JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 26, 165-182 (1992)

Jury Selection in Insanity Defense Cases

BRIAN L. CUTLER, GARY MORAN, AND DOUGLAS J. NARBY

Florida International University

In three studies legal authoritarianism, attitudes toward psychiatrists, and at-

titudes toward the insanity defense were examined as predictors of conviction-
proneness in insanity defense cases. In Study 1 subjects responded to a juror
selection survey containing a brief version of a case, a verdict form, and measures
of the constructs mentioned above. In Studies 2 and 3 subjects completed measures
of the relevant constructs, viewed a videotaped enactment of an insanity defense
case, and rendered verdicts. The three studies converge on the conclusion that
legal authoritarianism, attitudes toward psychiatrists, and attitudes toward the
insanity defense reliably predict conviction-proneness. In addition, Study 2 com-
pares two separate measures of legal authoritarianism and Study 3 examines the
reliability and factor structure of a newly devised instrument for assessing attitudes
toward psychiatrists and the insanity defense. The implications of these findings
for current jury selection procedures are discussed. o 1992 Academic PW, hc.

THE NEED FOR EXTENDED VOIR DIRE IN INSANITY

DEFENSE CASES
Although the involvement of mental health professionals in the court-
room has always been controversial, suspicion of and frustration with
expert mental health testimony and the corresponding legal doctrine
reached a new high following the acquittal, by reason of insanity, of John
W. Hinckley, Jr. (United States v. Hinckley, 1981), who attempted to
assassinate President Reagan (Hans & Vidmar, 1986; Rogers & Ewing,
1989). After reviewing results from public opinion polls and related evi-
dence, Hans and Vidmar (1986, p. 198) conclude: “There is a great deal
of negative feeling toward the insanity defense. Much of this negativism
appears to stem from misconceptions about the frequency, success, and

This research was funded by a grant from the Office of the Provost, Florida International
University, to Brian Cutler. We thank Barry Crown, Irene Prager, and Albert and Carmen
Gayoso for assistance with the videotaped trial, and Soloman Fulero and David Kravitz for
comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Address correspondence and requests for
reprints to Brian Cutler, Department of Psychology, Florida International University, North
Miami Campus, North Miami, FL 33181, or CUTLERBL@SERVAX.

165
0092-6566l92 $5 .OO
Copyright Q 1992 by Academic Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
166 CUTLER, MORAN, AND NARBY

consequences of the plea. This public negativism-particularly after the

Hinckley trial---translates into juries that are, on the whole, suspicious
of the insanity plea.”
Discontent among lay and professional populations regarding the laws
governing the use of the insanity defense and mental health testimony
has led to amendments of some state’s laws (e.g., the reclassification of
the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity verdict to Guilty but Mentally Ill
in some states) and the Federal Rules of Evidence (i.e., Rule 704; see
Rogers & Ewing, 1989) but the radical view, that the insanity defense
should be abolished, is unlikely to prevail. Nevertheless, it is evident from
the public opinion surveys cited by Hans and Vidmar (1986) that a segment
of the population is critical of the insanity defense and is suspicious of
psychologists and psychiatrists, as well. Research by Simon (1967) also
suggests that psychiatric testimony and the insanity defense have long
been viewed with skepticism. In her studies, prospective Chicago jurors
explicitly acknowledged the limitations of the field of psychiatry as an
inexact science. Responding to apparently overstated claims that psychi-
atric testimony might have undue influence on juries, Rogers and Ewing
(1989, p. 362) note: “In our experience and that of our colleagues, juries
appear mildly interested in what mental health experts have to say but
are not thunderstruck by their testimony. The image of a spellbound jury
mesmerized by the gilded testimony of a forensic expert is more likely
to reflect unfettered fantasies than the sobering realities of courtroom
testimony. ”
The fact that mental health testimony and the insanity defense are
viewed with skepticism, and that a sizable portion of the population dis-
trusts mental health experts and desires to abolish the insanity defense,
has detrimental consequences for the defendant who enters a plea of
insanity. Is it reasonable to expect the defendant to obtain a fair trial if
some of the jurors are unwilling to entertain the defendant’s defense of
insanity? The court’s response to this question is that the voir dire (jury
selection procedure) provides the defendant with the opportunity to iden-
tify and eliminate jurors who could not fairly try the case. Defense at-
torneys, during voir dire, are expected to excuse jurors who are strongly
opposed to either mental health testimony or the insanity defense.
In practice, however, dismissing such biased jurors is difficult because
they are not easily identified. Identifying jurors with any type of bias is
made difficult by the restrictions that judges frequently place on the voir
dire procedures. The Federal procedures for voir dire typically allow for
no questioning of the jurors by the attorneys. Judges ask the questions,
and judges are not bound to submit to the jury questions that the attorneys
would like answered. Questions asked by the judge are usually superficial
 JURY SELECTION 167

(e.g., asking for demographic information), do not always require verbal

responses (e.g., raise your hand if you have read anything about this
case), and tend to elicit socially desirable responsesfrom the jurors (Jones,
1987). Furthermore, jurors sometimes dissimulate (Jones, 1987; Marshall
& Smith, 1986).
State courts vary more than federal courts in their voir dire procedures.
Most states follow the federal practices of minimal voir dire (e.g., Mas-
sachusetts).Other states (e.g., California) that have traditionally allowed
more extensive questioning have recently adopted severe restrictions. Yet
others (e.g., Connecticut) are currently debating the voir dire issue. Some
states (e.g., Florida), however, regularly permit extended voir dire. Even
among states and individual federal courts or judges that permit extended
voir dire, not all attorneys take advantage of it.
The present research attempts to provide some data on the relations
between attitudes, demographic characteristics, and juror verdicts in in-
sanity defense cases. Research such as this can be used by attorneys in
their attempts to identify biased jurors. Perhaps more importantly, this
research examines predictors that are commonly available in voir dire as
well as predictors for which information is usually not obtained due to
the courts’ restrictions on the voir dire. By comparing the predictive
validity of information that is usually obtained with that of information
typically denied, we can evaluate the appropriateness of restrictions placed
on voir dire in insanity defense cases(cf. Moran, Cutler, & Loftus, 1990).
To date we have found only three studies that correlate individual
difference variables with verdicts in insanity defense cases. Ellsworth,
Bukaty, Cowan, and Thompson (1984) found a significant correlation
between attitudes toward the death penalty and insanity defense verdicts
such that respondents who favored the dealth penalty were more likely
to convict. Two unpublished studies by Gallun and Kassin (1983) found
that the Reasonable Doubt subscale of Kassin and Wrightsman’s (1983)
Juror Bias Scale (JBS) correlated significantly with mock-juror (college
students) verdicts in an insanity defense case. The Juror Bias Scale can
be considered a measure of legal authoritarian attitudes, which tend to
be predictive of mock-juror verdicts as well as actual juror verdicts in a
wide variety of cases (see Moran & Comfort, 1982; Moran & Cutler,
1989; Narby, Cutler, & Moran, 1991).
We present three studies of jury selection in insanity defense cases.
The first uses a juror selection survey approach with a random sample of
community residents. In Studies 2 and 3 we use a mock-jury methodology
with a videotaped enactment of a trial. Across the three studies we ex-
amine as predictors various measures of legal authoritarianism, attitudes
toward psychiatrists, and attitudes toward the insanity defense.
168 CUTLER, MORAN, AND NARBY

STUDY 1
A juror selection survey involves telephone interviews with community
residents wherein respondents listen to a case scenario, render verdicts,
and are then queried about their attitudes and demographics. While this
methodology is clearly limited in the realistic simulation of a trial, it does
provide an opportunity to sample from a wide variety of respondents.
Studies 2 and 3 retest the hypotheses using more realistic trial simulations.
The primary predictors examined in Study 1 are Kassin and Wrights-
man’s (1983) Juror Bias Scale, three single-item attitude measures (psy-
chiatrists, insanity defense, and death penalty), and demographic infor-
mation. In light of Gallun and Kassin’s results, we predict that high scorers
on the JBS, that is, subjects high in legal authoritarianism, are less likely
to acquit a defendant by reason of insanity than are low scorers. In the
case scenario adopted here, the psychiatric testimony is presented in sup-
port of the defendant’s plea of insanity. Therefore, we predict that subjects
with negative attitudes toward psychiatrists and the insanity defense, as
compared with subjects with more positive attitudes, will be less likely
to acquit a defendant by reason of insanity. Analyses of demographic
predictors are largely exploratory.
Method
The survey, The survey consisted of 39 questions that can be classified into four types of
individual difference variables: (1) a case scenario and verdict, (2) case-relevant attitudes,
(3) legal authoritarian attitudes, and (4) demographics. The format of the case scenario was
as follows.
The case involves a defendant who is charged with beating and stabbing his girlfriend to
death. The prosecution charged first degree murder and the defense pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity. Other significant facts mentioned were: (1) After committing the crime,
the defendant disposed of the murder weapon and his blood-stained clothes; (2) A police
officer testified that 1 week prior to the murder, the victim called the police and told them
that her boyfriend, the defendant, had threatened to kill her if he found out that she was
seeing another man; (3) A distinguished psychiatrist, testifying for the defense, claimed that
the defendant had been seeing psychiatrists and psychologists since he was 15 years old and
that he spent 6 months in the mental health unit of a state hospital. According to the
psychiatrist, the defendant suffers from a delusional paranoid disorder, has a long history
of alcohol abuse, and was possibly experiencing alcoholic hallucinosis as a result of his
recent withdrawal from alcohol; (4) A friend of the defendant testified that he had been
with the defendant several hours before the murder. He claimed that the defendant was
acting strange. He could not carry on a conversation, he was sweating profusely, and he
complained that he was having terrible headaches; (5) A distinguished psychiatrist, appearing
for the prosecution, testified that while the defendant has a long history of alcohol abuse
and blackouts, he does not appear to be suffering from a major mental disorder. However,
there is some evidence to suggest that he may have had some type of paranoid disorder
prior to the offense. The scenario was 413 words in length. In order to maximize respondents’
attention and comprehension of the scenario, they were asked to render preliminary verdicts
five times within the scenario (after each new set of facts was presented). After hearing all
the evidence respondents issued final verdicts (NGRI or Guilty). As a method of counter-
 JURY SELECTION 169

balancing two versions of the survey were used. In one version the prosecution evidence
was heard last, and in the other version the defense evidence was heard last. In an effort
to keep the survey brief, the legal definition of insanity and other information typically
available in judge’s instructions were not included.
The second section concerns respondents’ legal authoritarian attitudes. Items 7 to 23
consisted of Kassin and Wrightsman’s (1983) JBS (minus the filler items). The JBS has two
subscales. The Probability of Commission subscale (8 items) assessesthe tendency to assume
guilt based on the fact that the defendant is on trial (“If a suspect runs from the police,
then he probably committed the crime”). The Reasonable Doubt (9 items) subscale assesses
individual differences in the extent of doubt required in order to acquit a defendant (“A
defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 vote guilty”). The subscales are highly
correlated but are separable via factor analysis (see Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Item 24
assessed attitudes toward the insanity defense: “Every sane individual is responsible for his
every action.” Item 25 assessed attitudes toward psychiatrists as expert witnesses: “I don’t
put much faith in the testimony of psychiatrists.” Responses to Items 7 through 25 were
recorded as strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, or strongly agree.
The third section assessed demographics and contained one attitude item. The questions
concerned age (Item 26), education (Item 27) political attitudes (liberal, slightly liberal,
slightly conservative, or conservative; Item 28) political party affiliation (Item 29) race
(Item 30), marital status (Item 31) number of children (Item 32), annual household income
(Item 33) employment status (Item 34) occupation (Item 35) spouse’s occupation (Item
36), membership in social organizations (Item 37), experience as a victim of crime (Item
38), and sex (Item 39).
Telephone interviewers. Students in an upper-level Legal Psychology course participated
as interviewers in exchange for extra credit applicable toward the course grade. Each
interviewer participated in a 2-h standard training session. The training session involved a
lecture about general survey research, explicit instructions about survey behavior, and prac-
tice with the survey instrument.
Sample. Interviewers were given an algorithm for randomly selecting telephone numbers
from their local directories in such a manner as to include unlisted numbers. Interviews
were completed with 150 persons.’

Results and Discussion

After hearing all of the evidence, 78% voted guilty and 22% voted
NGRI. Because we are hypothesizing that each class of variables, case-
specific attitudes, legal authoritarian attitudes, and demographics, con-

’ The characteristics of the sample (N = 150) are as follows: Sex: male = 43%. female
= 57%; Age: 18-30 = 39%, 31-40 = 24%, 41-50 = 4%, 51-60 = lo%, above 60 =
13%; Education: no high school = 3%, some high school = 7%, high school graduate =
21%, some college = 42%, college graduate = 15%, postgraduate degree = 13%; Political
Attitudes: liberal = 18%, slightly liberal = 29%) slightly conservative = 29%) conservative
= 23%; Political Party Affiliation: democrat = 46%, republican = 48%, other = 6%;
Race: white = 41%, black = 16%, hispanic = 40%, other = 3%; Marital Status: married
= 41%, remarried = 3%, divorced = 13%, separated = 3%, widowed = 5%, single =
35%; Number of Children: 0 = 43%, 1 = 19%, 2 = 24%, 3 or more = 15%; Income:
less than $20k = 23%, 20-30k = 26%, 30-50k = 21%, 45-60k = 16%, 60-75k = 6%.
more than 75k = 9%; Employment Status: full time = 77%, parttime = 11%. occasionally
employed = 2%, retired = 10%; Belong to Social Organizations = 20%; Previously Victim
of Crime = 41%.
170 CUTLER, MORAN, AND NARBY

TABLE 1
RE.wL~~ OF STEPWISE REGRESSION

Zero-order Semipartial
Variable r r

Attitudes toward psychiatrists .24 .12

Sex .23 .17
Counterbalance order .24 .21
Political attitudes .20 .17
Hispanic v. white -.18 -.17
Reasonable Doubt subscale .18 .I5

tribute uniquely in the prediction of verdicts, we first examined these

variables’ zero-order correlations with verdict (scored 0 for NGRI and 1
for Guilty). Categorical variables were dummy-coded. Table 1 shows that
six variables correlated significantly with verdict; these correlations range
from .18 to .24 in magnitude.
Respondents more likely to convict were female, Hispanic, politically
conservative, endorsed legal authoritarian attitudes (as measured by the
Reasonable Doubt subscale), and had negative attitudes toward psychi-
atrists (agreed with the statement “I don’t put much faith in the testimony
of psychiatrists”).’
In order to examine whether these correlations represent unique or
shared variance, we regressed verdict over the six predictors simulta-
neously. As Table 1 shows, each variable contributed uniquely to the
prediction of verdicts. All but one predictor in the regression was signif-
icant at p < .05. Attitudes toward psychiatrists was marginally significant
(p < .lO), indicating that it shared some variance with one of the other
predictors. Together, these variables account for 22% of the variance in
verdicts.
The Reasonable Doubt subscale of the JBS and the item assessing
attitudes toward psychiatrists emerged as significant predictors of verdict.
We have also analyzed demographic predicrors (which would be available
in a standard voir dire) of responsesto the Reasonable Doubt and attitude
toward psychiatrist items. The purpose of this analysis is to examine
whether respondents with legal authoritarian attitudes and/or negative
attitudes toward psychiatrists can be identified by demographic infor-
mation in caseswhere relevant queries are disallowed by the trial judge.
Table 2 displays the significant correlations among the predictors and

* The counterbalancing produced a “recency” effect. Subjects exposed to defense-oriented

testimony in Statement 4 were less likely to convict.
 JURY SELECTION 171
TABLE 2
PREDKI~RS OF CASE-RELEVANT AIT~TUDES

Attitudes toward Legal

Predictors psychiatrists authoritarianism

Age .1s** .12

Education - .20** - .02
Political attitudes .06 .23**
Crime victim -.12 - .16’
Hispanic v. white, black - .18” .08
Black v. white, Hispanic .07 - .21**
Full-time v. retired .22** .03
Attitudes toward psychiatrists - .22**
* = p < .lO; ** = p < .05.

the attitude items.3 Respondents with negative attitudes toward psychi-

atrists were older, less educated, non-Hispanic, and full-time workers as
opposed to retired. Respondents more likely to endorse legal authoritarian
attitudes were politically conservative and non-black. Crime victims were
more likely to endorse legal authoritarian attitudes, but the correlation
was marginally significant. Last, respondents with negative attitudes to-
ward psychiatrists also tended to endorse legal authoritarian attitudes. In
conclusion, Study 1 shows support for the contention that demographic
variables, legal authoritarianism, and case-relevant attitudes predict ver-
dict in insanity defense cases.The pattern of results for race is somewhat
confusing, however. Hispanics were more likely to convict than non-
Hispanics but they also had more positive attitudes toward psychiatrists
than non-Hispanics.

STUDY 2
Study 2 attempts to augment and extend Study 1 in three ways. First,
rather than using a survey, we created a videotaped enactment of an
insanity defense trial and used a mock-jury paradigm. While mock-jury
studies can still suffer from external validity, they are more ecologically
valid analogues of trials than is the survey methodology. Second, two
different measuresof legal authoritarian attitudes are employed and com-
pared. Third, multiple dependent measures are examined. While Study
2 improves on Study 1 with respect to external validity of stimulus ma-
terials, measuresof legal authoritarian attitudes, and dependent measures,
it is limited in its use of college undergraduates as subjects. The sample
3 With respect to race, one-way ANOVAs were first conducted and then single df contrasts
were formed based on inspection of the means.
172 CUTLER, MORAN, AND NARBY

is more homogeneous with respect to demographic characteristics than

the sample of community residents examined in Study 1. Demographics,
then, are less likely to play an important role in the prediction of juror
verdicts. Again, it is predicted that subjects scoring high in legal author-
itarianism, as compared to low scorers, are less likely to acquit a defendant
by reason of insanity. No specific prediction is made regarding the su-
periority of the two measures of legal authoritarianism.

Method
Subjects were 61 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Florida
International University who received extra course credit in exchange for their participation.
They first completed questionnaires containing, in this order, demographic and attitude
items (i.e., sex, age, race, marital status, number of children, level of education, political
party affiliation, political attitudes, and prior criminal and civil jury service), the JBS, and
Boehm’s (1968) Legal Authoritarianism Questionnaire (LAQ).’
The LAQ is used here as a 304tem unidimensional scale.’ Sample items are: “Too many
obviously guilty persons escape punishment because of legal technicalities” and “Citizens
need to be protected against excess police power as well as against criminals.” Each item
is rated on a scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (score of 0) to “strongly agree” (score
of 6). Higher scores indicate legal authoritarianism. The same coding procedure was used
for the JBS.
Subjects then viewed the videotaped trial. Like the survey’s case scenario, the defendant
was charged with murder and his defense was not guilty by reason of insanity. The fact
pattern differed substantially from the survey. The primary evidence against the defendant
was the testimony of the arresting officer, who read to the court, verbatim, the statement
given by the defendant at the scene of the crime. This statement was pretested so as to
appear ambiguous with respect to the defendant’s sanity. The officer’s testimony suggested
that the defendant was not insane at the time of the crime. A psychiatrist testified for the
defense. In accordance with federal law, the psychiatrist did not offer an ultimate opinion
about whether the defendant was legally insane. He diagnosed the defendant as suffering
from a delusional paranoid disorder and a long history of alcohol abuse and possibly ex-
periencing alcoholic hallucinosis as a result of his recent withdrawal from alcohol (the same
diagnosis used in Study 1). The trial followed the format of an actual trial, beginning with
opening statements, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, closing arguments,

’ The demographic breakdown of the sample is as follows: Sex: male = 2X4%, female =
72%; Age: 17-29 = 92%, 30-39 = 8%; Race: white = 30%, black = 13%, Hispanic =
56%, other = 1%; Marital Status: single = 90%, divorced = 5%, married = 5%.
’ The LAQ, as proposed by Boehm, consisted of three subscales (Authoritarianism, Anti-
authoritarianism, and Egalitarianism) and used a tripartite forced choice response format.
Each item consisted of one authoritarian, one anti-authoritarian, and one equalitarian item.
The subject then ranks the three items for level of agreement. Our experience with the
LAQ, in its original format, is that subjects find the response format difficult and frequently
rank items improperly. In contrast, when the statements are treated as separate items with
Likert rating scales and (scored as civil libertarianism v. legal authoritarianism) and aggre-
gated, they demonstrate internal consistency and correlate significantly with verdict (Moran
& Comfort, 1982; Moran & Cutler, 1989).
 JURY SELECTION 173

and standard judge’s instructionsh It was filmed in the moot courtroom of the University
of Miami Law School. Local attorneys appeared in their roles. The psychiatrist was played
by an experienced forensic clinical psychologist from Miami. The judge, whose role was
ceremonial, was portrayed by a professor, and the remaining roles were played by colleagues.
The trial lasted approximately 30 min (no objections, recesses, etc.).
Immediately following the trial, subjects privately completed questionnaires containing
an item assessing verdict (Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity or Guilty) and 27 items measuring
juror reactions. These items were verdict confidence; credibility of the police officer; im-
portance of the defendant’s statement; the strength of evidence against the defendant; the
extent to which the psychiatrist was credible, convincing, understandable, and helpful; the
defendant’s degree of insanity; the extent to which the defendant’s behavior was a product
of mental illness; the extent to which he appreciated the nature and quality or the wrong-
fulness of his act; the extent to which the defendant understood the difference between
right and wrong; the extent to which the defendant should be blamed or held responsible
for the incident (separate items); sympathy for the defendant; helpfulness of the judge’s
instructions; how often the insanity defense is justified; and skills of the prosecution and
defense lawyers. Mixed in with these items were seven questions assessing memory for the
expert’s testimony and judge’s instructions. Questions about the psychiatrist concerned his
credentials, his diagnosis (two questions), and whether he gave an ultimate opinion. Ques-
tions about the judge’s instructions concerned whether the medical and legal definitions of
insanity are the same, whether the defense has to prove insanity, and, if so, the burden of
proof. Responses were recorded on 7-point (0 to 6) rating scales with appropriate anchors.

Results and Discussion

Verdict and inferences. Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3.
In all, 80% voted guilty and 20% voted NGRI. Also displayed in Table
3 are the correlations between the three measures of legal authoritari-
anism, PC, RD, and LAQ, and each dependent variable that used the
7-point rating scale. The LAQ showed the strongest pattern of correlations
with the dependent variables. Of the 20 dimensions, the LAQ correlated
significantly (p < .05) with 11 and marginally significantly (p < .lO) with
2. Subjects high in legal authoritarianism, as measured by the LAQ: (1)
were more likely to convict; viewed the psychiatrist as (2) less credible,
(3) less convincing, (4) less understandable (m.s.); perceived the defendant
as (5) less likely to be insane, (6) more likely to have appreciated the
nature and quality of his acts, (7) more likely to have understood the
difference between right and wrong, (8) more blameworthy, (9) more
responsible; (10) were less likely to perceive the defendant’s behavior as

6 The judge’s instructions contained the following definition of the insanity defense: A
person is insane when the person is in a state of natural imbecility or has a disease of the
mind to the extent that renders him incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of an
act or omission or of knowing that an act or omission is wrong. A person who has specific
delusions but is “in other respects sane, shall not be acquitted on the grounds of insanity
unless the delusions caused him to believe in the existence of a state of things that if it
existed would have justified or excused his act or omission. Everyone shall, until the contrary
is proven, be presumed to be and to have been sane.”
174 CUTLER, MORAN, AND NARBY

TABLE 3
CORRELATES WITH MEASURES OF LEGAL AUTHORITARIANISM

M SD PC RD LAQ
Predeliberation verdict 30 .41 .29* .06 .30*
Verdict confidence 4.44 1.36 -.I2 -.09 .13
Credibility of police officer 5.00 1.00 -.I9 -.16 .Ol
Importance of defendant’s statement 4.80 1.22 .12 .12 .25a
Credibility of psychiatrist 2.97 1.62 -.16 .04 - .26*
Understandability of psychiatrist 3.48 1.60 -.08 .oo - .22a
Convincingness of psychiatrist 2.31 1.65 -.18 -.02 - .29*
Helpfulness of psychiatrist 3.26 1.59 - .08 -.16 .05
Defendant’s degree of insanity 2.07 1.67 - .29* -.07 - .33**
Defendant’s behavior a product of mental 2.18 1.70 - .29* -.lO - .40**
illness
Defendant appreciate nature and quality 3.64 1.84 .08 -.04 .31*
or wrongfulness of his act
Defendant understand difference between 4.55 1.58 .26* -.05 .40*
right and wrong
Should defendant be blamed for incident 4.84 1.31 .38** - .Ol .34**
Should defendant be held responsible for 4.87 1.46 .32* SK3 .35**
incident
Sympathy for defendant 1.25 1.47 .02 - .28* -.12
Strength of evidence against defendant 4.23 1.67 .06 -.lO .03
Helpfulness of judge’s instructions 3.58 1.65 -.lO -.05 -.15
How often is insanity defense justified 2.97 1.18 -.31* -.13 - .35**
Skill of prosecution lawyer 4.18 1.31 -.I3 .Ol .03
Skill of defense lawyer 1.92 1.37 .02 -.15 - .29*
PC 24.47 6.74 .31* .25
RD 24.75 6.55 .43*
LAQ 95.47 17.45

Note. a = p < .lO; * = p < .05; ** = p < .Ol; PC, Probability of Commission Scale;
RD. Reasonable Doubt Scale; LAQ, Legal Authoritarian Questionnaire.

a product of mental illness; (11) found the defendant’s statement less

important (m.s.); (12) found the defense lawyer less skillful; and (13) felt
that the insanity defense is less frequently justified.
Of the 13 dependent variables predicted by the LAQ, the PC scale
emerged as a significant predictor of 7. For each dependent variable that
correlated significantly with both the LAQ and the PC scale, the corre-
lation with LAQ was higher (if only slightly) on 6 of the 7. The PC scale
did not correlate significantly with any dependent variables that were
nonsignificantly correlated with the LAQ. The RD scale correlated sig-
nificantly with only one of 20 dependent variables, which is what one
would expect by chance alone.
Memory for the psychiatrist’s testimony and judge’s instructions. Subjects
 JURY SELECTION 175

were asked to indicate whether the psychiatrist offered an explicit opinion

about the defendant’s degree of insanity; 41% correctly indicated that he
did not.7 Subjects were asked to recall whether the psychiatrist regarded
himself as a forensic psychiatrist by training: 89% correctly recalled that
he did not. Subjects were asked to recall the psychiatrist’s diagnosis of
the defendant: psychotic and grossly impaired v. absence of a major mental
disorder; 53% correctly recalled the former. Subjects were asked to recall
whether the psychiatrist discussed the defendant’s alcohol abuse; 64%
correctly recalled that he did. With respect to judge’s instructions subjects
were asked whether the legal and medical definitions of insanity are the
same; 72% indicated correctly that they are not. Subjects were asked to
indicate whether, according to the judge’s instructions, the following state-
ment is true or false: “In the case of the defense of insanity, the burden
is on the accused to prove that he was insane at the time the offense was
committed;” 84% correctly indicated that this statement is true. Subjects
were also asked to recall the judge’s instructions regarding the standard
of proof required by the defendant to prove insanity. They were allowed
to choose from four alternatives: the defendant had to prove (1) beyond
a reasonable doubt, (2) by clear and convincing evidence, or (3) by a
preponderance of evidence that he was insane at the time the offense was
committed, or (4) the defendant does not have to prove his insanity. The
correct answer, preponderance of evidence, was given by 22% of the
subjects. Reasonable doubt was chosen by most subjects (51%). Answers
to these questions were coded for accuracy (correct = 1; incorrect = 0)
and were aggregated to form a memory score. This aggregate score ranged
from 1 answer correct to 7 correct (M = 4.29, SD = 1.27). The three
measures of legal authoritarianism, PC, RD, and LAQ, were then cor-
related with accuracy on each of the seven items as well as accuracy score
on the aggregate measure. All correlations were statistically nonsignificant.
The correlations between legal authoritarian measures and the aggregate
score were - .07 for PC, .OO for RD, and - .13 for LAQ (JJ > .10 for
each).
Last, as Table 3 shows, the three measures of legal authoritarianism
were only moderately intercorrelated. The strongest correlation was be-

’ This finding can be interpreted as showing that a substantial proportion of our subjects
misinterpreted the psychiatrist’s testimony. Some clarification is therefore needed. The
psychiatrist in this trial did not offer an “ultimate opinion” meaning that he did not explicity
state his opinion on whether “the accused was capable of judging between right and wrong”
or whether “the accused acted under an insane delusion or was impelled by an irrepressible
impulse” (Rogers & Ewing, 1989, p. 359). Nevertheless, it is not difficult to infer the
psychiatrist’s opinion based on the content of his testimony. Thus, rather than concluding
that most subjects misinterpreted the psychiatrist’s testimony, it may be that most inferred
his opinion from his testimony but incorrectly recalled that the opinion was explicity stated.
176 CUTLER, MORAN, AND NARBY

tween the RD scale and the LAQ. Thus, it is questionable whether these
scales are assessing the same underlying construct.
Whether or not the different scales assessing legal authoritarianism are
measuring the same construct, the LAQ demonstrated the strongest pat-
tern of predictive relations with the dependent measures. We therefore
recommend it over the PC and RD scales for studies of insanity defense
cases. Further research geared toward construct validity might determine
which measure is more closely associated with the construct of legal au-
thoritarianism. It is also possible that a newly devised measure could
outperform both existing ones.
It is interesting to note that legal authoritarianism is more strongly
related to mock-juror decisions and inferences based on the trial testimony
than it is to memory for testimony. Indeed, there was no evidence that
legal authoritarian attitude was associated to memory for testimony. Thus,
to the extent that the effect of legal authoritarian attitudes on verdicts is
mediated through the processing of trial information, the nature of the
mediation is through the evaluation of, rather than attention to, trial
information. While data from Study 2 are suggestive that inferences drawn
from the trial information may mediate the relation between legal au-
thoritarianism and verdicts, they provide for a poor test in that the in-
ference measures were assessed after the verdict. Rather than inferences
affecting verdict, it may have been the case that inferences on the various
dependent measures were affected by the verdict rendered.
STUDY 3
Study 1 showed that the single-item measure of attitudes toward psy-
chiatrists significantly predicted verdict but that the single-item measure
of attitudes toward the insanity defense was a nonsignificant predictor.
Results involving single-item measures, however, are suspect because their
reliability is unknown. In Study 3 we developed a lo-item measure of
attitudes toward psychiatrists as well as toward the insanity defense and
tested its internal consistency, factor structure, and correlation with ver-
dict. As in Study 1, we predicted that subjects with negative attitudes
toward psychiatrists and the insanity defense, as compared with subjects
having more positive attitudes, will be less likely to entertain a defendant’s
defense of insanity.
Method
Attitudes towardpsychiatrists and the insanity defense scale. A large pool of items assessing
both attitude dimensions was inspected, and 10 items that seemed most face valid were
selected. Four items related to attitudes toward psychiatrists (one negatively keyed) and 6
were face valid assessments of attitudes toward the insanity defense (one negatively keyed).
The attitudes toward psychiatrists item from Study 1 was retained as one of the scale items.
Item responses were recorded on 7-point scales anchored with “Strongly Disagree” (0) and
 JURY SELECTION 177

“Strongly Agree” (6). A higher score indicates more negative attitudes toward psychiatrists
and the insanity defense. The scale is displayed in Table 4.
Subjects and procedures. Sixty-two undergraduates at Florida International University,
who earned extra course credit for their participation in this study, first completed a ques-
tionnaire containing the Attitudes toward Psychiatrists and the Insanity Defense Scale in
addition to some demographic items.’ Subjects then watched the videotaped insanity defense
trial described in Study 2 and rendered a verdict.

Results and Discussion

Table 4 displays each item’s descriptive statistics and corrected item-
total correlation with the full scale. Inspection of the means indicates that
the data are somewhat skewed toward negative attitudes toward the psy-
chiatrist and the insanity defense. This is evident in the mean scale score,
which is 41.60 (SD = 9.88). The possible range is 0 to 60; thus, the mean
scale score is substantially above the midpoint. Corrected item-total cor-
relations ranged from .22 to .69, and 7 of the 10 items had corrected
item-total correlations above .35. Coefficient alpha for the full scale was
.77.
In order to examine the factor structure of the scale, item scores were
subjected to a common factor analysis with an oblique rotation. The first
eigenvalue was 3.51, which accounted for 35% of the variance in the
solution. The second was 1.60, which accounted for an additional 16%,
and the third was 1.03, which accounted for another 10%. All other
eigenvalues were below 1.00. Despite the fact that three factors had
eigenvalues above 1.00, we decided to extract a two-factor solution on
the theory that we are attempting to assess only two attitude dimensions:
toward psychiatrists and toward the insanity defense. The rotated factor
pattern appears in Table 4. As expected, the four items assessing attitudes
toward psychiatrists tended to load primarily on one factor. These four
loadings ranged from .35 to .78. This factor is henceforth referred to as
the Attitudes toward Psychiatrists Factor (coefficient alpha = S4). The
six items designed to measure attitudes toward the insanity defense loaded
primarily on the other factor, with loadings ranging from 60 to .77. This
factor is henceforth referred to as the Attitudes toward the Insanity De-
fense Factor (coefficient alpha = .81). The factor correlation matrix in-
dicated that the two factors correlated .20.”
Individual item scores and the scale score were correlated with verdict
from the trial. In all, 82% convicted and 18% voted NGRI. Verdicts were

a The demographic breakdown of the sample is as follows: Sex; male = 37%, female =
63%; Age: 17-20 = 77%, 21-30 = 21%, 31-50 = 2%; Race: white = 40%, black =
18%, Hispanic = 23%, Asian = lo%, other = 10%; Marital Status: married = 5%, single
= 95%.
’ Unit weighting of the items creates a correlation of .54 between the factors.
 TABLE 4
THE ATTITUDES TOWARD PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE QUESTIONNAIRE:
STUDY 3

Corrected Factor pattern Correlation

item-total with
M SD correlation Factor 1 Factor 2 Verdict
Attitudes toward
psychiatrists
I don’t put much faith in 3.61 1.56 .42 .09 .76 .07
the testimony of
psychiatrists.
The testimony of psychi- 1.85 1.52 .24 .lO .35 .29’
atrists is critical to in-
sanity defense cases.
(n)
Psychiatrists are just 3.06 1.69 .38 .03 .78 .09
hired guns-they are
too willing to say any-
thing on the witness
stand for the right
pIiCe.
Psychiatrists are no bet- 2.58 1.73 .22 -.lO .65 .31*
ter than anyone else at
determining whether a
defendant is insane.
Attitudes toward the insan-
ity defense
Too many guilty people 5.52 1.49 .57 .60 .27 .07
are acquitted by plead-
ing insanity.
Criminal defendants 4.16 1.85 ..59 .74 .13 .27’
should not be allowed
to plead insanity.
In most cases in which a 3.95 1.46 .24 ho .31 .22
defendant is found not
guilty by reason of in-
sanity, the verdict is
justified. (n)
All criminal defendants 4.97 1.55 .49 .73 .02 .29*
should be punished for
committing crimes,
even if they are found
insane.
The courts are too leni- 4.76 1.69 .69 .77 .22 .24
ent with defendants by
allowing them to plead
insanity.
The defendant’s degree 4.74 1.72 .56 .76 .Ol .33*
of insanity is irrele-
vant: if he commits a
crime then he should
do the time.

Note. (n), negatively keyed items. * = p < .05. Mean and standard deviation were 41.60
and 9.88 for the full scale, 13.50 and 4.09 for the Attitudes toward Psychiatrists Factor,
and 28.10 and 7.05 for the Attitudes toward the Insanity Defense Factor.
178
 JURY SELECTION 179

scored 1 (guilty) and 0 (NGRI), and point-biserial correlations between

items, scale scores, and verdict were computed. Correlations between
individual items and verdict appear in Table 4. These correlations ranged
from .07 to .33. All were in the positive direction, indicating that negative
attitudes toward psychiatrists and the insanity defense were associated
with more convictions. Five of the correlations were statistically significant
(p < .05), and seven were above .20 in magnitude.”
The full scale score correlated significantly with verdict, r = .35, p <
.Ol, as did both factors considered separately. The Attitudes toward Psy-
chiatrists Factor (using unit weighting for the items) correlated .28 (p <
.05) with verdict, and the Attitudes toward the Insanity Defense Factor
(using unit weighting for the items) correlated .33 (p < .Ol) with verdict.
Study 3 provides some evidence in support of the Attitudes toward
Psychiatrists/Insanity Defense Scale’s internal consistency in that cor-
rected item-total correlations and coefficient alpha are acceptably high.
This Scale also produced an interpretable factor pattern, suggesting that
the Attitudes toward Psychiatrists Factor and the Attitudes toward the
Insanity Defense Factor can be considered separately. Last, insanity de-
fense verdict correlated significantly with the Scale scores, scores on each
factor, and scores on half of the individual items. While further tests of
reliability, factor structure stability, and construct validity certainly need
to be undertaken, the positive preliminary results indicate that the At-
titudes toward Psychiatrists/Insanity Defense Scale is likely to be a useful
instrument for studies of jury selection and jury decision making in insanity
defense cases. It might prove to be valuable in studies of jury processes
in other cases involving psychiatric or psychological evidence, as well.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
To summarize what we have learned thus far, Study 1 taught us that
legal authoritarian attitudes and attitudes toward psychiatrists are likely
to be important factors in insanity defense cases. Although Study 1 can
be credited with relying on a diverse population affordable through survey
methodology, it is limited in several important respects. It is unclear to
what degree telephone survey respondents’ evaluation of a brief crime
scenario corresponds to a juror’s task. Answering questions during a
telephone survey may not invoke similar normative and/or cognitive pro-
cesses as does evaluating trial evidence. Study 1 used only one measure
of legal authoritarianism and single-item measures of attitudes toward

” It is interesting to note that of the three items that had the corrected item-total cor-
relations that were less than .30 in magnitude, all three produced correlations above .20
and two produced significant correlations. This finding argues in favor of retaining these
items even if their corrected item-total correlations are somewhat lower than the others.
180 CUTLER, MORAN, AND NARBY

psychiatrists and the insanity defense. Study 2 compared measures of legal

authoritarianism in a closer approximation of the target setting-a mock
trial-and found that the LAQ outperformed other measures of legal
authoritarian attitudes, Study 2 also presented some evidence in support
of the notion that legal authoritarianism is related to inferences based on
insanity trial testimony. But because these inferential tests followed the
verdict assessment, the causal direction of the inference-verdict relation
is unclear, thus precluding any tests of mediation hypotheses, Study 3,
which also used the mock-trial methodology, demonstrated the viability
of a newly devised, more complete measure of attitudes toward psychi-
atrists and the insanity defense. In general, the three studies converge on
the conclusion that legal authoritarian attitudes and attitudes toward psy-
chiatrists and the insanity defense predict juror bias in insanity defense
cases. These findings also support those of Gallun and Kassin (1983).
That attitudes toward psychiatrists emerged as a significant predictor is
consistent with a growing body of jury selection research which suggests
that case-relevant attitudes are important predictors of juror bias. For
example, Moran et al. (1990) found, in one study, that attitudes toward
lawyers and drugs were the most important predictors of verdicts in a
criminal case against a lawyer charged with drug crimes. In their second
study they found that attitudes toward drugs was an important predictor
of verdicts in a case against a person charged with large-scale drug traf-
ficking. Goodman, Loftus, and Greene (1990) and Caiola and Berman
(1991) found that attitude toward tort reform was the best predictor of
civil case outcomes. Studies of juror decision making in cases involving
post-traumatic stress syndrome produce similar results. Schuller (cited in
Vidmar & Schuller, 1989) found that subjects who endorsed myths about
battered women were more likely to convict in a mock trial of a “battered”
woman who killed her husband.
The consistency of the present findings with previous research contra-
dicts recent conclusions by some reviewers of the field of jury selection
research. MacCoun (1989), p. 1947), for example, argued: “A large body
of empirical research calls into question the premise that jurors’ votes
during deliberation can be reliably predicted from juror characteristics
that are observable before the trial. In general, jurors’ demographic at-
tributes, personality traits, and general attitudes are associated weakly
and unreliably with jurors’ verdicts.” This summary is untenable. Case-
specific attitudes appear to reliably predict conviction-proneness.
If, as we have concluded, case-specific attitudes are important for iden-
tifying juror bias, then it behooves courts to lessen their restrictions on
voir dire and allow for more extensive, probing questions. Allowing for
extended voir dire will not only have the benefit of producing more
information on which attorneys could intelligently base their challenges,
 JURY SELECTION 181

but will also allow for a greater opportunities for the attorney to educate
jurors about the charge and the law (Penrod & Linz, 1984).
In 1989 Alabama Senator Howell Heflin introduced legislation to re-
quire judges to allow attorneys at least 30 min to address and question
the jury during voir dire. The legislation was not passed. Perhaps through
further research more data can be brought to bear on the importance of
information obtainable in extended voir dire for identifying biased jurors.
The current research shows that extended voir dire would benefit de-
fendants in insanity defense cases, and other research cited above shows
that it would benefit defendants in a variety of other cases, as well. These
findings support that segment of the judiciary that encourages extensive
voir dire (Hittner, 1989).

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