J Agric Environ Ethics (2015) 28:739–757

DOI 10.1007/s10806-015-9557-8

ARTICLES

Adaptive Ideals and Aspirational Goals: The Utopian

Ideals and Realist Constraints of Climate Change
Adaptation

Patrik Baard1

Accepted: 17 June 2015 / Published online: 29 June 2015

 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Abstract There is a growing need to implement anticipatory climate change

adaptation measures, particularly in vulnerable sectors, such as in agriculture.
However, setting goals to adapt is wrought with several challenges. This paper
discusses two sets of challenges to goals of anticipatory adaptation, of (1) empirical
and (2) normative character. The first set of challenges concern issues such as the
extent to which the climate will change, the local impacts of such changes, and
available adaptive responses. In the second set of uncertainties are issues such as the
distribution of burdens to enhance adaptive capacities in vulnerable agents with a
legitimate claim to such resources, and what anticipatory adaptation ideally should
result in. While previous discussions have been limited to either discuss the first or
second set of uncertainties, this paper suggests that both dimensions should be
considered when setting goals in social planning with long time frames. A taxon-
omy will be suggested that combines both dimensions. Furthermore, strategies for
managing situations in which there are either empirical, or normative, uncertainties
will be proposed which could be used in social decision-making with long planning
time-frames in which goals must be set.

Keywords Climate change adaptation  Agriculture  Utopia  Realism  Goals

& Patrik Baard

patrik.baard@abe.kth.se
1
Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology, Brinellvägen 32, 100 44 Stockholm,
Sweden

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Introduction

Reducing harmful consequences of the impact of climate change will be one of the
central issues of the coming years, as ‘[a]daptation and mitigation choices in the
near term will affect the risks of climate change throughout the 21st century’ (IPCC
2014a: 9). Even if ambitious mitigation policies are successfully implemented, it is
likely that climatic changes requiring adaptation will occur. Agricultural production
is significantly vulnerable. On a global level, for instance, more than 70 % of
agriculture is rain fed and consequently food security is highly sensitive to changes
in rainfall associated with climate change (IPCC 2014b: 514). Changes in
temperature, rainfall, and moisture levels will have consequences such as reducing
cropland areal, increase coastal flooding, and increases in the occurrence of pests
(cf. Pimentel et al. 1992). To conserve vital soil, biological resources, and improve
production is vital to sustainable agriculture (cf. Pimentel et al. 1992:131).
Anticipatory and planned adaptation is often, if possible, preferable to reactive or
autonomous adaptation or strategies of iteratively coping with impacts when they
have occurred, but there are several challenges to anticipatory and planned
adaptation. This paper will discuss two different sets of challenges to anticipatory
adaptation: (a) empirical and (b) normative.1 Included in the first set are
uncertainties and risks, such as local impacts on agriculture and food security,
which make it difficult to decide on and implement adequate responses. In the
second set of challenges are normative issues, such as how to identify burden-
sharers, and what resources that should, from a normative perspective, be given
priority. That is, what resources do we need to ensure will be available in the future,
at what costs, and who should pay those costs? Empirical and normative challenges
are two central aspects of planning climate change adaptation measures. This paper
has the aim of first discussing the two issues separately, and then offers a way of
combining them. To combine both (empirical) achievability, and (normative)
desirability are integral to proposing long-term goals (cf. Baard and Edvardsson
Björnberg 2015), but has not been combined in this manner when discussing climate
change adaptation. By combining both dimensions proposed goals can be adjusted
by explicating empirical uncertainty and/or normative disagreements. The proposed
strategies can inform actual goal-setting, in which either uncertainty, and/or
disagreement, of proposed goals are common.
To meet this purpose, the paper will suggest a taxonomy in which both the
empirical and normative dimensions are included. In addition to the proposed
taxonomy the paper will also raise the issue of how realistic a proposed goal has to
be, and the possible functions of goals that are very uncertain to be achievable from
1
The distinction between empirical and normative issues might not always be as sharp as discussed in
this paper. For instance, values play a great role when determining something to be a risk or threat. An
anthropocentric might view negative impacts on local industries as a threat, whereas an ecocentric might
not give the same priority to local economic growth. Such differences in values will affect how the
estimated impacts of climatic changes are interpreted, and what interventions that are deemed required.
This is also evidenced by the IPCC, suggesting that ‘‘[d]etermining what is dangerous [climate change] is
not a matter for natural science alone; it also involves value judgment’’ (IPCC 2014d: 211). That is, the
same empirical information regarding assessed impacts of climate change may have different policy
implications, depending on underlying values and what to regard as harm.

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an empirical perspective, or when there are great disagreements regarding the value
of the intended state of affairs.
This paper will investigate how the two dimensions—empirical and normative—
can be combined when assessing proposed goals, and suggest strategies to cope with
challenges that are relevant to actual goal setting. Explicating the two dimensions in
a taxonomy enables different strategies for coping with proposed goals in which
feasibility, in either an instrumental/empirical or normative sense, is uncertain. That
is, a future state of affairs is proposed, which is either unlikely or uncertain to
achieve, or the normative status generates significant disagreement.
A first step is to survey the problem, identify what adaptation would ideally
entail, and what the challenges are to such ideals. This is outlined in ‘‘Ideal
Adaptive Capacities and Non-ideal Constraints’’. ‘‘Different Concepts of Realism
and Feasibility’’ discusses what realistic goals and realism in normative political
theory requires. Lastly, ‘‘Aspirational Goals and Adaptive Ideals’’ proposes how
uncertainties can be analyzed, and managed, when combining both empirical and
normative perspectives. While the paper is focused on adaptation in the agricultural
sector, the topics that are discussed could be applied in other areas of long-term
planning in which uncertainties are common.

Ideal Adaptive Capacities and Non-ideal Constraints

This section will discuss the need for anticipatory climate change adaptation, and
what ideal adaptation would consist of. It will be suggested that there are both
empirical and normative aspects to consider in adaptation planning and, more
importantly, that there are empirical and normative challenges to the proposed ideal.
Such challenges are discussed in ‘‘Empirical Challenges’’ and ‘‘Normative
Challenges’’.
Anthropogenic climate changes pose a great threat to several aspects of global
civilization. Without additional mitigation it is estimated that the global mean
surface temperature is likely to, by 2100, reach 3.7–4.8 C increases relative the
period 1850–1900 (IPCC 2014c: 20). Between 1880 and 2012, the observed
increase in global mean temperature was about 0.85 C (2014c: 2). There are
already observed impacts such as, but not limited to, glacier shrinkage, thawing in
high-altitude regions, increased heat-related mortality in some regions, changing
interactions between species, and negative effects on crop yields (IPCC 2014d:
4–6). We can thus expect that even very ambitious mitigation policies will give rise
to a need for adaptation to, amongst other impacts, droughts, higher levels of
precipitation, and extreme weather events occurring more often.2 Mitigation and
adaptation differ regarding for instance the spatial and temporal scales on which
they are effective, the extent to which costs and benefits can be determined, and the
actors and types of policies involved in implementation (Klein et al. 2005: 581).
2
The only representative concentration pathway not likely to exceed 2 C increase by 2100—RCP2.6—
is still likely to entail increases in surface temperatures between 0.3 and 1.7 C compared to the period
1986–2005 (IPCC 2014c: 10). This pathway will require extensive mitigation action, but even if
successful, it will entail temperature increases and increased adaptation needs in several regions.

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However, they can be viewed as complementary strategies as neither a ‘mitigation

only’, nor an ‘adaptation only’ strategy will suffice: only focusing on mitigation
neglects the consequences that previous emissions will have that will require
adaptation, focusing solely on adaptation entails that emissions will proceed
unchecked, which could result in impacts that cannot be adapted to in many parts of
the world. Consequently, mitigation and adaptation should be integrated to support
sustainable development policies (cf. Klein et al. 2005).
The IPCC has identified several risks from climate change for the agricultural
sector, such as changes in rainfall and temperature changes affecting crop yields and
seasons (IPCC 2014b: 513ff). Given that over 70 % of agriculture is rain fed, the
agricultural sector is very vulnerable to changes in precipitation associated with
climate change, and consequently in need of adaptation to ascertain food security
(IPCC 2014b: 514). Global climate change may also reduce cropland areal due to
increased temperatures, coastal flooding, and reduced rainfall, and increase the
occurrence of pests (Pimentel et al. 1992: 114). Climate change adaptation is ‘the
process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects’ and ‘seeks to
moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC 2014a: 5). What
the IPCC refers to as anticipatory adaptation is often preferred to spontaneous
adaptation. The latter is defined as adaptation that is ‘triggered by ecological
changes in natural systems and by market or welfare changes in human systems’
(IPCC 2007: 869), whereas anticipatory adaptation takes place before impacts of
climate change are observed (IPCC 2007: 869; cf. Fankhauser et al. 1999: 69). The
reason for preferring anticipatory adaptation is that adaptation ex post might be very
costly, difficult, or even impossible as the impacts of climate change might be
irreversible.
Anticipatory adaptation entails assessing the consequences of climatic changes,
local risks and vulnerabilities, and identifying ‘what types and forms of adaptation
are possible, feasible, and likely; who would be involved in their implementation;
and what is required to facilitate or encourage their development or adoption’ (Smit
and Skinner 2002: 86). Ideally, capacities would be in place for (1) assessing
anthropogenic climate change; (2) identifying local environmental, social and
economic risks and vulnerabilities; (3) defining a set of (a) available and achievable
options which (b) will have acceptable outcomes. Furthermore, (4) there would be
known principles which enable (1) to (3) for agents lacking such capacities while
having a legitimate claim to them.
Ideally, scientists and government planners would know, with certainty, what
climatic changes will occur, the local effects of those changes, the value ascribed to
the goods and resources affected by those climatic changes, what the available
responses there are to protect those goods, and the desirability of the resulting states
of affairs. Perhaps most ideally, 3b would entail a future state of affairs in which no
negative consequence at all occurs on local levels. Regarding the fourth point, it
would be known how to distribute resources between identified burden-sharers to
agents with legitimate claims to such resources for enhancing adaptive capacities.
The remains of this section will discuss challenges to these ideal points, which
constrain the possibilities of setting goals.

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Empirical Challenges

Points 1 and 2 in the ideal account already result in an ‘uncertainty explosion’ with a
wide range of possible outcomes (Schneider and Lane 2006: 35). It is, for example,
very difficult to assess exactly how the climate will change. Even if we know that a
specific amount of emitted carbon or concentration levels of greenhouse gases will
entail an increase of 2 C in global mean temperatures compared to pre-industrial
times—which is considered a safe boundary to avoid dangerous climate change—
we might also be wrong. For instance, climate sensitivity might be greater than
assumed, and we will reach an increase of 2 C at lower concentration levels than
initially assumed. Moreover, the impacts of an increase of 2 C might be greater
than estimated, and some have suggested that the appropriate boundary should be an
increase of 1–1.5 C to avoid dangerous climate change (cf. Hansen et al. 2013).
But to adapt, one also needs to assess impacts on national, regional, and local levels,
something that estimates of changes in global mean temperatures might not always
enable. The agricultural sector will be required to adapt to changes in crop seasons
due to changes in temperatures and precipitation, and shifts in production areas,
though defining exact local adaptation needs will prove difficult. As suggested by
Fankhauser et al., ‘‘gaining better insights into climate change on a decadal scale
and into long-term regional weather patterns is essential for efficient adaptation,
provided that the information reaches the proper people in a timely, understandable,
and reliable manner’’ (Fankhauser et al. 1999: 74). If such insights can be provided
and disseminated in agricultural production it could provide the basis for gradual
shifts to, for instance, suitable crops.
There are also uncertainties about the consequences of adaptation measures, and
there are risks for maladaptation or goal conflicts (cf. Baard et al. 2012). An
adaptation measure might be considered adequate to reduce some anticipated
impacts, but have negative secondary consequences. For instance, water develop-
ment projects to adapt to water supply risks can increase transmission of parasitic
diseases, as ‘improved water supply in some rural areas of Asia has resulted in a
dramatic increase in Aedes mosquito breeding sites and, consequently, outbreaks of
dengue’ (IPCC 2001: 893). Another example is when adaptation measures result in
increased emissions, thus contributing to the underlying problem (IPCC 2014b:
518).
Such uncertainties regarding climatic changes and their local and regional
implications make it difficult to formulate appropriate responses. Managing
increased temperatures and ensuing droughts, for example, will differ extensively
from responses to increased and potentially extreme precipitation, depending on
local risks and vulnerabilities.

Normative Challenges

There are several normative issues that also have to be considered. Even if it is
known what local impacts will occur from an empirical perspective, there are still
value-laden aspects of risks (cf. Baard 2014). That is, not merely that something, X,
is likely to occur, but also that X has harmful consequences, or will negatively affect

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something valuable. Indeed, ‘‘the aim of adaptation is to protect that which we

value’’ (Hartzell-Nichols 2011: 690) from negative effects of climatic changes.
Ethics can elucidate what we value, and the reasons why (cf. Hartzell-Nichols
2011). Given that ‘absolute adaptation’ is most likely impossible, that is, a situation
in which no negative impacts result from climate change, priorities have to be made.
Deciding on what to prioritize is central to establishing what resources should be
maintained, as a matter of inter-generational justice, for future usage. Should one
permit negative impacts on ecosystems when constructing sea barriers, provided
that the positive consequences of such barriers are estimated to outweigh the loss of
the ecosystem, or that the loss can be compensated? And which moral theories can
prove useful when making such decisions? Moreover, resources in need of
adaptation might cross local jurisdictions and require coordination of several agents,
including stakeholders and experts, who might differ in the value they ascribe to
different resources. This in turn might entail that the threats of those impacts are
perceived differently. Consequently, there might be a need to balance possibly
conflicting values and goals.
Point 4 above is the most politically relevant uncertainty. Least developed
countries and the poor within developed countries are especially vulnerable and in
most need of enhanced adaptive capacities, since there is a ‘[r]isk of food insecurity
and the breakdown of food systems linked to warming, drought, flooding, and
precipitation variability and extremes, particularly for poorer populations in urban
and rural settings’ (IPCC 2014a: 13). If they are expected to bear the full costs of
managing such impacts, it would mean that already vulnerable populations with
modest resources have to cope with greatly detrimental impacts (cf. Moellendorf
2014: 186). The issue of who should bear the costs of adaptation is an inherently
ethical question (cf. Hartzell-Nichols 2011: 690). In addition, such agents, in least
developed countries in particular, often bear the least responsibility for greenhouse
gas emissions during the last 200 years (Page 2006: 35). There are significant
differences regarding which principles should be used to share such burdens, taking
into account historical responsibility, current abilities to contribute, or hybrid
accounts (cf. Duus-Otterström and Jagers 2012; Jagers and Duus-Otterström 2008;
Caney 2005).
Currently, few mechanisms are provided for burden-sharers to systematically
increase the adaptive capacities of vulnerable nations with legitimate claims. One
exception is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Adaptation Fund, established in 2010 and approving funding since 2012
(cf. Persson and Remling 2014). The fund was legally established through the Kyoto
Protocol stating an obligation to ‘assist developing country Parties that are
particularly vulnerable […] to meet the costs of adaptation’ (UN 1998; cf. Persson
and Remling 2014: 490). However, lacking specific criteria for identifying
beneficiaries in a principled way, the fund is based on a ‘first come first serve’
basis (Canales Trujillo and Nakhooda 2013: 12, Persson and Remling 2014: 502).
The lack of such criteria makes it difficult to prioritize between different recipients
on a limited budget, but there are potentially relevant principles. Should all projects
that apply receive a similar share (in accordance with egalitarian principles)?
Should one give funding to projects that prioritize the worst off (prioritarianism)?

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Or should one prioritize projects that bring the highest amount of people above a
certain well-being threshold (sufficientarianism) (cf. Persson and Remling 2014:
492)?
In summary, there is vast space for improvement concerning anticipatory
adaptation in the agricultural and other sectors, but also a need to set anticipatory
goals that can be achieved to prevent harm, or risk of harm to that which is
considered valuable. The challenges presented here make a significant departure
from the ideal of adaptation presented at the beginning of the section. Empirical
uncertainties regarding local impacts make it difficult to formulate adequate
responses, differences in values and normative outlooks make it difficult to agree on
a common conception of risk, what adaptation measures should ultimately protect,
and how burdens should be shared. In order to identify strategies to manage the
abovementioned challenges an explication of what ‘realism’ entails has to be
provided, to survey the requirements of a realistic goal. The role that realism plays
in both the setting of goals and plans in policies and political theory will be
discussed in the next section.

Different Concepts of Realism and Feasibility

The challenges proposed above do not reduce the need for setting goals to adapt to
climate change. The need persists for adaptation goals that are both empirically
feasible, and agreed upon to be desired. That is, goals that adhere to real-world
constraints of both empirical and normative character. Such goals are assumedly
realistic, and thus have practical relevance to actual adaptation planning. However,
‘realism’ can be conceptualized in several ways. ‘‘Realistic Goals’’ will discuss
realistic and utopian goals, whereas ‘‘Realism in Political Theory’’ will address how
realism is understood in normative political theory. Both instrumental and
normative dimensions are supposedly required in order to enable guidance on
climate change adaptation, to be further discussed in ‘‘Aspirational Goals and
Adaptive Ideals’’.

Realistic Goals

In social planning it is preferable to set goals that aim towards states of affairs that
are, or are very likely to be, achievable by known means. Such goals guide and
motivate relevant agents, coordinating action over time and between agents towards
the intended state of affairs (Edvardsson and Hansson 2005: 347). Being
achievement-inducing is a central aspect of rational goals, that is, those in which
the future state of affairs the goal represents can be achieved by known means.
Anticipatory adaptation is a future-oriented activity, in which one attempts to assess
future impacts of climate change, for which adequate responses should be in place
when the impacts occur to reduce harmful effects. Thus, anticipatory adaptation is
closely linked to the setting of goals, understood as future states of affairs that are
believed to be possible to achieve (cf. Baard and Edvardsson Björnberg 2015).

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While achievable goals are often preferred in social planning, being too
constrained by currently known abilities might severely reduce the set of options
that an agent has. Realistic goals are very difficult to set in long-term planning, due
to great uncertainties regarding changing preconditions, and available means (Baard
and Edvardsson Björnberg 2015). Moreover, anticipatory climate change adaptation
in the agricultural sector often requires planning in long time frames. This includes
assessing changes in decadal climate and adjusting crops accordingly, or
constructing adaptation measures to reduce negative impacts of local impacts of
climatic changes to ensure crop yields (cf. Fankhauser et al. 1999: 73). Such plans
might also require revisions to account for new information on climate change (cf.
Fankhauser et al. 1999: 73). Realistic goals are sometimes contrasted to utopian
goals, portraying future states of affairs that are either known to be impossible, or
highly unlikely or uncertain to be achieved (cf. Edvardsson and Hansson 2005;
Baard and Edvardsson Björnberg 2015).
Rather than reducing alternative goals to those states of affairs that an agent
knows, or is fairly confident that it can achieve, there is a case for allowing greater
levels of uncertainty when setting goals under certain conditions. For instance,
states of affairs that are uncertain or unlikely to be achieved might, in time, become
more likely if resources are allocated to develop the means to make an initially
unlikely goal more likely. There are a few reasons why permitting greater degrees of
uncertainty regarding achievability is appropriate in anticipatory adaptation
planning: (1) due to the long time frames before the most significant impact will
occur, means (such as technology) can develop in order to perform better than
currently available alternatives, and such goals might have a performance-
enhancing function; (2) permitting greater uncertainty ideally enables iterative
assessments of whether a goal is becoming more achievable, or whether it should be
reconsidered (cf. Baard and Edvardsson Björnberg 2015; Baard 2014).
This section has focused on realism in goal-setting, primarily understood as
feasibility from an empirical perspective and the degree to which something is
believed to be achievable. There are, however, other conceptions of realism that
focus more on normative issues, which we turn to next.

Realism in Political Theory

Distinguishing between utopianism and realism in normative political theory has in

recent years fuelled the methodological debate in political theory, motivated in part
by a frustration that normative political theory ‘offers no immediate or workable
solutions to any of the problems that our societies face’ (Stemplowska 2008: 319;
cf. Estlund 2008; Sleat 2014; Valentini 2012). In short, it is said to lack real world
relevance, or is premiered on unrealistic premises or requirements, and conse-
quently there is a difference between ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ normative political
theory.
It has been suggested that there are three ways of distinguishing between ideal
and non-ideal political theory: (1) the requirement of full versus partial compliance,
(2) utopian versus (more or less) realistic theory, and (3) the way in which they
portray end-state versus transitional theory (Valentini 2012). In (1) the focus is on

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whether normative political theory should focus on duties and obligations in

conditions of full or partial compliance, (2) distinguishes between utopian and
realistic (in some sense of the word) demands, whereas (3) questions whether
normative political theory should focus on long-term, optimum, end-state, or
transitional improvements, regardless of what the optimum end-state is (Valentini
2012: 654). Ideal theories disregard feasibility and real world constraints. In
contrast, non-ideal normative political theories are allegedly feasible in some sense
of the word (cf. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012; Gheaus 2013), or pay heed to
real world conditions. For instance, it would not be likely that all relevant agents
would, in practice, comply with a suggested principle, or that they would agree with
the normative desirability of a utopian vision or end-state of the future.
Assessing what can be achieved can be done in different ways. For instance, one
can define ‘feasible’ in a minimal way, and conclude that what is feasible conforms
to physical laws, is logically consistent, or is thought to motivate partial compliance,
and so forth (cf. Jensen 2009: 172). However, usually when it is stated that ‘State of
affairs, S, is feasible for a specific agent, A’, something stronger than ‘reaching S
would not require violating laws of nature for A’ is meant—such that ‘A has known
and specific means of achieving S, and should (for some compelling moral reason)
achieve S’. But this only gets us thus far, as what A can do ‘here and now’ might be
a severe restriction on the set of available alternatives. For instance, there might be a
difference regarding what an agent can do now and what an agent can develop
capacities to do later (cf. Jensen 2009). An additional issue pertains to knowledge
regarding abilities that might be unavailable for several different reasons, and thus it
might be difficult to say, with any certainty, whether a state of affairs is feasible.
The above account primarily seems to discuss feasibility in a sense similar to the
realistic goals discussed in ‘‘Realistic Goals’’—namely as feasibility from an
empirical perspective. However, different values and disagreements regarding
desirability might also play an important role when determining whether a proposed
goal is feasible. The role of such different values and disagreements is often
discussed in what is usually called realism in normative political theory, which is
dissimilar from the accounts of realism in the distinction between ideal and non-
ideal theory (Sleat 2014). According to Matt Sleat, realism in this sense has a
different notion regarding the purpose and limits of politics and the ambitions of
political theory (Sleat 2014: 5). Disagreement is prevalent and ineradicable on ‘the
terms that should regulate our shared political association, the values and principles
that should guide political action, and the end towards which political power should
be employed’ (Sleat 2014: 5). To Bernard Williams, when discussing political
realism and moral theory (Williams 2005) ensuring order and safety is prior to
finding salient moral principles by which to guide political life (Sleat 2014: 5).3
Thus, the primary, or rather first, political question to realists such as Bernard
Williams, is how to secure ‘order, protection, safety and the conditions of
cooperation’ (Williams 2005: 3). Politics cannot escape starting from what is at

3
Another way of handling disagreements is through coercion or use of brute force. However, it is very
questionable whether that would be considered legitimate even if ensuring safety and order (cf. Sleat
2014: 7).

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hand, i.e. existent disagreements, identities, and practices (cf. Williams 2005: 2ff;
23ff; Sleat 2014: 5). In an ideal world, such disagreements and conflicts would be
evaporated (cf. Sleat 2014: 10) but factors like existing disagreements and power
structures cannot be neglected in actual politics.
In summary, normative political theory’s interest in becoming practically
relevant has spawned a discussion on ideal and non-ideal theory and political
realism. Both concern what role existing constraints should have, whether regarding
feasibility and what can be done, or regarding existing disagreements, when guiding
political action. However, the different accounts seem to neglect the prospect of
combining feasibility in an instrumental and normative sense. That is, to combine
both empirical feasibility and disagreements regarding the values that guides
political action, along with the status of normative recommendations. This topic will
be returned to in ‘‘Aspirational Goals and Adaptive Ideals’’.

Realism and Realistic Goals in Climate Policies

Realistic, or rational, goals are primarily premiered on beliefs regarding

instrumental or empirical claims pertaining to the means to achieve an intended
state of affairs (cf. Baard and Edvardsson Björnberg 2015); however, given the
challenges in ‘‘Realistic Goals’’ section, is it even possible for realistic
anticipatory adaptation goals to be set? Given that anticipatory adaptation is
future-oriented and there might be some time before impacts requiring adaptation
will occur, technologies might have been developed, enabling more adequate
adaptive responses. Similarly, better assessment of risks and vulnerabilities may
become available as one learns more about climatic changes and their local
impacts. However, at the very worst, such strategies entail postponing adaptive
measures, which might risk leaving a community unprepared when impacts
occur. Postponing the implementation of adaptation measures until impact are
better understood or more strongly felt might be shortsighted, and early
adaptation is most likely relevant to long-lived investments (cf. Fankhauser et al.
1999: 69). Moreover, even if climate models are refined, providing the
foundation for assessing risks and vulnerabilities on local levels, this does not
necessarily result in reduced uncertainties. Rather, uncertainties might also
increase as more aspects of the climate system are included in models (cf.
Moellendorf 2014: 187ff). But even if those impacts were known, with certainty,
from empirical perspectives, there are additional issues regarding how to value
those impacts, and possible differences regarding such values. Given that the aim
of adaptation is to protect that which we value, such differences might entail
different conceptions of required adaptation measures.
Realism in the normative sense is sometimes discussed in climate justice,
primarily related to mitigation burdens. Two authors who have discussed realism in
climate change, primarily related to mitigation, are Posner and Weisbach in Climate
Change Justice (2010). To Posner and Weisbach, it is pivotal to find an agreement
that satisfies international paretianism: ‘all states must believe themselves better off
by their lights as a result of the climate treaty’ (2010: 6); this is a pragmatic
constraint, and not a normative principle, required to reach a much-needed

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agreement. Such a treaty would be feasible, they claim, in the sense of being a treaty
that countries are actually in practice willing to enter—which is preferable to the
current views on different normative principles to guide planning.
However, it has been suggested that principles of justice often have the ability ‘to
motivate people to act for the sake of others, as well as comply with such
motivations when there are counter-motivations grounded in individual self-
interest’ (Page 2006: 162). This would seem to suggest that an agent could take on a
greater burden than others if required as a matter of justice. Furthermore, they do
not define feasibility (cf. Caney 2014: 128ff). Moreover, if treaties are dependent on
bargaining, asymmetric bargaining power has to be considered (Shue 2014: 55ff)
Disregarding such asymmetries in power and wealth would most likely be
considered, by most, as a very inadequate strategy as a matter of justice, and might
‘undercut the moral legitimacy of the outcomes of actual bargaining’ (cf. Shue
2014: 55, 128). Even if an agreement has been reached between two or more parties,
that agreement might be considered unfair if it does not respect the background
conditions (Shue 2014: 84).
Hitherto this paper has discussed ideal adaptation and challenges to such
ideals (‘‘Ideal Adaptive Capacities and Non-ideal Constraints’’). It has also
discussed two different accounts of realism—realistic goals (‘‘Realistic Goals’’)
and realism in normative political theory (‘‘Realism in Political Theory’’), and
mentioned some challenges for both realistic goals and agreements (‘‘Realism
and Realistic Goals in Climate Policies’’). It is desirable to formulate realistic
goals to enable anticipatory adaptation in the agricultural sector and agreements
regarding the distribution of burdens. The next section will suggest an alternative
that considers both instrumental realism and normative factors in policies and
goal setting.

Aspirational Goals and Adaptive Ideals

This section will propose a way in which the empirical and normative challenges
described above can be explicated. To meet this purpose a taxonomy is presented, in
which proposed goals can be analyzed and managed. It will be assumed that goals
that are both empirically feasible, and agreed-upon from normative perspectives, are
preferable. In practice, however, uncertainty and/or disagreement are common.
Realistic goals, as suggested in ‘‘Realistic Goals’’ section above, are difficult to set
given the challenges proposed in ‘‘Empirical Challenges’’ section. Moreover, there
are disagreements regarding what goals should be set, and how burdens should be
distributed, as suggested in ‘‘Normative Challenges’’ and ‘‘Realism and Realistic
Goals in Climate Policies’’ sections. Of course, more resources and time could be
allocated to learning more about specific impacts, designing adaptation measures,
and formulating treaties that all can agree to. However, continuing deliberation will
entail ongoing increases in emissions of GHG’s, which will require even more
extensive adaptation. Agents with legitimate claims to such capacities might lose
the opportunity to adapt as the allocation of resources that they are entitled to is

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postponed.4 This section will discuss strategies to cope with the difficulties
discussed thereto.

Combining the Two Dimensions: Aspirational Goals and Adaptive Ideals

There is a need to develop long-term strategies for anticipatory adaptation. This

need is recognized in the insistence on National Adaptation Plans (NAP) and
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) established by the parties of
the UNFCCC under the Cancun Adaptation Framework. NAP is a ‘country-driven,
gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach’ for continuous and
iterative learning (UN 2014). It has a special focus on least developed countries and
provides technical guidance and financial support. This section will propose
strategies for dealing with empirical and normative uncertainties in areas where
responses are needed. That is, when goals have to be set despite uncertainties.
As proposed above, prior discussions on feasibility seem to have been limited to
either discussing empirical and instrumental feasibility, or normative accounts
including compliance, agreements, or defining optimum end-states. Rather, the
proposed thesis here is that both dimensions should be combined to provide
guidance. Even if it is decided that agents should facilitate adaptation in national
policies, such as NAP, or establish global funding infrastructures for adapting
agricultural production, the problems that have hitherto been discussed still have
both empirical/instrumental and normative characters. These might include
empirical issues such as the institutional mechanisms of funding, possible crop
developments, or normative issues such as identifying burden-sharers and the extent
of their required contribution, identifying recipients with legitimate claims to such
adaptation funding, and what to value. Table 1 illustrates how the two dimensions
can be combined to analyze proposed goals.
In practical planning it is arguably preferable for proposed goals to be in cell 1.
However, proposed goals are often, in practice, in either cell 2 or 3, or, at worst, in
cell 4, being the most problematic situation consisting of a dual challenge.
Explicating both dimensions enables coping strategies for proposed goals. The
following will suggest possible strategies when proposed goals are in cells 2–4,
under the assumption that cell 1 is the most preferable situation for a proposed goal
in social decision-making concerning risk. However, it will also be argued that there
are possible strengths of proposed goals in cells 2 and 3, and thus that goals do not
always have to be both instrumentally feasible and agreed-upon. Rather, it is a
matter of finding the right balance between realism and utopianism. In social and
political decision-making, proposed goals are seldom without uncertainty regarding
achievability, nor without disagreements regarding normative desirability.
Cell 2 Aproposed goal might be possible to achieve in an empirical sense, but be
controversial in the sense of generating disagreement. For instance, it is most likely

4
The lack of action might, in part, explain why ‘loss and damage’ has recently been given greater
attention by the parties of the UNFCCC. The Conference of the Parties 19 in Warsaw, 2013, sought to
establish mechanisms to address loss and damage caused by extreme weather events and slow onset
events such as rising sea levels, in which vulnerable agents are compensated for losses and damages.

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Table 1 Empirical feasibility and desirability

Instrumentally Normative status of goal
feasible
Agreed-upon Not agreed-upon

Realist 1. Most likely empirically achievable,
and agreed-upon to be desirable
Utopian 3. Unlikely to be empirically
achievable, but agreed-upon to be
desirable
2. Most likely empirically achievable, but
unlikely to be agreed-upon as desirable
4. Unlikely to be empirically achievable,
unlikely to be agreed-upon as desirable

feasible to achieve a proposed global goal such as ‘avoiding an increase above 2 C

in mean surface temperatures compared to pre-industrial times by 21000 . It will
require quite extensive transitions towards renewable energy sources, most likely
changes in consumption patterns, and similar, but it would not violate physical laws
nor, presumably, require changes in human nature that are too significant to be
considered impossible, even if they require significant behavioral changes. But the
disagreements are quite substantial regarding how burdens should be distributed,
who should make sacrifices, and the extent of such sacrifices that can rightfully be
demanded as a matter of justice. Such disagreements are, to a great extent, based on
different views as to the reasonableness of principles to guide such distributions, the
extent to which different nations should bear burdens, and how great those burdens
should be.
Disagreements are common in environmental policies and planning, including
divergent views in the sustainability discourse regarding which goods or resources
we are obligated, as a matter of inter-generational justice, to preserve for future
usage. This is evident in the many different conceptualizations of sustainable
development and the difference between strong and weak sustainability (cf.
Connelly 2007). For instance, there is great divergence between normative
viewpoints that take only an anthropocentric outlook, or ecocentric viewpoints
that aim towards respecting intrinsic values of other non-human species and
ecosystems. Such divergent viewpoints differ greatly in their views on the policies
and actions they see as permissible and what adaptation should aim towards.5
Different moral perspectives and differences in values will affect how the empirical
assessments of climate impacts are assessed, and how threats and risks are defined.
Consequently, it will affect what priorities that should be made, and what
interventions that are required. However, adaptation is usually formulated from a
human-centered perspective (Hartzell-Nichols 2011: 692), but of course, there are
several different values between different groups, which will affect how priorities
are made, and what to consider as dangerous climate change. A proposed adaptation

5
Some entertain the hope of finding agreement between different normative perspectives. Most notable
is perhaps the ‘convergence hypothesis’ as formulated by Bryan Norton, stating that even weak
anthropocentric and ecocentric viewpoints can converge on and support the same policy (Norton 1991).
The hypothesis has been criticized from several perspectives (cf. Minteer 2009 for an overview).

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goal, such as ‘adapting coastal agriculture’, might be empirically possible, but there
might be disagreements regarding the normative permissibility of adaptation
measures, should these measures have a negative effect on adjacent ecosystems. In
short, there are potential disagreements regarding the values that should guide
political action and decision-making.
However, one should not exaggerate the extent of disagreements. For instance, most
would likely agree that it is desirable to adapt to the extent that future food security will
be ascertained, but there is disagreement about the appropriateness and permissibility of
means of getting there. Do the benefits of constructing barriers to protect coastal
agricultural production outweigh the loss of a unique ecosystem, for example, given that
the sea barrier cannot be constructed in any way other than one in which the unique
ecosystem is negatively affected? Should deforestation be permissible to clear more land
for agricultural production and thus to make food security more likely, or is that morally
questionable given that deforestation will increase GHG emissions and could have a
negative effect on the resilience of ecosystems?
Neither should the disagreement regarding different normative political princi-
ples by which to distribute burdens be exaggerated. Despite divergent views on
responsibility ascription, several principles converge on the same conclusion—
‘whatever needs to be done by wealthy industrialized states or by poor non-
industrialized states about global environmental problems such as ozone destruction
and global warming, the costs should initially be borne by the wealthy industrialized
states’ (Shue 2014: 194). Assumedly, this also holds for burdens to enhance climate
change adaptation capacities of vulnerable agents with legitimate claims.
However, there are disagreements. One possible strategy of managing existent
disagreement is to ascertain spheres in which the reasonableness of different
viewpoints can be explicated and ‘tested’. Similar to the realist conception of
politics but the aim is to ensure a sphere in which different proposed goals are put
forward and their reasonableness is tested from different evaluative viewpoints. The
result would be that ideals are aligned to what is empirically possible and agreed-
upon. In this sense, goals could be adaptive and adjusted to feasible states of affairs,
and attempts made to find agreements between different normative viewpoints in a
structured fashion.
One problem with this is that deliberation and reaching agreement cannot be
prolonged indefinitely. Furthermore, how should we guard against agents dropping
out of agreements? Decisions must be taken and worked towards. One possibility is
to find a sufficient level of agreement that would commit all relevant agents to a
proposed plan, enabling decisions despite disagreements. Of course, assertions
regarding the normative status of burden-sharing might in time turn out to be
unreasonable and require reconsideration, despite being committed to until that
point. In this sense, normative assertions (regarding both the extent of burdens, and
what resources to maintain for future usage) are similar to the testing of hypotheses:
they might turn out to be wrong but are adhered to as true until the point of justified
and reasonable doubt.
Cell 3 There are arguably some states of affairs that would be considered desirable
from most normative viewpoints: ending famine, poverty, or a proposed goal of

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‘avoidance of any harmful impacts from climatic changes whatsoever, by

implementing adaptation measures’. However, the full achievability of such goals
might be questionable. One possible strategy is to revise what is considered
normatively desirable and instead lower demands to states of affairs that are known
to be possible to achieve. After all, even if an action or state of affairs is normatively
desirable, if it is impossible to achieve it cannot be obligatory, as stated in the
classic philosophical principle ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. This principle has also been
discussed in normative political theory, as a possible ‘feasibility constraint’ on
demands of justice (cf. Gheaus 2013). While being intuitively plausible, there are at
least two reasons for rejecting such a principle, and these support the claim that
ideals do not necessarily have to be fully constrained by what is currently known to
be possible: (1) such ideals can have performance-enhancing and aspirational
functions, and (2) normative ideals, even if impossible, can still have important
evaluative functions by pinpointing the distance between where agents are and
where they should be.
3.1: The performance-enhancing and aspirational function of ideals A state of
affairs agreed upon to be morally desirable but impossible to achieve, or very
uncertain or unlikely to be achievable, can have important performance-enhancing
and aspirational functions. For instance, as suggested by Henry Shue, we can
‘seriously and soberly adopt a policy that says, not ‘We want to get sexual harassment
down to tolerable levels’ (whatever ‘tolerable levels’ means), but ‘We intend to stamp
out sexual harassment’’ (Shue 2014: 134). Indeed, most moral frameworks would
surely be suspicious regarding a policy that says ‘We want to get sexual harassment
down to tolerable levels’, or ‘We want to get malnutrition down to tolerable levels’—
even if most likely being more realistic than absolute abolishment, this would seem to
be permitting a certain level of sexual harassment or malnutrition but at a level that
would be difficult, one could surmise, to defend from moral perspectives.6 The
absolute, but supposedly unlikely, state of affairs of stamping out sexual harassment
(or malnutrition) can be considered a long-term vision that guides short-term policies
(Shue 2014: 134). A succession of events follow such a goal, such as implementing
policies, passing laws, and setting up institutional frameworks to cope with such
issues over a longer-term. In other words, such long-term visions can enable the
development of means believed adequate to achieve the intended state of affairs.
Stated differently, if states of affairs are desirable as a matter of justice, but currently
not achievable, specific agents might have an (often defeasible) duty ‘to look for ways
of making those states of affairs achievable’ (Gheaus 2013: 461). In other words, to at
least try to meet those duties.
Moreover, proposing that ‘state of affairs, S, is impossible’ overshadows the
possibility that S might be approachable, or very unlikely but nevertheless possible
(cf. Baard and Edvardsson Björnberg 2015). It would often be the case that rather

6
Similar ‘absolute’ goals have also been used in practical policies. As an example, the Swedish traffic
safety goal ‘Vision Zero’ had the long-term aim that ‘no one would be killed or seriously injured in the
road transportation system’, that is, of reducing mortalities and serious injuries in the road transportation
system to zero (Nihlén Fahlquist 2006: 1113).

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than ‘S is impossible’, the correct assertion might be ‘We currently do not know
how to achieve S’, or that S is approachable, even if not achievable in full. In such
instances, knowledge or means can, in the best scenarios, be developed. Ideal states
of affairs that are unlikely or uncertain to be achievable can have aspirational
purposes (Estlund 2008). This situation is of course very relevant to climate change
adaptation in the agricultural sector, in which goals are set under uncertainty.
Development could include development of crops that are more resistant to specific
climate events, changing crops, or other technological developments, such as water
and sewage systems, to maintain production levels. That is, planned adaptation,
which requires conscious intervention, as opposed to autonomous adaptation that is
more in the line of natural or spontaneous adjustments to climatic changes (cf.
Fankhauser et al. 1999: 69).
3.2: The evaluative function of normative ideals Even if a state of affairs is
impossible, or very unlikely, it can still have an evaluative function in the sense of
providing principles against which the normative status of a current state of affairs is
determined. It might very well be the case that the most desirable state of affairs as a
matter of justice is impossible. Such ideals can still provide a measure of the current
state of affairs. Stated differently, we can define a state of affairs as ‘unjust’, even if
there is no possibility of rectifying it (cf. Gheaus 2013: 448). Ideally, such statements
can enhance the action-guiding potential of justice (Gheaus 2013: 448), similar to the
case above, but it might also be the case that such ideal states of affairs can, as
suggested by Stephen Gardiner, ‘bear witness’ to serious wrongs, even if difficult to
rectify (Gardiner 2011: 437). This function of ideals is presumably weaker than the
performance-enhancing function accounted for above, in the sense of having a
weaker ability to guide policies and action, but the ability to enable judgment and, to
an extent, have something to aspire towards, remain strong functions of ideals.
Cell 4 Propositions regarding a future state of affairs, i.e. goals, might be both
uncertain and unlikely to be achievable, in addition to generating substantial
disagreement regarding the goal’s normative status. One example in climate change
is perhaps geo-engineering. Suppose that a goal is proposed, along the lines of ‘We
will solely implement geo-engineering in order to avoid dangerous interference with
the climatic system’. As suggested by Stephen Gardiner, drawing on Gavin Schmidt
(2006), such an instance could be considered as ‘rocking the boat’:
Schmidt offers the analogy of a small boat being deliberately and dangerously
rocked by one of its passengers. Another traveler offers to use his knowledge
of chaotic dynamics to try to counterbalance the first, but admits that he needs
huge informational resources to do so, cannot guarantee success, and may
make things worse. Schmidt asks: ‘So is the answer to a known and increasing
human influence on climate an ever more elaborate system to control the
climate? Or should the person rocking the boat just sit down?’ (Gardiner
2012: 249)
Illustrating that there are possible uncertainties regarding the likelihood of success,
there are also divergent views on how permissible ‘rocking the boat’ is. In

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Adaptive Ideals and Aspirational Goals: The Utopian Ideals… 755

Gardiner’s case, it is highly inappropriate from a moral perspective to rely on geo-

engineering (cf. Gardiner 2011, 2012).
Proposed goals in cell 4 are both instrumentally very uncertain and generate
significant levels of disagreement regarding their normative status. Such goals are
arguably the most distant from being implemented but might be considered as future
suggestions to be cautiously investigated. Such propositions could be investigated
from both instrumental and normative perspectives, as suggested for cells 2 and 3
above, but should most likely be considered, rightly, as quite distant and low-ranked
alternatives (Table 2).
Finally, it should be stated that proposed goals might be erroneously located in a
cell. One might think that a goal is in cell 2, while it is actually in cell 4 due to, for
instance, failing to include or consider divergent views regarding the normative
status of the proposition. Agents might come to learn more about the means required
to achieve a state of affairs that is desirable as a matter of justice, but the means to
achieve the state of affairs generates substantial disagreement, thus moving the goal
from cell 3 to cell 2. Alternatively, when agreement has been reached regarding a
state of affairs, empirical preconditions for achieving the state of affairs might have
changed significantly, thus moving it from cell 2 to cell 3. Regardless, the taxonomy
by which to analyze proposed goals can enable an iterative strategy in which the
current focus—empirical uncertainty, or normative disagreements—becomes
explicit, allowing agents to act accordingly.

Concluding Remarks

This paper has identified central challenges to anticipatory adaptation of both

empirical and normative kinds. The paper has focused on agricultural production, an
area that is quite vulnerable to climatic changes, and which could have detrimental
effects on food security if not adapted. Explicating such challenges can inform goal-
setting and policies by creating a taxonomy of proposed goals and possible
strategies to cope with uncertainties. However, the paper also raises the issue of the
practical function of normative political theories and their role in goal setting and
planning. How empirically realistic does a normative demand have to be to be
aspired towards? What level of agreement is required before a goal is considered

Table 2 Summary of suggested strategies

Proposed goal Strategies

Likely achievable, not Spheres for considering divergent views, finding compromises, ‘testing’
agreed-upon the reasonableness of different judgments, seeking agreements regarding
ideals that are feasible and adjusting goals accordingly
Likely not achievable, but Possibilities to allocate resources to develop means, accumulate
agreed-upon knowledge, maintain goals as evaluative standards with moderate action-
guidance, consider aspirational purposes of goals
Likely not achievable, nor Deploy the previously mentioned strategies, should be considered a goal
agreed-upon distant from being implemented

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756 P. Baard

normatively desirable? And what is the potential function of goals whose normative
status is agreed-upon, but not empirically feasible, and vice versa? This paper has
discussed the need for explicating both dimensions when planning to enable
iterative adjustments as more is learnt regarding both empirical and normative
dimensions of proposed goals, but which are committed to until that point. Such an
approach could be beneficial to planning responses to complex issues over longer
time periods in which there are both empirical and normative challenges, but in
which goals have to be proposed, set, and aspired towards nevertheless. However,
the discussion here says little about reactive adaptation, but is focused solely on
anticipatory and planned adaptation which is more explicitly related to the setting of
goals. The potential empirical and moral challenges to reactive adaptation are thus
not considered. Even if anticipatory and planned adaptation would often be
preferable, the uncertainties and challenges discussed here might result in agents
having to iteratively cope with impacts as they occur. More research is possibly
required regarding potential moral differences between anticipatory and reactive
adaptation.

Acknowledgments The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for valuable
comments. He would also like to thank Olle Torpman, Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist, and Edward Page for
commenting on earlier versions of this manuscript.

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