•SS ■ . .¡r ^- ;

f." :

Dolood

Ulaan

_ Bayanjargalan Uhaa A 4'ro'Nj ,í:íí: K®í:: í

- % r -s ,H ,

/ ^
Ulaanbaatar , , :
HERLEN , Sumbe
BAYAN-ULAAN
GOVI-«
SUMBER ..... t © The Australian MMS TÎM31 National 2 KD University

the regular at
state cross-boundary
territorial adm
project was implemented
with or in all te
without t
for exploring management
agement, chal
pursuit o
groups. Third, in and
because beyond
herdersthe
in
collaborate conducted
with one with
another asof
w
(otor) herders and
on non-governme
their way to th
vide excellent from
data each
for bag rep
examining
seasonal aspectsdifferent
of backgro
livestock prod
pursuit of marital
short and status). In
long-distance
conducted 12 gaining,
months ofmaintain
fieldwor
veyed (40
from HBU,
pastoral 23 from D
resources,
were collected on production
regarding and
herders
and pasture, nized
patterns groups
of or th
collaborat

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 224 Hum Ecol (201 7) 45:22 1-234

Field observation
(Bold 1996;was also
Natsagdoij 1975; Simukov 1933).conduct
Since the defini-
herders' choice tion
of seasonal
of hoton became campin
more obscure and often overlapped with ail
ments, and collaboration on
(Simukov 1933), it is critical to investigate daily
what really consti- a
pasture use, tutes hoton in order to
livestock understand herders' collective action.
production and
The definition of hoton varied depending on size, structure,
functionality and role in pastoral production and land manage-
Collective Action Institutions of the Past ment. In northern and central Mongolia, hoton encompassed
more than two households, whereas in the Gobi region groups
Pre-Socialist Period (prior to 1921) Pastoralists operated
of more than one household (ail) rarely occurred (Bold 1996;
Meams 1993, 1996). In fact, 1-2 households in the Gobi were
within a state system that facilitated co-management and collec-
referred to as either ail or hoton due to the fact that the term
tive action in pastoral production that entailed two fundamental
elements regulating access to pastoral resources (Undargaa and
hoton/hot also referred to layers of dried dung used for live-
McCarthy 2016).: These include a) dual control (formal and
stock bedding (buuts) or a shelter (hashaa), depending on the
informal) (Femandez-Gimenez 1999; Meams 2004) and b) an ecological zone (Erdenetsogt 1998:37; Simukov 1933: 496).
integrated management of livestock, labor and land (hereafter
Availability of buuts or hashaa was an important asset for cre-
ating campsites and accessing the surrounding pasture
called 'production components') (Bazargur 1998; Erdenetsogt
(Fernandez-Gimenez
1998). The formal or state controlled mechanisms of jurisdiction- 2002; Sneath 2003), and also shaped
al residency and taxation of livestock production worked to bal-
the social structure of the hoton. Primarily, herders with large
ance the number of herding households and livestock to match or average sized herds were in demand to create buuts and
the availability of ecologically preferable land (EPL) withinattract
a those with smaller herds and thus less available buuts.
particular jurisdiction (Bazargur 1998; Natsagdoij 1972; Sneath
Although all herders had the right to produce and access pas-
2007). The formal control mechanisms also allowed herders ac-ture under formal mechanisms (Undargaa and McCarthy
2016), pasture access differed depending on the livestock as-
cess to grazing and to pursue pastoral production. The state's use
sets of each household (Natsagdoij 1967; Sneath 2007). In
of jurisdictional mechanisms also depended upon herders' infor-
mal control in balancing production components, such as labor
fact, a hoton had no static structure and/or significant admin-
istrative role. Herders joined or left a hoton depending on
inputs and herding strategies. This allowed herders to microman-
herd
age daily pasture use informally based on customary ( ulamjlalt ) type and size, and various livelihood skills (cattle breed-
ing,
production principles, and enabled flexibility of movement with- hunting, crafts, etc.) (Simukov 1933). Each hoton
contained a maximum of 1000 sheep to maintain hygiene
in a jurisdictional boundary. Herders pursued ulamjlalt seasonal
of the buuts and to provide sufficient grazing and labor for
movement based on a production strategy that depended on co-
ordinating access to production components. Overall, this systemintensive herding (Vreeland 1954: 36). Additionally, house-
holds preferred to join friends or kin who owned similar
provided both exclusionary and inclusionary mechanisms for
facilitating the freedom of movement based on the principle types
of of livestock (Bazargur 1998, p. 183; Simukov 1933;
Vreeland 1954) but with different sized herds so they could
reciprocity in pastoralism. Thus, property relations bequeathed
share pastoral assets and resources, pool labor and collabo-
by historical practices were embedded in the system of pastoral
production (Undargaa 2016; Undargaa and McCarthy 2016). rate for intensive economic activities (Simukov 1933: 504;
Vreeland 1954). Whereas Simukov (1933: 8) noted that the
Herders collaborated by creating alliances with fluid social
designated leader of a hoton advised on household matters
and resource use boundaries that allowed flexible strategies in
production and pasture use across pastures and administrative
and production management, Bold (1996: 73,74) reported the
leader was responsible for pasture management. The length
units. These temporary groupings included single households
(ail), more than one or two households (hoton or hot ail),of
a time hoton households camped together depended on sea-
collaboration of two different camps of ail or hot ail (saahalt),
sonal activities, which also determined the number of herding
more than a 100 households (huree), and the further alliances households
of in each hoton (between 2 and 13) (Simukov
these camps sharing pasture and water resources (neg nutag
1933). In sum, the hoton was a production-based 'fluid res-
usniihan) (Bold 1996; Natsagdorj 1975; Simukov 1933).
idential group of about one to eight gers. . .that often come
Femandez-Gimenez noted that the composition of membership
together temporarily for a season or more, before the constit-
uent households combine with others' (Sneath 2007: 97).
is dynamic in "medium-sized groups" such as hot ail and neg
nutag usniihan, in which herders interact with one another more Households from different hotons would informally collab-
often regarding daily and seasonal management of pasture use,orate on labor in the same manner as households within the
livestock production and movements (2002: 69). Indeed, defin-same hoton (Vreeland 1954: 89). For instance, two camps
within the vicinity of 500 m of each other swapped juvenile
ing units or groups is not as simple regarding social and resource
use boundaries. For instance, in the previous century, the basic
livestock to separate them from their mothers to prevent suck-
ling. This conserved milk and provided it for human use
form of camps and primary production units became the hoton

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Hum Ecol (2017) 45:221-234 225

(Simukov 1933). A herder

directed bycould
a so
collec
a household specialized
they had machin
previously c
entirely different
155). camp
Thus, (Vreela
collect
pooling of labor and reciprocal
possible on r
smalle
better off management
herders utilizing of
poorpr
h
and providing Another
food, awardsallianc
and ot
(Vreeland 1954: 89). Since
usniihan poor h
(hereafte
to manage, NNU
they constitutes
spent more timea
than wealthier NNU
and as several
average co
herder
(Humphrey 1978: 153;
socioeconomicSimukov
uni
there was no cial
formal and resource
system for
within a hoton (Bazargur
(Simukov 1998:
1933),
in this period Fernandez-Gimen
of non-egalitarian
wealth pre-collective
triggered a need for cus
poo
all households to access
1990s, importa
Meams not
and pastoral assets,
to "the as well
group ofas
h
(Undargaa and McCarthy
place of 2016
residence
tion, local authorities
noted arrange
that NNU is
those in need socioeconomic
to produce lives
unit
taxable property
ways (Vreeland
of creating195
needed without co
Collective delineated
Period social
(1921-1991) In t
tives or Sneath
communes 1993; Und
(nuhurlul, ham
formed as perspective
smaller of
socioeconomic'r
due to the lack "Households
of third do,
party of
tech
ideological support
fixed(Regsuren and
neighborhoo
1931). In the 1950s, the state for
excluding a small number of anima
hold consumption (Fernandez-
1978). The Collective
hoton and its Actio
informal
Period
herding was replaced with a prod
of 1-2 (often
non-related) househ
Promoting CBNRM in Mongolia
(Fernandez-Gimenez 1999;involves restoring historical
Hump
state pastoral institutions,
engineered basic or crafting newsocio-econ
self-governing commu-

on former bag nity institutions

administrative either by expanding or reducing social and
units
stock resource
husbandly. use boundaries
These of existing state territorial
acquired units t
stock to (Fernandez-Gimenez
establish 1999, 2002). Many policy advocates
integrated as-
mana
nents. In sumed
contrast, that engineering
other nested socioeconomic units
specializethat were

felt making) smaller than the current

were bag and soum territorial administra-
provided the n
nents tive
(Bazargur units was necessary.
1998; For instance, as in the common
Humph prop-

Although erty literature (Feeny

livestock et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990), Bazargur
movement was
territory, (1998:187, 190)and
negdel considered that aj
bag and soum
ahui level groups for
overall were too large to provide
production herders' socioeconomic needs and
components. C
EPL, they suggested
opened creating
up smaller units for herding specific species
available past
port, nested within
engineered soum and aimag territorial
wells and administrations.
provid
(Undargaa and Also, this
McCarthy would facilitate delivering aid to clearly defined
2016). In
ship and access small
to herdingpastoral
community groups (Mau and Chantsallkham
resourc
as collectives 2006; Schmidt 2004). Moreover, herder
provided each groups would suuri
ideally
assistance withfunction as autonomous property institutions that exercise ex-
labor-intensive se
1 978: 1 54). clusive use or possession
Further, the rights to pasture
state as in Ostromrepla
's
collaboration with two different f
3 "This is not a social group or institution; rather it is a social field defined by
group action: a) a flow
an intense permanent
of reciprocal exchange between neighbours' (Lomnitz grou
1977
holds (kheseg) and,
cited in Sneath 1993: 194).b) a periodic g

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 226 Hum Ecol (2017) 45:221-234

Fig. 1 Timeline of important

events, collective action & its
BI § I 1 ait III 1
transition
1
2 «2 *ë*
g «S § ? 1
5 S 1 II | S-
E a'ga ī1 Imi g
o .SS « rs *£! g -o ^ "o 'Sü ïiS; g s»
S
o 2 •- ļf rs 2 '-e e-jf g -o & Ï 8 S'gsS.-s'o^
i 1 2 •- ļf I I àgi Ï S s I s 2 *
ï -a
-
gl ! 1 í| ì 1= ï ■§ ir = mï" îl
5:5 *° *3C - ^ P - V®¿«"SeLÍ
1 - I« tš I 5:5 I *° il *3C
1 X O'
X O' jm > a (&, U ¿ H H ^ a H^oc<5oû«^ ¡i II I U ! ¿ il

Collective Huree structure replaced I Suuri I hot ail

action & with hot ail

transition /V^ nutag usniihan (NNU) networking among

IpvpI fh hnnnHnrv nf ctotA Iprritnri'il oHminictrntiup nnitc

concept of institutional design principles (SDC

for 2010: 33).
the difference in ecological conditions between group an
They used the notion of NNU to draw herder groups'
non-group
social
areas (Addison et al. 2013). Moreover, alternativ
and resource use boundaries, because some have used the term
livelihood strategies pursued by herder groups may not lead
arguably to refer to fixed socioeconomic units from the past
members' voluntarily reducing the size of their herds to redu
(Bazargur 1998: 171-190). Donors' shifted their pilot approach
pressure on pasture. The 'underlying philosophy [increased in
to scaling up the number of herder groups, and recommended
come leading to voluntary reduction in herd size] is unrealist
formalizing groups' property rights to possessand
pastureland
may even be counterproductive' (Mau and Chantsallkha
(Fernandez-Gimenez and Batbuyan 2004; Griffin 2003;
2006: 15, 23). This is particularly relevant when yield-focus
Ickowitz 2003). Policy analysts called for third party involve-
production is popular due to undervaluation of livestock pro
ucts in
ment for facilitating herder group formation, leadership local
that en-markets (Humphrey and Sneath 1999). In oth
words,
sures equal contribution to and benefit from group whether
action, and herder groups can independently address t
state recognition of group property rights (Batkhishig
principleet
ofal.
'freedom of movement' and accommodate custom
ary there
2012; SDC 2010; Upton 2008). Although, in general, collaboration
are is open to question as this approach to t
formation
2000 self-help groups registered among donor projects, of collective action groups is not necessarily bas
sustain-
ability of these groups is questionable as some only exist
on the on
historical, socio-political and ecological context of prev
paper (Mau and Chantsallkham 2006; Undargaa et al.herding
ous 2007). communities (Upton 2008).
Since there is no uniform definition of an NNU, Treating
it is prob-NNU as a fixed socioeconomic unit resulted in
rigiddefined
lematic to use the term to refer a group with clearly groups with diminished social and resource use boun
social and resource boundaries that is significantlyaries.
smaller
Thethan
group's effort to pursue exclusion through proper
mechanisms
the current state territorial administrative units. The opportunitycontradicts the fluid nature of group social an
for herders to join a group collective action is determined pri-
resource boundaries and their relationships and reciprocity t
non-group
marily by whether they have the time and/or labor required; areas (Fernandez-Gimenez et al. 2008b; Upt
other factors include financial constraints, group size For
2008). and/or
instance, some projects have already acknowledg
geographical distance, and restricted mobility and/or fewer kin of pursuing both exclusion and reciprocity, a
the difficulties
or social networking support (Fernandez-Gimenezpossession of pasture by herder groups (Undargaa 2016). Ev
et al. 2008a;
Undargaa 2006; Upton 2008). Donors have different ways
though of are nested within a broader state territorial a
groups
setting up social and resource use boundaries in theministration,
formation of local administrations are unable to balance pr
collective action groups (Fernandez-Gimenezduction
et al. 2015;
components due to increasing migration and the
Undargaa 2016), such that even in the same neighborhood,
number of livestock and reduced pasture in the absence
some herders are unable to form or join a group. previous jurisdictional mechanisms (Undargaa 2016; Undarg
For instance,
in some parts of the Green Gold program fundedand McCarthy
by the Swiss 2016). Although herder groups coped with s
Development Cooperation (SDC-GG), wealthy and even
vere some (Fernandez-Gimenez et al. 201 5), scaling up her
winters
poor herders either avoided or were excluded from herder
er groups remains challenging in different parts of Mongolia
groups (SDC 2010). This is because yield-oriented livestock
production requires extensive flexibility in mobility and collab-
Collective
oration that goes beyond 'group territory.' Also, it Action in the HBU Case Area
is debatable
whether group formation leads to better collective action and
pasture management (Leisher et al. 2012) as the Since
herder group
2003, project teams in three bags have funded activities
as an institution and its project activities may not such asaccount
fully repairing wells, protecting mineral springs and/or

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Hum Ecol (2017) 45:221-234 227

pasture through fencing,

interests on and
the liv
us
the SLP divided an
ideasentire
of bag
local int
past
lineated group exactly who
territories really
within
order to reflect historical
the UU bag pastur
meeti
bedded in the state territorial
proposal to ad
fence
2010; Upton 2009).
in reserve,
Similarly,
which
in
soum administrations,
clear the SLP
indication p
of
making to divide
how bags
it into
would begr
d
Otherwise, they employed
saltlicks, a part
springs
activities. Herders could
local and voluntar
neighbo
join and the project team
quality of would
livestock
However, this approach
pable of was ambi
supportin
ing group group
social and formation
resource use
boundaries to improve managem
Moreover, instead
wells and ject and
springs) officials' pro
productio
mals, protection from
attemptedlivestock
to serve
HBU bag, the project team
funding. In divide
other
tradition into and pastureland
groups of ten m
hous
administrative group
unit. pasture
They man
conside
ring to neighboring households
also enabled access to summer Co
Understanding a
management failed
excluded to achieve
winter pas
separated and spread across the
overlooking HBUfo
approach existed only on
boundaries. paper N
First,
groups. One official's
who are remark
from re
the s
"...X bag households
ferent are divided
levels of res
far, we are unsuccessful
on the in makin
context. Her
tive group..." (Interview
anism among 24,
all 20
sor
90% of the participants
including ( n = 97)
relatives
members and that
and they had repre
political neve
their bag. The area, the
remaining social b
partici
officials once attempted
boundary to form
and cros
a group of yond
herders small
from size
differeh
their residency herders
failed as collaborat
they ofte
tures (Herder 95, 2010)
Thus, (Undarga
stakeholders,
tion on production occurs
laborate to in cer
varying
separate to search
and for alternative
contexts. In H
their herders'
jurisdiction. In DDmigratio
bag, a g
came together temporarily
emerged as to
an gai
NNU
credit. Project for successive
incentives, sea
howeve
those who were able to on
herders manipulat
product
than for group ed through
collective marria
action.
Although group formation
broadly failed,
networked
mally on production
orationactivities
to a geogr
w
their formation.
immediate neighbors.They
Non
tioned formal and/or
group collaborati
pursuing
Herders lacked Second,
spare time and
herders' l
herds - 63% of participants
tionship (nby
shaped =
independently and hire
strategies herders
based on
supplement the demand
The ways for
in extr
which
collaborate informally
cisions with
to neig
collabor
long distance needs
otor, to be explore
preparations fo
campsites, or previous
milking systems,
mares. Als

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 228 Hum Ecol (201 7) 45:22 1-234

Fig. 2 Typical NNU Networking mechanism

common
fluxes Neg nutagiinhan/usnyhan Actors

Neg amny, jalg

... hudagiinhan ...well)
... golyn ...river valley) L Individuals, herding households & offic
...bagiin ...micro-district) Ç~ (network across all levels,)
...soumny ...rural district)
...aimagiin ...province)

households, contained 500 to

in 1000 livestock
different depending
seasons. on t
Absentee h
settlement
capacity of a campsite and the areas for social and economic
surrounding matters andCurrently,
pasture. leave i
livestock
the HBU study area a hot ail is behind with relatives or
generally hired herders. In contrast,
composed of single
(a household) with one or seasonal
twoherders
gers
reside (extra
primarily in thekitchen or stora
village or soum center
and move for herding
gers). This is due to the increasing activities as a separate
numbers of hotlivestock
ail in the th
each household owns and summer
the and autumn to fatten their herds.
increasing numberOtherwise, livestock
of legall
owned campsites,4 which ishas
cared forreduced theandpasture
by relatives in the winter spring seasons. betwee
These are bags,
campsites (Table 1). In all three some examples
theof howabsence
different actors benefit
of jurisdi
from increasing
tional mechanisms to control natural resources by controlling
numbers livestock or of
other migrant
re-
livestock, and campsites hassources
ledwithout claiminginability
to the exclusive property of
rightslocal
to land. offici
In fact, these instances
and herders to balance production raise questions of 'what (Undargaa
components is a herding an
McCarthy 2016; Undargaa 2016). As ail
household ( malchin a urkh)
result, many
and who is in househol
it', a response to
which has
with larger than average herd implications
size for defining social
(approx. 700 boundaries of any
livestock), par
group and
ticularly in HBU and UU bags, how theyalone
stay balance production
all yearcomponents. In other
round or ar
unable to stay with the same households
words, changing every
resource access conditions year due
without historical
fluctuating numbers of livestock
jurisdictional mechanisms
(Fig. to control
3). andFor
balance
instance,
production on
UU respondent noted "Lastcomponents
year,could
wepotentially
keptchallenge
my group pasture
brothers' live
management.
stock. But this year, we may herd only our own, because w
Fourth,
both have many livestock and legal possession
there is not of campsites
enoughalso contributes to
pasture ca
the dynamics
pacity for staying in one place all of community social boundaries
together" and its pasture 48, 201
(Interview
management. In HBU
(Undargaa 2013). Many households, bag, households of averagewealthy
particularly herd size one
rentlabor-intensive
independently manage most out their legally owned campsites to visiting herders
work as with
they lack
the spare time to collaborate compatible
withherd sizes. Consequently,
their neighbors their neighbors
orarerelatives.
then B
contrast in DD bag, households
forced to share with average
the small pasture to small
areas between campsites with size
larger numbers of
herds temporarily camp together asvisiting
a hotlivestock.
ailLegal
as possession
long of as the
combined herd size stays below
campsites changes the1000 headfrom
nature of reciprocity and mutual they
as- ca
collaborate on productionsistance
in to autumn
seeking economic and
incentiveswinter. In othe
by controlling access
words, reduced distances and
to pastoral
depleted
production resources.
pasture,
Hence, ascribing particularly
economic
between legally possessed campsites
value to pastureland increases itshas led
exploitation, whichto herder
thereby
camping alone to improve makes gaining economic benefits more important than man-
production.
aging the pasture sustainably.
Third, changes in hot ail structure resulted The use of in
legal campsite pos-
increasingly
session in this manner leads
dynamic social boundaries, particularly for to disputes
the over use and
bag. Although
overgrazing. Other project
bag social boundaries are formally definedareas face similar problems. Also, jurisdi
through
herders build wealthy
tional registration of residency, more campsites in the group's territory
herders or otor herder
hire
from outside their bag whohouseholds
own moved into their
very area. In these
few or situations, local
no livestock,
order to balance the number of livestock
authorities in
are often incapable of a hot
solving disputes ail. After a
in the ab-
sence of adequate jurisdictional
trial period of one year, non-resident herdersmechanismscan
to control labor
legally reg
ister as residents to gain and
access tothe
livestock, despite campsites and
fact that this same authority other re
granted
the residency which
sources. Also, seasonal or absentee caused the dispute
herding in (Undargaa
the HBU 2016; stud
Undargaa and
area contributes to fluctuating McCarthy 2016). Sincelabor
household legally owned
andfixed herd si
campsites do not secure access to sufficient pasture under
conditions of depleting pasture and unstable weather, with
4 In 2002, the land law was amended so that hot ail herders were allowed
own winter and spring campsites greater numbers
based on of livestock,
the 1994 herders claim ever moreallowing
version camp- leg
sites,plots.
possession of household residential utilizing legal possession to exploit available pasture as

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 Hum Ecol (2017) 45:22 1-234 229

Table 1 Key characteristics of produc

Bags HBU (n = 40) DD (n = 23) UU (n = 34)

Government structure HBU bag & village administration B

in Delgerkhaan soum, Khentii soum, Khentii aimag. soum, Tuv aimag.
aimag.
Strategic locations of the bags HBU RPA resides within its bag Winter seasonal pasture is located A corridor to the HBU RPA for otor
for the pursuit of otor territory. within the HBU RPA. A herders from outside the region.
corridor to the HBU RPA for
otor herders from outside the
region.
Herders' migration status 40% herders lived in the bag before 96% herders lived in the bag 100% herders lived in the bag before
1990. 60% migrated after 1991. before 1990. 1990.
Legal possession of campsites W 97% W-96% W-81%
(Winter- W, Spring-S) S 65% S-83% S-78%
Territorial capacity for Lacks spring, summer & autumn Lacks spr
seasonal grazing in general seasonal pastures. pasture due to lo
the HBU RPA. Herders lose HBU bag.
flexible customary access to the
HBU RPA due to the migrant
herders in the HBU bag.
Hot ail composition Single hot/ail. Mostly single hot/ail. Summer and Mostly single hot/ail. A few households
autumn, some households with camp as saakhalt on spring
fewer livestock camp as a larger campsites.
hot ail or saahalt ail.
Livestock types Mainly sheep/goat herders with Mainly sheep/goat herders with Mostly sheep herders, but a good
supplementary cattle and horses. supplementary cattle and number of them have horse herds
horses.
Seasonal camping Winter camping on HBU mountain Winter camping on HBU Pursue otor on HBU mountain. Regular
and the rest of the seasons along mountain, the rest along the seasonal camping in their own bag
the river. Some households camp river. Pursue summer otor territory. Pursue summer otor within
winter and spring on the mountain within and beyond the bag. and beyond bag.
and the rest outside of the bag
territory.

risk management (Undargaa 2016; Undargaa and McCarthy
2016). In other words, it is difficult to define group social
boundaries when herders legitimize access to pastoral re-
sources with legal possession of campsites.
Understanding Community Resource Use Boundaries The
SLP also failed to establish group pasture management due to
overlooking the factors that affect herders' resource use bound-
aries and their ability to pursue exclusion. First, seasonal mo-
bility is a basic production strategy used only under stable
weather conditions. Even under stable conditions, bag herders'
resource use boundaries are more flexible and fluid than setting
exclusive group territory to facilitate freedom of movement. In
HBU bag, due to the existence of the RPA, which reduced the
bag seasonal pasture, the majority of herders move 3-4 times a
year regardless of herd size (Fig. 4). Depleting pastoral re-
sources also reduced their ability to pursue summer otor locally
or outside of their bag (Fig. 5). As a result, a few wealthier
households (those who own more than 1000 livestock, but lack
spring campsites) move more than four times a year, resulting
in overuse of mountain pasture in the winter and spring, and/or
crossing bag, soum or even aimag boundaries during summer
and autumn. In UU and DD bags, a compatible ratio between
household herd size and a respectively larger bag territory out-
side of the RPA has enabled herders to move on average four
or more times, regardless of herd size. They were also able to
pursue summer and autumn otor broadly within the larger bag
or soum territory. In other words, mobility is based on the

Fig. 3 Participants' herd size by IS 14

12

bag
' ^ 5 s * HBU household

; 1 - 1 ;i! fc w -
50-99 100-250 251-399 400-699 700-999 1000<
livestock
number

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 230 Hum Ecol (201 7) 45:22 1-234

Fig. 4 Seasonal30 27
movement
22
frequencies by different bag
households 20 „ ,4 H BU household
IQ ;--f: tíà-

1 0 3 3 ^ U U household
>2. 2-3. 3-4. 4< times a year

amount of available pasture (within

herders the jurisdiction
with large or average
much as it is on herd size.
thatTherefore, herders'
are increasingly reso
dynam
boundaries appear to bequency
very dynamic
in otherand the setti
localities. In
clusive group source
territories access
to regulate as an 'open
current acce
mobili
prove challenging. pasture based on the princip
Second, resource use boundaries become
the area will more dy
allow,' which set
under unstable weatheraccess
conditions or depleting
to specific pasture. pas
He
sources. In summer or winter, herders
holds with need
fewer freedom
livestock w
ment to pursue long or denote
short an NNU.
distance Although
otor in searchso
o
in seasonally and vide a more
geographically legitimate
specific terrain exclu
that
boundary and cross-levelto
of exclude or
different include othe
jurisdictional te
Following the tion
pre-collective factors such
ulamjlal, as herd
herders movesi
leaving behind legally resources.
owned Additionally,
campsites. a w
As a result
who often share the with
same officials
seasonal and herders
pastures pursue ed
movement and camping access elsewhere.
patterns that are shaped by h
size, and labor demand. Third,
Movement of
specific seasonal herding some
activities poor
also contribute to he
particular becomes unpredictable, as they
fluctuating resource use boundaries. In all threeherd
bags during for
households annually in order
autumn, to
regarding the gain
ability to create aaccess to
hot with fewer than pas
sources. Those renting 1000
out livestock,
theirherders with small and average sized
campsites can herds also
unstable camping from different
pattern. They valleys negotiate with
either each other
stay to prepare an
with ot
hold or elsewhere beyond their
their herds together for bag jurisdictional
winter. Migrant households with large b
especially if they herd herds
for also return to HBU bag to prepare
someone from their livestock for
a neighbo
Since each type of livestock
winter. Some HBU
has
bag herders
different
with large herds visit
require
UU
coping with severe winters insaltlicks.
territory to access certain Therefore, theareas, memb
absence of jurisdic-
the same households in all
tional mechanisms
three impedes
bags,the capacity
separate
of the state territorial
and joi
from different valleysstrategy
to taketo control production
care components. Development
of specific type
stock. Moreover, herders'
programs also
ability
find it difficult
to to define
use social
the
boundaries
same
pasture is shaped by for exclusive
their group pasture
seasonal management andstrategy
herding to address a
ability to pursue dynamic patterns
mobility. In of pastoralsevere
the production and resource
spring access con
2010, some herders (in all
under three
both stable (butbags)
depleting pastoral
were resources)
unable
and unsta- to
legally owned spring ble weather conditions.
campsites as the road was bl
snow or there was insufficient pasture at the campsit
with large herds along with poor wage herders, sta
overused HBU Discussion
Mountain and Conclusion In
pasture. contrast, hous
with average sized herds avoided the risk of losing th
while exploring alternative camping
It is difficult elsewhere.
to apply property rights to pastureland basedThe
on
to return to a familiar the narrow
area application
for of collective action
stability, eventheory though
(Undargaa
staying in unmaintainedandbuuts
McCarthy 2016).
or I argue
emptyhere that forming
campsites.
herder groups T
fluctuating resource use boundaries
to strengthen common propertyare a coping
institutions may be insuffi- m
for unstable weather and
cient todepleted
solve rangeland management
pasture. problems During
in Mongolia

40 34
Fig. 5 Otor frequencies by
households in different bags 30
70
y¿ HBU
I
household
'
^ 8 10 DD household
'¡¡; 1 M ° 3 2 1 2 ,,,,,, UU household
0 1 2-3. 4 5<. times of otor

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 Hum Ecol (2017) 45:221-234 231

and raise the people represented by geographically issues

following distinct territory. re
collective action
Althoughapproaches in
herders are identified by both geographical land- pr
tional policy scapes and their place of jurisdictional
advocates and residence (Mearns
donor
instating 1996; Sneath 2007),
historical herder collaboration as an NNU goes
self-governing
small size socioeconomic units
beyond a neighborhood, hill, valley or water resource. This
2002; Mau
andis particularly
Chantsallkham
relevant when conflicting legal and unstable 20
re-instituting institutional
historical institut
arrangements affect neighboring herders' (e.g.,
lenges due to local and migrant herders) ability to collaborate.
difficulties inThat is, it is
interp
institutions (Berry
difficult to draw geographic
1993; social and resource
Endicot
use bound-
system of pastoral institutions
aries to formally identify specific group membership. (a
de facto/de jure
A thirdcategories), and
issue concerns the difficulty in interpreting cus- t
the system under different
tomary institutions, which can create problems in craftingsocio
tems, many policy analysts
new institutions. Bazargur faile
(1998: 228) advocated smaller so-
problems in rangeland managemen
cioeconomic units to shift towards modern livestock produc-
1990s, the Mongolian governme
tion and improve herders' socioeconomic conditions. Many
over the integrated
herders in the HBU studymanagement
area still rely on customary herding
employing and/or are interested in increasing
residency and numbers oflivestoc
livestock as
territorially they lack access to resourcespastoral
manage to achieve development goals. peo
components. As elsewhere
It allowedin Mongolia, the HBU case demonstrates the
herders t
and pasture use based
complications on
involved in re-engineering fixedcustom
socioeconom-
these ic units by clearly defining roles
complementary small group social andand
resource me
management useand collective
boundaries as prioritized in the design principle approach. ac
(Undaigaa 2016; Undargaa
Production and
strategies go beyond the idea of herder groups M
transition period, the
exclusive pasture managementstate
due to the absence of de
integrat- jure
tals, leaving a ed management of production components within
challenging the bag
legal an
in which local officials and herders are unable to balance community. Although support of a third party and group
leadership are important (Mau and Chantsallkham 2006;
production components in the absence of jurisdictional
mechanisms. This, in fact, complicates any policy reforms
Schmidt 2004; Upton 2008), the project team in the HBU
to re-establish a formal pastoral institution whether it case
be afailed to translate these factors into group formation.
This was due to misreading of the concept of NNU and
process of re-instituting a historical self-governing institu-
tion or engineering nested socioeconomic units as shown
changes in hot ail or herding households, which led to diffi-
in the HBU case. Unlike many failed CPR management
culties in defining groups' social and resource use boundaries.
contexts portrayed in the literature (Feeny et al 1990),Defining
in pastoral institutions based on a group of hot ail and
reality the single system remained resilient in Mongolia.
NNU Ho is insufficient, as there are many other mechanisms that
shape collaboration, especially under depleting pastoral re-
(2013) highlighted the strength of functions (over property
sources, from conflicting legal environments to unstable
forms such as private, communal or state) of a historically
weather conditions.
credible institution. In Mongolia, local officials and herders
continue to employ historically resilient legal and extra-legal
Formalizing herder groups' property rights is problematic
mechanisms (jurisdictional mechanisms and reciprocity) other
because it prioritizes land management over herders' informal
than property rights to land as these are better at coping collaboration
with based on non-egalitarian pastoral production
management.
conflicting legal and institutional arrangements that have led As in the HBU case study area, neither local
to depleting pastoral resources under increasingly unstable
officials nor herders are able to pursue exclusion under con-
climatic conditions (Undargaa 2016). flicting provisions of the Land Law. Legal possession of
Re-instituting historical institutions (Feeny et al 1990;
campsites could potentially affect a group's social boundary
Fernandez-Gimenez 1999, 2002) faces challenges in and pasture management. As proposed under a draft pasture-
interpreting historical or customary pastoral institutions. In land law, setting up group territory will face challenges in
particular, it is debatable whether the terms hot ail and neg accommodating the dynamics of inclusionary ulamjlalt
nutag usniihan (NNU) refer to fixed and stable socioeconomic strategies, particularly when neighbors in different living
units (Bazargur 1998). As in the HBU case, NNU has been conditions employ legal possession of campsites to share
revealed as more of an analytical term that underpins herders' pastoral resources and reciprocate with others. Although
production-based collaboration for accommodating flexibility the draft of the new pastureland law addresses the issues
in mobility. As argued elsewhere (Sneath 1 993, 2007), it refers of flexibility in mobility, reciprocity and exclusion, these
to social networking mechanisms among a community of are still under debate (Upton et al 2013).

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 232 Hum Ecol (201 7) 45:22 1-234

Lastly, herder Hashaa

groups Fence made of dung,
facerocks or wood
challeng
of power Hoton A camp
relations, of more than one or
which two
remain di
capacity of external households
support and lea
balance of Hot ail Contemporary
power among version ofgroup
hoton. See mem
(Mau and Chantsallkham hoton 2006; Und
2009). Although Hoshuu
herderFormal territorial groups
administrative unit could
alleviate financial known as a banner
constraints for t
(Mau and Chantsallkham 2006; Schmidt 2004), it is Hudagiinhan Use of same well
questionable whether they have the ability to ensure Huree A large camp including hundreds of
resource access to herders within and beyond groups, and households
address conflicting interests among stakeholders. The aspectNegdel Socialist collectives
of stakeholder power in strengthening self-governing institu- Neg nutgiinkhan Its definition is a matter of scholarly
tions has always been overlooked as donor support often per- debate as it refers to either networking
ceives community institutions as independent of the state and or a group or alliance of households
market (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). As in the HBU case, the camping together. See the section
enabling institutional environment is broken as both herders 'Collective action institutions in the
and local authorities lack the historical mechanisms to balance past' in this article.
increasing migration and numbers of livestock and depleting Otor Pursuit of short and/or long-distance
pastureland. The challenges for herder groups go well beyond temporary movement from regular
the need for leadership or third party and statutory property seasonal pastures
rights. In this environment, formalizing herders' land rightsSaahalt A collaboration of two different camps
through property mechanisms without the critical examination of ail or hot ail
of the concepts of hot ail and NNU, and community and Soum or sum Rural district

historical property relations in Mongolia, may be an over-Suuri A camp of 1-2 (often non-related)
estimation of the abilities of both the state and herder households to herd specific species
Ulamjlalt Equivalent to 'customary', which
groups in terms of enforcing property rights. Therefore,
development research and policy initiatives could facilitate referred to practices inherited from or
collective action by rectifying the conflicting legal envi- transferred by ancestors and which are
ronment and acknowledging the various mechanisms still adhered to and mainstream in the
employed by the wider pastoral community in multi- present
faceted circumstances to access aid and pastoral resources.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

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