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DC-AW-2010-02 Incomplete Unloading of EO Rail Tank Car
DC-AW-2010-02 Incomplete Unloading of EO Rail Tank Car
Target audience for this alert A potentially hazardous situation existed, not
EO rail tank car customers only because EO was standing in an
unmonitored container but also because there
What happened
was a risk of overfilling during the subsequent
A rail tank container (RTC) loaded with 55
loading.
tonnes of ethylene oxide (EO) was
incompletely unloaded at a customer site.
Approximately 7 tonnes of product remained
in the container. This was discovered some
weeks later when the RTC was returned to
Moerdijk to be re-loaded. During this period
the RTC was assumed to be empty.
The RTC was fitted with a track-and-trace
system, which monitors the RTC position and
the temperature and pressure of the product.
This system has two different alarm settings:
25 °C when full and 45 °C when empty.
The full/empty mode is determined by the Full/empty switch
manual full/empty indicator of the braking
system.
Why it happened
There were no independent checks of the product weight differences before and after the unloading
operation and there was no checklist in place to confirm that the weight difference was within an
acceptable range.
Lessons learned:
• Existing site controls may not always be effective in ensuring that RTCs are empty after
unloading.
Recommendations:
• Customers should review their unloading procedures and systems to ensure that effective
controls are in place to confirm that EO rail tank cars are fully empty before leaving the site.