The conception of International Persons is derived from the conception of the Law

of Nations. As this law is the body of rules which the civilised States consider legally
binding in their intercourse, every State which belongs to the civilised States, and is
therefore a member of the Family of Nations, is an International Person. There are,
however as will be seen, full and not-full sovereign States. Full sovereign States are
perfect, not-full sovereign States are imperfect, International Persons, for not-full
sovereign States are only in some respects subjects of International
Law.
In contradistinction to sovereign States which are real, there are also apparent, but
not real, International Persons
-such as Confederations of States and insurgents recognised as a belligerent Power
in a civil war. These are not, as will be seen,' real subjects of International Law, but
in some points are treated as though they were International Persons, without
thereby becoming members of the Family of Nations.
§ 64. A State 2 proper in contradistinction to colonies
-is in existence when the people is settled in a country under its own sovereign
Government. The conditions which must obtain for the existence of a State are
therefore four:
There must, first, be a people. A people is an aggregate of individuals of both sexes
who live together as a community in spite of the fact that they may belong to different
races or creeds, or be of different colour.
There must, secondly, be a country in which the people has settled down. A
wandering people is not a State.3 But it matters not whether the country is small or
large; it may consist, as in the case of city States, of one town only.
There must, thirdly, be a Government -that is, one or more persons who are the
representatives of the people and rule according to the law of the land. An anarchistic
community is not a State.
There must, fourthly and lastly, be a sovereign Govern-ment. Sovereignty is supreme
authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthly authority.
Sovereignty in the strict and narrowest sense of the term implies, therefore,
independence all round, within and without the borders of the country.
§ 65. A State in its normal appearance does possess independence all round, and
therefore full sovereignty. Yet there are States in existence which certainly do not
possess full sovereignty, and are therefore named not-full sovereign States. All
States which are under the suzerainty or under the protectorate of another State, or
are member-States of a so-called federal State, belong to this group. All of them
possess supreme authority and independence with regard to a part of the functions
of a State, whereas with regard to another part they are under the authority of
another State.
This fact explains the doubt as to whether such not-full sovereign States can be
International Persons and subjects of the Law of Nations at all.!
That they cannot be full, perfect, and normal subjects of International Law there is
no doubt. But it is inaccurate to maintain that they can have no international position
what-ever. They often enjoy in many respects the rights, and fulfil in other points the
duties, of International Persons.
They frequently send and receive diplomatic envoys, or at least consuls. They often
conclude commercial or other treaties. Their monarchs enjoy the privileges which,
according to the Law of Nations, the Municipal Laws of the different States must
grant to the monarchs of foreign States.
No other explanation of these and similar facts can be given except that these not-
full sovereign States are in some way or another International Persons and subiects
of International Law. Such imperfect International Personality is, to some extent, an
anomaly; but the very existence of States without full sovereignty is an anomaly in
itself. The distinction between full sovereign States and not-full sovereign States is
based upon the opinion that sovereignty is divisible, so that the powers connected
with sovereignty need not necessarily be united in one hand.
But some deny the divisibility of sovereignty, and maintain that a State is either
sovereign or not. It is therefore necessary to consider the conception of sovereignty
more closely.1
§ 67. The term sovereignty was introduced into political science by Bodin in his
celebrated work De la République, which appeared in 1577. Before Bodin, at the
end of the Middle Ages, the word souverain ? was used in France for an authority,
political or other, which had no other authority above itself. Thus the highest courts
were called Cours Souveraines. Bodin, however, gave quite a new meaning to the
old conception. Being under the influence of, and in favour of, the policy of
centralisation initiated by Louis xI. of France (1461-1483), the founder of French
absolutism, he defined sovereignty as ' the absolute and perpetual power within a
State.' According to Bodin, such power is the supreme power within a State without
any restriction whatever except the Ohmmandments of God and the Law of Nature.
No constitution can limit sovereignty, which is an attribute of the king in a monarchy,
and of the people in a democracy. A sovereign is above positive law. A contract is
only binding upon the sovereign because the Law of Nature commands that a
contract shall be binding.1
The conception of sovereignty thus introduced was at once accepted by writers on
politics of the sixteenth century, but the majority of these writers taught that
sovereignty could be restricted by a constitution and by positive law.
Thus at once a somewhat weaker conception of sovereignty than that of Bodin made
its appearance. On the other hand, in the seventeenth century, Hobbes went even
beyond Bodin, maintaining? that a sovereign was not bound by anything, and had a
right over everything, even over religion. Whereas a good many writers followed
Hobbes, others, especially Pufendorf, denied, in contradistinction to Hobbes, that
sovereignty involves omnipotence. According to Pufendorf, sovereignty is the
supreme power in a State, but not absolute power, and sovereignty may well be
constitutionally re-stricted.& Yet in spite of all the differences in the definitions of
sovereignty, all the authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries agree that
sovereignty is indivisible.
§ 68. In the eighteenth century matters changed again. N The fact that the several
hundred reigning princes of the . member-States of the German Empire had in
practice, ir although not theoretically, become more or less independent since the
Westphalian Peace enforced upon writers the C necessity of recognising a
distinction between an absolute, perfect, full sovereignty, on the one hand, and, on
the other, a relative, imperfect, not-full or half sovereignty. Absolute and full
sovereignty was attributed to those monarchs who enjoyed an unqualified
independence within and without their States. Relative and not-full sovereignty, or
half sovereignty, was attributed to those monarchs who were, in various points of
internal or foreign affairs of state, more or less dependent upon other monarchs. By
this distinction the divisibility of sovereignty was recognised.& And when in 1787 the
United States of America turned from a Confederation of States into a federal State,
the division of sovereignty between the sovereign Federal State and the sovereign
member-States became prominent in political theory. But the divisibility of
sovereignty was not universally recognised in the eighteenth century. It suffices to
mention Rousseau, whose Contrat Social appeared in 1762 and who again
defended the indivisibility of sovereignty.
§ 69. During the nineteenth century the old controversy regarding divisibility of
sovereignty had by no means died out. It acquired a fresh stimulus, on the one hand,
through Switzerland and Germany turning into federal States, and, on the other,
through the conflict between the United States of America and her Southern
member-States. The theory of the concurrent sovereignty of the federal State and
its member-States, as defended by The Federalist (Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, and John Jay) in 1787, was in Germany taken up by Waitz,' who found
many followers.
The theory of the indivisibility of sovereignty was defended by Calhoun, and many
European writers followed him in time. In view of the somewhat academic nature of
the controversy surrounding this subject it seems preferable to cling to the facts of
life and the practical, though abnormal and possibly illogical, condition of affairs. As
there can be no doubt about the fact that there are semi-independent States in
existence, it may well be maintained that sovereignty is divisible.
§ 70. While in the nineteenth century the problem of sovereignty was, as has been
shown, discussed largely with reference to the question whether sovereignty can be
conceived of as divisible, it assumed a different aspect in the twentieth century
before and after the First World War.
The question which is now confronting the science of law and politics is how far
sovereignty as it presents itself from the point of view of the internal law of the State,
namely, as the highest, underived power and as the exclusive competence to
determine its jurisdictional limits, is compatible with the normal functioning and
development of International Law and organisation. The very notion of International
Law as a body of rules of conduct binding upon States irrespective of their Municipal
Law and legislation, implies the idea of their subjection to International Law and
makes it impossible to accept their claim to absolute sovereignty in the international
sphere. Their mutual independence is indeed a fundamental rule of International
Law; but it is only by reference to a higher legal order that the mutual independence
of States, viewed as a rule of law, is conceivable. On the other hand, owing to the
weakness of International Law, its supremacy over the States composing the
international community is limited to the duty which it imposes upon them to observe
and, within a restricted sphere, to submit to the enforcement of the existing rules
created by custom or treaty or flowing from the very existence of the society of
States.1 It does not as yet include a competence on the part of the international
community to impose fresh obligations upon an unwilling State, or to interfere with
its rights in cases in which changed conditions require the adaptation of International
Law to the requirements of international peace and progress.? Neither does it as yet
include the duty to submit international disputes to judicial determination.3 The
abstract doctrine of equality of States is, to a large extent, yet another manifestation
of that conception of sovereignty. These aspects of sovereignty have been the
principal cause of the criticism levelled against it after the First and the Second World
Wars. It is being increasingly realised that progress in International Law, the
maintenance of international peace and, with it, of independent national States, are
in the long run conditioned by a partial surrender of their sovereignty so as to render
possible, within a limited sphere, the process of international legislation and, within
a necessarily unlimited sphere, the securing of the rule of law as ascertained by
international tribunals endowed with obligatory jurisdiction.