TIIH REVISED PENAL CODE

Criminal Law

People v. Marqulebnar.
(99 Phil. 992, 998)
Focts.. During the robbery in a dwelling house, one of the culprits fired
his gun upward in the ceiling, not knowing that there was a person in the THE REVISED PENAL CODE
ceiling of the house. The owner of the house who was up in the ceiling was
hit by the Slug that passed through it and was killed. (Act No. 3815, as amended)
Article294,paragraph1,oftheR.P.C.provides,aocordingtoitsEnglish
text, that the crime is robbery with homicide "when by reason or on cocasion AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE
of the robbery the crime of homicide shalJ have been commi'fted."
The Spanish text of the Same provision reads, a8 follows: acz4ando con
AND OTHEF] PENAL LAWS
Trrotii)o o con ocasivT. del robo resultare hoTrLieidto."
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Hezcz.. In view of the Spanish text which must prevail, the crime Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of
committed is robbery with homicide, even if the homieide supervened by
the same.
mere accident,
PRELIMINARYARTICIE-Thislawshallbe'knownasTheRevised
While the English text of Article 294, paragraph 1, of the R.P.C. Pend Code."
seemstoconveythemeaningthatthehomicideshouldbeintentionally
committed, the Spanish text means that it is sufficient that the
homicide shall have resulted, even if by mere accident.

Other cases of incorrect translation of the Spanlsh text Into the
English text.
1. "sosteniendo combofe" into "engiqg}ng fn owarp in Article
L35. (People u. Geronino,loo Phil. 90, 95-96)
Z. "suf riedo privacivn de libertad: in:ho "inprisonrnend 5]D\
Arfuche 16] . (People v. Abtlong, 82 Phil.172,174)
3. "nuel;o dezffo" into "o7rofhercrz77re" in the headnote ofArticle
160. (People u. Yabut, 58 Phi,l. 499, 504)
4. "sewillc. alimentieict into "cereal» in Arthale 808. (People
u. Me8ias, 65 Phil. 267, 268)
5. "fiJed" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is not
found in the Spanish text. (Peapfe u. Man¢ba, 58 Pb£Z. 665,
668)
- o0o -
BOOK ONE
General Provisions Regarding the Date of
EnforcementandtheApplicationofthefrovisions
of this Code, and Regarding the Offenses, the
Persons Liable and the Penalties
Prelirfuary Title
DAIE 0F EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION
OF THE pROvlsloNs OF Tins CODE
History of the Revised Penal Code.
This Code is called "Reufsed Penoz Code," because the
CommitteewhichwascreatedbyAdministrativeOrderNo.94ofthe
DepartmentofJustice,datedOctober18,1927,composedofAnacleto

29
28
Art. 2 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal I.aw
Char.ctol.I8tlcs of the posltlvist theory.
1. That man is subdued occasionally by a strange and morbid
phenomenon which constrains him to do wrong, in spite of
or contrary to his volition.
2. That crime i8 essentially a social and natural phenomenon,
and as such, it cannot be treated and checked by the
application of abstract principles of law and jurisprudence
norbytheimpositionofapunishment,fixedanddetermined
a prfori; but rather through the enforcement of individual
measures in each particular case after a thorough, personal
and individual investigation conducted by a competent
body of psychiatrists and social scientists. (Basic Principles,
Rationale, pp. 2 and 3, by the Code Commission on Code
of Crimes)
Ar.2.Applieafronofit8proviston8.-B:neep`oisprrowidedL
in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions Of this Code chau be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction,
adrt those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a philippine ship
or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency
note of the Philippine Islands or obligations
and securities issued by the Government of the
Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the intro-
duction into these Islands of the obligations and
8ocurities mentioned in the pl.eceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should
commit an offense in the exercise of their functions;
Or
32
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION Art. 2
0F THE PROVISIONS 0F THIS CODE
5. Should commit any of the crines against national
security and the law Of nations, defined in Title One
of Book Two of this Code.
Scope of the application of the provlslons of the Revised Penal
Code.
The sovereignty of the Philippines extends, beyond its land
territory and internal waters and its archipelagic waters, to an
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial Bea. This sovereignty
extends to the air space over the teITitorial sea as well as to its bed
and subsoil. (Art. 2, See.1, United Natiohs Convention on the Law of
the Sea) The breadth of the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles from
the archipelagic baselines.
The provisions of the R.P.C. shall be enforced rroc only zujfhfn the
Philippine Archipelago, but otso oz.tsjde of its jurisdiction in cerfajn
Cases.
The five paragraphs of Article 2 treat of the applicatioh of the
R.P.C. to acts committed in the air, at sea, and even in a foreign
country when such acts affect the political or economic life of the
nation.
In what cases are the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
applicable even if the felony is committed outside of the
Philippines?
They are applicable in the following cases:
i. When thie offender should commi,t an off;enee u]hile on a
Plulippine ship or al,rship.
A Philippine vessel, although beyond 12 flautical miles
from the archipelagic baseline, is considered paut of the national
territory.
Thus, any person who committed a crime on board a
Philippine ship or airship while the same is outside of the
Philippine territory can be tried before our civil courts for
violation of the Penal Code.
33
 TIIE REVISED PENAli CODE
Art. 2
Criminal Law
ButwhenthePhilippinevesBeloraircraftisfnfheferr#ory
a/ a foreign country, the crime committed on said vessel or
aircraft is subject to the laws of that foreign country.
A Philippine vessel or aircraft must be understood as that
which is registered in the Philippine Bureau of Customs.
It is the registration of the vessel or aircraft in accordance
withthelawsofthePhilippines,notthecitizenshipofitsowner,
which makes it a Philippine ship or airship. A vessel or aircraft
which is unregistered or unlicensed does not come within the
purview of paragraph No.1 of Article 2.
Thus, if a crime is committed 15 nautical miles from
the archipelagic baseline of the Philippines on board a vessel
belonging to a Filipino, but the same is not registered or
licensed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines,
paragraph No.1 of Article 2 is not applicable.
The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of
theftcommittedonfhefojgfaseasonboardavesBelnofregisfered
or Zieeused in the Philippines. (U.S. u. Fou;jer, I PfojJ. er4J
2. When the offerder shouid fbrge or couiderfeit any wir! pr
curTeneyiroteofthePhilippinesorobljgafroneand8ecurities
issued by the Government.
Thus, any person who makes false or counterfeit coins
(Art. 163) or forges treasury or bank notes or other obligations
and securities (Art. 166) jn c! /oreigri coz4nfry may be prosecuted
before our courts for violation of Art. 163 or Art. 166 of the
R.P.C.
8. When the off;end2r should be liel>le for cuts cgpruected u)ith.
theiitrodiredanintothephiltppine8Oftheaobliec[horrsand
8eeurities" meriti,oned in the apreceding number."
The reason for this provision is that the introduction
of forged or counterfeited obligations and Securities into the
Philippines is as dangerous as the forging or counterfeiting of
the same, to the economical interest of the country.
4. When the offender, while being a publie officer or employee,
should comrnd an offer.se in the ecereise of lds fuactious.
The crimes that may be committed in the exercise of
public functions are direct bribery (Art. 210), indirect bribery
34
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION Art. 2
0F THE PROVISIONS 0F THIS CODE
(Art. 211), frauds against the public treasury (Art. 213),
possession of prohibited interest (Art. 216), malversation of
public funds or property (Art. 217), failure of accountable
officer to render accounts (Art. 218), illegal use of public funds
or property (Art. 220), failure to make delivery of public funds
or property (Art. 221), and falsification by a public officer or
employee committed with abuse of his official position. (Art.
171)
When any of these felonies is committed ¢brocid by any
of our public officers or employees while in the exercise of his
functions, he can be prosecuted here.
5. When the offender should commit any of the crirmes ngalnst
the national security c[nd the Zaw Of rutivus.
The crimes against the natiorml security and the law of
nations are treason (Art. 114), conspiracy and proposal to commit
treason (Art. 115), espionage (Art. 117), inciting to war and
giving motives for reprisals (Art. 118), violation of neutrality
(Art. 119), correspondence with hostile country (Art. 120), flight
to enemy's country (Art. 121), and piracy and mutiny on the high
seas, (Art. 122)
Crimes punishable in the Philippines underArticle 2 are cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court in which the charge is flled.
The crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable
therein uhder Article 2 of the R.P.C. shall be cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court in which the charge is first filed. (Rule 110,
See. 15[d], Revised Rules of Criminal Fhocedure)
IMPORTANT WORDS AND PIIRASES IN ARTICLE 2.
1. "Eaeept as provided in the treaties cnd lciw8 cifpref;erewhn:I
applieation=
This phrase means that while the general rule is that
the provisions of the R.P.C. shall be enforced against any
person who violates any of its provisions while living or
sojourning in the Philippines, the exceptions to that rule
miry be provided by the treaties and leu]s of pref;ererbtial
appzjcafjous, like the RP-U.S. Visiting Forces Accord, the
Military Bases Agreement between the Republic of the
36
Jin. 2 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
Philippines and the United States of America, and the
provisions of R.A. No. 75.
2. .it8atmo8phere."
The sovereignty of the subj acent State, and therefore
its penal laws extend to all the air space which covers its
territory, subject to the right of way or easement in favor
of foreign aircrafts.
8. "interior waters."
The phrase "interior waters" includes creeks, rivers,
lakes and bays, gulfs, straits, coves, inlets and roadsteads.
Under Section 1, Article 8 of UNCLOS, waters on the
landward side of the baseline of the teintorial sea forln
part of the internal waters.
4. "TrraritiTne cone."
"Maritime zones" includes the territorial waters [12
nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical mnes from the baselines], and continental
Bhe*NeB. (Magallona u. Ermita, a.R. No. 187167, August
16, 2011)
Crimes committed on board a foreign merchant ship or airship.
Just as our merchant ship is an extension of our territory,
foreign merchant ship is considered an extension of the territory of
the country to which it belongs. For this reason. an offense colrmitted
on the hig7. seas on board a foreign mercl.ant ue88el is t\ot triRIbhe ty
ONI a;ourts. (U.S. u. Fowler,1 Phil. 614)
Continuing offense on board a foreign vessel.
But a continuing crime committed on board a Norwegian
merchant vessel sailing from Formosa to the Philippines, by failing
to provide Stalls for aninals in transit in violation of Act No. 55, is
triable in tbe Philippines.
The offense of failing to provide suitable means for securing
animals while transporting them on a (foreign) ship from a foreign
port to a port of the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the
36
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION Art. 2
0F THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE
courts of the Philippines when the forbidden conditions existed
duringthetimetheshipwaswithinterritorialwaters,regardlessof
the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship sailed from
the foreign port and while it was on the high seas. (U.S. I;. BUZZ, J5
Phi,I,. 7)
Rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard foreign
merchant vessels.
There are two rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed
aboard merchant vessels while in the territorial waters of another
country.
I+ench Rz4ke. - Such crimes are not triable in the courts of that
country,unlesstheircommissionaffectsthepeaceandsecurityofthe
territory or the safety of the state is endangered.
EngzisA Rc4fe. - Such crimes are triable in that country, unless
theymerelyaffectthingswithinthevesselortheyrefertotheintemal
management thereof.
Under the UNCLOS, the criminal jurisdiction of the coastal
Stateshouldnotbeexerdsedonboardaforeignshippa8singthrough
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation
in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its
passage, except:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state;
(b) if the crime i8 of a kind to disturb the peace of the country
or the good order of the territorial sea;
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested
by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or
consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit
traffic in narcotic dr`igs or psychotropic substances.
However, the coastal State has the right to take any steps
authorizedbyitslawsforthepurposeofanarrestorinvestigationon
board a foreign ship passing through the territorial Sea after leaving
internal waters.
ThecoastalStatemaynottakeanystepsonboardaforeignship
passingthroughtheterritorialseatoarrestanypersonortoconduct
37
 Art. 2 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal I.aw
anyinvestigationincormectionwithanycrimecommittedbeforethe
shipenteredthetendtorialsea,iftheship,proceedingfromaforeign
port, is only passing through the teritorial sea without entering
internal waters. (Art. 27, See. 1)
Dothophlllpplnecourtshavejurisdlctionoverth®crimeofhomicid®
commltt®donboardaforelgnmerchantves§elbyamemberofthe
crow aga]nst another?
Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on
boardaretobedealtwithexclusivelybythesovereigrtyofthehomeof
theship,butthosewhichdisturbthepublicpeacemaybesuppressed,
and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of
the local jurisdiction.
It may not be easy at all times to determine to which of the
two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedlydependontheattendingcircunstancesofthepartieular
case,butallmustcoDcedethatfelohioushomicideisasubjectforthe
localjurisdietion,andthatiftheproperauthoritiesareproceeding
withthecaseintheregularway,tbeconsulhasnorighttointerfere
tfop^r,%3"+.tt_.I.(hifelia.ndyildg.phusp._Keeperofoft;6irin-=;-ii:ii,
12o U.S. 1, cifed in People v. Wong C;heTbi, 46 ihil. 7ig,-ii:i:i:rig)
Crimes not involving a lneach Of public order committed on board
a foreign merchant vessel in transit not triable by our courts.
Merepossessionofopiumaboardaforeignmerchantvesselin
transit is not triable in Philippihe courts, because that fact alone
does not constitute a breach of public order. The reason for this
mling is that mere possession of opium on such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not bring about in this country
those disastrous effects that our law contemplates avoiding. But
saidcourtsacquirejurisdictionwhenthetinsofopiumareJ¢nded
from the vessel on Philippine soil. Landing or using opium is an
open violation of the laws of the Philippines. rU.S. u. I,oole Cfaazu,
18 Phil. 573, 577-578)
When the foreign merchant vessel is rot i" fraus££ because the
Philippinesisitsterminalport,thepersoninpossessionofopiumon
board that vessel is liable, because he may be held guilty of illegal
inpenda:fuonofapfun.(U.S.u.AhSing,3drphil.5ii8,agwi:952)
38
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION Art. 2
OF TIIE PROVISIONS 0F THIS CODE
Smoking opium constitutes a breach of public order.
Smoking opium aboard an English vessel while anchored two
undone-halfmilesinManilaBayconstitutesabreachofpublicorder,
because the primary object of the law in punishing the use of opium
is to protect the inhabitants of this country against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of such ding. And to smoke opium within
our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship,
is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causessuchdrugtoproduceitspemiciouseffectswithinourterritory.
Philippinecourtshavejurisdictionovercrimesconstitutingabreach
of public order aboard merchant vessels anchored in Philippine
jurisdictional waters. /Peopje u. Wong Cheng, 46 Pfojz. 729, 733J
Plijlippine courts have no jurisdiction over offenses commit(ed on
board foreign warships in terr]torial `Araters.
In case vessels are in the ports or territorial waters of a foreign
country, a distinction must be made betweeh merobanf chips and
zuarsfaJps; the former are more or less subjected to the territorial
tows. (See U.S. u. Bull,15 Phil. 7; U.S. u. Look Chau],18 Phil. 573;
and People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil,. 729)
Warships are always reputed to be the territory of the country
to which they belong and cannot be subjected to the laws of another
state.AUnitedStatesArmytransportisconsideredawarship.(I/.S.
u. Fouiler,1 Phil. 614)
Extra-territorial application of Republic Act No. 9372.
RepublicActNo.9372,otherwiseknownasthe"HwncainSee"".fy
Acf of2007," which was passed into law on March 6, 2007, has extra-
territorial application.
Section 58 of R.A. No. 9372 provides that subject to the provision
of an existing treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to
any contrary provision of any law of preferential application, the
provisions of the Act shall apply:
(1) to individual persons who commit any of the crimes
defined and puDished in the Act within the terrestrial
domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of
the Philippines;
39
Art. 2 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criinal Law

(2) to individual persons who, although physically outside

the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire
or plot any of the crimes defined and punished in the Act
inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; Title One
(3) to individjal persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said FELONIES AND CIFtcuMSTANCES WHICH
crimes on board Philippine ship or airship; AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILllY
(4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes within
any embassy, consulate or diplomatic premises belonging
to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official Chapter One
capacity;
FELONIES
(5) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes
againstPhilippinecitizensorpersonsofphiLippinedescent, Art. 3. Z}epn€fron. - Acts and omissions punishable by
where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the law are felonies /dezifo8j.
commission of the crime; and
Feloniesarecommittednotonlybymeausofdeceit(dofo)
(6) to individual persons who, although physically outside the but also by means of fault /oz.Jp¢J.
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes
directly against the Philippine government.
T]ieneiBdcoeitwhentheactisperfomedwithdeliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack Of foresight, or lack Of skill.

F®Ionlos, defined.
Fe/onies are acts and omissions punishable by the R.P.C.

El®monts of felonies.
The elements of felonies in general are:
1. Thatthere mustbe an actoromission.
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the
R.P.C.

3. That the actis performed orthe omissioninouned bymeans

ofdoloorculpa.(Peoplev.Goneales,GR.No.80762,March
19, 1990, 183 SCRA 309, 324)

40 41
Art. 3 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
lMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ARTICLE 3.
Meanlng of tl'ie word "act."
By acf must be understood any bodily movement tending to
pro.duce Bone effect in the external world, it being umecessary that
the same be actually produced, as the pcesfbjJzfy of its production i8
sufficient. /See People u. Gonzozes, 8z.proJ
But the acf must be one which is defined by the R.P.C. as
constituting a felony; or, at least, an overt act of that felony, that i8,
an external act which has direct connection with the felony intended
to be committed. (See Art. 6)
Example of felony by perforrn[ng an act.
AtcokthewatchofBwithintenttogainandwithouttheconsent
of the latter. The act of fafa!ng the watch of 8, with intent to gain,
constitutes the crime of theft.
Only extomal act is punished.
The act must be eefer/roz, because internal acts are beyond the
sphere of penal law. Hence, a criminal thought or a mere intention,
no matter how immoral or improper it may be, will never constitute
a felony.
Thus, even if A entertains the idea of killing 8, as long as he
dces not commence the commission of the crime directly by overt act,
A is not crimimlly liable.
Meaning of the word ``omlsslon."
By omission is meant jwacffon, the failure to perform a positive
duty which one is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the
doing or performance of an act.
Examples of felony by omission.
1. chyone who fo£Zs to render assistance to any person whom
he finds in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of
dying,i8liableforabandonmentofpersonsindanger.(Art.
275, par. 1)
42
TITLE ONE Art. 3
Felonies and Circunetances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
2. An officer entrusted with collection of taxes who voluntarily
f8!istoissueareceiptasprovidedbylaw,iBguiltyofinegal
exaction. (Art. 213, par. 2Th])
3. Every person owing allegiance to the philippines, without
beingaforeigner,andhavingknowledgeofanyconspiracy
against the government, who does nof disc/ace and make
known the same to the proper authority, is liable for
misprision of treason. (Art. 116)
It will be noted that in felonies by omission, there iB a law
requiring a certain act to be performed and the person required to
do the act fails to perform it.
The omisslon must be pun]shablo by law.
Because €here j8 no Jaw that punishes a person who does
not report to the authorities the commission of a crime which he
witnessed, the omis8fon to do 8o is nof a fefony.
The omission to indicate what kind of taxes the Tax Numeric
Codes (TNC8) Stand for was not a criminal act. Employees of the
BIR were expected to know what the TNCs stand for. If they do not,
there is a "Handbook of Tax Numeric Code of Revenue Sources"
which they can consult. With this, petitioner should not be required
to describe in words the kinds of tax for which each TNC used stands
for. Precisely, the pu]pose of introducing the use of tax numeric
codes in the Bureau was to do away with these descriptive words, in
order to expedite and facilitate communications among the different
divisions therein. Applicable here is the familiar maxim in criminal
low.. Nullum crinen nulla poera sine lege. 'There is ro crim!e where
thereisnolawpunishingit./Et7angejisfoz/.PeopzeandfheHoro7vzb/e
Sandiganhayan, a.R. No8. 108135-36, August 14, 2000)
People v. Silijestne and A±ienza
(56 Phil. 353)
Facts..MartinAtienzawasconvictedasprincipalbydirectparticipation
and Ronana SilveBtre aB accomplice of the crime of arson by the Court of
FirBt Instance.
On the night of Novonber 25, 1930, while NicolaB de la Cruz and
his wife, Antonia do la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants
heroin after Supper, Martin Atienza told Said couple to take their furniture
43
Art. 3 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
out of the bou8e because he was going to Set fire to it. Upon being asked by
NicolaB and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered
that it was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Ma8ocol,
who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and his
co-defendant, Romana Silve8tre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed
with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even Romana Silvestre,
who was about a meter away from her co-defendant. Alarmed at what
Martin Atienza had Bald, the couple left the house at once to communicate
with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just
heard Martin Atienza Bay; tiut they had hardly gone a hundred arms'
length when they heard cries of az7¥re/ Flre./" Turning back they saw their
home in flames. The fire destroyed about 48 houses.
Romamlistenedtohercordefendant'BthreatwithoutraiBingaprotest,
and did not give the alarm when the latter Bet fire to the house.
Held:Merepassivepresenceatthe8ceneofanother'schne,meresilence
and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy,
iB not punishable.
Romans SilveBtre was acquitted.
"Punishable by law."
This iB the other element of a felony. This is based upon the
rnaxirt\, "Twllum crimea, nulla pcera Sine lege," the:A is, the::re is ro
crime where there is no law punishing it.
The phrase "punished dy Za"" should be understood to mean
"punished by the Revised Penal Code» and no:t by a Bpechalluw. 'That
is to say, the term "felony" means acts and omi88ions punished in the
R.P.C. , to distinguish it from the words "crime" and "offense" which
are applied to infractions of the law punished by special statutes.
Classification of felonl®s accord[ng to the means by which they
are commltted.
Article 3 classifies felonies, according to the means by which
they are committed: (1) intentional felonies; and (2) culpable
felonies.
Thus, the second paragraph of Article 3 states that felonies are
committed not only by 7neaus of deceit (dofoJ but also by means of
fault'c"'pa'.
44
TITLE ONE AI,3
Felonies and CircunetanceB Which
Affect Criminal Liability
Intentional f®lonl®s and culpable felonies distlngulshed.
In intentional felonies, the act or omis8ioD of the offender is
ma!iefous. In the language of Article 3, the act is performed with
deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act
or in incurring the omission, has fhe jntenffon to cause an jay."ry to
another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is
rofmaJiefous,Theipjurycausedbytheoffendertoanotherpersonis
funintentional,itbeingsimplytheincidentofanotheractperformed
uiithout malici." (Peoirle u. Sc.ra, 55 Phil. 939) As sta:hod_in ±ridp 3,
thewrongfiilactresultsfromimpmdence,negligence,1ackOfforesight
or lack of sin.
Felonies committed by means of do/o or with mallc®.
Theword"deceit"inthesecondparagraphofArticle3ishotthe
propertranslationoftheword"deJo."DoZusisequivalenttomalice,
which is the in€enf to de an !njz.ry to another. (I Wharton'8 Criminal
Law 180)
When the offender, in performing an act or in incurring an
omission,hastheintentiontodoaninjurytotheperson,property,or
rishfofanother,suchoffenderactswithmalice.Iftheactoromission
is punished by the R.P.C., he is liable for intentional felony.
MostofthefeloriesdefinedandpenalizedinBcoklloftheR.P.C.
are committed by means of do!o or with malice.
F®Ionles committed by means of fault oT cv/pa.
Between an act performed voluntarily and intentionally, and
another committed unconsciously and quite unintentionally, there
exists another, per/ormed "j€howS moJice, but at the same time
punishable, though in a lesser degree and with an equal result, an
intermediate act which the Penal Code qualifies as imprudence or
negligence.
There are few felonies committed by means of fault or cHJpa.
Article 217 punishes malversation through negligence. Article 224
punishes evasion through negugence. Article 365 punishes acts by
imprudence or negligence, which, had they been intentional, would
constitute grave, less grave or light felonies.
46
Jfro. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal I,aw
There are crimes which carmot be committed through impru-
dence or negligence, Such a8 , murder, treason, robbery, and malicious
niischief.
A person who ceusod an injury, without intont]on to cause an ovll,
may bo hold llablo for culpable felony.
The dofondant, who was not a medical practitioner, tied a girl,
wrapped her feet with rags saturated with petroleum and thereafter
Bet them on fire, causing ihjuries. His defense was that he undertook
torondermedicalassistanceingoodfalthandtothebestofhisability
to cure her of ulcer. It was held that while there was no intention to
cause an evil but to provide a remedy, the defendant was liable for
physical irriuries through imprudence. (tJ.S. u. Dju!ro, J2 PbjJ. I 75,
190)
Imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Imprudenceindicatesade;¢cfernyo/acffom.Negligenceindicates
a deficieuey a/peroepcjon. If a person fails to take the necessary
precaution to avoid injury to person or damage to property, there is
imprudence. If a person faiJs to pay proper attentioh and to use due
diligenceinforeseeingtheipjuryordamageimpendingtobecaused,
there is negligence. Negligence usually involves lack Of foresight.
Imprudence usually involves lack of skill.
Reason for punishing acts of negligence /c4/pa/.
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all
his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from
instinct,thenthroughfearofincurringpunishment.Heisresponsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for his acts which no one
would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise,
his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow beings,
would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. /I/.S. Li.
Maleea, 14 Phil. 468, 470)
ln felonies committed by means of do/a or with malice and ln
feloniescomm]ttedbymeansoffaultorcti/pa,theactsoromlssfons
are voluntary.
TheadjectiveuoZ"nforyusedintheoldPenalCodeissuppressed
in the definition of felonies in Article 3 of the R.P.C. This omission
46
TITIH ONE Art, 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal I.inbility
does not mean that an involuntary act may constitute a felony. As
in the old Penal Code, the act or omission mz4sf be I;oZz.nfary and
punishable by law to constitute a felony. Article 3 classifies felonies
in:ho (1) intenttonc.l fielovies and (Z) culpable I;elorde8 . An in:*enttonal
felony is committed when the act is performed with de/£berote fnfenf ,
which must necessarily be voluntary.
Ontheotherhand,inculpablefelony,whichiscommittedwhen
thewrongfulactresultsfromimprLrdence,negligence,lackofforesight
or lack of skill, the act is also I/alz.nfary.
The only difference between intentional felonies and culpable
felonies is that, in the first, the offender acts tt;ifb malice; whereas,
in the second, the offender acts z„££hoz4£ malice.
The definition of reckless imprudence in Article 365 says
"reckless imprudence consists in Liozz.»torjdy, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage reBult8."
Thus, a hunter who seemed to have seen with his lantern
Something like the eyes of a deer about 50 meters from him and then
shot it, but much to his surprise, on approaching what he thought
was a deer, it proved to be his companion, performed a I;oZz4ntory act
in discharging his gun, although the resulting homicide is zu!£Aoz/f
imiziee,becausehedidnothavetheintenttokillthedeceased.Butthe
hunter, knowing that he had two companions, should have exercised
all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such
as the one that unfortunately occurred on the person of one of his
companions. The hunter was guilty of the crime of homicide through
rec;ldLeess im:prndenee. (People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 206)
A criminal act is presumed to be voluntary. Fact prevails over
assumption, and in the absence of indubitable explanation, the act
must be deelared voluntary and punishable. /People I;. Maeazisang;
22 SCRA 699)
Acts executed n®gligehtly are voluntary.
U.S. u. Reodique
(32 Phil. 458 [1915])
Facts.. Reodique picked up an airgun and asked the owner if it was
loaded. The owner answered in the negative. After receiving instructions as
to the handling and loading of the airgun, Reodique discharged it. However,
47
Jha. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crimmal I.aw
the gun was loaded and, at the time it was discharged, was pointed directly
atthevictim,causingawoundintheleftbreastwhichlatercausedherdeath.
He;d.. Reodique was convicted of the crime of causing death by gross
or reckless impmdence. He deliberately pulled the trigger of the airgun,
thereby voluntarily and intentional)y causing its discharge, with the result
that iltiury was produced, His act being voluntary and perfomed without
investigation or real effort to prevent injury, he cannot now be heard to say
that its consequences were different from those which he anticipated.
Whenthereiscompulsionorpreventionbyforceorintimidation,there
iB no voluntariness in the act.
Threereasonswhytheactoromissioninfeloniesmustbevoluntary.
1. The R.P.C. continues to be based on the classical Theory,
according to which the basis of criminal liability is human
free will.
2. Acts or omissions punished by law are always deemed
voluntary, since man is a rational being. One must prove
that his case falls under Article 12 to show that his act or
omission is not voluntary.
3. In felonies by dojo, the act is performed with deliberate
intentwhichmustnecessarilybevoluntary;andinfelonies
by cz.Jpo, the imprudence consists in uoZ%nforjJy, but
without malice, doing or fafling to do an act fi-om which
material injury results.
Therefore, ifl felonies committed by means ofdozo, as well as in
thosecommittedbymeansofcw/pa,theactperformedortheomission
incurred by the offender is voluntary, but the intent or malice in
intentional felonies is replaced by inprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of shell in culpable felonies.
Requisites of do/a or malice.
In order that an act or omjsszon may be considered as having
been performed or incurred uiitl. deliberate inter.t, the fio\howing
requisites must concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting
to do an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or
omitting to do the act;
48
TITLE ONE Art, 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
(3) He must have INTENT while doing the act or omittingto
do the act.
1. Freedom. When aperson acts without freedom, he is no Ion
a human bein his liability iB as much as that of the
that wounds, or of the torch that sets fire, or of the key that
opelis a door, or of the ladder that is placed against the wall of
a house in committing robbery.
Thus, a person who acts under th compulsion of an iITesistible
s exempt from criminal liability. (
Likewise, a person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury is exempt from
criminal liability. (Art. 12, par. 6)
2. Jnfezzjgence. Without this power, necessary to de!erm!ne fbe
morozjfy of Aztmar} acts, no crime can exist. Thus, the imbecile
or the insane, and the infant under nine years of age as, well
as the minor over nine but less than 15 years old and acting
without di8ce]mment, have no crininal liability, because they
act without intelligence. (Art. 12, pars. 1, 2, and 3)
3, Jntenf. Intent to commit the act with malice, being purely a
mental process, is presumed and the presumption arises from
the proof of the commission of an unlawful c.ct.
AIl the three requisites of voluntariness in intentional felony
must be present, because "a voluntary act is a free, !nfezzigen{, and
interbti;orunl act." (U.S. u. Ah Char.g, 15 Phi,l. 488, 495)
Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of
lnt®Illgenco.
One who acts without freedom necessarily has no intent to do
an injury to another. One who acts without intemgence has no such
intent.
But a person who acts with freedom and with intelligence may
ntit have the intent to do an injury to another. Thus, a person who
caused an ilriury by mere accident had freedom and intehigence, but
Hlnce he had no fault or intention of causing it, he is not criminally
llllble. (Art. 12, par. 4, R.P.C.)
49
 Art. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
The exlst®nc® of Intent ]s sliown by the overt acts of a person.
Wherethedefendantcarriedawayarticlesbelongingtoanother
and concealed them from the owner and from the police authorities,
denyinghavingtheminhisposses8ion,intheabsenceofasatisfactory
explanation, it may be infeITed that he acted with intent Of`gain.
Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt
acts clf a perfson. (Soric.no v. People, 88 Phi,l. 368, 374)
r=
Intenttokillisdifficulttoprove,itbeingamentalact.Butitcan
be deduced from the external acts performed by a person. When the
actsnaturallyproduceadefiniteresult,coultsareslowinconcluding
that some other result was intended. (U.S. t;. Mendcea, 38 Pb!Z. 69J-
6_93; People v. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, died in People v. Lco,11 CA.
Rep. 829)
• Cr]m]nal intent ls presumed from the commission of an unla`^/ful
act.
People u. Sia Teb Bar.
(54 Phil. 62, 63)
Facts.. The accused took a watch without the owner's consent. He was
I)roseouted for theft. The accused alleged as a defense that the prosecution
failed to prove the intent to gain on his part, an element of the crime of
theft.
HeJd..Fromthefeloniousact(takinganother'sproperty)oftheacoused,
fe7yandde/I.berote/yexeouted,themoralandlegalpresunptionofacriminal
and ilriurious intent arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
Criminalintentandthewilltocommitacrimearealwayspresumedto
exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear. rU.S. u. Apo8toz, J4 Pfaj/. 92, 93J
Butthopresumptlonofcrlminalintentdoesnotarisefromtheproof
of the commlssion of an act which is not unlawful.
u.s. v. ccfrolieo
(18 Phil. 504, sO8)
Focts.. The accused was a justice of the peace. He rendered decisions in
certalncases,eachonefordanage8resu]tingfromabreachofcontract,from
whichthedefendantsappealed,Asrequindbylaw,thedefendantsdeposited
rl6.00andabondofp50.00foreachcase.Itappearedthatthesuretie8onthe
50
TITLE ONE Art. 3
Felonies and Circ`imBtance8 Which
AffBct Criminal Liability
8aidbondswereinsolventandthatthedefendantsdidnotpresentnewbondB
within the time fixed by the accused as justice of the peace. Upon petition
of the plaintiffs, the accused dislnissed the appeals and ordered said sums
attached and delivered to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the judgment. The
accused was prosecuted for malverBation (a felony punishable now under
Art. 217).
HeJcZ.. The act of the accused, in permitting the sums deposited with
him to be attached in satisfaction of the judgment rendered by him, was
noc unzou)frl. Everything he did was done in good fhith under the belief
that he was acting judiciously and correctly. The act of a person does not
make him a criminal, unless his mind be criminal.
The main iB: acfz4g pop fzzcif re%m, ntsf mens 8if rco - a crime iB not
committedifthemindofthepersonperfomingtoactcomplainedbeimocent.
It iB true that a presumption of criminal intent may arise from proof of the
commission of a criminal act; and the generd rule is that if it is proved that
theaccuBedcommittedthecriminalactcharged,itwillbepresumedthatthe
act was done with criminal intention and that it iB for the accused to rebut
thiBpresunption.Butitmu8tbebomeinmindthattheactfromwhichsuch
presumption Springs must be a criminal act. In the case at bar, the act was
not criinal.
Wherethefactsprovenareaccompaniedbyotherfactswhichshowthat
the act complained Of was not unlawful, the presumption of criminal intent
does not arise.
There is rro i;elony by dD1,o if there is ro interit .
The presumption of criminal intent from the commission of an
unlawfiul act may be rebutted by proof of lack of such intent.
Thus, a minor who married without parental consent, in
violation of Article 475 of the old Penal Code which punished "any
minor who shall contract marriage without the consent of his or
her parents," was not liable criminally, because she proved that
she acted without malice. The defendant minor testified that she
believed that she was born in 1879; that so her parents gave her to
understand ever since her tenderest age; and that she did not ask
them concerning her age, because they had already given her to so
understand since her childhood. The presumption of malice was
rebutted by her testimony. One cannot be convicted under Article
476 (similar to Art. 350 of the R.P.C.) when by reason of a mfsfafee
o//act there does not exist the intention to commit the crime. (U.S.
u. Pehchosa,1 Phil.109)
61
Art. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
Also,apersonwhosuddenlygotupinhissleep,lefttheroomwith
a bozo in his hand, and upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him,
wounded her in the abdomen and attacked others, is not criminally
liable, because his acts were not voluntary, for having acted in a
dream; he had no criminal intent. /Peapze u. raneo, 58 Pfa!J. 255J
People u. Beror.illa
(96 Phil. 566)
Facts.. The acc`ised was a military major of La Paz, Abra, in 1944. He
received an order from the regional commander of an infantry, Philippine
Army, operating aB a guerrilla unit, to prosecute ArBenio Boljal for treason
andtoappointajuryofl2bolomen.ThejuryfoundBoljalguiltyofthechargo
and the recommendation of the jury was approved by the Headquarters of
the guerrilla unit. For the exeoution of Borjal, the accused was proseouted
for mnder.
The accused acted upon orders of Superior officers which tuned out to
be illegal. As a military Subordinate, he could not question the orders of his
superior officers, He obeyed the orders in good faith, without being aware of
their illegality, without any fault or negligence on his part.
Hezc!.. Criminal intent was not established. To constitute a crime, the
act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
crininaliuteut,ortya:i-chnegligeneeorindiffiereruetodrtyortoconsequenee8,
us in \trw, £8 equiucdent to criwirml intent. (U.S. u . Cc.tolico, 18 PI.il. 507) The
amused was acquitted.
Mlstake of fact.
While ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith (fgnorantza legis nan eacc.8a£J , ignorance or mistake of fact
relieves the accused from criminal liability (isnoran£!a faccj eecusci€J.
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the
person who caused injury to another. He is not, however, criminally
liable, because he did not act with criminal intent.
An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal
inteht which arises upon the commission of a felonious act. /Peapfe
u. Cocking, et al., CA., 52 0.G. 293, ctf:ing People u. Oanis, 74 Phil,.
257)
Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:
1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts
been as the acoused believed them to be;
52
TITIH ONE Art. 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act
should be lawful; and
3. That the mistcke must be without fault or carelessness on
the pat of the accused.
Lack Of intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the facts of
the case.
The accused was charged with theft for cutting and carrying
away33coconuttreesfrrmtheplantationofMenandro.Atamcio,who
owned the property adj acent to the plantation of Menandro, testified
that he authorized the accused to cut down coconut trees within the
boundaryofhisproperty.Thebarangaycaptainlikewisetestifiedthat
accused sought his permission to cut down coconut trees on the land
of Atanacio. The Supreme Court held that assuming that the trees
were within Menandro's land, no malice or criminal intent could be
attributedtotheaccusedashewenttotheplantotiontocutdowntrees
belongingtoAtanaciouponthelatter'sinstructions.If,indeed,inthe
courseofexecutingAtanacio'sinstructions,theaccusedencroachedon
the land of Menandro, because he missed the undetectable boundary
between the two lots, and cut down some of Menandro's trees, such
act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error. The criminal
mind is indeed wanting in the situation where accused even Bought
prior permission from the barangay captain to cut down the coconut
trees which was done openly and during broad daylight, effectively
negating malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason
thattheaccusedwouldstillapproachthebarangaycaptainifthereal
intention was to steal the coconut trees of Menandro. The accused
wz[s]acquithed.(Magsumbolu.People,G.R.No.207175,Nouember26,
2014)
ln mistake of fact, the act done would have been laiwful, had the
facts been as the accused believed them to be.
In other words, the act done would nof constitute a /€Jony had
the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
Thus, in the cases of U.S. LJ. Pef5aJo9a and PeopJe tJ. Beron£JZo,
supra, the accused in the first case believed that she was already Of
agewhenshecontractedmarriageandtheacousedinthesecondca8e
believed that the orders of his superior officer were legal. Had they
been the real facts, there would not be any felony committed. But
63
Art. 3 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
even if they were not the real facts, since the accused acted in good
faith, they acted without intent. Hence, their acts were involuntary.
In mistake of fact, the act done by the accused would have
constituted (1) a justifying circumstance under Article 11, (2) an
absolutory cause, such as that contemplated in Article 247, par. 2,
or (3) an involuntary act.
u.s. v. Ah Chong
( 15 Phil. 488)
Facts.. Ah Chong was a cook in Ft, MCKinley. He was afraid of bad
elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked hinself in his room by
placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened
by Someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "Who is there?"
but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped
from his bed and called out again, "J/yot4 enter the room I z„jj/ A£ZJ yoz.." But
at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed
againBtthedcor,andbdievingthathewasbeingattackedheseizedahitchen
lmife and stnick and fatally wounded the intruder who tuned out to be his
rcom"te.
Held. Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.
Had the facts beeD as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would
havebeenjustifiedinkillingtheintruderunderArticlell,paragraph
1, of the R.P.C., which requires, to justify the act, that there be -
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, (2)
reasomble necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. If
theintruderwasreallyarobber,forcinghiswayintotheroomofAhChong,
therewouldhavebeenunlawfulaggressiononthepartoftheintruder.There
would have been a necessity on the part ofAh Chong to defend hinself and/
or his home. The lmife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or
repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no provocation at all. Under
Article 11 of the R.P.C., there i8 nothing unlawful in the inteDtion as well
as in the act of the person making the defense.
People u. Oc.rds
(74 Phil. 257)
Facts.. Chief of police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were
under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped
convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the
64
TITIH ONE Art. 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal I.iability
BUBpected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with
his back towards the door, 8imultaneouBly fired at him with their revolvers,
without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The victim
tuned out to be an innocent man, TecBon, and not the wanted criminal.
J7eid.. Both accused are guilty of murder.
Even if it were tnie that the victim was the notorious criminal,
the accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was
sleeping.
In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does
not permit the captor to hill him. It is only when the fugitive from
justice i8 determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying to
capture him that killing bin would be justified.
Tlie mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of
the accused.
AA CAong case and Oan/s case dlst]nguished.
In the AA CAorig case, there is an innocent mistake of fact
without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, because,
having no tine or opportunity to make any further inquiry, and being
pressed by ciroum8tances to act immediately, the accused had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to hin, and
such facts justified his act of killing the deceased.
In the Oonis case, the accused found no ciroumstance8 whatever
which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room
being then asleep, the accused had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even
effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
made, as the victim was unarmed. This, indeed, is the only legitimate
course of action for the accused to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instmcted not to kill Balagtas at sight, but to
arrest, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression
is offered by bin.
Hence, the accused in the Oonis case were at fault when they
Shot the victin in violation of the instructions given to them. They
were also careless in not veriSring first the identity of the victim.
56
Art. 3 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crinrinal Law
L®ck of Intent to kill the deceased, because his intention was to kill
an®thor, does not relieve trie accused from criminal responsibility.
That the accused made a mistake in killing one man instead of
another cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility, he having
acted malieiously and wilfully. /Peop/e I;. Go", 54 Phj/. 605/
ln mistake of fact, the intention of the accused ln perform[ng the
act should be la`^rful.
Thus,inerrorjnpersorz¢eormistakeintheidentityofthevictim,
the principle of mistake of fact does not apply.
Ea;ample.. A wanted to kill 8 by shooting him with a pistol.
Thinking that the person walking in dark alley was 8, A shot the
person. It tuned out that the person killed was C, the brother of A.
A had no intention to kill C. Since the act and intention ofA in firing
his pistol are z4nJo";fi./, A cannot properly invoke the principle of
mistake of fact in his defense.
No crime of resistance when there is a mistake of fact.
One who resists an arrest, believing that the peace officer is
a bandit, but who submits to the arrest immediately upon being
informed by the peace officer that he is a policeman, is not guilty of
the crime of resistance to an agent of the authorities under Article
151 of the R.P.C., because of mistake of fact. rsee U.S. u. Boc4dsto,
31 Phil. 308)
When the accused ]s negligent, misfak® of fact is not a defense.
People u. de FerTrancki
(49 Phil.. 75)
Facts.. The accused, a policeman, was informed that three convicts
had escaped. In the dark, he saw a person going up the stairs of a house,
carrying a aolo and calling for someone inside. The daughter of the owner
of the house was at that tine with the aocused who fired a shot in the air.
As the unknown person continued to ascend the stairs and believing that
he was one of the escaped convicts, the accused fired directly at the man
who tuned out to be the nephew of the owner of the house.
Hezd.. He is guilty of homicide through reckless Degligence. The
victim called for someone in the house. That fact indicated that he was
known to the owner of the house. The accused should have inquired from
66
TTIT,E ONE Ant. 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
the daughter of the owner of the house as to who the unknown person
might be.
The defense of mistcke of fact is untenable when the accused is
charged with a culpable felony. In mistake of fact, what is involved
is lack of intent on the part of the accused. In felonies committed
through negligence, there is no intent to consider, as it is replaced
by imprudence, negligence, lack Of foresight or lack of skill.
Crlminal intent ]s necessary in felonies committed by means of
do'o.
Crz.mfrroz €ntenf is necessary in felonies committed by means of
dofo because of the legal maxims -
Acfz4s rion /8cjt rez.in "isj meri8 8jf rea, "the act itself does not
make a man guilty unless his intention were so."
Actus me irwito fiactus nor. e8t n.eus actu8J "an i*ct done by nue
again:sit "y vi]l is nch "y iud." (U.S. u. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 499)
Dlstlnction bet`reon general Intent and spec[f]c Intent.
Infeloniescommittedbydozz.8jthethirdelementofvoluntarinesa
i8 a general intent; whereas, in some particular felonies, proof of
porf!cz.Zor 8pecjfic Znfen! is required. Thus, in ceitaln crimes against
property, there must be the intent to gain (Art. 293 - robbery; Art.
308 - theft). Intent to kill is essential in fuistrated or attempted
homicide (Art. 6 in relation to Art. 249); in forcible abduction (Art.
342), the specific intent of lewd designs must be proved.
When the accused [s charged with Intentional felony, absence of
criminal intent [s a defense.
In the absence of criminal intent, there is no liability for
intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate er7-or
and nof crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused.
(People u. Paca:in, 47 Phil. 48)
If there is only error on the part of the person doing the act,
he does not act with malice, and for that reason he is not crilninally
liable for intentional felony.
57

Art. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
Crimlnal Intent ls replaced by negligence and imprudence in felonies
committed by means of cu/pa.
In felonies committed by means of cz4/pa, since the doing of or
failing to do an act must also be voluntary, there must be fi-eedom
and intelligence on the part of the offender, but the requisite of
criminal intent, which is required in felonies by doJo, is replaced by
the requisite of imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.
Such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence is, in
law, equivalent to criminal intent. rU.S. u. CacoJjco, J8 Pb£Z. 507J
But in felonies committed by means of cz4/pa, the mind of
the accused is not criminal. However, his act is wrongful, because
the injury or damage caused to the injured party results from the
imprudence,negligence,lackofforesightorlackofski]loftheaccused.
Therefore,inorderthattheactoromi8sioninfeloniescommitted
bymeanBoffaultorcz./pomaybeconsideredvoluntary,thefollowing
requisites must concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting
to do an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or
omitting to do the act;
(3) He is IMPRUDENT, NEGLIGENTor IlACKS FORESIGHT
or SRILL while doing the act or omitting to do the act.
In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should be
un]ntentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice.
People u. Guillen
(85 Phil. 307)
Facts.' Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, stated that he performed
the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it
did not make any difference to him if there were some people around the
President wben he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who
surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in view
of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President, were identified
witb the latter. In other words, although it was not his main intention
to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no compunction
68
TITIE ONE Art. 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the
President.
Hezd.. The facts do Dot Support the contention of counsel for appellant
that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less Serious physical injuries
in regard to Alfredo Eva, JOBe Fabio, Pedro Carillo, and Emilio Maglalang.
In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention of
killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all
the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with Article 4 of
the R.P.C., criminal liability iB incurred by any person committing a felony
/de/£fo/ although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another Should be
unintentional,itbeingsimplytheincidentofanotheractperformedwithout
malice. rpeapze u. Sera, 55 Pfo£Z. 939J In the words of viada, "in order that
an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that neither malice
nor intention to cause injury Should intervene; where such intention exists,
the act should be qualified by the felony it has produced oven though it may
not have been tbe intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as
that produced." (Vinda's comment on the Penal Code, Vol. 7, 5th Ed., p. 7)
And, aB was held by this court, deliberate intent to do an unlawful act iB
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. /Peopze Li.
Nc.rbqwil, 43 Phil. 232)
Mistake in the identlty of the intended vlctim is not reckless
imprudence.
A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such an
unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended
victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. /Peap/e I;. Gz.jJJer},
85Phtl.307,c3fin:gPeopleu.N®:riquil,43Phil.232,andPeopleu.Gwia,
54 Phil. 605)
A person causing damage or injury to another, without malice or
fault, 1§ not criminally llabl® under the Revls®d Penal Code.
Since felonies are committed either by means of deceit /dozoJ or
by means of fault rcz./paJ, if there is neither malice nor negligence
on the part of the person causing damage or injury to another, he is
not criminally liable under the R.P.C.
In such case, he is exempt from chminal liability, because he
causes an injury by mere accident, without fault or intention of
causing it. (Art. 12, par. 4, R.P.C.)
59
 Art. a TrlE REvlsED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
Illustrc[fron:
Three men, Ranos, Abandia and Catafigay, were hunting deer
at night. Ramos carried a lantern fastened to his forehead. Abandia
8ndCatafigaywerefo!lowinghin.Theysawadeer.Catafigaywhose
gun was already cocked and aimed at the deer stumbled against
an embankment which lay between him and Ramos. His gun was
accidentally discharged, hitting and killing Ramos. It was held that
Catafigaywasnotcriminallyliablebecausehehadrocrimj7roz!ntenf
and was nat negligent. (U.S. u. CcLtofigay, 28 Phil. 490)
The act performed mList b® la\Arful.
In the foregoing illustration, the act of aiming the gun at the
deer while hunting is lawful, it not being prohibited by any law.
But the act of discharging a gun in a pwbjie pzaee is unlawfu.
(Art. 155, R.P.C.) In such case, if a person is injured as a result of
the discharge of the gun, the one discharging it in a public place i8
criminally liable for the iriury caused.
The third class of crlmes are those punished by special laws.
There are three classes of crimes. The R.P.C. defines and
penalizes the first two classes of crimes: (1) the intentional felonies,
and (2) the culpable felonies. The third class of crimes are those
definedandpenalizedbyspeciallawswhichincludecrimespunished
by municipal or city ordinances. _ ; r `-r c>_``-\ i,A
Dole is not required ]n crimes punlshed by special laws.
When the crine is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent
to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender
has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to comml.£ the crime and intent to perpefrofe the act
must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended
to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act
is, by the very nature of things, the crine itself. (U.S. w Go Cb!co,
14 Plul. 128)
In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal
intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act), it is enough that
the prohibited act is done freely and con8civusly.
60
TITLE ONE Art. 3
Felonies and CircLimstances VI7hich
Affect Criminal Liability
People v. Bayora
(61 Phil. 181)
Facts.. Defendant was driving his automobile on a road in front of
electoral precinct No. 4 in Barrio de Aranguel, Pilar, Capiz. He had a
revolver with him. He was called by his friend, Jose D. Benliro. He alighted
from his automobile and approached him to find out what he wanted. He
did not leave his revolver in the automobile, because there were many
people in the road in front of the polling place and he might lose it. He was
within the fence suzTounding the polling place when Jose E. Desiderio, a
representative of the Department of the Interior, took possession of the
revolver defendant was carrying.
The Solieitor-General was for his acquittal.
HeJd.. The law which defendant violated is a statutory provision, and
the intent with which he violated is immaterial. It may be conceded that
defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law
in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carded his
revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the
act complained of, and he Committed it wilfully. 'The Election Law does not
require for its violation that the offender has the intention to intimidate the
voters or to interfere otherwise with the election.
The nile is that in acts maze fn se, there must be a criminal
intent; but in those ma!a proAjb££o, it i8 Sufficient if the prohibited
act was intentionally done.
Since the Election Code prohibits and punishes the carrying of
a firearm inside the polling place, and that person did the prohibited
act freely and consciously, he had the intent to perpetrate the act.
No Intent to perpetrate the act proh[blted.
If a man with a revolver merely paBBes along a public road on
election day, within 50 meters of a polling place, he does not violate
the provision of the law in question, because he had rro !nfenf to
pe7pefrace fhe act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a
peace officer in pursuing a crininal; nor would the prohibition extend
topersonslivingwithin50metersofapollingplace,whomerelyclean
or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day,
as they would not be carrying fit.earns within the contemplation of
I;ho \8Iw. (People u. Bayona, supra)
61

Art. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crinnd Law
ln those crimes punished by special lavys, the act alone, imespect]ve
of Its motives, constitutes the offense.
The Intellectual Property Code is mazHm probib££zJm and
prescribes a strict liability for copyright infiingement. Good faith,
lack of knowledge of the copyright, or lack of intent to infringe iB not
a defense against copyright infringement. tABS-CBN Corporoffon Li.
Ctozon, G.R. No.195956, March 11, 2015)
Tan v. Ballena
(G.R. No.168111 [2008])
Facts:PetitionerswerechargedwithviolationsoftheSSSLawfortheir
failure to either promptly report some of the respondents for compulsory
coverage/membership with the SSS or remit their SSS contributions and
loan amortizations. Petitioners did not deny their fault in not remitting the
SSS contributions and loan payments of the respondents in violation of the
SSS I,aw. Instead, petitioners interposed the defenses of lack of criminal
intent and good faith, aB their failure to remit was brought about by alleged
econolnic difficulties, and they have alrendy agreed to settle their obligations
with the SSS through a memorandum of agreement to pay in installments.
J7ezd: The claims of good futh and absence of criminal intent for the
petitioners' acknowledged non-remittance of the respondents' contributions
deserve scant consideration. The violations charged in this case pertain to
the SSS Law, which is a special law. As such, it belongs to a class of offenses
lsn!oirrn as Treala prohibita.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called
acts moha jn 8e; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called acts mo/a pnchjz>!to. This distinction is
important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act i8 done,
The rule on the subject is that in acts maze j7i ge, the intent govemB; but in
acts imaza proA!b!£o, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an
act iB illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
Good falth and absence of criminal intent not valld defenses in
crlm.. pun[.hod by special laws.
Accused was charged with the crime of nlegal Possession of
Fironrm. Tho fact that the firearm in question was issued to the
accuHod hy t,ho Provincial Governor of Lanao del Norte to be used in
thoporformancoofhisdutiesasDeputyGovemorandthattheacoused
had boon lwtiut!d a permit by the Acting PC Ptovincial Commander to
carry Bald flro«rm outside his residence is not a valid defense in this
\ 63
62
TITLE ONE Art. 3
Felonies and CircunstanceB Which
Affect Criminal I.iability
case.TheappellantreliesuponthedecisionoftheCouutofAppealsin
the case of peopze u. Asa, 50 0.G. 5853, where members of a civilian
guard organization were acquitted because they had no intention
to commit the offense charged and believed in good hath that, as
civilian guards, they could possess fireams issued by the head of
the civilian guard organization. Good fdith and absence of criminal
intent, however, are not valid defenses since the offense committed
is mozz4m proAfbjfz4m punished by special law. /PeapJe I/. IVcr£,
G.R. No.I,37762, December 19, 1985, 140 SCRA 406)
The appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent
to the provincial governor does not constitute a sufficient defense
to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
a]oDiB"ini:rfun. (People v. Mapa, No. L-22301, Angust 30,1967)
Eacepffon..Temporary,incidental,casualorharmlesspossession
or control of a fireamo is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the
possessing or carrying Of this kind of weapon. A typical example of
such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to
another to examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at some object."
(People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 [1953], chiirl:8 Sarderson u. Stoke, 5
S.W.,138; C.J., 22)
A4a/a /n s® and rna/a p/oAjb/-fa, dlstinguish®d.
There is a distinction between crimes which are maze fn Se, or
wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and
those that are mezo prohfbj€a, or wrong merely because prohibited
by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
Crimes maza jn se are those so serious in their effects on society
as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while
crimes maza profojbjfa are violations of mere rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the aflhirs of society.
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, RAwle's 3rd Revision)
(1) In acts #acDza fn se, the intent governs; but in those maJa
profofbifa, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
(Peoplev.ELbler,106N.I.,321,diedint;hacaseofU.S.v.
Go Chico, 14 Phil,. 132)
(2) The term maza !n se refers generally to felonies defined
and penalized by the R.P.C. When the acts are inherently
immoral, they are maha fn 8e, even if punished by special
Art. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crinrinal Law
laws. On the other hand, there are crimes in the R.P.C.
which were originally defined and penalized by special
laws. Among them are possession and use of opium,
malversation, brigandage , and libel.
Thetermmazc!proAjb£!arefersgenerallytoactsmade
criminal by special laws.
When the acts are inherently immoral, they are rna/a /-n se, ®von if
punished under speciail law.
Garvia u. CA. and People
(GR. No.157171 [2006])
Focts: Petitioner was the Chairman of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alamino8, Panga8inan. She was found guilty by the trial
cout Of the crime defined under Section 27®) of The Electoral Reform Law
of 1987 in relation to the Omnibus Election Code for decreasing the votes
Of Senator Pimentel by 5,034 votes. On appeal, petitioner contended that
there was no lnotive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent contends that good faith iB not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of molo proAjb!to.
Held.. Section 270]) of R.A. No. 6646 provides that any member of the
bond of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tanpers, increases,
or deereases the votes received by a candidate in any election shall be guilty
Of an election offense. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are maha
jn8e.Intentionallyincrea8ingordecreasingthenumberofvotesreceivedby
a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to
injure another. In this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one
who announced the figure of 1,921 and that She was the one who prepared
the Certificate of Canvass (COC), though it was not her duty. To our mind,
preparing the COO even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to
perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COO. The conviction of the petitioner
i8 affimed.
The Electoral Reform Law and Omnibus Election Code, as far as their
peml proviBionB are concerned, are special laws, since they are not I)art of
the R.P.C. and its amendments.
Int.nt dl.tlnoul.hod from motive.
Wollu. i8 the moving power which impels one to action for a
definite r®Bult. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to
•fha .ucb ve.ult,
64
TITLE ONE Art. 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affdet Criminal I.iability
Mofiue is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence, need
not be proved for purposes of conviction. /PeopJe tJ. Aposaga, No.
L-32477, October 30,1981,108 SCRA 574, 595)
An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime
without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. Or, the
apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not
necessarily mean that there is none, but that simply it is not known
to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of one's conscience where
it may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation.
(People u. Taneo, 58 Phi:I. 255, 256)
One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to
begoodorbadoreventhoughnomotiveisproven.Agoodmotivedoes
not prevent an act from being a crime, In mercy killing, the painless
killing of a patient who has no chance of recovery, the motive may
be good, but it is nevertheless punished by law.
Mot[v®, when relevant and when not.
(1) IDENTITY OF ACCUSED
a) Generally, proofofmotive is not necessary to pin a crime on
the accused if the commission of the crime has been proven
and the evidence of identification is convincing. rpeopJe u.
Aluiar, 59 SCRA 136, 160)
b) Where the identity ofa person accused of having committed
acrimeisindispute,themotivethatmayhaveinpelledits
colnmission is very relevant. /Peopze a. Mz4rray, JOG Phiz.
591, 598; People v. FelieiaTLo, 58 SCRA 383, 393)
c) Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the
identity of the assailant. It is inmaterial when the accused
has been positively identified. rpeapze I/. Gadfano, Z95
SCRA 211, 214-215; People u. Mondapet,196 SCRA 157,
165)
d) Where the defendant admits the killing, it i.s no longer
necessary to inquire into his motive for doing the act.
(People u. Arcille, No. L-11792, June 30,1959)
e) While the question of motive is importantto the person who
committed the criminal act, yet when there is no longer
any doubt that the defendant was the culprit, it becomes
66
Art. 3 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
unimportant to know the exact reason or purpose for the
corfuBBton of the cri:". (People u. Felieiano, 58 SCRA
383, 393)
Where the identification of the accused proceeds from an
unreliable soulue and the testimony is inconclusive and not
free from doubt, evidence of motive is necessary. rpeopJe u.
Beltran, 61 SCRA 246, 254-255)
(2) ANTAGONISTIC THEORIES
Motive is important in ascertaining the truth between
two antagonistic theories or versions of the hilling. /People Li.
Bohotst-Caballero, 61 SCRA 180,191; People v. Lim,190 SCRA
706, 714-715; People u. Tabije,113 SCRA 191,197)
(3) NO EYEVITNESSES
Where there are no eyewitnesses to the crime, and where
suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons, motive
±8 relevtmt and B±ghifictmt. (People u. Melgar, 157 SCRA 718,
725)
(4) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 0R SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE
If the evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of motive is
eBE3ential. (People v. Oquiho,122 SCRA 797, 808)
Proof of motive is not indispensable where guilt is
otherwise established by sufficient evidence. (Peopze LJ. Oorpz.z,
107 Phi:1,. 44, 49)
How motive is proved.
Geflerally, the motive is established by the testimony of
witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense. Snch deeds or words
may i:ndLcahe the "chive. (Barrtoquinto u. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642,
649)
Motive proved by the evidence.
Appellant stabbed the deceased. It was estabhihed that there
were two suffocating smokes noticed during the progress of the
religious serviee of the Iglesia ri Cristo, which made appellant to go
66
TITLE ONE Jin. 3
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Crinnd Liability
around. Certainly, the causing of those smokes, presumably by Don-
members, which disturbed and interrupted the service, particularly
at the time when the Minister was preaching, is enough motive for
any member of the sect to be offended thereby, particularly appellant
whowasa"emberofso"e±mportunce.(Peaplev.Rcrmire2:,104Phil.
720, 726)
Dlsclosuro of the motlve ls an Old ln complotlng the proof of the
comml®®lon of the crlmo.
Thus,thefactthattheaceusedhadbeenlosingintheirbusiness
operations indicated the motive and therefore the intent to commit
arson for the purpose of collecting the insurance on their stock of
Tnereharfus3e. (U.S. u. Go Foo Suy, 25 Phil.187, 204)
But proof of motlve alone ls not sufflc[ont to support a conv]ctlon.
The existence of a motive, though perhaps an important
consideration, is not sufficient proof of guilt. /Peapfe u. Moroas, 70
Phil. 468; People u. Martinet y Godir.ee, 106 Phil. 697) Mere p;Iroof Of
motive,nomatterhowstrong,iBnotsufficienttosupportaconvictionif
therei8noreliableevidencefromwhichitmaybereasonablydeduced
that the accused was the malefactor. /Peopje u. Macofangoy, J07Pbjj.
188, 194)
Even a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take the
place of proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to overthrow the
pl.esumptioD of innocehce. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the
mainstay of our accusatorial system of crilninal justice. /People u.
Pi8aluo, No. L-32886, October 23,1981,108 SCRA 211, 226)
Lack of motive may b® an aid ]n showing the Innocence of the
ccu8®d.
In a case, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant acted
while in a dream and his acts, with which he was charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
Under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim
was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
oonBideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his
I.thor, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides
67
Art. 4 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
attacking Tarmer and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited
as may be inferred from the evidence presented, [the Court] find[s]
not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the
acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
(People v. Taneo, 58 Phil. 265, 257)
Lack of motive to kill the deceased has been held as further
basis for acquitting the accused, where the lone testimony of the
prosecutionwitnessiBcontrarytocommonexperienceand,therefore,
tneredi"e. (People u. Padirayon, No. L-39207, Septerhoer 25,1975,
67 SCRA 136)
Art. 4. Crrim£»oZ Jhab€Jffy. - Criminal liahility shall be
inc-d:
1. By any person committing a felony /deJito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account
Of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Applicatlon of Article 4.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person in the cases
mentioned in the two paragraphs of Article 4. This article has no
reference to the manner criminal liability is incurred. The marmer
of incurring criminal liability under the R.P.C. is stated in Article 3,
that is, performing or failing to do an act, when either is punished
by law, by means of deceit (with malice) or fault (through negligence
or imprudence).
One who commits an Intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom,
whether foreseen or intended or not.
Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony zt)jffo mcijz.ce, he
intends the consequences of his felonious act. But there are cases
68
TITLE ONE Art. 4
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Crimiml Liability
where the consequences of the felonious act of the offender are rio£
£nfended by him. In those cases, "the wrongful act done" is "different
from that which he intended."
In view of paragraph 1 of Article 4, a person committing a felony
is crfmfnazdy ZjobJe although the consequences of his felonious act are
not intended by him.
There is no question that the death of the victim was brought
about by the rape committed by the accused. Her death was due to
profuse hemorrhage brought about by the laceration of the vagina
caused by a stiffened male organ or by the insertion of a hard
blunt object. That the accused did not intend to kill her was of no
moment. A person who performs a criminal act is responsible for all
the consequences of said act regardless of his intention. /Peopze I).
Marierro, No. L-45966, November 10, 1978)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural
consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend
to produce such consequences. (U.S. u. Brobsf, J4 Pfo£J. 3JOJ
Thus, one who fired his gun at 8, but missed and hit C instead,
is liable for the injury caused to C, although the one who fired the
gun had no intention to injure C.
One who gave a fist blow on the head ofD, causing the latter to
fall with the latter's head striking a hard pavement, is liable for the
death of D, which resulted although the one who gave the fist blow
had no intention to kill D,
And one who stabbed another in the dark, believing that the
latter was E, when in fact he was a, is liable for the injury caused
to a, although the one who stabbed him had no intention to
injure a.
Ratlonale of rule in paragraph 1 of Article 4.
The rationale of the nile in Article 4 is found in the doctrine
:f:i:c;aqL¥ee;fc,oh=:ass:aisc:::ac:8u::".Sfo,f:'e=:'c::=e:3o,'p`eh.;,:hu:
llral, No. L-30801, Mc.rch 27,1974, 56 SCRA 138,144)
69
Jin. 4 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crinnd I.aw
IrmoRTANT wORDs AND pHRASEs IN PARAGRAPH I OF
ARTICIJ= 4.
I. "Comwitting a i;elony."
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 says that criininal liability shall
be inouITed by any person "comm!#£ng a /ezony," not merely
performing an act. A felony is an act or omission punishable
by the R.P.C. If the act is not punishable by the Code, it is not
a felony. But the felony committed by the offender should be
one committed by means of de/a, that is, with malice, because
paragl.aph 1 Of Article 4 speaks of wrongful act done "different
from that which he fncendecz."
Ifthewrongfulactresultsfromtheimprudence,negligence,
lackofforesightorlackofskilloftheoffender,hisliabilityshould
be determined under Article 365, which defines and penalizes
criminal negligence.
The act or oniission should not be punished by a special
law, because the offender violating a special law may not have
theintenttodoaninjurytoanother.Insuchcase,thewrongfu
act done could not be different, as the offender did hot intend to
do any other injny.
Artjcle 4, paragraph 1, is not applicable in this case.
Defendant, who was not a regular medical practitioner, tied
a girl, wrapped her feet with rags saturated with petroleum and
thereafter set them on fire causing injuries. His defense was that he
undertook to render medical assistance in good ftith and to the best
of his ability to cure her of ulcer. He admitted applying petroleum
but denied causing the bums. Hezd.. While there was no intention to
cause an evil but to provide a remedy, accused was liable for injuries
through ±mprndence. (U.S. u. Divino, 12 Phil. 175)
IVofe.. Defendant did not commit an intentional felony. If at
all, he committed illegal practice of medicine, which is
punishedbyaspeciallaw.Violationofastatuteisproof
of negligence or imprudence. Defendant is liable for two
offenses: ( 1 ) physical injuries through imprudence; and
(2) illegal pl.actice of medicine.
70
TITLE ONE Art, 4
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
When a person has not committed a felony, he is not criminally
liable for the result which is not intended.
(a) Thus, one who, because of curiosity, snatched the bofo carried by
theoffendedpartyathisbelt,andthelatterinstinctivelycaught
the blade of said hoJo in trying to retain it, is not criminally liable
for the physical injuries caused, because there is no provision
in the R.P.C. which punishes that act of snatching the property
of another just to satisfy curiosity. /See LJ.S. I). VIJzanwet;a, 3Z
Phi:I. 412)
a) Thus, also, one who tries to retain the possession of his bozo
which was being taken by another and because of the struggle,
the tip of the bozo stnick and pierced the breast of a bystander,
is not criminally liable therefor, because the law allows a person
to use the necessary force to retain what belongs to him. /See
People u. Binday, 56 Phil.15)
people u. Bindy
(56 Phil. 15)
Facts.. In a fzlba wineshop in the berfro market, the accused offered
€z4be to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, the
accused threatened to iltiure her if she would not accept. There ensued an
interchange of words between her and the accused, and Pacas stepped in
to defend his wife, attempting to take away from the accused the bozo he
carried. This occa8ioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of
Emigdio Omamdam who lived near the market+ Emigdio left his bou8e to
Bee what was happening, while the accused and PacaB were Struggling for
the bofo. In the course of this 8tniggle, the accused succeeded in disengaging
himself from Paca8, wrenching the bozo from the latter's hand towards the
left behind the accused, with Such violence that the point of the Ziozo reached
Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind the accused, The accused
was not aware of Omamdam'B presence in the place.
HeJd.. There is no evidence to show that the accused injured the
doceaBed deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. He was
tinly defending his possession of the bo/a, which Pacas was trying to wrench
iiway from him, and his conduct was perfectly legal. The accused should be
cquitted.
Had the accused attempted to wound Pacas during the struggle,
liut instead of doing so, he wounded Omamdam, he would have
I)tion liable for the death of Omamdam, because in attempting to
w(iund another, the accused would be committing a felony, which
71
Ant. 4 Tlm REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
is attempted homicide, if there is intent to kill, under Article 249
in relation to Article 6.
2h aAIthongh the u]rongful act done be d,off ereut from that wlirh he
interded:
The causes which may produce a result different from that
which the offender intended are: (1) mistake ih the identity of
the victim; (2) mistalre in the blow, that is, when the offender
intending to do an injury to one person actually inflicts it on
another; and (3) the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious
result is greater than that intended.
Underparagraph1,Article4,apersoncommittingafelony
is 8ti,ll c:rirrbinally li,able ever. if -
a. There is a mistake in the identity of the victim -error fn
personae. (See the ease cl£ People v. Oonis, 74 Phil. 257)
In a case, defendant went out of the house with the
intentionofassaultingDunca,butinthedarknessoftheevening,
defendant mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted upon bin
a mortal wound with a bojo. In this case, the defendant is
criminally liable for the death of Mapudul. rpeopJe u. Go7ro, 54
Phil. 605)
b. There is a mistake in the blow -aberra££o jcfus.
E#ampje: People L). tJmozt;jd, G.R. No. 208719 (2014), where
Maureen'sdeathwasacaseofabemciffoiefz¢s,giveDthatthefafal
blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was actually
Vicente who was Umawid's intended target. Umawid was held
liable for murder for the death of Maureen.
c. The injurious result is greater than that intended -p7iaeter
inte"honem.
EsocmpJe.. Peapze I;. Cqgoco, 58 Phil. 524, where the accused,
without intent to kill, struck the victim with his fist on the back
part of the head from behind, causing the victim to fa]] down
withhisheadhittingtheasphaltpavementandresultinginthe
fracture of his head, it was held that the accused was liable for
the death of the victim, although he had no intent to kill said
victim.
72
TITI,E ONE Jfro. 4
Felonies and Circ`imstanceB Which
Affect Criminal ljiability
Pcople u. Mabngat
(51 Phil. 967)
Facfo.. The accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts. One day, the
accusedinvitedJuanatotckeawalkwithhim,butthelatterrefu8edhimon
accountoftheaceu8edhavingfrequentlyvi8itedthehouseofanotherwoman.
Iflteron,theaccuedwet)ttothehouseofciriloBayanwhereJuanahadgone
to take pert in Some devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, waited
untl Juana and her niece, Perfecta, came downstairs. When they went in
the direction of their house, the acouBed followed them. As the two girls were
goingupstairB,theaocused,whilestandingatthefcotofthe8tairvay,fireda
shotfromhi8revolveratJun]iabutwhichwoundedPerfecta,theBlugpassing
throughapartofherneck,havingenteredtheposteriorregionthereof and
coming out through the left eye. Perfecta did not die due to proper medical
atteDtion.
Held,.Theaceuedisguiltyoffrustratedmurder,qualifedbytreachery,
committed on the person of Perfecta Buralo.
In Peopze a. To»rotorgo, No. L-47941, April 30,1985,136 SCRA
238,theconductofthewifeoftheaceusedarousedhisireandincensed
with wrath and his anger beyond control, he picked up a piece of
wood and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground
complaining of severe chest pains. Realizing what he had done, he
picked her up in his arms and brought her home. Despite his efforts
to alleviate her pains, the wife died. Pfrosecuted for parricide, he
plendedguiltyandwasallowedtoestablishmitigatingcircumstances.
Passingonhiscontentions,theSupremeCourtheldthatthefactthat
the appellant intended to maltreat his wife only or inflict physical
iriuriesdoesnotexempthinfromliabilityfortheresultingandmore
Serious crime of parricide.
To the Bane effect is Peapze t;. MonJeon, No. L-36282, December
10, 1976, 74 SCRA 263, where it was held that the case is covered by
Article4oftheR.P.C.whichprovidesthatcriminalliabhityisincuned
hy any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done
I)a different from that which he intended, because the maltreatment
Inflicted by the aocused on his wife was the proximate cause of her
doath. The accused in his inebriated state had no intent to kill her.
I lu was infuriated because his Son did not feed his carabao. He was
I)rovoked to castigate his wife because she prevented him from
whipping his negligent son. He could have easily killed his wife had
Ilo really intended to take her life. He did not kill her outright.
73
Art. 4 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crirfual Law
R®qulsltes of paragraph 1 of Artlclo 4.
In order that a person may be held criminally liable for a felony
dffferenf from that which he intended to commit, the following
requisites must be pl.esent:
• a. That an !nfenfronaz felony has been committed; and
b. That the zdrong done to the aggrieved party be the direcf,
nafz4roz and ZogjcoJ consequence of the felony committed
by the off®ndon, (U.S. u. Brobct,14 Phil. 310, 819; U.S. i].
Malleri, 29 phil. 14, 19)
That a felony has b®®n comm]ttod.
Thus, in the cases of U.S. I;. VIZ/anz.et/a and Peopze u. Bindey,
sapro, the accused were not held criminally liable, because they
u/ere nof comm!ffing a fezony when they caused the injury to
another.
No felony i,s commi,tted (1) when the act or omi,88ton i,8 rot
punishable by the R.P.a., or (2) wherb the act is couered dy any of the
justifying cirouTTustanee8 enumerated in Article 1 1 .
An act which is not punishable by the R.P.C. is attempting to
commit suicide. (Art. 253)
Therefore, if A, in attempting a suicide, jumped out of the
window to lan himself, but when he dropped to the ground, he fell on
an old woman who died as a consequence, A is not criminally liable
for intentional homicide. A was not committing a felony when he
attempted a suicide.
One who shoots at another in self-defense, defense of relative,
defense of a stranger, or in the fulfillment of duty is not committing
a felony, the act beingjustified. (Art.11, R.P.C.)
Hence, if B, who was being fired at with a gun by a to kill him,
firedhispistolatthelatterinself-defense,butmissedhimandinBtead
hit and killed D, a bystander, 8 is not criminally liable for the death
of D. One acting in Self-defense is not committing a felony.
Apoliceman,whowaspursuingtoarrestanarmedprisonerwho
hadjustescapedfromjail,firedhisservicepistolatthelatterwhenhe
refusedtobecaptured.Theslugfiredfromthepistolofthepoliceman,
74
TITLE ONE Art. 4
Felonies and Circu"tances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
after hitting the prisoner on his right leg, hit and seriously injured a
passerby.Thepolicemanisnotcriminallyliablefortheinjurycaused
tothepasserby,becausebeinginthefulfillmentofadutyhewasnot
committing a felony.
Of course, the act of defense or fulfillment of duty must be
exercised with due care; otherwise, the accused will be liable for
culpable felony.
People u. Belbee
(GR. No. 124670 [2000])
Focf8.. Appellant Pat. Belbes and Pat. Pabon were aBBigred to
maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior mom of Pili Barangay
mgh School. While the teacher-inrfharge, appellant and Pat, Pabon were
watching the dance, two students reported to the teacher-in-charge that
there was Somebody incking trouble. Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with
an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber revolver, reapectively, responded and
momentB after the two pollco officorB loft, bureto of gunfire filled the air.
Befauer,agnduatingetndezitofthe4chool,waBhitondlfferentpartBofhie
bodyanddiod.MomentBbeforethegrue8omeincident,Bataller,th®ndrunk,
wco vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the school's temporary
buildingwhentheba]nboosplitsbroke.Atthatinstance,appellantandPat.
Pabon appeared and without waning, appellant fired his gun. Ap|]ellant
contendsthathewasonlyperforminghisofficialfunctionswhenheresponded
in the course of police duties to the information that Somebody was making
trouble and disturbing the peace. Being in charge of maintaining peace and
order within the vicinity, he ascertained the veracity of the infomation
given by the students concerned. He asserts that in the absence of intent
and voluntoriness, he cannot be faulted for the death of the deceased.
Hezd. Appellant acted in the performance of his duty. However, the
killingneednotbeanecesBarycousequenceoftheperformanceofhiBduty.
His duty was to maintain peace and order during the Junior and Senior
Ptombutheexceeded8uchdutywhenhefiredhisarmalitewithoutwarning.
Appollant i8 g`iilty of homicide.
Any person who croat®s ln another'e mlnd an lmmodlat® s®ns® of
a.ng®r, `A/hlch causes the latter to do som®thlng resultlng ln the
I.tt.r'. ln|u.l®®, 18 llabl® for the ro8ultlng ln]url®8.
Duringarobberyinapassengerjeepney,oneoftheculpritstold
thowomenpassengersqobringouttheirmoneyandnottoshout`or
•lco there will be shots.' " One of the womenjumped out ofthejeepney.
H®r head stmck the pavement, She died a8 a consequence.
76

AI.4 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
It was held that if a man creates in another pel.son's mind an
ilrmediatesenseofdanger,whichcausessuchpersontotrytoescape,
and,insodoing,thelatterinjureshinself,themanwhocreatessuch
a state of mind is r?sponsible for the resulting injuries." (People u.
Page, 77 SCRA 348, 355, cthim8 People u. Tall,ng, L-27097, Jowunry
17,1975, 62 SCRA 17, 33)
The reason for the ruling is that when the culprit demanded
money from the women, threatening to shoot if they would not
brirLg out their money, a felony was being committed (i.a. , at that
stage of execution, attempted robbery with intimidation which is
punishable under Article 294, in relation to Article 6 and Article
51 of the Code).
The TOJfng case, swpro, relying on U.S. u. VaJdee, 41 Phil. 497,
quotedthesyllabus,thus:qfapenBonagainstwhomacrimimlaBsault
isdirectedreasonablybelieveBhimselftobeindangerOfdeathorgreat
bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled
by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for
homicide in case death results by drowning."
Wrong done must bo the dlroct, natural and loglcal c®neequ®nc®
of folonlou® act.
It is an estobliBhed rule that a person iB criminally responsible
foractscommittedbyhininviolationofthelawandfora/jlhenatr.raf
and/ogiealconsequence8resultingtherefrom./I/.S.u.Som!to,4Ph!!.
357,360;U.S.u.Za:rrrora,32Phil.218,226;Peopleu.Cornd,78Phil;.
458. 261)
In the following cases, the wrong done is considered the direcf,
REfuraz and ZogieoJ conBequence of the felony committed, although -
a. The victim who was tfarcoferoed or chased by the accused
with a An£/e, jumped into the water and because of the
strong current or because he did not know how to swim he
sank down and died of drowhng. (U.S. I). VaJdez, 4] Pbiz.
497., People v . Bwhay , 79 Phil. 372)
b. 'rhe vichin reTroved the drainage f tom the u]ound w:bi!ch
resulted in the development of peritonitis which in turn
caused his death, it appearing that the wound caused by
76
TITLE ONE Art. 4
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
theaccusedproducedextremepainandrestlessnesswhich
made the victim remove it. (Peapze u. Qc.ja72sori, 62 Pfo£J.
162)
Other causes c.ooperofed in producing the fatal result, os
longastheuioundinfoietedisdangerous,thatis,edc\Pa:tpd
to destroy or endanger life. This is true even though the
immediate cause of the death was erroneot.s or I.7asfajjj:fi.Z
medfcaz or sz4rgjcaz freacmer}C. This rule surely seems
to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime
andtotakeawayfromhumanlifeasalutaryandessential
safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men,
and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of
bodilyailmentsandinjuries,itwouldbeeasyinmanycases
of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of
death,andtherebytoopenwidethedoorbywhichpersons
guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment. (13 R.C.L., 751, 752; 22 L.R.A., New Series,
841, ckhed in People u. Moldes, 61 Phil. 4)
But where it clearly appears that the injury too"ZcZ noc have
causeddeafh,intheordinarycourseofevents,butwouldhavehealed
insomanydaysandwhereitisshownbeyondalldoubtthatthedeath
was due to the malicious or careless acts of the injured person or a
thirdperson,theaccusedisnotliableforhomicide.Oneisaccountable
only for his own acts and their nafz.raz or Zogfcciz consequences, and
not for those which bear ro rezcifjon to the initial cause and are due,
for instance, to the mistakes committed by the doctor in the surgical
operation and the treatment of the victim's wound. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, April 2, 1903, cited by Viada)
d. The victim was suffering from internal malady.
Blou] u)as efficient cause of death.
The deceased had a delicate constitution and was
sufferihg from fwbercz.Zo8is. The accused gave fist blows on
the deceased's right hypochondrium, bruising the liver and
producing internal hemorrhage, resulting in the death of the
victim. The accused was liable for homicide. (Peopze u. JZZuscre,
64 Phil. 594)
77
Art. 4 ThlE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
Blow accelerated death.
The deceased was suffering from internal malady. The
accused gave fist blows in the back and abdomen, producing
inflamrmtion of the spleen and peritonitis, and causing death.
The accused was liable for homicide, because by his fist blows,
he produced the cause for the accefero£!on of the death of the
deceased. (People v. Rodriquez, 23 Phil. 22)
Blow u]as provirr.ate ow:use of dec.th.
The deceased was suffering from heart disease. The
accused stabbed the deceased with a knife, but as the blade of
the knife hit a bone, it did hot penetrate the thoracic cavity,
but it produced shock, resulting in the death of the victim. The
accused was liable for homicide, because the stabbing was the
proximate cause of the death of the deceased. /People L). Reyes,
61 Phil. 341)
e. The offended party refused to submit to surgical operation.
The offended party is not obliged to submit to a surgical
operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinay
retsults of his crine. (U.S. v. Mc.rasigon, 27 Phil. 504)
f. The resulting injury was aggravated by infection.
(1) Without the stab wounds, the victin could not have
been afflicted with an infection which later on caused
multiple organ failure that caused his death. /Bezbis
u. People, a.R. No.181052, November 14, 2012)
'I'he offender is criminally liable for the death
of the victin if his delictual act caused, accelerated
or contributed to the death of the victim. rpeopJe u.
Cutura, 4 SCRA 663)
(2) The fact that the wounds might have been cured
sooner than 58 days had the offended party not
been addicted to fz4bo drinking does not mitigate the
liability of the accused. /I/.S. u. Beyufas, 3J Ptjz. 584J
(3) The accused attacked the deceased with a bo/a. After
the deceased had fallen, the accused threw a stone
which hit him on the right clavicle. The wounds
78
TITLE ONE Alt. 4
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
iflflicted could not have caused the death of the
deceased. A week later, the deceased died of te€anz48
secondary to the infected wound. J7e/d.. The accused
is responsible for the death of the deceased. (Peapfe
v. Cornel, 78 Phil,. 418)
People v. Qwic~n
(62 Phil. 162)
Facts.. The acouBed took hold of a fireband and applied it to the neck of
the person who was pestering him. The victim also received from the hand
of the accused a wound in his abdomen below the navel. While undergoing
medical treatment, the victim took out the drainage from his wound and as
a result of the peritonitis that developed, he died. The accused Claimed as a
defeusethathndnotthedecea8edtckenoutthedrainage,hewouldnothave
died.
J7ezd.Deathwasthenafz4roJcoroseqi.enceofthemortalwoundinflicted.
Thevichm,inremovingthedrainagefromhiswound,dfdnofdD3oz;oZ&ntordy
andwithknowledgethatitwasprejudicialtohishealth.Theactofthevictim
(removing the drainage from his wound) was attributed to his pathological
condition and state of nervousness and restlessness on account of physical
pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the contact of the drainage tube
with the inflamed peritoneum.
U.S. v. Marasigan
(27 Phil,. 504, 506)
Focts,.TheacouseddrewhisknifeandstruckatMendoza.Inattempting
to ward off the blow, Mendoza was cut in the left hand. The extensor tendon
in one of the fingers was severed. As a result, the lniddle finger of the left
hand was rendered useless.
He/c!.. Nor do we attach any importance to the contention of the accused
that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a Surgical
operation. Mendoza is not obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieve
the accused from the nefur8l and ordfnar)/ results Of his crime. It was his
voluntaryactwhichdisabledMendozaandhemustabidebytheconsequen€es
resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza,
People u. Relof
(L-31335, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 526, 632)
Facts.' The acc`i8ed sta.bbed the victim with an ice pick, The victim was
broughttothehospitalwhereasurgicaloperationwasperformeduponhin,
Although the operation was successful and the victim seemed to be in the
process Of recovery, he developed, five days later, a paralytic ileum - which
79
 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Art. 4
Criminal Law
takes place, sometimes, in consequence of the exposure of the internal organs
during the operation - and then died.
Hezd. It is contended that the immediate cause of the death ofthe victim
was a paralysis of the ileum that supervened five days after the stabbing,
when he appeared to be on the way to fiill recovery. It has been established,
however,thattheexposureoftheintemalorgansinconsequehceofasurgical
operation in the abdomen sometimes results in a paralysis of the ileum
and that said operation had to be performed on account of the abdominal
irjury inflicted by the accused. The accused is responsible for the natural
i`onscquenceB of his own acts.
The l.Iony committed must be tlie proximate cause of the resulting
lnJury.
Proximatecausei8Thatcause,which,innaturalandcontinuous
Boquonce, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."
( nittiLclar. u. Medinni,102 Phil.181,186, quch:ing 38 Am. Jur. 695)
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable
l.tir ull the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
I`ltl`()ugh the wrongful act done be different from that which he
ji`(,i`i`dcd. "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of
li`iiiiiii` life or events, while logical" means that there is a rational
t..)ri ri.i(.I,i.)n between the act of the accused and the resulting injury
lir tliimiixt). The felony committed must be the proximate cause of
t,hti ritt`LI Iting irtiury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural
illitl.wiitiri`ioussequence,unbrokenbyanefficientinterveningcause,
lil.Iitllit`tw tl`o injury, and without which the result would not have
1it.t'Iii.i..itl.'l`hoproximatelegalcauseisthatactingfirstandproducing
I,l`Ii I i\|`I r.y, .tithor immediately, or by setting other events in motion,
Ii11{.m"l,it`itiiigunaturalandcontinuouschainofevents,eachhaving
ii I.lut`u tw`uiml ct)nnection with its immediate predecessor.
Thoro mu.t be 8 relation of "cause and effect," the cause being
I,li.tl`.illiniu`mi`cttiftheoffended,theeffectbeingtheresultantinjurieB
Iiliil/tii. tll`Ittl` ()1` I,h® victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is not
ii1L.tri`tliti.t.hungodbecauBeofthepre-existingconditions,suchasthe
I.ulliltlt.wicl`l c(indition of the victim /Zas condiefo7ees potozogjco dez
/..wJii/iuiJiiJ; t,ho predisposition of the offended party (!a cons£££wc!om
/lwj..w d('/ hcrl.doJ; or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such
a- the no#ligonce or fault of the doctors (Zo /azfa de medicos pare
80
TITLE ONE Art. 4
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
sister az feerfdo); or the conditions supervening the felonies act such
as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.
Thefelonycommittedisnottheproximatecauseoftheresulting
injny when:
a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony
colnmitted and the resulting injury, and the active force is
a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious
act of the accused; or
b) the resulting ilriury is due to the intentional act of the
victim.
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in suck a
marmer as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence
of their felohious act, it does hot alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the
factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death Of the
victin if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the
death of the victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity
to crime and take away from human life a salutary and eBBential
Bafeguul. (Qvinto u. And:res, GR. No. 155791, March 16, 2006)
How to d®t®rm]n® the prox]mat® cau3®,
At about 2:00 in the moming, while the bus was ninning very
fastonahighway,oneofthefronttiresburstandthevehiclebeganto
zigzaguntilitfeuintoacanalandtumedturtle.Fourofitspassengers
could not get out of the overturned bus. It appeared that as the bus
overturned, gasoline began to leak from the tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it. About ten men, one of them carrying
a lighted torch, approached the overturned bus to help those left
therein, and almost immediately a fierce fire started, burning the
four passengers trapped inside it.
Whatistheproximatecauseofthedeathofthefourpassengers,
the negligence Of the driver resulting in the fall into the canal and
overturning of the bus, or the fire that burned the bus?
kxxltmaybethatordinarily,whenapassengerbusovertums,
and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if
through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned
81
Art, 4 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
bus is Set on fire, Say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting
the vehicle Set it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one
might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire
and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and
under the circumstances obtaining in the same, [the Court] do[es]
not hesitate to hold that fhe pnaejmafe cause o/the death of x x x (the
four paBBengerB) zuce fhe otJerfzirmfng of £Ae bee, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural
or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was
in reBpon8e to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
becauseitwasverydark(about2:30inthemoming),therescuershad
to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a
torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than
that Bald re8ouers Should innocently approach the overturned vehicle
to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping
of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more,
the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the
witnesses,thedriverandtheconductorwereontherondwalkingback
and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could
and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area
in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even
from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus." That is negligence on the
part Of the agents of the carrier. /Vde. de Ba!aczan, eS az. t;. Medina,
102 Phil,.181,186.187)
People u. Garcta
(GR. No.171961 [2009])
Faol8.. Petitioner asBaulted the victim who continued to parry
petitioner'B blows. Petitioner then reached for a bottle of beer, and with it,
Btnick the lower back portion of the victim'B head. When the victim found
an oppoltunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife to
82
TITIJE ONE Jfro. 4
Felonies and Circumstances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
call the police. The victim told his wife about the mauling and complained
of difficulty in breathing. Upon reaching the victim's house, the policemen
knocked five tines but nobody answered. The victim's wife arrived minutes
later, unlocked the door and found the victim lying unconscious on the kitchen
floor, Salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital, The
autopsy confirmed that the victim died of myocardial infarction.
J7ezd.. Petitioner iB guilty of homicide. He was committing a felony
whom he boxed the victim and hit him with a bottle, Hence, the fact that the
victimwa8previouslyaffiictedwithaheartailmentdoesnotalterpetitioner's
liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence ia the doctrine laid
down in the case of United Stofe8 u. Erobe!, 14 Phil. 310 (1909), that:
x x x whet.e death results a8 a direct consequence of the use of inegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured
person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of
crinnd responsibility,
In the same vein, Un!Ced S!ate8 u. j3odrigwez, 23 Phil. 22 (1912),
enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party wag previously affected by
some internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand
or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure
he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such
acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted
injury.
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is
responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
from it although the unlawful act performed is different from
the oDe he intended; "eJ qke es cawso de Ja cat.sa e8 cawso dez
mo/ cazrsado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused).
In the case of peopze u. Marrin, 89 Phil.18, the accused, who
strangled his wife then suffering from heart disease, was found guilty
of pandcide even if the death of his wife was the result of healt failure,
because the heart failure was due to the fright or shock caused by the
Strangling, which is a felony,
The following are not offlclent lnt®rv®n]ng cau8o8:
1. The weak or diseased physical condition of the victim, as
when one is suffering from tuberculosis or heart disease.
(People u. Il,lustre an!d People u. Reyes, 8apra)
83
Art. 4 THE REVISED PENAI. CODE
Criminal Law
The nervousness or temperament of the victim, as when
a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage
brought on by moving about against the doctor's orders,
because of his nervous condition due to the wound inflicted
by the ace:used. (People v. Almonte, 56 Phil. 54,. Bee also
People v. Quieuson, 62 Phil.162)
3. Causes which are inherent in the victim, such as (a) the
victim not knowing how to swim, and (b) the victim being
addicted to fz.6o drinking. /Peopze Li. BztAay, and U.S. u.
Valdez, 8upra: U.S. u. Bayutas, 8upra)
4. Neglect of the victim or third person, such as the refusal
by the injured party of medical attendance or surgical
operatiofl, or the failure of the doctor to give anti-tetanus
injection to the injured person. rU.S. I;. Maneeison and
People u. Red, 8upra)
5. Erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment, as
when the assault took place in an outlying barrio where
proper modem surgical service was not available. /Pcop/e
v. Molde8. 61 Phil. 1)
6. Delay in the medical treatment of the victim, /People u.
heurun, GR. No.117964, April 27, 2000)
Those c8.n8eB, not being ef}froient intervening cc.uses, do not
break the relation of cause and effect - the felony colnmitted and
the resulting injury.
People u. Pictmonte, ct al.
(94 Phil. 293)
Facts.. One of the accused stabbed the injured party with a hunting
knife on October 28, 1951. The injured party was taken to the hospital and
was operated on. The operation did hin weu, but on December 19, 1951, he
contracted a sickness known as mzecoz¢8 cozjf is which developed because of
his weak condition. He died on December 28, 1951.
Is the accused who stabbed the injured party liable for the latter's
death?
J7eJd.. The doctors who attended the injured party agreed that his
weakened condition which caused disturbance in the functiofls of his
intestines made it possible for hin to contract 7nzecoz4s co/£tis, which Shows
that while the wounds inflicted were not the immediate cause, they were
84
TITLE ONE Art. 4
Felonies and Circunetances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
however the prorimate cause of death. This iB enough to make the accused
responsible for the cnme charged.
^roce.. The charge was robbery with homicide. The homicide was
committed with malice.
When death is presumed to be the natural consequence of physlcal
Injuries inflicted.
The death of the victim is presumed to be the natural
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, when the following
facts are established:
1. That the victim at the time the physical ilriuries were
inflicted was in normal health.
2. That death may be expected from the physical it`).uries
inflided.
3. That death ensued within a reasonable time. /Pcopje u.
Datu Baginda, CA., 44 0.G. 2287)
It having been established that the boy Jundam was in good
health on the moming of the incident; that he was whipped, spanked
and thrown against the post by his teacher, his breast hitting it; that
he complained to his mother about the oppressive pain, crying, and
massaging his breast all the time; that he was found to have two
suspicious bluish spots - a big one on the breast and another one
on the upper left arm; and that he vomited blood until he died three
days afterwards; and there being no proof of any jnferuen!ng catcoe,
the liability of the teacher for homicide necessarily follows from the
premises Stated. (People v. Tammang, 5 CA. Rep. 145)
IVote.. Had it been proved, as claimed by the defense, that the
boy died of hydrophobia, that would have constituted
an intervening cause, and the accused would have been
acquitted.
Notdirect,naturalandlogicalconsequenceOfthefe[onycommltted.
If the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct ac£
or fc!c} obeozz4fe/y /orezgn from the criminal act, the offender iB not
reBponBible fon Buck consequences. (Peaple u. Itellin, 77 Phil. 1038)
86
Art. 4 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
A person i8 not liable criminally for all possible consequences
which may immediately follow his felonious act, but only for such as
are proximate,
Thus, where a person struck another with his fist and knocked
him down and a horse near them jumped upon him and killed him,
the assailant was not responsible for the death of that other person.
(People u. Rocku]ell, 39 Mieh. 503)
This case should be distinguished from the case of Peop/e I/.
Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, 8#pro.
In the Cagoco case, there was no actiz;e force that intervened
between the felonious act and the result. In the RacAzuezz case, there
was an active force (the jumping of the horse upon the deceased)
which produced the result.
In the following cases, the injury caused is not the direct, logical
andnecessaryconsequenceofthefelonycommitted,becausethefelony
committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury:
a. Ifslightphysical injuries be inflicted byA uponB, andthe
latter dez!berate7y !77wnerses his body in a contaminated
cesspool, thereby causing his injuries to become infected
and serious, A can7rof be held liable for the crime of serious
phys:iedi in:5`iries. (U.S. u. De los Santos, G.R. No. 13309)
The act of 8 in deliberately immersing his body in
a contaminated cesspool, not the slight physical injuries
inflictedbyA,istheproximatecauseoftheseriousphysical
injuries.
b. The accused struck a boy on the mouth with the back
of his hand. Later. the boy died. Death misAf haL]e been
caused by fever prevalent in the locality, not by the blow
on the mouth. The accused who gave the blow was not
liable for the death of the deceased. (Peopze I/. PoZozon,
49 Phil,. 177)
c. The accused struck a child, who was seriously ill with
fever for three weeks, upon the thighs with a slipper,
pushed and dragged him, throwing him heavily on the
mat Spread on the floor. The child died two days later.
As the frz.e caz4se of the child's death was nof proz;ed, the
86
TITLE ONE Art. 4
Felonies and Circ`imstances Which
Affect Criminal Liabflity
accused was convicted of physical ilriuries only. /U.S. zi.
Embahe, 3 Phil. 640)
d. Where medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that
the infection Of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time the deceased
was wounded to the time of his death, the accused must
be acquitted of the crime of homicide. /Urdano u. ZAC, J57
SCRA 10)
The felony comm]tted is not the proximate cause of the resulting
injury when -
1. There is an acfjz;eforce that intervened between the felony
committed and the resulting ilriury, and the active force is
a distinct act or ftLct absolutely foreign from thee fehowione
act of the accused; or
2. The resulting injury is due to the jrzfenffona/ acf of the
victim.
Is the accused reepo::usible fdr the result, i;f there is c. neglect Of the
u]ound or there is an improper treatTneut Of the u)ound?
In the case ofpeapze u. Mozdes, G.R. No. L-42122 (1934), where
the accused was convicted of homicide, counsel for the accused claimed
that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treathent, the wound
would not have been fatal. The Court held that: The general rule is
". . . that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility
if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or
endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death was
erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment . . ." (29 C.J.,
1081, and the numerous cases there cited)
Unskillful and improper treatment may be an active force, but
it is not a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal
act.
Is the accused crinindly lidble for the corrsequeaces whieh origirra:te
through the f;ault or carelessness of the injured person?
In the case of U.S. u. Mousferriaz, 14 Phil. 391, it was held
that "persons who are responsible for an act constituting a crime are
nlBo liable for all the consequences arising therefrom and inherent
87
Art. 4 TIIE REVISED PENAL CODE TITIH ONE Art. 4
Crinnd Law Felonies and Circ`imstonces Which
Affect Criminal Liability
therein, olAer fAan fhose due to incidents entirely foreign to the act The 2nd parqgrapfa of Article 4 defines the so-called inpossible
executed, or which originate through the /oz4Jf or caredes8ue8s of the crimes (impossible attempts),
ilriured person, which are exceptions to the rule not arising in the
Requisites of impossible crime:
present case."
. In the case ofpcopfe L7. Qufonson, 62 Phil.162, it is stated that 1. That the actpe7formed would be an offense againstpersons
one who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the or property .
injury contributes to the death of the latter, "even if the deceased 2. That the act was done with et;i/ !ntenl.
might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or
submitted to surgical operation." 3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that
the mcaee employed is either j7®adeqz4ate oz' jneffecfz.aJ.
It would seem that the foeG/C or core/essness of the injured
4, That the act performed should not constitute a violation
party, which would break the relation of the felony committed and
the resulting injury, must have its origin from his malfofoz¢s act or of another provision of the R.P.C.
omission /U.S. u. Nauo7ro, 7 Pfa£Z. 7J3J, as when the injured party
had a desire to increase the criminal liability of his assailant. IrmoRTAI`IT woRDs AND pHRASEs IN PARAGRAPH 2 oF
AITICLE 4.
A supervening ®vont may be the subject of amendment of or]9]nal 1. aperflorrrting an act whieh u)ould be are offense against
information or of a new charge without double jeopardy. per8one or property..
Where the charge contained in the original information was In committing an impossible crime, the offender
for slight physical injuries because at that time the fiscal believed z`ntends to commit a felony against perBon8 or a felony
that the wound suffered by the offended party would require medical against property, and the acSpe77brmed would have been
attendance for a period of only eight days, but when the preliminary anoffenseagainstpersonsorproperty.Butafelonyagainst
investigation was conducted, the justice of the peace found that the persons or property 8hoz.Zd no! be actually committed, for,
wound would heal after a period of 30 days, the act which converted otherwise, he would be liable for that felony. There would
the crime into a more serious one had supervened after the filing of be no impossible crime to speak of.
the original information and this supervening event can still be the
subject Of amendment or of a new charge without necessarily placing F®loni®8 against persons are:
the ®ceuBed in double 3eapardy. (People u. Petille, 92 Phil. 395) a. Parricide(Art. 246)

Im possible cr[m®s. b. Murder(Art. 248)

c. Homicide(Art. 249)
The commission of an impossible crime iB indicative ofcrimirml
propensity or criminal tendency on the part of the actor. Such d. Infanticide (Art. 256)
person is a potential criminal. According to positivist thinking, the e. Abortion (Arts. 256, 257, 258, and259)
community must be protected from anti-social activities, whether
actual or pofenc!aJ, of the morbid type of man called "socially f. Duel (Arts. 260 and 261)
dangerous person."
9. Physical iriuries (A]ts. 262, 263, 264, 265, and 266)
The penalty for impossible crime is provided in Article 59 of this
h. Rape (Ifro. 266-A)
Code.

88 89

Art. 4 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Criminal Law
Felonies against property are:
a. Robbery (Arts. 294, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302, and 303)
b. Brigandage (Arts. 306 and 307)
c. Theft(Arts. 308, 310, and311)
d. Usurpation(Arts. 312 and 313)
a. Culpable insolvency (Art. 314)
f. Swindling and otherdeceits (Arts, 316, 316, 317, and
318)
9, Chattel mortgage (Art. 319)
h. Arson and other crimes involving destruction (Arts.
320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, and 326)
i. Malicious mischief(Arts. 827, 328, 829, 880, and 331)
If the act performed would bo an offenBo other than a felony
against persons or against property, there !8 no fmpcoe!bze crinae.
That the act was done u]ith evil intent.
Since the offender in impossible crime intended to commit an
offense against persons or against property, it must be shown that
the actor performed the act with evil intent, that is, he must have
the intent to do an injury to another.
A,whowantedtokill8,1ookedforhim.WhenAsaw8,he found
out that 8 was already dead. To satisfy his grudge, A stabbed 8 in
his breast three times with a lmife. Is this an impossible crime?
No.Aknewthat8wasalreadydeadwhenhestobbedthelifelesB
body. There was no evil intent on the part ofA, because he knew that
he could not cause an injury to 8. Even subjectively, he was not a
criminal.
2. "Were it rot fior the inherent impo88ibilify of ha accomplish,-
rnent or oT. aeeoun± Of the err.playmeut of irlndequate or
ineffectual neane.D
InimposBiblecrime,theactperfomedbytheoffender
cannot produce an offense against persons or property,
because: (1) the commission of the offense (against
90
TITLE ONE Jhi. 4
Felonies and Cir`cumstances lhrhich
Affect Criminal Liability
persons or against `property) is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate, or (b) ineffectual.
E\. "Inherent inpo88ibiitfty of its accomplishTneTit."
This phrase means that the act intended
by the offender is by its nafz.re one of impossible
accomplishment. (See Art. 59, R.P.C.)
Theremustbeeither(1)lqgo/!mpoae!6jJffy,or(2)
pky8foa/ !mpocezbjJzfy of accomplishing the intended
act.
Examples of impossible crimes which are
punishable under the R.P.C. are: (1) When one tries to
kil) another by putting in his Soup a substance which
he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is common
salt;and(2)whenonetriestomurderacoxpBe./People
v. Balmore8, 85 Phil. 493. 496)
(\) "Would be an offense agalmt per8one.»
Ea;ompJe.. A fired at 8, who was lying on
bed, Jeo£ Areozuf ng that 8 was dead hours before.
In crime against persons, as would have been
in this case, it is necessary that the victim could
be injured or killed. A dead person cannot be
injured or killed. Had 8 been alive when he was
shot, and as a consequence he died, the crime
committed by A would have been murder, a
crime ngchst persons.
Thereispkysiealan:dlegalimpo8sibilityin
this example.
(2;) "Wciwld be an offense agal:net property."
A, with intent to gain, took a watch from
the pocket of B. When A had the watch in his
possession, he found out that it was the watch
which he had lost a week before. In other words,
the watch belonged to A. Is this an inpoBsible
crime?
91

Art. 4 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crinnd Law
It is believed that it may be an impossible
crime. The act performed would have been
theft had the watch been the property of B. But
there is E` legal impo8stbility o£ ®coo"phiBhing
it,beeauseintheft,thepersonalpropertytcken
must belong to another.
An employee who, having known the safe
combination, opens the safe in the office for the
purpose of stealing money, but who finds the
safeempty,isgujltyOfanimpossiblecrime.The
act performed would have been a crime of theft
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment.Ifthereisnopersonalproperty
that could be;taken, it is inherently impossible
to commit theft.
b. "Emplaymeut of irndequate" Tnearrs.
E#ompze.. A, determined to poison 8, uses a
small quantity of arsenic by miring it with the food
given to 8, believing that the quantity employed by
him is sufficient. But since in fact it is not sufficient,
8 is hot killed. The means employed (Small quantity
of poison) iB inadequate to kill a person.
Where the mec[:ne employed is adequate.
But where the means employed is adegz.ode
and the result expected is not produced, it is not an
impossible crime, but a frustrated felony.
Thus, if the quantity of poison used is sufficient
to kill an ordinary persoh, but the intended victim
hasdevelopedstrongreBistancetopoisonbecausehe
has been working in a mine, the crime committed is
frustrated murder.
Emplaynentof"ineffect:ualneaTrs."
A tried to kill a by putting in his soup a sub-
stance which he thought was arsenic when in fact
it was sugar. 8 could not have been killed, because
92
TITIH ONE Art. 4
Felonies and Circunetances Which
Affect Criminal I,iability
the means employed was ineffectual. But A showed
criminal tendency and, hence, he should be punished
for it in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, in
relation to Article 59.
A,withintenttokill8,aimedhisrevolveratthe
back of the latter, A, not khowing that it was empty.
WhenhepresBedthetriggeritdidnotfire.Themeans
used by A i8 ineffchual.
Inherent lmposs]bility of accomplishment
A collector for a company did not remit the customer'B check
payment to the company but instead, appropriated it for herself by
depositingittothebankaccountofarelative.Thecheckwas,however,
dishonored.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate
the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, aB the mere act of
unlawfuuy taking the check meant for the company showed her
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact
that the check bounced, she would have received the face value
thereof, which was hot rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due
to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned
out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and the company had received the cash to replace the
value of said dishonored check.
Therecanbenoquestionthatasofthetimethatpetitionertcok
posseBsionOfthecheckmeantforthecompany,shehadperfomedall
the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible
of accomplishment in this case. : r.
Petitionerisfoundguiltyofanimpossibiecrimeasdefinedand
penalizedinArticles4,paragraph2,and59/oftheR.P.C.,respectively.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six months of orresto
mc[yor,tlndtopayChacostB.(Jaciritou.People,G.R.No.162540,July
13, 2009)
93
Jhi. 5 THE REVISED PENAL CODE
Crinnd Law
Offense against persons.
The accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter's
bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home
at the time, no harm came to hin. He was adjudged guilty only of
an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2,
Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the R.P.C., because Of
the factual impossibility of producing the crime. (Jr.tod I;. Comrf of
Appeals, a.R. No.103119, October 21,1992, 215 SCRA 52)
In lmpo®slble crime the act performed should not constitute a
vlol®tlon of another provision of the Code.
A,whoknewthat8ownedandalwayscarriedawatch,decided
to rob a of said watch. When A met 8 for that purpose, 8 did hot
have the watch because he forgot to carry it with him. Thinking
that a had the watch with him, A pointed his gun at him and asked
for the watch. Finding that a did not have the watch, A allowed 8
to g(t without further molestation. Is this an impossible crime? It is
b®li(ived that A committed attempted robbery, not impossible crime.
Thoro waB intent to gain on the part ofA when he decided to take the
watohofBatthepointofgun.Thecrimeofrobberywithintimidation
()f pot.Ion iB not produced, not because of the inherent impossibility
()f itB accomplishment, but because of a cause or accident (that a
forgttt to carry the watch with him) other than A's own spontaneous
de.t»tunco, (Art. 6, par. 3) Note also that A's pointing his gun at 8
ulroady conEitituted at least the crime of grave threats under Article
282, 8ubdivi8ion 2, of the R.P.C. This is another reason why it is not
an impoHNihlo crime.
Purpo.. ol the law ln punishing the impossible crime.
To ouppre88 criminal propensity or criminal tendencies.
(Jdy.ecljL)edy,theoffenderhasnotcommittedafelony,huts"[jecfjt)edy,
hc. i* a criminal.
^wh. 6. Duty of the court in connection with aat8 wpech
•houLcl be rapre88ed but wl.ieh are not covered dy the Zqu7,
und \n caee. of cace88ive penalties. -Whomever s\ court has
know]®dgo of any act which it may deem proper to repress
«ndwlilch18notpunishablebyhw,itshallrendertheproper
94
TITLE ONE Art. 5
Felonies and Cir€um8tances Which
Affect Criminal Liability
decision and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court
to believe that said act should be made the subjeet Of penal
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Deparinent of Justice, such statement
as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution
of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of
this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.
"ln connection with acts whlch should be repressed but `whlch are
not covered by the law."
The lst paragraph of this article which contemplates a froal of
a crimjrzaJ case requires the following:
1. The act committed by the accused appears not punishable
by any law;
2. But the court deems it proper to repress such act;
3. In that case, the court must render the proper decision by
dismissing the case and acquitting the accused;
4. Thejudge must then make a report to the chief Executive,
through the Secretary of Justice, stating the reasons which
induce him to believe that the said act should be made the
subject of penal legislation.
Basis of paragraph 1, Article 5.
The provision contained in paragraph 1 of Article 5 is based on
the legal maxim anz.ZJz4m crimen, nziJ/a poena sine Jege/" that is, that
there is no crime if there is ro Zazu that punishes the act.
"ln ca8os of excessive penalties."
The second paragraph of Article 5 requires that -
1. The court after trial finds the accused guilty.
96