G.R. No. 183965 Uy Vs Chua

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600 5/17/23, 8:23 PM
G.R. No. 183965. September 18, 2009.*
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, petitioner, vs. JOSE NGO CHUA,

respondent.
Pleadings and Practice; A party may directly appeal to this

Court from a decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on
pure questions of law.·A party may directly appeal to this Court
from a decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on pure
questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of
facts; a question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to
the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed
facts.
Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata is a rule
that pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law.·The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon
two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation,
interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo
debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. For res judicata, to serve as an
absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4)
there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.
Compromise Agreements; Contracts; A compromise is a contract
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whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a

litigation or put an end to one already commenced.·A compromise
is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate
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* THIRD DIVISION.
807
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 807
Uy vs. Chua
of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic (537 SCRA 513 [2007]), the
Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a
judgment on the merits. It must be emphasized, though, that like
any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the
requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of
the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established. And,
like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise
agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is
contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights
in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect
at all.
Civil Law; Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for
acknowledgement, affecting a personÊs civil status, which cannot be
the subject of compromise.·Advincula v. Advincula (10 SCRA 189
[1964]) has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar.
Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment
and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of
both parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela
again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for
acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared
that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not
bar the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking
for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action
for acknowledgement, affecting a personÊs civil status, which cannot
be the subject of compromise.
Same; Filiation; It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence,
that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.·It is
settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation
of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there
be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity
and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence
or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Courts; No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to
circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil
Code.·Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the
Com-
808
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Uy vs. Chua
promise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in

Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract valid
and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of
RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no
authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement
that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was
executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9
would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the
approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow
itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition
under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Judgments; A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all.·A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to
be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on
sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. In
sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is

not barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction
to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondentÊs Compromise
Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; and,
consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been
rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have
attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
Pleadings and Practice; RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that
while petitionerÊs admission may have evidentiary value, it does not,
by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.·The Court
must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and
public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitionerÊs admission
may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively
establish the lack of filiation.
809
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 809
Uy vs. Chua
Demurrer to Evidence; Demurrer to evidence authorizes a

judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to
submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiffÊs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.
·Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the
case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part,
as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff Ês evidence shows that
he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid
or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar
to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant
or deny. The Court has recently established some guidelines on
when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus: A demurrer
to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff Ês evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be
drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant,
a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence

is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable
to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out
one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no
evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should
be sustained where the plaintiff Ês evidence is prima facie
insufficient for a recovery.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; When there is a strong
showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the
strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax
the same in the interest of substantial justice.·It must be kept in
mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong
showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the
strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax
the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court
were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why
courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the
balance, technicalities take backseat against substantive rights,
and not the other way around.
810

Uy vs. Chua
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolution of the

Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 24.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alex D. Tolentino and William M. Mañus for petitioner.
Rolando M. Lim for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which
granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo
Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special Proceeding No.

12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003
before the RTC a Petition1 for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB,
assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent,
who was then married, had an illicit relationship with
Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two
children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan.
Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving
birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that
petitionerÊs birth certificate be filled out with the following
names: „ALFREDO F. SURPOSA‰ as father and „IRENE
DUCAY‰ as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the
name of IreneÊs father, and Ducay was the maiden surname
of IreneÊs mother. Respondent financially supported
petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and
regularly given petitioner allowances before she got
married. He also provided her with employment. When
petitioner was still in high school, respondent required
_______________
1 Records, pp. 1-7.
811
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 811

Uy vs. Chua
her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by

his family. She was later on able to work at the Gaisano-
Borromeo Branch through respondentÊs efforts. Petitioner
and Allan were introduced to each other and became
known in the Chinese community as respondentÊs
illegitimate children. During petitionerÊs wedding,
respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as
his representative, and it was the latter who acted as
father of the bride. RespondentÊs relatives even attended
the baptism of petitionerÊs daughter.2
In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December

2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship
with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.4 Hearings
then ensued during which petitioner testified that
respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care
of all her needs until she finished her college education;
and that he came to visit her on special family occasions.
She also presented documentary evidence to prove her
claim of illegitimate filiation. Subsequently, on 27 March
2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence5 on the
ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-
Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already
been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had already
filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-
Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered
into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB, which
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 1-6.

3 Id., at pp. 19-32.
4 Id., at p. 19.
5 Rollo, p. 53.
812

Uy vs. Chua
was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision6 dated 21

February 2000. The full contents of said Decision reads:
„Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the

parties on February 18, 2000, praying that judgment be rendered in
accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows:
„1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and
acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation

between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and
[herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This
declaration, admission or acknowledgement is concurred with
petitionerÊs brother Allan, who although not a party to the
case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also
abides by the declaration herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling
petitioner and her brotherÊs (Allan) civil, monetary and
similar claims but without admitting any liability,
[respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay
the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner
and her brother hereby acknowledge to have received in full
the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that
they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or
demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino
Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against all
corporations, companies or business enterprises including
Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and
Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO
CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or
participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all
counterclaim or counter-demand with respect to the subject
matter of the present petition.
_______________
6 Copy of the Petition and the RTC decision in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB
not attached to the records of the petition before this Court.
813
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 813

Uy vs. Chua
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a

judgment for the permanent dismissal with prejudice of the
captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment

permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim.‰
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the
Court hereby approves the same. Judgment is rendered in
accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The
parties are enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings
embodied in the agreement.‰7
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21

February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in Special
Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition8 to
respondentÊs Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now
assailed Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondentÊs
Demurrer.
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of
respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer and Opposition,
respectively, as follows:
„This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the

Evidence submitted to this Court; the Opposition thereto; the Comment
on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
xxxx
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata
because there was a judgment entered based on the
Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-sala
Court, branch 09, on the same issues and between the same
parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is
beyond review, reversal or alteration by another Regional
Trial Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter how
erroneous.
_______________
7 Records, pp. 210-211.

8 Id., at p. 237.
814
Uy vs. Chua
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitionerÊs pleadings

to the effect that there is no blood relationship between
petitioner and respondent, which is a declaration against
interest, are conclusive on her and she should not be
permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitionerÊs
father is Alfredo Surposa is a public document which is the
evidence of the facts therein stated, unless corrected by
judicial order.
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to
their compromise agreement, she is estopped from refuting
on the effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein
respondent].
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is
established by the open, and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative
grounds for a Motion to Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future
legitime can not be subject to compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of
another action asking for the same relief against the same
defendant.‰9
Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions

of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
„Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court

believes that its hands are tied. Unless the Court of Appeals strikes
down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to
vacate, much more annul, that Judgment issued by a co-equal
court, which had long become final and executory, and in fact
executed.
_______________
9 Id., at p. 304.
815
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 815

Uy vs. Chua
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do

otherwise would result in patent abuse of judicial discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction
cannot be waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the
Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of
allowing herein case involving same parties to re-litigate on the
same issues already closed.‰10
In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
„WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the

Evidence is hereby given due course, as the herein case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.‰11
RTC-Branch 24 denied petitionerÊs Motion for

Reconsideration12 in a Resolution13 dated 29 July 2008.
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the
following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to
judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases
enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu
City effectively bars the filing of the present case.14
At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC

Resolution granting respondentÊs Demurrer to Evidence,
petitioner
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 304-305.

11 Id., at p. 305.
12 Id., at p. 308.
13 Id., at p. 315.
14 Rollo, p. 7.
816

Uy vs. Chua
went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper,

given that petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her
instant Petition.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
„SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.·A party

desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.‰
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a

decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on
pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand,
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the other
hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not
disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct
application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed
facts.15
The central issue in this case is whether the
Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner
and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every
well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded
upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which
makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and
(2) the hardship of
_______________
15 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, 28 March

2008, 550 SCRA 251, 257.
817
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 817

Uy vs. Chua
the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same

cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.16
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a
subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.17
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
previously before RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were
both actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence,
there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action between the two cases. However, the
question arises as to whether the other elements of res
judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an
end to one already commenced.18 In Estate of the late Jesus
S. Yujuico v. Republic,19 the Court pronounced that a
judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment
on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other
contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the
requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a)
consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is
the subject
_______________
16 Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 385; 345 SCRA 617, 628-
629 (2000).
17 Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, 26
October 2007, 537 SCRA 513, 537.
18 CIVIL CODE, Article 2028.
19 Supra note 17, citing Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239; 424 SCRA
108, 123 (2004).
818

Uy vs. Chua
matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that

is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.
Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or
public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and
holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect
at all.20
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls
attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:
„ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall

be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.‰ (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and

respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to
settle the question of petitionerÊs status and filiation, i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In
exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of
respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan

P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that
petitioner also waived away her rights to future support
and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent.
Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
819
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 819

Uy vs. Chua
Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background

closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela Advincula
(Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment and
support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of
both parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after,
Manuela again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case
No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against
Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case No.
3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent
filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the
same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action
for acknowledgement, affecting a personÊs civil status,
which cannot be the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the
status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the
status and filiation of a child.22 Paternity and filiation or
the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties.23
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates
no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void
agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the
partiesÊ alleged performance (partial or full) of their
respective prestations.24
_______________
20 Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, 17 May 2005, 458

SCRA 714, 735.
21 119 Phil. 448; 10 SCRA 189 (1964).
22 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, 31 August 2005,
468 SCRA 438, 447-448, citing Baluyut v. Baluyut, G.R. No. 33659, 14
June 1990, 186 SCRA 506, 511.
23 De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 515, 522; 303 SCRA 176, 183
(1999).
24 See Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 366
Phil. 863, 871; 307 SCRA 394, 399 (1999).
820

Uy vs. Chua
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving

the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it
would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9
to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority
to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that
was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract
was executed and submitted for approval by both parties.
RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any
circumstances, to grant the approval of the said
Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be
used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under
Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote in
Francisco v. Zandueta25 is relevant herein:
„It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give

a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the
laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a
competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before
it, but whether the court itself is competent under any
circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And
where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment

is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to
it the vitality which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign
state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its
agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people.‰
(7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment

at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can
never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is
void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be
treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.26
_______________
25 61 Phil. 752, 757-758 (1935).

26 Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo, G.R. No. 155785, 13 April
2007, 521 SCRA 85, 97.
821
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 821

Uy vs. Chua
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-

Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch
9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
petitioner and respondentÊs Compromise Agreement, which
was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently,
the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been
rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not
have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the
merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though
the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent is void for being contrary to law and public
policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-

CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while
petitionerÊs admission may have evidentiary value, it does
not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.27
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is
remanding this case to the RTC-Branch 24 for the
continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-
CEB, more particularly, for respondentÊs presentation of
evidence.
Although respondentÊs pleading was captioned a
Demurrer to Evidence, it was more appropriately a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced in full
below:
„SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.·After the plaintiff has

completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he
shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted
but on
_______________
27 See De Asis v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23.
822

Uy vs. Chua
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have

waived the right to present evidence.‰
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the

merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff Ês evidence shows that he is not entitled to the
relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument
for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a
motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either
grant or deny.28
The Court has recently established some guidelines on

when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:
„A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and

the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the
plaintiff Ês evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as
may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery
against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained.
A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his
favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the
plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an
allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff Ês evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.‰29
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to

evidence is whether petitioner has been able to show that
she is entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-
Branch 24 to make such a determination. A perusal of the
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren
of any discussion on this matter. It did not take into
consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner.
RTC-Branch 24 dismissed
_______________
28 Condes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161304, 27 July 2007, 528

SCRA 339, 352.
29 Id., at pp. 352-353.
823
VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 823

Uy vs. Chua
Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of res

judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of
RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
approving the Compromise Agreement between petitioner
and respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008
of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having dismissed

Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res
judicata rather than an adjudication on the merits of
respondentÊs demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last
line of Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court should not
apply herein and respondent should still be allowed to
present evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special
Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must
prevail. When there is a strong showing that grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The
Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will
be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in
rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when
on the balance, technicalities take backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around.30
WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated
25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is
REVERSED and set aside. This case is ordered
REMANDED to the said trial court for further proceedings
in accordance with the ruling of the Court herein. No costs.
_______________
30 See People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58, 64; 269 SCRA 62, 67 (1997),
citing De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182, 188; 256 SCRA 171,
179-180 (1996).
824

Uy vs. Chua
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura

and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Resolution reversed and set aside. The case is remanded

to the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance
with the ruling of the Court.
Note.·The law requires that every reasonable

presumption be made in favor of legitimacy, a presumption
which not only flows out of a declaration in the statute but
is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. (Estate of Rogelio G. Ong vs.
Diaz, 540 SCRA 480 [2007])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 600 5/17/23, 8:23 PM

G.R. No. 183965. September 18, 2009.*

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, petitioner, vs. JOSE NGO CHUA,

Pleadings and Practice; A party may directly appeal to this

whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 807

808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

promise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in

sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 809

Demurrer to Evidence; Demurrer to evidence authorizes a

a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence

810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolution of the

Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special Proceeding No.

1 Records, pp. 1-7.

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 811

her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by

In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December

2 Id., at pp. 1-6.

812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision6 dated 21

„Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the

acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 813

5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a

captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment

With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21

„This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the

7 Records, pp. 210-211.

814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitionerÊs pleadings

Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions

„Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 815

This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do

In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:

„WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the

RTC-Branch 24 denied petitionerÊs Motion for

At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC

10 Id., at pp. 304-305.

816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper,

„SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.·A party

Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a

15 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, 28 March

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 817

the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same

818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that

„ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and

respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 819

Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background

20 Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, 17 May 2005, 458

820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving

„It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give

where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment

A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment

25 61 Phil. 752, 757-758 (1935).

VOL. 600, SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 821