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FMDS0736 Pharmacy
FMDS0736 Pharmacy
PHARMACEUTICAL OPERATIONS
Table of Contents
Page
List of Figures
Fig 1a. Examples of modifiable process piping. ............................................................................................ 8
Fig. 1b. Examples of modifiable process piping. .......................................................................................... 9
Fig. 2. Batch tray dryer. .............................................................................................................................. 22
Fig. 3. Conical dryer. ................................................................................................................................... 23
Fig. 4. Fluid bed granulator. ........................................................................................................................ 24
Fig. 5. Rotary dryer. .................................................................................................................................... 25
Fig. 6a. High-value R&D laboratory equipment. ......................................................................................... 28
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7-36 Pharmaceutical Operations
Page 2 FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Tables
Table 1. Typical Cleanliness Terminology for the United States ................................................................. 30
Table 2. Cleanliness Ratings Used in Farious Countries ............................................................................. 30
Table 3. Pharmaceutical vs. Semiconductor Cleanrooms ........................................................................... 31
1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet contains loss prevention recommendations covering various operations and equipment
related to the making of pharmaceutical products. This includes the manufacture of prescription (ethical and
generic) and over-the-counter medications; the compounding and packaging of health and beauty aids,
cosmetics and perfumes; biotechnology manufacturing; and research laboratories.
This data sheet does not cover basic construction, occupancy, and protection features necessary for property
loss prevention; see the applicable occupancy-specific data sheets for those types of recommendations.
1.1 Changes
July 2013. The following changes have been made:
• Replaced references to “flammable” and “combustible” liquids with “ignitable” liquids throughout the
document.
• Reorganized the document where necessary to provide a format that is consistent with other data sheets.
• Added references to other FM Global data sheets where sprinkler protection options are covered in more
detail.
• Changed terminology for animal facilities to “vivariums.”
• Updated the loss history.
• Updated the illustrative losses.
2.1 Occupancy
2.1.1 General
2.1.1.1 Apply principles of inherent safety wherever possible when designing or improving chemical
processes. Inherent safety includes the following general principles (see Data Sheet 7-43, Loss Prevention
in Chemical Plants, for further information on the principles of inherent safety):
A. Intensification: Uusing smaller amounts of hazardous substances.
B. Substitution: Replacing a hazardous chemical with a non-hazardous or less-hazardous one.
C. Attenuation: Using less hazardous process conditions or a less hazardous form of a material.
D. Limitation of effects: Designing a facility to minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or
energy; for example, by sufficient spacing or more-resistant construction.
E. Simplification/error tolerance: Designing a facility so operating errors are less likely, or the process is
more forgiving if errors are made.
Ignitable liquid and combustible dust hazards may still be present where the principles of inherent safety
have been applied. Always evaluate these hazards in accordance with the appropriate data sheets.
2.1.1.2 Implement programs to manage process safety at a level commensurate with the hazards present,
even if not required by national or local regulations.
This will help ensure hazards are identified, management programs are in place, equipment maintenance
is conducted on a regular basis, production and maintenance staffs are properly trained, and contractors
operate safely. (See Data Sheet 7-43 for details.)
2.1.1.3 Consider non-routine operations when conducting hazard evaluations of all processes and equipment,
including startup, shutdown (normal and emergency), sampling, cleaning, and maintenance, to ensure these
functions do not create hazards greater than normal operations.
For example, cleanup could involve ignitable solvents not present during the process. (See Data Sheet 7-46,
Chemical Reactors and Reactions, for details on hazard evaluations in reaction systems.)
2.1.1.4 Use noncombustible, fire-resistant, FM Approved Class I construction or FM Approved 4882 plastic.
2.1.1.5 Design the heating ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems in accordance with Data Sheet
1-45, Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems. Focus particular attention to the following aspects:
A. Use noncombustible HVAC ductwork and noncombustible insulation.
B. Where the use of plastic or other combustible ductwork is unavoidable, provide automatic sprinkler
protection in accordance with Data Sheet 7-78, Industrial Exhaust Systems.
C. Use noncombustible materials for HVAC filters.
D. Design all HVAC systems to minimize the transfer of contaminants or products of combustion from
one area to another. Zone the HVAC systems to minimize cross-contamination, and install automatic
smoke detectors in the return ducts interlocked with fire dampers.
2.1.1.6 Before installing shutdown interlocks, as recommended in FM Global data sheets, consider all the
consequences of such an interruption of flow; for example, interruption of heat transfer fluids (i.e., cooling)
could result in a runaway reaction. Where the interlock creates an increased hazard, alternate methods to
reduce the basic hazard need to be developed. Shutdown interlocks are often recommended for limiting
the release of hazardous materials (heat transfer fluid, hydraulic fluid, ignitable liquid, etc.). See Data Sheet
7-98; Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer By Organic and Synthetic Fluids; and Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid
Operations for more details.
2.1.1.7 Where ignitable liquid is used, implement the following safeguards:
A. Limit the amount of ignitable liquid to the minimum amount needed for the operation.
B. Install drainage and/or containment for control of ignitable liquid spills and firefighting water in
accordance with Data Sheet 7-32.
C. Design for the vapor explosion potentials in any area where a room or equipment explosion hazard
exists (see Data Sheet 7-32).
D. Provide sprinkler protection as recommended in Data Sheet 7-14, Fire Protection for Chemical Plants,
or Data Sheet 7-32, as appropriate, wherever ignitable liquid is used.
E. Provide the area with low-level safety ventilation to control accumulations of flammable vapor from
small leaks and spills. (See additional guidance for mechanical ventilation in Section 2.1.1.11.)
F. Locate and protect ignitable liquid in plastic containers in accordance with Data Sheet 7-32 or Data
Sheet 7-29 as appropriate.
Where plastic drums are used to handle low flash point liquid (i.e., lower than 200°F [93°C]), they may
present unacceptable exposures to high-value operations, and alternate solutions will be needed. These
solutions could include pumping from drums located in a properly designed cutoff room, limiting the
number of drums to 1 or 2, and providing a drained catch basin specifically for the needed drums to control
and remove spilled liquids.
Plastic IBCs filled with ignitable liquid can present a severe fire exposure within a pharmaceutical
occupancy due to the large quantity of liquid that could become involved in the fire, and the limited options
for adequate fire protection.
G. Provide hazardous location electrical equipment in accordance with Data Sheet 5-1, Electrical
Equipment in Hazardous (Classified) Locations, and NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, in areas where
a volatile ignitable liquid is used.
A volatile ignitable liquid is one with:
1. a closed-cup flash point below 100°F (38°C), or
2. a closed-cup flash point of 100°F (38°C) or above, if heated higher than its flash point.
H. Avoid materials such as cast iron, high silicon iron, plastic (thermoplastic, thermoset), glass, and
aluminum in ignitable liquid piping systems due to their potential for failure (low impact strength, low
pressure ratings, low resistance to thermal shock, and low melting point).
I. Provide FM Approved fire safe valves or interlocks to shutoff valves in accordance with Data Sheet
7-32 on lines that normally contain ignitable liquids, to minimize an unmanageable liquid release.
J. Adequately bond and ground all equipment as well as permanent or temporary transfer piping (rigid
or flexible) to prevent electrostatic buildup.
K. Do not permit open-ended piping on operating equipment. Provide all dead-end piping with a screwed
or bolted flanged cap.
L. Provide appropriate automatic means to prevent overfilling.
M. Implement a mechanical integrity program for transfer piping where corrosion, leakage, or other loss
of containment can result in serious consequences (product contamination, fire, explosion, etc.).
N. Where appropriate, provide protection/bracing against earthquake for all piping containing ignitable
liquid (see Data Sheet 1-2, Earthquakes, and Data Sheet 1-11, Fire Following Earthquake).
2.1.1.8 Where direct measurement or observation instruments (gauges, meters, glass-type liquid level
indicators, sight glasses, rotameters, sample tubes, etc.) are needed on equipment containing ignitable liquid,
install them in accordance with Data Sheet 7-32.
2.1.1.9 Do not use glass equipment (such as holding tanks) and glass piping where failure could result in
an unacceptable consequence such as release of an ignitable liquid, or toxic or corrosive material.
2.1.1.10 Implement the following safeguards where combustible dust is used: (See Data Sheet 7-76,
Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires, for additional details):
A. Where possible and practical, use a noncombustible dust to eliminate the hazard.
B. Design for the dust explosion potentials in any area where combustible dust is handled or processed
and could be released into a cloud. This includes processing equipment and rooms or buildings, but
usually not areas where dust is stored in bags, drums, IBCs, etc. Locate the process in a room of
damage-limiting construction as described in Data Sheet 1-44, or provide the equipment with explosion
protection as described in Data Sheet 7-76.
C. Design and maintain equipment and piping to prevent release of fugitive dust by maintaining the
equipment pressure negative with respect to its surroundings, minimizing joints in transfer systems,
providing localized dust pickup points at filling and dumping operations, and using entirely closed systems
for dust transfer.
D. Implement a mechanical integrity program for transfer piping where corrosion, leakage, or other loss
of containment events could result in serious consequences (product contamination, fire, explosion, etc.).
E. Provide hazardous location electrical equipment in accordance with Data Sheet 5-1 and NFPA 70,
National Electrical Code, in areas where combustible dust may be released, so the equipment will not
become an ignition source for either layers or clouds of dust.
F. Adequately bond and ground all equipment as well as permanent or temporary transfer piping (rigid
or flexible) to prevent electrostatic buildup.
2.1.1.11 Provide fixed mechanical exhaust ventilation for rooms or buildings wherever the following are stored
or handled:
• Ignitable liquid with a flash point below 100°F (38°C), or up to 300°F (149°C) if heated above its flash
point
• Flammable vapor or gas in a system that can be opened, or where leaks or releases from the system
are possible
2.1.1.11.1 Ensure the ventilation system meets the following requirements:
A. Operates at a rate of 1 cfm/ft2 (0.3 m3/min/m2) of the room floor area, with pickup taken within 12 in.
(30 cm) of the floor, recognizing that most kinds of flammable vapor are heavier than air.
B. Where only lighter-than-air materials are handled, high-level pickups are acceptable.
C. Mechanical ventilation ductwork should be of noncombustible construction and insulation. (If
combustible ducts are used, see Data Sheet 7-78.)
D. Locate exhaust openings so the building HVAC systems do not pick up discharged fumes/vapor.
E. Provide sufficient makeup air for all vapor extraction systems.
F. Be sure the safety ventilation system is operable when target liquids are being handled. Shut down
operations if ventilation fails.
2.1.2 Manufacturing
2.1.2.1 Where the consequence of an accident involving raw materials, intermediates, and finished products
is unacceptable, store the materials where they will not be subject to a common event. Where the production
cycle is long, keeping raw materials, intermediates, and finished products in individually separate areas could
further reduce the consequences.
2.1.2.2 Reactors used in the active ingredient manufacturing process can present serious loss prevention
challenges. (See Data Sheets 7-43 and 7-46 for additional information.) Important loss prevention features
that must be addressed include, but are not limited to, the following:
A. Conduct a thorough process hazard analysis at an early stage in development, periodically during the
process life, and whenever significant changes occur. Where possible, design the system using principles
of inherent safety.
B. Where the information is not otherwise available, conduct hazard studies on intermediates and final
product for dust explosibility, temperature sensitivity for ignition or decomposition, friction, shock or impact
sensitivity, etc.
C. Conduct reaction hazard studies to identify sensitivity to operating temperature excursions,
contaminants, mischarge of reactants, catalysts and reaction media, etc. The purpose is to determine
operating procedures, interlocks, materials of construction, vacuum and overpressure protection, etc.
D. Design all overpressure protection systems based on the worst credible scenario and current best
practices, especially the use of Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) technology to
evaluate runaway reaction potentials. Do not use glass or plastic piping of any type for vent relief systems.
(See Data Sheet 7-49, Emergency Venting of Vessels, for additional information.)
E. Create detailed operating procedures based on the reaction studies to prevent the development of
hazardous conditions, and to provide guidance on the steps to be taken to recover from out-of-range
conditions.
F. If reactions involving highly energetic materials (nitroglycerin, hydroxylamine, sodium azide, etc.) cannot
be adequately vented, conduct them in a pressure-resistant cubicle or in a remote area that will minimize
damage to other important facilities.
G. Permit only qualified and trained operators to conduct potentially hazardous operations, and ensure
their continued qualification by a suitable management system that may include audits and retraining as
needed.
H. Take steps to prevent foreign material from entering the reactor via internal or shell heat transfer
systems, hydraulic systems, piping, glass, or other lining systems, etc. This can be achieved by using
proper construction materials, applicable quality control steps between batches (e.g., visual inspections),
proper training of operators and maintenance staff, and adopting a rigorous mechanical integrity program.
I. Bond and ground all equipment to prevent the accumulation of static charge, with special emphasis
on isolated metal parts internal to the vessel or those that would be introduced when adding materials (e.g.,
dumping of powders or liquids from plastic bags or plastic lined drums).
J. Add material to the reactors through closed systems.
K. Operate the reactors so the headspace is outside of the flammable range. This can be achieved by
the proper selection of solvents, reactants, and operating temperature, or by reduced oxygen concentration
(inerting or purging; see Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels and Equipment).
L. Where reactors are used for multiple reactions, thoroughly clean the reactor between batches. In
addition, assess cleaning materials to ensure they don’t create their own hazards (e.g., ignitable liquids)
or incompatibilities.
M. Eliminate “dead areas” in the reactor or system. Dead areas can be difficult to clean, and present both
contamination and long-term instability issues from the isolated material. Dead areas include pipe legs,
thermowells, measuring and sampling lines, etc.
2.1.2.3 Where frequent changing of the piping setup is required for batch processes, implement the following
safeguards as appropriate (see Figures 1a and 1b):
A. Locate piping requiring regular modification together in a suitably arranged cutoff room or a separately
curbed, drained and ventilated area, not in locations scattered throughout the process area.
B. Provide adequate mechanical support for all piping (permanent or temporary).
C. Ensure flexible hose meets the recommendations for use described in Data Sheet 7-32. Use FM
Approved flexible hose where available.
D. For transfer lines that are changed frequently, use high-integrity, quick-connect couplings (FM Approved,
where available) or bolted flanged fittings.
E. Where possible, use firesafe shutoff valves on hard piping where failure would result in an
unmanageable release. Use valves that indicate their open/closed position (e.g., quarter-turn valves).
F. Clearly identify all piping, and provide documented procedures for pipe routing changes using the same
identifying criteria.
G. Take precautions to prevent contamination or mixing of incompatible materials using such practices
as dedicated hose marked for a specific service, or thorough cleaning between uses.
H. Ensure pipe routing changes are made only by well-trained operators who follow documented
procedures exactly.
2.1.2.4 Loss prevention steps that need to be taken in areas where pharmaceutical actives are formulated
to finished product (blending, drying, grinding, tableting and coating, liquid filling, packaging, etc.) include, but
are not be limited to, the following:
A. Use fire-resistant, noncombustible, or FM Approved Class 1 building construction.
B. Prevent combustible accumulations or construction in concealed spaces as might occur above the
drop ceiling of packaging areas, mixing and blending operations, clean and sterile rooms, etc.
Combustibles could be filters, insulation, spare parts, or plastic HVAC duct.
C. Limit the amount of combustibles (packaging material, fiber drums of product, etc.) in these areas,
especially finishing operations, to the absolute minimum needed for operations.
D. Design all HVAC systems to minimize the transfer of contaminants or products of combustion from
one area to another.
E. Use noncombustible materials for ductwork that pneumatically transfers combustible dust from one
point to another.
F. Install suitable combustion safety devices where glass ampoules are sealed using a natural gas or
propane flame.
G. Install automatic sprinklers where the combustible loading in the occupancy is significant.
H. Limit the use of concealed sprinklers to light hazard occupancies unless the sprinklers are specifically
FM Approved for other uses.
2.1.2.5 Implement the following heat transfer fluid (heating or cooling) system safeguards as appropriate
(see Data Sheet 7-99 for additional criteria):
A. In order of preference, use nonignitable fluids, FM Approved fluids, or organic heat transfer fluids.
B. For fired heat transfer fluid systems, focus particular attention on implementing the following safeguards
in addition to those recommended in Data Sheet 7-99:
1. Design for the mist or vapor explosion potentials in any area where an organic heat transfer fluid
having a flash point below 425°F (218°C) is heated to or above its atmospheric boiling point. Locate the
vaporizer or heater and the user facility outdoors or in a room of damage-limiting construction as
described in Data Sheet 1-44.
2. Provide sprinkler protection as recommended in Data Sheet 7-99 wherever organic heat transfer
fluids are used.
3. Provide HTF process safety interlocks in accordance with Data Sheet 7-99.
C. For unfired heat transfer fluid systems used for cooling, focus particular attention on implementing
the following safeguards in addition to those recommended in Data Sheet 7-99:
1. Arrange to keep moisture out of the low-temperature circuit (below 30°F [-1°C]) to prevent ice plugs
in the piping.
2. Locate the heat transfer system in a cutoff room or in a dedicated curbed area where the storage
tank, expansion tank, transfer pumps, and heat exchangers are located.
3. Provide a low-level interlock in the HTF expansion tank, to shut down the transfer pumps of the
primary circuits.
4. Arrange to shut down the primary circuit transfer pumps from the main control room or from an
accessible location in the event of a fire in the cutoff room or curbed area.
5. Where an ammonia refrigeration system is used, provide explosion-relieving construction and
appropriate safeguards as described in Data Sheet 7-13, Mechanical Refrigeration.
2.1.2.6 For centrifuges, provide the following loss prevention features:
A. Where the atmosphere inside a centrifuge can get into the explosive range during operation, provide
a continuous inert gas purge or explosion suppression, or design the equipment to withstand the explosion.
B. Provide grounding and bonding for all equipment to reduce the possibility of ignition from static sparks
during loading, operation, or unloading.
C. Ensure the enclosure is tight enough to prevent air from being drawn in by the action of the centrifuge.
D. Examine any flexible hoses or fittings needed for the operation before each operating cycle to detect
loose connections, cracked hose, corrosion, or deterioration that could affect the operation.
E. Monitor the vibration levels and provide interlocks to shut down the unit at excessive levels (as
determined by the unit manufacturer).
F. Maintain rotating components clear of accumulations that could be ignited by friction from the rotating
parts.
G. Conduct regular preventive maintenance on bearings and seals to detect unusual wear, lubrication
problems, corrosion, etc. (See Operating Standard 13-5R, Bearings, for additional information.)
H. Use lubricants and coolants that are compatible with the material being processed, or design the
equipment to prevent contamination.
2.1.2.7 For dryers (e.g., batch tray, continuous tray, continuous belt, cylinder, drum, rotary, vacuum, double
cone, spray and fluidized beds), implement the following loss prevention features:
A. Provide one of the following explosion protection safeguards where combustible dust, ignitable liquid,
or flammable vapor are processed:
2.1.3 Lyophilizers
2.1.3.1 For lyophilizers, implement the following loss prevention features:
A. Provide a reliable source of power for the equipment to ensure the process can continue to completion.
B. Use nonignitable heat transfer fluids, nonignitable hydraulic fluids, or FM Approved industrial fluids
(if present) where possible.
C. Use non-adsorbent, noncombustible pipe insulation materials at points of potential leakage if ignitable
heat transfer or hydraulic fluids are used.
D. Locate the heating/cooling equipment in an area separate from the lyophilizers and design them in
accordance with Section 2.1.2.5.
E. Conduct regular preventive maintenance on all components, especially hoses and piping subject to
pressure or temperature cycling or movement.
F. Use flexible hoses that are rated for the process conditions and compatible with the process fluids.
G. Provide automatic sprinkler protection in the room containing the lyophilizer and any support equipment
(hydraulic and heat transfer systems) where ignitable fluids are present in accordance with Data Sheet
7-99 and Data Sheet 7-98.
H. If the fluid being removed from the product is an ignitable liquid, have the process needs evaluated
to be certain that vaporization/sublimation of the liquid does not create a flammable atmosphere in either
the lyophilizer or any off-gas-handling equipment. If an explosive atmosphere is present, provide
safeguards to prevent an explosion in accordance with Data Sheet 7-32.
D. Where combustibles are sufficient to operate automatic sprinklers, use quick response sprinklers (low
RTI) with the design criteria as determined by the surrounding occupancy.
E. Install a fixed fire protection system inside storage units where combustibles are sufficient to damage
storage. Plastic storage components, electric motor drives, etc., could create damage from fire or smoke.
Because the stored compounds can be sensitive to smoke damage, use a gaseous extinguishing agent
activated by high-sensitivity products of combustion detectors. (See Data Sheet 4-9, Clean Agent
Extinguishing Systems, or Data Sheet 4-11N, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems.)
NOTE: The FDA has approved FM200 for use in medicinal inhalers; it is also a recognized extinguishing
agent.
2.1.5.2 For bench-scale laboratories (unit operation of 5 gal [19 L] or less), implement the following loss
prevention features:
A. Use noncombustible or FM Approved construction throughout.
B. Provide a 1-hour fire-rated cutoff between labs and higher hazard occupancies (e.g., pilot plants).
C. Arrange the fume hood exhaust system to be independent from the normal room ventilation systems
unless the ventilation systems are once-through, without recirculation.
D. Locate electric receptacles, switches, and controls so as not to be exposed to liquid spills. This assumes
small quantities of liquid can be spilled (for typical solvents, approximately 0.5 gal [2.4 liters]) and there
is strong local ventilation. Where other conditions exist, consider the need for classification of the local area
exposed. Laboratory areas, including the interiors of fume hoods, can be “unclassified” as defined in Article
500 of NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code.
E. Handle, store, and protect radioactive materials in accordance with Data Sheet 7-61, Facilities
Processing Radioactive Materials.
F. Closely control the inventory of ignitable liquid and other hazardous chemicals. Pay special attention
to compounds that form unstable peroxides on aging (e.g., ethers and tetrahydrofuran [THF]).
G. Handle perchloric acid in dedicated hoods. Perchloric acid, when heated, gives off vapor that can
condense in ductwork and form explosive perchlorates. (See NFPA 45, Fire Protection for Laboratories
Using Chemicals, for additional guidance.)
H. Maintain a high level of housekeeping, including prompt attention to spills, cleanup of completed
experiments, proper disposal of partially used chemicals, minimum paper clutter, etc.
I. Keep the quantities of ignitable liquid to a minimum and store them in FM Approved safety cans or storage
cabinets.
J. Where ignitable liquid is kept in glass bottles or plastic containers, use small sizes (1 qt [1 L] or less)
and store them in FM Approved storage cabinets where they will not be subject to mechanical damage,
bumping, or falling.
K. Do not store ignitable liquid in ordinary refrigerators. Use only devices specifically designed for such
use.
L. Locate flammable gas cylinders outside, piped to the usage equipment. (See Data Sheet 7-50,
Compressed Gases in Cylinders, for additional guidance.) An alternative is to use suitably designed and
arranged gas cabinets. (See Data Sheet 7-7/17-12, Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities for additional
guidance.)
M. Provide fire extinguishers of an appropriate type and quantity. (See Data Sheet 4-5, Portable
Extinguishers.)
N. Install automatic sprinklers in laboratories, walk-in hoods, and other enclosures where combustible
construction is present, or where there is a large accumulation of combustible equipment, stock, or
packaging. Design the sprinkler protection in accordance with Data Sheet 3-26, Fire Protection Water
Demand For Nonstorage Sprinklered Properties, Data Sheet 7-32, or Data Sheet 1-57, Plastics in
Construction, depending on the fire hazards present.
2.1.5.3 Where pressurized liquid dispensing containers (PLDC) in capacities from 5 to 55 gal (19 to 208 L)
are used in laboratories, implement the following loss prevention features:
A. Ensure PLDCs over 5 gal (19 L) containing ignitable liquid are only used where there is automatic
sprinkler protection.
B. Do not use non-metallic containers larger than 1 gal (4 L).
C. Use FM Approved PLDCs.
D. Route the discharge of relief devices to a safe location, preferably outside.
E. Ensure the piping/hose between the container and the use point are rated for the pressure, compatible
with the material being transferred, and not subject to mechanical damage.
F. Prior to pressurizing the system, ensure all fittings and connections are secure and leak-free.
G. Provide a means to stop the flow of liquid from the container by means of a readily accessible valve,
self-closing valve, or remote actuated valve on the liquid line, and by removing the pressure being applied.
(See Data Sheet 7-32 for additional guidance on inert gas transfer that may be applicable.)
H. Pressurize containers only with nitrogen or other inert gas (i.e., do not use air) either from a cylinder
or site-wide supply. Ensure backflow into the gas supply system is not possible.
2.1.6 Vivariums
2.1.6.1 For vivariums, implement the following loss prevention features:
A. Locate vivariums away from flood exposure.
B. Use noncombustible or FM Approved building construction.
C. Separate animals from support areas with at least 1-hour fire-rated construction.
D. Keep combustible storage out of animal areas and other areas sensitive to smoke contamination.
E. Install automatic sprinkler protection in areas used for the storage of food, bedding, and cleaning
supplies; in the animal areas if plastic cages are used; and in the office areas if combustible loading is
significant. Design the sprinkler protection in accordance with Data Sheet 3-26.
F. If sprinklers are installed in cage wash areas, ensure they have a temperature rating at least 50°F (10°C)
above the normal room temperature when cleaning is being undertaken.
G. Conduct a careful evaluation of important features of HVAC systems, including source and humidity
of make-up air, ductwork (noncombustible is preferred), fire dampers, backup power, and smoke detection
and control systems. (See Data Sheet 1-45, Air Conditioning And Ventilating Systems.)
H. Back up important records related to the animals and testing in a manner similar to other important
business records.
2.2 Utilities
2.2.1 Provide sufficient reliability and redundancy of process utilities to prevent interruption to critical
processes. This may include providing N+1 reliability. Critical utilities could include process heating and
cooling; room/building air-handling systems; humidity control; power, instrument, process, and breathing air;
fuels; process and inert gases; USP and deionized water; water for injection (WFI); process waste handling;
and solvent recovery.
2.2.2 When important emergency systems are taken out of service for maintenance or repair, implement a
follow-up system similar to FM Global’s red tag permit system used for sprinkler system impairments. This
will ensure that the outage is minimized and the proper precautions are instituted for affected users.
2.2.3 Evaluate the hazards presented by systems designed to treat waste process gas, vapor, and dust
prior to atmospheric release. Multiple devices/processes may be routed to one treatment unit. This may create
loss prevention issues including, but not limited to, the following:
• Proper arrangement and protection of waste solvent recovery units (see Data Sheet 7-2, Waste Solvent
Recovery) and fume incinerators (see Data Sheet 6-11, Fume Incinerators)
• Use of plastic or other combustible materials for vent collection headers (see Data Sheet 7-78)
• Contamination of connected processes by unintended back flow
• Chemical reactions
• Cell growth
• Crystallization, centrifuging, filtration, drying, milling, sieving, blending and bulk packaging
• Distillation, liquid-liquid extraction, chromatographic separation
• Heat transfer using water, brine, steam, or organic fluids
• Control of vapor, liquid, and solid emissions by collection (dust collectors, scrubbers, carbon bed adsorbers)
or destruction (catalytic or thermal oxidizers, fume incinerators)
Secondary pharmaceutical plants take the active ingredients manufactured by primary sites or toll converters
and put them into a form that is suitable for use by the customer. Operations are numerous and can include
the following:
• Blending APIs with other chemicals such as fillers (e.g., carboxymethycellulose), additives (e.g., sugar,
wax, stearates, lubricants) and even some ignitable liquids
• Granulation, where products (sometimes dissolved in ignitable liquid) are sprayed onto a nucleus in a
fluidized bed granulator/dryer
• Dissolving APIs in either aqueous or organic solutions (often ignitable), followed by several unit operations
that may include crystallization of the wanted substance (to improve purity of the finished product),
centrifuging, filtration, drying, milling, sieving, and blending
• Sterilizing of equipment and containers, often using steam-heated stainless steel autoclaves or ethylene
oxide
• Filling of bottles, syringes, ampoules, and vials with liquid actives
• Closure of ampoules with natural gas or propane flame
• Tableting
• Filling of inhalers (e.g., for asthma ventilators)
• Compounding of creams, pastes, and patches
• High-purity water production (water for injection [WFI])
• Freeze-drying of finished products (lyophilization)
• Sterile and non-sterile packaging
• Warehousing
Note that in the pharmaceutical industry, the word “aerosol” does not mean aerosol container; it means a
drug delivery technique. There are three categories of devices that generate aerosols:
• dry-powder inhalers that disperse aerosol particles to the lungs from a capsule, blister, or reservoir using
pneumatic, vibrational, or rotational forces;
• metered-dose inhalers that use metering valves and propellants to disperse aerosol droplets; and
• nebulizers that use air-jet and ultrasonic dispersion technology to generate droplets and deliver them to
the lungs.
(CGMP) as defined by 21 CFR, Parts 210 and 211. The regulation includes General Provisions, Organization
and Personnel, Buildings and Facilities, Equipment, Control of Components and Drug Product Containers
and Closures, Production and Process Controls, Packaging and Labeling Control, Holding and Distribution,
Laboratory Controls, Records and Reports, and Returned and Salvaged Drug Products. These regulations
are directed at maintaining drug quality and present very broad guidelines that need to be met.
If the manufacturer has a new process and new site, they have to register and successfully complete process
validation (a long process). Some validation stages can be conducted in parallel with construction.
If there is a product change at an existing site, the manufacturer may need to re-register and/or amend the
registration. The time will vary with the extent of the change.
If there is an existing product with a process change, the manufacturer may need to amend the registration
and will need to successfully complete process validation.
Finally, if there is only a replacement-in-kind of a piece of equipment, there will be a need to validate, and
this could be a relatively short process. Where the whole process is rebuilt due to a physical property loss,
validation could be a very lengthy process.
3.3.2 Reactors
coolant, control of leakage is a high priority. Contamination risk can be minimized by proper selection of
exchanger materials for the service conditions, and regular inspection and maintenance.
Pharmaceutical reactions should undergo process hazard analysis during development, scale-up, and prior
to startup (refer to Data Sheet 7-43). These reactions are frequently exothermic, sensitive to temperature
excursions or to mis-charge of the reactants, catalysts, carrier solvent, etc. Such incidents can lead to potential
overpressure of the reactor. Careful study, resulting in appropriate design criteria, can prevent an uncontrolled
pressure excursion that destroys the reactor and its surroundings.
In addition to overpressure prevention, hazard evaluation studies can identify needed process controls and
safety interlocks that keep the process in a safe operating range. Because of the nature of the hazard or
quality control requirements, programmable logic devices (computers, PLCs, etc.) are frequently considered
for both process and safety services. At a minimum, separate systems are needed for the process and safety
functions. The safety functions may be achieved by hard-wired systems or by other programmable systems.
(See Data Sheet 7-45 for additional guidance.)
The “broth” leaving a fermenter is usually filtered to recover the required product, and then concentrated to
a form that is easier to handle and process for subsequent downstream operations. Further processing can
include ion exchange, solvent extraction, crystallization, reverse osmosis, and drying.
3.3.3 Isolation
“Isolation” is a general term that refers to one or a series of physical separation processes using extraction,
centrifuging, and/or filtering. The isolated product could be an intermediate used in subsequent steps, or
an API sent to a secondary operation for subsequent blending and packaging.
The desired API may be formed as a solid particle in the reaction steps or may require additional steps to
achieve crystallization. The slurry containing the solid active can then be sent to a filter or centrifuge to remove
most of the liquid. Some in-line filters remove the desired solids and return the liquid to the reactor. The wet
cake can then be washed in situ and discharged to a dryer where residual moisture is removed. If the solid
is an intermediate material, it may need to be further processed so it can be discharged into drums as a wet
cake.
Filtration is another way of separating a liquid from a solid. There are basically four ways of achieving filtration:
gravity, pressure, vacuum, and in-line filters. With sensitive powders that are susceptible to breakdown by
mechanical forces, vacuum filtration is usually preferred. Some filters are also combined filter-dryers.
Liquid from the filtration, centrifuging, and drying steps and wash liquors may be recycled, further treated,
or disposed of as waste. Treatment or disposal may be conducted on or off site. Techniques can include, but
are not limited to: distillation, adsorption, neutralization, acidification, phase separation, and incineration.
The liquid streams may be aqueous or organic. Many of the organic streams are ignitable.
In some cases, the liquid may be the desired intermediate or product. It may be further processed using
treatment steps such as distillation, ion exchange, adsorption, neutralization, acidification, and phase
separation. Unwanted cake can either be incinerated or sent off site as solid waste.
can be operated under vacuum conditions to enable drying at lower temperatures. The heating medium can
be steam, hot water, organic heat transfer fluid, or indirectly heated air or nitrogen. Dryers can be batch or
continuous.
Where ignitable solvents are driven off in dryers, a suitable level of safety ventilation is needed (see Data
Sheet 6-9). In addition, the evaporated solvent may be recovered or further processed. These processes
present their own ignitable liquid and flammable vapor hazards that need to be addressed.
Some pharmaceutical powders and hybrid mixtures can have very low MIE, resulting in a potential for ready
ignition. It may be necessary to process these materials under inert atmospheres to reduce the frequency
of ignition.
Cleaning of dryers (and other process equipment) may introduce other hazards such as the use of ignitable
solvents that may not be part of the normal operation. Cleaning may require opening and entering the
equipment, or may be cleaned in place (CIP). CIP does not necessarily introduce additional fire or explosion
hazards, but can result in sources of breakdown or contamination. These need to be recognized in any hazard
studies.
Dryers can include the following:
A. Batch tray: These dryers are the simplest and most basic. The wet cake is put into trays, which are
then manually placed into ovens where they are dried by passing hot air or nitrogen across the material.
The major hazards include overheating of the product to the point where it catches fire, or vapor explosions
if the evaporated material is a ignitable solvent (Figure 2).
B. Continuous belt: These dryers use a continuous belt or conveying screen with a hot gas passing through
or across the belt and product. The major hazards include belt warping or fire caused by overheating
or friction at rotating or rubbing parts.
C. Spray: In these dryers, the feed is atomized by a centrifugal disk or nozzle and then discharged into
a cylindrical tower where the hot gas flows concurrent or counter-current to the feed. The major hazard is
overheating of the product where it has accumulated on the interior surfaces of the dryer. The result can
be a fire or explosion. Ancillary equipment can include cyclones, bag filters, dust collectors, and
scrubbers.
D. Conical: This type of dryer consists of cones that rotate end over end at low speed to tumble and dry
the product. Heating can be provided by steam, water, or other heat transfer fluid. Hazards include both
combustible dust and flammable vapor in the unit and ancillary equipment (Figure 3).
E. Fluidized bed: These dryers are direct-heated dryers that rely on a hot, fluidizing medium (usually air,
but nitrogen can also be used) to suspend the powder to be dried, thereby providing uniform drying of
the solids. Where air is the fluidizing medium and the dust is combustible, the head space could contain
dust in the explosive range. Where the liquid removed is ignitable, the head space could contain a hybrid
mixture (dust and vapor) in the explosive range. These units often have ancillary equipment similar to spray
dryers to remove fines that are entrained in the fluidizing medium exiting the dryer (Figure 4).
Fluid beds are commonly used for combined operations such as agglomeration and drying, wet granulation
and drying, or coating and drying. They are also used for powder layering and pelletizing applications.
Fluids and powders are applied as top-spray, bottom-spray (known as Wurster method), or tangential
spray. Top-spray is commonly used for granulation. Bottom-spray is commonly used for pharmaceutical
coating. Tangential-spray is commonly used for powder spheronization and layering.
F. Rotary: This type of dryer has a jacketed shell and is often horizontal cylindrical in shape. A double
flight of spiral ribbons or heavy-duty paddles is attached to a rotating shaft inside the dryer. During
operation, the ribbons or paddles move material from the center of the dryer to the end plates and back
so the batch is constantly exposed to heated shell and shaft. Heating can be provided by steam, water,
or other heat transfer fluid. Hazards include both combustible dust and flammable vapor issues in the unit
and ancillary equipment (Figure 5).
3.3.6 Lyophilization
Lyophilization is a freeze-drying process used for many drugs. Some products are thermolabile or unstable
at elevated temperatures in aqueous solution (instability is a quality issue in this case). The lyophilization
process creates a more stable, powder product that can be later reconstituted prior to patient use. The process
is vulnerable to spoilage in the event of an interruption.
The typical treatment cycle is that the product to be processed is first prepared as an aqueous solution or
suspension that is then cooled rapidly to a low temperature, often approaching -58°F (-50°C). The freezing
chamber is sealed, and the frozen material is then subject to heat under a high vacuum. The liquid portion
sublimes and the resulting dry product is often less than 1% moisture. The product is then packaged under
sterile and low-humidity conditions.
In a few cases, the solvent for the solution might be an ignitable liquid. If it is, the process needs to be
evaluated to be certain that vaporization/ sublimation of the liquid does not create a flammable atmosphere
in either the lyophilizer or any off-gas handling equipment.
Some lyophilizers process the solution in the final vial. Vials are loaded into the process chambers with loose
fitting tops, which are set by compressing the stack of trays at the end of the process. These units will
commonly have a hydraulic system (see Data Sheet 7-98).
Depending on the lyophilizer model, the heat transfer fluid coils can be on the exterior walls or part of the
internal trays.
To provide reliable electrical power, lyophilizers frequently have emergency power supplied by batteries and
backup emergency generators (see Data Sheet 5-23, Emergency and Standby Power Systems).
Loss prevention concerns include use of ignitable heat transfer fluid or hydraulic fluid, combustible or
absorbent piping insulation, loss of power during the operation, and contamination from liquid spills or smoke
from fires.
3.3.7 Ventilation
Ventilation is installed for personnel comfort and safety, product quality, and to prevent ignitable liquid,
flammable gas, and combustible dust hazards. Requirements for manufacturing process areas, packaging
areas, laboratories, and storage areas vary broadly.
Personnel comfort and safety requirements are often specified as “x” number of air changes per hour. Systems
designed to meet personnel safety or product quality requirements can have higher volumetric requirements
than are needed to deal with flammable hazards. These systems can be used to meet the flammable vapor
hazard requirements provided there are low-point pickups and there is no recirculation of the air. If there are
only limited flammable materials involved, air recirculation could be acceptable with FM Approved vapor
detection systems interlocked to put the system in full exhaust mode.
In laboratories, fume hoods are used to control hazards associated with the experiments being conducted.
In most cases, codes that specify minimum air flow rates are to protect personnel. These rates would be
sufficient for the quantities of ignitable liquid or flammable gas normally handled in these devices. If the hood
has a variable speed fan, the minimum speed should meet this requirement. With fume hood systems it is
important that ventilation openings are not obstructed, ventilation systems are regularly serviced, conditions
of operation (e.g., front sash panes in proper position) are observed, and sufficient make-up air is provided.
Noncombustible ducts for fume hoods need to be routed directly outside. Exhaust openings need to be
located away from intake points for building ventilation systems.
In general, ignitable liquids with a flash point below 100°F (38°C) produce enough vapor at room temperature
to require mechanical ventilation, while unheated ignitable liquids with flash points above 100°F (38°C)
require only natural ventilation. Any ignitable liquid with a flash point up to 300°F (150°C) heated to its flash
point also will need mechanical ventilation.
Limited amounts of a flammable gas such as hydrogen may be vented directly to atmosphere; however,
these need to be routed to a safe area such as above a high roof. When vented directly outside, the vent
must be protected against rainwater entry by protective caps or inverted U-bends at the end of the pipe.
Venting gases from indoor equipment only to a nearby exhaust system should not be permitted, as the system
may not be operating when the gas is released. Where the exhaust system is interlocked with the process
requiring its operation, such an arrangement could be acceptable.
Most gases are vented to some type of treatment system prior to atmospheric release. Often, multiple pieces
of process equipment are routed to a common treatment device. This can present the possibility of
contamination or mixing of incompatible materials. If flammable vapor is handled, a fire or explosion originating
in one unit can be transferred to others. Any incident shutting down the treatment system would stop the
operation of the connected process, with related time element effects.
Scrubbers are most commonly used to remove corrosive and/or toxic components from waste gas streams.
Scrubbers are usually vertical vessels containing packed beds to allow a large surface area for good
liquid-gas contact. Scrubbers with multiple internal trays also can be used.
The scrubbing solution can be water, alkaline streams (e.g., caustic, sodium hypochlorite, etc.) for treating
acidic and some toxic vapors (e.g., hydrogen chloride, chlorine, phosgene); and acidic streams (e.g., sulfuric
or hydrochloric acid) to scrub out some alkaline streams. The equipment used is frequently of combustible
construction such as glass fiber-reinforced plastic (GRP) or fiber-reinforced plastic (FRP) shells, with plastic
(PVC or polypropylene) internal packing. External or internal components of metal, ceramic, or glass
construction are also possible. Scrubbers may be located indoors, outdoors on the roof, or outdoors at ground
level. When located indoors and of combustible construction, sprinkler protection for the area may be needed.
The major hazards associated with scrubber systems include the combustible construction, and the effect
on operation if the ability to scrub off gases is lost. Often, the process will be shut down due to local pollution
control regulations. The plant should have alternative ways of handling the waste gas in the event of the
outage of the primary equipment. This could include duplicate equipment or methods to incinerate the waste
in boilers, flare stacks, etc.
Some gaseous streams that are flammable and have a sufficiently high calorific value can be burned on
site. Vent gases containing hydrogen, acetylene or carbon monoxide can be routed to:
• Boilers (or sometimes gas turbines), where the gases are burned as supplementary fuel.
• Incinerators, where flammable gas streams are burned; sometimes these incinerators are equipped with
waste heat recovery boilers that provide steam or hot water for other processes.
• A flare stack, where the gases are ignited, and flared-off.
See Data Sheet 6-11; Data Sheet 7-2; and Data Sheet 7-78, for further guidance.
Another system is 30 × 11 × 18 ft (9.1 x 3.4 x 5.5 m) high, with a 3 ft (0.9 m) access aisle down the center.
Construction is steel frame and steel/aluminum panels. The unit is totally enclosed on all sides (including
top). Solid steel shelves (on each side of access aisle) are 9 × 3 ft (2.7 x 0.9 m). Tier height is 3-4 in.(76-102
mm) for the entire height (60 tiers). Shelves are fixed; a robot arm is programmed to remove a sample from
the shelf and bring it to the access door. The unit will hold about 1.1 million bottled samples or about 6 million
microplate samples.
Fire hazards include the use of ignitable liquid, the electric motor, and possibly large quantities of plastic.
Although the liquids stored may be ignitable, the quantities are negligible. It is possible that a very small
electric motor fire or insulation breakdown may create enough combustion products to contaminate all
samples. A significant exposure is the fact that the samples themselves may be one of a kind or expensive to
purchase from a supplier. The monetary value of the storage may be difficult to determine and includes not
only the purchase/development cost, but also the effect of a loss on on-going development programs.
Class 1, 2, 3, 4 and Plastic Commodities, depending on the nature of the commodity and its arrangement.
Where ignitable liquid, gas, oxidizers, organic peroxides, etc. are stored, protection is addressed in the
applicable FM Global data sheets.
Pharmaceutical storage can often present high unit values, susceptibility to contamination from products of
combustion or foreign materials, a need for temperature and humidity control, and security considerations
associated with potential burglary or theft.
Due to the high values, it may be appropriate to consider separate storage areas for raw materials,
intermediates, and final products to minimize time element losses where there are long production cycle times.
Even where cycle times are short, consider splitting high property value concentrations to reduce exposure
to a single loss event.
In many cases, final product must be stored in walk-in coolers of small to moderate size with a high unit
value, resulting in a significant financial exposure. A small combustion incident (e.g., fire, overheating of
electrical equipment, adjacent exposure fire) can result in total loss of the product before sprinklers can
operate. The best loss prevention advice is a high level of equipment maintenance, strict control of ignition
sources, and use of noncombustible construction and storage containers. However, where combustible
packaging or construction is present, fast-response fire protection systems may be required. This includes
detection and/or extinguishing components. Detection systems are classified as high sensitivity smoke
detection (HSSD) and include several operating technologies with a number of FM Approved manufacturers.
Response of a gaseous clean agent system may result in less damage than sprinkler protection could
achieve, especially in cases where water may result in loss of the product. Water discharge in freezers may
impact the operation of manual or automatic material handling systems and should be considered in
developing contingency plans.
Where humidity and temperature control is needed to maintain product, intermediate or raw material quality,
utility reliability must be evaluated.
3.4.4 Vivariums
Pharmaceutical plants often have facilities for caring for animals that support production or research. Animals
can include almost any species, but the most common are small mammals and rodents. The animals are
genetically well defined, having been raised for specific purposes. Often, many generations of animals are
needed, and loss of one generation (or related documentation) due to disease, fire, flood, etc., can set a
development program back to its beginning.
The vivarium is best constructed of entirely noncombustible materials; for example, concrete block and
ceramic tile. The animal rooms have minimal combustibles, usually metal cages (although plastic cages may
be used on occasion), and a minimum of bedding material. Usually there are laboratories and work rooms
related to animal examination, again with minimal combustible loading. Auxiliary operations in the building can
include offices, cage wash areas, and rooms for the storage of food, cleaning materials, and bedding. These
are usually located outside the “clean” areas. The storage rooms present the largest concentration of
combustibles in the building. Automatic sprinkler protection is usually needed, and these areas are usually
separated from the vivarium by fire-rated construction.
Vivarium atmosphere is controlled to maintain temperatures and humidity within a close tolerance, arranged
so individual rooms have independent air circulation. The building conditioning system may have multiple
units to prevent contamination or cross contamination. A careful evaluation of the important features of HVAC
systems is needed to minimize the potential for a disruptive incident.
Fire alarm arrangements require extra consideration, as loud noises such as fire alarms can impact the
animals and research results.
Associated research records should be backed up similarly to other important business records.
3.4.5 Cleanrooms
Pharmaceutical plants commonly have areas referred to as cleanrooms. These cleanrooms are not
necessarily to the same as semiconductor cleanrooms. Table 1 highlights some typical (although not
universal) terminology related to cleanliness in pharmaceutical operations.
The cleanliness ratings listed in Table 2 are based on the number of particles equal to or greater than 0.02
in. (0.5 mm) in 1 ft3 (0.03 m3) of air. For example, a class 10 cleanroom based on US Federal Standard
209D has a maximum of 10 particles greater than 0.02 in. (0.5 mm) in every 1 ft3 (0.03 m3) of air.
Several of the other countries’ standards on cleanrooms adopted the cleanliness ratings used in ISO 14644
when it was published in 1991, making some of the listings in table obsolete.
Typically, a Class 100 to 1,000 area is located within a clean area. This might be for sterile filling operations
and may only be 100 to 300 ft2 (9 to 27 m2) in size. These areas might be achieved using a laminar flow
hood with a HEPA filter for the air circulation. Cutoff from surrounding occupancy is achieved by clear plastic
drop curtains.
Traditional noncombustible construction methods are predominant. Modular construction methods, using
both noncombustible and combustible (metal-faced, foam-insulated) panels, are sometimes used in renovated
or temporary areas. In many cases the combustible loading of the occupancy is light to non-existent.
Table 3 highlights some of the major differences between semiconductor and pharmaceutical cleanrooms.
Data Sheet 1-56, Cleanrooms, provides basic guidance for evaluating this occupancy with proper
consideration for the occupancy differences. Use of noncombustible construction, smoke and contaminant
control, and sprinkler protection where combustibles are present in significant quantities continues to be good
advice. There are some areas where the combustible loading is insufficient to warrant sprinkler protection,
even though work in process and equipment values may be sizeable.
In some areas, sealed concealed sprinklers have been installed to meet US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) cleanliness requirements as a result of local interpretations of the regulations. This type of installation
is not mandated by FDA regulations and some facilities have used standard sprinklers in the same occupancy.
Sealed concealed sprinklers use a gasket around the ceiling plate of the sprinkler to seal the small gap
formed between the ceiling plate and the tile. These sprinklers are not FM Approved and can be subject to
delayed operation. (In some cases, concealed sprinklers that are FM Approved for light hazard occupancies
have been modified by the addition of the gasket, creating an un-Approved unit.)
Data Sheet 1-57 provides guidance on plastic modular construction components that can be used in this
occupancy. The data sheet illustrates acceptable alternatives to FM Approved panels. FM Approved metal-
faced, foam-insulated panels are available for use with or without sprinklers (see the Approval Guide,
Building Materials Section, Building Insulation). Note, however, that smoke production from these panels could
be significant even though they don’t propagate fire beyond the initial ignition point. This should be considered
wherever plastic panels are installed or proposed.
There are also constructions other than rigid panels that include thin plastic facing materials (like paint
coatings or wallpaper) on a mineral board backing material. Such a facing, alone, in the absence of other
combustibles, would not likely warrant the installation of sprinklers.
or the diluent, solvent, or dust that creates the deflagration exposure. These frequently are valid options to
investigate. An example of attenuation would be to use an inert atmosphere in a process presenting a dust
explosion hazard.
Using limitation of effects is most practical on vessels, which can be designed to contain the explosion. This
would nominally be possible where the reaction is well defined and runaway pressures can be pinpointed,
or where a deflagration potential exists and the maximum unvented pressure has been measured (see Data
Sheet 7-76). Where this approach is extended to a building, the construction costs usually will be prohibitive
except for small buildings. Such structures would be the equivalent of blast cells used in explosive handling
processes but with no venting walls. Providing limitation by spacing is usually not an option because any
release to the outside is not permitted.
Finally, simplification or error tolerance will reduce the likelihood of an incident, but may not be acceptable
to the authority having jurisdiction where any release, no matter how infrequent, may be unacceptable.
As long as toxic/potent compounds are processed or handled, the exposure to personnel cannot be
eliminated. However, the concept of inherent safety can reduce or control property damage incidents and
indirectly reduce the exposure from release of these materials.
Calculated by number of events, 40% of all equipment losses were due to service interruption (Figure 10);
however, calculated by cost, service interruption only accounted for 20% of the equipment losses. The most
costly equipment losses were caused by pressure vessel breakdown (Figure 11).
The cause of the largest number of natural hazards losses was flooding, followed closely by wind and hail
events (Figure 12). Flooding is also the most costly natural hazard, making up 72% of the total gross loss
amount (Figure 13).
The pharmaceutical losses were also broken down by the main process involved in the incident. Figure 14
Other
Natural hazard
17%
22%
Fire
16%
Equipment
Explosion 24%
8%
Water damage
13%
shows process losses by the number of incidents, and Figure 15 shows processes losses by gross loss cost.
Storage losses account for the highest percentage of incidents by both number and gross loss cost (42% of
all losses in which the main process involved in the incident could be identified). Losses in cleanrooms are
infrequent (4% by number) but expensive (15% by gross loss cost).
Storage losses can be broken down into the major storage types and are shown by number of losses in
Figure 16 and gross loss cost in Figure 17.
In 60 of the losses that were over US$500,000 there was enough information to identify the ignition source.
The most common ignition source was electrical (Figure 18) at 50% of the losses. However, losses caused
by electrical ignition sources only makes up 16% of the total gross loss cost (Figure 19). Hot work losses
are the most costly (43%).
Electrical sparks/arcing and short circuits made up two thirds of all the electrical source losses (Figure 20).
The other electrical ignition sources were lightning, over-voltage, and static.
Other
10% Natural hazard
23%
Fire
22%
Equipment
16%
Explosion Water damage
17% 12%
Electrical breakdown
18%
Service interruption Mechanical
40% breakdown
15%
Pressure equipment
breakdown
27%
Electrical breakdown
9% Mechanical
breakdown
4%
Service interruption
20%
Pressure equipment
breakdown
67%
Lighting
4%
Earthquake
15%
Lighting
1%
Earthquake
Wind and hail 11%
16%
Flood
72%
Fig. 13. Pharmaceutical natural hazard losses (percentage by gross loss cost)
Air
handling
Chemical reactions 2%
3%
Laboratory
Electricity supply
8% Chemical processes
interruption
9% 17%
Drug preparation
15%
Storage
42%
Clean room
4%
Air
Laboratory handling
Chemical reactions 4% 1%
8%
Electricity supply Chemical
interruption processes
2% 12%
Drug preparation
16%
Storage
Clean room 42%
15%
Chemical storage
6%
Refrigerated drug
storage Drug storage
27% 25%
Pharmaceutical
storage
42%
Chemical storage
2%
Pharmaceutical
storage
76%
Hot work
17%
Electrical
50%
Hot surface
5%
Friction
3%
Fig. 18. Pharmaceutical losses by ignition source (percentage by number of losses)
Arson
1%
Human element
4% Open flame
Chemical reaction
11%
18%
Electrical
16%
Hot work
43%
Hot surface
7%
Friction
1%
Fig. 19. Pharmaceutical losses by ignition source (percentage by gross loss cost)
Static
7%
Spark/arcing
Short circuit 33%
33%
Fig. 20. Pharmaceutical losses with an electrical ignition source (percentage by number of losses)
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data Sheet 1-2, Earthquakes
Data Sheet 1-44, Damage-Limiting Construction
Data Sheet 1-45, Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems
Data Sheet 1-56, Cleanrooms
Data Sheet 1-57, Plastics in Construction
Data Sheet 4-5, Portable Extinguishers
Data Sheet 4-9, Clean Agent Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 4-11N, Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems
Data Sheet 5-1, Electrical Equipment in Hazardous (Classified) Locations
Data Sheet 5-23, Emergency and Standby Power Systems
Data Sheet 5-32, Electronic Data Processing Systems
Data Sheet 6-9, Industrial Ovens and Dryers
Data Sheet 6-11, Fume Incinerators
Data Sheet 7-2, Waste Solvent Recovery
Data Sheet 7-7/17-12, Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities
Data Sheet 7-13, Mechanical Refrigeration
Data Sheet 7-14, Fire Protection for Chemical Plants
Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations
Data Sheet 7-43, Loss Prevention in Chemical Plants
Data Sheet 7-45, Instrumentation and Control in Safety Applications
Data Sheet 7-46, Chemical Reactors and Reactions
Data Sheet 7-49, Emergency Venting Of Vessels
Data Sheet 7-50, Compressed Gases in Cylinders
Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels, and Equipment
Data Sheet 7-61, Facilities Processing Radioactive Materials
Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires
Data Sheet 7-78, Industrial Exhaust Systems
Data Sheet 7-88, Storage Tanks for Ignitable Liquids.
Data Sheet 7-95, Compressors
Data Sheet 7-98, Hydraulic Fluids
Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer by Organic and Synthetic Fluids
Data Sheet 8-9, Storage of Class 1, 2, 3, 4 and Plastic Commodities
Data Sheet 8-29, Refrigerated Storage
Data Sheet 9-16, Burglary and Theft
Class 4910, Cleanroom Materials Flammability Test Protocol
Class 7440, Firesafe Valves
4.2 Other
American Petroleum Institute (API). Fire Test for Soft-Seated Quarter-Turn Valves. API 607.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals. NFPA 45.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). National Electrical Code. NFPA 70.
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Current Good Manufacturing Practices for Finished Pharmaceuticals.
21 CFR, Chapter I, Part 211.
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Current Good Manufacturing Practices in Manufacturing, Processing,
Packing or Holding of Drugs, General. 21 CFR, Chapter I, Part 210.
BLEVE: Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. It occurs when, for example, a drum of liquid is exposed
to a fire, which causes the contained liquid to vaporize, overpressure and fail the drum, with the immediate
vaporization of the released liquid. If the liquid is ignitable, a large fireball will be created.
Campaign: the process of making different chemicals in a particular process system by producing chemical
A for X period of time, and then cleaning out the process system and producing chemical B for Y period
of time, etc. The period of time could be days, weeks or months.
Clean: as applied to Pharmaceutical operations, this means free from dirt, stain and other impurities. (See
Table 1.)
Combustible Dust: Combustibility of a dust is established by tests that expose the material to ignition sources
of various intensities, such as a spark, a match flame, a Bunsen burner, or a Meker burner. A combustible
dust is not always an explosible dust. Dust explosibility is established by ASTM tests E1226 or E1515, or the
national/international equivalent (e.g., ISO 6184/1). Any sample of dust with a median particle size smaller
than 500 microns is possibly explosible unless testing proves otherwise. Dust with a median particle size
greater than 500 microns can be assumed to be non-explosible as long as particles smaller than 500 microns
have not been segregated during material handling.
Cytotoxic: Compound that is toxic to cells. Chemotherapy drugs used to treat cancer are cytotoxic.
DIERS: Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems; see Data Sheet 7-49, Emergency Venting of Vessels,
for details.
Ethical pharmaceutical: A prescription medicine on which the patent held by the developing company is still
valid (also see generic pharmaceutical).
FM Approved: References to “FM Approved” in this data sheet mean that the products and services described
have satisfied the criteria for FM Approval. Refer to the Approval Guide, an online resource of FM Approvals,
for a complete listing of products and services that are FM Approved.
Ignitable Liquid: In this document the term is used to describe any liquid that will burn.
FRP: Fiber-reinforced plastic.
Generic pharmaceutical: A prescription medicine on which the patent has expired, allowing it to be produced
by many manufacturers (also see ethical pharmaceutical).
GRP: Glass-reinforced plastic.
HAZMAT: Hazardous material. Could refer to an ignitable, corrosive, or toxic liquid; a flammable, corrosive,
or toxic gas; or a combustible, corrosive, or toxic solid.
Inherent safety: Process whereby hazards are minimized by intensification, substitution, attenuation, limitation
of effects, and simplification/error tolerance (see Data Sheet 7-43).
Master Cell Bank (MCB): MCBs are the original modified biological material. There are also Research Cell
Banks (RCBs) and Master Working Cell Banks (MWCBs). MWCBs are copied from MCBs and are used for
production. They are often kept in “straws” or milliliter-sized vials. They can be stored in liquid nitrogen flasks
of 5 gal (19 liter) capacity, or liquid nitrogen-cooled freezers of 35 to 70 ft3 (1 to 2 m2) volume.
Nutraceuticals: Nutraceuticals are biological substances specifically derived from plants.
Parenteral: Medication that is administered by a route that bypasses the gastro-intestinal tract, such as a
drug given by injection.
PLDC: Pressurized liquid dispensing container. NFPA uses the term pressurized bulk solvent storage
container (PBSSC).
Potent compound: See toxic compound.
Primary pharmaceutical plant: A facility where APIs are produced.
Secondary pharmaceutical plant: A facility where the APIs manufactured by the primary plant (or by third
parties) are converted into a form that is suitable for use by a patient.
Sterile: As applied to pharmaceutical operations, this means free from bacteria and other microorganisms.
(See Table 1.)
Thermolabile: Subject to loss of characteristic properties on being heated to or above 55°C (131°F), a
characteristic of many immune bodies, enzymes, and vitamins.
Toll converter: A third-party company that carries out one or more of the steps in the manufacturing process
of a finished pharmaceutical commodity. The toll converter could be a primary or a secondary pharmaceutical
facility. For instance, a primary plant may produce an intermediate in-house, then send it to a toll converter
who processes it further to produce the active product. The toll converter might return the processed material
to the plant, or to one of the pharmaceutical facility’s other plants, for further processing. Or, the toll converter
might formulate, package, and distribute the product on behalf of the pharmaceutical plant.
Toxic compound: A substance that is poisonous and/or may produce an injurious or deadly effect on
introduction into a living organism.
USP/NF: The United States Pharmacopeia (USP) and National Formulary (NF) are standards for potency
and purity for most common drug products. They have been published since 1833 and 1887, respectively, and
were combined for the first time in 1980. Revisions take place every 5 years.
Vivarium: An enclosed area for keeping and raising animals for observation and research.
WFI: Water for injection.
WIP: Work in process.