UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS

SCHOOL OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
ASSIGNMENT COVER PAGE
PROGRAMME: __PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE 3A ___

(SURNAME & INITIALS): MUKHARI P

(STUDENT NUMBER): 220079648 (LECTURER): DR E NIYITUNGA

(TOPIC): PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OVER POLICYMAKING AND POLICY

IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES

18 / 04 / 2023
(DUE DATE)
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION:
I declare that this assignment is my own original work. Where secondary material has
been used (either from a printed source or from the internet), this has been carefully
acknowledged and referenced in accordance with School requirements. I understand
what plagiarism is and am aware of the school’s policy in this regard.

Signature: MUKHARI
P_______________________________________________________________

Contact Number:
0732731746____________________________________________________________
___

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PARLIAMENTRY OVERSIGHT OVER POLICYMAKING AND POLICY

IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 1

2.1 Policymaking 1

2.2 Oversight 2

2.3 Accountability 2

2.4 Policy implementation 2

2.5 Committees 2

3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4

3.1 Types and dimensions of accountability 7

4 PARLIAMENT’S OVERSIGHT FUNCTION AS A CENTRAL

TENET OF THE CONSTITUTION 8

5 DIFFERENT KINDS OF COMMITTEES AND HOW THEIR

FUNCTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 10

6 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE AND LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF OVERSIGHT BY THESE COMMITTEES 12

7 CONCLUSIONS 12

BIBLIOGRAPY 15

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1 INTRODUCTION

Parliamentary as a form of administration where the real executive power is held by a

cabinet made up of legislators who are jointly and individually accountable to the
legislature.

For the above reason, this assignment will focus on parliamentary oversight over
policymaking and policy implementation through parliamentary committees by providing
practical examples to illustrate parliamentary oversight functions within the constitution.
The assignment will firstly define the most important terms which will be used throughout
the discussion, namely, policymaking, oversight, accountability, policy implementation
and parliamentary committees. The assignment will then focus on the oversight and
accountability. Thirdly, the assignment will discuss the types and dimensions of
accountability. Furthermore, the assignment will give parliament’s oversight function as a
central tenet of the constitution. Moreover, it will discuss the different kinds of committees
and how their functions contribute to effective oversight. The last theme of this
assignment will focus on factors that contribute and limit the effectiveness of oversight by
these committees. The assignment will conclude by summarizing all the aspects
discussed throughout the body of the whole assignment.

2 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

The following terms will be used frequently throughout the assignment.

2.1 Policymaking

Is a difficult continuing process that lasts for a long time, involving a wide range of
interests and people, and may change over time (Checkland, 1981).

2.2 Oversight

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Is a duty that legislative bodies of a state have under the constitution to examine and
monitor any act of an executive branch of government (South African Legislative Sector,
2012:4).

2.3 Accountability

According to Brugge (2008), accountability is a social connection in which the ministers'

departments, public bodies, and other organizations, such as commissions, feel obligated
to defend and explain their actions to the accountability forum, in this case the Legislature
or Parliament.

2.4 Policy implementation

can be defined as the actions taken by both public and private persons (or groups) with
the intention of achieving the goals and objectives outlined in earlier policy choices (Van
Meter and Van Horn 1974:447).

2.5 Parliamentary Committees

A parliamentary committee is a group of lawmakers chosen by the chamber in which they

serve (or both chambers in the case of joint committees) to conduct in-depth research on
its behalf and report findings back to the chamber ( www.parliament.gov.za).

3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The Westminster system promoted the development of legislative oversight and

accountability. According to Shephard (2008:51–52), legislatures are required by
constitutions in many nations to hold governments accountable. Usually, the Constitution
specifies the accountability systems. The Westminster system's reference to the "power
of the purse" traces back to the Middle Ages when knights and burgesses in England
were called upon to inform communities of the rise of local taxes. Later, in the 14th
century, this authority was employed as a prerequisite for participation in the English
Parliament.

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As a result, the English Parliament began to concentrate on how money was raised and
spent. As in the case of policymaking during the time of King Henry VIII, Parliament's
position was typically granted in exchange for support. Therefore, it is evident that in the
Westminster system, legislative supervision was employed by succeeding kings to ensure
that parliament was rewarded by backing for the government's implementation of policies
or governance.

This suggests that whenever the administration and parliament could not agree on how
to carry out a program or budget, there would always be conflict. The legislature must
nonetheless make a point of being heard while acting in accordance with its authority.
The legislature cannot wait for the government to give it a reason to use its authority;
once legislators start being assertive, conflict is sure to break out.

It is evident that the inherent antagonism between the legislative and executive branches
can only be resolved by mature decision-making and perhaps the decency of those who
carry out these duties, including their political parties. This crucial arrangement depends
in large part on the electoral system and political parties' comprehension that each has a
responsibility to uphold and that they cannot coexist in isolation.

The following are the main responsibilities of parliamentary supervision, according to

Yamamoto (2007:9-10): to identify and stop misuse, arbitrary action, and illegal and
unconstitutional behavior on the part of the government and public agencies. The defense
of citizens' rights and liberties is the basis of this function. To ensure that the government
is held responsible for how taxpayers' money is used. The efficiency, economy, and
effectiveness of government operations can be increased because parliamentary
oversight uncovers waste inside the apparatus of the state and its agencies. To make
sure that the government's and parliament's approved plans are really carried out. These
duties include keeping an eye on government initiatives, parliamentary oversight
instruments, and legislative goals as they are laid down in legislation. To increase public
trust in government, which is a prerequisite for effective policy implementation, through
increasing government transparency and popular trust.

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Manona (2015:72) reminds us that oversight committees have frequently held senior
executives and ministers accountable only in some cases for inactive misuse of public
funds and bad administration.

Griffith (2005:3) emphasizes that good governance and accountability are intertwined and
that the government should be able to see some of the following: honesty and openness;
adequate means of accountability, whether they are governmental, legal, public, or
auditing; putting in place the necessary measures to increase governmental
effectiveness; that it is urged to engage the public.

To ensure and uphold government integrity as a component of good governance,

accountability in public administration is necessary. The concern that governments and
their agencies should fulfill their obligations and that there should be a way to hold them
accountable for their acts or inactions if issues or complaints arise is therefore addressed
by parliamentary accountability.

The major way that legislatures may effectively carry out their crucial duty of making sure
that the executive is held accountable and takes responsibility for its actions is by making
information on all topics readily available. Therefore, accountability means providing the
necessary data to the Legislature or Parliament. The Executive or other state
representatives cannot easily exercise proper supervision, accountability, or duty without
providing the Legislature with sufficient information.

According to Madue (2014:61), the principal-agent theory, which discusses the

contractual relationships between the government and the public, is applied to public
administration. This suggests that although the contract between the principle and the
agent outlines what the agent should accomplish, the principal, who are the people,
employs the agents, who are the public officials, to perform work on their behalf
sometimes and cannot always be relied upon to keep the agent in check.

3.1 Types and dimensions of accountability

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The 1996 South African Constitution, Section 32(2), mandates that officials give written
justifications for their judgments. For the purposes of this study, accountability entails that
decisions and actions taken by public officials are subject to oversight to ensure that
government initiatives meet their intended goals and take into account the needs of the
communities they are intended to serve, thereby promoting good governance. Therefore,
it is crucial for this study to address various forms of accountability as a key justification
for enhancing oversight in order to protect the public sector from financial
mismanagement, power abuse, wasteful, irregular, and pointless expenditure, among
other things. The categories of accountability that were covered in this study are listed
below;

Horizontal accountability abuses by public institutions, and branches of government are

checked by state institutions, such as the legislature and anti-corruption organizations.
This kind embodies the internal mechanisms used by the government to guarantee
accountability for actions and enforceability of negligence. The legislature is in charge of
carrying out this duty, assisted by additional institutional actors who have been specifically
named in the constitution as tools for oversight. As a body representing the interests of
the people, the legislature serves as the primary tool of accountability (Fagbadebo, 2019).

According to Goetz and Jenkins (2005), vertical accountability refers to the ways in which
non-state actors hold the state accountable (or not) for its actions in the course of their
interactions with the public through its elected officials. This accountability measure
shows that the electorate has the authority to select the mandates of their elected
representatives in the event that internal control and evaluation methods fall short of
holding office holders accountable.

When citizens actively participate in institutions that practice horizontal accountability, this
is known as diagonal accountability. By removing the state's monopoly on duty for formal
executive monitoring, the limited effectiveness of civil society's watchdog function is
increased (Fagbadebo, 2019).

According to Dykstra (1939), political accountability refers to the public and legislative
bodies, such as Parliament, to whom the government, civil workers, and politicians must
answer. By creating and promoting ethical tools and professional expertise, as well as by

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advocating for a supportive environment that will allow individuals and organizations to
adopt a culture of sustainable development, ethical accountability is the practice of
enhancing overall performance on a personal and organizational level. According to
Mulgan (2000), administrative accountability refers to internal standards and procedures
as well as ways to keep government employees accountable.

The value of the many aspects comes from how these varied accountability types cohere
into effective accountability. The term "accountability" in this study refers to the need to
account for the use of political, administrative, or other power. According to this study,
accountability is still a sign of a democratic system on its own. In other words, if individuals
in authority could not be held responsible for their acts regarding the misappropriation of
public monies, democracy would be ineffective. According to this study, SCOPA's primary
objective is to make executive and governmental officials answerable to the constituents
they represent (www.parliament.gov.za).

There are two aspects of accountability: answerability and enforceability. This study
basically acknowledges answerability to guarantee accountability. To address
accountability and enforceability, all legislatures, regardless of nature, have devised
various oversight measures. Therefore, answerability is imposed by statutory
mechanisms like oversight committees, question hours, and the scrutiny or approval of
several government appointments. The significance and potential benefits of the
oversight function have often been downplayed in democratizing societies due to political
indifference and corruption, even though there have been very few studies of legislative
supervision (Izah, 2013).

Applications of enforceability include the use of instruments like motions of censure,

motions of no confidence, impeachment, and the election or appointment of cabinet
ministers. The way these tools are adapted is determined by the type of government
(World Bank Institute, 2013).

According to this study, transparency refers to the minimal level of disclosure at which
contracts, dealings, practices, and transactions are available to everyone for inspection.
Demands that decisions and actions be done openly and that there be enough information

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available so that other agencies and the public may evaluate if the necessary procedures
are followed, in accordance with the stated mission (Lawson and Rakner, 2005).

This study defines responsiveness as the capacity to reply to all inquiries made by the
public to representatives of the groups with whom the country's financial administration is
charged. Reconstruction and sustainable development are based on good governance
(Mafunisa, 2004). It causes management's entire performance to deliver the desired
goals. According to the NDP vision 2030, effective government should encourage and
sustain growth for the benefit of all South African residents.

The legislature can use several mechanisms to monitor the government and its activities
in cases where these obstacles can be surmounted or minimized. The creation of ad hoc
committees, committee hearings, plenary assembly hearings, parliamentary questions,
and question period are some of these (Pennings, 2000).

4 PARLIAMENT’S OVERSIGHT FUNCTION AS A CENTRAL TENET OF THE

CONSTITUTION

Members of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers are required to submit complete and timely
reports to Parliament regarding the topics under their control under Sections 92 and 93,
which also hold them accountable to Parliament for the use of their authority and the
discharge of their duties.

The Constitution further stipulates that the Houses must pass international agreements
(section 231) and that the Parliament must exercise oversight of the security services
(section 199(8)), approve the declaration of a state of national defense (section 203), and
authorize the suspension of provincial finances (section 216). Additionally, there are
numerous instances of laws mandating that governmental entities report to Parliament.

According to Section 42(3), the National Assembly is chosen to represent the people,
uphold the Constitution's guarantee of popular government, approve laws, review and
monitor executive actions, and elect the President.

According to Section 55(2) of the Constitution, the National Assembly must establish
mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state operating within the national

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sphere of government are answerable to it and that they are all subject to its oversight. It
must also continue to keep an eye on how each organ of state is using its executive
authority. The monitoring obligation, which applies to all organs of state, is quite broad
even though the accountability responsibility only applies to executive organs of state in
the national sphere of government. An organ of state is defined as any department of
state or administration in the national, provincial, or local spheres of government as well
as any other functionary acting in accordance with the Constitution or a provincial
constitution or acting in accordance with any legislation, with the exception of a court or
judicial officer (section 239). Given that section 114(2)(b) gives provincial legislatures the
authority to maintain control over provincial organs of state, it follows that the Assembly
and provincial legislatures share concurrent duty for oversight of provincial organs of
state. functionary exercising a power or fulfilling a function under the Constitution or a
provincial constitution; or exercising a public power or responsibility ( Corder, Jagwanth
and Soltau, 1999: 25).

The scope of the Council's oversight role should be viewed in light of section 42(4), which
outlines the Council's role as the provinces' representative to ensure that provincial
interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government by participating in
the national legislative process and by offering a national forum for the public discussion
of issues affecting provinces. This interpretation should also apply to Section 66, which
states that the Council may request that a member of the Cabinet, a Deputy Minister, a
representative of the national executive, or a representative of a province executive
attend a meeting of the Council ( Murray and Nijzink, 2002).

Examples of particular supervision responsibilities outlined in the Constitution include its

involvement in approving interventions under Sections 100 and 139 and disputes over
provincial administrative ability under Section 125(4).

Therefore, unless where the Constitution expressly stipulates differently, the Council's
monitoring role is complementary and centered on the interaction between the realms of
government rather than duplicating the Assembly's duties.

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5 DIFFERENT KINDS OF COMMITTEES AND HOW THEIR FUNCTIONS

CONTRIBUTE TO EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT

Standing committees are permanent panels designated as such in chamber rules (House
Rule X, Senate Rule XXV). Standing committees analyze legislation and topics and make
recommendations for measures to be considered by their respective chambers since they
have legislative jurisdiction. As part of their oversight duties, they also must keep an eye
on the organizations, initiatives, and operations that fall within their purview and,
occasionally, those that cross committee boundaries ( Yamamoto, 2007: 30-40).

For government operations, as well as for new and existing programs, many standing
committees suggest funding levels authorizations. Several of them have additional
purposes. For instance, the Appropriations Committees suggest legislation to grant
budget authority for government agencies and programs. Through the yearly budget
resolution, the Budget Committees define overall spending and income thresholds that
serve as guides for the work of the authorizing and appropriating panels.

Typically, select, or special committees are constituted by a separate resolution of the

chamber, sometimes to carry out research and studies and, other times, to also consider
measures. Select committees frequently investigate new issues that either cross
jurisdictional lines or do not clearly fall under the purview of already established standing
committees. There are both permanent and transitory select committees. Select
committees may impose specific limitations on the length of membership or may appoint
ex officio members who meet certain criteria (such as party leaders or certain heads of
standing committees). The term "special committee" is occasionally used by the Senate
in place of the word "select" (such as the Special Committee on Aging).

Members of the House and Senate serve on joint committees. Permanent joint
committees now carry out studies or take care of administrative duties rather than
debating policies.

For instance, the Joint Committee on Printing regulates the activities of the Government
Printing Office and general printing practices within the federal government. The House
and Senate typically switch off as joint committee chairs. A conference committee is a

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short-term joint body established to reconcile disagreements between opposing House
and Senate versions of a proposal. Conference committees create compromises between
the two houses' perspectives, which are then presented to the full House and Senate for
ratification.

6 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE AND LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

OVERSIGHT BY THESE COMMITTEES

Funding- Lack of funds can sometimes hinder effective performance and the
implementation of suitable oversight because it is challenging for managers to hire more
staff to ensure a sufficient division of tasks (Wadesango et al. 2017:62). The way data
are handled, including adherence to reporting criteria, is influenced by the ability to pay
employees fairly (Abdulai et al. 2021:5). Financial constraints, which cause resources to
be diverted away from dealing with newly discovered findings, are cited by Matlala
(2018:92) as a factor in the delay in establishing internal control measures. Another
significant point made by Matlala (2018:106) is that the public sector's pay range does
not match that of the private sector, which offers advantages including better career and
development prospects and structured mentoring programs that are provided to their
employees. As a result of political, economic, and environmental instability, according to
Matlala's derivation (2018:106), it might be challenging for some nations to recruit, inspire,
and retain top talent.

Corruption- The misuse of power or authority to obtain or facilitate the acquisition of a

benefit or advantage to which the recipient or beneficiary is not legally entitled is described
as corruption by Budhram and Geldenhuys (2018:30). According to Section 4 of the
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act 12 of 2004), any public
official who accepts payment from another person or wants to do so, whether it is for their
own advantage or the benefit of others, is corrupt. Persuading someone else to act in an
unlawful, dishonest, unauthorized, insufficient, or discriminating way falls under this
category. Additionally, the Act views a public official's betrayal of trust or disregard for a
legal obligation or code of conduct as corrupt behavior (Section 4 of the Prevention and
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, [Act 12 of 2004]).

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Staffing and skills shortage- One of the things that has an impact on local government
performance is a lack of human resources. Staffing deficiencies can occasionally result
in poor management, mistakes, and violence, as noted by Abdulai et al. in 2021:4.
Additionally, Abdulai et al. (2021:4) assert that an internal audit department must be
properly staffed, and its workforce must be managed if internal auditing is to be
successful. According to Abdullai et al. (2021:6), certain officials who are appointed to
important positions don't fully match the qualifications and lack the essential skills to do
their jobs. The inefficiency of audit committees is attributed, according to Dodo (2017:19),
in large part to a lack of technical expertise and expertise in financial auditing.

The hiring of sufficient committee members and political participation during the
recruitment and selection processes are further considerations. Nepotism and cronyism
are two major factors that South African municipal governments face a skills crisis,
according to Corruption Watch (2021:9). Zudenkova (2015:473) describes cronyism as
the appointment of friends or colleagues to positions of authority, also without sufficient
qualifications, whereas Riggio and Saggi (2015:19) define nepotism as preferential
treatment provided to a family member of a public official, regardless of qualifications.

Madumo and Koma (2019:588) assert that due to a skills deficit, certain towns have
started appointing municipal managers in an acting capacity since 2011. For instance, in
2011, 30 out of 83 municipal managers lacked the appropriate educational credentials,
and 65 out of 83 municipal managers failed to either complete all of the competency levels
or satisfied only some of them. According to Abdulai et al. (2021:6), the majority of internal
auditors lack a wide range of competencies, including analytical skills, business
intelligence, effective communication and honesty, boldness, and conflict resolution skills.
Municipalities routinely hire consultants to create financial accounts and examine
supporting documents for significant financial problems, according to the AGSA (2021:8).

Consultancy costs for financial reporting services totaled more than R1 billion during the
2019–2020 fiscal year (AGSA 2021:8). As a result, it was difficult for management to
perform credible audits in a timely manner due to complex concerns. The AGSA (2021:8)
also said that low quality work was caused by inexperienced auditors, a lack of report

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writing skills, limited skill sets, insufficient training, imprecise audit objectives, and
demotivation.

7 CONCLUSIONS
From the mentioned above reason, it can be concluded that parliamentary committees
cannot work on their own. Therefore, there is a need to work hand in hand with policy
makers and policy implementers to improve and promote oversight and accountability. It
can also conclude that the types and dimensions of accountability plays a vital role in
Parliament. Moreover, parliament’s oversight function needs to respond through
implementation of laws and policy making as a central tenet of constitution. It can also be
concluded that the different kinds of committees limits and contribute to the effectiveness
of oversight through government operations. Lastly, factors that contribute and limit the
effectiveness of oversight by these committees can be through lack of funding, staffing
and shortage of skills, and corruption.

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