01 POLI Constitutional Law Review TEXT, NOTES and CASES

Political Law Review
Constitutional Law
Text, Notes and Cases
Compiled by Rehne Gibb N. Larena | JD-NT-4 | AY 2020-21 | University of San Carlos

Political Law Review TEXT, NOTES and CASES Constitutional Law
TABLE OF CONTENTS c.4.3. Adherence to International Law 30 f.2. Special Sessions 48

c.4.4. Civilian Supremacy 31 f.3. Joint Sessions 49
Constitutional Law 6
c.4.5. Government as protector of the people, and f.3.a. Voting separately 49
Module 1-1 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN PHILIPPINE POLITICAL people as defenders of the State 31 f.3.b. Voting jointly 49
LAW 6
c.4.6. Separation of Church and State 31 G. CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANS WITHIN CONGRESS 49
A. THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 🔗 6
c.4.7. Policies 32 g.1. Electoral Tribunals 49
a.1. Amendment and Revision 6
Right to life of the unborn 32 g.1.a. Composition 49
a.1.1. Doctrine of fair and proper submission 8
Right to balanced and healthful ecology 32 g.1.b. Function 49
a.2. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy 8
Right to Quality Education 33 g.1.c. Judicial Review 51
B. The Constitution as interpreted by Courts: Theory of Judicial
Right of Indigenous Cultural Communities 33 g.2. Commission on Appointments 53
Review 8
Family as social institution 34 H. SALARIES 53
b.1. Judicial Review 8
c.5. Doctrine of Separation of Powers 34 I. PRIVILEGES 53
5th Requirement: Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts 13
Module 1-2 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 37 i.1. Freedom from Arrest 53
b.2. Political Questions 15
I. STRUCTURE 37 i.2. Privilege of Speech and Debate 54
b.3. Effect Of Declaration of Unconstitutionality 15
A. COMPOSITION 37 J. RESTRICTIONS 55
C. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE 15
a.1. Senate (Secs. 2-4) 37 j.1. Appearance as counsel 56
c.1. Territory 16
a.2. House of Representatives (Secs. 5-8) 37 II. POWERS (Art. VI) 56
c.2. People 17
a.2.1. On Party-list 40 A. GENERAL PLENARY POWERS (Sec. 1) 56
c.2.1. Citizenship 17
B. QUALIFICATIONS AND TERM OF OFFICE 42 B. LEGISLATIVE MILL 56
c.2.1. Importance 17
b.1. Residence requirement 43 C. REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILLS 56
c.2.2. Modes of Acquisition; Citizens of the
Philippines 17 b.2. Term vs. Tenure 43 c.1. Subject and Title 56
c.2.3. Naturalization: Judicial, Administrative, C. ELECTION 44 c.2. As to speci ic laws 56
Congressional 21 D. ORGANIZATION & SESSIONS 45 Pork barrel system 59
c.2.4. Loss of citizenship 22 d.1. Election of Of icers 45 c.3. Procedure for passage of bills 60
c.2.5. Reacquisition 22 d.2. Quorum 45 c.4. Presidential Veto 61
c.2.6. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance 23 d.3. Rules of Proceedings 45 c.5. Effectivity of Laws 63
c.2.7. Foundlings 24 d.4. Discipline of Members 46 c.6. Initiative and Referendum 63
c.3. Sovereignty 25 d.5. Journal and Congressional Records 46 D. LIMITATIONS TO POWER OF LEGISLATION 63
Doctrine of Non-Suability of State 25 d.5.a. The Enrolled Bill Theory 46 d.1. Express Limitations 63
c.3.1. Suit against State 25 d.5.b. Probative Value of Journal 47 d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations 64
c.3.2. Consent 25 d.5.c. Matters to be entered in the Journal 47 d.2.a. Non-delegation of legislative powers 64
c.4. Government 26 d.5.d. Journal Entry Rule v. Enrolled Bill Theory 47 d.2.b. Prohibition on passage of irrepealable laws
The State as Parens Patriae 26 E. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 48 64
c.4.1. Principles and Policies of Philippine F. SESSIONS 48 d.3. Procedural Limitations 65
Government 27 f.1. Regular sessions 48 E. AIDS TO LEGISLATION 65
c.4.2. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism 29
Based on the Syllabus of Dean Largo, Book of Cruz, Bernas By RGL 2 of 212
e.1. Question Hour 65 D. Power of Appointment 81 A.4. Security of Tenure 98

e.2. Legislative Investigations 66 d.1. Basis 81 A.5. Removal 98
e.2.1. Publication requirement 68 d.2. With Concurrence of COA 81 A.6. Fiscal Autonomy 100
F. OTHER POWERS 68 d.3. Upon recommendation of JBC 82 B. Powers of the Supreme Court 100
f.1. As Board of Canvassers in Elections for President d.4. Appointment of VP as Cabinet Member 83 B.1. Judicial Power 100
and VP 68 d.5. Appointments solely by President 83 B.2. Judicial Review 100
f.2. Call Special Election for President and VP 68 d.6. Limitations to Appointing Power 83 B.3. ART. VIII, Sec. 5 100
f.3. Revoke/ extend suspension of privilege of writ of d.6.1. Prohibition against Nepotism and Midnight B.4. ART. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3 103
habeas corpus, declaration of martial law 69 Appointments 83 B.5. Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the
f.4. Approve Presidential Amnesties 69 d.6.2. Interim or recess appointments 84 Supreme Court 104
f.5. Con irm certain appointments 69 d.6.3. Temporary designations 85 B.6. Manner of sitting and votes required 104
f.6. Concur in treaties 69 d.6.4. Limitations on Appointing Power of Acting B.7. Requirements as to decisions 105
f.7. Declare war and delegate emergency powers 69 President 85 b.7.1. Mandatory periods for deciding cases 106
f.8. Judge President’s itness 70 d.6.5. Power to remove 86 b.7.2. Court deliberations as con idential
f.9. Power of Impeachment or Political Justice 70 E. Pardoning Power 86 communication 107
f.9.a. Who may be impeached 70 e.1. Pardon distinguished from probation 86 B.8. Administrative Powers 107
f.9.b. Grounds 71 e.2. Pardon distinguished from parole 86 b.8.1. Supervision of lower courts 107
f.9.c. Procedure 71 e.3. Pardon distinguished from amnesty 86 b.8.2. Temporary assignment of judges 107
f.9.d. Effect 72 e.4. Effect of Pardon 87 b.8.3. Change of Venue 107
f.10. Power to amend constitution 72 e.5. Who may avail of amnesty 87 b.8.4. Appointment of of icials and employees of
Module 1-3 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 73 F. Military Powers 87 judiciary 107
I. The President 73 G. Emergency Powers 93 B.9. Rule-making Powers 107
A. Quali ications, Election, Term, Oath 73 H. Contracting and Guaranteeing Foreign Loans 94 B.10. Prohibition on Quasi-judicial or Administrative
Works 109
B. Privilege And Salary 74 I. Power over Foreign Affairs 94
C. Report on Judiciary 110
b.1. Executive Immunity 74 i.1. deportation of undesirable aliens 95
D. The Lower Courts 110
b.2. Executive Privilege 74 J. Power over Legislation 95
d.1. Quali ications and Appointments 110
C. Prohibitions 75 j.1. To address Congress 95
d.2. Salary 111
D. Succession 77 j.2. Preparation and submission of budget 95
d.3. Congressional power to reorganize and security of
At the beginning of the term 77 j.3. Veto power 95
tenure 111
During the term 77 j.4. Emergency powers, supra 95
d.4. Removal 111
Temporary Disability 78 Module 1-4 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 96
d.5. Jurisdiction 111
E. Removal 78 I. The Judiciary 96
d.6. Preparation of decisions 111
II. Powers and Functions of the President 78 A. The Supreme Court 96
d.7. Mandatory period for deciding 112
A. Executive Power 78 A.1. Composition 96
E. The Judicial and Bar Council 112
B. Power of Control 79 A.2. Appointment and Quali ications 96
F. Automatic Release of Appropriations for Judiciary 114
C. Power of General Supervision over LGUs 80 A.3. Salary 97
II. ECSTACS 114 f.2. Damages and interest as part of just compensation 1. Probable cause, de ined 151
III. National Economy and Patrimony (Art. XII) 🔗 116 128 2. Personal determination by a judge 152
A. Policy 116 f.3. Rental 129 3. Particularity of description 153
B. Natural Resources 117 g. Remedy of Dispossessed Owner 129 4. Warrants, how enforced 154
b.1. Regalian Doctrine 117 h. Allied provisions 130 5. Use of evidence obtained through a search warrant
b.2. Citizenship Requirement 118 i. Distinguished from police power 130 154
b.3. “The Grandfather Rule” in corporation 118 3. Taxation 131 e. Warrantless Arrest 155
C. Classi ication, Size, Conditions for Grant of Public Lands a. Elements for valid exercise 131 f. Warrantless Search 157
118 a.1 When exercised by legislature 132 Plain View 157
D. Private Lands 118 a.2 When exercised by LGU 132 Stop-and-frisk 157
d.1. Citizenship requirements 118 b. Tax exemptions 132 Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest 158
d.2. Exceptions 118 c. Remedies 133 Moving Vehicle 158
d.2.1 Legal Succession 118 Recap on Inherent Powers of the State 134 Consent Searches 158
d.2.2. Acquisition by former natural-born citizens Module 2-2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS 143 g. Checkpoint Searches 160
119 I. Constitutional Rights and Privileges 143 Bus Searches/Inspections 160
E. Economic Activities 119 a. Nature of provisions 143 h. Immunity from arrest 161
e.1. Rationale 119 b. Against whom enforceable 143 i. Effect of invalid search and seizure 161
e.2. Organization and Regulation of Private II. Due Process of Law 143 V. Rights of a Person Under Custodial Investigation 161
Corporations 119
a. In general 143 a. Origin and rationale 162
e.3. Operation of public utilities 120
b. Procedural Aspect 144 b. Custodial Investigation: nature and scope 163
e.4. Filipinization 120
b.1. Judicial Proceedings 144 c. Prohibited conduct of custodial investigation 163
e.4.1. of mass media and advertising 120
b.2. Administrative Proceedings 144 d. Right to remain silent 163
e.4.2. practice of professions 121
b.3. Academic due process 145 e. Right to have independent and competent counsel,
F. Monopolies, Combinations And Unfair Competition 121 preferably of own choice 163
c. Substantive Aspect 145
Module 2-1 POWERS OF THE STATE 122 f. Right to be informed 167
d. Scope of Guaranty; Persons Protected 145
1. Police Power 122 g. Waiver 168
III. Equal Protection of Law 146
2. Eminent Domain 124 h. Effect of non-compliance 168
a. Classi ication 147
a. De inition, Nature and Function 124 i. Out of Court Identi ications/Police Line-ups 168
b. Special Issues 148
b. When exercised by legislature 124 VI. Right to Bail 168
c.1. Selective Prosecution 148
c. When exercised by local government unit or other a. Bail, de ined 169
c.2. Legislations for speci ic class 148
delegates 124
IV. Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 149 b. When matter of right; When matter of discretion 169
d. Taking 126
a. Search and seizure, when unreasonable 150 b.1. Effect if offense changed from non-bailable to
e. Public use 126 bailable 170
b. Search warrant, de ined 151
f. Just compensation 127 b.2. Bail pending appeal 170
c. Warrant of arrest, de ined 151
f.1. How determined 127 c. Standards for ixing bail 171
d. Requisites for valid issuance 151
d. Right to bail and right to travel 171
e. Effect on right when detention is questioned 171 XV. Freedom of Expression 192
f. Right to bail and extradition proceedings 171 a. Nature, purpose and scope of guaranty 192
VII. Rights of the Accused 173 b. Freedom from prior restraint; censorship; Freedom from
a. To due process of law 174 Subsequent Punishment 193
b. To be presumed innocent 174 c. Unprotected utterances 195
c. To be heard 175 c.1. Criticism of Judicial Conduct 196
d. To be informed of nature and cause of accusation 175 d. Obscene Matters 196
e. Speedy, impartial and public trial 176 e. Right to Assemble; Freedom of Association 197
e.1. Right to speedy trial vs. Freedom of the press 177 f. Facial challenge 200
f. To confront witnesses and to compulsory processes 177 g. Penumbral Right 201
g. Trial in absentia 179 XVI. Freedom of Religion 201
When presence of accused is a duty 179 I. Non-establishment of religion 202
h. Prohibited punishments 179 a. Holding of Religious Rituals in Halls of Justice 203
1. Excessive ines, cruel, inhuman and degrading b. Operation of sectarian schools 204
punishments 179 c. Religious instructions in public schools 204
2. Involuntary servitudes 179 d. Tax Exemption 204
3. Imprisonment for debt 179 e. Public Aid to religion 204
i. Allied Right: Right Against Double Jeopardy 179 f. Public morals and religion 204
j. Double Jeopardy in continued or continuous crime 180 II. Free Exercise of Religion 205
k. Appeals 181 a. Freedom to propagate religious doctrine 205
k.1. Appeal in Criminal Case throws the whole case b. Religious belief and private employment 206
open for review 181 c. Religious belief and public employment 206
k.2. Appeal of civil aspect 181 XVII. Privacy of Communication and Correspondence 206
VIII. Privilege Against Self-incrimination 181 XVIII. Remedies For Violation of Constitutional Rights 209
a. Scope 181 a. Constitutional Writs 209
b. DNA testing and the right against self-incrimination 184 b. Damages 211
c. In what proceedings available 185 c. Claims for compensation 211
d. Use immunity v. Transactional Immunity 185 d. Mandamus 211
e. Exclusionary Rule 185 e. Declaratory Relief as an Improper Remedy 212
f. Effect of denial of privilege 185
IX. Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder 186
X. Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus 186
XI. Liberty of Abode and Travel 186
XII. Right to Information 188
XIII. Non-impairment of Obligations and Contracts 191
XIV. Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases 191
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
Constitutional Law sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such laws.
amendment or revision.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
Module 1-1 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN PHILIPPINE incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when rati ied by a
POLITICAL LAW conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certi ication by the be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules
Commission on Elections of the suf iciency of the petition.
A. THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 🔗 and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
[the] Act.
Santiago v COMELEC
a.1. Amendment and Revision The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as
Respondent Atty. Jesus S. Del in iled with Comelec a “Petition to expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
Article XVII, 1987 Constitution. Section 1. Any amendment to, or Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Of icials, by potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are delegation:
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: People’s Initiative.”
(1) Of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of
R.A. No. 6735 Intended To Include The System Of Initiative On Article VI of the Constitution;
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Amendments To The Constitution, But Is, Unfortunately, (2) Of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2)
Members; or Inadequate To Cover That System. of Article VI of the Constitution;
2. A constitutional convention. (3) To the people at large;
The right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed (4) To local governments; and
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly (5) To administrative bodies.
in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of implementation. The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising
system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a
a. at least twelve per centum of the total number of XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
registered voters, However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
Is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of
b. of which every legislative district must be represented by at showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
Congress to “provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. right?” NO. (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within ive years First. Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (b) ixes a standard -- the limits of which are suf iciently
following the rati ication of this Constitution nor oftener than once
determinate and determinable -- to which the delegate must
every ive years thereafter. Second. It is true that Section 3 (De inition of Terms) of the Act conform in the performance of his functions.
de ines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 A suf icient standard is one which de ines legislative policy, marks
this right. (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the its limits, maps out its boundaries and speci ies the public agency to
percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does command is to be effected.
Members, call a constitutional convention, OR by a majority vote of not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a Constitution. concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
convention. Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum to the COMELEC is then invalid.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when rati ied by a majority of the This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main Lambino v Comelec
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 initiative. Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI and Sections 1-4 shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two
of Article VII and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive
Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary unrelated subject matter in the same petition. Under American Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan
form of government. jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Lozano v Nograles
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies ONLY to an The two petitions, iled by their respective petitioners in their
People capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the
amendment of the Constitution and NOT to its revision. In
nulli ication of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution
The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of
proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a
shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. Revision broadly implies a change that Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people a. alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering The "case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on the principle of separation of powers or the system of deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions," lest the
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential checks-and-balances. court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or
elements must be present. executive action. An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement
There is also revision if the change is the requisite of "ripeness." The concern is whether a case involves
a. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire b. alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated,
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. when the change affects substantial provisions of the or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of
constitution. the twofold aspect of ripeness: irst, the itness of the issues for
b. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by
be embodied in a petition. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
must state the fact of such attachment. constitution, while amendment generally affects only the speci ic challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
provision being amended. challenging it.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative A two-part test is thus used: the quantitative test and the qualitative In the present case, the itness of petitioners' case for the exercise of
petition. test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is judicial review is grossly lacking. In the irst place, petitioners have
"so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial not suf iciently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the
entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only
people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes
existing provisions." The court examines only the number of resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future
mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of
on Transitory Provisions, provides:Section 4(4). Within forty- ive The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has
days from rati ication of these amendments, the interim Parliament proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the
yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of
discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."
involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. Far from being a
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's
not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that a.2. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy lose their reason for being.
would warrant an intervention from this Court.
In the instant case, where a foreign irm submits the highest bid in a
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
a.1.1. Doctrine of fair and proper submission concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
Tolentino v Comelec and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign irm the award should go to
The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation has been de ined as the fundamental and paramount law of the the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the
that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or government, assigns to the different departments their respective this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
plebiscite. powers and duties, and establishes certain ixed principles on which rules, the constitutional iat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
Concurring opinion of Reyes, Zaldivar, Catro, and Makasiar, JJ. is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and
Assuming that the Constitutional Convention has power to propose all public authority administered.
piecemeal amendments and submit each separately to the people for B. The Constitution as interpreted by Courts: Theory of
rati ication, we are nonetheless persuaded Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract Judicial Review
(1) that there is no proper submission of the proposed whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
amendment in question within the meaning and intendment entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void b.1. Judicial Review
of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, and and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
(2) that the forthcoming election is not the proper election fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is Macalintal v PET
envisioned by the same provision of the Constitution. deemed written in every statute and contract. Macalintal impugns the constitutionality of the creation of the PET.
The minimum requirement that must be met in order that there can It should be stressed that while the Malaysian irm offered the higher The dif iculty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
be a proper submission to the people of a proposed constitutional bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
amendment is that amendments must be fairly laid before the provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of
people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, a judicial inquiry:
rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy 1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare provision of the Constitution bestows preference on quali ied 2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the
them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that proper party;
as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, 3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
extraneous or possibly insidious in luences. respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under possible opportunity; and
What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing 4. The decision of the constitutional question must be
submitting an amendment for rati ication, should put every the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the necessary to the determination of the case itself.
instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known
to all the bidders and other interested parties. To prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of any of icial policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus
rati ication or rejection. One thing is submission and another is Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
rati ication. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more
rejection. bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaf irmed in
nulli ied for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle Tileston v. Ullman. For a private individual to invoke the judicial
in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action,
the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not suf icient that he has a general interest common On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which are legally demandable and enforceable."
to all members of the public. sponsored by Rep. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases system of government. It obtains not through express provision but
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
following requirements are met: On June 2, 2003, former President Estrada iled an impeachment jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
complaint ( irst impeachment complaint) against CJ Davide and follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is complaint was endorsed by Reps. Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
unconstitutional; and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, secure coordination in the workings of the various
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn,
the validity of the election law in question; with the Supreme Court as the inal arbiter, effectively checks the
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
irst impeachment complaint was "suf icient in form," but voted to other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
issues raised are of transcendental importance which the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
must be settled early; and dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insuf icient in
substance. Four months and three weeks since the iling on June if violative of the Constitution.
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the of icial
2, 2003 of the irst complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
legislators.
impeachment complaint was iled. government," Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for
Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner the irst time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives,
has simply alleged a generalized interest in the outcome of this case, "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court.
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the iling of the second
and succeeds only in muddling the issues. Petitioner's standing is
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised
imperiled by the white elephant in the petition, i.e., his appearance as
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
counsel for former President Arroyo in the election protest iled by
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same of icial
2004 presidential candidate FPJ before the PET because judicial 1. In Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well
more than once within a period of one year."
inquiry, as mentioned above, requires that the constitutional within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Such whether the Senate or its of icials committed a violation of
appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
(1) WON the power of judicial review extends to those
been the irst opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the of their functions and prerogatives.
arising from impeachment proceedings;
Tribunal's constitution. 2. In Tanada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the
Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we ind
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
none in this instance. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch
had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to judiciary to settle the dispute.
the Tribunal's authority over the case he was defending, translates to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different 3. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a
the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper branches of government and "to direct the course of government resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
invocation of this Court's power of judicial review. Even on this score nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a
alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
4. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether
⭐Francisco v House of Representatives
the House representation in the Commission on sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
Appointments was based on proportional representation of being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy expenditure of public funds.
the Constitution is subject to judicial review. as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of
5. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the of dif icult constitutional questions. any of icial action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
6. In Tanada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally privileges vested by the Constitution in his of ice.
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
injured by the operation of a law or by of icial action taken, but by
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts While an association has legal personality to represent its
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. members, especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers
interest.
7. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that and the outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation
con irmation by the National Assembly of the election of In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
any member, irrespective of whether his election is legislators when speci ic requirements have been met have been profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may given standing by this Court. although undoubtedly true, does not suf ice to clothe it with standing.
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
the National Assembly. citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
would upset the system of checks and balances. some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to
he suffers thereby in some inde inite way. It must appear that the resolve the issues presented by it.
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or There being no doctrinal de inition of transcendental
(2) WON the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by
power of judicial review have been ful illed. subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' complained of. In ine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
satis ies the requirement of personal interest. case;
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely:
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional
1. An actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is instrumentality of the government; and
judicial power; (Ripeness)
being de lected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and speci ic
2. The person challenging the act must have "standing" to
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or interest in raising the questions being raised.
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct review, however, he must speci ically prove that he has suf icient Applying these determinants, this Court is satis ied that the issues
injury as a result of its enforcement; (Locus standi) interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
earliest possible opportunity; and Ripeness and Prematurity
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not suf icient
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the In Tan v. Macapagal, this Court held that for a case to be considered
the case. public. ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
Locus standi At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a come into the picture."
or legal standing has been de ined as a personal and substantial taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
impeachment complaint had been iled with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
controversy: 1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
(1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Justiciability required by the facts of the case
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
The term “political question” refers to "those questions which, unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their Article XI of the Constitution; and
reason of the operation of the statute
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the Constitution.
constitutionality.
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Demetria v. Alba, this Court, cited the "seven pillars" of
NB: Substantive issues to be discussed in subsequent topics.
Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a DUTY, a duty limitations of the power of judicial review, or the rules of
which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called avoidance enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in
⭐Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v DOLE
the political question doctrine. Ashwander v. TVA as follows:
Leonen En Banc
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
political questions." From this clari ication it is gathered that there legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining Administrative actions reviewable by this Court, therefore, may
are two species of political questions: because to decide such questions is legitimate only in the either be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. The enabling law
last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, must be complete, with suf icient standards to guide the
(1) "truly political questions" and administrative agency in exercising its rule-making power. As an
(2) those which "are not truly political questions." earnest and vital controversy between individuals.
2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional exception to the rule on non delegation of legislative power,
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. administrative rules and regulations must be "germane to the objects
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be 3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is conformity with, the standards prescribed by law."
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly to be applied.
political in nature. On the other hand, quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
power is "the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the present some other ground upon which the case may
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
be disposed of.
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed enforcing and administering the same law." In the 1931 case of
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
The Municipal Council of Lemery, Batangas v. The Provincial
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine Board of Batangas, this Court declared that the power of the
operation.
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly Municipal Board of Lemery to approve or disapprove a municipal
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
acted within such limits. resolution or ordinance is quasi-judicial in nature and, consequently,
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding.
Lis Mota bene its.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in However, in cases involving quasi-judicial acts, Congress may
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever require certain quasi-judicial agencies to irst take cognizance of the
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will irst case before resort to judicial remedies may be allowed. This is to
possible. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly take advantage of the special technical expertise possessed by
is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the possible by which the question may be avoided. administrative agencies. Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar
controversy.
The "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Mining Company, Inc. explained the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction. The issue is jurisdictional and the court, this concept, actions may be brought on behalf of third parties Legislative, and other constitutional agencies and organs.
when confronted with a case under the jurisdiction of an provided the following criteria are met:
administrative agency, has no option but to dismiss it. ⭐Kilusang Mayo Uno v Aquino III Leonen En Banc
1. irst, "the [party bringing suit] must have suffered an
In contrast, exhaustion of administrative remedies requires parties to 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a 'suf iciently This Court is called to determine the validity of the Social Security
exhaust all the remedies in the administrative machinery before concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute"; System premium hike, which took effect in January 2014. The case
resorting to judicial remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion 2. second, "the party must have a close relation to the third also involves the application of doctrines on judicial review, valid
presupposes that the court and the administrative agency have party"; and delegation of powers, and the exercise of police power.
concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of a matter. However, in 3. third, "there must exist some hindrance to the third party's
deference to the special and technical expertise of the administrative ability to protect his or her own interests." Courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
agency, courts must yield to the administrative agency by suspending of ices of the government as well as those of its of icers. In other
the proceedings. As such, parties must exhaust all the remedies The concept was irst introduced in our jurisdiction in White Light words, the judiciary is the inal arbiter on the question whether or
within the administrative machinery before resort to courts is Corp. et al. v. City of Manila. Based on third-party standing, this not a branch of government or any of its of icials has acted without
allowed. Court allowed the hotel and motel operators to sue on behalf of their jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
clients. According to this Court, hotel and motel operators have a constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of close relation to their customers as they "rely on the patronage of or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
administrative remedies may only be invoked in matters their customers for their continued viability." Preventing customers pass judgment on matters of this nature.
involving the exercise of quasi-judicial power. The DO and MC from availing of short-time rates would clearly injure the business Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court provides remedies to
were issued in the exercise of the DOLE's and the LTFRB's interests of hotel and motel operators. address grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or
quasi-legislative powers. instrumentality, particularly through petitions for certiorari and
➔ In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the
prohibition.
EXPANDED DISCUSSION ON STANDING third parties represented by the petitioner would have
special and legitimate reasons why they may not bring the Here, petitioners iled a Petition for both certiorari and prohibition to
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court action themselves. Understandably, the cost to patrons in determine whether respondents SSS and Social Security Commission
of justice on a given question." To possess legal standing, parties the White Light case to bring the action committed grave abuse of discretion in releasing the assailed
must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that themselves—i.e., the amount they would pay for the issuances. According to them, these issuances violated the
[they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the lease of the motels—will be too small compared with provisions of the Constitution on the protection of workers,
governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct the cost of the suit. But viewed in another way, whoever promotion of social justice, and respect for human rights. They
injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal among the patrons iles the case even for its transcendental further claim that the assailed issuances are void for having been
stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that interest endows bene its on a substantial number of issued based on vague and unclear standards. They also argue that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon interested parties without recovering their costs. This is the the increase in contributions is an invalid exercise of police power as
which the court depends for illumination of dif icult constitutional free rider problem in economics. It is a negative it is not reasonably necessary and, thus, unduly oppressive to the
questions." externality which operates as a disincentive to sue and labor sector. Lastly, they insist that the revised ratio in contributions
assert a transcendental right. is grossly unjust to the working class.
Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, interest being AS TO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review.
"material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree
or judgment of the case[,] [not just] mere curiosity about the In addition to an actual controversy, special reasons to represent, and
Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an
question involved." Whether a suit is public or private, the parties disincentives for the injured party to bring the suit themselves, there
⭐actual case or controversy. In every exercise of judicial
must have "a present substantial interest,'' not a "mere expectancy or must be a showing of the transcendent nature of the right involved.
power, whether in the traditional or expanded sense, this is an
a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Those absolute necessity.
Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a grounded
who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief sought.
level of urgency can be transcendent. This Court is not a forum to There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "con lict of legal
appeal political and policy choices made by the Executive, right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
Another exception is the concept of third-party standing. Under
resolution." A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must records shows that petitioners iled a case before the Social Security of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable Commission or asked for a reconsideration of the assailed issuances. matters of fact. Under the doctrine of primary administrative
right under the Constitution. There must be Moreover, petitioners did not even try to show that their Petition falls jurisdiction, petitioners should have irst iled their case before
under one (1) of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of respondent Social Security Commission.
1. a real and substantial controversy,
administrative remedies:
2. with de inite and concrete issues involving the legal As for mootness, Courts cannot render judgment after the issue has
relations of the parties, and However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of already been resolved by or through external developments.
3. admitting of speci ic relief that courts can grant. exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It However, Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
may be disregarded
The Court notes that petitioners failed to prove how the assailed 1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
issuances violated workers' constitutional rights such that it would (1) when there is a violation of due process, 2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
warrant a judicial review. Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, public interest is involved;
the Constitution without specifying how these rights translate to (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal 3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
being legally entitled to a ixed amount and proportion of Social amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
Security System contributions. (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative public; and
agency concerned, 4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Moreover, an actual case or controversy requires that the right must
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
be enforceable and legally demandable. A complaining party's Three (3) circumstances must be present before this Court may rule
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
right is, thus, affected by the rest of the requirements for the exercise on a moot issue. There must be an issue raising a grave violation
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
of judicial power: of the Constitution, involving an exceptional situation of
assumed approval of the latter,
(1) the issue's ripeness and prematurity; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies paramount public interest that is capable of repetition yet
(2) the moot and academic principle; and would be unreasonable, evading review. Here, since the Social Security Commission is set to
(3) the party's standing. (8) when it would amount to a nulli ication of a claim, issue new resolutions for the Social Security System members'
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case contributions, the issue on the assailed issuances' validity may be
A case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged rendered moot. Nonetheless, all the discussed exceptions are present.
proceedings,
governmental act is a completed action such that there is a direct, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and Thus, this Court may rule on this case.
concrete, and adverse effect on the petitioner. In connection with acts adequate remedy, Here, the assailed issuances set the new contribution rate and its date
of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the doctrine of (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of of effectivity. The increase in contributions has been in effect since
exhaustion of administrative remedies. One other concept pertaining judicial intervention, January 2014. As such, the issue of the validity of increase in
to judicial review is intrinsically connected to it: the concept of a (12) when no administrative review is provided by law, contributions is of transcendental importance. The required legal
case being moot and academic. (13) where the rule of quali ied political agency applies, and standing for petitioners must be relaxed.
Both these concepts relate to the timing of the presentation of a (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot. It is worth noting that this issue affects millions of Filipinos working
controversy before the Court — ripeness relates to its prematurity,
here and abroad. A substantial portion of members' salaries goes to
while mootness relates to a belated or unnecessary judgment on the Thus, petitioners have prematurely invoked this Court's power of the Social Security System fund. To delay the resolution of such an
issues. The Court cannot preempt the actions of the parties, and judicial review in violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of important issue would be a great disservice to this Court's duty
neither should it (as a rule) render judgment after the issue has administrative remedies. enshrined in the Constitution.
already been resolved by or through external developments.
Notably, petitioners failed to abide by the principle of primary For all these reasons, and despite the technical in irmities in this
Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative jurisdiction. This principle states that courts Petition, this Court reviews the assailed issuances.
administrative remedies. Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
Act are clear that the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior
over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage, bene its, 5th Requirement: Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal,
contributions, and penalties. The law further provides that the where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
aggrieved party must irst exhaust all administrative remedies ⭐Gios-Samar, Inc. v DOTC
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
available before seeking review from the courts. Here, nothing in the
GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., suing as a taxpayer and invoking the (6) the iled petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; information and communication technology project, which
transcendental importance of the issue, iled the present petition for (7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, does not conform to our traditional notion of the term
prohibition. Petitioner alleges that it is an NGO composed of speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of "infrastructure," is covered by the prohibition against the
subsistence farmers and isherfolk from Samar, who are among the law that could free them from the injurious effects of issuance of court injunctions under RA No. 8975.
victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government assistance for the respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of 6. In Capalla v. COMELEC, the issue is the validity and
rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood. It assails the expression; and constitutionality of the Commission on Elections'
constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin (8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public Resolutions for the purchase of precinct count optical
the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded scanner machines as well as the extension agreement and
same. by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained the deed of sale covering the same.
of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was 7. In Kulayan v. Tan, the issue is whether Section 465 in
CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." relation to Section 16 of the Local Government Code
principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special
authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of
and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the foregoing
national emergency and to exercise the powers enumerated
Court. The case should have been iled with the trial court, because it exceptions would reveal a common denominator - the issues for
in his Proclamation No. 1-09.
raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown resolution of the Court are purely legal.
8. In Funa v. MECO, the issue is whether the Commission on
trial.
The presence of one or more of the so-called "special and Audit is, under prevailing law, mandated to audit the
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to important reasons" is not the decisive factor considered by the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Of ice.
this Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law, Court in deciding whether to permit the invocation, at the irst 9. In Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, the issue is the constitutionality of
notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental instance, of its original jurisdiction over the issuance of the Quezon City ordinances imposing socialized housing tax
importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question raised and garbage fee.
a constitutional iltering mechanism designed to enable the Court to by the parties in those "exceptions" that enabled us to allow the 10. In Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, the issue is whether Section
focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by direct action before us. 8(3) of RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is
the highest law of the land. constitutional.
An examination of the cases wherein this Court used 11. More recently, in Aala v. Uy, the Court En Banc, dismissed
This doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to the proper "transcendental importance" of the constitutional issue raised an original action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
venue of appeals and/or the appropriate forum for the issuance of to excuse violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts would which prayed for the nulli ication of an ordinance for
extraordinary writs. Thus, although this Court, the CA, and the RTC show that resolution of factual issues was not necessary for the violation of the equal protection clause, due process clause,
have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, resolution of the constitutional issue/s. and the rule on uniformity in taxation. We stated that, not
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, parties are
1. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., only did petitioners therein fail to set forth exceptionally
directed, as a rule, to ile their petitions before the lower-ranked
Inc., we stated that "[t]he facts necessary to resolve these compelling reasons for their direct resort to the Court, they
court. Failure to comply ts suf icient cause for the dismissal of the
legal questions are well established and, hence, need not be also raised factual issues which the Court deems
petition. Aside from the special civil actions over which it has
determined by a trial court," indispensable for the proper disposition of the case.
original Jurisdiction, the Court, through the years, has allowed
litigants to seek direct relief from it upon allegation of "serious and 2. In Jaworski v. PAGCOR, the issue is whether Presidential The ONLY circumstance when we may take cognizance of a case in
important reasons." Decree No. 1869 authorized PAGCOR to contract any part of the irst instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the
its franchise by authorizing a concessionaire to operate exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the
(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that internet gambling. suf iciency of the factual basis of the President's proclamation of
must be addressed at the most immediate time; 3. In Province of Batangas v. Romulo, we declared that the
(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental martial law under Section 18, Article VII.
facts necessary to resolve the legal question are not
importance; disputed. Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should not be
(3) cases of irst impression; 4. In Aquino III v. COMELEC, the lone issue is whether RA No. a matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional imperative given (1) the
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the 9716, which created an additional legislative district for the structure of our judicial system and (2) the requirements of due
Court; Province of Camarines Sur, is constitutional. process.
(5) exigency in certain situations; 5. In DFA v. Falcon, the threshold issue is whether an
President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts, as a iltering mechanism,
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political not been passed. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
operates to:
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
(1) prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the nulli ies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
attention which are better devoted to those matters within government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
its exclusive jurisdiction; EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate. is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always
(2) prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket; and be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose LEGAL and not political
(3) prevent the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or declaration.
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which often have to questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
forum under the rules of procedure, or as the court better
of governmental powers under section 11 of Article VII. The issues invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
equipped to resolve factual questions.
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
How to differentiate certiorari in the Rules of Court from that petitioner against prejudicial publicity. reliance upon a law creating it.
provided for by Sec 1 Art VIII of the Constitution?
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the
b.3. Effect Of Declaration of Unconstitutionality Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section
➔ Rule 65 has its reference to grave abuse of discretion exercised
10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the
by courts and entities exercising quasi-judicial functions. Article 7, New Civil Code of the Philippines. Laws are repealed only implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their
➔ In the Constitution, it refers to any branch or by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the "new
instrumentalities of the government. excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. cities" or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be
recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the
b.2. Political Questions When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed
Estrada v Arroyo as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
Private respondents raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar
Court's declaration of their unconstitutionality.
pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the
cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. League of Cities v Comelec (2010 Resolution) Chavez v JBC
Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as Under the circumstances, the Court inds the exception applicable in
doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to this case and holds that notwithstanding its inding of
prudential considerations, continue to be re ined in the mills its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
constitutional law. equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact of icial actions are nonetheless valid.
In ine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be
power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional C. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of constitutional an unconstitutional act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. The Province of North Cotabato v GRP
grievances which only affected the of ice of the President. EDSA Fertiphil Corporation, the Court stated:
I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of
that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the
EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the

government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the
present ARMM. national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go Philippines. (archipelagic doctrine of territoriality)
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
The relationship between the Central Government and the Part IV, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance 🔗RA 9522
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
institutions with de ined powers and functions in the comprehensive Magallona v Ermita
Philippine territory for independence.
compact.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional. RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to
An association is formed when two states of unequal power region recognized in the Constitution. Demarcate the Country's Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory.
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free relationship with the national government being fundamentally UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of
associations represent a middle ground between integration and different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use
independence. In international practice, the "associated state" as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo rights over maritime zones, i.e.,
arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former Convention, namely, 1. the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
colonies on their way to full independence. 1. a permanent population, baselines],
The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with 2. a de ined territory, 2. contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
the international legal concept of association, speci ically the 3. a government, and 3. exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
following: 4. a capacity to enter into relations with other states. baselines]), and
4. continental shelves
1. the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily
with foreign countries, sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - that UNCLOS III delimits. On the other hand, baselines laws such as
2. the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial speci ic basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are
the specialized UN agencies, and integrity of the Republic. drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
3. the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
The de ining concept underlying the relationship between the shelf. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
external defense. national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine of icial missions Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the speci ic provisions within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely,
bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in con lict
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water with the Constitution and the laws. 1. the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral 2. the jurisdiction to enforce customs, iscal, immigration, and
domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
c.1. Territory
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any 3. the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
foreign affairs matter affecting them. exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
Article I, 1987 Constitution. The national territory comprises the
(Article 77).
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
any rate, a status closely approximating it. acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, luvial and aerial
territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
The concept of association is NOT recognized under the present domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular (or conversely, lose) territory through
Constitution shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their 1. occupation,
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized 2. accretion,
3. cession and ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the
4. prescription, father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
public or private domain was intended to protect lands from
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her
NOT by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
discriminate against him.
to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims hands of Filipinos quali ied to acquire and own such land. Thus, the
to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by subsequent transfer of the property to quali ied Filipinos may no The fact of the matter – perhaps the most signi icant consideration –
the rules on general international law. longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the
transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
c.2. People lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
c.2.1. Citizenship c.2.2. Modes of Acquisition; Citizens of the Philippines “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”
In sum, the issue is whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
⭐Tecson v Comelec citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
c.2.1. Importance
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
Lee v Director of Lands some of the entries on the birth certi icate of respondent and the and, in the af irmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
marriage certi icate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having
that -
the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
Chinese citizen, was disquali ied to acquire the land in question. rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien 16 September, 1940; death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
did not validate the transaction, for it was still contrary to the 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the 5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe would have bene ited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the was 84 years old. Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the transaction. Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father
The death certi icate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This
11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. respondent FPJ has seen irst light, confers citizenship to all persons
was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated
It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. While
year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner children are legitimate or illegitimate.
it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not
would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the
barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the
crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
State. Valles v Comelec
existing record about such fact in the Records Management and
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, Archives Of ice. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, death certi icate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth. Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also
proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos.
his residence before death. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens. citizenship of its mother, it did so for the bene it the child. It was to
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certi icate stating that he is former elected public of icial, cannot vest in him Philippine
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an citizenship as the law speci ically lays down the requirements for
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by application for an alien certi icate of registration was not tantamount acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
which the United States governed the country. These were the to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
De initely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an ⭐Go, Sr. v Go
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he iled a
their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Rosalind’s father, certi icate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the
Telesforo, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet. Thus, under the assertions of his American nationality before the termination of citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo was deemed to his American citizenship. be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v.
be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the Comelec, we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with inality. This
private respondent Rosalind, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certi icate of is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter,
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus purpose.
citizenship.
soli, then at most, Rosalind can also claim Australian citizenship Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that,
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of
Re: Application of Ching
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the
citizenship: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country; fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? NO. administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship; generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
twenty-one years of age or more; followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers 1. a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a controversy where said person is a party;
service of a foreign country;
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took
(5) By cancellation of the certi icate of naturalization;
any of icer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be iled active part in the resolution thereof; and
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter
with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the 3. the inding of citizenship is af irmed by this Court.
of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his
granted: and and the Government of the Philippines." deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive
virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor bene it will redound
acquires his nationality. should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." case.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear
application of private respondent for an alien certi icate of allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines him. However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid
In the case of Aznar v. Comelec, the Court ruled that the mere fact
and his being a certi ied public accountant, a registered voter and a down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the
deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board court correctly found that it did not. those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
cases when the courts themselves believe that there is Bengson III v HRET Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
that the claim is correct. Moreover, when the evidence submitted was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, in 1960, of Filipino parents. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under CA No. 473,
review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and, without otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, and by RA No.
enjoin the deportation proceedings. the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses
allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino all the quali ications and none of the disquali ications provided
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not citizenship under CA No. 63, Section 1(4). Whatever doubt that by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
convinced that the same was suf icient to oust the Board of its remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings considering his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990. promulgation when the court is satis ied that during the intervening
that what were presented particularly the birth certi icates of Jimmy, period, the applicant has
as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found repatriation under RA No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the (1) not left the Philippines;
the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession;
additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on 1998 elections. He won over Bengson III. Subsequently, petitioner (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
time. iled a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the HRET claiming Government promulgated rules; or
that Cruz was not quali ied to become a member of the House of (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen. contrary to any Government announced policies.
acquisition of one's citizenship. However, the Supreme Court
abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only bene ited those follows: reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63,
who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
inal court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the reacquired by a former citizen:
adoption of this Constitution;
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the (1) by naturalization,
make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his
Philippines; (2) by repatriation, and
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, (3) by direct act of Congress.
passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
whatsoever will not suf ice.
majority, and Naturalization is a mode for BOTH acquisition and reacquisition
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by CA No. 473, as
authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by CA No. 63. Under
act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to (1) by birth, and this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen (2) by naturalization. citizenship must possess certain quali ications and none of the
himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence disquali ications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes
aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, by those who lost their citizenship due to:
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship is a natural-born citizen thereof.
conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we ind that the appellate (1) desertion of the armed forces;
As de ined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are
(2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War an unequivocal af irmation of where he cast his life and family, iled to Filipinos, serving in public of ice where citizenship is a
II; with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for quali ication, voting during election time, running for public of ice,
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other naturalization on February 15, 1954. At the time Jose Ong Chuan took and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
time; his oath, the private respondent, then a minor of nine years, was manifestations for these persons.
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and inishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
(5) political and economic necessity.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair private respondent would not only have been super luous but would
concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results position which discriminates against Filipino women. also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a Philippine citizenship?
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue HRET observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino father, Jose Ong Chuan, became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizen. the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its bene it to him for
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the
Filipino. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and by declaring him as such."
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, reaching the age of majority. The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship.
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
of a Filipino father. unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr.
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered a naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He just so we can go after the son.
natural-born citizen: could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a
the Constitution would be amended to require him to have iled a
collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an
(1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
(2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
Philippine citizenship, statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure
direct action for its nullity.
for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
exc those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, Ma, et al. v Fernandez, Jr
who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
majority, as they are deemed natural-born citizens. suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be mother and an alien father, who executed an af idavit of election of
expected to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
Co v HRET
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule. government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born immediately ile the documents of election with the nearest civil
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting The iling of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as
purposes. for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certi icates of
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate registration?
The father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
c.2.3. Naturalization: Judicial, Administrative, Congressional (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least
(1) a statement of election under oath;
ten years;
(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of
🔗Commonwealth Act No. 473 (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the
the Philippines; and
principal dialects;
(3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath
🔗RA 530 (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
with the nearest civil registry.
date of the iling of the petition until his admission to
Petitioners complied with the irst and second requirements upon 🔗RA 9139 or The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000 Philippine citizenship; and
reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the (5) that he has iled a declaration of intention or if he is excused
documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. Mo Ya v Commissioner from said iling, the justi ication therefor.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition. Likewise, the
elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or petition is not supported by the af idavit of at least two credible
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is persons who vouched for the good moral character of private
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
In Mallare, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came
out again and again as the occasion may demand. Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certi icate
of age was deemed to be a positive act of election of Philippine
of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.
citizenship. In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his Granting the validity of marriage, the Court has ruled in Ly Giok Ha v.
right of suffrage, as he established his life here in the Philippines. In Galang, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
Ching, we denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar suf ice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the irregularities:
because, in his case, all the requirements were complied with only Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled
fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered Filipino must show, in addition, that she 'might herself be lawfully date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing
no reason for the late election of Philippine citizenship. naturalized' as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last
elected public of icial, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Filipino is herself not disquali ied under section 4 of the publication of the petition;
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine Naturalization Law. (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before
citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we the inality of the judgment; and
now say is that where, as in petitioners' case, the election of Republic v dela Rosa (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the
citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the two-year waiting period.
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent, Frivaldo. The proceedings A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes inal only after 30
documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in
conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is
the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the
consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of
and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law. copy of the decision. Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no
Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings
petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation
equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for in order to be able to observe if:
citizenship. three consecutive weeks in the Of icial Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional. (1) the applicant has left the country;
Registration is the con irmation of the existence of a fact. In the (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful
instant case, registration is the con irmation of election as such Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order
must be in its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction. calling or profession;
election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or
a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by violation of government promulgated rules; and
confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
of con irming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. interest of the country or contrary to government announced
(1) that the petitioner is of good moral character;
policies.
irreproachable, thus disqualifying him for naturalization. In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot
becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From
implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or
then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
before its inality. settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty,
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
such payment is not a suf icient ground for lifting the order of the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to
Republic v Li Yao lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certi icate of
stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the decree is merely
William Li Yao, a Chinese national, iled a petition for naturalization the removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for
on June 3, 1949. On November 20, 1952, acting on the petition of part of the taxpayer, only insofar as his tax case is concerned. naturalization as a U.S. citizen.
William Li Yao praying for the execution of the foregoing decision and
In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of In Caasi v. CA, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States
that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen.
obliterating his lack of good moral character and by virtue of a “greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently
About 15 years later, or in 1968, the Republic, through the Solicitor irreproachable conduct which are grounds for in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
General, iled a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certi icate of denaturalization. Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a
naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be
obtained for the following reasons: Philippines.
rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against
1. At the time of the iling of the petition, the applicant was not the applicant, this Court has repeatedly maintained the view that Nor can petitioner contend that he was “compelled to adopt American
quali ied to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization because: where the applicant failed to meet the quali ications required for citizenship” only by reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces. It
naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship. is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630,
a. He was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit
which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine
amorous relationships with several women other than his lawfully
citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the
wedded wife, by whom he fathered illegitimate children (Li Siu Liat Limkaichong v Comelec United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned,
vs. Republic, L-25356, November 25, 1967).
Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos
b. Nor had he conducted himself in an irreproachable manner in his Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic
dealings with the duly constituted authorities. their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized
requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in
The lower court, however, without touching on all the grounds upon
may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on
which the said motion was based, relied solely on the ground that
period notwithstanding. November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence
William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes due the
in this country.
government by underdeclaration of income as re lected in his income In resolving the disquali ication cases, the COMELEC Second
tax returns for the years 1946-1951. Division relied on the entries in the docket book of the OSG, the only c.2.5. Reacquisition
After the parties had iled their respective briefs, petitioner-appellant remaining record of the naturalization proceedings, and ruled on the
Li Yao died. The case has not, however, become moot and academic basis thereof that the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, Frivaldo v COMELEC
since its disposition, either way, will have grave implications for the Limkaichong's father, in Special Case No. 1043, were null and void.
late petitioner-appellant's wife and children. We cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichong's citizenship as the If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
same should have been challenged in appropriate proceedings as reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so
The issue in this case is whether or not the cancellation of the earlier stated. in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
certi icate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may
William Li Yao made by the government through the Of ice of the be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
c.2.4. Loss of citizenship
Solicitor General is valid. repatriation.
In the case entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Bengson III v HRET, supra. While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the irst two methods, he
Naturalization as Citizen of the Philippines, Lim Eng Yu v. nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
Republic, it was held that the concealment of applicant's income to Coquilla v Comelec virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating
evade payment of lawful taxes shows that his moral character is not
in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American Altarejos v Comelec

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17,
Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even 1997, but his Certi icate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil
or economic exigencies.
if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004,
did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring In sum, petitioner is not quali ied to avail himself of repatriation and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner,
his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and he iled his certi icate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but
loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225) by simply taking an oath of before the elections.
individual. allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
When does the citizenship quali ication of a candidate for an
He contends that by simply iling his certi icate of candidacy he had, elective of ice apply?
without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. Angat v Republic
In Frivaldo v. Comelec, the Court ruled that the citizenship
But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions - surely,
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines quali ication must be construed as “applying to the time of
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the USA. proclamation of the elected of icial and at the start of his term.” The
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what
Court’s ruling in Frivaldo that repatriation retroacts to the date of
that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was Angat iled on 11 March 1996 before the RTC a petition to regain his
iling of one’s application for repatriation subsists for the same
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No.
reasons quoted above.
63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630. On 13 June
Tabasa v CA 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to Accordingly, petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he iled
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, quali ied to run for
The only persons entitled to repatriation under 🔗RA 8171 are the a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
The OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed
following: elections.
by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum
1. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization.
marriage to aliens; and c.2.6. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
The Of ice of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that
2. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who Angat’s petition should have been iled with the Committee, 🔗RA 9225 (Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003)
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover.
economic necessity. The court’s order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and Mercado v Manzano
it did not acquire inality nor could be a source of right on the part of
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
petitioner. It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No.
because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for
Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630
a minor. considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition. follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Philippine citizenship would not even be required to ile a petition in both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
"repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
to children who are of minor age at the time of the iling of the the Philippines. countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
petition for repatriation.
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
a dual citizen. violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children
are citizens of that country; On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the The intent of the legislature in drafting RA No. 9225 is to do away
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his with the provision in CA No. 63 which takes away Philippine
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
citizenship.
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
is the result of an individual's volition. themselves as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, the allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution
Citizenship Retention and Re Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, R.A. 9189, and that COMELEC No. 9225.
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as
Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - enact a law on dual allegiance.
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay
"dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
in the Philippines irst before they can exercise their right to vote. On c.2.7. Foundlings
§20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that 'duals' are
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same Llamanzares v COMELEC
this disquali ication. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suf ice While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
if, upon the iling of their certi icates of candidacy, they elect enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos
there is no restrictive language which would de initely exclude
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable voter under ordinary conditions, are quali ied to vote.
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine
consequence of con licting laws of different states. The Commission provided for Section 2 Article V immediately after the intent of the framers.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are necessary implication in statutory construction the strategic
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign Section 1 with respect to quali ied Filipinos abroad. The same
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
citizenship. That is of no moment. Commission has in effect declared that quali ied Filipinos who are
"unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number
not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certi icate of candidacy that he is was not enough to merit speci ic mention.
not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of Constitution. It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certi icate under
the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he these laws and the issuance of said certi icate are acts to acquire or
Calilung v Datumanong
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 Public bidding as a method of government procurement is governed of icials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines by the principles of transparency, competitiveness, simplicity and discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect accountability. These principles permeate the provisions of R.A. No. of icials will require the state itself to perform an af irmative act to
their Philippine citizenship." In the irst place, "having to perform an 9184 from the procurement process to the implementation of satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In awarded contracts. pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In
Since respondent's lowest calculated bid for the subject project did
child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the
not undergo the required post-quali ication process, then she cannot
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship ground that it has been iled without its consent.
claim that the project was awarded to her. And if the project was never
of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to
awarded to her, then she has no right to undertake the same. If she has This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from
naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the
no right to the project, then she cannot demand indemnity for lost being sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent
election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a
pro its or actual damages suffered in the event of failure to carry out or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
the same. Without a formal award of the project in her favor, such a sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private,
perfect it.
demand would be premature. commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. The restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to
The proper remedy for respondent should have been to seek
common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is
reconsideration or the setting aside of Datumanong's November 7,
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
2001 Memorandum, and then a reinstatement of the bidding or
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
post-quali ication process with a view to securing an award of the
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present economic affairs.
contract and notice to proceed therewith. After all, said Memorandum
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and
enjoys the same presumption of regularity that is attached to all The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
of icial acts of government. invoked where the public of icial is being sued in his private and
eighteen (18) years old.
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unrati ied by the Arigo v Swift In this case, the US respondents were sued in their of icial capacity as
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law.
commanding of icers of the US Navy who had control and
The irst is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
Questions Relating to the Con lict of Nationality Laws under which a expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian
foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
on the TRNP was committed while they were performing of icial
birth.” The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2.
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of
Even without such af irmation, we would still be bound by the against said of icials will require remedial actions and appropriation
the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against
Statelessness.
of incorporation. the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
c.3. Sovereignty As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based
Swift, Rice and Robling.
on the justi ication given by Justice Holmes that “there can be no legal
Doctrine of Non-Suability of State right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends.” In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in c.3.2. Consent
Section 3, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution. The State may not be sued the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim
par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals Philippine Textile Research Institute v CA
without its consent.
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
PTRI, et al. are not immune from suit.
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, “unduly vex
c.3.1. Suit against State
the peace of nations.” E.O. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code, identi ied the
PTRI as an institute of the DOST. The PTRI has the mandate of
DPWH v Malaga While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
conducting applied research and development for the textile industry
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints iled against
sector, undertaking the transfer of completed researches to end-users the subject Contract. Further, the subject Contract was clearly not persons non sui juris and to make and enforce rules and regulations
or via linkage units of other government agencies, and undertake executed in the exercise of PTRI's governmental function of aiding the as it deems proper for the management of their property. Parens
technical services and provide training programs. textile industry. The subject Contract dealt solely with the patriae means "father of his country", and refers to the State as a
rehabilitation works of the electrical facilities of PTRI's buildings. last-ditch provider of protection to those unable to care and fend for
Hence, being an unincorporated government agency that exercises a
themselves. It can be said that Filipino consumers have become such
governmental function, ordinarily, the PTRI enjoys immunity from
Case study: Leonardia v Phuture Visions persons of disability deserving protection by the State, as their
suit. Further, the employees of PTRI acting in their of icial capacity
welfare are being increasingly downplayed, endangered, and
likewise enjoy this immunity from suit, as "public of icials may not
Consent may be express or implied, such as when the government overwhelmed by business pursuits.
be sued for acts done in the performance of their of icial functions or
exercises its proprietary functions, or where such is embodied in a
within the scope of their authority." While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural
general or special law. In the present case, respondent sued
resources, police power is state regulation through legislation, and
However, needless to say, the rule on State immunity from suit is not petitioners for the latter's refusal to issue a mayor's permit for bingo
parens patriae is the default state responsibility to look after the
absolute. The State may be sued with its consent. The State's operations and for closing its business on account of the lack of such
defenseless, there remains a limbo on a lexible state policy bringing
consent to be sued may be given either expressly or impliedly. permit. However, while the authority of city mayors to issue or grant
these doctrines into a cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of
licenses and business permits is granted by the LGC, which also vests
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special public interest, and backing the security of the people, rights, and
local government units with corporate powers, one of which is the
law. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is resources from general neglect, private greed, and even from the own
power to sue and be sued, this Court has held that the power to issue
found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government 'consents excesses of the State. We ill this void through the Public Trust
or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the
and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability Doctrine.
government's proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
police power of the State, ergo a governmental act. The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its
basis of civil action between private parties.
No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus be implied representative of continuing supervision over the taking and use of
PTRI entered into a Contract of Works for the Rehabilitation of appropriated water. Thus, "[p]arties who acquired rights in trust
from the mere conferment and exercise of the power to issue
Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot Plants property [only hold] these rights subject to the trust and, therefore,
business permits and licences. Accordingly, there is merit in
with B.A. Ramirez. It is likewise not disputed that the cause of action could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful
petitioners' argument that they cannot be sued by respondent since
of E.A. Ramirez's Complaint is the alleged breach of the subject to the trust."
the City's consent had not been secured for this purpose. This is
Contract. In other words, PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving
notwithstanding petitioners' failure to raise this exculpatory defense The doctrine further holds that certain natural resources belong to all
liability arising from a contract. Hence, the general law on the
at the irst instance before the trial court or even before the appellate and cannot be privately owned or controlled because of their inherent
waiver of immunity from suit inds application.
court. importance to each individual and society as a whole. A clear
Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be declaration of public ownership, the doctrine reaf irms the
subjected to suit when the State enters into a contract. In this c.4. Government superiority of public rights over private rights for critical resources.
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of It impresses upon states the af irmative duties of a trustee to manage
the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign The State as Parens Patriae these natural resources for the bene it of present and future
immunity. However, not all contracts entered into by the government generations and embodies key principles of environmental
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be Maynilad v SENR protection: stewardship, communal responsibility, and sustainability.
made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. Hand-in-hand with police power in the promotion of general welfare In this framework, a relationship is formed - "the [s]tate is the
is the doctrine of parens patriae. It focuses on the role of the state trustee, which manages speci ic natural resources the trust
In the instant case, not only did PTRI descend to the level of a principal - for the trust principal for the bene it of the current
as a "sovereign" and expresses the inherent power and authority of
contracting party by entering into the subject Contract, under the and future generations - the bene iciaries." The public is regarded
the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person
subject Contract itself, which contemplated a situation wherein legal as the bene icial owner of trust resources, and courts can enforce the
non sui juris.
action may arise from the execution of the agreement and public trust doctrine even against the government itself.
incorporating provisions on the procedures to be undertaken in Under the doctrine, the state has the sovereign power of guardianship
settling legal disputes, PTRI also manifested unequivocally its over persons of disability, and in the execution of the doctrine the It is in this same manner that the right to distribute water was granted
consent to be subjected to suit with respect to disputes arising from legislature is possessed of inherent power to provide protection to by the State via utility franchises to Maynilad and Manila Water,
under express statutory regulation through its delegated c.4.1. Principles and Policies of Philippine Government provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence
representative, the MWSS. The State conferred the franchise to these of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
concessionaires, working under the irm belief that they shall serve Art. II, 1987 Constitution provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
as protectors of the public interest and the citizenry. In this regard, necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing.
water rights must be secured to achieve optimal use of water Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS, supra. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution
resources, its conservation, and its preservation for allocative does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
ef iciency. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further
and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
DepEd v Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
an outline of government providing for the different departments of subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
May the Department of Education (DepEd) be compelled by writ of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
mandamus to collect, by salary deductions, the loan payments of inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the irst and third
public school teachers and remit them to the Rizal Teachers Kilusang principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
Bayan for Credit, Inc. (RTKBCI)? usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
self-executing. The argument is lawed. If the irst and third
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
DepEd has no legal duty to act as a collecting and remitting agent for paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
legislation, or that which supplies suf icient rule by means of which
RTKBCI. The latter has not shown that it remains an accredited measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
private lending institution entitled to avail of the payroll deduction fully owned by Filipinos, as in the irst paragraph, and the State still
system. Assuming that RTKBCI is still DepEd accredited, DepEd is Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
not precluded from suspending its activities under the payroll 1. if the nature and extent of the right conferred and investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
deduction scheme vis-à -vis a private lending agency such as RTKBCI. 2. the liability imposed are ixed by the constitution itself, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
The payroll deduction scheme expressly describes the services it 3. so that they can be determined by an examination and self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in
offers as a privilege. As such, DepEd may act as a collecting and construction of its terms, and order to give preference to quali ied Filipinos in the grant of rights,
remitting agent for a private lending agency, but doing so must 4. there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
always be in consonance with DepEd's power, duties, and functions the legislature for action. patrimony.
under Section 7 of RA 9155. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to A constitutional provision may be self-executing in
RTKBCI has no clear legal right to demand that DepEd act as its enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
one part and non-self-executing in another.
collecting and remitting agent. To reiterate, this is not one of DepEd's provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
power, duties, and functions. constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
Teachers have no one else to turn to for protection of their welfare practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
except the State itself. For its part, the State is duty bound to render From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
such protection in observance of its duty under the doctrine of In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
parens patriae. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country. It enact legislation to
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
refers to the State in its role as "sovereign" or the State in its capacity 1. facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
as a provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves. In constitution, shall give preference to quali ied Filipinos, it means just that -
ful illing this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent 2. further the operation of such a provision, quali ied Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation. In 3. prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, declares that a right exists in certain speci ied circumstances an
implementing the payroll deduction system, DepEd performed a 4. provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
function only secondarily to favor RTKBCI as a private lending secured or the determination thereof, or absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
institution and primarily to protect and promote the welfare of 5. place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
teachers and institutions of basic education. right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13. there are.
Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
Tanada v Angara development, as follows: It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does
Petitioners vigorously argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the 1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
Constitution mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the wealth;
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact,
so-called “parity provisions” and “national treatment” clauses 2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its provided by the nation for the bene it of the people; and
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in 3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. life for all especially the underprivileged. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and
all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to
Speci ically, the “ lagship” constitutional provisions referred to are With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals
restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution. of economic nationalism
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent (1) by expressing preference in favor of quali ied Filipinos “in Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration
national economy and patrimony” and in the use of “Filipino of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage
labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods”; generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
(2) by mandating the State to “adopt measures that help make law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
owned by Filipinos.
them competitive; and justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the (3) by requiring the State to “develop a self-reliant and doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to independent national economy effectively controlled by accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
quali ied Filipinos. Filipinos.” automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most
fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda --
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of “a trade policy that international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty
that help make them competitive. serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity”; and speaks of binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted
It is petitioners’ position that the foregoing “national treatment” and valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
“parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and such modi ications as may be necessary to ensure the ful illment of
markets” as well as of the protection of “Filipino enterprises against
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and the obligations undertaken.”
unfair foreign competition and trade practices.”
local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, et al., The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be
“effectively controlled by Filipinos.” this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture:
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in
These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or the family of nations and
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used
rules for its enforcement. However, as the constitutional provision (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to “the grants of rights,
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
privileges and concessions covering national economy and
Espina v Zamora
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It
Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762, also known as the Retail
Economy whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, violates the mandate of the 1987
Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke
laying down general principles relating to the national economy and
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that the provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other
under Article II. Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National right to revolt is af irmed as a natural right. Even then, it must be
a method of removing a local of icial from of ice before the
Economy and Patrimony under Article XII. exercised only for weighty and serious reasons.
expiration of his term because of loss of con idence.
But, as the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of What took place at EDSA from January 16 to 20, 2001 was not a
(5) referendum.
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The operative
state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue fact which enabled Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the people can approve or reject a law or an issue of national
such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. assume the presidency was the fact that there was a crisis, nay a importance.
vacuum, in the executive leadership which made the government rife
While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the To capture the spirit of People Power and to make it a principle upon
for seizure by lawless elements. The presidency was up for grabs,
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy which Philippine society may be founded, the Constitutional
and it was imperative that the rule of succession in the Constitution
effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a Commission enunciated as a irst principle in the Declaration of
be enforced.
policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The Principles and State Policies under Section 1, Article II of the 1987
objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from Constitution that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are Read: Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno in Tolentino, et al. v democratic state.
given preference in all areas of development. Comelec, GR 148334, January 21, 2004
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, The case at bar transcends the political fortunes of respondent republican framework because it is through the act of voting that
lessens the restraint on the foreigners' right to property or to engage Senator Gregorio B. Honasan. At issue is the right of the people to government by consent is secured. Through the ballot, people
in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law elect their representatives on the basis and only on the basis of an express their will on the de ining issues of the day and they are able
amounts to a denial of the Filipinos' right to property and to due informed judgment. The issue strikes at the heart of democracy to choose their leaders in accordance with the fundamental principle
process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the and representative government for without this right, the sovereignty of representative democracy that the people should elect whom they
kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted of the people is a mere chimera and the rule of the majority will be no please to govern them.
the entry of foreign investors. more than mobocracy. The electorate’s right to information on public matters
An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of occupies a higher legal tier in the Philippines compared to the
c.4.2. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism United States. While the right to information in U.S. jurisdiction is
the democratic space giving the people greater power to exercise their
sovereignty. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the people can merely a statutory right, it enjoys constitutional status in
Read: Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v Arroyo, directly exercise their sovereign authority through the following Philippine jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution not only enlarged the
supra. modes, namely: democratic space with provisions on the electorate’s direct exercise
of sovereignty, but also highlighted the right of the people to
From this judgment that petitioner became permanently disabled (1) elections; information on matters of public interest as a predicate to good
because he had lost the public's trust, I except extravagant claims of governance and a working democracy. The Bill of Rights
the people choose the representatives to whom they will
the right of the people to change their government. While Art. II, §1 of sancti ies the right of the people to information under Section 7,
entrust the exercise of powers of government.
the Constitution says that "sovereignty resides in the people and Article III.
all government authority emanates from them," it also says that (2) plebiscite;
"the Philippines is a democratic and republican state." This In our jurisdiction, it is also the rule that the exercise of the right of
the people ratify any amendment to or revision of the suffrage should be an enlightened one, hence, based on relevant facts,
means that ours is a representative democracy - as distinguished
Constitution and may introduce amendments to the data and information. It is for this reason that the choice of
from a direct democracy - in which the sovereign will of the people is
constitution. representatives in a democracy cannot be based on lottery or any
expressed through the ballot, whether in an election, referendum,
initiative, recall (in the case of local of icials) or plebiscite. Any (3) initiative; form of chance. The choice must be based on enlightened
exercise of the powers of sovereignty in any other way is judgment for democracy cannot endure the rule and reign of
legal process whereby the registered voters of a local ignorance.
unconstitutional.
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional ordinance through an election called for the purpose. Application of the Principles of Democracy, Republicanism,
principle. A constitution to provide for the right of the people to Freedom of Information and Discourse to the Case at Bar
(4) recall; and
revolt will carry with it the seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the In the case at bar, the number of votes cast for the special election
cannot be determined as the ballot did not indicate separately the trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipinos except the Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
votes for the special election. In fact, whether or not the electorate very few who may have noticed it while traveling abroad. It has never organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
had notice of the special election, a candidate would just the same fall paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine government. Under the circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of
as the 13th placer because more than twelve candidates ran for the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks. the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
regular senatorial elections. Nobody was nominated to vie international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for
speci ically for the senatorial seat in the special election nor was sphere.
infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
there a certi icate of candidacy iled for that position.
Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the In the case at bar, is there really a con lict between international law
Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong and Hassan all deepened the question of whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components
doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no
genuinely free, orderly and honest election is predicated upon an of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we
electorate informed on the issues of the day, the programs of of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
government laid out before them, the candidates running in the when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic
election and the time, place and manner of conduct of the election. Philippines iles a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage
actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted,
Bince and Benito further teach us that free and intelligent vote is not
foreign corporation may have the personality to ile a suit for after the iling of the extradition petition and during the judicial
enough; correct ascertainment of the will of the people is
infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and
equally necessary. The procedure adopted in the case at bar for
to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market. hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However,
holding the May 14, 2001 special senatorial election utterly failed to
prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights.
ascertain the people’s choice in the special election.
SOJ v Lantion In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that the “special election shall be
held simultaneously with such general election.” It does not The rule of pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to a treaty to of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of
contemplate, however, the integration of the special senatorial keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
election into the regular senatorial election whereby candidates who country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights
iled certi icates of candidacy for the regular elections also Article II of the Constitution. Under the doctrine of from a prospective extraditee.
automatically stand as candidates in the special election. incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such Ang Ladlad v Comelec
c.4.3. Adherence to International Law rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we
Philip Morris v CA tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on there appears to be a con lict between a rule of international law and to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the
trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts ICCPR.
must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the should irst be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons,
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law speci ically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in
constitutional provision.
over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law In a situation, however, where the con lict is irreconcilable and a opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to
are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative choice has to be made between a rule of international law and include "sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual
enactments.
upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
business in the Philippines. It has never promoted its tradename or
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. Art. IX(C), Section 2(5). The Commission on Elections shall exercise
Existing legislation contrary to the provisions of the treaty becomes
There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles
invalid, but legislation is necessary to put the treaty into effect. The the following powers and functions: xxxx Register, after suf icient
which are not re lective of the current state of international law, and
constitutional requirement that the treaty be concurred in by no less publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
do not ind basis in any of the sources of international law
than two-thirds of all members of the Senate (Article 21, Article VII) addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.
is, for legal intent and purposes, an equivalent to the required of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
The Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by transformation of treaty law into municipal law.
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
various international law professors, are - at best - de lege ferenda -
In preserving harmony between treaty law and municipal law, it is registered. xxxx
and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed,
submitted —
so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the
Art. VI, Section 5(2). The party-list representatives shall constitute
"soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles 1) That treaty law has the effect of amending, or even repealing
that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for an inconsistent municipal statute, a later enactment being twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning controlling, those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 2) but that an inconsistent municipal statute subsequently rati ication of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
passed cannot modify treaty law, without the concurrence of party-list representatives shall be illed, as provided by law, by
Compare: Doctrine of Transformation the other state party thereto, following the generally selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
accepted principle of pacta sunt servanda. cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
US v Purganan provided by law, except the religious sector.
c.4.4. Civilian Supremacy
Separate opinion of Vitug, J.
Exceptions: Art. VI, Section 28(3). Charitable institutions, churches
In the Philippines, while speci ic rules on how to resolve con licts Art. II, Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-pro it
between a treaty law and an act of Congress, whether made prior or military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
subsequent to its execution, have yet to be succinctly de ined, the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
established pattern, however, would show a leaning towards the the integrity of the national territory. purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
dualist model. The Constitution exempli ied by its incorporation
clause (Article II, Section 2), as well as statutes such as those found c.4.5. Government as protector of the people, and Section 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated,
in some provisions of the Civil Code and of the Revised Penal Code,
people as defenders of the State applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene it, or
would exhibit a remarkable textual commitment towards
"internalizing" international law. The Supreme Court itself has support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
recognized that "the principle of international law" are deemed part
of the law of the land as a condition and as a consequence of our people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
admission in the society of nations. and, in the ful illment thereof, all citizens may be required, under minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service. institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
The principle being that treaties create rights and duties only for
those who are parties thereto — pacta tertiis nec nocre nec prodesse c.4.6. Separation of Church and State
possunt — it is considered necessary to transform a treaty into a Art. XIV, Section 3(3). At the option expressed in writing by the parents
national law in order to make it binding upon affected state organs, or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
like the courts, and private individuals who could, otherwise, be seen wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class
as non-parties. The US-RP Extradition Treaty in particular, hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities
Art. III, Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
undoubtedly affects not only state organs but also private individuals of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional
as well. It is said that, in treaties of this nature, it should behoove the religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination cost to the Government.
state to undertake or adopt the necessary steps to make the treaty
binding upon said subjects either by incorporation or transformation. or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
Section 4(2). Educational institutions, other than those established by
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens
of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per

or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress The Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely
stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of
may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all abused their of ice when they rede ined the meaning of abortifacient.
Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
educational institutions. The control and administration of educational It allows “contraceptives” and recognizes as “abortifacient” only
feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines. stamps were not issued and sold for the bene it of the Roman
inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb.
Aglipay v Ruiz given to that church. On the contrary, it appears that the only purpose
in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines Evidently, the addition of the word “primarily,” in Section 3.01(a) and
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the and attract more tourists to this country." The of icials concerned (j) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of
Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of merely took advantage of an event considered of international the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is
a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people." danger that the insertion of the quali ier “primarily” will pave the
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
c.4.7. Policies
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such quali ication in
of separation of church and state. All the of icers of the Government, the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
Right to life of the unborn
from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and considered as an “abortifacient” if its sole known effect is abortion
defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize arid respect the or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the
Imbong v Ochoa
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent fertilized ovum.
limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life Thus, the word “primarily” in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the
is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II. RH-IRR should be declared void.
religious toleration.
The Philippine national population program has always been
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not grounded two cornerstone principles: “principle of no-abortion” Right to balanced and healthful ecology
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its and the “principle of non-coercion.” As will be discussed later,
in luence in human affairs. In fact, certain general concessions are these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly Applications v Greenpeace Southeast Asia
1. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
Greenpeace, et al alleged that the Bt talong ield trials violate their
devoted exclusively to religious purposes. The traditional meaning of the word “conception” which, as constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology.
2. Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, described and de ined by all reliable and reputable sources, means
minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. signaled an even more liberalized policy on
that life begins at fertilization, when the ovum is fertilized by the
assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, locus standi in public suits. In said case, we recognized the "public
sperm.
orphanage or leprosarium. right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
3. Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be the irst time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
constitutional mandate allowed. deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives incorporated in the fundamental law." Their personality to sue in
4. Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Christmas Day, and that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
Sundays are made legal holidays. ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it permissible.
gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine The precautionary principle inds direct application in the
when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 evaluation of evidence in cases before the courts. The precautionary
to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was principle bridges the gap in cases where scienti ic certainty in factual
Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing indings cannot be achieved. By applying the precautionary principle,
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public abortion. the court may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial
money or property for the use, bene it or support of a particular sect action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment. This may be further evinced from the second paragraph In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and Right to Quality Education
where bias is created in favor of the constitutional right of the people healthful ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from
to a balanced and healthful ecology. In effect, the precautionary Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. ⭐Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
principle shifts the burden of evidence of harm away from those Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Philippines v Secretary of Education
likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring to change the status Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure
quo. An application of the precautionary principle to the rules on the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced and While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality
evidence will enable courts to tackle future environmental problems healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the education, the determination of what constitutes quality
before ironclad scienti ic consensus emerges. local government unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao education is best left with the political departments who have
City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an ordinance that the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the
For purposes of evidence, the precautionary principle should be same.
seeks to protect the health and well-being of its constituents.
treated as a principle of last resort, where application of the regular
Rules of Evidence would cause in an inequitable result for the Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining When the government, through the K to 12 Law and the DepEd
environmental plaintiff — environmental integrity are privileges that do not only advance the issuances, determined that the use of Mother Tongue as primary
interests of a group of individuals. The bene its of protecting human medium of instruction until Grade 3 constitutes a better curriculum,
(a) settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; it was working towards discharging its constitutional duty to provide
health and the environment transcend geographical locations and
(b) settings in which harm might be irreversible and what is its citizens with quality education. The Court, even in the exercise of
even generations. This is the essence of Sections 15 and 16, Article II
lost is irreplaceable; and its jurisdiction to check if another branch of the government
of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. we declared that the
(c) settings in which the harm that might result would be committed grave abuse of discretion, will not supplant such
right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue
serious. When these features determination as it pertains to the wisdom of the policy.
of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It
— uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be Petitioners' argument that the establishment of the voucher system
possibility of serious harm — coincide, the case for the appreciated. will result in the de facto privatization of senior high school is not
precautionary principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be only speculative, it is also without any basis. The voucher system is
resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a balanced and Resident Marine Mammals v Reyes one of the mechanisms established by the State through RA No. 6728,
healthful ecology. Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of the otherwise known as the Government Assistance to Students and
strongest fora in which the precautionary principle may ind In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of Teachers in Private Education Act. In Mariño, Jr. v. Gamilla, the
applicability. generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational Court recognized that RA No. 6728 was enacted in view of the
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology declared policy of the State, in conformity with the mandate of the
Assessing the evidence on record, as well as the current state of GMO
is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and Constitution, to promote and make quality education
research worldwide, the Court inds all the three conditions present
healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
in this case - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm and the accessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the recognition of the
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of
possibility of serious harm. State of the complementary roles of public and private educational
humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
institutions in the educational system and the invaluable
Eggplants (talong) are a staple vegetable in the country and grown by impairing the environment.
contribution that the private schools have made and will make to
small-scale farmers, majority of whom are poor and marginalized.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine education. The establishment and expansion of the voucher system is
While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is
Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which the State's way of tapping the resources of the private educational
laudable, independent scienti ic studies revealed uncertainties due to
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to system in order to give Filipinos equal access to quality education.
unful illed economic bene its from Bt crops and plants, adverse
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the The Court inds that this manner of implementing the grant of equal
effects on the environment associated with use of GE technology in
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in access to education is not constitutionally in irm.
agriculture, and serious health hazards from consumption of GM
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos
foods. For a biodiversity-rich country like the Philippines, the natural
and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be Right of Indigenous Cultural Communities
and unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
would be disastrous and irreversible.
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing ⭐Tawahig v Lapinid 2019 Leonen case
to ile this petition.
Mosqueda v Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of
indigenous peoples was never intended and will not operate to 4. SECTION 6. ART XIII. The State shall apply the principles of the nation[,]" and articulates the State's overarching commitment to
deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Individuals agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in "strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
belonging to indigenous cultural communities who are charged with accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of development." Article XV, Section 2 concerns marriage, in particular,
criminal offenses cannot invoke RA No. 8371, or the Indigenous other natural resources, including lands of the public and articulates a broad commitment to protecting its inviolability as
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and liability under domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, a social institution.
courts of law. subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual de inition of marriage, the
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral
The provisions under Chapter IX of IPRA do not only lend legitimacy Constitution is capable of accommodating a contemporaneous
lands.
to and enable the continuing ef icacy and viability of customary laws understanding of sexual orientation, gender identity and expression,
5. SECTION 17. ART XIV. The State shall recognize, respect, and
and practices to maintain order and dispense justice within and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). The plain text and meaning of our
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
indigenous cultural communities. They also work to segregate constitutional provisions do not prohibit SOGIESC.
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and
customary laws and practices in two (2) respects.
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation As a social institution, the family is shaped by economic forces and
First, they make customary laws and practices structurally and of national plans and policies. other social structural forces, such as ideologies and politics. The
operationally distinct from enactments of the legislature and of 6. SECTION 12. ART XVI. The Congress may create a evolution of the social concept of family reveals that
those upon whom legislative power has been delegated, as well consultative body to advise the President on policies heteronormativity in marriage is not a static anthropological fact.
as regulations of general application. affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority The perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the
of the members of which shall come from such changing roles undertaken by men and women, especially under the
Second, they distinguish disputants belonging to the same
communities. present economic conditions.
indigenous cultural communities as the exclusive objects of the
application of customary laws and practices. Section 65 ought not be read as an all-encompassing, unquali ied To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the
authorization. Rather, it must be viewed within the con ines of how it concept of the complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the
As such, Chapter IX is a means to effect the overarching right of
is a component of a larger mechanism for self-governance. Section 65 discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex,
indigenous peoples to self-governance and empowerment, as spelled
is quali ied by Section 15. With respect to dispensing justice, who do not it into that mold. It renders invisible the lived realities of
out in Chapter IV.
resolving con licts, and peace-building, the application of customary families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile couples,
In turn, the IPRA's provisions on self-governance and empowerment, laws and practices is permissible only to the extent that it is in families formed by couples who preferred not to have children,
along with those on the right to ancestral domains, social justice and harmony with the national legal system. A set of customary laws and among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces
human rights, and cultural integrity, collectively re lect and bring to practices is effective only within the con ines of the speci ic certain gender stereotypes within the family.
fruition the 1987 Constitution's aims of preservation. indigenous cultural community that adopted and adheres to it.
The 1987 Constitution devotes six (6) provisions "which insure the The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to c.5. Doctrine of Separation of Powers
right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life" desist from taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous
peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of Separate Opinion, Justice Puno, Macalintal vs. Comelec, et al. GR No.
1. SECTION 22. ART II. The State recognizes and promotes the
petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued. 157013, July 10, 2003
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development. The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration
2. SECTION 5 ART VI. xxx For three consecutive terms after the Family as social institution
of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of
rati ication of this Constitution, one-half of the seats government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches of
allocated to party-list representatives shall be illed, as ⭐Falcis III v Civil Registrar General 2019 Leonen En Banc
government.
provided by law, by selection or election from xxx From its plain text, the Constitution does not de ine or restrict
indigenous cultural communities, xxx. In this jurisdiction, our adherence to the principle of separation
marriage on the basis of sex, gender, sexual orientation, or gender powers was succinctly discussed by Justice Laurel in Angara v.
3. SECTION 5. ART XII. The State, subject to the provisions of identity or expression.
this Constitution and national development policies and Electoral Commission. The separation of powers is a fundamental
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural Article XV of the 1987 Constitution concerns the family and operates principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their in conjunction with Article II, Section 12. Article XV, Section 1 provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
economic, social, and cultural well-being. pertains to the family in general, identifying it "as the foundation of It is now beyond debate that the principle of separation of powers
objectives,
(1) allows the “blending” of some of the executive, legislative, The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises
(b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered,
or judicial powers in one body; its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. “Supervision”
(c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty,
(2) does not prevent one branch of government from inquiring connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
(d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and
into the affairs of the other branches to maintain the balance congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given
(e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
of power; administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and
perception of public interest.
(3) but ensures that there is no encroachment on matters within investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in
the exclusive jurisdiction of the other branches. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of order to in luence future executive branch performance,
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise
For its part, this Court checks the exercise of power of the other inherent in a democratic system of government. of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain
branches of government through judicial review. It is the inal arbiter part of that delegated authority.
of disputes involving the proper allocation and exercise of the Categories of congressional oversight functions
different powers under the Constitution. Since then, the Court has Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
used its expanded power to check acts of the House of its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting
powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny,
Representatives, the President, and even of independent bodies such the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate
investigation and supervision.
as the Electoral Tribunal, the Commission on Elections and the Civil regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the
Service Commission. a. Scrutiny President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a “right” to approve or disapprove any
Congress checks the other branches of government primarily Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions
through its law making powers. Congress can create administrative attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after
agencies, de ine their powers and duties, ix the terms of of icers and determine economy and ef iciency of the operation of the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
their compensation. It can also create courts, de ine their jurisdiction government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, af irmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
and reorganize the judiciary so long as it does not undermine the Congress may request information and report from the other
security of tenure of its members. The power of Congress does not branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass
resolutions for consideration of the agency involved. In Re: Production of Court Records
end with the inished task of legislation. Concomitant with its
principal power to legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure that the Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation From the constitutional perspective, a necessary starting vantage
laws it enacts are faithfully executed. As well stressed by one scholar, of Congress. Under the Constitution, the “power of the purse” point in this consideration is the principle of separation of powers
the legislature belongs to Congress. through the recognition of the independence of each branch of
1. ixes the main lines of substantive policy and is entitled to government and through the protection of privileged and con idential
Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power documents and processes, as recognized by law, by the rules and by
see that administrative policy is in harmony with it; of con irmation. Through the power of con irmation, Congress
2. it establishes the volume and purpose of public Court policies.
shares in the appointing power of the executive.
expenditures and ensures their legality and propriety; The Independence of the Judiciary
3. it must be satis ied that internal administrative controls are b. Investigation
operating to secure economy and ef iciency; and The doctrine of separation of powers is an essential
Congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. component of our democratic and republican system of government.
4. it informs itself of the conditions of administration of As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to
remedial measure. The doctrine inures not by express provision of the Constitution, but
investigate is circumscribed by three limitations, namely: as an underlying principle that constitutes the bedrock of our system
Concept and bases of congressional oversight (a) it must be in aid of its legislative functions, of checks and balances in government. It divides the government into
The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by (b) it must be conducted in accordance with duly published three branches, each with well-de ined powers. In its most basic
Congress to enhance its understanding of and in luence over the rules of procedure, and concept, the doctrine declares that the legislature enacts the law, the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their executive implements it, and the judiciary interprets it.
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: constitutional rights. Each branch is considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and
(a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program supreme within its own sphere, under the legal and political
c. Supervision
reality of one overarching Constitution that governs one
government and one nation for whose bene it all the three privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it (3) Court records which are "predecisional" and
separate branches must act with unity. relates. In other words, communications are considered "deliberative" in nature, in particular, documents and other
predecisional if they were made in the attempt to reach a inal communications which are part of or related to the
A lesser known but no less important aspect of the principle of
conclusion. deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers,
separation of powers - deemed written into the rules by established
internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of
practice and rendered imperative by the departments' A material is "deliberative," on the other hand, if it re lects the
internal deliberations, and similar papers.
inter-dependence and need for cooperation among themselves - is the give-and-take of the consultative process. The key question in
(4) Con idential Information secured by justices, judges, court
principle of comity or the practice of voluntarily observing determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is
of icials and employees in the course of their of icial
inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned whether disclosure of the information would discourage candid
functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged
constitutional duties for the harmonious working of government. discussion within the agency.
even after their term of of ice.
Access to court records: general rule — Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in (5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are
a policy of transparency nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject of a privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except only for
subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved. Additionally, pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made
Underlying every request for information is the constitutional right to two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, available by the court to the general public.
information (a right granted to the people) that Article III, Section 7 of as well as preventing members of the bench, from being subjected to (6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy
the Constitution provides. compulsory process: demands that the highest of icials of each department be
The right to information, by its very nature and by the exempt from the compulsory processes of the other
(1) the disquali ication by reason of privileged communication
Constitution's own terms, is not absolute. On the part of private departments.
and
individuals, the right to privacy, similarly inviolable, exists. (7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an
(2) the pendency of an action or matter.
Institutions also enjoy their own right to con identiality, that, for institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her
governmental departments and agencies, is expressed in terms of Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be subject to individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the
their need to protect the integrity of their mandated tasks under the any compulsory process in relation to the performance of their individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or
Constitution and the laws; these tasks, to state the obvious, are their adjudicatory functions. judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception
reasons for their being. without the consent of the Court.
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled
When Court Records are considered Con idential to testify on matters relating to the internal deliberations and
actions of the Court, in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions Re: EM No. 03-010 - Order of the First Division of the Commission
Speci ically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation where the on Elections dated August 15, 2003, A.M. No. 03-8-22 SC
the disclosure of testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory
functions and duties. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the three major
(1) the result of the raf le of cases,
branches of government -- the Executive, the Legislative and the
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the
To summarize these rules, the following are privileged Judicial -- are coequal and coordinate with each other. But none may
agenda of the Court's session, and
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
documents or communications, and are not subject to interfere with, review or pass upon the exclusive powers vested in
disclosure: each of them by the Constitution. Speci ically, not even the other two
and matters pending before it.
great branches of government may reverse or modify decisions and
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC speaks only of the (1) Court actions such as the result of the raf le of cases and orders of the Supreme Court in given case -- not the President, not
con identiality of court deliberations, it is understood that the rule the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the Congress much less the COMELEC.
extends to documents and other communications which are part of or agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to
are related to the deliberative process. pending cases, except where a party litigant requests
information on the result of the raf le of the case, pursuant to
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
agency must show that the document is both (1) predecisional and (2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in
(2) deliberative. court sessions on cases and matters pending before the
A document is "predecisional" under the deliberative process Court;
Module 1-2 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of a.1. Senate (Secs. 2-4)
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress as per Section 5, Article VI. Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
Article VI, 1987 Constitution shall be elected at large by the quali ied voters of the Philippines, as
Section 5 (1), Article VI vests in Congress the power to increase, may be provided by law.
I. STRUCTURE through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is
A. COMPOSITION legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of 1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
Sema v Comelec existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that 2. on the day of the election, is at least thirty- ive years of age,
Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local 3. able to read and write,
There is no provision in the Constitution that con licts with the
legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of 4. a registered voter, and
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of 5. a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by immediately preceding the day of the election.
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution Congress.
Section 4. The term of of ice of the Senators shall be six years and
provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred ifty Indeed, the of ice of a legislative district representative to shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in Congress is a national of ice, and its occupant, a Member of the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve
the House of Representatives. House of Representatives, is a national of icial. It would be for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional of ice for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI as well as Section 3 of Assembly to create a national of ice when its legislative powers in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a extend only to its regional territory.
a.2. House of Representatives (Secs. 5-8)
city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar
without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or
as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create Section 5. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power
provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of than two hundred and ifty members, unless otherwise ixed by law,
to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a
Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a
Section 3 of the Ordinance. Only Congress can create provinces and provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
legislative district because once the city's population reaches
cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI and Section 3 of the
can exercise. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
Ordinance. Thus, the power to create a province or city
law creating a national of ice like the of ice of a district sectoral parties or organizations.
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the
For Congress to validly delegate the power to create a province or ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X. Thus, we rule that total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and three consecutive terms after the rati ication of this Constitution,
validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is illed, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
in the negative. peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
sector.
Government Code. succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the hundred ifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion above representative."
of at least two hundred ifty thousand, or each province, shall have at stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
least one representative. proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands." entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision stated province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress or implied. Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the of the IRR stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply city must irst meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
standards provided in this section. where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" similarly entitled.
is null and void. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines R.A. No. 9355, failed to comply with the land area requirement of minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty- ive years of age, able 2,000 square kilometers. The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed representative, but not so for a province.
to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered to comply with the population requirement of not less than 250,000 Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof inhabitants as certi ied by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of of several other factors in the composition of the additional
for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of district.
the election. Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951. Less than a year
after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be 2007 Census of Population. The NSO certi ied that as of August 1, Aldaba v Comelec (Resolution)
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813, which The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground
election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for In ine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or that it is a political question.
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the of ice the population requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators
Islands.
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Congress used to measure Malolos City's compliance with the
"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On
🔗Republic Act No. 7941 apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an Miranda's Certi ication, (that the "projected population of the [City]
unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Bernas de ined of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
Navarro v Ermita 2010 Decision "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative district out of growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of
Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. EO 135's requirements that
is not quali ied to become a province because it failed to comply with The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates
(a) for intercensal years, the certi ication should be based on a
the land area or the population requirement, despite its compliance each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a
set of demographic projections and estimates declared
with the income requirement. contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
of icial by the National Statistical and Coordination Board
The Lands Management Bureau certi ied that though the land area of (NSCB);
the Province of Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers, it is Aquino III v Comelec (b) certi ications on intercensal population estimates will be as
composed of one or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the of the middle of every year; and
There is no speci ic provision in the Constitution that ixes a 250,000
required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of (c) certi ications based on projections or estimates must be
minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The
issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated election of a member of the House of Representatives and members stated that the city's land area “shall comprise the present territory
certifying of icer. of the local legislative body. It is NOT, however, a political of the municipality.” At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854,
subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Further, using Miranda's own growth rate assumption of 3.78%,
It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. We take
Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333,
may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using
below the constitutional threshold of 250,000.
unlike the latter, it is NOT a corporate unit. Not being a corporate the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising government units with unsettled boundary disputes.
Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city who will choose a representative in their national affairs. district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the
from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of
Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that
does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local of Makati stands at only four hundred ifty thousand (450,000). Said
district. This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI
government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable,
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, two hundred ifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory."
municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative 1990 census stood at four hundred ifty thousand (450,000), its
Bagabuyo v Comelec legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
apportionment or reapportionment.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the minimum population requirement of two hundred ifty
Equality of representation.
City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment. The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased
is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters while District to more than two hundred ifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled
Legislative apportionment is de ined as the determination of the 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays to at least one congressional representative.
number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision while District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays. Thus, R.A.
may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.
legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of Aldaba v Comelec (Decision)
voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional
among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the
Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by number of registered voters therein. We settled this very same
the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional question in Herrera v. COMELEC. The Constitution does not require
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
requirement of equality of representation. mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation. House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certi ication of Regional
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the NSO as authority that
Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution the population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year
Mariano, Jr. v Comelec
and the LGC expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, 2010." The Certi ication states that the population of "Malolos,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of an LGU. In Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291."
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
or reapportionment provision. boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an The Certi ication of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on
inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established
sense, be called a political unit because it is the basis for the Certi ication. The Certi ication is also void on its face because based
land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal the irst party is entitled is as follows: should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any And it must demonstrate that in a con lict of interests, it has
N umber of votes of f irst party
event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to T otal votes f or party −list system
= P roportion of votes of 1st party chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
have a legislative district only in the "immediately following 2. Major political parties must comply with the declared statutory
election" after the attainment of the 250,000 population. If the proportion is policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
● At least 6%, 2 additional seats; and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
First, certi ications on demographic projections can be issued
● At least 4% but less than 6%, 1 additional seat; Representatives.”
only if such projections are declared of icial by the National
● Less than 4%, NO additional seat. 3. The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certi ications based
system.
on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the 4. Disquali ications under Sec 6 of RA 7941:
Administrator or his designated certifying of icer. Third,
other quali ied parties are entitled to, based on proportional ➔ It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of
representation. association organized for religious purposes;
every year.
➔ It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
Addt′l seat =
N o. of votes of party
× N o. of additional seats of 1st party ➔ It is a foreign party or organization;
a.2.1. On Party-list N o. of votes of f irst party
➔ It is receiving support from any foreign government,
Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
Bantay RA 7941 v Comelec
directly or through any of its of icers or members or
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names indirectly through third parties for partisan election
Constitution and RA No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein purposes;
parameters. These are: petitions. ➔ It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
➔ First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the relating to elections;
all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other ➔ It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
total membership of the House of Representatives, including than the "Certi ied List" the names of the party-list nominees. ➔ It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
those elected under the party list. Section 5 (2), Article VI is not ➔ It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in CIBAC v Comelec or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
Congress. cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that
➔ Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
has met the 2% threshold, "proportional representation" is the
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast 5. The party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats. See BANAT
for the party-list system are "quali ied" to have a seat in the organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government.
House of Representatives. See BANAT 6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the
➔ Third, the three-seat limit - each quali ied party, regardless of Ang Bagong Bayani v Comelec
law; its nominees must likewise do so.
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a 1. The political party, sector, organization or coalition must 7. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
additional seats. identi ied in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show nominees.
➔ Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, 8. While lacking a well-de ined political constituency, the nominee
which a quali ied party is entitled to shall be computed "in history, platform of government and track record -- that it must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
proportion to their total number of votes." represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene it the nation who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in
as a whole. choice." the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clari ied in this Resolution.
➔ The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is
Partido ng Manggagawa v Comelec BANAT v Comelec (Resolution) intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of
The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created by the There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not
way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law.
require absolute proportionality for the party-list system.
of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani. Be that as it may, we reiterate that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates
the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for such additional party-list seats. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the
party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case of wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the
The illing-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Constitution.
Veterans.
Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of
participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated
Torayno v Comelec in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54 BANAT v Comelec (Decision)
seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats
Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the
family, three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
available seats. observed:
(1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
de Oro City; There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
(2) had actually held of ice there during his three terms as system: they garnered during the elections.
provincial governor of Misamis Oriental,the provincial ➔ Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
capitol being located therein; and the House of Representatives is the maximum number of two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
(3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" automatically one party-list seat for every four existing 3. Those garnering suf icient number of votes, according to the
when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city legislative districts. ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
mayor. ➔ Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one additional seats are allocated.
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a irst 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two more than three (3) seats.
Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a percent of the total party-list votes.
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs ➔ The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
of a community and not identi ied with the latter from [seeking] an allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
elective of ice to serve that community." Such provision is aimed at party-list organizations including those that received less seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats
excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats
Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect threshold mathematically and physically prevents the illing allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall
needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.
be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat
who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or
do not need to represent any “marginalized and ➔ The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should
First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, underrepresented” sector. refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided nature, economically “marginalized and
under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the they register under the party-list system and do not ield underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant,
two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, isherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in whether major or not, that ields candidates in legislative district handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar
the remaining available seats. elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party
rank until all available seats are completely distributed.
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to
Ang Ladlad v Comelec, supra. and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-de ined political the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or in irmity.” It is
Phil Guardians Brotherhood v Comelec
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The suf icient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class.
The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon veri ied complaint of any sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include More speci ically, the economically “marginalized and
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the labor, peasants, isherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income group as
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The classi ied by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
coalition if it: sectors that lack “well-de ined political constituencies” include
(a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. ➔ A “political party refers to an organized group of citizens
(b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must for the general conduct of government.”
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
A party-list group or organization which quali ied in the second represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral ➔ A “sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason parties or organizations that lack “well-de ined political belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
The disquali ication should now necessarily be read to apply to nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the and concerns of their sector.”
party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those
the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it who lack “well-de ined political constituencies,” either must B. QUALIFICATIONS AND TERM OF OFFICE
registered. belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
Social Justice Society v DDB
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
Atong Paglaum v Comelec and regional parties or organizations must be bona- ide
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
members of such parties or organizations.
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the quali ication
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
a. national parties or organizations, be disquali ied if some of their nominees are disquali ied, couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for
b. regional parties or organizations, and provided that they have at least one nominee who remains senator to be certi ied illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition
c. sectoral parties or organizations. quali ied. to the validity of a certi icate of candidacy for senator or, with like
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and Additional Notes proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the
chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public of ice
shall enter upon the duties of his of ice until he has undergone domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and de inite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
another quali ication layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence of choice must be for an inde inite period of time; the change of
drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected for the new domicile must be actual.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
would be of little value if one cannot assume of ice for
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent
The unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa free entry
having infringed the constitutional provision de ining the synonymously with domicile. under a balikbayan stamp being insuf icient. Since petitioner was
quali ication or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any
for and serve as senator. of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7
doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in
Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the July 2006 cannot be counted.
b.1. Residence requirement implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of
quali ied Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads
Macalintal v. Comelec Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her
a system for overseas absentee voting. U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas quali ied schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S.
Filipinos, it behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, Post Of ice of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating
pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
should be construed as a whole. Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence
requirement of Section 1 with respect to quali ied Filipinos here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the irst
abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that quali ied Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence
paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband
shall provide a system for voting by quali ied Filipinos abroad. It
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual
must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters
Article V of the Constitution. application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear
the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
Llamanzares v Comelec that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
exercised its function as de ined in Article VI.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person Petitioner’s residency started when she arrived on 24 May 2005.
b.2. Term vs. Tenure
cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However,
under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original
domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to Dimaporo v Mitra
Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as residence is considered acquire a new domicile: Petitioner admits that he iled a Certi icate of Candidacy for the
synonymous with domicile. position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however,
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
There is a difference between domicile and residence. ‘Residence’ is maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman after
2. an intention to remain there; and losing in said election.
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
‘domicile’ denotes a ixed permanent residence to which, when 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.
The term of of ice prescribed by the Constitution may not be
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona ide intention an of icer actually holds the of ice (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said of icer. Tenure Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she 1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following
may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June
situations will not change the duration of the term of of ice. stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed 30, 2001;
by her. 2. Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
Under the questioned provision, when an elective of icial covered
thereby iles a certi icate of candidacy for another of ice, he is The appropriate starting point of the terms of of ice of the irst interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002
deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 during which time he was a private citizen;
term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption 3. Hagedorn’s recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30,
unexpired portion. of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a
quali ication, the interval between the start of the term and the actual
The legal effects of iling a certi icate of candidacy for another of ice fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is
quali ication of the appointee must be counted against the latter.
having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, not a fourth consecutive term; and
no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker In the law of public of icers, there is a settled distinction between 4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest
and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding "term" and "tenure." The term of an of ice must be distinguished possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their
petitioner's name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time leaders.
administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises during which the of icer may claim to hold of ice as of right, and ixes
administrative powers and functions attached to his of ice. As the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
administrative of icers, both the Speaker and House another. The tenure represents the term during which the C. ELECTION
Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to incumbent actually holds the of ice. The term of of ice is not
remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term
tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held
on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that on the second Monday of May.
petitioner had iled his certi icate of candidacy for regional governor
of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the Socrates v Comelec
Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. Sec 8 Art X and Sec 46 of the LGC have two parts. The irst part Representatives, a special election may be called to ill such vacancy in
881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These of icers cannot
provides that an elective local of icial cannot serve for more than the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House
refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of
the statute imposing the duty. three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part
Grounds by which term may be shortened: states that voluntary renunciation of of ice for any length of time Tolentino v Comelec
a) Section 13, Article VI. Forfeiture of his seat by holding any does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that ➔ The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time
other of ice or employment in the government or any involuntary severance from of ice for any length of time interrupts and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
government-owned or controlled corporations or interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service
subsidiaries; indispensable to the election’s validity. In a general election,
or consecutive terms. where the law ixes the date of the election, the election is valid
b) Section 16 (3). Expulsion as a disciplinary action for
disorderly behavior; In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on without any call by the body charged to administer the election.
c) Section 17. Disquali ication as determined by resolution of September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third ➔ In a special election to ill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute
the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. that expressly provides that an election to ill a vacancy shall be
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of of ice. held at the next general elections ixes the date at which the
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is quali ied to run in the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
Gaminde v COA September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
The basic issue raised is whether the term of of ice of Atty. Thelma P. because: prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of

law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is D. ORGANIZATION & SESSIONS persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the
statute and not from any call for the election by some authority d.1. Election of Officers Arroyo v de Venecia
and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and
place of the election. Sec. 16(1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of The Court inds no ground for holding that Congress committed a
➔ Conversely, where the law does not ix the time and place for Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is
therefore dismissed.
holding a special election but empowers some authority to ix Members. Each House shall choose such other of icers as it may deem
the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, necessary. First. What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A.
the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. d.2. Quorum than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but
➔ In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that
Sec. 16(2). A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the
in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to ill such House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding presence of a quorum.
compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under
regular election. Accordingly, the special election to ill the
such penalties, as such House may provide. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held that ‘the rules adopted by
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modi ication or waiver
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be Avelino v Cuenco at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are
held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will
Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
invalidate it. House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that
➔ Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved number than the irst. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the they are subject to revocation, modi ication or waiver at the pleasure
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes the constitutional of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
a special election to ill a vacancy in the House of
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not constitute a
election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the
should take place at least one year before the expiration of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
term. doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
➔ This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against quali ication. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
6645, as amended, for COMELEC to “call x x x a special election x and one abstained. persons other than members of the legislative body the question
x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open
occurrence of the vacancy” and give notice of the of ice to be d.3. Rules of Proceedings to question in a case where private rights are involved.
illed. Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Sec. 16(3). Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
xxxx following instances:
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its 1. upon the last and third readings of a bill,
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in 2. at the request of one- ifth of the Members present, and
3. in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
their publication before the rules can take effect. jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by
coordinate branch of the Government.
the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
certi ication by the secretaries of both Houses are conclusive of its Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the
Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under Santiago v Sandiganbayan
due enactment.
the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their
Pimentel, Jr. v Senate Committee of the Whole suspension of an incumbent public of icial charged with violation of
publication.
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole from WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the jurisprudential support.
conducting further hearings on the complaint iled by Senator complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate
Madrigal against Senator Villar on the alleged double insertion of Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of
P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
Appropriations Act. err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of d.4. Discipline of Members
d.5. Journal and Congressional Records
proceedings has been recognized and af irmed by this Court. As such,
the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial Sec. 16(3). Each House may xxxx punish its Members for disorderly
Sec. 16(4). Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and
supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
of due process. The only limitation to the power of Congress to judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
shall not exceed sixty days.
promulgate its own rules is the observance of question shall, at the request of one- ifth of the Members present, be
Alejandrino v Quezon entered in the Journal. xxxx
1. quorum,
2. voting, and No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that d.5.a. The Enrolled Bill Theory
3. publication it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature
when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, or a branch thereof to take any particular action. An Enrolled bill is that bill which bears the signature of the Senate
the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its President and Speaker of the House; the bill approved by both houses
own rules. members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an and that which is sent to the President for approval.
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate appointive member from the exercise of his of ice for one year.
It carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
Committee of the Whole. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Of icers and Investigations, the Court Osmena v Pendatun departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries enacting and executing the laws, that it was duly passed by Congress.
insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeñ a may be A duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is
In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We binding on the courts. It proves two things:
Committee on Justice, et al., the Court further clari ied: believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has 1) Conclusive as to tenor of bill - cannot entertain comments on
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends variance with journal/record; things there are conclusive.
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. 2) Conclusive as to due enactment - process required by
which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of Congress in passing it onto a bill has been done; all of the
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the
the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect proceedings required have been followed.
power to determine whether Osmeñ a's conduct constituted
only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for Mabanag v Lopez Vito
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by

The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the d.5.b. Probative Value of Journal
conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
US v Pons against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
the political departments, a duly certi ied law or resolution also Journals should be public, because all are required to conform to originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
A duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
binding on the courts. tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in (c) yeas and nays on repassing of vetoed bill (id)
the memory of individuals.
(d) yeas and nays on any question upon request of 1/5 of
Casco v Gimenez Such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the members present (sec. 16[4])
question whether a particular bill became a law or not. The journals
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, d.5.d. Journal Entry Rule v. Enrolled Bill Theory
"urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining
the aforesaid margin fee. to go behind these journals. Astorga v Villegas
"Urea formaldehyde" is clearly a inished product, which is
patently distinct and different from, "urea" and "formaldehyde", as d.5.c. Matters to be entered in the Journal Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their
known as "urea formaldehyde". (a) yeas and nays on 3rd and inal reading (sec. 26[2]) respective presiding of icers and secretaries on the printed copy of
the approved bill. It has been held that this procedure is merely a
Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved, in Congress No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has mode of authentication to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to ready for his approval or rejection. The function of an attestation is
exempt "urea", and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements thereof in its inal form have been distributed to its Members
therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea and three days before its passage, except when the President it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided
formaldehyde", not the latter a inished product, citing in support of certi ies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the
this view the statements made on the loor of the Senate, during the public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon statute invalid. The af irmative view, it is pointed out, would be in
said individual statements do not necessarily re lect the view of the shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays effect giving the presiding of icers the power of veto, which in itself
Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of entered in the Journal. is a strong argument to the contrary. There is less reason to make the
Representatives. attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill—which uses the (b) veto message of the President (section 27[1]) does not even provide that the presiding of icers should sign the bill
term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde"— is before it is submitted to the President.
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the
passed by Congress and approved by the President. law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he respect due to coequal and independent departments,” which requires
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
certi ied by the of icers of Congress and approved by the with his objections to the House where it originated, which authenticated in the manner stated.” Thus it has also been stated in
Executive—on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the
cornerstones of our democratic system— the remedy is by journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds the certi ication made by the presiding of icers. It is merely a mode
of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of

the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certi ication does not E. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon his of ice, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Sec. 16(4). xxxx Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
signatures of the presiding of icers that is essential. Vice-President as Acting President.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no F. SESSIONS
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of f.1. Regular sessions President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth discharge the powers and duties of his of ice, the Vice-President shall
9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is ixed by immediately assume the powers and duties of the of ice as Acting
Houses of Congress. Under the speci ic facts and circumstances of law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it President.
this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular
that purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. xxxx
amendments were introduced on the loor and approved by the and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the Section 16(5). Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate
without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor duties of his of ice. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of
such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. the Cabinet transmit within ive days to the President of the Senate and
therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they f.2. Special Sessions that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error of ice, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the
committed and subsequently recti ied by the President of the Senate Sec. 15. xxxx The President may call a special session at any time.
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours,
and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
disregarding such recti ication and holding that the erroneous bill Art. VII, Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning
has become law would be to sacri ice truth to iction and bring about of the third day after the vacancy in the of ices of the President and xxxx
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special Art. VII, Sec. 18, par.3. xxxx The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
Morales v Subido election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
than forty- ive days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
As we observed explicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the
The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certi ied under set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
of ice of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as of icially paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. for the special election shall be charged against any current invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph
All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required
4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
to be entered in the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy. Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen with its rules without need of a call.
Arroyo v de Venecia, supra months before the date of the next presidential election.
xxxx
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
f.3. Joint Sessions G. CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANS WITHIN CONGRESS thereof to said Electoral Tribunal;
3. that the party having the second largest number of votes in
g.1. Electoral Tribunals the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three
f.3.a. Voting separately
(3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each Tribunal;
Art. VII, Sec. 4. xxxx The returns of every election for President and
4. that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may
Vice-President, duly certi ied by the board of canvassers of each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all be nominated by a person or party other than the one having
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the contests relating to the election, returns, and quali ications of their the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certi icates of canvass, the respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of representative therein;
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to 5. that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing
the election, open all the certi icates in the presence of the Senate and to validly make such nomination and
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, 6. that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by
upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab
manner provided by law, canvass the votes. xxxx from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered initio.
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Sec. 11(4). If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. g.1.b. Function
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals xxxx shall be constituted within Dueñas, Jr. v HRET
voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have
and duties of his of ice, the Vice-President shall act as President; So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. Xxxx
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
quali ications of members of the House of Representatives, any inal
of his of ice. ➔ Sole Judge. Not subject to appeal. May only be questioned via
action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as
Certiorari petition to the SC. Its exercise of power is intended to a rule, not be reviewed by this Court .... the power granted to the
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Of ice of the be its own -- full, complete and unimpaired. Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President ➔ Contests. May only be iled by one who seeks to replace the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate protestee. even affect the same.
and the House of Representatives who shall assume of ice upon ➔ Members. Electoral tribunal acquires jurisdiction upon taking Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an
con irmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of of oath and assumption of of ice of the proclaimed winner. independent constitutional body require that any inding of grave
the Congress, voting separately. Prior to assumption, COMELEC has jurisdiction. abuse of discretion against that body should be based on irm and
convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave
Section 23(1). The President shall address the Congress at the opening abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET must be established by a
g.1.a. Composition
of its regular session. clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence.
Tanada v Cuenco
Art. XVII, Sec. 1(1) The meaning of Rule 88 is plain. The HRET could continue or
We hold discontinue the revision proceedings ex proprio motu, that is, of its
1. That the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate own accord. Thus, even if we were to adopt petitioner's view that he
f.3.b. Voting jointly
Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been ought to have been allowed by HRET to withdraw his counter-protest,
nominated by the political parties speci ied in the there was nothing to prevent the HRET from continuing the revision
Art. VII, Section 18. xxxx The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
Constitution; of its own accord by authority of Rule 88.
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
2. that the party having the largest number of votes in the The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its prerogative
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members under Rule 88 was its own determination that the evidence thus far
set aside by the President. xxxx
presented could affect the of icially proclaimed results. Much like the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of (f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, the government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the contests relating to the election, returns and quali ications
determination of whether the evidence could in luence the of icially limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer of members of the National Assembly.
proclaimed results was a highly technical undertaking, a function to the legislative department than to any other. But it is a body (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
best left to the specialized expertise of the HRET. separate from and independent of the legislature. Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature
was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
quali ications of their elective members.
lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is relating to the election, returns and quali ications of members of the
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
terminated. Thus, in Robles v. HRET, the Court ruled: National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to
if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
The mere iling of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining contests relating to the election, returns and quali ications of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent its members, to the Electoral Commission.
exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
the parties but continues until the case is terminated. procedure to be followed in iling protests before the Electoral carried with it ex necessitate rei the implied power inter
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and
Angara v Electoral Commission rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to manner of iling protests.
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and Quali ications (j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution of of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by Commission was to have an independent constitutional
December 3, 1935, con irmed the election of the herein petitioner to necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns
the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by Commission. and quali ications of members of the National Assembly,
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, ixed said date as the last devoid of partisan in luence or consideration, which object
Summarizing, we conclude:
day for the iling of protests against the election, returns and would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain
quali ications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding (a) That the government established by the Constitution the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
the previous con irmation made by the National Assembly as follows fundamentally the theory of separation of manner of conducting said contests.
aforesaid. powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
xxxxxx
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
overlapping of functions and duties often makes dif icult We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within
con lict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
the delimitation of the powers granted. the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
(c) That in cases of con lict between the several departments to take cognizance of the protest iled by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
other. Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now
and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that
proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether
Supreme Court as the inal arbiter, is the only constitutional the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,1935 can not
the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
mechanism devised inally to resolve the con lict and in any manner toll the time for iling protests against the election,
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, and in
allocate constitutional boundaries. returns and quali ications of members of the National As* sembly,
assuming to take cognizance of the protest iled against the election
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial nor prevent the iling of a protest within such time as the rules of the
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous con irmation
review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, Electoral Commission might prescribe.
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3.
and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident agency of the government transcends the Constitution, Barbers v Comelec
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers which is the source of all authority.
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent Claiming that Biazon’s proclamation was void, Barbers iled a
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial constitutional creation with speci ic powers and functions petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator with the
tribunal. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classi ication COMELEC on 7 June 2004.
invested with the necessary authority in the performance and to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of
The phrase “election, returns and quali ications” should be
execution of the limited and speci ic function assigned to it by the the government.
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral
(1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
can say that Tribunal of its jurisdiction. (2) in open session.
1. “election” referred to the conduct of the polls, including the
Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is
listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and Reyes v Comelec
no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and,
the casting and counting of the votes;
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of of ice was
2. “returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation
when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, indeed complied with.
of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity Article VI, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this
of the election returns; and judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
3. “quali ications” to matters that could be raised in a quo quali ications” of the Members of the House of Representatives. 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already inally disposed of the issue
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his jurisdiction for the following reasons: Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before
certi icate of candidacy. the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of quali ications to run for the position of Member of the House.
The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI and Rule 12 of the Revised petitioner’s quali ications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
Rules of the SET underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction Resolutions, unless a petition is duly iled with said tribunal. Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which
over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The Petitioner has not averred that she has iled such action. was promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of
authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013,
therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate became inal and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule
instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive Section 17, Article VI.
To prevent the assailed Resolution from becoming inal and
jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint. In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and executory, petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 37
In Pangilinan v Comelec, we ruled that “where the candidate has Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that once a winning candidate of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed of ice as a by iling a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but
remedy of petitioner is to ile an electoral protest with the Electoral Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction she failed to do so. She would ile the present last hour petition on
Tribunal of the House of Representatives.” In like manner, where as over election contests relating to his election, returns, and 10 June. Hence, on 5 June, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a
in the present case, Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th quali ications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Certi icate of Finality.
duly elected Senator, Barbers’ proper recourse is to ile a regular From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a
election protest with the SET. Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a g.1.c. Judicial Review
Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that concurrence of the following requisites:
Co v HRET
there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of (1) a valid proclamation,
law to annul the COMELEC’s assailed proceedings. The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to
(2) a proper oath, and
correct perceived errors of independent branches of the
(3) assumption of of ice.
Limkaichong v Comelec; Biraogo v Nograles; Paras v Nograles; Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of
Villando v Comelec Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed of ice. no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of of ice of a Member
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar, (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the
and assumed of ice as a Member of the House of Representatives, of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the
Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond
the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until
judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a
returns, and quali ications, and mere allegation as to the Before there is a valid or of icial taking of the oath it must be made denial of due process."
their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s

The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on (a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the
respective electoral tribunal.
how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by
that party. The test remains the same - manifest grave abuse of Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a the COMELEC en banc.
discretion. suf icient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to
The HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or
the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
In the case at bar, the Court inds no improvident use of power, no decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17
denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate en banc.
and 18, Article VI, party-list representatives must irst show to the
the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
House that they possess the required numerical strength to be (b) The instant case does not involve the election and
entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to quali ication of Locsin.
Guerrero v COMELEC comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
A petition for quo warranto may be iled only on the
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
the determination of the validity of the certi icate of candidacy of party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Fariñ as is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
HRET? recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was
instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to quali ied to run, and if she won, to assume of ice.
We ind no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC this Court is premature.
when it held that its jurisdiction over Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against
with the assumption of of ice of respondent Fariñ as. While the The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having
COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is
certi icate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following rule on proportional representation. in question at the time of such proclamation.
the proclamation and assumption of the position by Fariñ as is a
It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of
recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC Codilla v de Venecia
quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections
and the HRET.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a
The word "quali ications" cannot be read as quali ied by the term jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She maintains that the patent nullity. Her premature assumption to of ice as
"constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. COMELEC en banc has been divested of jurisdiction to review the Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was
validity of her proclamation because she has become a member of void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the
Whether respondent Fariñ as validly substituted Chevylle V. Fariñ as
the House. We ind no merit in these contentions. respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the
and whether respondent became a legitimate candidate, in our view,
winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
must likewise be addressed to the sound judgment of the HRET. First. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue
in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably iled by the petitioner.
Martinez III v HRET
Pimentel v HRET
Since the petitioner seasonably iled a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and Petitioner alleges that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" votes in his favor
prerogative, within constitutionally de ined limits, to choose from
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second despite the inality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Edilito C.
among its district and party-list representatives those who may
Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet Martinez a nuisance candidate.
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
unenforceable as it has not attained inality; the timely iling of the The adverse effect on the voter's will was similarly present in this
Section 18, Article VI explicitly confers on the Senate and on the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with
House the authority to elect among their members those who would used as the basis for the assumption in of ice of the respondent as the only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
ill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Representative - over ive thousand - which have been declared as
Commission on Appointments.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than suf icient to
Under Section 17, Article VI each chamber of Congress exercises the which has no jurisdiction in the instant case. overcome private respondent's lead of only 453 votes after the
power to choose, within constitutionally de ined limits, who among recount.
Commission from recognizing and allowing the respondent senators Appointments to re lect at any time the changes that may transpire in
What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the
to sit as members thereof. the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that
HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of
such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. It has been established that the legality of illing up the
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political
Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in af irming the membership of the Commission on Appointments is a
loyalties or formal disaf iliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected justiciable issue and not a political question.
from one political party to another.
Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the
We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect
inal outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only
12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution
"MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for
does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must
Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in H. SALARIES
necessarily include twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of
favor of petitioner and not nulli ied as stray votes, after considering
the House of Representatives. What the Constitution requires is that
all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
there be at least a majority of the entire membership.
not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
nuisance candidate in a inal judgment. The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañ ada as members of compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
the Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
g.2. Commission on Appointments was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
approving such increase.
Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP majority by
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization
Art. XVIII, Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the
meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion.
of the President of the Senate, as ex of icio Chairman, twelve Senators, President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand
and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
Coseteng v Mitra
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list A political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of
system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not be able to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, the House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the Supreme
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress membership in the Commission on Appointments. hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the
from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
all the Members. Daza v Singson
I. PRIVILEGES
The legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of illing the
Section 19. The xxxx Commission on Appointments shall be
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is
constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of i.1. Freedom from Arrest
justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the still come within our powers of review under the expanded
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall,
President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the
meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
as are herein conferred upon it. has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
government. or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Guingona, Jr. v Gonzales The contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from
Martinez v Morfe
the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is
This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senators
permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr.
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañ ada from sitting and assuming the
position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to We resolve the issue in favor of the authority of the House of is that the respective warrants of arrest issued against them be
prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-of icio Chairman, of said Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity
they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article questioned in said disbarment case were part of a lawyer-Senator's the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the privilege speech delivered on the Senate loor professedly with a causing the communication to be so published, he was not
Revised Penal Code, they are immune from arrest. view to future remedial legislation. By reason of the Senator's performing his of icial duty, either as a member of Congress or as
parliamentary immunity, the Court held that her speech was "not of icer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the inding made
In the language of the constitutional provision then that portion of
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not
Article 145 penalizing a public of icial or employee who shall while
of Court." The questioned statements in this case, however, were absolutely privileged.
the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any
admittedly made in response to queries from the media during gaps
member thereof except in case he has committed a crime punishable
in the Senate's plenary and committee hearings, thus, beyond the People v Jalosjos
under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor
purview of privileged speech or debate under Section 11, Article
is declared inoperative.
VI Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full- ledged member of Congress who is now
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and forti ied con ined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
An action for damages on account of defamatory statements not
by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts
constituting protected or privileged "speech or debate" is a
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the is pending appeal. Jalosjos iled this motion asking that he be allowed
controversy well within the courts' authority to settle.
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other In ine, petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost nonaccountability to insulate his statements, uttered outside the been convicted in the irst instance of a non-bailable offense.
latitude in free speech should be accorded to them. When it comes to "sphere of legislative activity," from judicial review.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of
freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a
the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
privileged class, without justi ication in reason, if notwithstanding i.2. Privilege of Speech and Debate Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and Jimenez v Cabangbang an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions The determination of whether the publication in question is a
implication or equitable considerations.
ef iciently and well, without the need for any transgression of the privileged communication depends on whether or not the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong "speech or debate therein" - that is to say, in Congress - used in this sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To provision. con inement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the law, it has constitutional foundations.
performance of their of icial functions, such as speeches delivered,
minority, it suf ices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the Trillanes IV v Pimentel, Sr.
same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and of icers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
of ices, in the of icial discharge of their duties as members of
every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
essence. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the
in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of
acts in question.
Trillanes v Castillo-Marigomen 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Petitioner argues that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, and category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or
citing Pobre, asserts that the authority to discipline a member of the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty
Congress lies in the assembly or the voters and not the courts. Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said lifted a prisoner into a different classi ication from those others
letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in who are validly restrained by law.
Petitioner's reliance on Pobre is misplaced. The statements
Pobre v Santiago Adaza v Pacana, Jr. Liban v Gordon
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan This is a petition to declare Senator Gordon as having forfeited his
the manner they perform their functions in the legislative loor Pambansa from holding any other of ice or employment in the seat in the Senate having been elected as Chairman of the Philippine
or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
falsity and mala ides of the statement uttered by the member of the
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has taken his Not being a government of icial or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as
Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of
oath of of ice as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been such, does not hold a government of ice or employment. We hold that
the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage
discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned the of ice of the PNRC Chairman is not a government of ice or an
or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
constitutional provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post of ice in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes
immunity.
and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal discharge its functions.
of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Funa v Executive Secretary
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a Puyat v de Guzman
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the President and his of icial family, which prohibitions are not similarly
Trillanes v Castillo-Marigomen, supra SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, imposed on other public of icials or employees such as the Members
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of
J. RESTRICTIONS the Constitutional provision. the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
treat the President and his of icial family as a class by itself and to
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he
Representatives shall, upon assumption of of ice, make a full disclosure is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause Thus, while all other appointive of icials in the civil service are
of their inancial and business interests. They shall notify the House of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for allowed to hold other of ice or employment in the government during
concerned of a potential con lict of interest that may arise from the the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI. However, their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
iling of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to
outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact." lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
hold any other of ice or employment in the Government, or any
public of icials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including We are constrained to ind that there has been an indirect "appearance
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, as counsel before x x x an administrative body" and, in our opinion,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
during his term without forfeiting his seat. (Incompatible of ice) that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
assistants.
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in
Neither shall he be appointed to any of ice which may have been the proceedings in some other capacity. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of
DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional
13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
he was elected. (Forbidden of ice) provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
in luence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
another of ice is allowed by law or the primary functions of the
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the
position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-of icio
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not
capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects speci ically or impliedly
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each
prohibited.
Member.
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with

j.1. Appearance as counsel II. POWERS (Art. VI) amendments.
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may A. GENERAL PLENARY POWERS (Sec. 1) Section 25. The Congress may not increase the appropriations
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Read: Part I of Legislative Investigations and Right to Privacy, By:
speci ied in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested inancially in any Hon. Reynato S. Puno, The Lawyers Review, April 30, 2005 the budget shall be prescribed by law.
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
B. LEGISLATIVE MILL No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its appropriations bill unless it relates speci ically to some particular
C. REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILLS
subsidiary, during his term of of ice. He shall not intervene in any appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
matter before any of ice of the Government for his pecuniary bene it or c.1. Subject and Title limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
where he may be called upon to act on account of his of ice.
Section 26. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
Villegas v Legaspi subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. xxxx strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the
De la Cruz v Paras
Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certi ied
Instance. exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view
proposal therein.
"appearance as counsel" "before any Court without appellate advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as
jurisdiction." "Appearance" has been de ined as "voluntary allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
submission to a court's jurisdiction". "Counsel" means "an adviser, a rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every
bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
person professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause
title thereof." Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
in court; a legal advocate managing a case at law; a lawyer appointed
or engaged to advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
public of icer, or public body". if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
club was prohibited. of ices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the
Constitutional provision, appearance by legislators before Courts of Discretionary funds appropriated for particular of icials shall be
c.2. As to specific laws
First Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exercise
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored principle that
whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a Art. VII, Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
Constitution, whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the
be deemed implied and intended in the provision itself. general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources If, by the end of any iscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
of inancing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue general appropriations bill for the ensuing iscal year, the general
Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which
measures. appropriations law for the preceding iscal year shall be deemed
Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel, were
re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they
must be held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in Art. VI, Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
the two cases involved herein. authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Tolentino v SOF
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the
constitutionality of the VAT Law. somehow calls attention to their existence.
"except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the
To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing
required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and Demetria v Alba
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill distribution three days before inal approval) would not only violate
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the
was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However,
Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of
to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and
a bill which is certi ied in order to meet a public calamity or
To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated those of the constitutional commissions considerable lexibility in
emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law – the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the
presidential certi ication, the time saved would be so negligible as to
must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose
be of any use in insuring immediate enactment.
the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
"propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the certi ication dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
House superior to the Senate. the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with conditions for which funds may be transferred were speci ied, i.e.
the requirement of three readings on separate days, also. 1. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
item and
iling revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to
2. such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come bills introduced for the irst time in either house of Congress,
another item in the appropriation of the government branch
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they not to the conference committee report.
or constitutional body.
are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the
removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the
the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to
VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill
same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, of ice
which became Republic Act No. 7716 without re lecting this fact in
made to bear on the enactment of such laws. or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
its title.
activity of any department, bureau or of ice included in the General
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the iling in the Senate of a
The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
of the House bill.
statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
not pass three readings on separate days as required by the is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
Constitution because the second and third readings were done on before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is speci ically thereof. Indeed, such constitutional in irmities render the provision
1994 and again on March 22, 1994, the President had certi ied S. No. referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a in question null and void.
1630 as urgent. The presidential certi ication dispensed with the complete index of its content.
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on Abakada Guro v Ermita
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certi ies to the
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in. Art. VI, §26(2) In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill
title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress
quali ies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for amending provisions
and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish
of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal
(1) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did
of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill
(2) it has been printed in its inal form and distributed three not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not
No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the
days before it is inally approved. because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason
value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other
kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v Secretary of programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of Department; and
Budget and Management
tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the (c) They “augment” discretionary lump sum appropriations in
constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari the GAAs.
with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House? assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in allotments under the DAP were not savings, and the use of such
in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 appropriations contravened Section 25(5), Article VI
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill (GAA of 2004).
Section 25(5), supra, should be interpreted in the context of a
when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the limitation on the President’s discretion over the appropriations
corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Members of Congress based on their own list of proposed projects, during the Budget Execution Phase.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any did the implementation of the PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004
prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may violate the Constitution or the laws? The Court rules in the The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section
be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. negative. Absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following
The main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of separation of powers was committed, much less tolerated by both the requisites, namely:
Representatives is to bring in sizable revenues for the government to Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
supplement our country’s serious inancial problems, and improve lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process
Senate, the Speaker, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the
tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues from ensued during the enactment and all throughout the implementation
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills were of the GAA of 2004.
respective of ices;
transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from Please see full text for detailed discussion on government (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
the point of national perspective, can introduce amendments within budgeting and appropriation process citing Guingona v. appropriations for their respective of ices; and
the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would soften Carague, that mainly involves these phases: (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing general appropriations law for their respective of ices.
the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the 1. Budget preparation;
shoulders of the consumers. 2. Legislative authorization; Section 25(5) not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution,
3. Budget Execution; and must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law,
As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in 4. Budget accountability. generally, is the GAA of a given iscal year. To comply with the irst
fact, the amendments made on provisions in the tax on income of requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of
corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is funds.
Araullo v Aquino III
to raise revenues for the government.
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be
Likewise, the Court inds the sections referring to other percentage The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of
borne in mind.
and excise taxes germane to the reforms to the VAT system, as these savings, namely: Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for 1. Congress wields the power of the purse;
his of ice in the general appropriations law. 2. The Executive is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and
The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax to spend the budget in accordance with the provisions of the
administration which are necessary for the implementation of the One of the substantive issues thus posed is whether or not the DAP,
GAA;
changes in the VAT system. NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly
3. In making the President’s power to augment operative under
implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for lexibility in
Constitution insofar as:
subject matter and purposes of the house bills, which is to budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own
supplement our country’s iscal de icit, among others. Thus, the (a) They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to
Senate acted within its power to propose those amendments. allotments withdrawn from government agencies as the Executive; and
“savings” as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the 4. Savings should be actual.
provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly
against expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then funds appropriated for one of ice are prohibited from crossing over So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the to another of ice even in the guise of augmentation of a de icient item Congress must "not concern itself with details for implementation by
purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border the Executive.”
satis ied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for only transfers or cross-border augmentations. Cross-border transfers,
The foregoing cardinal postulates were de initively enunciated in
then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section
Abakada where the Court held that "[f]rom the moment the law
the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the 25(5).
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
purse.
The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
The three instances listed in the GAAs’ aforequoted de inition were a should be understood to mean that the revenue collections must enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the exceed the total of the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to powers and is thus unconstitutional.”
purpose of the appropriation being ful illed, or upon the need for the release the unprogrammed funds simply because there was an excess
Any post-enactment measure allowing legislator participation
appropriation being no longer existent. revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound iscal
beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
management measure because it would disregard the budget plan and
The phrase “free from any obligation or encumbrance” in the tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of
foster budget de icits, in contravention of the Government’s surplus
de inition of savings in the GAAs conveyed the notion that the executive functions.
budget policy.
appropriation was at that stage when the appropriation was already
The Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
obligated and the appropriation was already released.
Pork barrel system sanctioned the conduct of legislator identi ication on the guise
According to Philconsa v. Enriquez: “Impoundment refers to a that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made Belgica v Ochoa respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
authority of any type.” Impoundment under the GAA is understood to The Court de ines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of
rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any
mean the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable National discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
Government budget de icit. violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through
augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
1. The Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein de ined as budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
augmented must be de icient. Upon careful review of the documents
a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence,
contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that the
either individually or collectively organized into accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
“savings” pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of
covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.
the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment
Section 29. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has measures and/or practices.
the inal say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, 2. The Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein de ined as a pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its utilization. The No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
(1) a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene it, or support of any
Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
received from whatever source by any part of the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
government are public funds; and
(2) a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary
expenditure of any public money without legislative members, should not cross over the ield of implementing the as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
authorization. national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
domain of the Executive. Upon approval and passage of the GAA, orphanage or leprosarium.
On Cross-border augmentations
Congress‘ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from
Section 25(5) has delineated borders between their of ices, such that there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins.
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from

All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be con ined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government,
taxation. so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the
charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money
purpose for which a special fund was created has been ful illed or No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
inures to the private bene it of the persons managing or operating the
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. institution.
of the Government.
Art. XIV, Sec. 4[3] and [4]. All revenues and assets of non-stock, Even as we ind that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold,
Guingona v Carague non-pro it educational institutions used actually, directly, and anent the second issue, that those portions of its real property that
are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and
This is a case of irst impression whereby petitioners question the as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of charitable purposes.
the 1990 budget. such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner
provided by law. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for
The automatic appropriation provides the lexibility for the effective charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual
execution of debt management policies. Our Constitution does not Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively application of the property itself to the purposes for which the
require a de inite, certain, exact or ‘speci ic appropriation made by charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income
owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the
law.’ Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of from the real property that is determinative of whether the property
these words. limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and is used for tax-exempt purposes.
provisions for reinvestment.
More signi icantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private
provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the
be made, except that it be ‘made by law,’ such as precisely the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the
educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are
decrees. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual exempt from real property taxes.
Lung Center v Quezon City
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of
laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds We hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the c.3. Procedure for passage of bills
for speci ic public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an
appropriation measure is suf icient if the legislative intention clearly enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements Sec. 26[2]. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
and certainly appears from the language employed. which should be considered include
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
1. the statute creating the enterprise,
in its inal form have been distributed to its Members three days before
Section 28. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The 2. its corporate purposes,
3. its constitution and by-laws, its passage, except when the President certi ies to the necessity of its
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
4. the methods of administration, immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to ix within speci ied 5. the nature of the actual work performed, last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
6. the character of the services rendered, vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
7. the inde initeness of the bene iciaries, and nays entered in the Journal.
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage 8. the use and occupation of the properties.
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national Tolentino v SOF, supra
development program of the Government. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists
to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it
is maintained for gain, pro it, or private advantage. Farinas v Executive Secretary
Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-pro it cemeteries, and all lands, As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the
derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
Section 26(1), Article VI, requiring every law to have only one subject FY ‘89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
which should be expressed in its title. thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY ‘90), is unconstitutional and
without effect.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of the item or items to which he does not object. unconstitutional, and that charge being controverted, there is an
an act relating to its subject inding expression in its title. actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of
Bolinao Electronics v Valencia Congress and the executive department that may be taken cognizance
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
of by this Court.
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that – Paragraph (1) of Sec 27 refers to the general veto power of the
particular item or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a
President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill,
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the
as a general rule.
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same
the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular
It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that
technical construction. It is suf icient if the title be comprehensive item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As speci ied,
the amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks the President may not veto less than all of an item of an
Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same
to effect, without expressing each and every end and means Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to
shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant
Luzon where there are already existing commercial television
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the President
index of the Act. portion of the same item.
may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. item in the appropriation bill. The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice
9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars,
It was already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was
the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the details, the distinct and severable parts x x x of the bill. It is an
illegal. This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry
the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose.
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been
insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in
follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the Article VI, Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to
c.4. Presidential Veto restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, the veto of a provision, the extent of the President's veto power as
remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the previously de ined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is
Section 27. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign where there are already television stations in operation, would be in principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject
it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriation of a separate veto.
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large and, consequently, null and void.
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the
in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, executive power to veto, we are of the opinion that Section 55 (FY '89)
two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the Gonzales v Macaraig and Section 16 (FY '90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by the term. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds Appropriations Bill should relate speci ically to some
declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process,
"particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions"
of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision,"
fall short of this requirement. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and were vetoed.
Section 16 (FY ‘90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually
the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 purpose of the President's veto power.
and have a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent
Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP
in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how the money
connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of
shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said In the appropriation for the AFP, the President vetoed the special
expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. Tested by these
provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance
criteria, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held
Hence the item veto of said provisions is void. with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
to be inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16
(FY '90), have been "artfully drafted" to appear as true conditions or We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item
limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot
for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring that "any be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item
payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject following Bolinao Electronics.
PHILCONSA v Enriquez to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines xxx".
military equipment
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the vetoed the underlined proviso of Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use
on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire
President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of of Fund," which requires the prior approval of Congress for the
amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose. The Solicitor General
income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the
counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to the item of
funds. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed entire Special Provision No. 3 on the "Speci ic Prohibition".
appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the subject of
said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
an item veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to
law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being
Section 16(2) of the 1935 Constitution in the 1987 Constitution because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by
"inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were
should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power of virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to
properly vetoed.
the President to veto a "provision." the "one-fund policy."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio
Modernization Fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored
include in an appropriations bill must "relate speci ically to some for road maintenance
personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to
In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President vetoed the second violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that
the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision
paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so,
which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
ratio of works to be contracted for the maintenance of national roads contracts entered into by the Government itself.
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an
and bridges.
inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension
item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision funds.
provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the
are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it speci ies how the said
President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general item shall be expended -- 70% by administrative and 30% by
use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. contract.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisos that the provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot
Retirement and Separation Bene its System is violative of Sections
appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's
Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisos are germane to item for the DPWH is therefore unconstitutional.
The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation
of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other Garcia v Comelec
to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
6758. class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
⭐This is the irst case before this Court where the power of
to all concerned. Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent
the President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment refers
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which also dealt
to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More
made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate EO 200, June 18, 1987. Laws shall take effect after ifteen days
speci ically, the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to
budget authority of any type. following the completion of their publication either in the Of icial
ordinances alone.
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
We do not ind anything in the language used in the challenged This provision clearly does not limit the application of local
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to unless it is otherwise provided.
initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects or matters which are
the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which
PVB Employees v Vega
deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if undoubtedly includes resolutions.
such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB
for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or ifteen
in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the (15) days after its publication in the Of icial Gazette; and, the
Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the D. LIMITATIONS TO POWER OF LEGISLATION
contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of
CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an said law is conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the
appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws, in d.1. Express Limitations
Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view that both
this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. contentions are bereft of merit.
Art. III Bill of Rights
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc. While as a rule, laws take effect after ifteen (15) days following the
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President completion of their publication in the Of icial Gazette or in a Secs. 26, 28, 29 supra
violated the independence and iscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature
the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
"unless otherwise provided." jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
In the irst place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were
placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides: without its advice and concurrence.
Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
law. Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law enacted.
effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A.
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on Art. XIV, Sec. 4[3]. No educational institution shall be established
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date. exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than
law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as super luities.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this
the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on subsection shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic
c.5. Effectivity of Laws
February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law,
Of icial Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed for other foreign temporary residents.
Tañada v Tuvera by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or Fabian v Desierto
"of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, c.6. Initiative and Referendum
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
presidential decrees that provide for ines, forfeitures or penalties for
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Of ice of the Ombudsman
their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as R.A. No. 6735, August 4, 1989
in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law complete and should set forth therein the policy to be executed, Delegation to the President
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. carried out or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the
suf icient standard test requires that the law to be implemented Sec. 23[2]. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
contain adequate guidelines to map out the boundaries of the
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
delegate's authority. To be suf icient, the standard must specify the
modi ies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
Furthermore, the Administrative Code requires that administrative
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
agencies ile with the University of the Philippines Law Center the adjournment thereof.
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
rules they adopt, which will then be effective 15 days after iling.
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classi ied as a substantive
Sec. 28[2]. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to ix
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right Since Congress expressly granted the Chief of the Philippine National
then the rule deals merely with procedure. Police the power to issue rules and regulations to implement within speci ied limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
Republic Act No. 10591, the fundamental issue to be resolved by this as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
Court is whether the Chief of Police validly exercised this
in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a
quasi-legislative power in light of the completeness and suf icient national development program of the Government.
review of decisions of the Of ice of the Ombudsman in
standard tests.
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which
Delegation to the people
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, There is no such retroactive application mandated in the
relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to Implementing Rules and Regulations. On the contrary, irearm
Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right licenses to possess Class-A light weapons issued before the passage
has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be of Republic Act No. 10591 are still recognized both under Republic system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
made or decided has been changed. Act No. 10591 and its Implementing Rules. whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
If the Implementing Rules and Regulations were indeed in the nature
legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
of an ex post facto law, then private individuals who possess Class-A
d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations light weapons under the old law must be expressly punished under least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
the new law because the new law only allows them to own and every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
d.2.a. Non-delegation of legislative powers possess small arms. Yet, as expressly provided in the law, existing centum of the registered voters thereof.
license holders of Class-A light weapons may renew their licenses
Two tests of valid delegation: ⭐Acosta v Ochoa 2019 Leonen En under the new law and Implementing Rules. Delegation to LGUs
Banc Republic Act No. 10591 sets forth a suf icient standard found in Art. X, Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
Section 2. It lays down the State policy to "maintain peace and
There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges
order and protect the people against violence" by providing "a
ownership or possession of a irearm a property right. Persons subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
comprehensive law regulating the ownership, possession, carrying,
intending to use a irearm can only either accept or decline the consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
manufacture, dealing in and importation of irearms, ammunition, or
government's terms for its use.
parts thereof." As such, the Chief of the Philippine National Police charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
As an exception to the non-delegation of legislative power, incorporated provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations
Congress has historically delegated to the chief of the police force the to regulate the activities of gun clubs, sports shooters, reloaders, d.2.b. Prohibition on passage of irrepealable laws
power to approve or disapprove applications for license to possess gunsmithing, competitions, and indentors, which are related to the
or deal with irearms. To validly exercise their quasi-legislative ownership, possession, and dealing in irearms. City of Davao v RTC Br XII - Davao City
powers, administrative agencies must comply with two (2) tests: (1)
the completeness test; and (2) the suf icient standard test. It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations
Exceptions under the Constitution: on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of
The completeness test requires that the law to be implemented be irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures
of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting laws following City of Davao, only for the interim period, or from
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal
appropriate to the operative milieu. 1992 to 1996, to be precise.
Corporation, De ining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
It might be argued that Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, does Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
not preclude the repeal of the tax-exempt status of GSIS, but merely Kida v Senate of the Philippines Connected Therewith."
imposes conditions for such to validly occur. Yet these conditions, if
Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting irrepealable laws
VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
applies in prohibiting restraints on future amendatory laws.
laws? subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
President Marcos, who exercised his legislative powers in amending
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is suf icient
P.D. No. 1146, could not have demanded obeisance from future YES. Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less
compliance with the constitutional requirement. Where a statute
legislators by imposing restrictions on their ability to legislate than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of
amendments or repeals. The concerns that may have militated his Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to
the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
enactment of these restrictions need not necessarily be shared by effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement
required to be brie ly expressed in its title. As observed in one case if
subsequent Congresses. is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills,
the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,
never claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters by
Compare: GSIS v City Treasurer of Manila revise or repeal the laws it had passed.
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such
While a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor
While not determinative of this case, it is to be noted that
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage practicable.
prominently added in GSIS' present charter is a paragraph precluding
of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it signi icantly
any implied repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect the We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from
constricts the future legislators' room for action and lexibility.
solvency of GSIS funds. Moreover, an express repeal by a subsequent some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal
law would not suf ice to affect the full exemption bene its granted the objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more ef icient
GSIS, unless the following conditionalities are met: d.3. Procedural Limitations and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its
(1) The repealing clause must expressly, speci ically, and nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and Secs. 26-27, supra included in the title of the said law.
(2) a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption
Phil Judges Association v Prado Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain or
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
protect the solvency of the fund.
The purposes of the one subject - one title rule are: 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such of icial assurances
These restrictions for a future express repeal, notwithstanding, do not
(1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such restrictions do not
(2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means the very least, a becoming courtesy.
impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the
of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation,
legislature to so amend it. The restrictions merely enhance other
and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
provisos in the law ensuring the solvency of the GSIS fund.
unintentionally adopted; and E. AIDS TO LEGISLATION
Given the foregoing perspectives, the following may be assumed:
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 33 of PD 1146, GSIS enjoyed tax exemption
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of Read: Part I of Legislative Investigations and Right to Privacy, By:
from real estate taxes, among other tax burdens, until
legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
January 1, 1992 when the LGC took effect and withdrew Hon. Reynato S. Puno, The Lawyers Review, April 30, 2005
have the opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or
exemptions from payment of real estate taxes privileges
otherwise, if they shall so desire.
granted under PD 1146; e.1. Question Hour
(2) RA 8291 restored in 1997 the tax exempt status of GSIS by It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354
reenacting under its Sec. 39 what was once Sec. 33 of P.D. which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative,
1146; and expressed in the title of the law, nor does it re lect its purposes. with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House,
(3) If any real estate tax is due to the City of Manila, it is,
as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written

of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the department heads. Only one executive of icial may be exempted from self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of impeachment. the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies
the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the
Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of department
writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as
such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear
⭐Senate of the Philippines v Ermita one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the of icials made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
creations of law.
covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before Congress. There are signi icant differences between e.2. Legislative Investigations There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly
the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory
the validity of these provisions separately. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
Section 1 speci ically applies to department heads. The required petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can
prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22
of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. exercise these powers.
hour. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact
Senate of the Philippines v Ermita, supra
Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted ordinances to regulate the installation and maintenance of electric
vis-á -vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inef icient power lines, in order
Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." A distinction to protect the city residents from the hazards these may pose. In aid
was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of of this ordinance-making power, said body or any of its committees
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is may conduct investigations similar to, but not the same as, the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. As
legislation. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of already discussed, the difference lies in the lack of subpoena power
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who
of such appearance during the question hour in the present inquiries shall be respected". It follows then that the rights of are willing to supply information which may be relevant to the
Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation which may be
powers. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within its
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining against one's self. ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric
to the same power of Congress. One speci ically relates to the power
The contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the The power to inquire into the ef iciency of the service supplied by
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to ind electric cooperatives is within the franchising powers of the NEA
obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function. out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa under Sec. 43 of Pres. Dec. No. 269.
had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
In ine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in Arnault v Nazareno
courts rather than of the legislature.
pursuit of legislation.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for Negros Oriental II Electric Coop v SP of Dumaguete making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
member. AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
inquiries in aid of legislation. testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before
judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive branch
either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which In the instant case, the complaint against respondent Flaviano
or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control
that House has jurisdiction to inquire. regarding the anomaly in the sale of Lot X, MR-1160 was still pending
over the actions of the of icers concerned. The legislative purpose of
before the Of ice of the Ombudsman when the Committee served
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same — whether
subpoena on him. In other words, no court had acquired jurisdiction
Committee created by it, to investigate the Buenavista and grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar
over the matter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment by the
Tambobong estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we concerns — would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the
legislature into the exclusive jurisdiction of another branch of the
entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of
government. Clearly, there was no basis for the respondent Judge to
validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against
apply the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the denial of petitioner's motion
involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular each other. And once the courts speak with inality, both branches of
to dismiss the petition for prohibition amounted to grave abuse of
expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which government have no option but to comply with the decision of the
discretion.
Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved government courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.
agencies created by Congress and of icers whose positions it is
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus
Read: Separate Opinion of J. Puno in Macalintal vs. Comelec
of Camilo Sabio
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Of icers and
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is Investigation
pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right signi icant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory
against self-incrimination. Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
1) The protected communication must relate to a
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to investigative function are also available to the committees.
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and
necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and solid existence and expansive construal. The Court's high regard to received" by a close advisor of the President or the President
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to "operational proximity" with the President.
a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. cover of icials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
We ind that the question for the refusal to answer which the reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of quali ied privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a adequate need, such that the information sought "likely
matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of
is co-extensive with the power to legislate." the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within authority.
the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we ind Section 4(b)
testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
obedience to its process may be enforced by the committee by the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited
imprisonment inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and
is any provision granting such exemption. correspondence between the President and public of icials"
necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making process" and,
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v Majaducon that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
Senate v Ermita, supra
When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic
respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with Gudani v Senga of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
If the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the foreign relations.
respondent relative to their separate indings on the illegal sale of inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms regarding effectivity.
the presidential communications privilege.
of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate,
First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and activity.
or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not suf icient under the
non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
Tañ ada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the Romero II v Estrada Of icial Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Publication
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
in accordance with Tañ ada is mandatory to comply with the due
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine Suf ice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person's
jurisprudence. subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be
investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant
Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the arrested and detained by the Senate.
to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is
President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be
clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's
quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
cabinet.
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before F. OTHER POWERS
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability with its duly published rules of procedure. f.1. As Board of Canvassers in Elections for President
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating and VP
authority. United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive e.2.1. Publication requirement
privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other Art. VII, Sec. 4. xxxx The returns of every election for President and
words, con identiality in executive privilege is not absolutely Garcillano v House of Representatives Committees on Public Vice-President, duly certi ied by the board of canvassers of each
protected by the Constitution. Information province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certi icates of canvass, the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v Majaducon, supra
basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of
for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a the election, open all the certi icates in the presence of the Senate and
Standard Chartered Bank v Senate Committee on Banks
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,
Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code. manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
conduct the legislative investigation -- was the Court’s determination The Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body
that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
Indeed, the mere iling of a criminal or an administrative complaint Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number
before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority
the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be Senators. of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring
the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
complaint. rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to certi icates. xxxx
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or
respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall f.2. Call Special Election for President and VP
resource persons were of icials of the Securities and Exchange be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These repealed to suf iciently put the public on notice. Art. VII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of
of icials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the the third day after the vacancy in the of ices of the President and
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier Section 16. xxxx The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of f.6. Concur in treaties
than forty- ive days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. other of icers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. xxxx Art. VII, Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certi ied under
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become
Sarmiento v Mison Members of the Senate.
law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations
for the special election shall be charged against any current It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Bayan Muna v Romulo
appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of of icers whom
4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious
Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No will hereafter refer from time to time, are: validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must
be duly concurred in by the Senate.
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
months before the date of the next presidential election. other public ministers and consuls, of icers of the armed forces from One type of executive agreement is a treaty-authorized or a
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other of icers whose treaty-implementing executive agreement, which necessarily
f.3. Revoke/ extend suspension of privilege of writ of appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; would cover the same matters subject of the underlying treaty. The
habeas corpus, declaration of martial law right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
Second, all other of icers of the Government whose
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been con irmed
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxxx The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
appoint; consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights,
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress Fourth, of icers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a may by law vest in the President alone.
never been seriously questioned by our courts.
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion The irst group of of icers is clearly appointed with the consent
shall persist and public safety requires it. of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such f.7. Declare war and delegate emergency powers
of icers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours con irmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
Section 23. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance appoints.
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power
with its rules without need of a call. xxxx The second, third and fourth groups of of icers are the present bone
to declare the existence of a state of war.
of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
f.4. Approve Presidential Amnesties statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
Art. VII, Sec. 19. xxxx He shall also have the power to grant amnesty appointments to positions expressly stated in the irst group require authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. the consent (con irmation) of the Commission on Appointments. restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident
f.5. Confirm certain appointments by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the irst group of adjournment thereof.
Art. VII, Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Of ice of the
appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President David v Arroyo
Appointments is required.
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to
and the House of Representatives who shall assume of ice upon declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise
con irmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of emergency powers. To the irst, as elucidated by the Court, Section
the Congress, voting separately.
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate national policy declared by Congress. government is in exercise of its police power and not of its power of
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold eminent domain.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
constitutional issues arise.
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of Section 23 refers affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the government to
not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the powers generally reposed upon Congress. In Araneta v. Dinglasan, "temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which public utility or business affected with public interest." It is the
President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to times of crisis. consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over
Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions
the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that takeover is exercising its police power.
suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or
Congress should irst authorize the President before he can declare a
well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in these
"state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that f.8. Judge President’s fitness
de initions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United
national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional Art. VII, Sec. 11, par. 4. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of
States since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of
enactment.
situations, classi iable under three (3) principal heads: the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
a) Economic,
privately owned public utility or business affected with public Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the
b) natural disaster, and
interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
c) national security. powers and duties of his of ice, the Vice-President shall act as President;
Congress.
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari of his of ice.
President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately Estrada v Arroyo, supra.
same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the owned public utility or business affected with public interest
light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and without authority from Congress. f.9. Power of Impeachment or Political Justice
Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national
emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation f.9.a. Who may be impeached
Agan v PIATCO
of the exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This Temporary takeover of business affected with public interest. Art. XI, Section 2.
is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to In the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the term "national 1. The President,
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot emergency" was de ined to include threat from external aggression,
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that 2. the Vice-President,
calamities or national disasters, but not strikes "unless it is of such
during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for proportion that would paralyze government service." The duration of 3. the Members of the Supreme Court,
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the 4. the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporary 5. the Ombudsman
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the
(1) There must be a war or other emergency. business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is may be removed from of ice on impeachment xxxx
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or In re Gonzales
Congress may prescribe. temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the temporary
takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the A public of icer who under the Constitution is required to be a
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a Member of the Philippine Bar as a quali ication for the of ice held by
said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be

him and who may be removed from of ice only by impeachment, requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the
cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
public of icer. Further, such public of icer, during his incumbency, receipt thereof. committee."
cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other
A vote of at least one-third of ALL the Members of the House shall Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules
court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal
where a determination of suf iciency of form and substance of an
from of ice, or any penalty service of which would amount to be necessary either to af irm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not
removal from of ice. Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the
A Member of the Supreme Court must irst be removed from of ice vote of each Member shall be recorded. Constitution basically merely requires a "hearing." In the discharge
via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a inding of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme In case the veri ied complaint or resolution of impeachment is iled by suf iciency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is
Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such
held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven forthwith proceed. Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts
against him in appropriate proceedings.
constitutive of the offenses vis-à -vis her submissions disclaiming
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same of icial
the allegations in the complaints. This the Court cannot do.
f.9.b. Grounds more than once within a period of one year.
Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make
for, and conviction of, The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on
1. culpable violation of the Constitution, has left to the sound discretion of the legislature.
oath or af irmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
2. treason, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived
3. bribery, of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
4. graft and corruption, September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the
ALL the Members of the Senate. suf iciency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her
5. other high crimes, or
6. betrayal of public trust. contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which
xxxx
directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on
All other public of icers and employees may be removed from of ice as impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication,"
provided by law, but not by impeachment. carry out the purpose of this section. there is a statutory difference in their usage.
f.9.c. Procedure Gutierrez v The House of Representatives Committee on Justice Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is
(Decision) generally understood--that is, to make known. Generalia verba
Art. XI, Section 3. The House of Representatives shall have the sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. The determination of suf iciency of form and substance of an generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general
impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly
A veri ied complaint for impeachment may be iled by any Member of grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which intended that the restricted sense was to be used.
committed such determinative function to public respondent.
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation"
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Contrary to petitioner's position that the Impeachment Rules do not to "publication," the former should be understood to have been used
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper provide for comprehensible standards in determining the suf iciency in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the
the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
"veri ied complaint or resolution," and that the substance promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
court for iling and publication. the candle at the same time. What is important is that there made part of the composition of the Of ice of the Ombudsman, the
should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that role it performs as an organic component of that Of ice militates
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no against a differential treatment between the Ombudsman’s Deputies,
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a speci ic
longer rekindle the candle. on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other.
method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only
mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Gutierrez v The House of Representatives Committee on Justice for her Deputies but, also for other lesser of icials of that Of ice
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the
(Resolution)
published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case performance of her duties.
of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat
"promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the English political exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court the Special Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman’s deputies,
language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned,
published. comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the Constitution. However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to
legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit
instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may is concerned. The Court did not consider the Of ice of the Special
duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Signi icantly notable in Neri thus direct any question of partiality towards the concerned member Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Of ice of the
is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter
ruling on the 1987 Constitution's directive, without any reliance on and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision. enjoys under the Constitution.
or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera.
Gonzales III v Of ice of the President (2014) f.9.d. Effect
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the
is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, Art XI, Sec. 3[7]. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of
and not for the punishment of the offender. further than removal from of ice and disquali ication to hold any
the Of ice of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
of ice under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
The one-year bar rule In more concrete terms, it is ruled that subjecting the Deputy shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own punishment, according to law.
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same alter egos and of icials in the Executive Department are subject to the
of icial more than once within a period of one year." Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at Barcenas v House of Representatives
risk the independence of the Of ice of the Ombudsman itself. The
Francisco states that the term "initiate" means to ile the complaint Of ice of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, Section 3 (1) of Art XI speaks of initiating "cases of impeachment"
and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the iling of the includes its key of icials, all of them tasked to support the while Section 3 (5) pertains to the initiation of "impeachment
complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. What is true for the proceedings." "Cases," no doubt, refers to those iled before the
complaint moving. It refers to the iling of the impeachment Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Senate. Its use and its sense are consistent throughout Section 3.
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the Thus, Section 3(6) states, “The Senate shall have the sole power to
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is performance of their duties. decide all cases [not "proceedings"] of impeachment." Section 3(7)
the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. provides, "Judgment in cases [not "proceedings"] of impeachment
By constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an
The iling of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a shall not extend further than removal from of ice and disquali ication
ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up to hold any of ice...."
Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include
the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the investigation and prosecution of of icials in the Executive
candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites Department. f.10. Power to amend constitution
the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of
multiple complaints iled, more than one lighted matchsticks light Thus, even if the Of ice of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly
proven in due time.

Module 1-3 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT xxxx
Considering that we ind the protest suf icient in form and substance,
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their of ice, the we must again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the
I. The President President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only suf icient for the
following oath or af irmation: Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove
Art. VII Executive Department her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule
"I do solemnly swear (or af irm) that I will faithfully and only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the
A. Qualifications, Election, Term, Oath conscientiously ful ill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest
Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its errors, pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making power under Section 4,
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is Article VII of the Constitution.
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate
myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of
1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, Macalintal v PET (Decision and Resolution)
af irmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
2. a registered voter,
Whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of
3. able to read and write, FPJ v Arroyo this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and
4. at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and Section 12, Article VIII.
As movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ claims that because of the untimely
5. a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased The Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of
preceding such election.
husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the election contests involving our country's highest public of icials, and
Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election elections. The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is
and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals
In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly bene it of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the SET and the
President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president HRET.
who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than did not truly get the highest number of votes. Conformably then with
four years shall be quali ied for election to the same of ice at any time. the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal inds no We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to
justi iable reason to grant the petition/motion for intervention and which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. substitution. intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the
Voluntary renunciation of the of ice for any length of time shall not be
Supreme Court.
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full Legarda v De Castro
term for which he was elected.
On the matter of suf iciency of the protest, protestee failed to adduce Pormento v Estrada
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and new substantial arguments to reverse our ruling. We hold that while
Peña v. HRET on requisites of suf iciency of election protest is still What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: "[t]he President shall not be
good law, it is inapplicable in this case. We dismissed the petition in
Peñ a because it failed to specify the contested precincts. In the eligible for any reelection?"
xxxx
instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, Court declined to rule due to mootness.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the
precincts therein. The protest here is suf icient in form and
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number
substantively serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to
of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority protestee’s title to his of ice. In our view, the instant protest consists
of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be
B. Privilege And Salary reiterated in Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III.

Tribe comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive
Section 6. The President shall have an of icial residence. The salaries of b.2. Executive Privilege privileges.
the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall
Almonte, et al v Vasquez 1. One variety of the privilege is the state secrets privilege
not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation on the ground that the information is of such nature that its
shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic
during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, objectives.
their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public 2. Another variety is the informer's privilege, or the privilege
source. interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons
transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, who furnish information of violations of law to of icers
b.1. Executive Immunity as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. charged with the enforcement of that law.
3. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets
⭐De Lima v Duterte been said to attach to intragovernmental documents
will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
re lecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
The rationale for the grant of immunity is stated in Soliven v. personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which
Makasiar, thus: The rationale for the grant to the President of the evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such
would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is
of ice-holder's time, also demands undivided attention. exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important
enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this
executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental
Unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum
operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets
immunity under our governmental and constitutional system does is directed are government of icials in whose possession or custody
but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the
not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an of icial act of the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the
executive" domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is,
the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal service has already
those documents re lecting the frank expression necessary in
The lack of distinctions prevents us from making any distinctions. been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to
intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
We should still be guided by our precedents. the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the
Separate concurring of Leonen, J courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types
⭐Senate of the Philippines v Ermita, supra
Presidential immunity from suit only extends to civil, criminal, and of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege
administrative liability. A proceeding for the issuance of a writ of On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
habeas data, as in this case, does not determine any such liability. Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data only requires courts to ascertain Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive
the accountability and responsibility of the public of icial or Of icials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation of icials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the
employee. Thus, the President cannot invoke immunity from suit in a Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes." mere fact of being executive of icials. Indeed, the extraordinary
petition for such writ. character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
Schwartz de ines executive privilege as "the power of the
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
However, the proper respondent in a habeas data case for Government to withhold information from the public, the
pronouncements made by the President in his of icial capacity is the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell de ines it as "the right En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually
Executive Secretary, following the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Aquino III. of the President and high-level executive branch of icers to states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a
This is in accord with the doctrine that the president should not be withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is
impleaded in any suit during his or her incumbency, as recently the public." properly invoked in relation to speci ic categories of
information and not to categories of persons.
⭐Neri v Executive Secretary, supra. the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating

In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature,
authority.
scope and coverage of executive privilege, the reference to persons
Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive
being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from
privilege on the following questions, to wit:
abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
information which is, in the judgment of the head of of ice answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead,
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
concerned, privileged as de ined in Section 2(a). the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the
oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the project after being told about the alleged bribe?
21 of the same Article.
requested information privileged. It does not suf ice to merely
There are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the
declare that the President, or an authorized head of of ice, has The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information
presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to
that determination. A claim of privilege, being a claim of public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative
"communications, documents or other materials that re lect
exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to information.
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
therefore, be clearly asserted.
President believes should remain con idential." The latter The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked
Absent then a statement of the speci ic basis of a claim of executive includes àdvisory opinions, recommendations and
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked,
privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of deliberations comprising part of a process by which
there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of
the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in governmental decisions and policies are formulated."
the department which has control over the matter. A formal and
which it is made, it should be respected. Upon the other hand,
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain
Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
Presidential communications privilege applies to reason" for preserving their con identiality.
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process
information which the privilege is meant to protect. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
privilege, to decision-making of executive of icials. The irst is
satis ies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the
There, he expressly states that "this Of ice is constrained to invoke
Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law
the settled doctrine of executive privilege as re ined in Senate v.
implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly." Obviously, he is
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement presidential communications privilege applies to documents in
referring to the Of ice of the President. That is more than enough
that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully their entirety, and covers inal and post-decisional materials as
compliance.
insuf icient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of well as pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or
information is justi ied under the circumstances of each case. It judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is
severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative C. Prohibitions
process privilege.
In ine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
invalidated. The elements of presidential communications privilege are, to wit:
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court 1) The protected communication must relate to a this Constitution, hold ANY other of ice or employment during their
inds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and any other profession, participate in any business, or be inancially
invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive received" by a close advisor of the President or the President
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege "operational proximity" with the President. granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
of icial in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may quali ied privilege that may be overcome by a showing of corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid con lict of
not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. adequate need, such that the information sought "likely interest in the conduct of their of ice.
contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or af inity within the fourth therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary
of ice or employment. Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and Communication acting
civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as
as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Of ice of the These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
Aeronautics Board.
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of President and his of icial family, which prohibitions are not similarly
bureaus or of ices, including government-owned or controlled imposed on other public of icials or employees such as the Members If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental,
of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien
corporations and their subsidiaries.
the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to to the primary function of a cabinet of icial, such additional
treat the President and his of icial family as class by itself and to functions would fall under the purview of "any other of ice"
Doromal v Sandiganbayan
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the Press
Special Prosecution Of icer II Caoili, conducted a preliminary Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine
In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
investigation of the charge against the petitioner Doromal, a former Amusement and Gaming Corporation.
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public of icials
Commissioner of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3(h), in and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the In order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress
connection with his shareholdings and position as president and exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase Constitution,
which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a
electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to 1. such additional duties or functions must be required by the
literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited
the DECS and NMYC. primary functions of the of icial concerned,
in the Constitution itself, to wit:
2. who is to perform the same in an ex-of icio capacity as
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the presence of a signed 1. the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the provided by law,
document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as 3. without receiving any additional compensation therefor.
application to bid x x x is not a sine qua non", for, the Ombudsman President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
indicated in his Memorandum/Clearance to the Special Prosecutor, Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and,
that the petitioner "can rightfully be charged with having participated 2. the Secretary of Justice being ex-of icio member of the
in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article Public Interest Center v Elma (Decision and Resolution)
Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family VIII.
corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." This action seeks to declare as null and void the concurrent
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the
interpreted as covering positions held without additional PCGG and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary
compensation in ex-of icio capacities as provided by law and as contrary to Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
Petitioners maintain that this EO 284 s 1987 which, in effect, allows required by the primary functions of the concerned of icial's of ice. the 1987 Constitution.
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant The term ex-of icio means "from of ice; by virtue of of ice." It refers The general rule contained in Article IX-B permits an appointive
secretaries to hold other government of ices or positions in addition to an "authority derived from of icial character merely, not expressly of icial to hold more than one of ice only if "allowed by law or by
to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the the primary functions of his position." In the case of Quimson v.
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII. of icial position." Ex-of icio likewise denotes an "act done in an Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, "[t] here is no legal objection to a
of icial character, or as a consequence of of ice, and without any government of icial occupying two government of ices and
Although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket
other appointment or authority than that conferred by the of ice." An performing the functions of both as long as there is no
prohibition against the holding of multiple of ices or employment in
ex-of icio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his incompatibility." The crucial test in determining whether
the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
title to a certain of ice, and without further warrant or appointment. incompatibility exists between two of ices was laid out in People v.
of icials, the Constitutional Commission should see it it to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, speci ically prohibiting the The term “primary” used to describe "functions" refers to the order Green - whether one of ice is subordinate to the other, in the sense
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The that one of ice has the right to interfere with the other.
assistants from holding any other of ice or employment during their additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. The required by the of icial's primary functions. Examples of PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving
prohibition imposed on the President and his of icial family is designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are the
be appointed to any of ice which may have been created or the

independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of D. Succession
various executive departments and agencies and to review emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
investigations involving heads of executive departments and (a) At the beginning of the term
Art. IX-A, Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission
agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is,
without question, an agency under the Executive Department. Thus, shall, during his tenure, hold any other of ice or employment. Neither
Art. VII, Sec. 7, 10. xxxx If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice
the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
CPLC. management or control of any business which, in any way, may be
quali ied.
As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion affected by the functions of his of ice, nor shall he be inancially
on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall
conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
act as President until a President shall have been chosen and quali ied.
involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall
law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding
have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice
incompatible of ices. Art. IX-B, Section 7. No elective of icial shall be eligible for
President-elect shall become President.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 appointment or designation in any capacity to any public of ice or
Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the position during his tenure. Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall
CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an have quali ied, or where both shall have died or become permanently
assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
latter positions. However, Elma remains covered by the general position, no appointive of icial shall hold any other of ice or
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a
prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and quali ied.
must still comply with the standard of compatibility of of icers laid instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled
down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced corporations or their subsidiaries. The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is
in violation of the Constitution.
to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President
Resolution Art. VIII, Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of
shall have quali ied, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability
other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
In response to the respondents' request for clari ication, the Court of the of icials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
ruled that respondent Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.
Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible (b) During the term
Exceptions to the rule:
of ices. This ruling does not render both appointments void.
Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of of ices, Art. VII, Sec. 8, 10. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his irst of ice as PCGG Art. VII, Sec. 3, par. 2. The Vice-President may be appointed as a
from of ice, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
Chairman when he accepted the second of ice as CPLC. Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no con irmation. become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from of ice, or resignation of both the
Art. VIII, Sec. 8 (1). A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
Compare with prohibitions against other of icials: President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act
Art. VI, Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of ex of icio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been
Representatives may hold any other of ice or employment in the the Congress as ex of icio Members, a representative of the Integrated
elected and quali ied.
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their representative of the private sector. The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He
shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been
elected and quali ied, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the President * * * is
and disquali ications as the Acting President.
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is emergency without waiting for any special authority."
(c) Temporary Disability
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. It is a The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons
Estrada v Arroyo, supra. power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the of national security—predicated upon the "worsening situation in
Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia
E. Removal President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. problem"—and the alleged powers of the President as
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's commander-in-chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under
powers as protector of the peace. The request or demand of the Section 2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1),
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and
II. Powers and Functions of the President considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-suf iciency in
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is
A. Executive Power exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency. Even if the
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from
Philippines.
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that of ice to safeguard engaging in the production of rice.
Marcos v Manglapus (Decision and Resolution) and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of DENR v DENR Employees
By enumerating certain powers of the President, did the framers of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those speci ic Regional Executive Director of the DENR-XII Gaddi issued a
powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the breadth and Resolution Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII
scope of "executive power"? The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly Regional Of ices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative
We hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Cerilles.
limitations on the exercise of speci ic powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of quali ied
of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot of 1986-to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the
political agency, thus:
be said to be limited only to the speci ic powers enumerated in the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the of speci ic powers of the President, particularly those relating to the Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
sum of speci ic powers so enumerated. commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of executive power. of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
peace and order, the protection of life liberty and property, and the except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Gonzales v Hechanova
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
governmental action. Faced with the problem of whether or not the Respondents question the suf iciency of petitioner's cause of action demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the upon the theory that the proposed importation in question is not administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these governed by RANos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having President as commander- in-chief "for military stock pile purposes" such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their Commonwealth Act No. I; that in cases of necessity, the President "or Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. This
welfare and advance the national interest. his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as provided for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
of the PTC inds justi ication under Section 17, Article VII of
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the
DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Of ices from the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that B. Power of Control
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this the laws are faithfully executed. (Faithful Execution Clause)
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers departments, bureaus, and of ices. He shall ensure that the laws be
the same. inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to faithfully executed.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case,
of the President to reorganize the administrative regions carries with fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency - is ⭐PIDS v COA 2019 Leonen En Banc Case
it the power to determine the regional centers. In identifying the inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the
regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create Petition for Certiorari challenging the Decision of the Commission on
delivery of the ield services of government agencies. bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Audit, which upheld the validity of the disallowance of the Philippine
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such Institute for Development Studies' procurement of group healthcare
authority. maintenance totaling P1,647,235.06.
Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to The amount was disallowed for being violative of the February 3,
Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public of ice and not this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc 2005 CoA Resolution No. 2005-001, which the Audit Team Leader
merely an adjunct body of the Of ice of the President. Thus, in order committees. This lows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and and Supervising Auditor said prohibits the procurement of healthcare
that the President may create a public of ice he must be empowered determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in DOH v. insurance from private agencies.
by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by Camposano, the authority of the President to issue Administrative
law. Here, unlike in Province of Negros, petitioner is not a local
Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the
government unit, but a government-owned and controlled
Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to administrative charges iled against the employees of the Department
corporation which sought the President's approval before
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld.
establishing its annual medical checkup program. It likewise sought
Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the the Of ice of the President's approval to continue the annual medical
following functional and structural lines: Vinuya v Romulo checkup program's implementation after Notice of Disallowance No.
(1) restructuring the internal organization of the Of ice of the 2006-01 had been issued, which the petitioner in Province of
This case is with regard to the comfort women who approached the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging Negros never did.
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to assistance in iling a claim against the Japanese of icials and military A review of MO No. 17 and other presidential issuances shows that
another; of icers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" there is no absolute or categorical rule stating that a Senior Deputy
(2) transferring any function under the Of ice of the President to stations in the Philippines. However, of icials of the Executive Executive Secretary has no power to act on his own or in default of
any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position the Executive Secretary by authority of the President generally or
(3) transferring any agency under the Of ice of the President to that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation speci ically whether it be to exempt PIDS from the coverage of A.O.
any other Department/Agency or vice versa. had already been fully satis ied by Japan's compliance with the Peace No. 402, or to approve the HMP pursuant to A.O. No. 402.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
While this may be true, the authority to issue the exemption must
of of ices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners' nonetheless be done upon the express designation and delegation by
of functions. These point to situations where a body or an of ice is cause would be inimical to our country's foreign policy interests, and the president through a presidential or executive issuance.
already existent but a modi ication or alteration thereof has to be could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
effected. The creation of an of ice is nowhere mentioned, much Furthermore, it must be stressed that the Administrative Code
implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the
less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the explicitly grants the power to sign papers by authority of the
Executive Department's determination would mean an assessment of
question is in the negative. president to the executive secretary. It grants no similar authority to a
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to
senior deputy executive secretary.
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation committed. In addition, while the executive secretary is likened to a Cabinet
secretary, a deputy executive secretary is equated to an
undersecretary. former President Noynoy Aquino, former PNP Chief Purisima, and responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
former PNP-SAF Director Napeñ as.
In Planas, this Court emphasized that in the exercise of his or her a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between
executive power, the president can act through the heads of the The record shows that the mission to arrest Marwan and Usman had the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as
executive departments. Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the always been lodged with the SAF, with the irst mission to capture his subordinate;
President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or Marwan predating the appointment of Purisima as PNP Chief. b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Napeñ as, as director of the SAF, was the driver of Oplan Exodus, about to be or had been committed; and
having fully managed and controlled the mission from start to inish. c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
1. The declaration of martial law,
On top of poor planning and execution, the Senate Report also measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
2. the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
observed that Oplan Exodus broke the chain of command, was not perpetrators thereof.
3. the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the
followed to the details, was badly coordinated, and had badges of
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, In this case, since Aquino is considered a superior of the AFP but not
failure from the very start. As the foregoing lapses may be attributed
the PNP which is the agency involved in this case, the irst element is
all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise to the SAF, with Napeñ as at its helm, We hold that among the three
not satis ied. Likewise, even granting that Aquino may be considered
by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by private respondents, it is Napeñas alone who may be liable for a
a "superior" of the PNP, the last two elements are also not satis ied
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive charge of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide.
since it was not shown by evidence that he knew or had reason to
power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
Aquino’s actuations do not constitute a participation in the planning know that a crime was about to be or had been committed, and that
In 2007, however, this Court in Berdin v. Mascariñas expanded the and implementation of Oplan Exodus since, as President of the he failed to take steps to prevent the criminal act or punish its
application of the doctrine of quali ied political agency. In that Republic, he does not exercise direct control over the PNP under the perpetrators.
case, the doctrine was extended to cover the Assistant Regional doctrine of quali ied political agency.
Director as an alter ego of the Finance Secretary in ful illing the C. Power of General Supervision over LGUs
The Senate Report stated that as the PNP is under the DILG, the
latter's obligations under Sections 49 and 50 of the Local Tax Code.
President, as Chief Executive, exercises supervision and control over
While this Court has at times expanded the application of the doctrine the PNP. Given that the President gave the policy direction to arrest Art. X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
of quali ied political agency, the doctrine remains limited to the Marwan and Usman, and that he approved Oplan Exodus with full supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
President's executive secretary and other Cabinet secretaries. It does knowledge of its operational details, he is ultimately responsible for component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
not extend to deputy executive secretaries or assistant deputy the success or failure of the mission. It suggests Aquino's respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
secretaries. accountability under the doctrine of command responsibility. component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
Hence, in this case, then Executive Secretary Ermita, as the The President of the Republic of the Philippines is not part of the functions.
President's alter ego, had the authority to let petitioner continue chain of command of the PNP. Under Section 26 of Republic Act No.
implementing its annual medical checkup program through 6975, the command and direction of the PNP is vested in the Chief of Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
enrollment with health maintenance organizations. Consequently, the the PNP. That the PNP chain of command does not include the autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
exemption granted by Executive Secretary Ermita, as the President's President is further con irmed by the PNP BOI Report itself.
alter ego, is valid. It will remain so, unless disapproved or Ganzon v CA
The President's power over the PNP is subsumed in his general
reprobated by the President. power of control and supervision over the executive department of The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President
the government. In fact, Carpio v. Executive Secretary held that "the (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend
Nacino v Of ice of the Ombudsman national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief and/or remove local of icials.
power of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force,
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the AFP. As a The Court is laying down the following rules:
the Of ice of the Ombudsman's Consolidated Resolution and civilian agency of the government, it is only subject to the exercise by
Consolidated Order for having been issued with grave abuse of 1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere
the President of the power of executive control." decentralization of administration, not of power, in
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction insofar as they
dismissed the complaints for 44 counts of reckless imprudence Command responsibility has a technical meaning. In Saez, We which local of icials remain accountable to the central
resulting in multiple homicide iled against private respondents ruled that to hold someone liable under the doctrine of command government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; of icer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate legislative members of the committee created by Acts Nos. 2705 and
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the of icer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the 2822.
supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Does the constitution confer upon the governor the power to appoint
control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested certain of icers and upon the legislature the power to prescribe the
from legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent
in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive manner of appointment. The appointment of public of icials is
with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
of icials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power generally looked upon as properly an executive function. The power
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national
of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be of appointment can hardly be considered a legislative power.
authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth
removed from of ice; or their actions and decisions changed, Appointments may be made by the Legislature or the courts, but
therein, impose disciplinary action against local of icials;
suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political when so made should be taken as an incident to the discharge of
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms:
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers functions properly within their respective spheres.
"investigation" does not signify "control" (which the
emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.
President does not have); Appointment to of ice is intrinsically an executive act involving
By constitutional iat, they are subject to the President’s supervision
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the the exercise of discretion. We deduce that the power of
only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere
suspensions so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor exceptions,
of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not
for the offenses he was charged originally: provided: to the executive department; that membership in the voting
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
a. that delays in the investigation of those charges committee in question is an of ice or executive function; that the
Constitution and the law.
"due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the National Coal Company and similar corporations are
delay) shall not be counted in computing the time Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos instrumentalities of the government; that the duty to look after
of suspension." seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local government agencies and government property belongs to the
b. that if during, or after the expiration of, his affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it executive department; and that the placing of members of the
preventive suspension, the petitioner commits violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an
another or other crimes and abuses for which the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the
proper charges are iled against him by the corporations. Executive Department.
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes. We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of section 4 of
shall not be a bar to his being preventively
Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given
to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the
Section 63 of the Local Government Code. by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces
National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker
and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of
of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void.
Dadole v COA RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55,
allows the grant of additional allowances to judges “when the
Petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision and inances of the city government allow.” The said provision does not d.2. With Concurrence of COA
resolution of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) af irming authorize setting a de inite maximum limit to the additional
the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the allowances granted to judges. Art. VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
the RTC and MTC stationed in Mandaue City. D. Power of Appointment executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the consuls, or of icers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
supervisory powers of the President d.1. Basis naval captain, and other of icers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other of icers of the
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power Gov of Phil Islands v Springer
or authority of an of icer to see that subordinate of icers perform Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to ful ill them, the former may This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform Government of the Philippine Islands, against three directors of the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other of icers lower in
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of

Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third department" falls "under the Of ice of the President."
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. group of of icers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power,
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating
or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public
commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus,
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such of ice or board cannot legally exist under the 1987
if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Constitution.
President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the trustees fall under the third group of of icers.
Congress. (a) Heads of Departments
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies,
(a) Ambassadors, Public Ministers and Consuls
commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has
Ru ino v Endriga (b) Of icers of AFP from colonel and naval captain
the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked of icers. (c) Chairman and members of Constitutional Commissions
The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo
warranto proceeding involving two sets of CCP Boards. The (d) Regular members of JBC (Art. VIII, Sec. 8[2])
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its
controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both various amendments constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right head of CCP. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably
to hold of ice. The resolution of the issue boils down to the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of illing Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members irst appointed,
vacancies in the Board. CCP Board to ill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four
The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16 allows heads of years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice
Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only for two years, and the representative of the private sector for
Section 16, Article VII. Here, the President appoints three groups of "of icers lower in rank." one year.
of icers. In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga
(e) Sectoral (Art. XVIII, Sec. 7)
1. The irst group refers to the heads of the Executive group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and Endriga group to the same positions. This has been the modus vivendi
Until a law is passed, the President may ill by appointment
consuls, of icers of the armed forces from the rank of in illing vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to
appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are from a list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats
colonel or naval captain, and other of icers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the two appointing powers over the same set of of icers in the reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5
Constitution. Executive branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its of Article V1 of this Constitution.
2. The second group refers to those whom the President may own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. The Court
be authorized by law to appoint. must put an end to this recurring anomaly. d.3. Upon recommendation of JBC
3. The third group refers to all other of icers of the The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of
Government whose appointments are not otherwise (a) Members of SC and all other courts
government extends to all executive employees from the Department
provided by law. Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the
Art. VIII, Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked President is self-executing and does not require any implementing
law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
of icers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads
over the Executive branch. a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case
involves the interpretation of Section 16 with respect to the Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of
appointment of this fourth group of of icers. con irmation.
government. The CCP is also not one of the independent
The President appoints the irst group of of icers with the consent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment
of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive
branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency within ninety days from the submission of the list.
second and third groups of of icers without the consent of the
"not placed by law or order creating them under any speci ic
(b) Ombudsman and deputies President Garcia after December 13. On January 1, 1962, President Quimsing v Tajanlangit
Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the
Art. XI, Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be Central Bank. This is a petition for prohibition iled by Godofredo Quimsing to
restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of
appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees This Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the
Police of Iloilo City to which petitioner allegedly had previously been
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such
appointed and duly quali ied.
three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.
appointments shall require no con irmation. All vacancies On May 20, 1960, Quimsing was designated Acting Chief of Police of
As a rule, once an appointment is issued, it cannot be reconsidered
Iloilo City. On December 20, 1961, and while such incumbent of the
shall be illed within three months after they occur. specially where the appointee has quali ied. On the other hand, the
of ice, he was extended by then President Garcia an ad-interim
authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation
appointment to the same position.
d.4. Appointment of VP as Cabinet Member such as when mass ad-interim appointments (350) issued in the last
hours of an outgoing Chief Executive are to be considered by the Respondent Tajanglangit, in his answer, claimed among others, that
d.5. Appointments solely by President Commission on Appointments that is different from that be petitioner's ad-interim appointment was a nullity in view of the
submitted by an incoming Chief Executive who may not wholly President Macapagal's Administrative Order No. 2.
(a) Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law approve of the selections especially if it is doubtful that the outgoing
In the present case, petitioner Quimsing admittedly had been
(b) Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint President exercised double care in extending such appointments.
occupying the position in controversy, in an acting capacity since
After the proclamation of the election of an incoming Chief Executive, May 20, 1960, and discharging the functions thereof. Clearly, it
d.6. Limitations to Appointing Power the outgoing Chief Executive is no more than a "care- taker" cannot be said that the ad-interim appointment extended to
administration. He is duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer him on December 20, 1961, by virtue of which he took his oath of
d.6.1. Prohibition against Nepotism and Midnight Appointments of authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts of ice on December 28, 1961 was one of those hurried designations
which, he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of that brought about the "scramble" on the 29th and 30th of December,
Section 13[2]. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or af inity his successor. 1961, where the outgoing Chief Executive perhaps did not have the
within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his opportunity to consider the merits and quali ications of the hundreds
tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or Jorge v Mayor of nominees to the positions to which they were respectively being
the Of ice of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, appointed. The ad-interim appointment of petitioner, whose
Petition for mandamus and quo warranto, iled directly in this Court quali ication is not in dispute and the regularity of which is not
chairmen or heads of bureaus or of ices, including government-owned
to have petitioner declared as the sole legally appointed and quali ied questioned except for the fact that it was made only on December 20,
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Director of Lands. 1961, can not be considered as among those "midnight"
appointments the validity of which this Court declared to be, at least,
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential The fundamental issue is whether Administrative Order No. 2 of
doubtful to entitle the appointees to the equitable relief of quo
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President Macapagal operated as a valid revocation of petitioner's ad
warranto.
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments interim appointment. We think it has not done so.
It has been established here that on July 19, 1962, notice of the
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13,
con irmation of Quimsing's appointment was delivered to
public service or endanger public safety. 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was made and
Malacañ ang. This action by the Commission on Appointments
released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same
supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for
Aytona v Castillo on midnight appointments day. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be
reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding
presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed the effectivity of the con irmation, nor is it synonymous with
of ice hours, that being the regular course of business. The
Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. On disapproval of the appointment. In fact, it is a recognition that the
appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be
the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath. On December appointment was con irmed.
covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands
30, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed of ice; and unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly con irmed by the In view of the foregoing considerations, the appointment of
on December 31, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, Commission on Appointments, and thereafter, the of ice never respondent Eduardo Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by became vacant. Iloilo City, which was not vacant, was null and void.
call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such

de Castro v JBC (Decision) Read: Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio Morales in Peralta v JBC, powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
Tolentino, Jr. v JBC, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v JBC (Decision
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
and Resolution consolidated with de Castro v JBC) Art. VII, Sec. 16, par. 2. The President shall have the power to make
17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on
May 10. appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
To hold that the ban on midnight appointments applies only to
executive positions, and not to vacancies in the judiciary and compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
independent constitutional bodies, is to make the prohibition disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in
the Supreme Court shall be illed within 90 days from the practically useless. It bears noting that Section 15, Article VII of the adjournment of the Congress.
occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his Constitution already allows the President, by way of exception, to
make temporary appointments in the Executive Department during Guevara v Inocentes
successor?
the prohibited period. Under this view, there is virtually no
May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of After due deliberation, the Court resolved that the ad interim
restriction on the President's power of appointment during the
screening the candidates nominated or being considered to succeed appointment extended to petitioner on November 18, 1965 by the
prohibited period.
Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent former Executive lapsed when the special session of Congress
President even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, The general rule is clear since the prohibition applies to ALL kinds adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966.
Article VII? of midnight appointments. The Constitution made no distinction. Ubi
It is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution to make a
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to recess appointment effective only
appointments to ill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other The exception is likewise clear. Expressio unius et exclusio
(a) until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments, or
appointments to the Judiciary alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence
(b) until the next adjournment of Congress, and never a day
implies the exclusion of all others.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in longer regardless of the nature of the session adjourned.
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme I submit that the more important and less complicated question is
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have whether the 90-day period in Section 4(1) of Article VIII runs De Rama v CA
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have during the period of prohibition in Section 15 of Article VII.
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective
Considering also that Section 15 of Article VII is an express limitation
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of of icials from making appointments during the last days of his or her
on the President's power of appointment, the running of the 90-day
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in tenure.
period is deemed suspended during the period of the ban which takes
Section 4 (1). Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President effect only once every six years. The constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight appointments,"
from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article speci ically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to
VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. We The Court, as a collegial body, operates on a "one member, one vote"
the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting
reverse Valenzuela. basis, whether it sits en banc or in divisions. The competence,
President.
probity and independence of the Court en banc, or those of the Court's
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Division to which the Chief Justice belongs, have never depended on
Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission whether the member voting as Chief Justice is merely an acting Chief Matibag v Benipayo
con ined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Justice or a duly appointed one.
Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to The Of ice of the President submitted to the Commission on
appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of
d.6.2. Interim or recess appointments Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for con irmation. However, the
and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. On
Art. VI, Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on June 1, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same
the Judiciary.
and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their
election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on oaths of of ice for a second time. The Of ice of the President
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the transmitted on June 5 their appointments to the Commission on
Appointments for con irmation. Congress adjourned before the on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the d.6.3. Temporary designations
Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision
Thus, on June 8, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, SECTION 17. Power to Issue
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same give its consent after deliberating on the quali ications of the Temporary Designation. —
positions. appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal
from such decision, the disapproval is inal and binding on the (1) The President may temporarily designate an of icer already in
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a
appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the the government service or any other competent person to
temporary appointment that is prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article
President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the perform the functions of an of ice in the executive branch,
IX-C of the Constitution.
constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a inal appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the consent to the appointment. (a) the of icer regularly appointed to the of ice is unable
President once the appointee has quali ied into of ice. The fact that it to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time
is subject to con irmation by the Commission on Appointments does any other cause; or
or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another
not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been inally (b) there exists a vacancy;
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the (2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached
close of the session of Congress. There is no inal decision by the
next adjournment of Congress.
Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the to the position, unless he is already in the government service
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, in which case he shall receive only such additional
interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the
immediately. The appointee can at once assume of ice and exercise, by-passed appointee. salary authorized by law for the position illed. The
as a de jure of icer, all the powers pertaining to the of ice.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds
A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential renew the ad interim appointments of by-passed appointees. appropriated for the of ice or agency concerned.
prerogative requiring con irmation by the Commission on
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the (3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.
Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess.
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim
In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of
appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be de Castro v JBC (Decision)
the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval Read: Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio Morales
assume of ice. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments.
is inal under Section 16, Article VII, and not because a reappointment
It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and
is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C. A by-passed ad To hold that the ban on midnight appointments applies only to
perform his function without loss of time. His title to such of ice is
interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim executive positions, and not to vacancies in the judiciary and
complete.
appointment because there is no inal disapproval under Section 16, independent constitutional bodies, is to make the prohibition
An ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not practically useless. It bears noting that Section 15, Article VII of the
appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment result in the appointee serving beyond the ixed term of seven years. Constitution already allows the President, by way of exception, to
is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in make temporary appointments in the Executive Department during
The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who
which the appointment was made. Thus, the term “ad interim the prohibited period. Under this view, there is virtually no
appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the 1. has been appointed by the President and restriction on the President's power of appointment during the
President, means a permanent appointment made by the 2. con irmed by the Commission on Appointments, prohibited period.
President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.
whether or not such person completes his term of of ice.
The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments d.6.4. Limitations on Appointing Power of Acting President
There must be a con irmation by the Commission on Appointments
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain
Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days
appointment. The disapproval is a inal decision of the Commission President’s power to make ad interim appointments. from his assumption or reassumption of of ice.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential an authority that is already implied from the President's e.2. Pardon distinguished from parole
constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid of icials in the Of ice
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
of the Ombudsman. Torres v Gonzales
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
public service or endanger public safety. conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which
E. Pardoning Power
are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
d.6.5. Power to remove
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, e.3. Pardon distinguished from amnesty
Gonzales III v OP (2012)
and pardons, and remit ines and forfeitures, after conviction by inal
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with Barrioquinto v Fernandez
judgment.
it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all of icers
1. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
appointed by the President are also removable by him. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise majority of all the Members of the Congress. pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
– that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an of ice or while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Art. IX-C, Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be the courts should take judicial notice.
President's power to appoint. granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the 2. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
1. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission. while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
shall be appointed by the President. e.1. Pardon distinguished from probation
generally before or after the institution of the criminal
a. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
People v Vera
removed after impeachment proceedings initiated 3. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
They are actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
b. while judges of lower courts may be removed only
and in nature. reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold
by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative
public of ice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no
11, Article VIII). pardons, as understood when the constitution was adopted, are
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
totally distinct and different in their origin and nature. The former
2. The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence".
was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of
Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)], the Commission While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply
on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the oblivion the offense with which he is charged that the
postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or inde initely, but
Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
the conviction and liability following it, and all civil disabilities,
likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be as though he had committed no offense.
remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon
removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt In order to entitle a person to the bene its of the amnesty
3. The Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and committed the criminal act (see Vera v People) or offense with
disabilities, and restores him to his civil rights. It makes him, as it which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. suf icient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of saids Of ice which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in authorizing the amnesty, (a) The crimes to be amnestied must have
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation considering her quali ications and suitability for the public post, the been for violations of subversion laws or those de ined and
of the bene its of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and proscribed under crimes against public order under the RPC.
avoidance." taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once
In the instant case, the petitioners were charged with and convicted
again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
of defrauding the Republic by diverting public funds from their
Vera v People granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disquali ication
intended public uses to private and personal use and gain, under
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
Article 315 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not a person invoking the bene it of amnesty should regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply
Article 315 is found in Title 10, Chapter 6, of that Code which de ines
irst admit having committed the crime of which they were and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Crimes against Property. The estafa was committed through the
accused.
falsi ication of documents described in Article 171, entitled
It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek Risos-Vidal v COMELEC "Falsi ication by Public Of icer, Employee or Notary or
forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Ecclessiastical Minister" found in Title 4, entitled Crimes Against
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an Public Interest, of the Revised Penal Code. Clearly, petitioners fall
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have under Section 2 (a) as persons expressly disquali ied from amnesty
right to seek public elective of ice, the focal point of this controversy.
any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes under P.D. 1182, as amended. Petitioners' applications for amnesty
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused were also iled way beyond the time limit established under P.D.
complete, unambiguous, and unquali ied.
to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty 1182, as amended, since petitioners were convicted by the
is in the nature of a. plea of confession and avoidance, which means The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon Sandiganbayan on 15 July 1981; their applications for amnesty were
that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims remain to be in: iled only in 1984.
liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,
(1) impeachment cases;
would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty F. Military Powers
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a inal conviction; and
proclamation. (Superseding Barrioquinto)
(3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
At any rate, the facts established before the Commission do not regulations in which there was no favorable Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
bring this case within the terms of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8. Note recommendation coming from the COMELEC. forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
that said proclamation extends its provisions to "all persons who call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute
committed any act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. The
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of
foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
the enemy." As found by the Commission, the killing of the deceased
41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
(Lozañ es) was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but
abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
was due to the rivalry between the Hunter's Guerrilla, to which he
President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
belonged, and the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners.
statutes.
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
e.4. Effect of Pardon The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the report in person or in writing to the Congress. xxxx
said Articles contain speci ic textual commands which must be
Monsanto v Factoran strictly followed in order to free the bene iciary of presidential grace A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
from the disquali ications speci ically prescribed by them. Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
The absolute disquali ication or ineligibility from public of ice forms legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for e.5. Who may avail of amnesty military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
estafa thru falsi ication of public documents. It is clear from the
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were Macaga-an v People
expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise
removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the As pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, under the very legislation
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly concurrence of two conditions, namely,
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces
connected with invasion. to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power 1. an actual invasion or rebellion, and
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need 2. that public safety requires the exercise of such power.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
congressional authority to exercise the same.
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, However, as we observed in IBP v Zamora, “these conditions are not
otherwise he shall be released. Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only
state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President
Art. II, Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President's invasion or rebellion.’”
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
actions.
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion.
Sanlakas v Reyes re Oakwood Mutiny Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with
public and civic affairs.
Commander-in-Chief powers but, irst and foremost, with
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts Executive powers. Reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring “a
most recent Charter has restricted the President’s powers as
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
Commander-in-Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not rebellion.
President’s powers as Chief Executive.
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended.
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Thus, the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to
in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time,
Government. barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1.
Ampatuan v Puno re Maguindanao Massacre The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed
We seize this opportunity to inally lay to rest the validity of the
forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President’s
super luity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a
men and women, including some news reporters, then President calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or
Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a
suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise
upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation.
state of emergency." of Congress’ emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers’
But this Court’s mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences
legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a
Petitioner ARMM of icials claimed that the President had no factual of the declaration. This Court inds that such a declaration is devoid
subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the President’s
basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of of any legal signi icance. For all legal intents, the declaration is
exercise of martial law powers.
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent deemed not written.
incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out
The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President's power the Constitution does not require the President to make
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive
emergency powers. OSG contends that the President issued the a declaration of a state of rebellion.
and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
proclamation pursuant to her "calling out" power as Sec 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
Commander-in-Chief under the irst sentence of Section 18, Article VII “graduated powers.” From the most to the least benign, these are: opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
of the Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this Section 23 (2), Article VI.
power rests solely on her wisdom. The President merely delegated 1. the calling out power,
through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the ARMM 2. the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego. corpus, and IBP v Zamora
3. the power to declare martial law.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for issuance of a TRO seeking to nullify on constitutional Lacson v Perez re EDSA 3 mock-ups of the Saturday issue. A few minutes after the search and
grounds the order of President Estrada commanding the deployment seizure at the Daily Tribune of ices, the police surrounded the
of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister
the metropolis. violent mob armed with explosives, irearms, bladed weapons, clubs, publication, the tabloid Abante.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break
As to how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of
determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed into Malacañ ang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was
power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go no
forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. a state of rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is
leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness. In
rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests,
to leading the State against external and internal threats to its Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is
the following four related petitions were iled before the Court
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by
the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the undertake an independent investigation beyond the
horizon. circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by pleadings."
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo's exercise of the
rebellion."
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from basis.
the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. David v Macapagal-Arroyo
Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the
The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of
examination of whether such power was exercised within
declaring a state of national emergency. Exactly one week after the power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
petitions had been iled, the President lifted PP 1017. weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails issuances was the conspiracy among some military of icers,
time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed
to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the leftist insurgents of the NPA, and some members of the political
procedural limitations.
assertion that there exist no justi ication for calling out the armed opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
forces. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and Facial Challenge
take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension First, a facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 uncalled for. The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool
review the suf iciency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases.
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested
review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The validity of a law that "re lects legitimate state interest in maintaining
(without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David. Also arrested was his
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
companion, Ronald Llamas. At around 12:20 in the early morning of
the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion
February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct."
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O.
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers
No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune of ices in Manila. The raiding team Second, facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require
and provided for their revocation and review without any
con iscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its laws and defects, not
quali ication. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the 2. Administrative Orders; 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others 3. Proclamations; discussed earlier. However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving
not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech 4. Memorandum Orders; the President express or implied power
or expression. 5. Memorandum Circulars;
(1) to issue decrees;
6. General or Special Orders.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those
dif icult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must President Arroyo's ordinance power is limited to the foregoing not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by promulgated by the President; and
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show Former President Marcos under PP 1081. The assailed PP 1017 is (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint
whether this situation exists. unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the on the press,
authority to promulgate "decrees."
Constitutionality of PP 1017 are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
Take Over Power
There is a distinction between the President's authority to declare a The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
"state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot
state of national emergency. purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected
from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any with public interest.
While President Arroyo's authority to declare a "state of rebellion"
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority It is also pristine clear that
interest.
cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
(1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and
Administrative Code of 1987. President Arroyo's declaration of a A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to
Ronald Llamas;
"state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise emergency
(2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU
of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4. powers. To the irst, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII
and NAFLU-KMU members;
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
(3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint
signi icance, and deemed not written. objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional
on the press; and
issues arise.
In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune of ices and the
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section The framers did not intend that Congress should irst authorize the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and
18, Article VII, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The other materials,
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare
are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and
17, Article XII, a provision on the State's extraordinary power to the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O.
take over privately-owned public utility and business affected Congressional enactment.
No. 5.
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed
privately owned public utility or business affected with public In Re: Arguelles, Jr. v Baladia, Jr.
harmless, without legal signi icance, or not written, as in the case of
interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Sanlakas.
Congress. Without legislation, the President has no power to point A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal con inement
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
President Arroyo's calling-out power for the armed forces to assist be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all
in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas
"decrees"? Conclusion
corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book The Court inds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as Petitioners have been released.
III of EO 292. She may issue any of the following: it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section Fortun, et al. v Macapagal-Arroyo
1. Executive Orders;
These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential to the Government.

In reviewing the suf iciency of the factual basis of the proclamation
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
The Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has of suspension, the Court considers only the information and data
habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were
no suf icient factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it
withdrawn after just eight days.
in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion since there is pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
shares such power with the Congress. Thus: from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. declaration.
1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated
good for only 60 days; resort and should be invoked by the President only after exhaustion by the iling of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen.
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or of less severe remedies. It contends that the extraordinary powers of On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the
suspension, report his action in person or in writing to the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., irst, the power sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
Congress; to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the proclamation or suspension was made.
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and inally, the power to
Reexamination of Fortun v Arroyo
convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension declare martial law.
for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and The Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and
In An Appropriate Proceeding
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or af irm the surrendered the same to Congress as well as, abdicated from its
President’s proclamation or suspension, allow their limited Lansang held that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered itself just on
effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress
warranted. a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review. Thus, "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be
by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of recti ied and set aside in this proceeding.
The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial
the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is irst a political We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its
writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke
constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine.
one in the hands of the Court. by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint
clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the The judicial power to review the suf iciency of factual basis of
different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third
same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition iled pursuant
and the Court has nothing to review. of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may
of the President's decision of which among his graduated
ile it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the
Lagman v Medialdea (2017) powers he will avail of in a given situation.
suf iciency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive
of his emergency powers. The usual period for iling pleadings in Void for Vagueness
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days,
Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable.
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas In ine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups." The
corpus in the whole of Mindanao. third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the
suf iciency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief and differ as to its application." In such instance, the statute is
recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by
throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
the Court.
population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH lags especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove The judicial power to review versus the congressional power to conduct to avoid; and
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance revoke. (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary lexing of the requirement. implementing martial law in Mindanao. The test of suf iciency is
Government muscle. b) Probable cause is the allowable standard of proof for the not accuracy nor preciseness but reasonableness of the factual
President. basis adopted by the Executive in ascertaining the existence of
The vagueness doctrine has a special application only to
rebellion and the necessity to quell it.
free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to
of penal statutes. convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing 2. Rebellion Exists and Persists in Mindanao
that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus Rebellion, within the context of the situation in Mindanao,
committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof
void, on the ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual encompasses no de inite time nor particular locality of actual war
would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.
operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, and continues even when actual ighting has ceased. Therefore, it is
operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the To summarize, the parameters for determining the suf iciency of not restricted as to the time and locality of actual war nor does it end
implementation of the proclamation. factual basis are as follows: when actual ighting has ended. The state of rebellion results from
the commission of a series or combination of acts and events, past,
The "suf iciency of factual basis test" 1) actual rebellion or invasion;
present and future, primarily motivated by ethnic, religious, political
2) public safety requires it; the irst two requirements must
The phrase "suf iciency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of or class divisions which incites violence, disturbs peace and order,
concur; and
the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial and poses serious threat to the security of the nation. The ultimate
3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that
review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend objective of the malefactors is to seize power from the government.
there is actual rebellion or invasion.
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article
3. The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law
VII. Public safety "involves the prevention of and protection from events
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
that could endanger the safety of the general public from signi icant
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to corpus as the Constitution does not limit the period for
danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters."
declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of which it can extend the same.
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review The President deduced from the facts available to him that there was
The only limitations to the exercise of congressional authority to
of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of
extend such proclamation or suspension are that:
the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is
suf icient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers a) the extension should be upon the President's initiative;
on facts or information known by or available to the President at the and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was b) it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being rebellion and the demands of public safety; and
information are found in the proclamation as well as the written committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial c) it is subject to the Court's review of the suf iciency of its
Report submitted by him to Congress. law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
In determining the suf iciency of the factual basis of the declaration The records of the Constitutional Commission show that
and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full Lagman v Medialdea (2019) Commissioner Suarez's proposal to add a similar 60-day limitation
complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or These are consolidated petitions iled under Section 18, Article VII of to the extension of an initial proclamation of martial law was not
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the Constitution, assailing the constitutionality of the third adopted by a majority of the members of the Commission. The
the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the extension from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019, of the framers evidently gave enough lexibility on Congress to determine
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ the duration of the extension.
all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao. 4. The manner by which Congress approved the extension of
require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would
1. The requirements of rebellion and public safety are present martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his
to uphold the extension of martial law in Mindanao from habeas corpus is a political question that is not reviewable
decision-making.
January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019. by the Court.
The parameters for determining the suf iciency of the factual
In determining the suf iciency of the factual basis for the extension of In addition to the safeguards provided by the Constitution, adequate
basis
martial law, the Court needs only to assess and evaluate the written remedies in the ordinary course of law against abuses and violations
a) Actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety reports of the government agencies tasked in enforcing and of human rights committed by erring public of icers are available
including the following: (f) The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation
No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants
or suspension. He should ask the Congress' approval.
(1) R.A. No. 7438 (An Act De ining Certain Rights of Persons the Congress the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its
(g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the
Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as Well proceedings.
Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of
as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating
5. Congress has the power to extend and determine the all its Members, can extend the proclamation or suspension
Of icers, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof);
period of martial law and the suspension of the for such period as it may determine.
(2) R.A. No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007;
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (h) The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only
(3) R.A. No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009; and
be approved when the invasion or rebellion persists and
(4) Writs of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) and Habeas Data The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the
public safety requires it.
(A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); and Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the
(i) The Supreme Court may review the suf iciency of the factual
(5) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
basis of the proclamation or suspension or the extension
habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a
thereof, in an appropriate proceeding iled by any citizen.
To revoke or extend: Lagman v Pimentel III vacuum, law or de iciency in the provision. While it does not
(j) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30
specify the number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve
days from the iling of the appropriate proceeding.
These are consolidated petitions, iled under the third paragraph, an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
(k) Martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution, assailing the writ of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only
Constitution.
constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of martial limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in such proclamation or suspension are that the extension should be Accordingly, the Bill of Rights remains effective under a state
the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the of martial law. Its implementers must adhere to the principle
2018. persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public that civilian authority is supreme over the military and the
safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the suf iciency of armed forces is the protector of the people. They must also
1. The Court is not barred by the doctrine of
its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. abide by the State's policy to value the dignity of every
conclusiveness of judgment from examining the
human person and guarantee full respect for human rights.
persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. Checks and Balances
(l) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil
The consolidated petitions at hand essentially assail the Congress' The framers of the 1987 Constitution endeavored to institute a
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
act of approving the President's December 8, 2017 request and system of checks and balances to limit the President's exercise of the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
extending the declaration of martial law in Mindanao. martial law and suspension powers, and to establish safeguards to
over civilians where civil courts are able to function.
protect civil liberties. Thus, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of
The Court's review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the (m) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to
the 1987 Constitution:
existing factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
extension. The gravity and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case (a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
may be, should necessarily be re-examined, in order to make a privilege or the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus only (n) Finally, during the suspension of the privilege of the writ,
justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao when there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety any person thus arrested or detained should be judicially
as to justify an extension of a state of martial law. requires such declaration or suspension. charged within three days, otherwise he should be
(b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a released.
2. The Court's power to review the extension of martial law is
period not exceeding 60 days.
limited solely to the determination of the suf iciency of the
(c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the Compare: Writ of Habeas Data (AM No.08-1-16-SC); and Writ of
factual basis thereof.
President must submit a Report in person or in writing to
3. Congressional check on the exercise of martial law and Congress. Amparo (October 24, 2007)
suspension powers (d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members, can revoke the proclamation or G. Emergency Powers
4. The manner in which Congress deliberated on the
suspension.
President's request for extension is not subject to judicial Art. VI, Sec. 23[2]. In times of war or other national emergency, the
(e) The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of
review Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
his proclamation or suspension.
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless

the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international
rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any
cease upon the next adjournment thereof. law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not
limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic in nature. All In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the
David v Macapagal-Arroyo, supra
treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature.
regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding
Ampatuan v Puno, supra
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and its consent, or concurrence, to the rati ication.
effective.
H. Contracting and Guaranteeing Foreign Loans
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that Pimentel v Executive Secretary
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. This is a petition for mandamus iled by petitioners to compel the
Of ice of the Executive Secretary and the DFA to transmit the signed
the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which speci ically deals with copy of the Rome Statute of the ICC to the Senate of the Philippines for
by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, Constitution.
report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will ind
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is
corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
concurrence of the Senate.
and containing other matters as may be provided by law. architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the
I. Power over Foreign Affairs facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
suf iciently met, viz: governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
(a) it must be under a treaty;
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the
of the Senate. when so required by congress, rati ied by a majority of the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and In iling this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII
Bayan v Zamora re VFA (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of There is no dispute as to the presence of the irst two requisites in the belongs to the Senate. We disagree.
which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the case of the VFA. As to the 3rd element, respondents argue that the The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation,
exercise by the senate of its constitutional power to concur with the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is signature, rati ication, and exchange of the instruments of
VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the point rati ication. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and
considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United States. publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential
military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the This Court is of the irm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty"
VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges The signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the
merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is
joint military exercises. the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the usually performed by the state's authorized representative in the
United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is diplomatic mission. Rati ication, on the other hand, is the formal
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international to accord strict meaning to the phrase. act by which a state con irms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an
two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on
government.
J. Power over Legislation any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to
ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the government for whatever purpose.” As a rule, the term “SHALL” is a
Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or j.1. To address Congress word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the rati ication. Hence, it provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of
the Senate or, having secured its consent for its rati ication, refuse to its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has j.3. Veto power
been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken j.2. Preparation and submission of budget
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President Art. VI, Section 27. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he
mandamus. days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
i.1. deportation of undesirable aliens inancing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
measures. such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
Go Tek v Deportation Board agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
The issue is whether the Deportation Board can entertain a
deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not speci ied in by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In
The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision,
Section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet not control, over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
been convicted of the offense imputed to him. him to see to it that LGUs and their of icials execute their tasks in nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any
power may be exercised by the Chief Executive when he deems such cooperation in solving economic dif iculties, he cannot prevent them bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power
continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
unquali ied. revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
administrative iat.
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive the item or items to which he does not object.
judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens, Whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to
j.4. Emergency powers, supra
as disclosed in an investigation conducted. No other tribunal is at reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the
liberty to reexamine or to controvert the suf iciency of the evidence same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
on which he acted.
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of
It was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a criminal general supervision over local governments.
proceeding of the particular charge does not prevent the deportation
of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not
constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local
crime is not necessary to warrant deportation. iscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs
in the National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than
the Constitution. The Local Government Code speci ies further that
the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within ive
(5) days after every quarter of the year and “shall not be subject to
but as divisions of one and the same court.

Module 1-4 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT NO. The Constitution does not admit any composition of the Supreme
Court other than by the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein The constitution of divisions has been permitted for convenience
mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is and the prompt dispatch of business. The provision in no way
I. The Judiciary enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the involves the question of jurisdiction.
Court—as in this case—are replaced by judges of irst instance. It is
ART. VIII. Judicial Department distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the A.2. Appointment and Qualifications
constitution provides for only one Supreme Court. No temporary
A. The Supreme Court composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the Section 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
constitution.
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born
A.1. Composition In principle, what really matters is not the length or shortness of the citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be
alteration of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very
Section 4. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and permanence and inalterability of that composition so long as the 1. at least forty years of age, and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. 2. must have been for ifteen years or more, a judge of a lower
division of three, ive, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be illed (c) WON by the method of "designation" created by the aforecited court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. xxxx section 14 a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First
Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the President under The Congress shall prescribe the quali ications of judges of lower
Vargas v Rilloraza the same section can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justice" courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a
(a) WON Congress had power to add to the pre-existing grounds of of the Supreme Court by virtue thereof. citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
disquali ication of a Justice of the Supreme Court; NO. We ind absolutely nothing in the context which may soundly be
construed as authorizing, merely by legislation, any change in the A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
NO. What matters here is not only that the Justice affected continue to
constitutional composition of the Supreme Court, or the performance integrity, probity, and independence.
be a member of the Court and to enjoy the emoluments as well as to
exercise the other powers and ful ill the other duties of his of ice, but of its functions by any but its constitutional members. On the other
hand, we have to go by the cardinal rule that "usually provisions of a Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and ful ill all the
constitution are mandatory rather than directory, and mandatory supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
responsibilities of said of ice in all cases properly coming before his
Court under the constitution, again without prejudice to proper cases provisions are binding on all departments of the government."
1. the Chief Justice as ex of icio Chairman,
of disquali ication. Any statute enacted by the legislature which
would impede him in this regard, in the words of this Court in In re US v Limsiongco 2. the Secretary of Justice, and
Guariña, supra, citing Marbury vs. Madison, supra, simply "can not 3. a representative of the Congress as ex of icio Members,
become law." Appellant's motion is based on the ground that the instant decision 4. a representative of the Integrated Bar,
was rendered by a division of the court and not by the body
5. a professor of law,
If, according to the Constitution, "the Supreme Court shall be constituted by law for the purpose, and hence the decision as
composed" of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein referred 6. a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
rendered, was rendered by a body outside the law and having no
to, its jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To power, authority or jurisdiction to render a inal decision in the 7. a representative of the private sector.
disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the controversy.
Court—particularly, as in the instant case, a majority of them—in a The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President
treason case, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of There is but one Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. It is the for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on
its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. jurisdiction of this Supreme Court which cannot be diminished. The
Appointments. Of the Members irst appointed, the representative of
Disquali ication of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. Supreme Court remains a unit notwithstanding it works in divisions.
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for
Although it may have two divisions, it is but a single court. Actions
(b) WON a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who considered in any one of these divisions and decisions rendered three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
has not been duly appointed by the President even only as a therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The two divisions of the private sector for one year.
"designee"; and this court are not to be considered as two separate and distinct courts
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex of icio of the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day Perfecto v Meer see Nitafan
period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
should start the process of selecting the candidates to ill the vacancy The CIR required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After
The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila
may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the
court of irst instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his
provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. President the list of nominees to ill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes
in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the
thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has
appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall
occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the receive such compensation as may be ixed by law, which shall not
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Constitution for the President to make the appointment. be diminished during their continuance in of ice". Does the
imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
diminution thereof?
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but
nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be YES. Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley)
Such appointments need no con irmation. submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The and piecing them together, the logical conclusion may be reached that
object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of judges
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs.
in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in
ninety days from the submission of the list.
duty, there must be an unjusti ied delay in performing that duty. For of ice at the time of such declaration because such taxation would
mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham).
de Castro v JBC (Decision), supra
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the
Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President. Endencia v David see Nitafan
nominees by the JBC? Accordingly, we ind no suf icient grounds to grant the petitions
WON Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and
NO. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The
legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial of icers.
with: actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC
still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional
(a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; list of nominees to the President to ill the vacancy created by the provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial of icers are
(b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno. exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because
because it is mandated by law; the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or
(c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the diminution of their salaries during their continuance in of ice, a
duty enjoined by law; A.3. Salary
thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
(d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did
and Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
(e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be ixed by
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. law. During the continuance in of ice, their salary shall not be that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a decreased. income tax on the salaries of judicial of icer.
list of at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the Judiciary. Art. XVIII, Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the
the salary of a public of icial, especially a judicial of icer, not a
President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the
President to ill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days pesos; xxxx the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty decided otherwise? NO. The legislature cannot, upon passing a law
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the thousand pesos xxxx the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court xxxx which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent
two hundred four thousand pesos each; xxxx
an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices Standards for Public Of icials and Employees. The Republic
and judges. accordingly seeks the nulli ication of respondent's appointment,
The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted
asserting that her failure to ile the required disclosures and her
by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue
failure to submit the same to the Judicial and Bar Council show that
preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High of the abolition of the of ice. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
she is not possessed of "proven integrity" demanded of every
Tribunal but of the other courts. The exemption was not primarily of ice. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
aspirant to the Judiciary.
intended to bene it judicial of icers, but was grounded on public removal, there is an of ice with an occupant who would thereby lose
policy. his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, The Court has Jurisdiction over the instant Petition for Quo
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Warranto
Nitafan v CIR discarding Perfecto and Endencia Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
Section 5, Article VIII provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
original jurisdiction over petitions for
Petitioners submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or between removal and the abolition of the of ice. Realistically, it is
compensation as judicial of icers constitutes a decrease or devoid of signi icance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. 1. certiorari,
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, 2. prohibition,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. A.5. Removal 3. mandamus,
4. quo warranto, and
The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
Re Pamatong 5. habeas corpus.
ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
The Court inds no basis to proceed with the instant disbarment case
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including
against respondent (Leonen, J), an incumbent member of the Supreme
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in of ice. The quo warranto.
Court, who may only be removed from of ice by impeachment as
Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are
provided for under Section 2, Article XI. Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the
properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all
venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the
income earners and that payment of such income tax by Justices and Jurisprudence prohibits disbarment of an incumbent member of the
Solicitor General, is either the RTC in the City of Manila, in the CA, or
Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against Supreme Court. In Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan, a disbarment case iled
in the SC.
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in of ice. against then incumbent Supreme Court Justice Marcelo B. Fernan was
dismissed not only for utter lack of merit, but because it amounted to Impeachment vs Quo warranto
A.4. Security of Tenure a circumvention of the constitutional mandate that his removal from
Impeachment is essentially a political process meant to vindicate
of ice should only be by way of impeachment.
the violation of the public's trust. It is a proceeding exercised by the
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower A public of icer who under the Constitution is required to be a legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the
court shall hold of ice during good behavior until they reach the age of Member of the Philippine Bar as a quali ication for the of ice held by breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their him and who may be removed from of ice only by impeachment, of icer by determining the public of icer's itness to stay in the of ice.
of ice. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a judicial
public of icer. determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of
appointment of a public of icial based on predetermined rules.
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted in thereon. ⭐Republic v Sereno (Resolution and Decision) Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and
impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these
In this case for quo warranto against the incumbent Chief Justice,
Section 2(2). No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it remedies are distinct as to
the Republic entreats this Court to declare Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
undermines the security of tenure of its Members. ineligible to hold the highest post in the Judiciary for failing to (1) Jurisdiction
regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of (2) Grounds,
De la Llana v Alba the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, iling and dismissal,
and later as Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court, in violation of the and
(4) limitations.
When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding In essence, Carpio is of the opinion that removal from of ice of
The term "quo warranto" is Latin for "by what authority." Therefore, mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of impeachable public of icers shall only be by impeachment, and
as the name suggests, quo warranto is a writ of inquiry. It determines laches or prescription. Indubitably, the basic principle that not through any other mode.
whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public of ice he "prescription does not lie against the State" which inds textual basis
Velasco, J concurring and dissenting
or she occupies. The remedies available in a quo warranto judgment under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies 😼 in this case.
do not include correction or reversal of acts taken under the Justice Velasco concurs with the majority that the remedy of quo
Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and Nominee for the
ostensible authority of an of ice or franchise. Judgment is limited to warranto is available even against an impeachable of icer. He
Position of Chief Justice
ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed retroactively upon prior ultimately dissented against the removal of respondent in that as her
exercise of of icial or corporate duties. The Court has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision nomination, which is matter of public record, has not been timely
over the JBC, to ensure that the JBC faithfully executes its duties as the challenged, much less nulli ied, the JBC's indings on her eligibility
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
Constitution requires of it. Wearing its hat of supervision, the Court and quali ication should be respected. Nullity of the JBC
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable of icial may be
is thus empowered to inquire into the processes leading to Nomination is a condition sine qua non to the iling of a petition
removed from of ice
respondent's nomination for the position of Chief Justice. for quo warranto against a member of the Supreme Court.
The principle laid down in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenco v.
The JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the Constitution itself Del Castillo, J dissenting
Fernan, In Re Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Marcoleta v.
when it prescribed the quali ications absolutely required of a person
Borra is to the effect that during their incumbency, impeachable Maintains that impeachment, not quo warranto, is the mode of
to be eligible for appointment as a Member of the Court.
of icers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries removal from of ice of an appointive impeachable of icer who does
with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of not possess the quali ications required by the Constitution for the
of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be quali ication laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, position.
charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions or if not, approximately equated to an applicant's good reputation for Impeachment is the delicate balancing act the Constitution has put in
assailing the public of icer's title or right to the of ice he or she honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and idelity to place to ensure two compelling interests are promoted: the need to
occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a sound moral and ethical standards. guarantee the independence of constitutional bodies in the discharge
quo warranto action can never be iled against an impeachable of icer.
The iling of SALN is an essential requirement to one's assumption of of their mandate on one hand, and the need to enforce accountability
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an a public post. It has Constitutional, legal and jurisprudential bases. Of from public of icers who have failed to remain faithful to their oath to
election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the paramount signi icance is Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution uphold and defend the Constitution on the other. Throwing quo
eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are on the Accountability of Public Of icers. Respondent chronically warranto into the milieu unsettles the constitutional design and may
impeachable of icers. failed to ile her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law ultimately end up throwing off the system that the Constitution has
and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who put in place.
We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI allows the
institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of Perlas-Bernabe, J dissenting
of icer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds proven integrity.
There lies the need of a central authority that would, among
distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the Carpio, J dissenting others, standardize the criteria to determine whether or not a person
validity of a public of icer's appointment while the latter indicts him
Since the repeated failure to ile the SALN constitutes culpable possesses these subjective quali ications and hence, render him or
for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, it is her eligible for appointment to the Judiciary. By deliberate
to the of ice he holds.
immaterial if the failure to ile the SALN is committed before constitutional design, this central authority is no other than
The Petition is Not Dismissible on the Ground of Prescription as appointment to an impeachable of ice. However, it is up to the JBC. The independence of the JBC is rei ied by the following
Prescription does not lie against the State Congress, which is the constitutional body vested with the features:
The question is whether the one-year limitation is equally applicable exclusive authority to remove impeachable of icers, to determine if 1. irst, it is composed of representatives from various sectors
when the petitioner is not a mere private individual pursuing a the culpable violation of the Constitution or betrayal of public trust, such as the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial departments,
private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for a public committed before appointment as an impeachable of icer, warrants as well as from the legal community and private sector;
wrong and suing for public interest? The answer is no. removal from of ice considering the need to maintain public trust in 2. second, it is subject only to the supervision, not control,
public of ice. of the Court;
3. third, the President can only appoint someone from among impeachable of icial. The word "may" should mean that it was an B. Powers of the Supreme Court
those included in the JBC's list of nominees and thus, acts as option to remove, in the sense that it was not mandatory to remove
a check and balance on the Chief Executive; and an impeachable of icer. B.1. Judicial Power
4. fourth, the President's appointment based on the JBC's list
Even assuming that this Court can take cognizance of the petition, an
no longer requires con irmation. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
action for quo warranto is limited in time regardless of who
In view of the JBC's independence and integral role under the institutes the action. It can only be instituted within one (1) year lower courts as may be established by law.
Constitution, it can therefore be concluded that the interpretation, after the cause of action arises. Article 1108(4) refers to
treatment, and application of its guidelines and criteria set to acquisitive and extinctive prescription as regards the acquisition or Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
determine the subjective quali ications of a Judiciary candidate are - ownership of real rights, and not prescription in general. Article 1108 controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
as will be further expounded below - policy matters that are solely can be found in Book III of the Civil Code which relates to the enforceable xxx
within its sphere of authority and hence, generally non-justiciable, different modes of acquiring ownership.
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion. B.2. Judicial Review
The ownership referred to in Book III of the Civil Code is ownership
It is apt to point out that "integrity," as well as the other subjective of real property, personal property, and intellectual creations. It is
quali ications of "competence," "probity," and "independence," are preposterous to include the position of Chief Justice within and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
personal qualities that are hardly determinable from the facts on the coverage of Book III of the Civil Code, since a public of ice is discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
record. Unless they are irst concretized into operable guidelines and not a property right, hence, no proprietary title can attach to it. of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
criteria, the determination of the same would be clearly subject to
varied interpretation. The nature of these subjective quali ications Furthermore, a quick review of jurisprudence shows that the phrase
Francisco v House of Representatives, supra.
starkly contrasts with the quali ications of age, natural-born "Prescription does not lie against the State" was limited to actions of
citizenship, and years of legal practice, which are inherently reversion to the public domain of lands which were fraudulently
Justice Panganiban’s “Liberty and Prosperity”
granted to private individuals and not in all actions instituted by the
objective in nature.
State.
B.3. ART. VIII, Sec. 5
Thus, where the JBC imposes a requirement that bears on an
Once a candidate has undergone the rigorous application process of
applicant's subjective quali ication, such as integrity, it ineluctably
engages in the enterprise of interpretation. In so doing, the JBC
the Judicial and Bar Council, the candidate is considered quali ied for 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
the position. To hold otherwise would be to render inutile the ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
exercises an inherent policy function and perforce, the treatment and
constitutional mandates of the Judicial and Bar Council and the
application of said requirement - being a concrete embodiment of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
Commission on Appointments. The removal of an impeachable
JBC's interpretation - should be deemed as "political and habeas corpus.
of icer was meant to be dif icult and cumbersome since it will only
questions," which as earlier stated, are generally non-justiciable, be on the basis of impeachable offenses committed while in 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or af irm on appeal or
unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion. of ice, not any disquali ication prior to appointment. certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, inal
All things considered, it is my opinion that a petition for judgments and orders of lower courts in:
This Court's power of supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council
certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the subjective a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
cannot be read as authority to interfere with the Judicial and Bar
quali ications of a Judicial appointee. Council's discretion in performing its constitutional mandate. At any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
most, this Court's supervision is administrative in nature. presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
If grave abuse of discretion has not been asserted nor was it
attributed against the JBC, which was not even made a party to this ordinance, or regulation is in question.
case, then the quali ication of respondent, as embodied in her A.6. Fiscal Autonomy b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
shortlisting by the JBC, should be maintained. For these reasons, the assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
present petition for quo warranto is in irm. Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy iscal autonomy. Appropriations thereto.
Leonen, J dissenting for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be is in issue.
Maintains that impeachment is the only process to remove an
automatically and regularly released.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is

penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
reclusion perpetua or higher. warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review. adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
involved.
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must irst
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as Rule 122 and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC Re Amendments Governing be iled with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall Death Penalty effective October 15, 2004 remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
not exceed six months without the consent of the judge reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and
concerned. People v Mateo re intermediate review of the CA of cases requiring adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage automatic review by the SC prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency
of justice. to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving Certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same motion for reconsideration before the iling of a petition for
and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.
provide a simpli ied and inexpensive procedure for the speedy penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is These are:
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same imposed). (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the has no jurisdiction;
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
Supreme Court. proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life court;
6. Appoint all of icials and employees of the Judiciary in
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
accordance with the Civil Service Law. question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals
before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
In re Bermudez
liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or of the action is perishable;
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the irst paragraph of Section 5 of evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination reconsideration would be useless;
Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. extreme urgency for relief;
Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
this action (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court. Procedural matters, improbable;
relief. irst and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of lack of due process;
People v Ramos Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
Should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed review, is such a procedural matter. public interest is involved.
in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said Court, with a In this case, the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the
Carpio-Morales v CA on the rule-making power of the SC
comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the irst time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court,
law involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Of ice of the Ombudsman is put under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
to the fore. procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
Court.
Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a The prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
public of icer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. procedure solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this
is justi ied. Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, Court.
practice, and procedure as exclusive and one of the safeguards of
The lis mota of this case is the validity of the irst paragraph of
its institutional independence. Re GSIS
Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this
Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an It should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting
May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the
Ombudsman investigation. provisional injunctions, such as in the irst paragraph of Section 14,
Court on GOCCs and LGUs? NO.
RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over
powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291.
Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an
129. The CA's certiorari jurisdiction is not only original but also
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its
concurrent with the RTC (under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP
while the court is hearing the same. rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII.
129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII). In view of
the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of
certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. passing the irst paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the government employees in support of its petition. It is a corporate
Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its
While the power to de ine, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its
of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
These issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's its members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of 41(g) of RA 8291, the speci ic power which involves the exemption
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members.
Court as per Section 5 (5), Article VIII. Thus, as it now stands,
case.
Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and
In re NPC procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modi ied by
The power of a court to issue provisional injunctive reliefs
Congress. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative
coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, The National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks clari ication from the
grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of
processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired Court on whether or not it is exempt from the payment of iling fees,
RA 8291 necessarily fails.
jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of appeal bonds and supersedeas bonds.
Court. A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules Estipona, Jr. v Lobrigo re Plea-bargaining
in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and
that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modi ied by Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the
inal determination of the appeal.
Congress. constitutionality of Section 23 of RA 9165 on plea-bargaining.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the irst paragraph of
Section 22 of Rule 141 provides that LGUS and GOCCs with or The SC has rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in
Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their
without independent charters are not exempt from paying legal fees. the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, to
power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform wit:
conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's
Act of 2001), on privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the
constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, 1. Fabian v. Desierto - Appeal from the decision of the Of ice
NPC "shall remain as a national GOCC." Thus, NPC is not exempt
which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case
from payment of iling fees.
quali ications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate

should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate"
of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under component of the administration of justice. its rules for the purpose.
Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
Plea bargaining has been de ined as "a process whereby the Lopez v Roxas
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. - The Cooperative Code Lopez assailed RA 1793 creating the PET as unconstitutional.
disposition of the case subject to court approval."
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons
under Rule 14 of the Rules. Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on Pursuant to the Constitution, "the Judicial power shall be vested in
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established
from Payment of Legal Fees; BAMARVEMPCO v. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by by law". This provision vests in the judicial branch of the
Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the NPC from regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties government, not merely some speci ied or limited judicial power, but
Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Republic v. Hon. recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy "the" judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the
Mangotara, et al. - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. entirety or "all" of said power, except, only, so much as the
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment Constitution confers upon some other agency.
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. Under
of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
4. Carpio-Morales v. CA - The irst paragraph of Section 14 of disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party
R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of
and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation legislative action:
charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
conducted by the Ombudsman, Is unconstitutional as it
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute (1) de ining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, de ines and evidence on hand can sustain. (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give Thus, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared said controversies or disputes, in the irst instance and/or
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of on appeal.
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII. RA No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential
redress for their invasions. Leonen, J concurring
Electoral Tribunal. Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for The prohibition found in Section 23 is unconstitutional not only RA No. 1793, the aforementioned provision of the Constitution,
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or because it contravenes the rule-making power of this Court, it also establishing said Electoral Tribunals for Members of Congress only,
modi ies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really constitutes "cruel, degrading, [and] inhuman" punishment for proves the exact opposite, namely: that the Constitution intended to
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing the accused. The aim is to rehabilitate, not punish, those drug vest Congress with discretion to determine by law whether or not the
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly offenders. election of a president-elect or that of a vice-president-elect may be
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of contested and, if Congress should decide in the af irmative, which
them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. B.4. ART. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3 court of justice shall have jurisdiction to hear the contest.
If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be It follows, therefore, not only that RA No. 1793 is not inconsistent
classi ied as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding iled by with the Constitution or with the principle of separation of powers
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with any citizen, the suf iciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of underlying the same, but, also, that it is in harmony with the
procedure. martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the aforementioned grant of "the judicial power" to said courts.
It is towards the provision of a simpli ied and inexpensive procedure extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on thirty days from its iling. Art. IX-A, Section 7. xxxx Unless otherwise provided by this
plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the required
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the
executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court
initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the
B.5. Congressional Power over Jurisdiction of the en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and
Supreme Court to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances.
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
Section 2(1). The Congress shall have the power to de ine, prescribe, A deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with
cannot write a rule with precedential value. Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. involving the constitutionality of a statute, without
hereof. distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration.
Art. VI, Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
denied.
without its advice and concurrence. case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When
the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the
Villavert v Desierto Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases
Case was REFERRED to the Court of Appeals as a petition for review decision rendered en banc or in division may be modi ied or reversed
"shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
under Rule 43 in light of Fabian v Desierto. except by the court sitting en banc. who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
instant cases and voted thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the issue
Fabian v Desierto, supra Rule 56, Section 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. —
of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that re lected in the
Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary April 28, 2009 Resolution--a 6-6 deadlock.
Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if
decisions of the Of ice of the Ombudsman in administrative On the postulate then that irst, the inality of the November 18, 2008
after such deliberation no decision is reached,
disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate entry of
30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the
1. the original action commenced in the court shall be
appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In second motion for reconsideration did not de initely settle the
dismissed, constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take
addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the 2. in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall another hard look at the underlying decision
Of ice of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, stand af irmed; and
appeals from decisions of the Of ice of the Ombudsman in 3. on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be Lu v CA (2011 Resolution)
administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under denied.
Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for
Ombudsman. Rule 125, Section 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. — When "Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution"
the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided in opinion or the iled by David Lu, et al. against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym
necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the father and sons) and LLDC.
B.6. Manner of sitting and votes required
case shall again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after By Decision of August 26, 2008, the Court unanimously disposed of
Art. VIII, Section 4. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief re-deliberation, the judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be the three present petitions, which Decision was, on motion for
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its reversed and the accused acquitted. reconsideration, the Court voting 4-1, reversed by Resolution of
discretion, in division of three, ive, or seven Members. Any vacancy August 4, 2009, dismissing the complaint of David Lu which was on
League of Cities v Comelec (2009 Decision) appeal with the CA. David Lu's Motion for Reconsideration and
shall be illed within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc was denied by
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the minute Resolution of September 23, 2009.
supervision of all courts and their personnel. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) states that the Court
en banc shall act on the following matters and cases: The present cases fall under at least three types of cases for court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
consideration by the Court En Banc. At least three members of the basis therefor.
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, Court's Second Division (to which the present cases were transferred,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, they being assigned to a Member thereof) found, by Resolution of Yao v CA
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, October 20, 2010, that the cases were appropriate for referral-transfer
ordinance, or regulation is in question; to the Court En Banc which subsequently accepted the referral in Yao was convicted by the MeTC for Unfair competition under Art
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the view of the suf iciently important reason to resolve all doubts on the 189(1) of the RPC. Yao appealed to the RTC. Without waiting for the
death penalty or reclusion perpetua; validity of the challenged resolutions as they appear to modify or Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution, which was iled only on
(c) cases raising novel questions of law; reverse doctrines or principles of law. 20 August 1994, Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July 1994 a
(d) cases af one-page Decision which af irmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so
(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to inal and doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC and
CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA; executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve a stated that "[a]after going over the evidence on record, the Court inds
(f) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is modi ication or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, no cogent reason to disturb the indings of the Metropolitan Trial
(i) the dismissal of a judge, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be Court."
(ii) the disbarment of a lawyer, considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become inal.
(iii) the suspension of any of them for a period of more The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It
A decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of this is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available
than one year, OR constitutional provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and,
(iv) a ine exceeding forty thousand pesos; only if granted or provided by statute. Since the right to appeal is not
therefore, invalid. Any entry of judgment may thus be said to be a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in
(g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the "inef icacious" since the decision is void for being unconstitutional.
reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Corollarily,
reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the It is necessary to reconcile and declare the legal doctrines regarding its requirements must be strictly complied with.
lifting of a judge's suspension or a lawyer's suspension actions that are incapable of pecuniary estimation, application of That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period
from the practice of law; estoppel by laches in raising an objection of lack of jurisdiction, and ixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a whether bad faith can be deduced from the erroneous annotation of
Presiding Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial lis pendens. In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the
appellate court; petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for
(i) ✔ cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle. The decision
B.7. Requirements as to decisions
Court en banc or by a Division may be modi ied or of the RTC af irming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed
reversed; Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
(j) cases involving con licting decisions of two or more We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially
submitted to it for the decision en banc or in division shall be reached
divisions; or suf iciently complied with the constitutional injunction
in consultation before the case assigned to a Member for the writing of
(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained; notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge the opinion of the Court. A certi ication to this effect signed by the Chief
written provided that
inancial impact on businesses or affects the welfare of a Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
community; case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or 1. they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they
(m) ✔ Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases were based, as when they stated the legal quali ications of
dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the
that, in the opinion of at least three Members of the the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying
reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower
Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty
collegiate courts. imposed and the civil liability; or
transfer to the Court en banc;
(n) ✔ cases that the Court en banc deems of suf icient 2. discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without that was charged in the information, and accordingly
importance to merit its attention; and
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty;
(o) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative
it is based.
or shown of the Philippine Constabulary, now the PNP, Colonel Abadilla, who
3. quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum 1. that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing was ambushed in broad daylight.
but made their own indings and assessment of evidence, before a court of competent jurisdiction;
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed
before inally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of 2. that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
constitutionally in irm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which
the case. following due citation or voluntary appearance of the
the ruling was based, and while it did not speci ically address each
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions, a and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said
secure an impartial administration of justice; and
specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its
3. that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court
accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129 on the ruling af irming the trial court's judgment of conviction. The
and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud
grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before
in procuring the judgment.
our courts. We have also declared that memorandum decisions this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such
comply with the constitutional mandate. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the as the alleged suf iciency of prosecution evidence, their common
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of ballistic and
In Francisco v. Permskul, however, we laid down the conditions for
of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due ingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense and
the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:
notice in the foreign forum. modi ication of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the
In the instant case, petitioner suf iciently established the existence of
indings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court facts narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the
the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it
only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal.
offered. There is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is
decision is not easily and immediately available to the person
not enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts and
reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by b.7.1. Mandatory periods for deciding cases
law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. As
reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the
aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs
facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a Art. VIII, Section 15. All cases or matters iled after the effectivity of
matters of remedy and procedure. Considering that under the
statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129 should actually embody the indings of fact and conclusions
be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact and law months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate
of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the
indispensable part of the decision. courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
Tested against these standards, we ind that the RTC decision at bar otherwise.
A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution
miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the
constitutional injunction. upon the iling of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
Fr Martinez v CA
the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of
Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals
the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certi ication to this
denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in violation of
process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process the Constitution because it does not state the legal basis thereof. effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith
clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter,
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual Art. VIII, Sec. 14 was fully complied with when the Court of Appeals,
in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution and served upon the parties. The certi ication shall state why a decision
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.
that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
raised anything new.
Asiavest v CA Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court,
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal Lumanog v People without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of

Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3. The Supreme Court may review, in an administrative duties.
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
appropriate proceeding iled by any citizen, the suf iciency of the factual in the case and voted in thereon. b.8.2. Temporary assignment of judges
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its Maceda v Vasquez
Sec. 5[3]. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
decision thereon within thirty days from its iling. public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether the Of ice of the
Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
Art. XVIII, Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after
falsi ication of a judge's certi ication submitted to the Supreme Court,
the rati ication of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made irst to b.8.3. Change of Venue
the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme the Supreme Court.
Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A Sec. 5[4]. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his of icial duties. A judge miscarriage of justice.
bodies. who falsi ies his certi icate of service is administratively liable to
the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inef iciency under b.8.4. Appointment of of icials and employees of judiciary
Section 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the rati ication of this Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. Sec. 5[6]. Appoint all of icials and employees of the Judiciary in
the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be accordance with the Civil Service Law.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any
determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable. administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to
B.9. Rule-making Powers
his certi icates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of
Ombudsman encroaches into the court's power of administrative
Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters iled Sec. 5[5]. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
before the rati ication of this Constitution, when the applicable period doctrine of separation of powers. of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
lapses after such rati ication. the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simpli ied
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
b.7.2. Court deliberations as con idential communication and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
court personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
In Re Production of Court Records, supra see Module 1-1 on all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
Doctrine of Separation of Powers they commit any violation thereof. courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Ombudsman should irst refer the matter of
B.8. Administrative Powers petitioner's certi icates of service to this Court for determination
Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2. No petition for review or motion for
of whether said certi icates re lected the true status of his pending
case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
b.8.1. Supervision of lower courts denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of
the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision Art. VII, Sec 18, par. 3, supra
its personnel to testify on this matter.
over all courts and the personnel thereof.
In ine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other In Re Cunanan re Bar Flunkers Act
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
court shall hold of ice during good behavior until they reach the age of Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
court employee had acted within the scope of their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
of ice. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
responsibility. of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and the court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the
being inseparable from the provisions of Article 1, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar
entire law is void. common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397
to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a In Re Edillon re Integrated Bar authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the
judgment—a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the
during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and it," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
name of Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, State.
pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution,
for justi iable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
notwithstanding due notice. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear The core of the respondent's arguments is that the provisions
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question. constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State. Salus populi
is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has est suprema lex.
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession,
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classi ication, it is inancial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which
arbitrary and unreasonable. personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might
be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even
1. irst, because they are not within the legislative powers of An "Integrated Bar" is a State organized Bar, to which every
to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and
2. second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in
or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which his concerns.
3. third, because their purposes or effects violate the every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
Constitution or its basic principles. carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his 1. The irst objection posed by the respondent is that the Court
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of is without power to compel him to become a member of the
As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal the State, an integrated Bar is an of icial national body of which all IBP.
defects. lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to
force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit: discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of provide an of icial national organization for the well-de ined but
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
1. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, constitutes suf icient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if member.
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
they are at present already prepared to become members of disbarment of the offending member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
the Bar. This is a manifest encroachment on the The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. It must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the annual dues.
2. The law in effect is a judgment revoking the resolution of Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise
this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates. of the police power over an important profession. The practice of 2. The fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed
3. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties integration.
4. The law is a class legislation. not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the 3. It is clear that under the police power of the State, and under
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an of icer of existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of
as a regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and iled various
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
or arbitrary. of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time
"counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no
Attorneys, it is suf icient to state that the matters of ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other
authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral un itness to
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of relevant laws.
be a member of the Philippine Bar.
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
In re De Vera petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and of ices under
and responsibilities.
them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
This is a Petition mainly seeking the disquali ication of respondent mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
Re: Request for Special Division, AM No. 02-1-09-SC, Jan. 21, 2002 Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being elected IBP Governor of Eastern preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other
Mindanao." judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," the
Aguirre v Rana Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for
Aguirre charged Rana with unauthorized practice of law, grave the selection of the IBP of icers from the Chapter Of icers up to the the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is its highest naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
allowed Rana to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics. Petitioners doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001. However, the Court ruled that asseverate that De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to and municipal pollution.
resolution of the charge against him. Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he covets the IBP presidency. The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS,
We agree with the indings and conclusions of the OBC that
went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus,"
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does
of the domicile rule. shall, from inality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a
not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
De Vera argues that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
controversy, contending that the election of the Of icers of the IBP,
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to
including the determination of the quali ication of those who want to
said date.
serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is B.10. Prohibition on Quasi-judicial or Administrative
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by
Works
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other the IBP.
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP. established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the quasi-judicial or administrative function.
activities of the IBP, including the election of its of icers.
law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
Meralco v Pasay Transportation
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and Re GSIS, supra
The issue here concerns the legal right of the members of the
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute Continuing Mandamus: MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila
majority of whom shall be inal, to act in that capacity.
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, Bay
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte ninety days from the submission of the list.
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative
judicial functions.
functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is SB of Taguig v Estrella
The Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes constrained to deny his request.
the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government The present controversy stems from an election protest iled by then
constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and mayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the
illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig. The protest was iled with the
C. Report on Judiciary RTC of Pasig and eventually raf led to the sala of Judge Estrella.
of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be inal, to
act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the Complainants allege that respondent judge, together with Papa and
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the
members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the the NBI of icials concerned, violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act
matter. opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President
3019.
and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the
Judiciary. In the case at bar, respondent’s demeanor during the entirety of the
Garcia v Macaraig trial is clearly wanting. From the outset, it must be noted that Garcia
The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in D. The Lower Courts obtained a total of 41,900 votes as compared to Papa’s 36,539.
collaborating or working with other of ices or of icers under the However, respondent based his decision to proclaim Papa the winner
other great departments of the government must always be kept clear d.1. Qualifications and Appointments of the 1995 elections on the basis of the NBI reports. Respondent was
and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on remiss in examining the questioned ballots despite the wrong
which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Section 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court igures, computations, and typographical errors and mistakes present
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated in the NBI Reports. Notwithstanding these errors, respondent based
or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
by good intentions in the interest of the public service. his decision solely on the conclusions and indings of the NBI.
Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years
of age, and must have been for ifteen years or more, a judge of a lower Respondent’s obvious partiality for Papa is further bolstered by his
In Re Judge Rodolfo Manzano court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. acts during the promulgation of judgment on August 27, 1997. The
facts show that respondent did not set the NBI Reports for hearing,
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos The Congress shall prescribe the quali ications of judges of lower nor was Garcia allowed to confront the NBI of icials concerned. He
Norte, Branch 19 was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte did not even allow Garcia to get copies of the reports until after the
courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a
Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential EO promulgation of the decision on August 27, 1997, and this, only after
No. 856. citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
the COMELEC had ordered respondent to do so on August 26, 1997. In
An examination of EO No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/ fact, the only time Garcia’s counsel was able to study the two reports
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy of the NBI consisting of 53 and 17 pages, respectively, was ive
integrity, probity, and independence. minutes before the promulgation of judgment. Respondent’s
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the
poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and justi ication that he alone should have copies of the reports since
Section 8[5]. The Council shall have the principal function of these were court-sponsored and the request did not emanate from
improving local jail conditions. It is evident that such Provincial/City
recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other either of the parties, is an explanation which this Court inds hard to
Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. accept.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation
and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower Judge Estrella’s obvious bias became even more apparent when he
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry granted the motion for execution pending appeal iled by Papa on the
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the day of promulgation of judgment, August 27, 1997. What is
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. disturbing is that said motion was dated August 26, 1997, a day
Such appointments need no con irmation. before the scheduled promulgation, indicating that Papa had prior
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and
knowledge of a decision favorable to him.
other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
d.2. Salary The RTC declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and COMELEC member who takes no part in a decision or resolution
Section 10. The salary xxxx of judges of lower courts shall be ixed by also for its presumed validity. must state the reason for his inhibition.
law. During the continuance in of ice, their salary shall not be
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution imposes an identical
decreased. unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright con iscation of the requirement on the members of this Court and all lower collegiate
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. courts. By intent of the Constitution's framers, as re lected in the
d.3. Congressional power to reorganize and security of His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without language of the text, this requirement is mandatory. Owing to the
tenure according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and exact identity of the two provisions' phrasing of the requirement in
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the question, Section 1, Rule 18 (which, in all probability, was lifted from
Section 11. xxxx [J]udges of the lower court shall hold of ice during measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as Section 13, Article VIII), must be of mandatory nature itself.
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become constitutional.
There is no dispute here that two COMELEC Commissioners took no
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their of ice. xxxx This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a part in the 30 September 2005 Resolution without stating the reasons
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are for their inhibition. Petitioner is of the view that this omission
Section 2[2]. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever annuls the Resolution for lack of quorum, with the two
undermines the security of tenure of its Members. warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have non-participating Commissioners' votes becoming "inexistent."
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify
De la Llana v Alba, supra Even if the votes of Commissioners Sadain and Tuason are
or af irm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
disregarded, a quorum still remains, with three of the then ive
provide," inal judgments and orders of lower courts in, among
d.4. Removal COMELEC Commissioners voting to deny petitioner's motion for
others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures.
reconsideration. The more important question is whether, despite
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in
Section 11. xxxx The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to such quorum, the Resolution should be invalidated for failure of the
the irst instance by these lower courts.
two Commissioners to state the reasons for their inhibition.
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on The purpose of the rule in question was meant to see to it that all
presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
the issues in the case and voted in thereon. justices participate in the promulgation of decisions. Being a device
rebutted.
to dissuade members of this Court and all lower collegiate courts (or
d.5. Jurisdiction in this case, the members of the COMELEC) from not taking part in
d.6. Preparation of decisions the deliberation of cases, the requirement has nothing to do with
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and the ruling involved but concerns the judge himself. Thus,
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without non-compliance with the rule does not annul the ruling in which a
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which judge takes no part but may be basis for holding him responsible for
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual it is based. the omission.
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and Indeed, the omission involved here is akin to the failure of the head
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the of a collegiate court to issue the certi ication under Section 13, Article
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal VIII that "The conclusions of the x x x Court in any case submitted to it
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
basis therefor. for decision en banc or in division [was] reached in consultation
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
before the case [was] assigned to a Member for the writing of the
Pedragoza v Comelec opinion of the Court," a requirement also imposed on the Chairman
Ynot v IAC
or the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC, as the case may be,
The Failure of Commissioners Sadain and Tuason to State their
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from under Section 1, Rule 18.
Reasons for Taking No Part in the Resolution of 30 September
Masbate to Iloilo when they were con iscated by the police station
2005 does not Annul that Ruling The certi ication requirement is a new provision introduced by
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO 626-A.
the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for
implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory,
the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of where they refer to matters merely procedural. three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after the private sector for one year.
To hold that non-compliance by the courts with the aforesaid
consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc or in a
provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex of icio of
division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for
through which con licts are resolved, the very instruments to foster the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
decision-writing. The decision is thus rendered by the court as a
unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render a
body and not merely by a member thereof. This is in keeping with the
decision within the allotted term. Such an absurd situation could not The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only
have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law. Where
after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall
the contrary construction would lead to absurd, impossible or
concurrence of the required majority vote. provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
mischievous consequences, it should not be followed.
Partido ng Manggagawa v Comelec, supra. Cases pending must be decided within the afore-mentioned period. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
d.7. Mandatory period for deciding administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Marcelino v Cruz De Roma v CA de Castro v JBC (2010 Decision supra)
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the Chavez v JBC
respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. from promulgating his decision petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the
and for release from detention of petitioner, the accused in said case, respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article Whether the irst paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As held in Marcelino v. Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in
case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide the JBC.
(90) days from submission thereof. on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction
NO. In opting to use the singular letter “a” to describe “representative
or render their decisions invalid.
Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed of Congress,” the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
by Section 11[1] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the
constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no
non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court E. The Judicial and Bar Council uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
over the unresolved case.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several
Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
We disagree. Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of bicameralism. The underlying reason for such a limited participation
eighty- ive [85] days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was
deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge iled with the can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to
1. the Chief Justice as ex of icio Chairman,
deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No. C-5910. He recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential
had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the 2. the Secretary of Justice, and considering that the Constitution employs precise language in laying
three-month period prescribed by the Constitution. 3. a representative of the Congress as ex of icio Members, down the functions which particular House plays, regardless of
4. a representative of the Integrated Bar, whether the two Houses consummate an of icial act by voting jointly
Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately
5. a professor of law, or separately.
after the trial or verdict have been held by some courts to be merely
6. a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and The dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized
directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
7. a representative of the private sector. considering the interplay between these two Houses. In checkered
judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it
would clearly have indicated it. Said provision, having been contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the Houses in their participation in the JBC. Rather, in the creation of
incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of
procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris declares that President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four
on Appointments. Of the Members irst appointed, the representative of (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major
branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-of icio Chairman More signi icantly, this case of irst impression impugns the
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice end-result of its acts - the shortlist from which the President
JBC in cases where an applicant’s
(representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the appoints a deserving addition to the Highest Tribunal of the land. integrity is challenged
Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is
The integrity of Jardeleza, one of the nominees to replace the retiring Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the “unanimity
seven (7), not eight. Justice Abad, was impugned by CJ Sereno who was the JBC ex-of icio rule,” contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an applicant?
To allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with Chair. According to the JBC, CJ Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to When an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or
one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the discharge the duties of his of ice as shown in a con idential legal her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes “unanimous”
three branches of government. memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case instead of the “majority vote.” Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions
for the government. only a situation where an applicant’s moral itness is challenged. It
The lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote.
This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the The JBC released the subject shortlist of four (4) nominees. SC follows then that the “unanimity rule” only comes into operation
said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Spokesman Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually ive (5) when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It inds no
Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee application where the question is essentially unrelated to an
process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution could not be included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 applicant’s moral uprightness.
authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot of the JBC rules. The minutes of the JBC meetings reveal that not only the question on
be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or Jardeleza iled the present petition for certiorari and mandamus his actuations in the handling of a case was called for explanation by
tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a under Rule 65 seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list of the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show his
constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justice lack of integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and
Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in alleged acts of insider trading.
of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
representation carries with him one full vote. Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve
in excluding him, despite having garnered a suf icient number of a question on Jardeleza’s integrity? Does his adoption of a speci ic
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an votes to qualify for the position. legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over logical challenge against his moral character? Does the “unanimity
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no of ice; it is inoperative as the case rule” apply in cases where the main point of contention is the
if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or
Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the corrupt behavior?
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over
nulli ied. This is essential in the interest of fair play. it. Supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that The Court answers these questions in the negative.
subordinate of icers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and Disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential
Leonen, J dissenting the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A
His dissent mainly revolves around the point that Congress is a and complied with. lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a
bicameral body that should be represented by a member of each of its The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not case entrusted to him. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
House. An alternate mode of representation is not representation of available. There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least,
Congress at all since the Senate or House of Representatives alone is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something. linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as
not Congress. a professional. What this disposition perceives, therefore, is the
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorari on the ground inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground
that it does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It has of its invocation.
Jardeleza v Sereno
been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper
The selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardeleza’s alleged
JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally in irm. The heart of government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the irst time only
the debate lies not only on the very soundness and validity of the lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the during the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. Do these issues fall
application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power. government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, within the purview of “questions on integrity” under Section 2, Rule
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues.
Aguinaldo v Aquino III re Clustering of nominees by the JBC issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers. By
The Availability of Due Process
already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC
in the Proceedings of the JBC
The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new
The right to due process is available and thereby demandable as a Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired the President's power to Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by
matter of right. The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of
impressed with discretion does not automatically denigrate an the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. the President's power of appointment.
applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court unanimously voted that in this case of six simultaneous
The JBC contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond
directory in nature as can be gleaned from the use of the word “may.” its constitutional mandate in clustering the nominees into six F. Automatic Release of Appropriations for Judiciary
Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave
and/or discretionary on the part of the JBC. Even the conduct of a abuse of discretion in disregarding the said clustering. Section 3. xxxx Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by
hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and,
for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the
clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power in the after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
of allegations. While JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that
entails a trial-type hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces “any following ways:
II. ECSTACS
complaint or opposition,” the right to answer the accusations against 1. The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the
him. This constitutes the minimum requirements of due process. ive to seven nominees in each cluster. Academic Freedom: Pimentel v LEB 2019 En Banc
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the 2. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one
cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens to
determination that the application of the “unanimity rule” on
nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. quality and accessible education, violates academic freedom in that it
integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due
3. All the nominees applied for and were found to be quali ied interferes with the law school's exercise of freedom to choose who to
process.
for appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice admit, and is an unfair academic requirement.
The Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides that
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated why one nominee should be considered for appointment to Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the position assigned to one speci ic cluster only. learning.
the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but 4. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for appointment was
from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow
basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to they were included, even though they applied and were aspect of the broader area of freedom of thought, speech, expression
strike down the “unanimity rule” as it re lects the JBC’s policy and, found to be quali ied for all the vacancies. and the press. It has been identi ied with the individual autonomy of
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. 5. Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the educators to "investigate, pursue, and discuss free from internal and
vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or order of external interference or pressure." Thus, academic freedom of faculty
Leonen, J dissenting
preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a members, professors, researchers, or administrators is defended
No person has a vested right to be nominated for a judicial position. power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential based on the freedom of speech and press.
In my view, the elemental requirements of fairness embedded in the Decree No. 1606), rules (Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but
due process clause was afforded to petitioner. Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan), and jurisprudence (Re: also by the students themselves, as af irmed in Ateneo de Manila
He opines that the supervisory power of the SC over the Judicial and Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the University v. Judge Capulong. Jurisprudence has so far understood
Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals), vest
Bar Council is mainly administrative. There is nothing in the academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to enjoy in
exclusively upon the President. school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Constitution which allows this Court to interfere with the Council’s
exercise of its discretion in the execution of its constitutional It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the
mandate. He is also of the opinion that the remedy of certiorari members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the academic freedom of the institution itself is recognized and
does not lie in non-judicial or non-quasi-judicial functions. power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such constitutionally guaranteed. As held in Garcia v. The Faculty
newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, institutions
decide for themselves their aims and objectives and how best to eventually allowed to practice medicine.
Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT score is not the sole determining
attain them. They are free from outside coercion or interference save
The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical factor on whether or not an examinee may be admitted to medical
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
profession is not in iltrated by those unquali ied to take care of the school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for
They have a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
life and health of patients was likewise the reason why the Court in evaluating applicants for admission to a college of medicine.
choice of students.
DECS v. San Diego upheld the "three- lunk" rule in NMAT.
The Court takes a calibrated approach and partially nulli ies LEBMO
Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional
In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the No. 7-2016 insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the
academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should have de facto
quality of legal education by evaluating and screening applicants to PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two years as a prerequisite for
control over:
law school. The Court inds no constitutional con lict between the admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter
(a) the admission and examination of students; Court's rule-making power concerning admissions to the practice of to institutional academic freedom.
(b) the curricula for courses of study; law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law
2. Other LEB issuances on law admission
(c) the appointment and tenure of of ice of academic staff; and admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
(d) the allocation of income among the different categories of The requirement that an applicant obtain a speci ic number of units
Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7(e), the Court af irms
expenditure. in English, Mathematics, and Social Science subjects affects a law
the LEB's authority to initiate and administer an aptitude test, such as
school's admission policies leaving the latter totally without
State's supervisory and regulatory power over legal education the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard for law admission. Thus, the
discretion to admit applicants who are de icient in these subjects or
in relation to academic freedom PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an aptitude exam that
to allow such applicant to complete these requirements at a later
measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion time.
the study of law to the end that the quality of legal education is
to decide for itself
improved is not per se unconstitutional. Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may
1. who may teach; be admitted to graduate programs in law encroaches upon the law
However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its
2. what may be taught, school's right to determine who may be admitted.
operation exclusionary, restrictive, and qualifying which is contrary
3. how it shall be taught and
to its design as an aptitude exam meant to be used as a tool that The required general weighted average in the college course
4. who to admit,
should only help and guide law schools in gauging the aptness of its suffers the same in irmity and would have been struck down had it
being part of their academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of applicants for the study of law. not been expressly repealed by the LEB.
its reasonable supervision and regulation over education, can only
LEB's Powers vis-a-vis Institutional Academic Freedom and the 3. Minimum quali ications of faculty members
impose minimum regulations. Any form of State control, even at its
Right to Education
most benign and disguised as regulatory, cannot therefore derogate Under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B
the academic freedom guaranteed to higher educational institutions. 1. PhiLSAT or J.D. degree and must, within a period of ive years from the
promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or from June 14, 2011 to June
While there is a right to quality higher education, such right is In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct
14, 2016, commence studies in graduate school of law.
principally subject to the broad academic freedom of higher answers shall be admitted to any· law school, the PhiLSAT actually
educational institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable usurps the right and duty of the law school to determine for itself the As worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7(c) and 7(e) insofar as
admission and academic requirements. Plainly stated, the right to criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such they give LEB the power to prescribe the minimum quali ications of
receive education is not and should not be taken to mean as a right to criteria on a case-by-case basis. The token regard for institutional faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and
be admitted to educational institutions. academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the regulation clause and do not infringe upon the academic
applicants had been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. freedom of law schools. University of the East v. Pepanio held that
By case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an
The right of the institutions then are constricted only in providing the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit for tertiary education
aptitude test as a reasonable police power measure in the context of
"additional" admission requirements. teachers, is not unreasonable.
admission standards into institutions of higher learning. The Court
reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power Mandating law schools to reject applicants who failed to reach the However, it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised this
because the method employed, i.e., regulation of admissions to prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those with expired PhiLSAT power through its various issuances that prove to be
medical education is reasonably related to the subject, i.e., the eligibility transfers complete control over admission policies from unreasonable. The LEB-imposed period of compliance is
protection of the public by ensuring that only those quali ied are the law schools to the LEB. unreasonable given the logistical and inancial obstacles.
that make full of ef icient use of human and natural resources, and
1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of
The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that
law schools when the LEB deems that there is gross incompetence on the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors. LEB is competition and trade practices. determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." It is the
thus usurping the law school's right to determine for itself the
recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their
competence of its faculty members. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional
4. Legal apprenticeship and legal internship of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private mandate.
While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the
Section 7(g) on legal internship, as plainly worded, cannot organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII
immediately be interpreted as encroaching upon institutional ownership.
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral
academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised this power
Cruz v SENR re Constitutionality of IPRA and its IRR domains and ancestral lands.
through several of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB
controls and dictates upon law schools how such apprenticeship and Section 7 (a) de ines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
The 1987 Constitution reaf irmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2
internship programs should be undertaken. The provisions unduly ancestral domains which covers
of Article XII on "National Economy and Patrimony."
interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its
(a) lands,
curriculum, particularly its apprenticeship program. Plainly, To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator
(b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the
these issuances are beyond mere supervision and regulation. Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulates:
ICCs/IPs,
Leonen, J dissenting and concurring (1) the concept of native title; and (c) sacred places,
(d) traditional hunting and ishing grounds, and
The provisions permitting the imposition of the Philippine Law In Cariño v. Insular Government, the court has recognized
(e) all improvements made by them at any time within the
School Admission Test, as well as the entire concept of the Legal long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the
domains.
Education Board, are unconstitutional for intruding on the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in
academic freedom of law schools and the universities and colleges to legal concept, is termed "native title." The right of ownership includes the following rights:
which they belong. The State has no business in deciding and
(2) the principle of parens patriae. (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources;
substituting its judgment for the academic institutions. Any
(2) the right to stay in the territories;
government attempt to dictate upon universities the quali ications of Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private
(3) the right to resettlement in case of displacement;
their studentry or interfere with their curriculum undermines the Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of
(4) the right to regulate the entry of migrants;
school's academic freedom. the Land of the Public Domain.
(5) the right to safe and clean air and water;
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in (6) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as
the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to individual reservations; and
III. National Economy and Patrimony (Art. XII) 🔗 ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. (7) the right to resolve con lict in accordance with customary
laws.
Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the
A. Policy
1987 Constitution classi ies lands of the public domain into four Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership
categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, over the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable
and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option
in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but
bene it of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire not to domains.
the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources --
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space
potential energy, isheries, forests or timber, wildlife, lora and fauna,
sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. The
and other natural resources -- are owned by the State. The Article XII Mineral Production Sharing Agreement between PH Government
Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and and Philnico for the exploration, development and commercial
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or
utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full utilization of nickel ores covering the contract area of about 25,000
exploitation of natural resources within ancestral domains" and
control and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) hectares in Cagdianao, Surigao del Norte and Hanigad, Awasan and
"gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting,
modes: Nonoc Islands, Surigao City within the Surigao Mineral Reservation.
extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for foundation of the State's property regime, and has been consistently
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or commercial or other extensive use that require technology other than adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions—it espouses
quali ied corporations; manual labor. that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that, as a
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of consequence thereof, any asserted right of ownership over land
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is
natural resources by Filipino citizens; necessarily traces back to the State.
an af irmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and
within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by The mineral agreements entered into by the State with private
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision persons and entities partake of two natures:
the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
corporations involving technical or inancial assistance. (a) a permit—as the State is the owner of mineral resources as
Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution in
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these declared by the 1987 Constitution, all authority for its
power and responsibility in the exploration, development and natural resources, may directly undertake the development exploration, development and utilization emanate from it;
utilization of these natural resources. and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the and
alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs (b) a contract—as the fruits of the production agreement are
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the being shared by the State and the private person or entity
as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their permitted or allowed to undertake exploration and extraction
by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or
ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains activities.
production-sharing agreement with them.
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly de ined and
limited in Section 7 (a). To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within Given the foregoing general principles governing mineral lands and
the ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has mineral resources, the query to be resolved is whether the CA
However, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural correctly found the RTC to have committed grave abuse of discretion
four (4) options:
resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing in enjoining the respondents from refusing to issue OTPs and MOEPs
Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development to the petitioner.
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. and exploitation of the natural resources; or
(2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by The RTC's act of granting the petitioner's application for a
The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of entering into an agreement with them for such development preliminary injunction is a patent violation of existing laws and
the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII and exploitation; or jurisprudence which amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the In this case, the petitioner had no more right in esse to speak of when
remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or it iled a complaint with prayer for the issuance of an injunction on
to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "bene it and (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the May 25, 2013 to enjoin the respondents from suspending the
share" the pro its from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate agreement with the ICCs/IPs. issuance of the OTPs and MOEPs before the RTC. The records show
the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of that the petitioner and Paci ic Nickel's April 27, 2009 MOA had
"ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation already expired as early as April 27, 2013.
measures." Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural B. Natural Resources Consistent with the Regalian Doctrine, all unexplored or
resources take the form of management or stewardship.
unextracted mineral resources belong to every Filipino as declared
b.1. Regalian Doctrine by the Constitution. As a consequence, the determination of what is
The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57
of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, in the interest of the public is necessarily vested in the State as owner
Shuley Mine v DENR 2019 Case
priority to subsistence ishermen and ish workers in rivers, lakes,

of all mineral resources. In other words, issues regarding the provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code.
exploration, extraction and utilization of mineral resources are bays, and lagoons.
WON the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in
imbued with public interest. This striking constitutional
xxxx violation of a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if
realization justi ies a strict interpretation in favor of preserving
it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen quali ied
the possession of mineral resources in favor of the State and in
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall to own and possess it.
trust for its citizens pending controversies regarding their
exploration, extraction, transportation or exportation. be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez of his
associations quali ied to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. residential lot acquired from the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo
Consistent with the interpretation in favor of preserving mineral
townsite to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in Hongkong,
resources in trust for the Filipinos, the CA is correct in declaring that b.3. “The Grandfather Rule” in corporation was violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution.
the RTC erred in enjoining the DENR-MGB in suspending petitioner's
mining operations as well as withholding the issuance of its OTPs C. Classification, Size, Conditions for Grant of Public Lands The vendor or his heirs cannot rely on an argument based on
and MOEPs. In this regard, the Court inds it constitutionally sound to imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the
sustain the propriety of the CA's rulings. Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classi ied into agricultural, hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of prescription was never intended to apply. Fong Pak Luen, the
b.2. Citizenship Requirement disquali ied alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S.
the public domain may be further classi ied by law according to the
Navata, a Filipino citizen quali ied to acquire real property.
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
Art. XII, Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, Tejido v Zamacoma
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
isheries, forests or timber, wildlife, lora and fauna, and other natural
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty- ive years, Issue herein is the validity of the deed of conveyance executed by
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
renewable for not more than twenty- ive years, and not to exceed plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest wayback in February 26, 1926 in
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, favor of the late Pedro Uriarte, considering that the latter was, at the
one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full time, a Spanish citizen.
not more than ive hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant. The litigated property is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
Defendant Juan Uriarte Zamacoma who owns the bigger portions of
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and subject properties became a Filipino citizen as of October 20, 1936.
or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the The other defendants, by the very allegation of plaintiffs' complaint
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain are all Filipino citizens. Therefore, there would be no more public
twenty- ive years, renewable for not more than twenty- ive years, and which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions policy to be served in allowing plaintiffs-appellants to recover the
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of land as it is already in the hands of quali ied persons.
therefor.
water rights for irrigation, water supply, isheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of waterpower, bene icial use may be the D. Private Lands d.2. Exceptions
measure and limit of the grant.
d.1. Citizenship requirements d.2.1 Legal Succession
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use Section 7, supra Ramírez v Vda de Ramirez
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate
Godinez v Pak Luen
estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal bene iciaries,
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural The plaintiffs iled this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative ish farming, with father, now deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda
the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general
who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
lives in Spain. absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands of equality and reciprocity.
in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
It is contended that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired e.2. Organization and Regulation of Private
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates
sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's Corporations
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property
opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory subject to the test of economic viability.
meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory NADECO v PVB
of a piece of land. would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
The particular enactment in question is Pres. Decree No. 1717, which
prohibition.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be
Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the administered mainly by the National Development Company. The
land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in d.2.2. Acquisition by former natural-born citizens law outlined the procedure for iling claims against the Agrix
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. companies and created a Claims Committee to process these claims.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is Sec. 4(1)
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine thereof providing that "all mortgages and other liens presently
Matthews v Taylor
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. provided by law. hereby extinguished."
Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the
The Court inds irst of all that the interests of the public are not
vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under E. Economic Activities
suf iciently involved to warrant the interference of the government
her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin
with the private contracts of AGRIX. The indispensable link to the
sought the nulli ication of the contract on two grounds: irst, that he e.1. Rationale
welfare of the greater number has not been established. On the
was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds
contrary, it would appear that the decree was issued only to favor a
used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic
special group of investors who, for reasons not given, have been
into a valid contract involving the subject property without his agents shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private preferred to the legitimate creditors of AGRIX.
consent. groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
Assuming there is a valid public interest involved, the Court still
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disquali ied organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate
inds that the means employed to rehabilitate AGRIX fall far short of
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
the requirement that they shall not be unduly oppressive. The
aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disquali ied from distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so oppressiveness is patent on the face of the decree. The right to
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional demands. (Stewardship Concept) property in all mortgages, liens, interests, penalties and charges
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our
owing to the creditors of AGRIX is arbitrarily destroyed.
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino
the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or And not only is there arbitrary taking, there is discrimination as well.
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by In extinguishing the mortgage and other liens, the decree lumps the
Filipinos. measures that help make them competitive. secured creditors with the unsecured creditors and places them on
the same level in the prosecution of their respective claims. In this
its capital, and all the executive and managing of icers of such
respect, all of them are considered unsecured creditors. Under the herself enjoys the legal presumption of validity and regularity of
equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. of icial action.
must be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so
obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons or things differently Republic v PLDT
situated should be treated differently. In the case at bar, persons requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
differently situated are similarly treated, in disregard of the principle terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter
that there should be equality only among equals. any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the
interest. principal terms and conditions of the contract.
On top of all this, New Agrix, Inc. was created by special decree
notwithstanding the provision of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the
Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense,
Constitution proscribing the formation, organization, or regulation of Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the
private corporations by the government. New Agrix, Inc. is entirely establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
private and so should have been organized under the Corporation compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of
Law. enterprises to be operated by the Government. the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs
of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
The Court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the
Albano v Reyes compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course,
contract between AGRIX and the private respondent without
the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
justi ication. While it is true that the police power is superior to the This is a Petition for Prohibition seeking to restrain the respondents title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and the Secretary of the Department reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose
is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered of Transportation and Communications from awarding to the only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss
congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) the contract of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
the greater number. for the development, management and operation of the Manila through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.
International Container Terminal (MICT). The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice
Liban v Gordon (2011 Resolution) That the Constitution provides in Art. XII, Sec. 11 that the issuance of connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In
a franchise, certi icate or other form of authorization for the either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use
The structure of the PNRC is sui generis¸ being neither strictly private
operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration and bene it. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the
nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in
or repeal by Congress does not necessarily imply, as petitioner State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to
its entirety.
posits, that only Congress has the power to grant such public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no
authorization. Our statute books are replete with laws granting reason why the State may not require a public utility to render
e.3. Operation of public utilities speci ied agencies in the Executive Branch the power to issue such services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid
authorization for certain classes of public utilities. therefor. Ultimately, the bene iciary of the interconnecting service
Section 11. No franchise, certi icate, or any other form of authorization would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the
In the instant case, the PPA, in the exercise of the option granted it by condemnation would be for public use.
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
P.D. No. 857, chose to contract out the operation and management of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the
the MICP to a private corporation. This is clearly within its power to
laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is do. Thus, PPA's acts of privatizing the MICT and awarding the MICT e.4. Filipinization
owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certi icate, or contract to ICTSI are wholly with in the jurisdiction of the PPA under
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than ifty its Charter which empowers the PPA to “supervise, control, regulate, e.4.1. of mass media and advertising
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under construct, maintain, operate and provide such facilities or services as
Art. XVI, Section 10. The State shall provide the policy environment
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the PPA."
for the full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of
by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall The contract between the PPA and ICTSI, coupled with the President's communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. written approval, constitute the necessary authorization for ICTSI's
nation and the balanced low of information into, out of, and across the
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any operation and management of the MICP. The award of the MICT
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in contract approved by no less than the President of the Philippines
country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of speech

F. Monopolies, Combinations And Unfair Competition market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building re ineries of
and of the press. their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not
Section 11. The ownership and management of mass media shall be Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the build re ineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
competing on an uneven ield. The argument that the 4% tariff
associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens. unfair competition shall be allowed. differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to
The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial invest in re ineries puts the cart before the horse.
Lagman v Torres (Decision and Resolution)
mass media when the public interest so requires. No combinations in The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of
restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed. It is contended that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violates Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell
section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A.
The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective
be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion competitors again will ind compliance with this requirement
more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or
of the general welfare. dif icult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.
power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a The question then is whether these offending provisions can be
particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one individually struck down without invalidating the entire R.A. No.
seventy per centum (70%) of the capital of which is owned by
or only a few irms dominate the total sales of a product or service. 8180. R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. This separability
such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry. On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck
in such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory
association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, pricing are among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress
capital thereof, and all the executive and managing of icers of such
monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without
entities must be citizens of the Philippines. controlling its production, distribution and price, or otherwise these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these
Art. XVIII, Section 23. Advertising entities affected by paragraph (2), interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing
Section 11 of Article XVI of this Constitution shall have ive years from Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere
refers to the end. with the free interaction of market forces.
its rati ication to comply on a graduated and proportionate basis with
the minimum Filipino ownership requirement therein. Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372
in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competition void.
e.4.2. practice of professions is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the
reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for To recapitulate, the Decision declared R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional
regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the for three reasons:
Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national
underlying principle of Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution (1) it gave more power to an already powerful oil oligopoly;
talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, (2) it blocked the entry of effective competitors; and
managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We shall proceed to
examine whether the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff (3) it will sire an even more powerful oligopoly whose
craftsmen in all ields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall unchecked power will prejudice the interest of the
differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed
encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our consumers and compromise the general welfare.
national bene it. The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall downstream oil industry.
be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.
Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the
➔ To be read together with Sec 5(5) Art VIII regarding legal oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the
dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing re ineries
profession.
of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works
to their immense bene it. New players that intend to equalize the
billboards and other similar structures situated within Davao City, power measure being speci ically aimed to safeguard public morals
Module 2-1 POWERS OF THE STATE independent of the provisions of the National Building Code. is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance.
An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if:
1. Police Power On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or
(a) it has a lawful subject such that the interests of the public
local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
Evasco, Jr. v Montañez require its exercise; and promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
At issue is an ordinance of Davao City regulating Outdoor Advertising (b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
Materials. Respondent Montanez claimed that the Ordinance is measures must be reasonably necessary for the equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties,
unconstitutional for being overbreadth in its application, vague, and accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the
inconsistent with PD No. 1096 or the National Building Code of the upon individuals. life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry.
Philippines. First, the Ordinance seeks to regulate all signs and sign structures Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
based on prescribed standards as to its location, design, size, quality capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
CA erred when it declared Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 of the Ordinance
of materials, construction and maintenance. Second, the ordinance process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty
as unconstitutional, thus, null and void for being inconsistent with
employs rules in implementing its policy. The Court will not be may call for correction by the courts.
the National Building Code. It is settled that an ordinance's validity
shall be upheld if the following requisites are present: quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules Arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
imposed are so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, the due process requirement, of icial action, to paraphrase
First, the local government unit must possess the power to unreasonable, oppressive, or con iscatory. Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
enact an ordinance covering a particular subject matter and
sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any of icial action
according to the procedure prescribed by law.
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v City Mayor marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identi ied as
Second, the ordinance must not contravene the fundamental freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower of fair play.
law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or must not be against
court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of
public policy or must not be unreasonable, oppressive, partial, Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees
the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. provided for by the challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels.
The ordinance is being assailed as unreasonable and violative of due It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and
process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for irst municipal license fees could be classi ied into those imposed for
installation of building and other structures such as billboards
class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. The Davao City
provision in the same section which would require the owner, restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
Charter vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the legislative
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, purposes only.
power to regulate, prohibit, and ix license fees for the display,
or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest
construction, and maintenance of billboards and similar structures.
or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or
This direct and speci ic grant takes precedence over White Light v City of Manila
persons without his illing up the prescribed form in a lobby open
requirements set forth in another law of general application, in this
to public view at all times. The petition at bar assails a city ordinance that prohibits motels and
case the National Building Code.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence inns from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
Thus, the consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 with "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays.
of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches
the National Building Code is irrelevant to the validity of the
to a challenged statute or ordinance. It admits of no doubt therefore A long line of decisions including City of Manila v Laguio has held
former.
that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
Even if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements evidence to rebut is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
as to the construction and regulation of billboards, the city is void on its face, which is not the case here. according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
government may impose stricter limitations because its police the following substantive requirements:
The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty
power to do so originates from its charter and not from the
does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
National Building Code. The ordinance speci ically governs
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; for achieving that interest. pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and arbitrarily invaded.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
(6) must not be unreasonable.
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by
The Ordinance prohibits two speci ic and distinct business practices, amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
twice a day. validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race activities are rare or even unheard of. Less intrusive measures such
as well as other fundamental rights, such as suffrage, judicial as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.
and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. The access and interstate travel.
Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented
apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those
of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use to liberty upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. The concept engaged in illicit activities.
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the and interference demands respect. The right to privacy as a
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their City of Cagayan De Oro v Cagayan Electric Power & Light
constitutional right was recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc, the invasion
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution. of which should be justi ied by a compelling state interest. CDO enacted an Ordinance which imposed an annual Mayor's Permit
The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary In the case at bar, there are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or Fee of P500.00 on every electric or telecommunications post
regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are belonging to public utility companies operating in the city.
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power CEPALCO contended that the imposition, in the guise of police power,
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to was unlawful for violating the fundamental principle that fees,
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for charges, and other impositions shall not be unjust, excessive,
property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of oppressive, or con iscatory.
action adhering to the established process when it makes an persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few
intrusion into the private sphere. Substantive due process hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can "Taxes" has been de ined by case law as the enforced proportional
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient contributions from persons and property levied by the state for the
inquires whether the government has suf icient justi ication for alternative. support of government and for all public needs. While, under the
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Local Government Code, a "fee" is de ined as any charge ixed by law
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or
Standards of judicial review were established to test validity of an patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in activity.
ordinance on substantive due process grounds: with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. The purpose of an imposition will determine its nature as either a tax
1. strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or a fee. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is at least
or restricting the political process, 1. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly
2. rational basis standard of review for economic distinguished from those of a particular class, require an classi ied as an exercise of the power to tax. On the other hand, if the
legislation, interference with private rights and the means must be purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed an exercise of
3. heightened or immediate scrutiny for evaluating reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the police power in the form of a fee, even though revenue is
classi ications based on gender and legitimacy. purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. incidentally generated. In other words, if generation of revenue is
2. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the the primary purpose, the imposition is a tax but, if regulation is
Using the rational basis examination, in analysis of equal protection accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private the primary purpose, the imposition is properly categorized as
challenges, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a rights can work. a regulatory fee.
legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, 3. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of A cursory reading of the whereas clauses makes it apparent that the
between the purposes of the measure and the means
less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the purpose of the ordinance is to regulate the construction and
maintenance of electric and telecommunications posts erected within and advantageous for the bene iciaries, to justify the landless;
Cagayan de Oro City. non-applicability of the list of priorities in land acquisition (3) there is payment of just compensation, as required under
under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7279. Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
On account of the foregoing, it is clear that the ordinance in this case
laws; and
serves a regulatory purpose and is, hence, an exercise of police Petitioner failed to take into consideration the legal
(4) a valid and de inite offer has been previously made to the
power. de inition of an on-site development under R.A. No. 7279,
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
i.e., "the process of upgrading and rehabilitation of blighted
offer was not accepted.
2. Eminent Domain and slum urban areas, with a view of minimizing
displacement of dwellers in said areas and with provisions Sec 19 of the LGC also states that the exercise of such delegated
for basic services as provided for in Section 21" of the same power should be pursuant to the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Art. III, Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
Act. R.A. No. 7279 is such pertinent law in this case as it governs the
without just compensation. local expropriation of properties for purposes of urban land
"Blighted lands" was further de ined under Section 3(c)
reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 of the said Act provide:
a. Definition, Nature and Function thereof as referring to the "areas where the structures are
dilapidated, obsolete and unsanitary, tending to depreciate SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. - Lands for socialized
Also called the power of expropriation, it is described as “the highest the value of the land and prevent normal development and housing shall be acquired in the following order:
and most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may use of the area."
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
be acquired for some public purpose through a method “in the nature of 2. Petitioner failed to exhaust other modes of acquisition instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned
a compulsory sale to the State.” before it resorted to expropriation in violation of Section 10 or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
of R.A. No. 7279. Failure to renegotiate the offer to (b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
Sec 9 Art III of the Constitution, providing that “private property shall purchase the property before iling the expropriation case (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
not be taken for public use without just compensation”, serves as a warrants the dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. (d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development,
limitation, not a grant, of such power. It should be strictly interpreted 3. The intended bene iciaries of petitioner's socialized housing Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement
against the expropriator and liberally in favor of the property owner. program are not "underprivileged and homeless," in and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been
violation of Section 8. acquired;
b. When exercised by legislature (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily
sites which have not yet been acquired; and
involves a derogation of fundamental right. The exercise of the power
c. When exercised by local government unit or other delegates (f) Privately-owned lands.
of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private
property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right Where on-site development is found more practicable and
City of Manila v Prieto 2019 Division case necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity advantageous to the bene iciaries, the priorities mentioned in this
and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Therefore, section shall not apply. The local government units shall give
The City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance that authorized the
the exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny. budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.
City Mayor to acquire certain parcels of land belonging to
respondents to be used for the city’s Land-For-The-Landless Program. Through the LGC, the national legislature delegated the power of SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. - The modes of acquiring lands
eminent domain to the LGUs. Several requisites must concur before for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community
Initially, petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by
an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit: mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
negotiated sale, offering the amount of P2,000.00 per square meter,
banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture
which respondents refused to accept. (1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided,
The SC adopted the ruling of the CA wherein the latter found the authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
following circumstances to invalidate the expropriation done by government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That
petitioner: or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
private property; property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: x x x.
1. The records lack any evidence to support petitioner's claim (2) the power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
that an on-site development program is the most practicable purpose or welfare, or for the bene it of the poor and the The case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v.
City of Manila emphatically ruled that the above-quoted provisions State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of
Even if patrimonial property refers to land owned by the State or any
are strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent private rights. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, is not
of its instrumentalities, such is still deemed private property as it is
domain by local government units, especially with respect to: a grant, but only a limitation of the State's power to expropriate.
property held by the State in its private and proprietary capacity,
(1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized The expropriation of property consists of two stages. and not in its public capacity, in order to attain economic ends.
housing; and Hence, the mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any
(2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means of The irst stage is concerned with "the determination of the of its instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of
acquiring it. authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent public dominion and not private property. If land owned by the
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts State is considered patrimonial property, then such land
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory. As correctly found involved in the suit." assumes the nature of private property.
by the CA, nothing in the records indicates that petitioner complied
with Section 19 of the LGC and Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279. The second stage is concerned with "the determination by the Republic v. Spouses Alejandre held that patrimonial property are
court of 'the just compensation for the property sought to be either:
taken'. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more
PNOC Alternative Fuels v NGCP 2019 Division case than three (3) commissioners." (1) "by nature or use" or those covered by Article 421,
The instant case stems from a Complaint for Expropriation iled by which are not property of public dominion or imbued with
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
NGCP over a certain area of a parcel of land in order for it to public purpose based on the State's current or intended use;
government. However, the power to expropriate is not exclusive to
construct and maintain the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission or
Congress. The latter may delegate the exercise of the power to
Line Project. (2) "by conversion" or those covered by Article 422, which
government agencies, public of icials and quasi-public entities.
previously assumed the nature of property of public
The subject property is part of the Petrochemical Industrial Park Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity. dominion by virtue of the State's use, but which are no
which is administered by the PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation Respondent NGCP is allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain longer being used or intended for said purpose.
(PAFC). only with respect to private property.
Land of the public dominion expressly deemed by the State to be
Section 4 of Rule 67 states that a inal order sustaining the right to Based on Article 420 of the Civil Code, there are three kinds of alienable and disposable, susceptible to the commerce of man
expropriate the property, such as the assailed Order of Expropriation, property of public dominion: through sale, lease, or any other mode of disposition, assumes the
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, nature of patrimonial property.
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just (1) those for public use, which may be used by anybody, such as
compensation to be paid. It is clear from the foregoing that the proper roads and canals; The Subject Property Is Patrimonial
remedy of a defendant in an expropriation case who wishes to contest (2) those for public service, which may be used only by certain Property That Assumes The Nature of
an order of expropriation is not to ile a certiorari petition and duly authorized persons, although used for the bene it of the Private Property
allege that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the public; and
(3) those used for the development of national wealth, such as Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corp. held that
order of expropriation. The remedy is to ile an appeal of the when the subject property is classi ied by the government as an
order of expropriation. our natural resources.
industrial zone, the subject property therein had been declared
Here, petitioner PAFC raises the argument that the expropriation of Land of the public domain is outside the commerce of man and, patrimonial. Further, it is apparent from R.A. No. 10516 and its IRR
the subject property by respondent NGCP is invalid because such thus, cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of any that the industrial estate is being owned, managed, and operated by
exercise of eminent domain was neither done directly by Congress contract, except insofar as they may be the object of repairs or the State, not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in its private
nor pursuant to a speci ic grant of authority. improvements and other incidental things of similar character. capacity. It is apparent from P.D. No. 949, as amended by R.A. No.
Hence, they cannot be appropriated or alienated. Inalienability is 10516, that the Petrochemical Industrial Park is intended and
The Concept Of The Right Of Eminent Domain an inherent characteristic of property of the public dominion. accordingly devoted by law as a commercial and business venture.
Also called the power of expropriation, it is the inherent right of the Properties owned by the State which do not have the aforementioned Thus, NGCP has the authority under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511
State to condemn private property for public use upon payment of characteristics of a land of public dominion are patrimonial to expropriate the subject property.
just compensation. It is an ultimate right of the sovereign power to properties of the State. Patrimonial properties are properties owned
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a by the State in its private or proprietary capacity.
public purpose. The exercise of this power, whether directly by the
d. Taking easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a
the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
National Transmission Corp. v Sps Taglao 2020 Division case not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public
inde inite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. service.
To enable it to construct and maintain its Tayabas-Dasmariñ as 500 For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
KV Transmission Line Project, the NPC iled a Complaint for Eminent compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the NPC v Ibrahim
Domain against the spouses Taglao. The NPC (later TRANSCO) sought monetary equivalent of the land taken.
to acquire an easement of right of way over the property. Respondents are owners of a 70,000-square meter lot in Saduc,
NPC v Sps Aoque citing NPC v Tiangco held that if the easement is
Marawi City. Sometime in 1978, NPC, without respondents'
TRANSCO avers that just compensation must be determined as of the intended to perpetually or inde initely deprive the owner of his
knowledge and consent, took possession of the subterranean area
date of the taking of the property or the iling of the complaint, proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the
of the land and constructed therein underground tunnels.
whichever came irst. Moreover, the TRANSCO argues that the RTC ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through
Respondents thus demanded that NPC pay damages and vacate the
and CA's calculation of the just compensation was not based on any restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of
subterranean portion of the land, but the demand was not heeded.
established rule, principle, or evidence. the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or
objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of NPC insists that the payment of just compensation for the land
Just compensation is de ined as the full and fair equivalent of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the carries with it the correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It is that sum land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the land taken.
of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an monetary equivalent of the land.
owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as price to Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a
be given and received therefor. The measure is not the taker's gain, In this case, considering that the installation of the power lines corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way
but the owner's loss. would de initely deprive Spouses Taglao of the normal use of their easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property
property, they are entitled to the payment of a just compensation, rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls
While market value may be one of the basis in the determination of which is neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the within the ambit of the term expropriation.
just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without subject property.
considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market
value of the property, e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value e. Public use
of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax TELEBAP v Comelec
declarations thereon. MCIAA v Lozada, et al.
The present case considers the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881
Here, since the iling of the Complaint for Eminent Domain came against claims that the requirement that radio and television time be Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the
ahead of the taking, just compensation should be based on the fair given free takes property without due process of law; that it violates supposition that the Decision in the pertinent expropriation
market value of Spouses Taglao's property at the time of the iling the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the proceedings did not provide for the condition that should the
of the NPC's Complaint on November 24, 1995. payment of just compensation, among others. intended use of Lot No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be
aborted or abandoned, the property would revert to respondents,
A simple reading of the CA's Decision would signify that its All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is
being its former owners.
conclusion was highly speculative and devoid of any actual and licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated
reliable basis. Although the determination of just compensation as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are Contrary to the stance of petitioners, this Court had ruled otherwise
indeed lies within the trial court's discretion, it should not be done frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. MCIAA. The
arbitrarily or capriciously. among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety,
the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted wherein it is apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the
Furthermore, not only that the market value ixed by the RTC was shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport
speculative, the computation by the trial court of the property's just when the common good so requires.” would continue its operation. The condition not having materialized
compensation was also improperly made. The just compensation because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner should
should not only be 10% of the market value of the subject In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are
then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
property. given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely Fery v Municipality of Cabanatuan was not decided pursuant to
True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the
our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall f.1. How determined
Respondents voluntarily offered their landholdings for agrarian
not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well
reform. They lowered their offer to P83,346.76 per hectare. DAR
settled that the taking of private property by the Government's City Government of Valenzuela v Sps Abacan 2019 Resolution
endorsed the matter of land valuation to Landbank. According to
power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory
Landbank, respondents' lands were planted with more than
requirements: Sps Abacan are the registered owners of a 1,203-square meter parcel
30-year-old rubber trees that were no longer productive. Thus,
of land in Valenzuela. The city formally offered Abacan Spouses to
(1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and Landbank gave a lower counteroffer to respondents.
purchase their property at P400.00 per square meter. The latter
(2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
In determining just compensation, whether or not the RTC can simply rejected the offer.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions adopt the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, and whether or not it
The Sanggunian enacted an ordinance authorizing Mayor Gatchalian
that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the is mandated to follow the formula prescribed under Republic Act No.
to initiate expropriation proceedings over the property for the
property expropriated. 6657, Section 17.
construction of a public school building. The lone issue for
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the NO. The RTC has the full discretion to make a binding decision on the resolution was the amount of just compensation.
expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the value of the properties. Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of
In expropriation cases, just compensation is "the full and fair
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation iled, failing which, it Court, the RTC may
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator."
should ile another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
1. accept the Consolidated Commissioners' Report,
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its In Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, the Court held that where
2. recommit it to the same commissioners for further report,
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. the issue is determining the amount of just compensation in an
3. set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or
expropriation suit, a trial before the commissioners is
⭐We now expressly hold that the taking of private property, 4. accept only a part of it and reject the other parts.
indispensable. However, while the appointment of commissioners
consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent
The inal determination of the Regional Trial Court sitting as a Special is mandatory in resolving the issue of just compensation, courts are
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be
Agrarian Court must be respected. not bound by their indings. Courts may substitute their estimate of
devoted to the speci ic public purpose for which it was taken.
the value, as long as it is supported by the evidence on record.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or The determination of just compensation is a judicial function
not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the which cannot be curtailed or limited by legislation, much less In the case at bar, the RTC did not solely rely on the BIR zonal
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the by an administrative rule. RA 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special valuation when it ixed the just compensation at P6,000.00 per square
property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation Agrarian Courts the "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all meter. Evidentiary records disclose that the RTC evaluated the
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." Commissioners' Report. In the said report, it is very evident that the
has become improper for lack of the required factual The inal decision on the value of just compensation lies solely on commissioners' recommendation of P7,500.00 per square meter was
justi ication. the Special Agrarian Court. Any attempt to convert its original not merely based on the zonal valuation made by the BIR. The
jurisdiction into an appellate jurisdiction is contrary to the explicit commissioners recommended said amount after taking into
f. Just compensation provisions of the law. Thus, aggrieved landowners can go directly to consideration the factors set forth under Section 5 of Republic Act
the Special Agrarian Court that is legally mandated to determine just No. 8974.
⭐LBP v Manzano 2018 Leonen Division case compensation, even when no administrative proceeding as conducted
The RTC likewise considered that the City Government of Valenzuela
before DAR.
purchased a 3,000-square meter property within the same vicinity as
The inal determination of just compensation is strictly within the
The Special Agrarian Court must ensure that the amount determined the subject property at a value of P5,000.00 per square meter. Said
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Court. In
at the end of the proceedings is equivalent to the fair market value transaction was done sometime in August 2001. It further considered
expropriation cases, a party cannot allege lack of due process when
of the property at the time of the taking, and not based on a that in 2003, the BIR has valued the properties in the same zone or
he or she was given every reasonable opportunity to present his or
strict adherence to a particular set or series of rules imposed area at P5,300.00 per square meter.
her case before the courts. A judgment may be executed pending
by agricultural reform laws or administrative orders. While
appeal for good reasons, such as where the government belatedly Verily, the RTC had carefully studied the expropriated property when
Section 17 requires due consideration of the formula prescribed by
pays the just compensation for properties taken under the it ixed the just compensation at P6,000.00 per square meter.
DAR, the determination of just compensation is still subject to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The delay in payment
inal decision of the proper court.
likewise requires the imposition of legal interest by way of damages.
f.2. Damages and interest as part of just compensation not entitled to recover interest on the just compensation and
In this case, the trial court should have ixed just compensation for
attorney's fees because they caused the delay in the payment of the
the property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is
Eusebio v Luis just compensation due them; they erroneously iled their complaints
nothing on record showing the value of the property at that time. The
with the DARAB when they should have directly iled these with the
trial court, therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with an RTC acting as an agrarian court. Furthermore, the Court found it
subject land on the price paid for properties in the same location,
area of 1,586 square meters. Said parcel of land was taken by the City signi icant that the LBP deposited the pertinent amounts in the
taken by the city government only sometime in the year 1994.
of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road. petitioners' favor within fourteen months after the petitions were
Respondents iled a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages However, in taking respondents' property without the bene it of iled with the RTC. Under these circumstances, the Court found no
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the award of 12%
Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their
compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of interest.
property taken by the city government in the 1980's and, in the event
respondents' proprietary rights. For said illegal taking, the City of
that said property can no longer be returned, how should just The Court herein grants the motion for reconsideration.
Pasig should de initely be held liable for damages to
compensation to respondents be determined.
respondents. While the DAR initially valued the petitioners' landholdings at a total
Just like in the Forfom v PNR case, herein respondents also failed to of P251M, the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court, determined the
Such pecuniary loss entitles the owner to adequate compensation in actual value of the petitioners' landholdings to be P1.38B. In
question the taking of their property for a long period of time. It is
the form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case eminent domain terms, this amount is the "real, substantial, full
likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city
should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time and ample" compensation the government must pay to be "just" to
government on respondents' property was a road for public use.
of taking. the landowners.
Thus, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering
possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation. The award of interest renders unwarranted the grant of back rentals. Signi icantly, this inal judicial valuation is far removed from the
In Republic v. Lara, et al., the Court ruled that the indemnity for initial valuation made by the DAR. They indicate how undervalued
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just
rentals is inconsistent with a property owner's right to be paid legal the petitioners' lands had been at the start, particularly at the time the
compensation is that set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled
interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to pay petitioners' landholdings were "taken". While the LBP deposited the
that even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to
the compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual total amount of P72M into the petitioners' accounts, at the time the
determine just compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act
taking of their property, the payment of such compensation is landholdings were taken, these amounts were mere partial payments
in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67
deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property; and, hence, that only amounted to 5% of the P1.38B actual value of the
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not
there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking. expropriated properties.
more than three competent and disinterested commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the subject Thus, the deposits might have been suf icient for purposes of
property. Apo Fruits v LBP
the immediate taking of the landholdings but cannot be
NPC v. Dela Cruz, reiterating Forfom, emphasized that although Petitioners received separate notices of land acquisition and claimed as amounts that would excuse the LBP from the
ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the valuation of their properties from the PARO. HPI and AFC rejected the payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the compensation
commissioners' indings may only be disregarded or substituted valuations for being very low. due.
with the trial court's own estimation of the property's value only In Republic v CA, the Court recognized that the just compensation
DAR requested the Land Bank (LBP) to deposit P26M in AFC's bank
1. If the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the account and P45M in HPI's bank account, which amounts the due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to
evidence submitted to them, petitioners then withdrew. The titles over AFC and HPI's properties an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the
2. where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of were thereafter cancelled and new ones were issued in the name of Eastern Shipping Lines ruling, the Court ixed the applicable
evidence, or the Republic. interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time the
3. where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was
AFC and HPI iled separate petitions for determination of just paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant luctuation and
excessive.
compensation with the DARAB. With DARAB failing to act within 3 in lation of the value of the currency over time.
Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but years, petitioners iled separate complaints for determination and
also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of payment of just compensation with the RTC. While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially seeking
expropriation. recourse through the DAR, this agency itself - hence, the government -
On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc held that petitioners are
committed a graver transgression when it failed to act at all on the reform proceedings, it is exempt from the payment of costs of suit compensation was just in the face of the long delay in payment.
petitioners' complaints for determination of just compensation. as provided under Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, we hereby impose 12% interest per annum on the
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances of unpaid gross value from the date of the approval of the failed
this case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps of the Republic v Dela Cruz 2019 Resolution Compromise Agreement, until the full amount of the just
government, not at the petitioners’. compensation is paid, as a way of making the compensation just.
Interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and This accords with a long line of pertinent jurisprudence, whereby the
follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be Court has imposed interest at 12% per annum in eminent
LBP v Rivera placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the domain whenever the expropriator has not immediately
Respondents are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land. They date of taking." delivered the just compensation.
instituted a civil case for determination and payment of just Hence, the unpaid balance of the just compensation (i.e.,
compensation before the RTC. P1,332,800.00 - P107,100.00 = P1,225,700.00) shall earn interest at g. Remedy of Dispossessed Owner
In the instant case, while the subject lands were acquired under PD the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of
No. 27, the complaint for just compensation was only lodged before taking, i.e., on November 10, 2003 when the Order of Expropriation NTC v Bermuda Development 2019 Division case
the court on 23 November 2000 or long after the passage of Republic was issued, until June 30, 2013; and the rate of 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until inality of the Decision. The total amount of just Respondent Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) iled a case
Act No. 6657 in 1998. Therefore, Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657
compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from the for Unlawful Detainer against Petitioner National Transmission
should be the principal basis of the computation for just
inality of this Decision until full payment thereof. Corporation (TransCo).
compensation.
TransCo then iled a Complaint for Expropriation of the parcel of land
The formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of
f.3. Rental subject of the unlawful detainer case. Because of this, the appeal of
1998 should be applied in computing just compensation, thus:
TransCo in the unlawful detainer case was dismissed for being moot
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) Export Processing Zone Authority v Estate of Jimenez and academic.
Where: The Court has held that compensation cannot be just to the owner Whether the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo's appeal allegedly
LV = Land Value in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is because it has become moot and academic with the iling of the
CNI = Capitalized Net Income prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately expropriation complaint involving the same property subject of the
CS = Comparable Sales suffers not only the loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits unlawful detainer case.
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration or income. Thus, in addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no
from the time of the taking of the property until the actual longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly,
The Court of Appeals imposed interest of 12% per annum on the
payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation
amount of P515,777.57 beginning 7 October 2004, until full payment.
better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred. to continue its services to the public. The non- iling of the case for
As held in Republic v CA, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to
It is undeniable that just compensation was not promptly made to the
the case, the inal compensation must include interest on its just the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
Estate of Salud Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitioner.
value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time compensation.
The move to compensate through the swap arrangement under the
when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In Compromise Agreement was aborted or amounted to nothing through It is well-settled that a case iled by a landowner for recovery of
ine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal no fault of the Estate of Salud Jimenez. The petitioner, which should possession or ejectment against a public utility corporation,
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as have known about the inef icacy of the swapping of Lot 434 for Lot endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the
(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking 1406-B, could even be said to have resorted to the swapping for the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service without
occurred. purpose of delaying the payment. Thus, it was solely responsible for prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or
The next issue to be resolved is whether or not the Court of Appeals the delay. expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel
correctly adjudged LBP liable to pay the cost of suit. the public utility corporation to vacate such property is unavailing
Thus, the CA's ixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum cannot
since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and
NO. Since LBP is performing a governmental function in agrarian be upheld and must be corrected, for that rate would not ensure that
injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as
well as equitable estoppel. The proper recourse is for the emergency" was de ined to include threat from external under it the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit.
ejectment court: aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to
"unless it is of such proportion that would paralyze government guide or limit the mayor's action.
(1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner iling service."
the proper action for recovery of just compensation and An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that
consequential damages; or The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
(2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation how long the temporary takeover by the government would last. The regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The
to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation temporary takeover by the government extends only to the only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and
proceedings and to pay the just compensation and operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the
consequential damages assessed therein; or such the government is not required to compensate the private burden of payment of taxation, while outright con iscation would
(3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of relieve him of that burden. A regulation which substantially
case and determine the just compensation and ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private deprives an owner of all bene icial use of his property is
consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, con iscation and is a deprivation.
of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction claim just compensation for the use of the said business and its
We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7,
over the value of the subject land. properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in
Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was
exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent
While the award of rental in arrears is proper in an unlawful detainer beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore
domain.
action, its award in the present case cannot be upheld since an null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed,
unlawful detainer action is not a sanctioned remedy in case a public PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the and said accused are acquitted.
service or utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and
domain, like TransCo in this case, has occupied privately-owned obligate the government to pay "reasonable cost for the use of the Agan v PIATCO (Resolution)
property without irst acquiring title thereto by negotiated purchase Terminal and/or Terminal Complex." Article XII, Section 17 of the
or expropriation proceedings. 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the Section 17, Article XII is an exercise of police power.
times necessitate the government to "temporarily take over or direct
The subsequent iling by TransCo of the expropriation Police power has been de ined as the "state authority to enact
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
proceedings could not have rendered the unlawful detainer legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
affected with public interest." It is the welfare and interest of the
case moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in order to promote the general welfare." It consists of two essential
public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether
proceeding with the unlawful detainer case and not dismissing elements.
or not to temporarily take over a particular business.
it following the prevailing jurisprudence. First, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property.
Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant Second, the power is exercised for the bene it of the common
h. Allied provisions
to the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution. good.
Art. XII, Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public It is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of eminent domain,
interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under i. Distinguished from police power police power is exercised without provision for just
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the compensation for its paramount consideration is public welfare.
People v Fajardo
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national
with public interest. Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Sur convicting emergency is the primary consideration when the government
defendants-appellants Fajardo and Babilonia of a violation of decides to temporarily take over or direct the operation of a public
Agan, Jr. v PIATCO (Decision) Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, utility or a business affected with public interest. Police power can
Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the not be diminished, let alone defeated by any contract for its
Sec 17 Art XII pertains to the right of the State in times of national municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public paramount consideration is public welfare and interest.
emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take plaza.
over the operation of any business affected with public interest.
A irst objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that Chevron v BCDA
In the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the term "national
The CA held that in imposing the challenged royalty fees, respondent percent (20%) discount on the purchase of medicine by persons with The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to ix within speci ied
CDC was exercising its right to regulate the low of fuel into CSEZ, disability (PWD).
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
which is bolstered by the fact that it possesses exclusive right to
The CA is correct when it applied by analogy the case of Carlos impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
distribute fuel within CSEZ pursuant to its Joint Venture Agreement
Superdrug Corporation et al. v. DSWD, et al. wherein it was dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
(JVA) with Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Coastal
pronounced that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9257 which grants 20% development program of the Government.
Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. (CSBTI). Royalty fees were assessed on fuel
discount on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens is a
delivered, not on the sale, by petitioner and that the basis of such
legitimate exercise of police power. xxxx
imposition was petitioner's delivery receipts to Nanox Philippines.
The fact that revenue is incidentally also obtained does not make the Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
imposition a tax as long as the primary purpose of such imposition is restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. On the Art. VI, Sec. 29, par. 3. All money collected on any tax levied for a
regulation. other hand, the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
the state and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the
delegated to condemn private property to public use upon payment of been ful illed or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the
just compensation. In the exercise of police power, property rights of the general funds of the Government.
purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax
private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Lung Center v Quezon City
other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a
regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is
Petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973
though incidentally, revenue is generated. supported by a valid objective or purpose as aforementioned. It has a
and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a
valid subject considering that the concept of public use is no longer
The questioned royalty fees form part of the regulatory charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should be
con ined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held
framework to ensure "free low or movement" of petroleum fuel to considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate
synonymous with public interest, public bene it, public welfare,
and from the CSEZ. The fact that respondents have the exclusive right purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of
and public convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the
to distribute and market petroleum products within CSEZ pursuant to administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the character
discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a
its JVA with SBMA and CSBTI does not diminish the regulatory of the services rendered, the inde initeness of the bene iciaries, and
bene it enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong.
purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied by petitioner to the use and occupation of the properties.
The means employed in invoking the active participation of the
its client at the CSEZ.
private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, In the legal sense, a charity may be fully de ined as a gift, to be
In relation to the regulatory purpose of the imposed fees, is reasonably and directly related. Also, the means employed to applied consistently with existing laws, for the bene it of an
Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City stated that provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs are reasonably inde inite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and
the imposition questioned must relate to an occupation or activity related to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering hearts under the in luence of education or religion, by assisting them
that so engages the public interest in health, morals, safety and that as a form of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of
development as to require regulation for the protection and the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments as government. It may be applied to almost anything that tend to
promotion of such public interest; the imposition must also bear a allowable tax deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442. promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. It embraces the
reasonable relation to the probable expenses of regulation, taking into Otherwise stated, the discount reduces taxable income upon which improvement and promotion of the happiness of man. The word
account not only the costs of direct regulation but also its incidental the tax liability of the establishments is computed. “charitable” is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. The test of
consequences as well. a charity and a charitable organization are in law the same. The test
whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to
In the case at bar, there can be no doubt that the oil industry is greatly
carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or
imbued with public interest as it vitally affects the general welfare. 3. Taxation
whether it is maintained for gain, pro it, or private advantage.
Drugstore Association of the Phils v National Council on Disability a. Elements for valid exercise As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its
character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it
Affairs
Art. VI, Section 28. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or
Here, the CA upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory twenty equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. con ined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government,
so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the property taxes. might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money government.
inures to the private bene it of the persons managing or operating the a.1 When exercised by legislature The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power
institution.
to destroy" cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or
Even as we ind that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, a.2 When exercised by LGU creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
anent the second issue, that those portions of its real property
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always
that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real Basco v PAGCOR
subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since
property taxes as these are not actually, directly and
Challenged herein is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1869, or the PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or
exclusively used for charitable purposes.
PAGCOR Charter. revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local
from tax are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be
liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and “regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local
exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law." autonomy.
to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption from tax payments Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of
must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption Art. X, Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
be mistaken. clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
The tax exemption under this Sec 28(3) Art VI covers property taxes Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
only. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 following reasons: with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to among the different local government units their powers,
prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has
no inherent right to impose taxes. The "power to tax" responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the quali ications,
(a) it is a charitable institution; and therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
(b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and superior having been passed upon by the state itself which and duties of local of icials, and all other matters relating to the
EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. has the "inherent power to tax." organization and operation of the local units.
“Exclusive” is de ined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of (b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by
others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and “exclusively” Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create
is de ined, “in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges
exclusively.” If real property is used for one or more commercial Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
subject to taxation. Solely is synonymous with exclusively. charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
gambling, has long been revoked.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for (d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of
charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned b. Tax exemptions
application of the property itself to the purposes for which the or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869.
charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Art. XIV, Sec. 4 [3]. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-pro it
from the real property that is determinative of whether the Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
property is used for tax-exempt purposes. Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers. educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon
Thus, the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such
those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by
exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an law.
occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and
patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively process, the Commissioner ignored all of its protests and
The second to the sixth requirements refer to the party's "inviolable
submissions to contest the de iciency tax assessments. The
owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the rights applicable at the deliberative stage." The decision-maker
Commissioner issued identical Preliminary Assessment Notice,
limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and must consider the totality of the evidence presented as he or she
Final Assessment Notices, and Collection Letters without
provisions for reinvestment. decides the case.
considering Avon's submissions or its partial payment of the
assessments. Avon asserts that it was not accorded a real opportunity The last requirement relating to the form and substance of the
Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, to be heard, making all of the assessments null and void. decision is the decision-maker's '"duty to give reason' to enable the
donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been
Avon's arguments are well-taken.
educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and
The Commissioner exercises administrative adjudicatory power or criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by
Art. VI, Sec. 28 [3]; [4]. Charitable institutions, churches and quasi-judicial function in adjudicating the rights and liabilities of the decision-maker."
personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-pro it persons under the Tax Code. In carrying out quasi-judicial functions,
The Ang Tibay safeguards were subsequently "simpli ied into four
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, the Commissioner is required to "investigate facts or ascertain the
basic rights," as follows:
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their of icial action and exercise (a) The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
of discretion in a judicial nature." Tax investigation and assessment institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal
necessarily demand the observance of due process because they right;
No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
affect the proprietary rights of speci ic persons. (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
concurrence of a majority of ALL the Members of the Congress. rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in
Ang Tibay v CIR enumerated the fundamental requirements of due
his favor;
c. Remedies process that must be respected in administrative proceedings:
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable
(1) The party interested or affected must be able to present his assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
⭐CIR v Avon Products Manufacturing 2018 Leonen Division case
or her own case and submit evidence in support of it. jurisdiction; and
Tax assessments issued in violation of the due process rights of a (2) The administrative tribunal or body must consider the (d) a inding or decision by that tribunal supported by
taxpayer are null and void. While the government has an interest in evidence presented. substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least
the swift collection of taxes, the BIR and its of icers and agents (3) There must be evidence supporting the tribunal's decision. ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.
cannot be overreaching in their efforts, but must perform their duties (4) The evidence must be substantial or "such relevant evidence
Saunar v. Ermita expounded on Ang Tibay by emphasizing that
in accordance with law, with their own rules of procedure, and as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
while administrative bodies enjoy a certain procedural leniency, they
always with regard to the basic tenets of due process. conclusion."
are nevertheless obligated to inform themselves of all facts material
(5) The administrative tribunal's decision must be rendered on
The 1997 NIRC, or the Tax Code, and revenue regulations allow a and relevant to the case, and to render a decision based on an
the evidence presented, or at least contained in the record
taxpayer to ile a reply or otherwise to submit comments or accurate appreciation of facts. In this regard, this Court held that Ang
and disclosed to the parties affected.
arguments with supporting documents at each stage in the Tibay did not necessarily do away with the conduct of hearing and a
(6) The administrative tribunal's decision must be based on the
assessment process. Due process requires the BIR to consider the party may invoke its right to a hearing to thresh out substantial
deciding authority's own independent consideration of the
defenses and evidence submitted by the taxpayer and to render a factual issues.
law and facts governing the case.
decision based on these submissions. Failure to adhere to these (7) The administrative tribunal's decision is rendered in a Section 228 of the Tax Code, as implemented by Revenue
requirements constitutes a denial of due process and taints the manner that the parties may know the various issues Regulations No. 12-99, provides certain procedures to ensure that the
administrative proceedings with invalidity. involved and the reasons for the decision. right of the taxpayer to procedural due process is observed in tax
Avon asserts that the de iciency tax assessments are void because assessments.
Mendoza v. Comelec explained that the irst requirement is the
they were made without due process and were not based on actual party's substantive right at the hearing stage of the proceedings, Under Section 228, it is explicitly required that the taxpayer be
facts but on the erroneous presumptions of the Commissioner. which, in essence, is the opportunity to explain one's side or to seek informed in writing of the law and of the facts on which the
Avon claims that from the start up to the end of the administrative a reconsideration of the adverse action or ruling. assessment is made; otherwise, the assessment shall be void.
Section 3.1.2 of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 requires the
Preliminary Assessment Notice to show in detail the facts and law, Recap on Inherent Powers of the State
The injunctive relief is not available as a remedy to assail the
rules and regulations, or jurisprudence on which the proposed
collection of a tax
assessment is based. Further, Section 3.1.4 requires that the Final Inherent and do not need to be expressly conferred by constitutional
Letter of Demand must state the facts and law on which it is based; The more substantial reason that should have impelled the RTC to
provisions.
otherwise, the Final Letter of Demand and Final Assessment Notices desist from taking cognizance of the respondent's petition for
themselves shall be void. Finally, Section 3.1.6 speci ically requires declaratory relief except to dismiss the petition was its lack of
Deemed invested in a State the moment it comes into being.
that the decision of the Commissioner or of his or her duly jurisdiction.
authorized representative on a disputed assessment shall state the
We start by reminding the respondent about the in lexible policy that Brie ly
facts and law, rules and regulations, or jurisprudence on which the
taxes, being the lifeblood of the Government, should be collected (1) Police Power regulates liberty and property for the promotion
decision is based. Failure to do so would invalidate the Final
promptly and without hindrance or delay.
Decision on Disputed Assessment. of the general welfare.
Action for declaratory relief was procedurally improper as a (2) Eminent Domain enables the State to forcibly acquire
The use of the word 'shall' in Section 228 and in RR No. 12-99
remedy
indicates that the requirement of informing the taxpayer of the property, upon payment of just compensation, for some
legal and factual bases of the assessment and the decision The third requisite of declaratory relief was not met due to the intended public use.
made against him is mandatory. This is an essential requirement subject of the action (i.e. statute) having been infringed or (3) Taxation is the ability to demand from the members of society
of due process and applies to the Preliminary Assessment Notice, transgressed prior to the institution of the action. We observe in this
their proportionate share or contribution in the maintenance of
Final Letter of Demand with the Final Assessment Notices, and the regard that the RTC seemed to believe that the tax assessments issued
had merely created a liability against the respondent as the taxpayer, the government.
Final Decision on Disputed Assessment.
and that its suit for declaratory relief was but consistent with Similarities
The facts demonstrate that Avon was deprived of due process. It was protesting the assessments. The RTC's belief was absolutely devoid
not fully apprised of the legal and factual bases of the assessments of legal foundation, however, simply because internal revenue taxes, (1) Inherent in the State and may be exercised without express
issued against it. The Details of Discrepancy attached to the being self-assessing, required no further assessment to give rise to constitutional grant.
Preliminary Assessment Notice, as well as the Formal Letter of the liability of the taxpayer.
Demand with the Final Assessment Notices, did not even comment (2) Not only necessary but indispensable. The State cannot
or address the defenses and documents submitted by Avon. Thus, Inasmuch as the cause of action for the payment of the DSTs pursuant continue or be effective unless it is able to exercise them.
Avon was left unaware on how the Commissioner or her authorized to Section 108 and Section 184 of the NIRC accrued upon the (3) Methods by which the State interferes with private rights.
representatives appreciated the explanations or defenses raised in respondent's failure to pay the DST at least for taxable year 2011
(4) Presuppose an equivalent compensation for the private rights
connection with the assessments. There was clear inaction of the despite notice and demand, the RTC could not procedurally take
cognizance of the action for declaratory relief. interfered with.
Commissioner at every stage of the proceedings.
(5) Exercised primarily by the legislature.
The Commissioner's total disregard of due process rendered the Lastly, the respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA
identical Preliminary Assessment Notice, Final Assessment Notices, for the DST de iciency for taxable year 2011 was not the action for
Limitation
and Collection Letter null and void, and of no force and effect. declaratory relief but an appeal taken in due course to the Court of
Tax Appeals. Instead of appealing in due course to the CTA, however,
This Court has, in several cases, declared void any assessment that Subject at all times to the limitations and requirements of the
it resorted to the RTC to seek and obtain declaratory relief. By
failed to strictly comply with the due process requirements set forth choosing the wrong remedy, the respondent lost its proper and true Constitution and may in proper cases be annulled by the courts of
in Section 228 of the Tax Code and Revenue Regulation No. 12-99. recourse. Worse, the choice of the wrong remedy rendered the justice.
assessment for the DST de iciency for taxable year 2011 inal as a
CIR v Standard Insurance consequence. As such, the petition for declaratory relief, assuming its Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation
propriety as a remedy for the respondent, became mooted by the
At issue is the authority of the RTC to enjoin the enforcement or inality of the assessment.
implementation of Section 108 and Section 184 of the 1997 NIRC Regulates Both liberty Only property rights
through an original action for declaratory relief. and property
Human Rights. The Supreme Court saw no con lict and decreed Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be
Exercised by Government Government and Government
that “the treaty is always subject to quali ication or amendment diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will
private entities by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
the scope of the police power of the State.” invalidated. (Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD)
Property taken Destroyed Intended for public use or
★ It must be noted though that, in Bayan Muna v Romulo, the Exercise
because it is purpose and is therefore
Supreme Court distinguished a treaty and an executive
noxious wholesome ➔ Lodged primarily in the national legislature.
agreement as follows: “a treaty has greater “dignity” than an
executive agreement, because its constitutional ef icacy is ➔ By virtue of valid delegation, may be exercised by:
Compensation Intangible A full and fair equivalent of the beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the
◆ The President;
altruistic property expropriated or President, the Senate, and the people; a rati ied treaty, unlike an
feeling that he protection and public executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory ◆ Administrative boards;
has improvements for the taxes paid enactment.
◆ Lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
contributed to ★ In Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v Commissioner of barangay.
the general Internal Revenue, citing Tanada v Angara, SC pronounced that
➔ Quasi-legislative power - authority delegated by the lawmaking
a “state that has contracted valid international obligations is
welfare body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
bound to make in its legislations those modi ications that may
intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement
be necessary to ensure the ful illment of the obligations
legislative policy.
1. Police Power undertaken.”
➔ Municipal governments exercise quasi-legislative powers under the
➔ Is dynamic, not static, and must move with the moving society it is
➔ Power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating general welfare clause, Sec 16, Local Government Code.
supposed to regulate.
the use of liberty and property.
➔ No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police
➔ May sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the
➔ In a positive sense, it is the power to prescribe regulations to power. Its exercise is upon the discretion of the legislature.
attainment of a legitimate police objective.
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
➔ The question of validity of legislation as determined by the
and general welfare of the people. ★ In Lutz v Araneta, the SC sustained as a legitimate exercise of
criterion of their conformity to the Constitution is justiciable.
the police power the imposition of a special tax on sugar
In negative terms, it is that inherent and plenary power in the State
producers for the purpose of creating a special fund to be used Rational Relationship/Basis and Strict Scrutiny Tests
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
for the rehabilitation of the sugar industry.
and welfare of society. (Agustin v Edu, G.R. No. L-49112) (1) Rational Relationship/Basis Test
★ In Gerochi v DOE, the Universal Charge was considered as an
➔ The most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, (a) Applied mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges;
exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power, imposed to
extending as it does “to all the great public needs.”
ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry. (b) Laws and ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a
➔ It operates from the womb to the tomb, protecting the person even legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate
➔ Power of eminent domain could also be used as an implement.
before he is born and prescribing structures and requirements as to review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the
the disposition of his body, and his estate, ifa any, when he dies. ➔ When the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
➔ May not be bargained away through the medium of contract or (c) Two requisites must concur:
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
even a treaty. The impairment clause must yield to the police
yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the (i) The interests of the public generally, as
power whenever the contract deals with a subject affecting the
common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of distinguished from those of a particular class, require
public welfare.
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the its exercise; and
★ In Inchong v Hernandez, the enforcement of the Retail Trade questioned provision is invalidated. When the conditions so (ii) The means employed are reasonably necessary for
Nationalization Law was enjoined as it was alleged to be demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
inconsistent with the treaty of amity between the Philippines bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, oppressive upon individuals.
and China, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
(2) Strict Scrutiny Test stations to give free airtime to respondent for broadcasting ★ In City Government of QC v Ericta, in invalidating an ordinance,
information regarding the candidates in the 1998 elections was the SC said “there is no reasonable relation between the setting
(a) Focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
validated. According to Justice Mendoza, “Radio and television aside of at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries for
substantial, government interest and on the absence of less
broadcasting companies which are given franchises, do not own the charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
restrictive means for achieving that interest.
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of
Lawful Subject signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without just
of using them. The exercise of the privilege may reasonably be compensation.”
Subject of the measure is within the scope of police power, i.e. the
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
activity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. ★ In OSG v Ayala Land, Inc., the SC rejected petitioner’s contention
public service.”
that malls, inasmuch as they are required by the National
★ In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v Board of Transportation,
★ In Social Justice Society v Atienza, a zoning ordinance of the City of Building Code to provide parking spaces for their customers,
an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six
Manila reclassifying “certain areas of the city from industrial to should provide such for free.
years old was held a valid police measure to protect the riding
commercial” was upheld by the SC citing its implementation for the
public and promote their comfort and convenience. ➔ The SC has invariably applied certain standards for judicial review:
protection and bene it of the residents.
★ In Velasco v Villegas, an ordinance prohibiting barber shop
Private matters in which the public interest is not at all involved are Laws dealing with the freedom of the mind
operators from rendering massage services in a separate room was Strict scrutiny
beyond the scope of police power. or restricting the political process.
likewise sustained, to prevent immorality and enable the
authorities to properly assess license fees. ★ In Ople v Torres, an administrative order establishing the National
Computerized Identi ication Reference System for the expressed Rational basis
★ In Bautista v Junio, to conserve energy, prohibition of heavy and Review of economic legislation
purpose of facilitating transactions with the government, standard
extra-heavy vehicles from using public streets on weekends and
particularly those providing basic services and social security
legal holidays was sustained.
bene its was struck down as an invasion of people’s privacy. Heightened or Evaluating classi ications based on gender
★ In Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board, the creation of the VRB was immediate scrutiny and legitimacy
★ However, in Kilusang Mayo Uno v Director General, NEDA, the
sustained “to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
Court upheld EO 420 prescribing for all government agencies and
particularly because of the rampant ilm piracy, the lagrant Overbreadth A statute needlessly restrains even
GOCCs a “uniform data collection and format for their existing ID
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
systems” for their respective employees. doctrine constitutionally guaranteed rights
pornographic video tapes.”
Lawful Means
★ In the landmark case of Lozano v Martinez, the SC upheld the Void-for-vagueness A penal statute encroaches upon the freedom
validity of BP 22 as it preserves the integrity of the banking ➔ Both ends and means must be legitimate. Otherwise, the police doctrine of speech.
system by preventing worthless checks from looding the system. measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights.
★ In Department of Education v San Diego, a regulation disqualifying
➔ In ine, the means employed for the accomplishment of the police
any person who has failed the NMAT three times from taking it ➔ There should be reasonable relation between the means and
objective must pass the test of reasonableness and, speci ically,
again was reinstated by the SC as the measure was intended to the end.
conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill of Rights for the
protect the patients.
★ In Ynot v IAC, an EO prohibiting the transport of carabaos and protection of private rights.
★ In Sangalang v IAC, the SC sustained the opening of two erstwhile carabeef across provincial boundaries without government
private roads due to the demands of the common good, namely, clearance, was invalidated as the purpose of indiscriminate
traf ic decongestion and public convenience. slaughter was not satisfactorily met by the means employed. 2. Eminent Domain
★ In Del Rosario v Bengzon, the Generics Act was sustained to ★ A law limiting the capacity of common carriers, or of theaters De inition, Nature and Function
“promote and require the use of generic drug products that are as in the case of People v Chan, is valid as this would be a
Also called the power of expropriation, it is described as “the highest
therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name counterparts.” reasonable method for promoting the comfort, convenience and
and most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may
safety of the customers.
★ In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines be acquired for some public purpose through a method “in the nature of
v COMELEC, Sec 92 of BP Blg 881 requiring radio and television a compulsory sale to the State.”
Sec 9 Art III of the Constitution, providing that “private property shall Stages of Expropriation Proceedings ➔ May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material
not be taken for public use without just compensation”, serves as a impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the
1) Determination of the validity of the expropriation;
limitation, not a grant, of such power. It should be strictly interpreted ordinary uses for which the property was intended.
against the expropriator and liberally in favor of the property owner. - Necessity of an expropriation is a justiciable question.
★ In Ayala de Roxas v City of Manila, the imposition of an
When exercised by local government unit or other delegates 2) Determination of just compensation. easement over a 3-meter strip of the plaintiff’s property could
not be legally done without payment to it of just compensation.
1. Who may exercise? ➔ Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain,
2. Congress; the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, leaving ★ In People v Fajardo, a municipal ordinance prohibiting
3. The President of the Philippines; the courts to settle only the second stage. construction of any building that would destroy the view of the
4. Various local legislative bodies; plaza from the highway was considered a taking under the
➔ Only when just compensation has not been given or the amount
5. Certain public corporations, like the NHA and water districts; power of eminent domain.
thereof not agreed upon may the remedy of prohibition
6. Quasi-public corporations like the Philippine National
become available. ★ The right-of-way easement, resulting in the restriction or
Railways, PLDT, Meralco.
limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
➔ A court’s determination of just compensation may be set aside
Essential requisites for the exercise by an LGU transmission lines is also an exercise of expropriation, as in
if tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
NPC v Aguirre-Paderanga.
1) Enactment of an ordinance, not just a resolution;
Private Property
★ In NPC v Ileto, the prohibition imposed by the transmission
2) Must be for a public use, purpose or welfare, or for the bene it
➔ Anything that can come under the dominion of man, including: (1) lines, i.e. construction of any improvements or planting of any
of the poor and the landless;
real and personal, (2) tangible and intangible properties. trees that exceed 3 meters within the aerial right of way, clearly
3) Payment of just compensation; and Exceptions: money and choses in action. interferes with the landowners’ right to possess and enjoy their
properties.
4) Exercise must be preceded by a valid and de inite offer made ◆ Choses in action - The right to bring a lawsuit to recover
to the owner, who rejects the same. chattels, money, or a debt. ➔ Not every taking is compensable, as it may be justi ied under
the police power.
Conditions precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession ➔ Property already devoted to public use is still subject to
expropriation, provided this is done (1) directly by the ◆ Thus, losses sustained are in the nature of damnum absque
1) Complaint for expropriation suf icient in form and substance is
legislature, or (2) under a speci ic grant of authority to the injuria. The only recompense available to the affected owners
iled in the proper court; and
delegate. is the altruistic feeling that they somehow contributed to the
2) Deposit with said court at least 15% of the property’s fair greater good.
★ In NHA v DARAB, land, whether tenanted or not, acquired by
market value based on its current tax declaration.
the NHA for its housing and resettlement programs are exempt ◆ This rule is only valid as long as the prejudice suffered by an
Necessity of Exercise from land reform under PD 1472. individual is shared in common with the rest as was illustrated
in Richards v Washington Terminal. In that case, most of the
➔ Essentially political in nature when exercised by the legislature. ➔ Services are considered embraced in the concept of property.
smoke from an exhaust fan blew directly into the house of the
➔ In cases of delegated authority, the judiciary has assumed the power ★ In Republic v PLDT, the SC upheld the right of the Bureau of petitioner, and was thus duly awarded with just compensation.
to inquire whether the authority conferred has been correctly or Telecommunications to demand the interconnection between
➔ Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution,
properly exercised. This involves looking into the necessity of the the Government Telephone System and PLDT, so that the
or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
expropriation. former could make use of the lines and facilities of PLDT.
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
★ In Republic v La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, the ★ Similarly, in PLDT v NTC, the petitioner was required to lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the
order of the President of the Philippines to expropriate a interconnect with a private telecommunications company. owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material
portion of the property of the defendant for the extension of whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner,
➔ Must be wholesome, as it is intended for public use.
now Recto St. was dismissed, with the Court declaring that or in any respect changes hands.
courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the right of Taking
Requisites of Taking in Eminent Domain (according to Republic v
eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a
Castellvi)
genuine necessity therefor.
1) The expropriator must enter a private property; Just compensation ◆ Actual or potential uses;
2) The entry must be for more than a momentary period; ➔ Full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private ◆ In case of land, their size, shape or location and the tax
owner by the expropriator. declarations thereon.
3) The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
➔ Must be fair not only to the owner, but also to the expropriator. Damages and interest as part of just compensation
4) The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; ➔ According to Knecht v CA, owner refers to all those who have ➔ Consequential Damages consist of injuries directly caused on the
lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a residue of the private property taken through expropriation.
5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
mortgagee, a lessee, and a vendee in possession under an executory
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of bene icial ★ In Republic v BPI, SC clari ied that no actual taking of the
contract.
enjoyment of the property. building is necessary to grant consequential damages.
★ However, in LBP v AMS Farming Corporation, SC rejected
➔ Mere notice of the intention to expropriate a particular property ★ In Heirs of Banaag v AMS Farming Corporation, it was stressed
respondent’s claim for just compensation as it was a mere
does not bind its owner and inhibit him from disposing or that just compensation for the crops and improvements is
lessee. The Court ruled that it had no right under the CARL
otherwise dealing with it. inseparable from the valuation of the raw lands as the former
to demand from LBP just compensation for the
are part and parcel of the latter. These must be awarded to the
➔ An Ordinance authorizing expropriation will not suf ice. improvements it had introduced to the leased land. Its
landowner irrespective of the nature of ownership of said
rights are conferred by the provisions of the MOA it
➔ The expropriator can only enter said property after expropriation crops.
executed with TOTCO in relation to the Civil Code. (Thus,
proceedings are actually commenced and the deposit required by
AMS may demand from TOTCO, and not from LBP.) ➔ Marcos promulgated decrees providing that the just compensation
law is duly made.
should be either the sworn valuation made by the owner or the
How determined
➔ The owner does not need to ile the usual claim for recovery of just of icial assessment thereof, whichever is lower, which was
compensation with the COA if the government takes over the ➔ To ascertain just compensation, the court should determine irst the applied in NHA v Reyes.
property and devotes it to public use without bene it of actual or basic value of the property.
★ In EPZA v Dulay, these decrees were invalidated and the Reyes
expropriation, as was held in the case of Amigable v Cuenca.
case reversed.
If Consequential Damages > Consequential Bene its
Public use
J .C. = Actual V alue + (Damages − B enef its )
Export Processing Zone Authority v Dulay
➔ Any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right
149 SCRA 305 (1987)
and not merely of forbearance or accommodation. Otherwise: J ust Compensation = Actual V alue
➔ There will also be public use involved even if the expropriated As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to
property is not actually acquired by the government but is merely appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. xxxx
➔ The basic or market value of the property is the price that may be
devoted to public services administered by privately-owned public It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to
agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled to enter into a
utilities such as telephone or light companies. prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And
contract of sale.
➔ Important thing is that any member of the general public can it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow
➔ Just compensation “simply means the property’s fair market value
demand, for free or for a fee, the right to use the converted property the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely
at the time of the iling of the complaint, or that sum of money
for his direct and personal convenience. prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
which a person desirous but not compelled to but, and an owner
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
➔ Broadened to include those that will redound to the indirect willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as price to be
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
advantage or bene it of the public. given and received therefor.”
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been
➔ Compliant to the public use requirement: ➔ Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market judiciously evaluated.
value:
◆ Agrarian reform;
◆ Cost of acquisition; ➔ Thus, the determination of just compensation is a judicial
◆ Slum clearance and urban development;
◆ Current value of like properties at the time of taking; function. Any determination by an administrative body, is at best,
◆ Urban land reform and housing, or socialized housing program preliminary.
➔ CARL vests in RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts (SACs), ➔ Amount to be Deposited:
APO Fruits Corporation v Land Bank of the Philippines
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
G.R. No. 164195, 12 Oct 2010, 607 SCRA 200 ◆ Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court: Upon iling of the
determination of just compensation.
expropriation case, the expropriator is required to deposit an
➔ Just compensation must be paid in money. This was not followed in To be just, the compensation must not only be the correct amount to amount which is equivalent to the full assessed value of the
the CARP cases, where the SC adopted a more pragmatic stance be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time from the time property as appearing in the tax declaration in order for the
noting the enormity of the amount needed vis-a-vis the inancial the land is taken from the owner.If not, the State must pay the court to issue a writ of possession allowing the expropriator to
capacity of the expropriator. Thus, modes of compensation under landowner interest, by way of damages, from the time the property take actual possession of the property during the pendency of
Sec 18 of RA 6657 (CARP Law) were validated as its invalidation was taken until just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed the case.
would verily mean the death of the entire law. a part of just compensation, has been established by prevailing
jurisprudence to be 12% per annum. ◆ If the expropriator is an LGU, the amount to be deposited is
➔ The property taken should be assessed during the time of the taking only 15% of the assessed value of the property.
which usually coincides with the commencement of the Note: By virtue of BSP Circular No 799 Series of 2013, rate of interest
is pegged at 6% per annum, as of July 1, 2013. ◆ In RA 8974, if the purpose of the expropriation is to
expropriation proceedings.
implement a national government infrastructure project, what
➔ Where entry preceded the iling of the complaint for expropriation, needs to be done is not a deposit but payment of BIR Zonal
the assessment should be made at the time of the entry. ➔ Neither laches nor prescription may bar a claim for just valuation of the property. This amount deposited or paid is
compensation for property taken for public use. NOT the just compensation.
◆ As a general rule, Rule 67 Sec 4 provides that just
compensation is computed at the time of taking of the ➔ Title to the property shall not be transferred until after actual ★ In NPC v Pobre, the expropriator is not allowed to unilaterally
property or at the time the complaint is iled, whichever payment of just compensation. withdraw because damages may have already been caused to
comes irst. the property.
★ In Republic v Castellvi, property was deemed taken only when Republic v Lim ➔ Every expropriation case has this built-in condition that the
expropriation proceedings were commenced in 1959, not as of 462 SCRA 265 property should be devoted for the very same purpose for which it
the time of commencement of the lease in 1947. Thus, just was expropriated as stated in the complaint. Such that: if the
compensation was ascertained in 1959. In cases where the government failed to pay the compensation within property was not utilized in the said purpose, then recovery may be
ive years from the inality of the judgment in the expropriation allowed with or without the express condition. The State shall have
★ In City of Cebu v Dedamo, the iling of the complaint preceded proceedings, the owner concerned shall have the right to recover to institute a separate expropriation case for that new purpose.
the taking of the property but SC said that the valuation should possession of their property. xxxx
be computed at the time of taking not necessarily at the time of Allied provisions
the iling of complaint which was done earlier the reason for In Coscolluela v CA, we de ined just compensation as not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner Distinguished from police power
that is there is a provision under section 19 of RA 7160 LGC
which provides in essence that the valuation taken by the local but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time.
xxxx Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of the DSWD
government unit should be reckoned as of the date of actual
G.R. No. 175356, 3 Dec 2013, 711 SCRA 302
possession. Rental
➔ Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, Remedy of Dispossessed Owner In the exercise of police power, xxxx examples of these regulations
the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the iling are (1) property condemned for being noxious or intended for
of the complaint. ➔ If a landowner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to be
the government for public use, he waives his right to the institution demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in
➔ Value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by of a formal expropriation proceeding. the interest of public morals) as well as (2) zoning ordinances
the government are the criteria for determining just prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the health,
compensation. ➔ Owner’s failure to question for a long period of time the
government’s failure to institute expropriation proceedings morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory
➔ The owner is entitled to payment of interest from the time of constitutes a waiver of his right to regain possession of his into residential and industrial areas).
the taking until just compensation is actually paid to him. property. His only remedy is an action for payment of just On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
compensation and may not sue for ejectment. xxxx, examples include the (1) acquisition of lands for the
and not a charge on property, and is therefore not an imposition in order to encourage investments and thereby promote the
construction of public highways as well as (2) agricultural lands
from which petitioner is exempt. country’s economic growth.
acquired by the government under the agrarian reform law for
redistribution to quali ied farmer bene iciaries. However, it is a Attributes e) Protectionism – in some important sectors of the economy,
settled rule that the acquisition of title or total destruction of the taxes sometimes provide protection to local industries like
➔ Enforced Contribution (will not depend on the will of the person)
property is not essential for “taking” under the power of eminent protective tariff and customs duties.
domain to be present. Examples of these include (3) establishment of ➔ Personal Contribution ( base on one’s ability to pay ( the bigger
Characteristics
easements such as where the landowner is perpetually deprived of your income, the bigger your income tax)
his proprietary rights because of the hazards posed by electric 1) Inherent – the power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be
➔ It is a pecuniary burden payable in money, but such a tax is not
transmission lines constructed above his property (NPC v Gutierrez, availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions.
necessarily con ined to those payable in money.
271 Phil. 1 (1991)) or the (4) compelled interconnection of the
2) Legislative – taxing power is peculiarly and exclusively legislative
telephone system between the government and a private company. ➔ Imposed on persons and property
in character and remains undiminished in the legislative in
(Republic v. PLDT, 136 Phil. 20 (1969)) In these cases, although the
➔ Imposed by the State (exercising jurisdiction over the person in a character.
private property owner is not divested of ownership or possession,
state)
payment of just compensation is warranted because of the burden 3) Constitutionally limited – the power to tax is an attribute of
placed on the property for the use or bene it of the public. ➔ Normally exercised by the Lawmaking body of the State concerned sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of the government.
The Constitution sets forth such limits.
➔ It is levied for public purpose as taxation itself involves a burden to
provide revenue for public purposes of a general nature. Scope
3. Taxation
Purposes ➔ Reaches even the citizens abroad and his income derived therefrom.
➔ Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from persons
and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the 1) Revenue – The purpose of taxation is to provide funds or property ➔ All income earned within the territorial jurisdiction within the State
support of government and for all public needs. with which the State promotes the general welfare and protection of is taxable.
its citizens. Raising the revenues is the principal object of taxation.
➔ Obligation to pay taxes is not based on contract. ➔ Shares of stock issued by a foreign corporation but “in action” in the
2) Non-Revenue local State.
➔ Except only in the case of poll taxes (Sec 20 Art III Constitution),
nonpayment of a tax may be the subject of criminal prosecution and a) Regulation – Taxes may also be imposed for a regulatory ➔ Proceeds from an insurance policy issued abroad.
punishment. purpose as for example, in the promotion, rehabilitation, and
Two opposing views, but equally correct
stabilization of industry which is affected with public interest.
➔ Taxes are the nation’s lifeblood through which government agencies
continue to operate and with which the State discharges its b) Promotion of General Welfare – If objectives and methods Taxation as including the Taxation as not including the
functions for the welfare of its constituents. are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state power to destroy power to destroy
may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and
➔ Taxes = levied to raise revenues; Licenses = imposed for
attainment. Taxation may be made to implement the state’s Proferred by Chief Justice John Refuted later by Justice Holmes
regulatory purpose.
police power. Marshall of the US SC
➔ Imposition of a vehicle registration fee is not an exercise of police
c) Reduction of Social Inequality – made possible through If taxation is used as implement If taxation is used solely for
power, but of taxation, as its main purpose is to raise funds for the
progressive system of taxation where the objective is to prevent of police power raising revenues
construction and maintenance of highways.
the undue concentration of wealth in the hands of few
➔ On the other hand, the Universal Charge is not a tax as its primary individuals (that is why, the bigger income of the person, the Exercise
purpose is to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power bigger the income tax).
industry. ➔ Inherent in the State, primarily vested in the Legislature.
d) Promote Economic Growth – in the realm of tax exemptions
★ In Angeles University Foundation v City of Angeles, SC held that ➔ May be delegated to the President pursuant to Sec 28(2) Art VI of
and tax reliefs, the purpose of taxation (the power to tax being
the payment of building permit fee is a regulatory imposition, the Constitution.
the power also not to tax) is to grant incentives or exemptions
◆ SECTION 28. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to ix within speci ied limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, ➔ Not constitutionally prohibited. ➔ Sec 4(3) Art XIV. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-pro it
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively
➔ Occurs when additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
same taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period and for the
national development program of the Government. xxxx
same purpose.
➔ Pursuant to direct authority conferred by Sec 5 Art X of the ➔ Sec 4(4) Art XIV. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all
◆ e.g. a person’s properties are taxed individually, then
Constitution, local legislative bodies may also exercise the power of grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually,
collectively.
taxation. directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
★ In Punzalan v Municipal Board of Manila, the additional tax of from tax.
➔ General rule: there must be a law granting for an LGU to lawfully
P25.00 on professionals practicing in Manila on top of the
impose a tax. Not applicable where what is involved is the ➔ Statutory exemptions are granted at the discretion of the legislature.
P50.00 imposed under the Revised Internal Revenue Code did
regulatory power of the LGU which is expressly accompanied by the However, as provided in Sec 28(4) Art VI, no law granting any tax
not amount to double taxation as these were imposed by two
taxing power. exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority
distinct jurisdictions, the LGU and national government
of all the Members of the Congress.
Due Process and Taxation respectively.
➔ Where a tax exemption was granted gratuitously, the same may be
➔ Taxes should not be con iscatory, except when they are intended as ➔ Despite the lack of prohibition, it will not be allowed if it violates
validly revoked at will, with or without cause.
an implement of police power. the equal protection clause. (Sec 1 Art III)
➔ If the exemption is granted for valuable consideration, it is deemed
➔ Due process does not require previous notice and hearing before a Public Purpose
to partake of a contract and obligation thereof is protected against
law prescribing ixed or speci ic taxes on certain articles may be
➔ Revenues received from the imposition of taxes or levies cannot be impairment. Sec 10 Art III.
enacted.
used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive bene it of
★ In Casanova v Hord, the Spanish Government, in exchange for
➔ Where the tax to be collected is based on the value of the taxable private persons.
certain obligations assumed by the plaintiff, decreed to him
property, the taxpayer is entitled to be noti ied of the assessment
★ In Planters Products Inc v Fertiphil Corporation, the Court certain mines in accordance with a Royal Decree, which inter
proceedings and to be heard therein on the correct valuation.
declared that a tax levy on the sale of fertilizers for purposes of alia imposed a number of taxes.
Equal Protection and Taxation bene iting a private corporation, Philippine Planters Inc., is
★ In PAGCOR v BIR, SC rejected petitioner’s assertion that the
invalid. It may not be justi ied even as a valid exercise of police
➔ Sec 28(1) Art VI, the rule of taxation shall be uniform and removal of its statutory exemption from the payment of
power.
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of corporate income tax is violative of the equal protection and
taxation. Tax Exemptions non-impairment clauses.
➔ Uniformity does not forfend classi ication as long as: ➔ Construed strongly against the claimant. ➔ Sec 11 Art XII. xxxx Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
1) The standards that are used therefor are substantial and ➔ Sec 28(3) Art VI. Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
not arbitrary; or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-pro it cemeteries,
common good so requires.
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
2) The categorization is germane to achieve the legislative
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes ★ In MERALCO v Province of Laguna, the Court held that a
purpose;
shall be exempt from taxation. franchise partakes the nature of a grant, which is beyond the
3) The law applies, all things being equal, to both present purview of the non-impairment clause.
★ However, in Lladoc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a
and future conditions; and
donation of P10K for the construction of a church was subject Other Constitutional Limitations
4) The classi ication applies equally well to all those to donee’s tax as it was not an ad valorem tax on the church but
➔ Sec 29 Art VI.
belonging to the same class. an excise tax imposed on the priest for the exercise of the
privilege to accept the donation. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
➔ Equitable taxation connotes that taxes should be apportioned
of an appropriation made by law.
among the people according to their capacity to pay. ★ In Lung Center of the Philippines v Quezon City, those portions
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied,
leased to private properties and individuals are not exempt
Double Taxation paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene it, or
from real property taxes.
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,

minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been ful illed or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government.
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.

Module 2-2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS The grant of license, however, is without prejudice to the inviolability
Procedural due process concerns itself with government action
of the home. The right of the people against unreasonable searches
adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into
and seizures remains paramount, and the government, in the guise of
the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to
I. Constitutional Rights and Privileges regulation, cannot conduct inspections of applicants for irearm
the level of formality of a hearing.
licenses unless armed with a search warrant.
Art. III, 1987 Constitution 🔗 If due process were con ined solely to its procedural aspects, there
This Court resolves the consolidated Petitions assailing the
would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action,
constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 10591, or the
a. Nature of provisions provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due
Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, and their
process completes the protection envisioned by the due process
corresponding provisions in the 2013 IRR.
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS clause. It inquires whether the government has suf icient justi ication
With the bearing of arms being a mere privilege granted by the State, for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of there could not have been a deprivation of petitioners' right to due
Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under process in requiring a license for the possession of irearms. Article Palacios v People 2019 Division
custodial investigation, the rights of an accused, and the privilege III, Section 1 of the Constitution is clear that only life, liberty, or
against self-incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is property is protected by the due process clause. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine
unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions whether there is suf icient ground to engender a well-founded belief
In Chavez, the Court held that there is no vested right in the
guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
continued ownership and possession of irearms. Like any other
of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The rationale of
license, the license to possess a irearm is "neither a property nor
provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public preliminary investigation is to "protect the accused from the
a property right." As a mere "permit or privilege to do what
use without just compensation. inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal
otherwise would be unlawful," it does not act as "a contract between
trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been
the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted."
b. Against whom enforceable irst ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the right to possess a of icer." Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court requires the conduct
People v Domasian irearm was considered a property right, it is doctrine that property of a preliminary investigation before the iling of a complaint or
rights are always subject to the State's police power, de ined as the information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private "authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard
individuals, being directed only against the government and its liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." to ine.
law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on of icial action.
In this case, although the OCP-QC conducted a preliminary
White Light v City of Manila investigation relative to the complaint iled by Ramirez against
II. Due Process of Law petitioner, the latter bewails the lack of notice to him of the
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due
proceedings, which resulted in his failure to participate in the
process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property preliminary investigation. He claims that Ramirez committed fraud
Due process evades a precise de inition. The purpose of the guaranty
without due process of law, xxxx. by intentionally giving the wrong address in her Sinumpaang
is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
Reklamong Salaysay instead of his true and correct residence
liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves
a. In general address.
as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even
corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar Due process is comprised of two (2) components – substantive
⭐Acosta v Ochoa 2019 Leonen En Banc as their property is concerned. due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as
ownership or possession of a irearm a property right. Persons property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government,
intending to use a irearm can only either accept or decline the basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural
government's terms for its use. heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. The essence of
due process refers to the procedures that the government must
procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard. "Non-observance of these from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for able to cross-examine them. Lastly, he was able to ile a motion for
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be new trial or reconsideration of the RTC Decision convicting him. A
noti ied of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some party who was given the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and form of illegal restraint. action or ruling complained of cannot claim denial of due process of
to refute the position of the opposing parties." law.
Concomitantly, if a person's liberty is restrained by some legal
The Court found no showing that petitioner had been duly noti ied of process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot In view thereof, petitioner's claim of denial of due process is without
the charges iled against him by Ramirez or served with a subpoena be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court merit.
relative to the preliminary investigation conducted by the OCP-QC. or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not ousted
of this jurisdiction through some irregularity in the course of the b.2. Administrative Proceedings
It was incumbent upon respondent to show that petitioner had been
proceedings.
duly noti ied of the proceedings and that, despite notice, he still
failed to appear or participate thereat. In the absence of such proof, Jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also Ang v Belaro, Jr. 2019 Division
the Court therefore inds that petitioner had not been given an be availed of as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence
Ang seeks the disbarment of Belaro for violating the 2004 Notarial
opportunity to be heard. sentence as to circumstance of a judicial proceeding, any of the
Rules and the CPR.
following exceptional circumstances is attendant:
The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not
The right to be heard is the most basic principle of due process. It
merely formal or technical. As such, to deny petitioner's motion for 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
is a settled rule that there is no denial of due process when a party
reinvestigation on the basis of the provisions of A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC resulting in the restraint of a person;
has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case.
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
There is only denial of due process when there is total absence or
process on purely procedural grounds. Thus, the courts a quo should 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court.
allow petitioner to be accorded the right to submit counter-af idavits sentence as such excess.
and evidence in a preliminary investigation. Respondent Atty. Belaro claims that the IBP violated his right to due
Mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not
process because the case was already submitted for resolution when
enough. The violation of constitutional right must be suf icient to
b. Procedural Aspect it came to his knowledge. He also insists that the IBP's resolution
void the entire proceedings. This, petitioner failed to show.
was solely based on complainant Venson's evidence as the IBP did
Petitioner avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process not act on his motion for reinvestigation.
b.1. Judicial Proceedings
because of lack of notice of the proceedings in the trial court. To
Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in administrative
recall, the RTC submitted the case for decision on April 30, 2009 for
In re Abellana v Paredes 2019 Division proceedings and administrative due process cannot be fully
failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear during the scheduled
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Via a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, Abellana hearing on the same date for initial presentation of the evidence for
prays for his release from prison on the ground that he has been the defense. However, petitioner claims that he was not noti ied of In administrative proceedings, the iling of charges and giving
deprived of his rights to due process and to competent counsel. said hearing. He likewise claims that he was not given the notice reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
setting the promulgation of judgment on July 29, 2009. accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
Abellana was charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
of RA 9165. Even if it were true that petitioner or his counsel were not noti ied of
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
the scheduled hearing, it is still not enough to warrant a inding of
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
denial of due process. For in the application of the principle of due
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. It action or ruling complained of.
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous
secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. Petitioner A thorough examination of the records shows that respondent Atty.
examined and determined by a court of justice and to have it was able to ile several pleadings, including the following: motion to Belaro was accorded ample opportunity to defend himself and
ascertained whether he is held under lawful authority. quash the search warrant, motion for physical re-examination and adduce his own evidence. The IBP duly noti ied him of the
Broadly speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of re-weighing of the alleged shabu con iscated from him, petition for proceedings by sending the notices via registered mail to St. Dominic
illegal con inement or detention by which any person is deprived of bail, and demurrer to evidence. Also, he was represented by counsel Savio College of Law, where he used to teach and was the College
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld when all prosecution witnesses testi ied and his counsel was also Dean. While respondent Atty. Belaro claimed that the notices were
not sent to his registered address of place of business, such bare

Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
assertion deserves scant consideration as he failed to suf iciently
enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for x x x (its) be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission
prove that the service of notices was highly irregular.
government,x x x (this being)" incident to the very object of would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
Upon being informed of the notices, respondent Atty. Belaro iled a incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
Manifestation with Motion or Reinvestigation and a subsequent the college". legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
Answer to Letter-Complaint Requesting for Formal Investigation immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
dated September 22, 2015. He even iled a Motion for publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication),
procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
Reconsideration before the IBP assailing the April 29, 2016 it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
Resolution which was in fact given due course by the IBP. Therefore, result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings
the minimum requirements of administrative due process have been but simply because they did not know of its existence. Signi icantly,
in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may
observed and met by the IBP. this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One
be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to petitioners'
can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription,
view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards
b.3. Academic due process which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process;
before they can begin to operate.
and these are, that
Guzman v National University We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
Petitioners are students of respondent National University, who cause of any accusation against them;
their effectivity, which shall begin ifteen days after publication
sought relief from what they describe as their school's "continued (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
unless a different effectivity date is ixed by the legislature.
and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll." with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and d. Scope of Guaranty; Persons Protected
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings
behalf; and
of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had Halili v Public Service Commission
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
indeed led or participated "in activities within the university
committee or of icial designated by the school authorities to
premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, Serrano v NLRC
hear and decide the case.
that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" or perpetrated acts of
"vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and There are three reasons why violation by the employer of the notice
other acts showing disdain for and de iance of University authority" c. Substantive Aspect requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process
resulting in the nullity of the employee’s dismissal or layoff.
Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, as students, have Ynot v IAC
the right among others "to freely choose their ield of study subject to The irst is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise
graduation, except in case of academic de iciency, or violation of because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not of private power, such as the termination of employment under the
disciplinary regulations." Petitioners were being denied this right, or reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly Labor Code.
being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the
admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private School that ''(n)o property con iscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought
penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as is immediately condemned and punished.
to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of
de ined in x x x (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and
termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not
regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation Tañada v Tuvera (Resolution) faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for
shall have been conducted". This Court is therefore constrained, as in
requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not
Beriña v. Philippine Maritime Institute, to declare illegal this act Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him,
of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due its discretion provide that the usual ifteen-day period shall be
for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare
investigation. shortened or extended.
for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to
determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who inef iciency in the performance of duty because they would be
termination of his employment. hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does attending to their campaign rather than to their of ice work.
not justify such differential treatment.
The third reason is that the employer cannot really be expected to be Indeed, whether one holds an appointive of ice or an elective one, the
entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in In order that there can be valid classi ication so that a discriminatory evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the
termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282. governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter,
protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid could wield the same in luence as the Vice-President who at the same
We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code,
classi ication be complied with, namely: time is appointed to a Cabinet post.
the employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does
not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; NB: This was overturned by a subsequent Resolution.
procedure for the termination of employment which makes the (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
termination of employment merely ineffectual. (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and Read: Dissents of CJ Puno, J. Carpio, J. Carpio-Morales in Quinto v
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. Comelec (Resolution), Read: Dissent of J. Nachura
Lao Gi v CA
The irst requirement means that there must be real and substantial Upon MR, the Court reversed its Decision and now rule that Section
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and the fairly recent Mirasol v. DPWH, a real and substantial distinction and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles suf icient to 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause.
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due justify its classi ication among those prohibited from plying the toll
process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal--a two-wheeled The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to
Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel limit the participation of civil service of icers and employees in
applicable to deportation proceedings. vehicle. partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.
The charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions The classi ication, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical
language to enable a person of common understanding to know on requirement means that the classi ication must be enforced not only of ices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover
what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected elected of icials. This is because elected public of icials, by the very
pronounce a proper judgment. continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classi ication nature of their of ice, engage in partisan political activities almost all
would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not year round, even outside of the campaign period. Political
treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political of ice,
imposed. elective positions included.
III. Equal Protection of Law
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court inds that The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
the differential treatment of persons holding appointive of ices as absolute, but is subject to reasonable classi ication. If the groupings
Section 1. xxx nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
the laws. differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
purposes of the law.
the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection
Quinto v Comelec (Decision) The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use guarantee in this manner:
of a governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to
Petitioners posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto wield a dangerous or coercive in luence on the electorate. The The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
resigned from of ice upon the iling of their CoCs is discriminatory measure is further aimed at promoting the ef iciency, integrity, and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
and violates the equal protection clause discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto discharge of of icial duty would be motivated by political which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
resigned from their posts upon the iling of their CoCs, but not considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
considering as resigned all other civil servants, speci ically the also justi ied by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the irst class. electoral arena, while still in of ice, could result in neglect or treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection at bar, the petitioners failed - and in fact did not even attempt - to
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those discharge this heavy burden.
perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render
persons falling within a speci ied class, if it applies alike to all
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective of icials is R.A. 9262 invalid.
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who The mere fact that the legislative classi ication may result in actual
to preserve the integrity, ef iciency, and discipline of the public
do not. inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of
classi ication of persons or things for regulation by law produces
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective of icials judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
and appointive of icials. The former occupy their of ice by virtue of competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the
invalid.
the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an of ice for a sovereign will.
de inite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent The distinction between men and women is germane to the
conditions. On the other hand, appointive of icials hold their of ice a. Classification purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. against women and children.
Some appointive of icials hold their of ice in a permanent capacity Garcia v Drilon Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as
pleasure of the appointing authority. A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of
well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their
R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of of icials is children are threatened by violence and abuse.
clauses.
that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
violence and abuse.
Order No. 292), appointive of icials, as of icers and employees in the similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan and responsibilities imposed.
political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:
Under the same provision, elective of icials, or of icers or employees
Petitioners posit that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
holding political of ices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution of icials and
in political and electoral activities. equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
personnel of the previous Arroyo administration as if corruption is
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
Since the classi ication justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
elected of icials vis-à -vis appointive of icials, is anchored upon administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
material and signi icant distinctions and all the persons belonging
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
under the same classi ication are similarly treated, the equal
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
The fact that a legislative classi ication, by itself, is underinclusive identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things however, to provide for a more speci ic guaranty against any form of
will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There is which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But
every class to which it might be applied; that the Legislature must be discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none. legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. clause.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must
convincingly show that the law creates a classi ication that is R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power The equal protection clause is aimed at all of icial state actions, not
"palpably arbitrary or capricious." He must refute all possible relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments
rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender of the government including the political and executive departments,
Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, such that bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the justifying the classi ication under the law. laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
reasonableness of the classi ication is "fairly debatable." In the case
already served the purpose of preventing the same. The use of plastic that the disallowance of the subject CNA Incentive was made
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
as secondary packaging materials for wet goods is merely to provide pursuant to a discriminatory purpose. Clearly, no violation of equal
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
support to any packaging and it is intended for the convenience of the protection clause for selective enforcement could be attributed to the
commission is to investigate and ind out the truth "concerning the
handler. Thus, a reusable packaging material would be enough to COA as Cuaresma failed to prove that there was intentional
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
serve that purpose. And as explained by the City Government of discrimination.
administration" only. The intent to single out the previous
Muntinlupa, the prohibition covers only the sale and provision of
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
plastic bags as packaging materials for wet and dry goods and not the c.2. Legislations for specific class
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo plastic packaging or wrappers of these goods done by the producers
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past or manufacturers thereof. ⭐Zomer Development v Special Twentieth Division of the CA,
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
Cebu City 2020 Leonen En Banc
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which b. Special Issues
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Petition for Mandamus which seeks to compel the CA to rule on the
c.1. Selective Prosecution constitutionality of Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791, or the
Philippine Plastics Industry Association v San Pedro 2018 General Banking Law of 2002.
Resolution DPWH Region IV-A v COA 2019 En Banc Zomer argues that said section violates its right to equal protection
Cuaresma avers that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion since the law provides a shorter period for redemption of three
Muntinlupa City passed an Ordinance wherein business
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it disallowed the (3) months or earlier to juridical entities compared to the one (1)
establishments and/or individuals are prohibited from selling and
subject CNA Incentive. She asserts that DPWH IV-A was among the year redemption period given to natural persons. This
providing (1) plastic bags to consumers as secondary packaging
of ices singled out by the COA concerning the disallowance of the discrimination, it argued, gives "undue advantage to lenders who are
materials on wet goods; (2) plastic bags to consumers as primary
CNA Incentive. She claims that there were other of ices which granted non-banks."
packaging material on dry goods; and (3) Styrofoam/styrophor as
containers. the CNA Incentive sourced from the savings from EAO but these The grant of declaratory relief is discretionary on the courts. Courts
releases were allowed. Cuaresma further points out that the DPWH may refuse to declare rights or to construe instruments if it will not
Petitioner argued that the subject Ordinance runs counter to the IV-A's CNA Incentive for calendar year 2007, or for the previous year, terminate the controversy or if it is unnecessary and improper under
Constitution for being violative of the equal protection clause as it was also paid out of the savings from the EAO. Surprisingly, however, the circumstances. A discretionary act cannot be the subject of a
prohibits the use of plastic bags as secondary packaging materials on the COA did not disallow the release of this incentive. petition for mandamus.
wet goods without substantial distinction as opposed to primary
packaging materials of the same wet goods. Also, while the subject In People v. Dela Piedra, the Court declared that an erroneous In Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank,
Ordinance prohibits the selling of plastic bags, no such prohibition performance of statutory duty - such as an apparent selective the Court squarely addressed the argument that Republic Act No.
was made with regard to plastic spoons and forks used in restaurants enforcement of the statute - could not be considered a violation 8791, Section 47 violated the equal protection clause when it
and eateries, which are also harmful to the environment. of the equal protection clause, unless the element of intentional provided a shorter redemption period for juridical persons.
or purposeful discrimination is shown. In that case, the Court
The subject Ordinance did not violate the equal protection clause ruled that there is no violation of the equal protection of the laws in The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural
of the Constitution, as there is substantial distinction between the prosecuting only one of the many equally guilty persons. This lone persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed —
primary and secondary plastic packaging materials, or even between circumstance would not be suf icient to uphold the claim of denial of whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal
plastic packaging materials and plastic cutlery. To note, the frozen the equal protection clause. Absent a clear showing of intentional one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or
and wet goods require nonporous primary packaging to prevent the discrimination, the prosecuting of icers shall be presumed to have commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
seepage or spillage of liquid or luid but no such seepage or spillage regularly performed their of icial duties. It is up to the person who necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of
can be had on dry goods that do not require refrigeration. For this claims to have been the victim of selective enforcement to prove that property and enable mortgagee banks to dispose sooner of these
reason, plastic as primary packaging materials for wet goods is the same was made for a discriminatory purpose. acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law
allowed while the same is disallowed as primary packaging of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian inancial
materials for dry goods. Further, plastic is also disallowed as In this case, aside from her allegation that DPWH IV-A was among crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by
secondary packaging materials for wet goods since no more seepage those singled out by the COA concerning the disallowance of the CNA fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound
or spillage of liquid or luid can be had as their primary packaging Incentive, Cuaresma failed to present even a single evidence to show banking system. In this context, the amendment introduced by
2. to be determined personally by the judge

Section 47 embodied one of such safe and sound practices aimed at debts. Thus, a corporate of icer or a stockholder, as a general rule, is
ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our banks. It cannot therefore not personally held liable for corporate debts. 3. after examination under oath or af irmation of the complainant
be disputed that the said provision amending the redemption period and the witnesses he may produce, and
The properties of juridical entities are also often used for commercial 4. particularly describing the place to be searched and the
in Act 3135 was based on a reasonable classi ication and
purposes. Corporations will give more attention to assets that are
germane to the purpose of the law. persons or things to be seized.
income generating, and will also be equipped with greater resources
In the exercise of its power to make classi ications for the purpose of for the protection of these assets.
Republic v Sandiganbayan
enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is
In contrast, the properties of natural persons are more often used for
recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the
residential purposes. They are also directly responsible for the
that the classi ication be based on scienti ic or marked differences of properties con iscated from Dimaano's house as illegally seized and
liabilities they incur and, often, are not equipped with the same
things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the therefore inadmissible in evidence.
resources that juridical entities may have.
classi ication be made with mathematical nicety. Hence legislative
classi ication may in many cases properly rest on narrow Juridical entities, thus, cannot be considered a "suspect class." On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano's
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms
The rational basis test may be applied to determine the and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid but
legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8971, Section 47. The rational Dimaano's cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the
is addressed to evils as they may appear. Thus, a statute that treats
basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not
one class differently from another class will not violate the
and that there is a reasonable connection between it and the means included in the search warrant.
equal protection clause as long as the classi ication is valid.
employed to achieve it. A longer period of redemption is given to
In Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, this Court natural persons whose mortgaged properties are more often used for Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
summarized the three (3) tests to determine the reasonableness residential purposes. A shorter period of redemption is given to withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed
of a classi ication: juridical persons whose properties are more often used for private respondents' exclusionary right.
commercial purposes. Goldenway Merchandising explains that the Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from
The strict scrutiny test applies when a classi ication either
shorter period is aimed to ensure the solvency and liquidity of banks. an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
1. interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, This helps minimize the period of uncertainty in the ownership of rati ication of the 1987 Constitution.
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the commercial properties and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose of
these acquired assets quickly. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
Constitution, or
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except
2. burdens suspect classes. There is, thus, a legitimate government interest in the protection of treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classi ication the banking industry and a legitimate government interest in the government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires protection of foreclosed residential properties owned by natural
persons. The shortened period of redemption for juridical entities The correct issues are:
heightened scrutiny, such as in classi ications based on gender and
legitimacy. may be considered to be the reasonable means for the protection of (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the
both these interests. Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over
covered by the irst two tests. A "suspect class" is de ined as "a class of power by the revolutionary government following the
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of IV. Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection Constitution); and
from the majoritarian political process. " Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
(2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Juridical entities enjoy certain advantages that natural persons do
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
not, such as limited liability. A corporation has a separate and
distinct personality from its corporate of icers or stockholders. It warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
may incur its own liabilities and is responsible for the payment of its We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
1. upon probable cause
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the team con iscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe gives this guarantee.
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. these items and the raiding team con iscated them on its own
This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People v.
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the Lacerna enumerated ive recognized exceptions to the rule against
without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless
revolutionary government were the supreme law because no warrantless search and seizure, viz.:
search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
when it seized these items. (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest,
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
(2) search of moving vehicles,
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items
(3) seizure in plain view,
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the
(4) customs search, and
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right person from whom the raiding seized them.
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
unreasonable search and seizure.
Bill of Rights during the interregnum. a. Search and seizure, when unreasonable
Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government
Probable cause for a search is, at best, de ined as a reasonable
had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or Manalili v CA ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances suf iciently strong
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
Manalili was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
correspondence."
Republic Act No. 6425. existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
A surveillance was being made because of information that drug
provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
Upon reaching the Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their
did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a law is in the place to be searched.
vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the
declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was
State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
manner. wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the
Declaration. Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his according to police information was a popular hangout of drug
possession, contending that they were products of an illegal search. addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit
Suf ice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being characteristic of drug addicts who were “high.” The policemen
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a therefore had suf icient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate stop-and-frisk was de ined as the vernacular designation of the right was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the of a police of icer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and marijuana in petitioner’s possession.
1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary pat him for weapon(s).
government could not escape responsibility for the State's good faith Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General’s contention that
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence
the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object
In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned police of icer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more
the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search,
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, speci ied the even though there is insuf icient probable cause to make an actual requires the concurrence of the following requirements:
items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with arrest.
respect to the items speci ically described in the warrant. (1) the right to be waived existed;
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive,
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial thereof; and
the warrant. The warrant did not include the monies, warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
b. Search warrant, defined investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies,
complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
Rule 126, Sec. 1, Rules of Court. A search warrant is an order in expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
submit a counter-af idavit, to examine all other evidence submitted
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard
by the complainant and, where the iscal sets a hearing to propound
judge and directed to a peace of icer, commanding him to search for of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
clari icatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
personal property described therein and bring it before the court. afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to “The substance of all the de initions” of probable cause “is a
examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”
c. Warrant of arrest, defined opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they
There are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against
Rule 113, Sec. 1, Rules of Court. Arrest is the taking of a person into where probable cause is needed to be established:
Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right (1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating of icer,
an offense. was never available to him. to determine whether there is suf icient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that
d. Requisites for valid issuance the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
the courts are not clogged with weak cases that will only be
held for trial.
dismissed, as well as to spare a person from the travails of a
(1) upon probable cause (2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine
needless prosecution. The Ombudsman and the prosecution
(2) to be determined personally by the judge whether a warrant of arrest xxx shall be issued.
service under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the
(3) after examination under oath or af irmation of the complainant (3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace of icer or a private
Department of Justice are inherently the fact- inder, investigator,
and the witnesses he may produce, and person making a warrantless arrest.
hearing of icer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether
(4) particularly describing the place to be searched and the investigations. Obviously, this procedure cannot comply with Ang
a search warrant shall be issued.
persons or things to be seized. Tibay, as ampli ied in GSIS. However, there is nothing
unconstitutional with this procedure because this is merely an It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause
1. Probable cause, defined Executive function, a part of the law enforcement process leading to does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or
Concepts of Probable Cause in Estrada v Of ice of the Ombudsman trial in court where the requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented.
ampli ied in GSIS, will apply. As previously discussed, these matters are better ventilated during
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the the trial proper of the case.
A inding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was The determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even
implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence hearsay statement is credible. Probable cause can be established
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and de initely, not on with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
establish his innocence.”
Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because
The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation than “bare suspicion,” it requires “less than evidence which would such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not inally
is such evidence suf icient to “engender a well founded belief” as to justify . . . conviction.” A inding of probable cause merely binds over adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. To require the
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. application of Ang Tibay, as ampli ied in GSIS, in preliminary
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in
The rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are merely
full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or
statutory rights, not constitutional due process rights. An
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
investigation to determine probable cause for the iling of an
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
information does not initiate a criminal action so as to trigger into
probably guilty thereof. People v Ramon 2019 Resolution
operation Section 14(2), Article III. It is the iling of a complaint or
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary information in court that initiates a criminal action.
The case involved the anomalous disbursement of the colossal form a well-grounded belief that a crime has been committed, the warrant, grave abuse of discretion is committed.
amount of P728 million purportedly for the purchase and elements thereof being present, and that the accused is probably
Given the foregoing, the CA thus erred in ascribing grave abuse of
distribution of liquid fertilizers and other farm inputs and guilty thereof, or, stated otherwise, it is insuf icient to sustain a
discretion on the part of the RTC in upholding the validity of the
implements. This came to be known as the Fertilizer Fund Scam. prima facie case against the accused, then the imperative is for the
search warrant. Judge Balagot made sure that the witness had
prosecutor or the judge to relieve the accused from the pain of going
OMB found probable cause against respondents, as well as against personal knowledge of the facts by asking speci ics, and asked how
through trial. Conversely, if the inding by the prosecutor or the judge
Barredo, for the crime of plunder in conspiracy with one another. All he obtained knowledge of the same and how he was sure that the
is that the evidence on record suf iciently establishes a prima facie
of them were indicted in an Information for the crime of plunder. facts continue to exist. The questions propounded by Judge Balagot,
case or probable cause against the accused, the accused should be
taken and viewed as a whole, were therefore probing and not merely
On the other hand, SB issued a Resolution inding no probable cause indicted and held for trial.
super icial and perfunctory. It was thus reversible error on the part of
against respondents and Barredo. The singular issue is whether the
the CA to have set aside the search warrant.
SB gravely erred and decided a question of substance by applying a 2. Personal determination by a judge
higher quantum of proof — prima facie evidence and/or evidence
needed to hold an accused accountable or liable, which is akin to, if Fenix v CA
People v Gabiosa, Sr. 2020 Division
not the same as, proof beyond reasonable doubt — during the stage
We uphold the power of judges to dismiss a criminal case when the
of judicial determination of probable cause for the purpose of the The RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in af irming the validity
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. of the search warrant.
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules, which sets forth the duty of the The magistrate authorizing the State-sanctioned intrusion must
When Informations are iled before the courts and the judges are
judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of an therefore himself or herself be personally satis ied that there is
called upon to determine the existence of probable cause for the
arrest warrant, is circumscribed by Section 2, Article III. probable cause to disturb the person's privacy. In the case of Alvarez
issuance of a warrant of arrest, what should be foremost in their
v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the Court explained that
The evidence that "clearly" establishes probable cause to justify the minds is not anxiety over stepping on executive toes, but their
ultimately, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine
iling of an information against an accused is the same evidence that constitutional mandate to order the detention of a person rightfully
that probable cause exists. Thus, there is no need to examine both the
is suf icient to establish a prima facie case; and a prima facie case indicted or to shield a person from the ordeal of facing a criminal
applicant and the witness/es if either one of them is suf icient to
necessarily rests on prima facie evidence. The quantum of proof that charge not committed by the latter.
establish probable cause.
establishes probable cause and a prima facie case is congruent. Since
When judges dismiss a case or require the prosecutor to present
probable cause is required for the issuance of a warrant of arrest Since probable cause is dependent largely on the indings of the judge
additional evidence, they do so not in derogation of the prosecutor's
against the accused, the judge is bound by the same — not lesser — who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to
authority to determine the existence of probable cause.
quantum of proof for the iling of an information. question the applicant and his witnesses, then his indings deserve
great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such indings only First, judges have no capacity to review the prosecutor's
Based on Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules, probable cause is
upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored determination of probable cause. That falls under the of ice of the
established when there is "suf icient ground to engender a
the clear dictates of reason. DOJ Secretary. Second, once a complaint or an Information has been
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
iled, the disposition of the case is addressed to the sound discretion
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
of the court, subject only to the quali ication that its action must not
trial. On the other hand, prima facie evidence has been de ined as witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although
impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People
that "suf icient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should conduct
to due process of law. Third, and most important, the judge's
disproved or rebutted" and a prima facie case is a "cause of action his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing
determination of probable cause has a different objective than that of
or defense that is suf iciently established by a party's evidence to and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory
the prosecutor. The judge's inding is based on a determination of the
justify a verdict in his or her favor, provided such evidence is not or pro-forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the
existence of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
rebutted by the other party." af idavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
justi ication of the application. The questions should not merely be
Thus, the quantum of proof to establish probable cause and a committed by the person sought to be arrested. The prosecutor, on
repetitious of the averments stated in the af idavits or depositions of
prima facie case for purposes of issuance of an arrest warrant the other hand, determines probable cause by ascertaining the
the applicant and the witnesses. If the judge fails to determine
and for preliminary investigation are one and the same. existence of facts suf icient to engender a well-founded belief that a
probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
If the evidence on record does not clearly establish probable cause to witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search
thereof. responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable and respondent’s own admission are circumstances that tend to belie
To be sure, in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not any pretense of the ful illment of this duty.
a warrant of arrest, the judge is not compelled to follow the
required to personally examine the complainant and his
prosecutor's certi ication of the existence of probable cause. As we
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: People v Tuan
stated in People v. Inting, "[i]t is the report, the af idavits, the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents behind the [prosecutor's certi ication which are material documents submitted by the iscal regarding the existence of 3. Particularity of description
in assisting the [j]udge to make his determination." probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; OR Dimal v People
In this case, it bears stressing that the RTC never considered any
(2) if on the basis thereof he inds no probable cause, he may
evidence other than that which the panel had already passed upon. The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-11 was
disregard the iscal’s report and require the submission of
The only difference was that unlike the RTC, the panel did not give validly issued, but most of the items seized pursuant thereto are
supporting af idavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
any serious consideration to the counter-af idavits of Ong and inadmissible in evidence, as they were neither particularly
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Santiago, the recantation of Santos or the af idavit of Bishop Bacani. described in the warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine".
That the trial court did so spelled the difference between the First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the
Petitioners submit that the search warrant is also void for failing to
divergent indings. prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by
identify with particularity the place to be searched and the
the judge.
The panel's act of resolving the complaint against petitioners and items to be seized. They assert that Felix Gumpal Compound
Ong primarily on the basis of Doble's evidence, and in spite of the Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely consists of a very large area, consisting of two houses, one nipa hut,
timely submission of the counter-af idavits, was clearly committed solely on the report of the prosecutor in inding probable cause to two external bathrooms, one garage, one warehouse utilized as a
with grave abuse of discretion. justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must decide palay depot, and one warehouse utilized to store a palay drying
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than machinery. They likewise claim that all the items actually seized
We have stressed that the court's dismissal of a case for lack of
the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own were either not among those listed in the warrant or were seized in
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest must be done
indings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue violation of the "plain view doctrine".
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause;
an arrest order.
that is, when the records readily show uncontroverted and, thus, Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by
established facts that unmistakably negate the existence of the Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the Judge Ong identi ied with particularity the place to be searched,
elements of the crime charged. case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and namely; (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay warehouse
examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge must in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction,
Abdula v Guiani have suf icient supporting documents (such as the complaint, Echague, Isabela.
af idavits, counter-af idavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
A description of a place to be searched is suf icient if the of icer with
Petitioners argue that the warrant for his arrest should be recalled transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the
considering that the respondent judge "did not personally examine independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the
the evidence nor did he call the complainant and his witnesses in the indings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
community. A designation that points out the place to be searched to
face of their incredible accounts." As proof, he points to the fact that
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
the information was iled at around 4:00 p.m. of January 2, 1995 and
warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the of icers to it, satis ies the constitutional requirement of de initeness.
the order of arrest was immediately issued the following day or on
certi ication made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary To the Court's view, the search warrant suf iciently describes the
January 3, 1995. Moreover, petitioner argues, respondent judge did
investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to place to be searched with manifest intention that the search be
not even issue an order stating that there is probable cause for the
exist as against those charged in the information iled." The statement con ined strictly to the place described. At any rate, petitioners
issuance of the warrant of arrest.
is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the cannot be heard to decry irregularity in the conduct of the search of
We ind merit in the contention of petitioners. certi ication made by the iscal that probable cause exists. the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound because, as aptly ruled
by the RTC, a Certi ication of Orderly Search was issued by the
In Soliven vs. Makasiar, this Court pronounced: A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies
barangay of icials, and the presumption of regularity in the
merely on the certi ication or report of the investigating of icer. The
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal performance of public duty was not suf iciently contradicted by
petitioners. af idavit iled in support of the warrant is physically attached to it,

It remains unrefuted that, at the time of the search, appellant was the
and the warrant expressly refers to the af idavit and incorporates it
Moreover, the objection as to the particularity of the place to be owner and possessor of the rest house based on established facts and
with suitable words of reference. Conversely, a warrant which lacks
searched was belatedly raised in petitioners' motion for evidence. As owner of the cock farm and the rest house, appellant
any description of the items to be seized is defective and is not cured
reconsideration of the Order denying their Omnibus Motion to quash. clearly had full control and dominion over all the rooms located
by a description in the warrant application which is not referenced in
The Court has consistently ruled that the omnibus motion rule under therein, including the bedroom where the thing seized were located.
the warrant and not provided to the subject of the search.
Section 8, Rule 15 is applicable to motion to quash search warrants. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe
above, the Court sustains the validity of Search Warrant No. 10-11 drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the
the things to be seized
and the admissibility of the items seized which were particularly other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
(1) when the description therein is as speci ic as the described in the warrant. This is in line with the principles under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
circumstances will ordinarily allow; or American jurisprudence: exercise dominion and control over the place where it [was] found.
(2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
(1) that the seizure of goods not described in the warrant does
of law by which the warrant of icer may be guided in making avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over
not render the whole seizure illegal, and the seizure is illegal
the search and seizure; the place where the contraband is located is shared with another.
only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and
(3) and when the things to be described are limited to those
(2) the fact that the of icers, after making a legal search and
which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the 5. Use of evidence obtained through a search warrant
seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and
warrant is being issued.
seizure of other property not within the warrant does not
The purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized invalidate the irst search and seizure. Polangcos v People 2019 Division
only to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to
The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed fact that the seized
leave the of icers of the law with no discretion regarding what 4. Warrants, how enforced item was con iscated from Polangcos as he was being issued a traf ic
items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and
violation ticket. His violations consisted of (1) not having a plate
seizures will be committed. People v Obias, Jr. 2019 Division number, and (2) expired of icial receipt (OR) and certi icate of
In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, the Court clari ied that technical registration (CR) of the motorcycle he was riding.
It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made
precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that
without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Polangcos' violations were punishable only by a city ordinance that
there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of
prescribes as penalty certain ines.
the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall However, it must be emphasized that a search warrant validly and
not be a mere roving commission. lawfully issued by a competent authority does not provide unbridled In view of the foregoing, SPO2 Juntanilla thus conducted an illegal
freedom to the peace of icer in the manner of implementing the same. search when he frisked Polangcos for the foregoing violations which
In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly
were punishable only by ine. He had no reason to "arrest" Polangcos
described and sought to be seized in connection with the special To be reasonable and valid, the search must be witnessed primarily
because the latter's violation did not entail a penalty of
complex crime of kidnapping with murder, namely: (1) blood-stained by the lawful occupant of the place or any member of his family. It
imprisonment. It was thus not, as it could not have been, a search
clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves is only in their absence, that two witnesses of suf icient age and
incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no, as there could not have
jacket and a black tshirt, and (2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol. Having no discretion and who are residents of the place searched, may be
been any, lawful arrest to speak of.
direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay that were witnesses to the search. The order of preference cannot be
supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal and found in his warehouse, disregarded, interchanged or intercalated. The case of Cristobal squarely applies to this case. There was
cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant. likewise no valid arrest to speak of in this case - as Polangcos'
Appellant argues that the members of the raiding team were freely
violations were also punishable by ine only — and there could thus
The Court could have rendered a favorable ruling if the application roaming around the house and the surrounding yard, unaccompanied
be no valid "search incidental to lawful arrest." Ultimately, Polangcos
for search warrant and supporting af idavits were incorporated by by any of the required witnesses. It must be noted that the actual
must be similarly acquitted, as the corpus delicti of the crime, i.e. the
reference in Search Warrant No. 10-11, so as to enable the warrant search did not commence until after the arrival of Barangay Captain
seized drug, is excluded evidence, inadmissible in any proceeding,
of icer to identify the speci ic clothes sought to be searched. This is Baldemoro, the media representatives and Assistant City Prosecutor.
including this one, against him.
because under American jurisprudence, an otherwise overbroad Appellant himself admitted that he accompanied the search team
warrant will comply with the particularity requirement when the throughout the conduct of the search. Any evidence seized as a result of searches and seizures conducted in
violation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is legality of their arrest, and in fact, actively participated in the trial of lagged by a police of icer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding" in accordance with the case. As such, they are deemed to have waived any objections had just transpired is enough to provide PO2 Torculas with personal
the exclusionary rule in Section 3(2), Article III. involving the same. Nonetheless, it must be clari ied that the knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just been committed
foregoing constitutes a waiver only as to any question concerning and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon
e. Warrantless Arrest any defects in their arrest, and not with regard to the gaining such personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded area, he also called for
Rule 113, Sec. 5, Rules of Court. A peace of icer or a private person warrantless arrest. back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until they
were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: There are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
circumstances indubitably show that the twin requisites of personal
lawfully effected. These are:
knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid "hot
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
(a) an arrest of a suspect in lagrante delicto; pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge Torculas obtained personal knowledge that a crime had just been
an offense; of the arresting of icer, there is probable cause that said committed and that he did not waver in his continuous and unbroken
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing,
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or committed; and the Court concludes "that the police of icers validly conducted a "hot
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody pursuit" warrantless arrest on petitioners.
and serving inal judgment or temporarily con ined during the
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred
a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting of icer from being harmed
from one con inement to another.
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving inal by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
judgment or is temporarily con ined while his case is pending, Under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within
or has escaped while being transferred from one con inement personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of reach. It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State's police power
to another. immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nulli ied, and resultantly, to protect:
the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be
(a) law enforcers from the injury that may be in licted on them
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule.
by a person they have lawfully arrested; and
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police The reason for the element of the immediacy is this: as the time (b) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee.
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the
Case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to
7 of Rule 112. pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully
and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the
arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her
⭐Vaporoso v People 2019 Division other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5
arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
A judicial perusal of the records reveals that the arresting police proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search
of icer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be
of icers conducted a total of two (2) searches on petitioners, namely: obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of
limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as
(a) the body search after the police of icers apprehended them; and arrest."
they were within a very limited period of time.
(b) a "more thorough" search conducted at the Panabo Police Station The Court concludes that the irst search made on petitioners, i.e., the
where the seized drugs were allegedly recovered from them. In this case, a judicious review of the records show that while PO2
cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs but
Torculas was cruising on his motorcycle, he personally saw
It behooves the Court to ascertain whether or not the police of icers only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a
petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken
lawfully arrested petitioners without a warrant, as the resolution search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done contemporaneous
from a parked vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told
thereof is determinative of the validity of the consequent search to their arrest and at the place of apprehension. On the other hand, the
petitioners to halt, prompting the latter to speed away aboard their
made on them. This is because in searches incidental to a lawful same cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs
motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle,
arrest, the law requires that there irst be a lawful arrest subject of this case, considering that a substantial amount of time had
Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his assistance,
before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second
narrating that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took
At this point, the Court notes that petitioners failed to question the search, not to mention the fact that the second search was conducted
her belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden light upon being
at a venue other than the place of actual arrest, i.e., the Panabo Police accused-appellant was previously identi ied only from a CCTV also did not yet know how or where Rose was transporting the
Station. footage supposedly covering his previous criminal conduct because dangerous drugs. So, PO1 Rosales immediately inquired about her
he was seen by PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar performing an overt act of baggage, and, in response, she requested the driver to hand her the
People v Olarte 2019 Division drawing a gun as he was about to enter LBC. pink bag resting at the rear portion of the van.
For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block
The concept of in lagrante delicto arrests should not be confused People v Gardon-Mentoy 2019 Division shaped bundle from one bag to another should not be cited to justify
with warrantless arrests based on probable cause as contemplated in
the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1
the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule 113. In the latter type of We are mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and
Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the
warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is warrantless searches and seizures admit of some exceptions. One
of icers rely on the still-unveri ied tip from the unidenti ied
probable cause which is discernible by a peace of icer or private such exception relates to arrests, searches and seizures made at a
informant, without more, as basis to initiate the search of the
person that an offense "has just been committed." Here, the offense police checkpoint. Indeed, routine inspections made at
personal effects. The of icers were themselves well aware that the tip,
had already been consummated but not in the presence of the peace checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if the
being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent
of icer or private person who, nevertheless, should have personal inspections are limited to the following situations:
veri ication as its substance and reliability, and removed the
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested (a) where the of icer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then
had committed it. More importantly, there is durational vehicle parked on the public fair grounds;
obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that
immediacy between the offense that had just been committed and (b) simply looks inside a vehicle;
would con irm their suspicion coming to. the knowledge of the
the peace of icer or private person's perception or observation of the (c) lashes a light into the vehicle without opening its doors;
searching or arresting of icer, was not yet actionable for purposes of
accused's presence at the incident or immediate vicinity. Such is why (d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a
effecting an arrest or conducting a search.
probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in cases physical or body search;
where the peace of icer or private person did not catch or witness the (e) where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual Under Section 5(a), the of icer himself witnesses the commission of
accused in the act of committing an offense. search or visual inspection; and the crime; under Section 5(b), the of icer actually knows that a crime
(f) where the routine check is conducted in a ixed area. has just been committed.
Under the circumstances, PO2 Intud and PO2 Monilar had a
In short, inspections at checkpoints are con ined to visual The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of
reasonable suspicion to arrest accused-appellant who was seen to
searches. An extensive search of the vehicle is permissible only the personal belongings because the arrest did not precede the
have drawn a gun as he was about to enter LBC. Common sense
when the of icer conducting the search had probable cause to believe search.
dictates that police of icers need not wait for a serious crime, such as
prior to the search that he will ind inside the vehicle to be searched
robbery, to be consummated before they move in and make the arrest The arresting of icers plainly ignored the constitutional and statutory
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a
because it will de initely endanger the lives and safety of the public, limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They
crime.
as well as their own. effected the warrantless search of the personal effects of the
Based on the alleged tip from the unidenti ied informant to the effect accused-appellant without suf icient probable cause, and on that
Moreover, even if the irearm drawn turned out to be a replica, the
that the accused-appellant would be transporting dangerous drugs on basis arrested her. If the arrest did not precede the search, where was
police of icers were not expected to know on sight whether the
board a Charing 19 shuttle van with plate number VRA 698, the police the probable cause that justi ied her warrantless arrest?
irearm was genuine or not, considering they had only a split second
of icers had set up a checkpoint.
to act on any indication of danger. What was necessary was the The conclusion is inevitable that both the warrantless arrest of the
presence of reasonably suf icient ground to believe the existence of There, PO1 Abdulito Rosales later lagged down the approaching accused-appellant and the warrantless search of her personal effects
an act having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same shuttle van. The of icers at the checkpoint introduced themselves as were unreasonable.
grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained policemen. But even at that time none of the of icers knew who
participated in it. As a result of the validity of the accused-appellant's would be transporting dangerous drugs to. They were only told that Porteria v People 2019 Division
warrantless arrest, the incidental search and seizure of the items in the suspect was a person named Rose, but they had no independent
his possession is also valid. knowledge of who she was other than her name being Rose. Upon the The circumstantial pieces of evidence of the prosecution are not
driver opening the door of the vehicle, PO1 Rosales nonetheless suf icient to ind Marvin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
The rule only requires that the accused perform some overt act that
singled her out by immediately asking who of the passengers was crime of carnapping.
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
Rose. The accused-appellant naturally answered the query by
attempting to commit an offense. Therefore, it does not matter that There are several circumstances which the Court recognizes as
identifying herself as Rose without hesitation. The police of icers
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant: of searching a person's clothing for concealed weapons, the police describe what said plastic sachet contained, if any. He only
of icer is required to introduce himself properly, make initial mentioned that the plastic contained "pinaghihinalaang shabu."
(a) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
inquiries, approach and then restrain the person manifesting unusual
(b) seizure of evidence in plain view; The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled
and suspicious conduct.
(c) search of a moving vehicle; searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
(d) consented warrantless search; SPO4 Pequiras did not specify the actions or behavior of Marvin, or exploratory search made solely to ind evidence of defendant's guilt.
(e) customs search; the factual circumstances occurring prior to his arrest and search. He The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police of icer is
(f) stop-and-frisk; and simply stated that Marvin was arrested due to the anonymous tip. not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
(g) the existence of exigent and emergency circumstances. inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court holds that f. Warrantless Search The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
Marvin was not validly arrested without a warrant. The prosecution concur:
failed to establish any overt act which could lead to Marvin's in Plain View
lagrante delicto arrest. There was also no evidence that the arresting (a) the law enforcement of icer in search of the evidence has a
of icers, or SPO4 Pequiras in particular, knew of an offense that was Dominguez y Argana v People 2019 Division prior justi ication for an intrusion or is in a position from
just committed and that Marvin was the perpetrator of the offense. which he can view a particular area;
Dominguez focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
SPO4 Pequiras merely testi ied that after receiving the information search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the and
regarding the presence of a suspicious person, they veri ied the admissibility of the sachet. (c) it is immediately apparent to the of icer that the item he
report, and this eventually resulted in the arrest of Marvin. It was not observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
Well settled is the rule that an accused is estopped from assailing the
established that Marvin had a irearm visibly tucked in his waist, or otherwise subject to seizure.
legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash the information
that he behaved in a manner which would elicit a reasonable
against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police
suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trial court and
arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction of icers was legitimate as they were patrolling the area and that
the CA grievously erred in agreeing with the prosecution. The
over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be
prosecution established only a suspicion that a crime was
plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not apparent
committed—nothing more—prior to the arrest of Marvin.
that such plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime, a contraband, or
The Court agrees that Dominguez had already waived his objection to
In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suf ice to otherwise subject to seizure.
the validity of his arrest. However, it must be stressed that such
ful ill the requirements for a hot pursuit arrest. The prosecution did
waiver only affects the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
not allege and prove that SPO4 Pequiras and the arresting of icers
accused but does not carry a waiver of the admissibility of evidence. Stop-and-frisk
have personal knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an
offense. Neither does the anonymous report of a suspicious person The CA and the RTC concluded that Dominguez was caught in
People v Cristobal 2019 Division
operate to vest personal knowledge on the police of icers about the lagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act of actually
commission of an offense. committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed fact that the seized
of the apprehending of icers, when he was caught holding a sachet of items were con iscated from Cristobal as he was being issued a traf ic
There being no valid warrantless arrest, the search conducted on
shabu. Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as violation ticket.
Marvin's body and belongings is likewise unjusti ied. The law
it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
requires that there should be a lawful arrest prior to the search. The The police of icers involved in this case conducted an illegal search
process cannot be reversed. From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO1 Parchaso would when they frisked Cristobal on the basis of the foregoing violations.
not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents It was not, as it could not have been, even believing the story of the
The warrantless search is also unjusti iable as a stop-and-frisk
of the plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and police of icers, a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no,
search.
holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are not by themselves suf icient as there could not have been any, lawful arrest to speak of.
A stop-and-frisk search is de ined as "the act of a police of icer to to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for enough to justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO1 Parchaso's "Stop and frisk" searches should be allowed only in the speci ic and
weapon(s) or contraband." Searches under stop-and-frisk are limited testimony reveals that before the arrest was made, he only saw that limited instances contemplated in Terry:
to the protective search of outer clothing for weapons. For purposes Dominguez was holding a small plastic sachet. He was unable to (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police of icer's
reasonable suspicion, in light of his or her experience, police who had the right to be where they are;
To sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with c. the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
of icer should have personally observed two (2) or more
whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently d. "plain view" justi ied mere seizure of evidence
suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then create a
dangerous; without further search;
reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting
(2) the search must only be a carefully limited search of the 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
of icer to investigate further.
outer clothing; and government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
(3) conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons which expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable
might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion search was conducted on petitioner, the facts on record do not point
area. amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what
criminal activity; transpired was a stop and frisk search.
Applying the foregoing in the present case, the police of icers' act of
4. Consented warrantless search;
proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite their own admission Chief Inspector Beniat received information that petitioner, whom he
5. Customs search;
that they were unable to ind any weapon on him, constitutes an knew as a kagawad and security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying
6. Stop and Frisk; and
invalid and unconstitutional search. a gun outside the Municipal Tourism Of ice during an election gun
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
ban. With a few other police of icers, he went there and spotted
Compared with Two (2) of these exceptions to a search warrant—a warrantless petitioner right in front of the building with a suspicious-looking
search incidental to a lawful arrest and "stop and frisk"—are often bulge protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The police of icer
Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest confused with each other. Malacat v. Court of Appeals explained deduced this to be a irearm based on the object's size and contour.
that they "differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police of icers' visual
⭐Manibog v People 2019 Leonen Division they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope."
con irmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his
For an arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun
For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious
judicially issued or there was a lawful warrantless arrest as provided during an election gun ban. However, a reasonable suspicion is not
circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting of icer, must
for in Rule 113, Section 5. The lawful arrest generally precedes, synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section
lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an
or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search. 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest. Thus, the Court of
illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this
Appeals erred in ruling that the search conducted on petitioner fell
constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy. In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful
under the established exception of a warrantless search incidental to
arrest, stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime.
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out a lawful arrest.
through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and. seizure Manalili and Solayao upheld the warrantless searches conducted
Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the
violates the Constitution. Any evidence resulting from it "shall be because "the police of icers[,] using their senses[,] observed facts
arresting of icers' observation of a gun-shaped object under
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." that led to the suspicion." Furthermore, the totality of the
petitioner's shirt already suf ices as a genuine reason for the
circumstances in each case provided suf icient and genuine reason
However, the constitutional proscription only covers unreasonable arresting of icers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner.
for them to suspect that something illicit was afoot.
searches and seizures. Jurisprudence has recognized instances of Hence, the trial court correctly upheld the reasonableness of the
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures, which are: For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting of icer must have had warrantless search on petitioner.
personal knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
degree of suspicion of an illicit act. Cogaed emphasized that Moving Vehicle
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
anything less than the arresting of icer's personal observation of a
and by prevailing jurisprudence;
suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of Consent Searches
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which
the "basic right to security of one's person and effects."
are:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere In Saluday v People, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally suspicion is not enough; there should be a genuine reason, as searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived.
present in the pursuit of their of icial duties; determined by the police of icer, to warrant a belief that the person However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the searched was carrying a weapon.
unequivocal, speci ic, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness

guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the It cannot be said that Sison, the driver, consented to the search
constitute a waiver, it must irst appear that
environment in which consent is given: made by the arresting of icers. Jurisprudence has settled that "[m]ere
(1) the right exists;
passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
(a) the age of the consenting party; implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all." The
constructive, of the existence of such right; and
validity of a supposedly consented warrantless search is contingent
(b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded location; (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
on the totality of the attendant circumstances. This may entail an
(c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked right.
inquiry into the environment in which the consent was ostensibly
on; given, such as "the presence of coercive police procedures." In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable
(d) his or her education and intelligence; searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The
Here, Sison, who was then unarmed, was prodded by the arresting
(e) the presence of coercive police procedures; trial court's indings show that petitioner presented his bag for
of icers to open the pickup's hood. His beguiling conformity is easily
(f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray
accounted by how he was then surrounded by police of icers who
(g) the nature of the police questioning; machine and the irearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted his
had speci ically lagged him and his companions down. He was
(h) the environment in which the questioning took place; and bag for inspection to the port authorities.
under the coercive force of armed law enforcers. His consent, if at all,
(i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person was clearly vitiated. The consented search conducted on petitioner's bag is different from
consenting. a customs search.
People v Johnson Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search
⭐People v Yanson 2019 Leonen Division
warrant, are allowed when "persons exercising police authority under
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
To be valid, searches must proceed from a warrant issued by a judge. the customs law . . . effect search and seizure ... in the enforcement of
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
While there are exceptions to this rule, warrantless searches can only customs laws."
re lecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
be carried out when founded on probable cause, or "a reasonable expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are:
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances suf iciently strong recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person (1) the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come police authority under customs law;
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." There must increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to
be a con luence of several suspicious circumstances. A solitary tip (2) the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house.
hardly suf ices as probable cause; items seized during warrantless carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected
searches based on solitary tips are inadmissible as evidence. to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port security
In offenses involving illegal drugs, narcotics or related items suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized
establish the commission of the crime charged. They are the corpus what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the
delicti of the offense. The inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs
that forms the corpus delicti dooms the prosecution's cause. Without safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that
proof of corpus delicti, no conviction can ensue, and acquittal is associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often noti ied the search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.
inexorable. through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited Comerciante v People
The police of icers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
arrest on the basis of a solitary tip: the radio message that a certain For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2)
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
pickup carrying three (3) people was transporting marijuana from elements must concur, namely:
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
Pikit. When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly matching this
do not apply to routine airport procedures. (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
description) reached the checkpoint, the arresting of icers went
ahead to initiate a search asking the driver about inspecting the indicating that he has just committed, is actually
vehicle. Only upon this insistence did the driver alight. It was also Dela Cruz v People 2016 Leonen Division committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
only upon a police of icer's further prodding did he open the hood. (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
the arresting of icer. g. Checkpoint Searches Bus Searches/Inspections

On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the
time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the Valmonte v de Villa Saluday v People 2018 En Banc
arresting of icer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military
accused had committed it.
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao
In both instances, the of icer's personal knowledge of the fact of enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission or establishing effective Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where
the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the bene it of passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco
(a), the of icer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive
he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shirt to inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where
The Court inds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggages.
that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable clearly re lected in the increased killings in cities of police and Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article
accuracy — especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and military men by NPA. III of the Constitution inds no application, thereby precluding the
while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
necessity for a warrant.
hour — miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two
(2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also People v Escano In the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following
notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to guidelines. Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which
Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport
are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in
former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning
a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly,
a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be
routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right
handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required
to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as
criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, which
a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the
showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the
vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two.
the same would not have been suf icient in order to effect a lawful passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban terminal.
enforced by the COMELEC. The facts adduced do not constitute a
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or
ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three
against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were
Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose
"stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard
windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were
approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause. can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and
carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their lashlights
his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is forced
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clari ies the requirement further. It inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or
to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal
does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing
articles carried by a passenger on board. Second, whenever a bus
It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.
picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked
frisk" exception. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine
of icer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the invoked. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn inspection by government agents or private security personnel as
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because
Police of icers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. checkpoints may still be inferred from their ixed location and the unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the
There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent regularized manner in which they are operated. way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be lagged down at
criminal activity." designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can
board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own

bags or luggages. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system
of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior independent counsel by the investigating of icer.
political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit 3. The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where
must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid
the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and af irmed by the the investigating of icer, provided that before such report is signed,
reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the or thumb-marked if the person arrested or detained does not know
the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to
persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any
suggestion by the principal law of icer of the government, the him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the
cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second,
Solicitor General in this case, or other of icer acting under his
neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as investigating of icer in the language or dialect known to such
direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may
insidious pro iling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report
not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property,
instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be
foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the 4. Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested,
protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be
judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
continued to ensure public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized
political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that
antagonistic jurisdiction." latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was
planted against the accused. the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
i. Effect of invalid search and seizure mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of
others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their tenninals, extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category. proceeding.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly V. Rights of a Person Under Custodial Investigation 5. Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions
accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these Section 12. Any person under investigation for the commission of an investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent presence of his counsel; otherwise such waiver shall be null and
while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own void and of no effect.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be 6. Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation
Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private provided with one. xxxx shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his
or personal use, as in the case of taxis. immediate family, or any medical doctor of priest or religious
Republic Act 7438 🔗 minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family
h. Immunity from arrest or by his counsel, or by any national non-government organization
1. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or by any
Art. VI, Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of at all times be assisted by counsel. international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six 2. Any public of icer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or Of ice of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the include his or her spouse, iance or iancee, parent or child, brother
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece,
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and guardian or ward.
thereof. and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the
WHO v Aquino privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without

one acting in his behalf; a. Origin and rationale
prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" of icer for any violation of law.
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be
People v Moreno y Tazon 2020 Division informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be Miranda v Arizona
conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid
Appellant likewise questions the legality of his identi ication and The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as
waiver has been made;
arrest and the conduct of custodial investigation. He alleges that the it exists today is inherently intimidating, and works to undermine the
procedure was irregular and that he was deprived of his 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has privilege against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive
constitutional right to have a counsel present. the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
- telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be
Even assuming that appellant's arrest was irregular, still, it is not a retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or the product of his free choice.
jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
person arrested submits to arraignment without objection. The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited
expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our
There was no violation of appellant's right to counsel during by/confer with duly accredited national or international
adversary system, and guarantees to the individual the "right to
custodial investigation. The records show that appellant was non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
informed of his constitutional rights when he was arrested. Since he of icer to ensure that this is accomplished;
his own will," during a period of custodial interrogation as well as in
chose to remain silent, he was not interrogated and no statement or 7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said the courts or during the course of other of icial investigations.
evidence was extracted from him; neither was any evidence rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
presented in court that was supposedly obtained from him during In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures
intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
custodial investigation. to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: the
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed
must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will
People v Mahinay
presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has
It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights speak; during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
which had become insuf icient and which the Court must update in appointed to represent him.
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate
the light of new legal developments: in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that
investigation must be informed in a language known to and indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is
understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has present.
shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, already begun;
Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an
information or communication must be in a language known to 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
and understood by said person; his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, intelligently waived his right to counsel.
any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or
Where the individual answers some questions during in-custody
volunteered some statements;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all interrogation, he has not waived his privilege, and may invoke his
times and have the presence of an independent and competent 11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the right to remain silent thereafter.
lawyer, preferably of his own choice; case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,
The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any
inadmissible in evidence.
services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant.
lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may
be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or
b. Custodial Investigation: nature and scope crime, Fernandez was not assisted by a lawyer at that time. Atty. silent and to counsel. We note that the alleged admission is
Francisco only arrived past 1:00 p.m. after Fernandez had already incriminating because it places the accused in the company of the
People v Fernandez y Dela Vega 2018 Division been subjected to questioning by the police of icers starting 6:00 a.m. victim at the time the crime was probably committed.
Moreover, Atty. Francisco was not an independent counsel. Atty. The exclusionary rule applies.
According to Fernandez, his extrajudicial confession cannot be
Francisco testi ied that he was a legal consultant in the Of ice of the
used against him since the same was inadmissible.
Municipal Mayor of Binmaley. As such, his duty was to provide legal People v Cabiles
It is settled that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in advice to the Mayor whose duty, in turn, is to execute the laws and
evidence against the accused, the same must be ordinances and maintain peace and order in the municipality. To our An admission made without the assistance of counsel during
mind, Atty. Francisco cannot be considered as an independent custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence (People vs.
(a) voluntary,
counsel since protecting the rights of Fernandez as a suspect is in Cascalla). Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it
(b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent
direct con lict with his duty to the Municipal Mayor and the local was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
counsel,
government of the Municipality. evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
(c) express, and
voluntarily given (People vs. Agustin). An uncounselled extrajudicial
(d) in writing. The Court inds that Atty. Francisco was not vigilant in protecting the
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel – that is, in
rights of Fernandez during the course of the custodial investigation.
Article III, Section 12(3) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Any writing and in the presence of counsel – is inadmissible in evidence
Atty. Francisco allowed Fernandez to answer each question without
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section (People vs. Cabintoy).
reminding him that he can refuse to answer them and/or remain
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
silent. In contrast, accused-appellant’s verbal confession before Marites Nas
Moreover, Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7438 requires that "any Atienza is, however, admissible in evidence. The case in point is
Given these circumstances, Fernandez's extrajudicial confession is
person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation shall at People vs. Andan where we ruled that the accused’s verbal
inadmissible in evidence.
all times be assisted by counsel." confession made in a private meeting with the municipal mayor,
spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is admissible in evidence
In People v. Cachuela, the Court held that a custodial investigation c. Prohibited conduct of custodial investigation since it is to be covered by the requirements of Section 12(1) and (3)
is:
of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the
any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a Sec. 12[2]. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other mayor as a con idant and as not a law enforcement of icer,
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights.
action in any signi icant manner. x x x It begins when there is no detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the detention are prohibited. spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by
investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or d. Right to remain silent orally admitted having committed the crime – as in the case at bar.
exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense. People v Bravo e. Right to have independent and competent counsel,
In this case, Fernandez was not assisted by counsel at all times The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a preferably of own choice
during his custodial investigation. The records show that Fernandez written extra-judicial confession; the admission was allegedly made
was assisted by Atty. Francisco only during the time he executed his People v Deniega
to the arresting of icer during an "informal talk" at the police station
extrajudicial confession. However, no lawyer assisted Fernandez at after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita
the time he was arrested and brought to the police station to answer Four fundamental requirements needed of admissibility of a
Antolin. The arresting policeman testi ied that the appellant admitted confession, to wit:
questions about the robbery with homicide. that he was with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994, the (1) the confession must be voluntary;
Fernandez testi ied that he was brought to the Binmaley Police probable time of the commission of the crime and that he carried her (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
Station at 6:00 a.m. on June 16, 2011 and was asked if he was the one on his shoulder but that he was too drunk to remember what competent and independent counsel;
responsible for the crime and if he would rather admit the same. subsequently happened. The arresting policeman admitted that he (3) the confession must be express; and
Despite the fact that he was already considered as a suspect of the did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain (4) the confession must be in writing.
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely

A thorough reading of the transcripts of the testimonies of the two We ind the second requisite lacking. Prosecution witness SPO3
gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy
lawyers, Atty. Sansano and Atty Rous, indicates that they appeared Jamoralin testi ied that the accused and appellant were arrested and
of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice
less as agents of the accused during the alleged investigation than brought to the police station at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991.
given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the
they were agents of the police authorities. In the case before us, it The records show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was
lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing
was the police authorities who brought the accused, handcuffed, to taken down by Pat. David D. Tuazon at 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991.
of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein compliance with
the IBP headquarters where the services of the lawyers were Atty. Lao con irmed on the stand that the police investigators called
the accused's constitutional rights, the constitutional standard
supposedly "engaged." No details of the actual assistance rendered him at around 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991, and that he conferred
guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 (1) is not met.
during the interrogation process were furnished or alleged during the with the accused for about 10 minutes prior to the execution of the
entire testimony of the lawyers in open court. The bulk of the The investigation was actually conducted in the absence of counsel in extrajudicial confession. Evidently, Rodriguez and appellant were
lawyers' oral testimonies merely gave the trial court assurance that one place (the QC SID headquarters) and signed in the presence of detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the
they supposedly explained to the appellants their constitutional counsel in another (the QC IBP of ice). These facts lead us to the fourth day of detention when accused was about to put his confession
rights, that the signatures present were their signatures and those of inevitable conclusion that the confessions of both defendants were in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and
the accused, and that the accused agreed to having the lawyers assist obtained in the absence of independent and competent counsel as appellant were arrested and brought to the police station, they were
them during the process of custodial investigation. mandated by the 1987 Constitution. already under custodial investigation.
Clearly, the standards utilized by police authorities (and the lawyers) In the case of People v. Bolanos, we held that an accused who is on
to assure the constitutional rights of the accused in the case at bench People v Culala board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already
fall short of the standards demanded by our case law and the under custodial investigation, and should therefore be accorded his
On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of
Constitution itself. rights under the Constitution. In this case, the teaching of Bolanos
accused-appellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial
clearly went unheeded.
The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be investigation he was assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal
as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. In People vs. Bandula, it was Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, held that a Municipal Attorney cannot be an independent investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., counsel as required by the Constitution. As a legal of icer of the crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a
that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor suspect. When Rodriguez and appellant were arrested by the police
rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they were already the suspects
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is in the slaying of the security guard, Ramon Matias, and should have
the individual's constitutional rights. In People vs. Basay, this Court therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the been afforded the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 of the
stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain defense of the accused without running into con lict of interests. He 1987 Constitution, particularly the right to counsel. The records do
silent and to counsel "contemplates the transmission of is no better than a iscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the not show that Rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their arrest in
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and accused during custodial investigations. Consequently, for being the afternoon of October 11, 1991, were informed of the well-known
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." violative of the Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of Miranda rights. Worse, they were not provided with competent and
accused-appellant is inadmissible. independent counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial execution of the extrajudicial confession.
investigation (if the latter could not afford one) "should be engaged
People v Rodriguez and Artellero Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under custodial investigation
by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person
authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very
The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a confession
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to ile are start thereof. In this case, Rodriguez and appellant were in the hands
such petition." Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials (1) the confession must be voluntary; of the police for about four days without the assistance of counsel.
are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of In People v. de Jesus (213 SCRA 345 [1992]) the Court said that
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers competent and independent counsel; admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the
and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. (3) the confession must be express; and bene it of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial (4) the confession must be in writing. presence of counsel are still lawed under the Constitution.
and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor every page thereof in the presence of counsel Angot. Consequently,
In People v. Olivarez, Jr., theCourt explained that:
did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. there was an effective waiver of the right to remain silent.
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial When appellant talked with the mayor as a con idant and not as a law
The main question in this case is whether accused-appellant validly
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting enforcement of icer, his uncounselled confession to him did not
waived his right to remain silent and, therefore, whether his
confession even by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
confession is admissible in evidence against him.
to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the "evil of constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence, it must
for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant satisfy the following requirements:
prosecute and thereafter convict him." These constitutional orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution
(1) the confession must be voluntary;
guarantees have been made available to protect him from the bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
(2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and
inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude
independent counsel preferably of the confessant's choice;
such investigation. the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
(3) it must be express; and
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
(4) it must be in writing.
telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the
People v Andan
mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. The Court inds that accused-appellant's confession satis ies the said
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the requirements.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly
policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were Accused-appellant, when asked, said he wanted to have the assistance
admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by
made during custodial investigation without the assistance of of counsel. Atty. Anggot of PAO was appointed counsel de of icio to
news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating of icer.
counsel. assist accused-appellant and the latter expressly accepted her
We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and appointment as his counsel before giving his confession. As this
shall have the right are admissible in evidence. Court has held, a PAO lawyer can be considered an independent
counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that
(1) to remain silent; he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of
(2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his People v Bacor
the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
own choice; and adverse to that of the accused-appellant. Thus, the assistance of a
Atty. Miriam D. Angot, the PAO lawyer who assisted the appellant
(3) to be informed of such rights. PAO lawyer in the present case satis ies the constitutional
testi ied that before the in-custody interrogation started, she even
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence asked the police escorts then present to leave the room. She then requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused.
of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this ascertained from accused-appellant Victor Bacor himself that the
provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. latter was not cajoled nor coerced into making the intended People v Base
confession and apprised him further of his right to remain silent and
The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or The crux of accused-appellant's appeal hinges on the admissibility of
not to answer any question propounded to him. He was warned that
investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what the Sworn Statement dated February 8, 1990. In challenging its
statements made by him might be used against him in the future.
really transpired. probative value, he insists in sum that the document is inadmissible
Bacor then intimated that he was confessing to the crime for the
It cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before simple reason that he had done it. He was again informed of his in evidence because it was executed in violation of his constitutional
the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has constitutional rights by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura before the actual rights, irstly his right to counsel of his own choice.
"operational supervision and control" over the local police and may taking of his extrajudicial confession. Despite all these, the appellant While the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the
arguably be deemed a law enforcement of icer for purposes of proceeded into confessing that he was the one who killed the victim services of counsel de parte is not absolute.
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Dionesio Albores.
However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the
All throughout the custodial investigation, Atty. Miriam Angot of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not PAO took pains to explain meaningfully to the accused each and every
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude
query posed by SPO3 Ydulzura. Accused then stamped his approval to other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling
talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely the extrajudicial confession by af ixing his signature on each and his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can

With respect to the irst requisite, we ind that Espiritu readily The assistance rendered to appellant by Atty. Mangallay met the
impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
admitted killing Sanad when he was confronted by the relatives of the standards that had been set in Deniega for the purpose of
selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to
deceased. Thereafter, without being "invited" by the investigating safeguarding the right of the accused against involuntary confession.
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
of icers, he went to the police station and voluntarily gave his In the present case, the counsel was vigilant in informing Espiritu of
contemplated by the framers of the charter.
statement to SPO1 Wilfredo P. Cabanayan. Later, appellant af irmed his rights. He was clear in explaining to his client every question
While the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial before Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell the fact that he, with Atty. propounded by the investigating of icer. And he was not negligent in
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally Mangallay, had gone to the police station to surrender and that the relating to the appellant the legal consequences of the latter's
lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the inal said counsel had assisted him when the police started taking his extrajudicial confession.
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for statement. In his confession, appellant admitted that he and Malicdan
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed killed Sanad, after being hired by Alicoy to do so for the sum of People v Turla
engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection P20,000. Aside from describing the details of how he and his cohort
against the former's appointment during the course of the killed Sanad, Espiritu, during an ocular inspection, even pointed out Counsel for the appellant points out that the only incriminating
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the place where the killing had been committed. evidence against him is the Receipt for Custody which contains a
his statement before the swearing of icer. list of things, a sack of marijuana leaves included, found inside the
Competent and Independent Counsel
car driven by the appellant when he was apprehended by PC soldiers
Verily, to be an effective counsel "[a] lawyer need not challenge all
The defense contends that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo and which bears the signature of the appellant. But, this receipt,
the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a Kinao and not by appellant. It is also argued that the said lawyer was according to counsel for the accused-appellant is inadmissible in
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything unable to advise or to explain the contents of the extrajudicial evidence as the signature of the accused therein was obtained by
which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our confession to the appellant before the latter signed it. means of force and intimidation during custodial investigation
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the without the assistance of counsel.
accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should We are not persuaded. At the outset, we must clarify that the right to
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own The Court agrees with counsel for the accused-appellant that the
truth." counsel. The constitutional requirement is satis ied when a counsel Receipt for Custody is inadmissible in evidence, as it was signed by
is the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of
A circumspect scrutiny of the records leaves this Court unconvinced counsel of his choice and without having been irst informed of his
of accused-appellant's claim that he was not adequately assisted by (1) engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under
constitutional right to silence and to counsel. The said Receipt is a
counsel during his custodial interrogation. investigation OR
declaration against interest and a tacit admission of the crime
(2) appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or by
charged, since mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is
someone on his behalf.
People v Espiritu punished by law. The Receipt is in the same category as
Thus, that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by the appellant extra-judicial confessions outlawed by the Constitution.
A counsel-assisted, voluntary confession of guilt is evidence of personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of counsel
strong persuasive weight. It becomes overwhelming when it is deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted
corroborated by independent prosecution evidence pointing to People v Mahinay, supra
on behalf of Appellant Espiritu. Besides, Espiritu did not object when
appellant as the perpetrator of a killing. Atty. Mangallay represented him during the investigations before the Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial
Espiritu insists that his confession was obtained in violation of his police and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged confession, which he, however, claims was executed in violation of
rights (1) to have an independent and competent counsel and (2) to Atty. Mangallay as his counsel. his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the
be informed of such right. Further, he argues that he was not advised records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned
The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present
by Atty. Mangallay of the consequences of the execution of a and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed
from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview,
confession. pre-interrogatory and custodial rights.
counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
We are convinced that the confession of Appellant Espiritu is investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to
admissible in evidence, as it was satisfactorily shown that it was (1) give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to Lumanog v People, supra
voluntary and (2) made with the assistance of a competent and remain silent or terminate the interview.
Police of icers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of
independent counsel.
his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel
would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of
competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be
and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided probative value. merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful
with one (1). However, since these rights can only be waived in information to the suspect.
writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been People v Obrero Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in
such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at
custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here,
the IBP Of ice, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession
accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though
overnight at the police station before he was brought to said counsel. which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with
presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent
homicide. He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in
P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel began in counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was
executing his confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That
the morning of June 20, 1996, the irst time said suspect was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted
was the reason, he said, he refused to sign the booking and
presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he was brought to accused-appellant.
information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial confession ive
the IBP Of ice for the taking of his formal statement. Thus, the
times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him. As observed in People v. Bandula, the independent counsel required
possibility of appellant Joel having been subjected to intimidation or
by Art. III, §12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private
violence in the hands of police investigators as he claims, cannot be There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated
prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose
discounted. The constitutional requirement obviously had not been in this constitutional provision:
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police of icer tries to
(1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant’s extrajudicial
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt
suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, confession is inadmissible in evidence.
with in paragraph 2 of §12, and
unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) those which are given without the bene it of Miranda
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial f. Right to be informed
warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same
investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a
§12.
confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating People v Canoy
statements. To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign
ive times is not the same confession but different parts thereof. We It is settled that one's right to be informed of the right to remain
The question really is whether or not Atty. Sansano was an
discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of
independent and competent counsel as to satisfy the constitutional
the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant ive times. meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
requirement. We held that the modi ier competent and independent in
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is
the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed
not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under
accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and
investigation the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the
Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such
explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. An effective and extrajudicial confession and sign it for ive times, there is no reason
provision in practical terms — e.g., what the person under
vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The
interrogation may or may not do — and in a language the subject
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the inference rather was that no force was used to make
fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a
confessant answers the irst question asked by the investigating accused-appellant execute the confession, otherwise, he could also
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain,
of icer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the have been forced to sign the booking and information sheet.
and contemplates effective communication which results in the
lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is subject's understanding of what is conveyed. Since it is
that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and
the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the
constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be
statement is presumed to be psychologically coerced. education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of
antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
the person undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the right to
and to be presumed innocent. There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights
counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he
to accused-appellant without any effort to ind out from him whether
Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be
told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one could be implied admission of guilt, which should have been done in writing, face to face with the witness for identi ication. It is done thru mug
provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel of with the assistance of his counsel, or after a valid waiver of these shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, rights. suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identi ies the
chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x. In
Remarkably, neither P/Insp. Villamer nor SPO4 Pequiras testi ied that
effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel, who, resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
Marvin was informed of his rights, much less granted the
under prevailing jurisprudence, must be a lawyer. identi ication of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
opportunity to obtain a counsel of his own choice. Marvin, on
circumstances test where they consider the following factors,
We are convinced that the foregoing constitutional rights of the.other hand, narrated in his direct examination that he was not
viz[.]:
GREGORIO were violated in these cases. informed of his rights
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
The records show that the document of Waiver (Exh. "F") signed by Without the assistance of a counsel, and in the absence of a valid
the crime;
GREGORIO was prepared on 7 February 1990 but was subscribed and waiver of this right, Marvin's "voluntary" answer to P/Insp. Villamer
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
sworn to on 19 February 1990 before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose is inadmissible as evidence of his guilt.
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
Garcia, Jr. Over the signature of Atty. Ridgeway Tanjili, the following
Another circumstantial evidence considered by the trial court is the (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
words were typed: "Declarant assisted by counsel."
alleged confession of Marvin to Virgie, the mother of the identi ication;
No meaningful information as to his rights under custodial complainant. Unlike Marvin's admission to P/Insp. Villamer, the (5) the length of time between the crime and the identi ication;
interrogation was conveyed to GREGORIO. He was not asked if he confession to Virgie, a private party, is not within the scope of the and
wanted to avail of his rights and was not told that if he has no lawyer constitutional and statutory limitations on extrajudicial confessions. (6) the suggestiveness of the identi ication procedure.
of his own choice he could avail of one to be appointed for him.
This notwithstanding, the Court should still inquire upon the Applying the totality of circumstances test, We ind appellant's
Furthermore, the waiver states that he does not want the assistance of
voluntariness of the confession. The prosecution must establish out-of-court identi ication to be reliable and thus admissible. To
counsel and it is not shown that he agreed to be assisted by Atty.
that the accused spoke freely, without inducement of any kind, and recall, Adelriza after being awakened when a hard object hit her head
Tanjili.
fully aware of the consequences of the confession. This may be and after she switched on the lights inside the room, had a clear and
inferred from the language of the confession, as when the accused direct view of the attack on her husband and the perpetrator.
g. Waiver provided details known only to him or her. Moreover, she described with certainty the assailant to the police
cartographer barely hours from the time of the incident, which
Sec. 12 (1). These rights cannot be waived except In the present case, the Court cannot determine the voluntariness of
description matched the facial features of the appellant, whom she
Marvin's supposed confession to Virgie because it was not reduced
subsequently identi ied as the assailant. In other words, the interval
into writing or recorded in another manner. The Court can only rely
1. in writing and between the time she witnessed the crime and her identi ication of
on the testimony of Virgie as to the substance of Marvin's confession.
2. in the presence of counsel. the appellant, was merely a matter of hours, leaving no room for her
Aside from her testimony, there is no independent evidence that
recollection to be tainted.
establishes the voluntariness and substance of Marvin's alleged
h. Effect of non-compliance
extrajudicial confession. Verily, it was Adelriza's own description that led to the apprehension
of the appellant. There was no evidence on record indicating any hint
Sec. 12(3). Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
i. Out of Court Identifications/Police Line-ups of a suggestion from the police of icer who presented the appellant to
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Adelriza. Hence, the identi ication of the appellant as the culprit of
People v Moreno y Tazón, supra the crime stands.
Porteria y Manebali v People, supra
A police line-up is not indispensable for the proper and fair VI. Right to Bail
Marvin was already under custodial investigation, having been
identi ication of offenders. The important consideration is for the
placed in the custody of the police, or deprived of his freedom of
victim to positively declare that the persons charged were the
action in a signi icant manner. Thus, when the police of icers asked Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
malefactors.
Marvin regarding the discovery of the motorcycle's registration by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
documents in his possession, Marvin's right to counsel Out-of-court identi ication is conducted by the police in various conviction, be bailable by suf icient sureties, or be released on
automatically attached. Furthermore, his answer constitutes an ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is

bail or require him to submit his recommendation; grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
a. Bail, defined application for bail regardless of whether or not the
discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
properly exercise this discretion, he must irst conduct a hearing to
Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court. Bail is the security given for the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion lies
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a court to exercise its sound discretion;
not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held,
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the
under the conditions hereinafter speci ied. Bail may be given in the form summary of evidence of the prosecution; and prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused.
of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing
upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should for a petition for bail is required in order for the court to consider the
b. When matter of right; When matter of discretion
be denied. guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in
ixing the amount of bail.
Te v Perez
Villanueva v Buaya
Respondent Judge clearly acted irregularly when he motu proprio Balanay v Adalim-White
ixed and granted bail and subsequently reduced the amount thereof, Basco v. Rapatalo laid down the rules outlining the duties of a judge
in both instances, without hearing the side of the prosecution. in case an application for bail is iled: Respondent admits allowing Adamas six consecutive furloughs to
Irrespective of his opinion that the evidence of guilt against the attend regular sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence of Oras, Eastern Samar based on very urgent motions that did not
bail or require him to submit his recommendation x x x;
demands that a hearing be conducted before bail could be contain notice of hearing and were not heard in open court.
ixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
It is basic, however, that bail hearing is necessary even if the
justi ied. whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
prosecution does not interpose any objection or leaves the
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
Respondent Judge should not have granted bail simply on the failure application for bail to the sound discretion of the court.
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion x x
of the prosecution to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused x; A fortiori, respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of
was strong but should have endeavored to determine the existence of the law for granting ex parte motions to allow Adama's temporary
such evidence. Under the present rules, a hearing is required in (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
liberty without setting the same for hearing. If hearing is
granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. A based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution x x x;
indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the
motion to reduce the amount of bail likewise requires a hearing [and]
motions for the temporary liberty of Adamas were iled without
before it is granted in order to afford the prosecution the chance to (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the offering any bail or without any prayer that he be released on
oppose it. In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or accused upon the approval of the [bail bond]. x x x recognizance. Besides, the reasons relied upon in said motions - to
discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the Otherwise, petition should be denied. allow Adamas to attend the Sangguniang Bayan sessions - had already
prosecutor or iscal, or at least he must be asked for his been rebuked by this Court. In People v. Hon. Maceda reiterated in
recommendation. If the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence In the present case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant
Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel Sr., this Court held that "all prisoners
or fails to interpose an objection, it is still mandatory for the court bail on the same day that it was iled by the accused. He did this
whether under preventive detention or serving inal sentence cannot
to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clari icatory questions. without the required notice and hearing. He justi ied his action on the
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation or
In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing ex-parte motion by arguing that the offense charged against the
hold of ice, elective or appointive, while in detention."
should still be held. accused was a bailable offense; a hearing was no longer required
since bail was a matter of right. Under the present Rules of Court,
We reiterate the following duties of judges in case an application for however, notice and hearing are required whether bail is a matter of People v Escobar 2017 Leonen Division
bail is iled: right or discretion.
Res judicata applies only in a inal judgment in a civil case, not in an
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail interlocutory order in a criminal case. An order disposing a petition
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for hearing in petitions for bail. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the for bail is interlocutory. This order does not attain inality when a
new matter warrants a second look on the application for bail. Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her without valid justi ication;
Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed (c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
has been arrested and detained but "whose guilt has not yet been innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing parole, or conditional pardon;
proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is the commission of a crime. The notion that bail is required to punish (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. a person accused of crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. of light if released on bail; or
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
the right to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, during the pendency of the appeal.
accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the his presence at trial. In Leviste v. Court of Appeals (Leviste), We explained that the
Regional Trial Court. However, if the accused is charged with an foregoing provisions contemplate two scenarios. First, where none
offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take
of the listed bail-negating circumstances is present, the Court may
imprisonment—"regardless of the stage of the criminal light. This is the reason precisely why the probability or the
grant or deny bail based on its sound judicial discretion. Second, if a
prosecution"—and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then improbability of light is an important factor to be taken into
bail-negating circumstance exists, the Court has no other option but
the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases. The
to deny or cancel the bail. We, however, emphasized that the
court. exception to the fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct
enumeration in Section 5 is not exclusive. The appellate court is not
ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is a mere fact- inding body whose authority is limited in determining
death, reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar's bail is, thus, a whether any of the ive circumstances mentioned in the third
matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt b.1. Effect if offense changed from non-bailable to paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. 48 Hence, the Court may
is not strong. bailable consider "other similar circumstances" in its allowance, denial, or
revocation of bail.
The RTC denied Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res
Rule 114 🔗
judicata. The CA overturned this and correctly ruled that his Second The Sandiganbayan misapplied Leviste. When the third paragraph of
Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata. Escobar's Second Bail Section 5, Rule 114 Revised Rules speaks of "other similar
b.2. Bail pending appeal
Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not circumstances" which would result in the denial or cancellation of
recognized in criminal proceedings. bail, it refers to matters extraneous or separate from the fact of
⭐People v Sales 2019 Resolution conviction. It cannot include the conviction of the accused because
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements: the provision irst and foremost presupposes that the accused was
In non-capital offenses where the trial court imposes the penalty of
1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be inal; imprisonment exceeding six years, the conviction of the accused of already found guilty by the court and was sentenced to suffer the
2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having the crime charged does not ipso facto negate bail pending appeal. penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years. If the fact of conviction
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; would be treated as a bail-negating circumstance, the rules on bail
3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the Sales argues that there is absolutely no basis for the cancellation of pending appeal would be rendered nugatory.
merits; and his bail because the prosecution failed to prove the presence of any of
the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, We clarify that conviction of the accused of the crime charged is
4. There must be between the irst and second actions, identity irrelevant only in bail application pending appeal where the
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. Article 114 of the Revised Rules.
penalty imposed is not reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment,
Res judicata applies only when there is a inal judgment on the If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding or death. The Revised Rules is clear that when a person is charged
merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
even if this order is not appealed. cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the or death, he/she shall not be admitted to bail, regardless of the stage
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: of the criminal prosecution, when evidence of his/her guilt is strong.
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral Conviction of a capital offense imports that evidence against
matter—whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty—and is (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the the accused is strong so bail pending appeal is foreclosed.
not a inal judgment on accused's guilt or innocence.
circumstance of reiteration; Since Sales' conviction by the Sandiganbayan does not per se negate
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal con inement, bail, the case before Us would fall in the irst scenario discussed in
Enrile v Sandiganbayan (Resolution and Decision)
Leviste. Consequently, We may use the "less stringent sound discretion to cancel petitioner's bail. Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty,
discretion approach" in determining whether the bail previously could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
granted to Sales should be revoked or cancelled. c. Standards for fixing bail Petitioner's contention is untenable.
We rule that Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling Sales' bail. In cases of
Padua v People 2019 Division A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
bail pending appeal, the purpose of bail is for the accused to avoid
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the
the potential hardships of prison, while at the same time prevent his
The subject Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash nature and function of a bail bond.
light from custody and to ensure the protection of the community
Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) is distinct and separate from an
from potential danger. Aside from its bare allegations, the Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of
application for bail where custody of law is required. A motion to
prosecution failed to prove that Sales is a light risk or a danger to the the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to
quash is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the
society. put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in
court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
custody of the proper of icer, and to secure the appearance of the
that it is the very issue. Its prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
⭐Reyes v People 2019 Leonen Division accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
jurisdiction of the court which is also as an exception to the rule that
require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
iling pleadings seeking af irmative relief constitutes voluntary
The grant of bail after a judgment of conviction is discretionary upon himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the
the courts. Bail may be denied if the courts ind any of the presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
jurisdiction of the court.
circumstances present in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate
Thus, in iling the subject Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad
Even the 1987 Constitution mandates that bail is a matter of right in court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the
Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail), petitioners are
bailable offenses before conviction. consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We ind no abuse of
questioning the court's jurisdiction with precaution and praying that
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for
After conviction of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion the court ix the amount of bail because they believed that their right
permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the grant of bail becomes to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. They are not applying
contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been
discretionary upon the court, which may either deny or grant it. In for bail, therefore, custody of the law, or personal appearance is not
committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the
circumstances where the penalty imposed exceeds six (6) years, required. To emphasize, custody of the law is required before the
country after it had satis ied itself that she would comply with the
the court is not precluded from cancelling the bail previously granted court can act upon the application for bail but it is not required for
conditions of her bail bond.
upon a showing by the prosecution of the circumstances enumerated the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the accused, as in the
in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The presence of even one instant omnibus motion to quash warrant of arrest and to ix bail.
(1) of the enumerated circumstances is suf icient cause to deny or e. Effect on right when detention is questioned
The existence of a high degree of probability that the accused will
cancel bail.
abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase Rule 114 🔗
Here, the Sandiganbayan initially granted petitioner's application for the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the
bail on August 29, 2017. presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be f. Right to bail and extradition proceedings
subject, of course, to the constitutional provision that "excessive bail
The factual indings show the presence of two (2) circumstances
shall not be required." The recourse of the judge is to ix a higher Government of the USA v Purganan
stated in Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
amount of bail and not to deny the ixing of bail.
(1) petitioner had previously escaped from legal con inement, In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to the
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail d. Right to bail and right to travel right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
without a valid justi ication; and proceedings are pending?
(2) he poses a light risk if admitted to bail. Manotoc, Jr. v CA Generally NO, except a clear and convincing showing that the
The Sandiganbayan did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, but rather, potential extraditess will not be a light risk and there exist special,
Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
arrived at its decision with due consideration of the arguments humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel? NO.
presented by the prosecution.
Five Postulates of Extradition
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of
There was. thus, no error in the Sandiganbayan's exercise of its
right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and 1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime; (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person
Accused; cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it may properly be a subject of international law is now taking
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis; grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith; law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
Since this exception has no express or speci ic statutory basis, and
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight. second half of the past century.
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above A reexamination of this Court's ruling in Purganan is in order.
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
possible, a prima facie inding whether forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an First, we note that the exercise of the State's power to deprive an
individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
(a) they are suf icient in form and substance,
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
(b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept,
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
and it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is
(c) the person sought is extraditable. not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the Second, if bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by justi ication why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases.
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our
documentation or may personally examine the af iants and witnesses Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign
country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised.
of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
facie inding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
Government of Hong Kong SAR v Olalia, Jr. correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
discretion of the judge.
state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed GADALEJ in
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature
then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest admitting private respondent to bail.
criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the The constitutional right to bail " lows from the presumption of punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its
petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is
issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a
Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
offenses for which he is charged. Jimenez should apply for bail before state from which he led, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in
the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the international law: But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized
extradition court. by the following:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
The rule is that bail is NOT a matter of right in extradition international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb attained global recognition; extraditee and
grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. international sphere; also "the machinery of criminal law."
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23,
hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed universal human rights in ful illing their treaty obligations;
1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the
under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted and
trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a light extradition, on the other.
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was
risk or a danger to the community; and
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly noti ied and
court to grant him bail. Philippines (double criminality rule).
his failure to appear is unjusti iable.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an It was as to the sixth element that the CA took exception as not having
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from been established. Although the crime of conspiracy to defraud was Rule 115, Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 1. Rights of
iling a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. included among the offenses covered by the RP-Hong Kong accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
Agreement, and the RTC and the CA have agreed that the crime was be entitled to the following rights:
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the
analogous to the felony of estafa through false pretense as de ined
same as that in criminal proceedings. The prospective extraditee thus
and penalized under Article 315(2) of the Revised Penal Code, it was (a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a light risk
disputed whether or not the other crime of accepting an advantage
and should be granted bail. reasonable doubt.
as an agent was also punished as a crime in the Philippines.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof (b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be against him.
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested (c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
states. This simply means that the requested state comes under no
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however,
conduct covered by the request for extradition as criminal.
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set
is to prevent the prospective extraditee from leeing our jurisdiction. Because the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent charged forth in his bail, unless his presence is speci ically ordered by
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now against him in the HKSAR is one that deals with private sector
the court for purposes of identi ication. The absence of the
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he bribery, the conditions for the application of the double criminality
accused without justi iable cause at the trial of which he had
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in rule are obviously not met. Accordingly, the crime of accepting an
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard advantage as an agent must be dropped from the request for notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than extradition. Conformably with the principle of specialty (a state thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by may not prosecute a person extradited from another country for an deemed to have waived his right to be present on all
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a light risk and will offense other than the one for which the extradition was granted) subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. embodied in Article 17 of the RP-HK Agreement, Muñ oz should be motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in
proceeded against only for the seven counts of conspiracy to defraud. person when it suf iciently appears to the court that he can
Government of Hong Kong SAR v Muñoz properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.
See also: AM No. 15-06-10- SC (Continuous Trial System) (d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to
For purposes of the extradition of Munoz, the HKSAR as the
cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination.
requesting state must establish the following six elements, VII. Rights of the Accused
namely: His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(1) there must be an extradition treaty in force between the (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
Section 14. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
HKSAR and the Philippines; himself.
without due process of law. (criminal due process)
(2) the criminal charges that are pending in the HKSAR against (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at
the person to be extradited; the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
(3) the crimes for which the person to be extradited is charged testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with
are extraditable within the terms of the treaty; until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or
(4) the individual before the court is the same person charged in
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
the HKSAR;
(5) the evidence submitted establishes probable cause to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
believe that the person to be extradited committed the secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to
offenses charged; behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding cross-examine him.
(6) the offenses are criminal in both the HKSAR and the
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the

The requisite quantum of proof of proof beyond reasonable doubt presumed—their participation in the hazing as a principal—is
attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in is borne by the constitutional imperative of due process. It is also in lacking. Neither has it been shown how Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing
his behalf. keeping with the presumption of innocence of an accused until the Law does away with the requirement that the prosecution must prove
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial. contrary is proved. While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not the participation of the accused in the hazing beyond reasonable
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed demand absolute, impeccable, and infallible certainty, it still requires doubt.
by law. moral certainty.
On the contrary, the study of human behavior has shown that being
Here, the trial court gave extraordinary weight to the bare assertion of surrounded by people who approve or encourage one's conduct
a. To due process of law a police of icer, who was presented as the only witness to an alleged impairs otherwise independent judgment, be it in the form of peer
crime that he himself claimed to have been discovered because of a pressure, herd mentality, or the bystander effect.
Nunez v Sandiganbayan public disturbance. It trivialized the defense's version of events,
The term "groupthink" was coined by American psychologist
Petitioner claims that PD 1486, as amended, creating despite being more logical. This, coupled with an assertion of the
motives of the lone prosecution witness—extortion and getting even Irving L. Janis to describe the phenomenon of "mental deterioration
theSandiganbayan is violative of the due process, equal protection, of mental ef iciency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. after losing a bet—should have been enough to give pause especially
because of the fundamental guarantee for every accused to be from group pressures. " In hazing, presence is participation.
What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in presumed innocent.
criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson this Court succinctly Compare: Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Of icial
identi ied it with "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable Functions
Disputable Presumptions:
opportunity for the preparation of defense." In criminal
proceedings then, due process is satis ied if the accused is "informed ⭐People v Ordiz 2019 Division
⭐Fuertes v Senate of the Philippines 2020 Leonen En Banc
as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet,
with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted This Court has upheld the constitutionality of disputable In convicting Ordiz, both the RTC and CA relied so much on the
with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence presumption of regularity and the weak defense offered by Ordiz. The
presumptions in criminal laws. The constitutional presumption of
being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of presumption of regularity in the conduct of police of icers CANNOT
innocence is not violated when there is a logical connection
course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent trump the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. When
jurisdiction." guilty.
such prima facie evidence is unexplained or not contradicted by the
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of accused, the conviction founded on such evidence will be valid. Both courts overlooked the long-standing legal tenet that the starting
due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, However, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused point of every criminal prosecution is that the accused has the
generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of a disputable presumption constitutional right to be presumed innocent. And this presumption
does not preclude the presentation of contrary evidence. of innocence is overturned only when the prosecution has discharged
1. has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and its burden of proof in criminal cases: and has proven the guilt of the
2. proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law, which provides that
accused beyond reasonable doubt, by proving each and every
3. only punished after inquiry and investigation, an accused's presence during a hazing is prima facie evidence of his
element of the crime charged in the information, to warrant a inding
4. upon notice to him, or her participation, does not violate the constitutional presumption
of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
5. with an opportunity to be heard, and of innocence. This disputable presumption is also not a bill of
therein.
6. a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional attainder.
law, The Court stresses that the presumption of regularity in the
Generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of
then he has had due process of law. amount to conspiracy. Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the
innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional
participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be
guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be held
proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the
b. To be presumed innocent subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of
hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
evidence.
Here, petitioner fails to show that a logical relation between the fact
⭐De Guzman y Aguilar v People 2019 Leonen Division
proved-presence of a person during the hazing— and the ultimate fact Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be
properly presumed in favor of the policemen because the records constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
The Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense,
were replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a cause of the accusation against him, speci ically require certain
ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented,
presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police of icer matters to be stated in the Information for its suf iciency. The
enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform
must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his
the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the suf iciency
from thin air. To say it differently, it is the established basic fact that defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the charge. An Information may be suf icient to withstand a motion
triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any of the facts constituting the offense charged.
to quash, and yet insuf iciently inform the accused of the speci ic
hint of irregularity committed by the police of icers in arresting the
To be considered as suf icient and valid, an information must state details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court
accused and thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there
allow the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him
can be no presumption of regularity of performance in their favor.[ 1. the name of the accused;
2. the designation of the offense given by the statute; properly to plead and to prepare for trial.
c. To be heard 3. the acts or omissions constituting the offense; In general, a bill of particulars is the further speci ication of the
4. the name of the offended party; charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by
Rule 115, Section1, Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra 5. the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
6. the place where the offense was committed. prepare for trial.
People v Tulin An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the When allegations in an Information are vague or inde inite, the
offense; the evidentiary and other details can be provided during the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a
Does it constitute a violation of Hiong's constitutional right to be
trial. bill of particulars.
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the
ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of PD Ultimate facts is de ined as “those facts which the expected The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details of allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to
under Section 2 of said law? probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that the Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime charged,
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if
evidence will prove at the trial. albeit under vague terms. Notably, the speci ications that a bill of
there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that
of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA Ultimate facts have also been de ined as the principal, determinative, particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint
514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the and constitutive facts on whose existence the cause of action rests; or Information.
commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser they are also the essential and determining facts on which the court's
responsibility. conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support ⭐People v Solar y Dumbrique 2019 En Banc
in essential particulars.
In the assailed Decision, while the CA af irmed the RTC's inding that
d. To be informed of nature and cause of accusation Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to Rolando indeed killed Joseph, it downgraded the offense from Murder
establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the to Homicide for failure of the Information to suf iciently state the
Enrile v People ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the particular facts establishing the existence of the qualifying
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact. circumstance of treachery.
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal
offense has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that In sum, the Court, continually cognizant of its power and mandate to
accusation against him. the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
The objective is to describe the act with suf icient certainty to fully
convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable hereby lays down the following guidelines for the guidance of the
appraise the accused of the nature of the charge against him and to
doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Bench and the Bar:
avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the
During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully
accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at all. 1. Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or
know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware of
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of aggravating circumstance — in which the law uses a broad
an offense, signed by the prosecutor and iled with the court. The the crime imputed to him. term to embrace various situations in which it may exist,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of
superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — Decision.

The consequences of delay do not only affect the accused. The
is present, must state the ultimate facts relative to
prosecution of the case will also be made dif icult the longer the
such circumstance. Otherwise, the Information may be People v Cubay y Ugsalan 2019 Division period of time passes. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan:
subject to a motion to quash under Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form), Rule Here, appellant was charged with forty-four (44) counts of rape. Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the
117, or a motion for a bill of particulars under the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of
The Informations conspicuously lack the second element of rape, i.e.
parameters set by said Rules. time may make it dif icult or impossible for the government to carry
the accused employed force or intimidation, or that the victim was
its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies deprived of reason, unconscious, under twelve (12) years of age, or
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from
constitutes a waiver of his right to question the defective was demented.
courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall
statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in Thus, the Informations do not validly charge the crime of rape or any deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting
the Information, and consequently, the same may be offense at all. The same, for sure, cannot be the basis of a valid criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the government
appreciated against him if proven during trial. judgment of conviction. to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show
Alternatively, prosecutors may suf iciently aver the ultimate two things:
We are not unmindful of the rule that by his plea, an accused is
facts relative to a qualifying or aggravating circumstance by deemed to have waived all objections to the information. This rule, (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that
referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution inding however, is correct only insofar as formal objections to the pleadings which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and
probable cause against the accused, which resolution should are concerned. By express provision of Section 9, Rule 117 of the (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable
be attached to the Information in accordance with the second Rules of Court and by established jurisprudence, the validity of the to the ordinary processes of justice.
guideline below. Information vis-a-vis the essential issue of whether or not it
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the delay incurred in conducting
2. Prosecutors must ensure compliance with Section 8 (a), suf iciently charges an offense goes into the very foundation of
the preliminary investigation surely prejudiced the petitioners. After
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure that jurisdiction, hence, may be raised and addressed at any stage of the
submitting their counter-af idavits with the documents proving that
mandates the attachment to the Information the resolution proceedings.
Sikap Yaman had been a quali ied NGO and showing the express
inding probable cause against the accused. Trial courts authority of petitioner Martinez III to enter into the MOA, they had
must ensure that the accused is furnished a copy of this e. Speedy, impartial and public trial reasonable basis to become comfortable and to honestly believe
Decision prior to the arraignment. themselves cleared of the accusation They had no inkling whatsoever
Martinez III v People 2019 Division that the Of ice of the Ombudsman was in the meanwhile adding their
3. Cases which have attained inality prior to the promulgation
of this Decision will remain inal by virtue of the principle supposed failure to monitor the use of the funds by Sikap Yaman as
Although delay is not to be determined solely from the length of time
of conclusiveness of judgment. the recipient NGO in support of the accusation. The addition was
taken for the conduct of the preliminary investigation, a long delay is
without prior notice to them. Worse, the failure to monitor the use of
4. For cases which are still pending before the trial court, the inordinate unless the Of ice of the Ombudsman suitably justi ies it.
the funds by Sikap Yaman had not been supposedly required of them.
prosecution, when still able, may ile a motion to amend the The Constitution guarantees under Section 16, Article III the right to At least, they were not aware of the requirement, if true. With the
Information pursuant to the prevailing Rules in order to the speedy disposition of cases. The Court has adopted the lapse of nearly ive years from the submission of their counter
properly allege the aggravating or qualifying circumstance "balancing test" based on the landmark ruling of the United States af idavits, they were thus no longer in the position to adequately
pursuant to this Decision. Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo to the effect that in determining prepare themselves for their defense should further proceedings and
5. For cases in which a judgment or decision has already been the existence of inordinate delay the courts should consider the trial be held, including the gathering of evidence upon the new
rendered by the trial court and is still pending appeal, the presence of the following factors, namely; allegation that had meanwhile contributed another ground for their
case shall be judged by the appellate court depending on indictment for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
(1) the length of delay;
whether the accused has already waived his right to question (2) the reason for delay;
the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying (3) the defendant's assertion or non assertion of his or her right; Imperial, et al v Joson, et al
circumstance in the Information, (i.e., whether he previously and
iled either a motion to quash under Section 3(e), Rule 117, Although the Constitution concededly guarantees that "(a)ll persons
(4) the prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay. shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
or a motion for a bill of particulars) pursuant to this
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies", it is evident that different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial who manage what they do not understand."
petitioners' arguments in G.R. No. 160067 have more to do with the probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present
Respecting the possible in luence of media coverage on the
wisdom of the assailed rulings of the RTCs of Naga and Parañ aque danger, etc.
impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
than said courts' jurisdiction to issue the same. Consistent with its
In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., later reiterated in the case of prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial
function as a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al., we laid down the doctrine must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in People
however, the rule is settled that errors of judgment involving the
that: v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an
wisdom or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the province of a
petition for certiorari. Not being intended to correct every We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
controversial interlocutory ruling, a writ of certiorari cannot be to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused
exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. publicity, just like all high pro ile and high stake criminal trials. impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear
Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a of possible undue in luence is not tantamount to actual prejudice
In G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, we ind that petitioner resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
Francisco is similarly out on a limb in insisting that the Lucena RTC
responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre
gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Sariaya MTC's denial
for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of
of his motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 01-99 on the ground that
regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, accommodating even the parties to the cases - the private
his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Designed
especially in the criminal ield x x x. The press does not simply complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses - inside the
to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
publish information about trials but guards against the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
prosecution suspended over him for an inde inite time and to prevent
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
delays in the administration of justice, said right is considered An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
capricious and oppressive delays. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly
the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights
Far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the
characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is
delays entailed by the postponements of the aforesaid hearings were,
Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Francisco's own pursuit of
of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available
extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the
Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a inding of prejudicial seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
to the case, namely, Prosecutors Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., Francis Sia and publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have process.
Joel Baligod. been unduly in luenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual f. To confront witnesses and to compulsory processes
bias and he has not discharged the burden.
e.1. Right to speedy trial vs. Freedom of the press
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence ⭐People v Sergio and Lacanilao 2019 Division
Estrada v Desierto to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the May a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Veloso, who was convicted
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer of drug traf icking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian
Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. Government and who is presently con ined in a prison facility in
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases iled against
Indonesia, testify by way of deposition without violating the
him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt.
Re Radio and Television Coverage of Cases Against Ampatuan, et al constitutional right to confrontation of a witness by the accused?
The British approach the problem with the presumption that
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners' prayer for a YES. Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and
live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to guidelines. is inapplicable in this case. Mary Jane is neither too sick nor in irm
stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a
to appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines inde initely. To
threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume a Putt's Law states that "technology is dominated by two types of recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia.
skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity people: those who understand what they do not manage, and those
on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed Considering the circumstances of Mary Jane, the Court of Appeals
demanded for the impossible to happen and thus impaired the asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated the accused of the crime of which he was charged. The discretion still
substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was akin to a denial of representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded lies with the prosecution as to the number of witnesses and whom to
due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the present on the witness stand. For sure, the prosecution could not be
establish its case against the respondents. same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in accused of suppressing vital evidence. The defense could have
turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the presented Mrs. Mercado as an adverse witness if it so desired.
Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by
prosecution. Should the prosecution raise any objection thereto, the
written interrogatories, the appellate court in effect silenced Mary On the other hand, this Court agrees with accused-appellants that the
trial court judge must promptly rule on the same, and the inal cross
Jane and denied her and the People of their right to due process by trial court should not have considered the extrajudicial statement of
interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be
presenting their case against the said accused. By its belief that it was Edna Crisologo Jacob who was not placed on the witness stand, thus,
conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall
rendering justice to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect depriving the defense of its right to cross-examination. The
likewise be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall be
impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the People. veracity of her statement not having been ascertained, it should not
given to the prosecution.
have been given any probative value at all. Be that as it may, her
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure
The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has testimony is merely corroborative, and its exclusion will not affect
does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the
likewise been upheld. As aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the inding of guilt of accused-appellants.
same time convicted of a grave offense by inal judgment and
the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present during
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give People v Givera
testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to
her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of
how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open
the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial On the matter of the admissibility of the testimony of the
court because he is imprisoned in another country.
court judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of medico-legal taken in the irst case, involving the three other accused
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Mary Jane as she answers each question propounded to her both by for the death of the same victim, offered in evidence in the case at bar,
Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written the prosecution and the defense. this Court must declare the same inadmissible. As correctly
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that contended by the defense, because they did not have the
Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are
it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Baltazar, his testimony cannot be
equally safeguarded. The parameters laid down by the trial court are
there is compelling reason. used in evidence against accused-appellant. Indeed, where the
suf icient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony
opposing party failed to cross-examine a witness, this Court in
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still
several cases held:
criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well as in subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of
proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the trial Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is
has a two-fold purpose: court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined
credibility. by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly
(1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when
testimony of the witness by cross-examination; and cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to
(2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of People v Matibag
causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the
the witness. The trial court committed no error in lending credence to the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane testimony of Mrs. Amparo Carlos. The alleged inconsistency as to the
face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the distance of Mrs. Carlos to her husband when the latter was shot is People v Chua
terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that they are de initely inconsequential. Whether the distance was four (4), ive
given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of (5) or seven (7) meters, the fact still remains that she was in the Chua claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to
written interrogatories so as not to defeat the irst purpose of their vicinity and personally witnessed the crime when it was committed. compulsory process.
constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Likewise, the prosecution could not be faulted for not presenting a The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory
Julius, through their counsel, to ile their comment and may raise certain Mrs. Mercado, the President of the Homeowner's Association process which now includes the right to secure the production of
objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories and neighbor of the Carloses, whom Mrs. Carlos allegedly saw after evidence in one's behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid
submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly her husband was shot. The testimony of a single witness, if found to down the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may
rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the inal questions would be be credible, trustworthy and straightforward would suf ice to convict be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show:
2. Involuntary servitudes against public order.

(a) that the evidence is really material;
(b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a
production of such evidence; 3. Imprisonment for debt matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check
(c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
(d) that no similar evidence could be obtained. Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of sanctions.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion a poll tax.
for the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the i. Allied Right: Right Against Double Jeopardy
Lozano v Martinez on BP 22
POEA Certi ication dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in
any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a People v Sandiganbayan (Second Division) 2019 Division
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most
license until then. serious is the alleged con lict between the statute and the We adhere to the inality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment
constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is of acquittal is inal and unappealable.
g. Trial in absentia contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of
Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or In our jurisdiction, the inality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard
When presence of accused is a duty non-payment of a poll tax." against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle irst
enunciated in Kepner v. United States. As succinctly observed in
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes, wherein a statutory Green v. United States the underlying idea is that the State with all
1. Arraignment and plea provision which made illegal and punishable the refusal of an its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
2. During trial, for identi ication employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
3. Promulgation of sentence, unless for light offense laborers on the ifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday subjecting him embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
every week, was challenged for being violative of the constitutional him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
h. Prohibited punishments prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The constitutionality of enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
the law in question was upheld by the Court, it being within the guilty.
1. Excessive fines, cruel, inhuman and degrading authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the
punishments police power. It was held that "one of the purposes of the law is to The elements of double jeopardy are
suppress possible abuses on the part of the employers who hire (1) the complaint or information was suf icient in form and
Section 19. Excessive ines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon substance to sustain a conviction;
or inhuman punishment in licted. Neither shall death penalty be for their services, thus causing them inancial dif iculties." The law (2) the court had jurisdiction;
was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an obligation, (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a practice (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
considered harmful to public welfare. dismissed without his express consent.
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the
against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the
Bernas, pp. 549- 560 presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation trial was sham.
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, In this case, all the elements of double jeopardy are present: (1) the
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and Informations for thirteen (13) counts of violation of Section 3(h) of
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the R.A. No. 3019 were suf icient in form and substance to sustain the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law conviction of the respondent; (2) the court a quo de initely had
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense jurisdiction over the cases; (3) arraignment took place on July 13,
2006 where the respondent entered a negative plea; and (4) the court People v CTA 2019 Resolution Judicial review in certiorari proceedings shall be con ined to the
a quo, on motion for reconsideration iled by the respondent,
question of whether the judgment for acquittal is per se void on
acquitted the latter of the offense charged. Petitioner, in this case, assails the acquittal of the accused on the
jurisdictional grounds. The court will look into the decision's
ground that the CTA Second Division committed grave abuse of
validity — if it was rendered by a court without jurisdiction or if the
Remedy of State from Judgment of Acquittal: discretion by ignoring relevant facts and applicable jurisprudence.
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Petitioner contends that the accused should be convicted of violation
excess of jurisdiction — not on its legal correctness.
Bowden v Bowden 2019 Division of Section 255 of the NIRC.
As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
A judgment of acquittal cannot be appealed as this would violate the
If the court inds the evidence insuf icient to support a verdict of committed in the exercise of its discretion is not reviewable via
constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused against double
guilt, the court shall grant the demurrer and the criminal case shall certiorari for being nothing more than errors of judgment.
jeopardy enshrined in the Constitution. An exception, however, exists
be dismissed. Such dismissal is a resolution on the merits and
if the judgment of acquittal was rendered with grave abuse of Guided by the foregoing, the Court so inds that the CA committed
tantamount to an acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused
discretion. In such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be assailed reversible error when it annulled the RTC Decision.
after an acquittal is a violation of his constitutional right against
via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
double jeopardy. Accordingly, an order granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insuf iciency of In this case, however, the arguments raised by petitioner involve j. Double Jeopardy in continued or continuous crime
evidence cannot be the subject of an appeal. mistakes in the appreciation of the facts and the evidence allegedly
committed by the CTA Second Division which do not fall within the Mallari v People
It bears stressing, however, that the Court is not at all precluded from
ambit of Rule 65.
reviewing an order of denial if it is shown that grave abuse of To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three (3) requisites must be
discretion attended its issuance. present:
Mandagan v Jose M. Valero Corp 2019 Division (1) a irst jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however,
(2) the irst jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
not absolute. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that a judgment of
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in
acquittal is immediately inal and unappealable. Such rule
1. when the prosecution is denied due process of law; and the irst.
proceeds from the accused's constitutionally-enshrined right against
2. when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion
prosecution if the same would place him under double jeopardy. With the prior conviction by a inal judgment of petitioner for the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a
crime of estafa thru falsi ication of public document in CA-G.R. No.
criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to For an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of
20817-CR, there is no question that the irst and second requisites
evidence. discretion, there must be a showing that the prosecution's right to
above enumerated are present in the case at bar. The problem then
due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The
Such issues are brought to the attention of a reviewing court through lies with the third requisite. Is the crime charged in CA-G.R. No.
burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of 20817-CR the same as in this case (CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR)?
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
very power to dispense justice. We rule in the af irmative.
In assailing the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner
resorted to this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, In this case, petitioner Mandagan faults the CA in granting the petition A comparison of the Informations iled in the two cases under
purportedly raising pure questions of law. This is erroneous for for certiorari of respondent JMV Corporation and reversing her consideration as well as the indings of facts of the appellate court
which reason this petition is dismissible outright. acquittal. While petitioner Mandagan agrees that the rule on double tells us that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of acts
jeopardy is not without exceptions, she nevertheless maintains that amount to what is known in law as a continued, continuous or
But even if a Rule 65 petition is iled, the same will not prosper since
no grave abuse of discretion was attributable to the RTC in rendering continuing offense.
the CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
the Decision.
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the cases for use of falsi ied A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but
af idavit of loss and use of falsi ied deed of sale. The Court agrees The CA, in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari of all arising from one criminal resolution. It is a continuous, unlawful
with the CA that the petitioner fails to put up a prima facie case of use respondent JMV Corporation, thus reasoned that such error of act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by
of falsi ied documents which justi ies the grant of the demurrer but judgment on the part of the RTC "unfolded" into one of jurisdiction, an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Although
for a different reason. allegedly due to a misappreciation of the evidence. This is an there are series of acts, there is only one crime committed. Hence,
egregious error. only one penalty shall be imposed.
questions of law. Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but

The crime of estafa thru falsi ication of public document committed In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
by Consuelo Mallari, although consummated through a series of acts, iling of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by
special and important reasons.
was "set on foot" by the single intent or impulse to defraud Remegio his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately inal.
Tapawan of a total amount of P3,000.00. And contrary to the appellate In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by
court's observation, there was only one deceit practised by petitioner or life imprisonment, an accused may: private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066.
on the two (2) victims.
(1) ile a notice of appeal under Section 13 (c), Rule 124 to avail The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being
The singularity of the offense committed by petitioner is further of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's
demonstrated by the fact that the falsi ication of the two (2) public the entire case for review on any question; or judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of
documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the (2) ile a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort acquittal. Nor did it order the iling of a second criminal case against
same date, in the same place, at the same time and on the same to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no
occasion. questions of law. second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been placed
in double jeopardy is incorrect.
It has also been ruled that when two informations refer to the same In this case, the CA af irmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of
transaction, the second charge cannot prosper because the accused life imprisonment to petitioner. Notably, however, the petition iled Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on
will thereby be placed in jeopardy for the second time for the same before this Court invokes grave abuse of discretion in assailing the CA the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground
offense. decision, which is a ground under a petition for certiorari under Rule that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
65 of the Rules of Court. In any event, even if the instant petition is complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a
Petitioner, having already been convicted of the complex crime of
treated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
estafa thru falsi ication of public document in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR,
limited to questions of law, it still raises questions of fact because it omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
it stands to reason that she can no longer be held liable for the same
essentially assails the appreciation of the testimonial and omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
crime in this case. The rule against double jeopardy protects the
documentary evidence by the CA and the RTC. As a rule, these question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
accused not against the peril of second punishment but against
questions of fact cannot be entertained by the Court under Rule 45. based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
being tried for the same offense. Nemo bis punitur pro eodem
Thus, the petition is procedurally in irm. situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
delicto. No man is punished twice for the same fault or offense.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
k.1. Appeal in Criminal Case throws the whole case on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
k. Appeals
open for review accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
Macad v People 2018 Division from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
Case Study: People v Tulagan 2019 En Banc evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the
Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that Civil Code
The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modi ication of the
"[i]n cases where the CA imposes reclusion perpetua, life nomenclature of the crime, the penalty imposed, and the damages
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault, and a
imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for VIII. Privilege Against Self-incrimination
Supreme Court by notice of appeal iled with the Court of Appeals." statutory rape, are in order.
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
life imprisonment had been imposed by the CA, can simply ile a himself.
k.2. Appeal of civil aspect
notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right
before the Court, which opens the entire case for review on any a. Scope
question including one not raised by the parties. Manantan v CA
On the other hand, an accused may also resort to an appeal by Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate US v Tan Teng
certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal court awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only misplaced.
witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not a right to hold secret.
This constitutional privilege has been de ined as a protection against
an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material.
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein Beltran complains testimonial compulsion, but this has since been extended to any
Tan Teng was identi ied by Oliva as her rapist. The police stripped that the Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under circumstances
him of clothing and swore that his body bore every sign of the fact iscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit
that he was suffering from gonorrhea. positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
The order was given upon petition of Fiscal Jose for the purpose of
procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to
The prohibition that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness comparing the Beltran's handwriting and determining whether or not
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."
against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsi ied.
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to
As to its scope, the privilege against self-incrimination is not limited
of his guilt. disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the
precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
Constitution.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his evidence.
objection, the examination was made by competent medical This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts
In the case before us, writing is something more than moving the
authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed
body, or the hand, or the ingers; writing is not a purely
from said disease. facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
mechanical act, because it requires the application of
observation. This includes
Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means
witnesses, can not violate the privilege, because it does not call that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether 1. requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus
upon the accused as a witness - it does not call upon the defendant or not he is the falsi ier. from his body,
for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence 2. or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth,
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony by his body 3. or making her submit to a pregnancy test
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document,
but his body itself. 4. or a footprinting test,
and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting,
5. or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain
for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
Villa lor v Summers cases.
against himself.
In each case, the accused does not speak his guilt.
The court ordered Villa lor to submit to a pregnancy test. She And we say that the present case is more serious than that of
refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused
person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by
self-incrimination. writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his
him as the falsi ier. will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled
Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that
confession.
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness In the case of Villa lor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory something already in existence, while in the case at bar, the question Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to be in violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent
proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence.
trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which
permissible. may seriously incriminate him. Chavez v CA
People v Olvis Chavez asserts that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from
Beltran v Samson
imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his
The constitutional inhibition against self-incrimination is The accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled
directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as but twice. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the to testify against himself.
well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and
mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced
against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as
confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination.
resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he
a witness against himself” signi ies that he cannot be compelled to
to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner
testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness nevertheless answered the questions in spite of his fear of being
accused, or one of the accused.
stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance
will. cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own If he should wish to testify on his own behalf, however, he may do so.
choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the
cross-examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined
use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements.
People v Ayson as to any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected
Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
therewith.6 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
The right against self-incrimination, "No person shall be compelled question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the
judgment would in our opinion be suf icient. So is moral coercion
to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant."
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in for the crime with which he is charged.
Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal
prosecution as the irst witness in that case to testify for the People contained in Section 12.
action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the
during the irst day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked
The right prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct
the privilege of self-incrimination.
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer speci ic question, on the strength of the right against
ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which self-incrimination.
take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the
In ine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may right can be claimed only when the speci ic question, incriminatory
subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at
following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence,
answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
to wit:
an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,
The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having
evidence necessary for his conviction."This rule may apply even to a questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty
co-defendant in a joint trial. the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he in some signi icant way, and on being interrogated by the
may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel,
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that
and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force,
the accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in
of abuse." in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
violation of these rights rejected; and
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
case for the People was built primarily around the admissions of a) to refuse to be a witness;
Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him
for the prosecution." Indeed, the damaging facts forged in the decision is entitled, among others- by such refusal;
were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution witness c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and
and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. cross-examination by the prosecution;
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a speci ic
With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other
question which tends to incriminate him for some
forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall
crime other than that for which he is then
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
prosecuted.
Alih v Castro respect to their students; the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random
(2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under
Petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and and are subject to the custody and supervision of their the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their parents, guardians, and schools;
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165,
purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
the Court inds no valid justi ication for mandatory drug testing
these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge health and well-being of their students and may adopt such
for persons accused of crimes.
their ingerprinting, photographing and paraf in-testing as violative of measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
their right against self-incrimination. duty; and We ind the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
(4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants before the public prosecutor's of ice with criminal offenses
As the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the
for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The
Constitution, all the irearms and ammunition taken from the raided
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness"
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the
and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime
against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
before the prosecutor's of ice, a mandatory drug testing can never be
tree." mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
random or suspicionless.
constitutional.
The objection to the photographing, ingerprinting and
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt
paraf in-testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, of icers and employees of public and private of ices is justi iable,
violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of
"The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a albeit not exactly for the same reason.
the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is forced to incriminate themselves.
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a b. DNA testing and the right against self-incrimination
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
SJS v DDB balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's People v Yatar
The constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, insofar as it requires privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest. DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public of ice, students of
crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as
secondary and tertiary schools, of icers and employees of public and The irst factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the ingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave
private of ices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's of ice nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva
with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the of ice or workplace serves as iber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA
employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
arrangement. The primary legislative intent is not criminal employees' privacy interest in an of ice is to a large extent between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the
prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known
this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and ef iciency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends
user consent to undergo rehabilitation.
in a regulated of ice environment is, in ine, reduced; and a degree of that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the US cases of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his
Vernonia and Board of Education and applied to this jurisdiction right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
are: Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation Constitution.
of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with likely to be met by the search, and the well-de ined limits set forth in This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property 🔗RA 1379, SEC. 8. Protection against self-incrimination.—Neither
self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting of a public of icer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion
the respondent nor any other person shall be excused from attending
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply to his salary as such public of icer or employee and his other lawful
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence,
incrimination but as part of object evidence. forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a memoranda and other records on the ground that the testimony or
penalty. evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to
We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant
incriminate him or subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall
insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed
submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any transaction, matter or
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his
him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or are applicable thereto. privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence,
any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so testifying
Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that
under duress. shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false
the information, in a proceeding to declare a forfeiture of certain
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to ingerprinting, property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative
photographing, paraf in, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a proceedings.
compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where immediately criminal one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within
after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused the reason of criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion of Galman v Pamaran
without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. which declares
Immunity statutes may be generally classi ied into two: one, which
of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness
grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his against himself.
as "transactional immunity".
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
⭐Calida v Trillanes IV 2019 Leonen En Banc The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity"
c. In what proceedings available prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
The legislative power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
Cabal v Kapunan, Jr. conferred by Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to
the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
The power of legislative inquiry must be carefully balanced with the
Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or testimony relates.
private rights of those affected. A person's right against
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case
self-incrimination and to due process cannot be swept aside in favor
from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are 🔗 PD 1886
of the purported public need of a legislative inquiry.
applicable thereto.
It must be stressed that persons invited to appear before a legislative e. Exclusionary Rule
At the start of the investigation, the Committee ordered Cabal to take
inquiry do so as resource persons and not as accused in a criminal
the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for the complainant
proceeding. Thus, they should be accorded respect and courtesy Art. III, Sec. 12(3). Any confession or admission obtained in violation
Maristela. Cabal objected invoking his right against
since they were under no compulsion to accept the invitation
self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that Cabal take the of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
extended before them, yet they did so anyway.
witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer him.
such questions as may be incriminatory.
d. Use immunity v. Transactional Immunity f. Effect of denial of privilege
Although said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no Art. XIII, Sec. 18(8). Grant immunity from prosecution to any person Chavez v CA, supra
question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner
whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence
herein as Chief of Staff of the AFP. As a matter of fact he no longer The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high
holds such of ice. It seems, likewise, conceded that the purpose of is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional
the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the conducted by it or under its authority;
remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such
as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such and the accused's participation in it, beyond reasonable doubt.
defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore Petitioner, in turn, may present her defenses to the allegations.
X. Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused
whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of Misolas v Panga In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Punzalan 2019
conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is
the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another But even if a challenge on the ground that P.D. 1866 is a bill of Resolution
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. attainder could be appropriately considered, it will still be met with The writ's primary purpose is to inquire into all manner of
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of little success. The Court, in People v. Ferrer, supra, de ined a bill of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be attainder as a legislative act which in licts punishment on person therefrom, if such restraint is illegal. "Called the 'great writ
granted upon a judgment already inal. individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. of liberty,' the writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
Essential to a bill of attainder are a speci ication of certain speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a restraint, and as the best and only suf icient defense of personal
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This freedom."
IX. Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder
last element, the total lack of court intervention in the inding of guilt
and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the In this case, petitioner avers that the delay in Simplicio's arraignment
⭐Fuertes v Senate of the Philippines, supra. violates his right to speedy trial and thus, entitles him to a writ of
most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Anti-Hazing Law is not a bill of of attainder. habeas corpus.
attainder. Petitioner herself admitted that an Information for violation of R.A.
Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v De Lima 2019 En Banc No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364 was iled against Simplicio
In modern times, a bill of attainder is generally understood as a
legislative act which in licts punishment on individuals or members on August 24, 2018.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not de ine a crime/offense or
of a particular group without a judicial trial. provide/prescribe/establish a penalty as it addresses the Case law has held that the iling of Information, rendered a petition
For a law to be considered a bill of attainder, it must be shown to rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions for habeas corpus moot and academic.
contain all of the following: have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached In such cases, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of
to the crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the
1. a speci ication of certain individuals or a group of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, bene icial to the detention
individuals, usual remedies, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary
and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of remedy of a petition for habeas corpus. An ordinary remedy is to ile
2. the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and Article 22 of the RPC.
3. the lack of judicial trial. a motion to quash the information or warrant of arrest.
The prospective application of the bene icial provisions of R.A. No.
The most essential of these elements is the complete exclusion of the 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those
courts from the determination of guilt and imposable penalty. who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty XI. Liberty of Abode and Travel
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay;
or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
in lict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a committed. Depriving them of time off to which they are justly
entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence and limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
bill of attainder.
increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
Here, the mere iling of an Information against petitioner and her mandate of Article 22 of the RPC. interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
fellow sorority members is not a inding of their guilt of the crime provided by law.
charged. Contrary to her claim, petitioner is not being charged merely Thus, Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
because she is a member of the Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, but Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides
Marcos v Manglapus
because she is allegedly a principal by direct participation in the for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time
hazing that led to Abracia's death. As stated, these are matters for the allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair
trial court to decide. The prosecution must still prove these offense, special time allowance for loyalty. the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
“within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may the President impair interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be Memorandum Order Radir No. 2011-011, allowing its Travel
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive Control and Enforcement Unit to "of load passengers with
advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by of icers or administrative authorities are not armed with fraudulent travel documents, doubtful purpose of travel,
any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose including possible victims of human traf icking" from our
to that effect. limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or ports.
public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase 4. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
which did not appear in the 1973 text. 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022. In
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
enforcement of said law, the Philippine Overseas
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that
Employment Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security,
deployment permit to a speci ic country that effectively
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must
prevents our migrant workers to enter such country.
from although related to the right to travel. be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court
5. The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A.
providing for the impairment. The requirement for a legislative
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights No. 9262. The law restricts movement of an individual
enactment was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on
speci ically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the against whom the protection order is intended.
the person's right to travel by administrative of icials who may be
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered 6. Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043.
tempted to wield authority under the guise of national security,
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally Pursuant thereto, the Inter-Country Adoption Board may
public safety or public health.
accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is issue rules restrictive of an adoptee's right to travel "to
part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from The liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation,
the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the court and, on the one hand, the right to travel may only be impaired traf icking and/or sale or any other practice in connection
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being by a law that concerns national security, public safety or public with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof. health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation to the child."
on the right to travel, the Congress must respond to the need by
The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis
Genuino v De Lima 2018 En Banc explicitly providing for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to
the primacy of the right to travel, being a constitutionally-protected The Court is in quandary of identifying the authority from which the
These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with right and not simply a statutory right, that it can only be curtailed by DOJ believed its power to restrain the right to travel emanates. To
Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writs of Preliminary a legislative enactment. begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of
Injunction Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail the the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in
In Leave Division, Of ice of the Administrative Services (OAS) -
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41, series of 2010, otherwise the interest of national security, public safety or public health. As it
Of ice of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs. Wilma Salvacion P.
known as the "Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing is, the only ground of the former DOJ Secretary in restraining the
Heusdens, the Court enumerated the statutes which speci ically
Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist petitioners, at that time, was the pendency of the preliminary
provide for the impairment of the right to travel, viz.:
Orders and Allow Departure Orders" on the ground that it infringes investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation
on the constitutional right to travel. 1. The Human Security Act of 2010 or R.A. No. 9372. The Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage against them.
law restricts the right to travel of an individual charged with
The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be There must be an enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must
the crime of terrorism even though such person is out on
deprived without due process of law. It is part and parcel of the derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities
bail.
guarantee of freedom of movement that the Constitution affords its relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and
2. The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239.
citizens. It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not suf icient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish the
Pursuant to said law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his
absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance of the
authorized consular of icer may refuse the issuance of,
regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to questioned circular.
restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino
travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security,
citizen. The exceptions to the right to travel are LIMITED to those stated
public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
3. The "Anti-Traf icking in Persons Act of 2003" or R.A. No. in Section 6, Article III of the Constitution
In Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidated, thus: 9208. Pursuant to the provisions thereof, the [BI], in order to
The DOJ argues that Section 6, Article III of the Constitution is not an
manage migration and curb traf icking in persons, issued
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be exclusive enumeration of the instances wherein the right to travel
may be validly impaired. It cites that this Court has its own Constitution complements the State's policy of full public disclosure the accused."
administrative issuances restricting travel of its employees and that in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28
The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23,
even lower courts may issue HDO even on grounds/outside of what of Article II.
2005 meeting was classi ied as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by
is stated in the Constitution.
Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be virtue of the committee's composition and the nature of its mandate
It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to the compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly, the information sought dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They
courts. The courts may issue a HDO against an accused in a criminal must be in relation to matters of public concern or public assert that the information withheld was within the scope of the
case so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. It does not interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM meetings were directly
require legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; it operation of the constitutional guarantee. related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as
co-exists with the grant of judicial power. the Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of
As to the irst requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether trade, as provided in Section 3 (a) of Rule IV of the Rules
The point is that the DOJ may not justify its imposition of restriction or not a particular information is of public concern or public interest. Implementing R.A. No. 6713.
on the right to travel of the subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 by Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may want to
resorting to an analogy. Contrary to its claim, it does not have be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right
inherent power to issue HDO, unlike the courts, or to restrict the right or because the issues "naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary constitutionally granted to the people, is liberally construed in favor
to travel in any way. citizen." As such, whether or not the information sought is of public of disclosure and strictly against the claim of con identiality.
interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of the However, the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the
courts on a case to case basis. obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted by
specifying the grounds for the exemption. In case of denial of access
XII. Right to Information The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of to the information, it is the government agency concerned that has
plastic and other related materials, and provides essential input the burden of showing that the information sought to be obtained is
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public requirements for the agricultural and industrial sectors of the not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from the
concern shall be recognized. Access to of icial records, and to country. Thus, the position of the petrochemical industry as an coverage of the constitutional guarantee. We reiterate, therefore, that
documents and papers pertaining to of icial acts, transactions, or essential contributor to the overall growth of our country's economy the burden has been well discharged herein.
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for easily makes the information sought a matter of public concern or
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such interest.
DFA v BCA International
limitations as may be provided by law. The second requisite is that the information requested must not be
excluded by law from the constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the RA 9285, its IRR, and the Special ADR Rules provide that any party to
Sereno v Committee on Trade and Related Matters of NEDA Court has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the an arbitration, whether domestic or foreign, may request the court to
people's right to information does not cover national security provide assistance in taking evidence such as the issuance of
The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and subpoena ad testi icandum and subpoena duces tecum.
door to any and all information, but is rather con ined to matters of banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally excluded
public concern. It is subject to such limitations as may be provided This case is one of irst impression involving the production of
from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic evidence in an arbitration case where the deliberative process
by law. The State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive
transactions involving public interest, and is tempered by reasonable privilege is invoked.
sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
conditions prescribed by law. deliberations of the Supreme Court. In Chavez v. Public Estates Thus, DFA insists that we determine whether the evidence sought to
The issue is whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by Authority, the Court has ruled that the right to information does not be subpoenaed is covered by the deliberative process privilege. DFA
mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information under the contends that the RTC erred in holding that the deliberative process
May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to separation of powers," which include "Presidential conversations, privilege is no longer applicable in this case.
information on matters of public concern and the State's policy of full correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet We have held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority that:
public disclosure. meetings." Likewise exempted from the right to information are
"information on military and diplomatic secrets, information Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids
The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of affecting national security, and information on investigations of or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review
public concern enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of committee is not immediately accessible under the right to
information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going,

second, it prevents public confusion from premature disclosure This Court's Advisory issued on 17 November 2017 made it clear
there are no "of icial acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids
of agency opinions before the agency establishes inal policy; that this Court was interested in
or proposals. However, once the committee makes its of icial
and
recommendation, there arises a "de inite proposition" on the (1) the legal basis for the issuance of PNP Command
part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision; the public Memorandum Circular (CMC) No. 16-2016 and DILG
information attaches, and any citizen can access all the should not judge of icials based on information they considered Memorandum Circular 2017-112;
non-proprietary information leading to such de inite prior to issuing their inal decisions. (2) whether the acts authorized, or conducted under the
proposition. authority of the PNP's CMC 16-2016, as well as the DILG's
DFA did not waive the privilege in arbitration proceedings under the
MC 2017-112, violate certain constitutional, statutory, and
The constitutional right to information includes of icial Agreement. The Agreement does not provide for the waiver of the
administrative provisions; and
information on on-going negotiations before a inal contract. deliberative process privilege by DFA. Section 20.02 of the Agreement
(3) whether the acts authorized, or conducted under the
The information, however, must constitute de inite propositions merely allows, with the consent of the other party, disclosure by a
authority of the PNP's CMC 16-2016, as well as the DILG's
by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions party to a court arbitrator or administrative tribunal of the contents
MC 2017-112, violate the Philippines' international legal
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets of the "Amended BOT Agreement or any information relating to the
obligations.
and similar matters affecting national security and public order. negotiations concerning the operations, contracts, commercial or
The Court is also mandated to protect and enforce the people's right
Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to inancial arrangements or affair[s] of the other parties hereto." There
to information. The undeniable fact that thousands of ordinary
information in several legislations. is no express waiver of information forming part of DFA's
citizens have been killed, and continue to be killed, during police
predecisional deliberative or decision-making process. Section 20.02
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority expressly and unequivocally drug operations certainly is a matter of grave public concern.
does not state that a party to the arbitration is compelled to disclose
states that the right to information "should not cover recognized
to the tribunal privileged information in such party's possession. Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the requested
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
information and documents do not obviously involve state secrets
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public Rights cannot be waived if it is contrary to law, public order, public
affecting national security. The information and documents relate to
order." policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with
routine police operations involving violations of laws against the
a right recognized by law. There is a public policy involved in a claim
Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged sale or use of illegal drugs. There is no showing that the country's
of deliberative process privilege - "the policy of open, frank
information, which is within the exceptions of the constitutional territorial integrity, national sovereignty, independence, or foreign
discussion between subordinate and chief concerning administrative
right to information. The privileged character of the information does relations will be compromised or prejudiced by the release of these
action." Thus, the deliberative process privilege cannot be
not end when an agency has adopted a de inite proposition or when a information and documents to this Court or even to the public. These
waived.
contract has been perfected or consummated; otherwise, the purpose information and documents do not involve rebellion, invasion,
of the privilege will be defeated. As a quali ied privilege, the burden falls upon the government terrorism, espionage, infringement of our sovereignty or sovereign
agency asserting the deliberative process privilege to prove that the rights by foreign powers, or any military, diplomatic or state secret
Traditionally, U.S. courts have established two fundamental
information in question satis ies both requirements - predecisional involving national security. It is simply ridiculous to claim that these
requirements, both of which must be met, for the deliberative
and deliberative. information and documents on police operations against drug
process privilege to be invoked. First, the communication must be
pushers and users involve national security matters so sensitive that
predecisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy."
Records of Police Drug Operations: Almora v Dela Rosa even this Court cannot peruse these information and documents in
Second, the communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part
deciding constitutional issues affecting the fundamental right to life
of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or
The Supreme Court en banc is expressly mandated, under Section and liberty of thousands of ordinary citizens.
expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." It must re lect the
4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, to hear cases involving the
"give-and-take of the consultative process."
"constitutionality, application or operation of presidential decrees, Right to Information and Con identiality of Disbarment Proceedings:
The deliberative process privilege can also be invoked in arbitration proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
Roque, Jr. v AFP Chief of Staff 2017 Leonen Division
proceedings under RA 9285. regulations." In short, there can be no dispute that the Court en banc
has jurisdiction to hear cases involving not only the constitutionality, Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the
Deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases:
but also the "application or operation," of CMC 16-12016 and DILG con identiality rule. This is laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of
irst, the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency; Memorandum Circular (MC) 2017-112, which both fall under the the Rules of Court.
term "other regulations."
The con identiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing I-Popefrancis v DBM
disbarment proceedings as a tool to damage a lawyer's reputation in to keep private and con idential. Respondents' threats were made
This is a Petition seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
the public sphere. before November 4, 2014, and there was no proceeding to keep
compel respondent to publish through its website and the Of icial
private.
Thus, the general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment Gazette the list of emoluments it released, including the Priority
proceedings may be punished with contempt. Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) or Pork Barrel, and the full
Remedy for Enforcement: J. Leonen’s Separate Opinion in Vitangcol III names of the recipients of the same, i.e., with the middle names for
The con identiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not
v Comelec determination of familial relationship. The ultimate objective of the
absolute. It is not to be applied under any circumstance, to all
Petition is to prevent the possible circumvention of Sections 10 and
disclosures of any nature. Petitioners seek to determine whether the data received by the 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution by members of the same
As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should Comelec during the transmission of election results originated from family through nepotism and political dynasties.
not be restricted. This Court recognizes the fundamental right to the devices recognized by the Comelec.
The right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus,
information, which is essential to allow the citizenry to form When the subject of the petition for mandamus relates to a public provided the following requisites concur: irstly, the information
intelligent opinions and hold people accountable for their actions. right such as the right to information on matters of public concern, sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public
Accordingly, matters of public interest should not be censured for the and when the object of the petition is to compel the performance of a interest; and, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the
sake of an unreasonably strict application of the con identiality rule. public duty, the petitioner need not show that its interest on the operation of the constitutional guarantee. It is not disputed that PDAF
Thus, in Palad v. Solis, this Court dismissed claims that the result is exclusive. It may be shared by the public in general. disbursements and the recipients of the same constitute a matter of
con identiality rule had been violated, considering that the lawyer
For every person's fundamental right, there is a corresponding duty public concern or public interest, which are not exempt from the
therein represented a matter of public interest.
on the part of government to recognize and protect it. In Valmonte v. operation of the constitutional guarantee of the right to information.
As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are con idential in nature Belmonte: Nevertheless, it is not proper to issue a writ of mandamus in the
until their inal resolution and the inal decision of this Court.
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the present case.
However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner
became a matter of public concern considering that it arose from his constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in In this case, petitioners fail to establish that respondent actually
representation of his client on the issue of video voyeurism on the the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the neglected or refused to provide the information they requested.
internet. The interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking "While respondent has the duty to give the public access to the
his involvement and participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal. abuse in government.The policy of full public disclosure is information, it has the discretion to ascertain the best way to
Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner related to his enshrined in Article II, Section 28. disseminate, publish, or otherwise make available the said
supposed conduct and statements made before the media in violation Like other constitutional guarantees, the right to information and the information. As respondent points out, the information petitioners
of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving the controversy. policy of full public disclosure are not absolute. The People's right to seek are already posted on its website, except that petitioners are
Indeed, to keep controversial proceedings shrouded in secrecy would information is limited by the nature and classi ication of the unsatis ied because the names of the recipients of the PDAF
present its own dangers. In disbarment proceedings, a balance must information sought. The information should involve "matters of disbursements do not include their middle names, making it more
be struck, due to the demands of the legal profession. public concern" and should not be excluded by law from the dif icult to determine familial relations for petitioners' purposes. It
operation of the guarantee. In the same manner, the policy of full bears to stress that petitioners are not able to present any law that
The con identiality rule requires only that "proceedings against
public disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest speci ically prescribes the medium by which respondent shall make
attorneys" be kept private and con idential. It is the proceedings
and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. such information available to the public (i.e., through its website)
against attorneys that must be kept private and con idential. This
and the form or content of the same (i.e., to include middle names of
would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment Without a doubt, information on the conduct of elections is a matter the recipients). There is also no clear legal mandate for
complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so far that of public concern as it directly affects the lives of the People. The respondents to identify familial relations and/or determine
it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions. Commission on Elections may be compelled, through mandamus, to nepotism or political dynasties among the recipients of the
Petitioner assails two acts as violating the con identiality rule: irst, make an inventory of and disclose the MAC and IP addresses and PDAF disbursements. In fact, as of yet, there is even no law that
respondents' supposed public threats of iling a disbarment case IMSI and IMEI numbers of all electronic devices used during particularly de ines and governs political dynasty.
against him, and second, respondents' public statement that they had elections to the public. It is mandated to enforce and administer all
iled a disbarment complaint. laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
XIII. Non-impairment of Obligations and Contracts anchors Resolution No. 9674's requirement of disclosing subscribers on an ad hoc basis.
to election surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to
"guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service" and
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors
is impelled by the imperative of "fair" elections.
passed. must be considered:
As a valid exercise of COMELEC's regulatory powers, Resolution No.
(a) length of delay;
PADPAO v Comelec 2017 En Banc 9674 is correctly deemed written into petitioners' existing
(b) the reason for the delay;
contracts. (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and
Petitioner's argument that the application of Resolution No. 10015 to
PSAs violates the constitutional tenets of equal protection and non (d) prejudice to the defendant.
impairment of contracts deserves scant consideration. a. Contracts to which guaranty has reference
b. Impairment of obligation: Tests of impairment Lumanog v People, supra
The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article III of the
c. Means of impairment
Constitution is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior Appellants further cite the comment made by the United Nations
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing d. Effect of exercise of police power upon the guaranty
Human Rights Committee in its Communication No. 1466/2006 that
the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law under the circumstances, there was, insofar as the eight (8)-year
changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new XIV. Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
delay in the disposition of their appeal in the CA was concerned, a
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies violation of Article 14, paragraph 3 (c) of the International Covenant
for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. Speedy Trial Act of 1998 🔗
on Civil and Political Rights (1966). It provides that in the
In this case, PSAs' contracts with their clients are not affected in any determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
Olbes v Buemio
manner by the requirement of having to obtain from the COMELEC entitled, as among the minimum guarantees provided therein, "to be
written authority to bear, carry, and transport irearms outside of Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his tried without undue delay."
their residence or place of work and in public places, during election arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the irst pre-trial setting on Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy
period. All that PSAs must do is to secure such authority. May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to disposition of cases" is a lexible concept. It is consistent with
the second pre-trial setting on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution
days - a clear contravention, according to petitioner, of the 80-day
SWS and Pulse Asia v Comelec 2015 Leonen En Banc prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
time limit from arraignment to trial.
delays, which render rights nugatory.
It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment... is It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February 12,
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest 2003, petitioner interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to
of public health, safety, morals and general welfare." "It is a basic rule to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later declared a speedy disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must
in contracts that the law is deemed written into the contract between non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere
the parties." The incorporation of regulations into contracts is "a pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial court. mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be suf icient.
postulate of the police power of the State." Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, the Court during which the case remained pending with the CA and this Court
The relation of the state's police power to the principle of stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.
non-impairment of contracts was thoroughly explained in Ortigas provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 re lect the fundamentally
and Co. V. Feati Bank: recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative term and In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or
necessarily involves a degree of lexibility. Such right to a speedy other rights guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been
While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the denied, this Court has not faltered to accord the so-called "radical
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive relief" to keep accused from enduring the rigors and expense of a
with the legitimate exercise of police power.
delays. full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not entitled to
This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or the same relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that
unreasonable" regulation. We have demonstrated that not only an A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the the delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or
important or substantial state interest, but even a compelling one accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases arbitrary.
Art. III, Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy a. Nature, purpose and scope of guaranty It is easy to discern why size matters.
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
⭐The Diocese of Bacolod v Comelec 2015 Leonen En Banc First, it enhances ef iciency in communication.
administrative bodies.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of
Art. VIII, Section 15. All cases or matters iled after the effectivity of of the message to the reader.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four notice and letter ordering the removal of the tarpaulin. It is their Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces,
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless position that these infringe on their fundamental right to freedom of therefore, may translate to more opportunities to amplify,
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to
courts, and three months for all other lower courts. xxxx and, thus, are unconstitutional. communicate.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the
Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3. The Supreme Court may review, in an
their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Large tarpaulins,
appropriate proceeding iled by any citizen, the suf iciency of the factual However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political therefore, are not analogous to time and place. They are
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to fundamentally part of expression protected under Article III, Section
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate 4.
decision thereon within thirty days from its iling. the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
Art. IX, A, Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an
of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in
opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.
Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the iling Proponents of the political theory on “deliberative democracy”
The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum of
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the submit that “substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue is a critical,
speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by and indeed de ining, feature of a good polity.”
inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication. In
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the Justice Cruz discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner of marketplace of ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. communication and a valid form of expression: Holmes in that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by
[the] free trade in ideas.”
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has
XV. Freedom of Expression it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees dignity. This right is “a means of assuring individual
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute self-ful illment,” among others.
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. message as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid
form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to
Section 18. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those “protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses
political beliefs and aspirations. xxxx raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic
them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be governance].”
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free
Lastly, Free speech must be protected under the safety valve
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for society.
theory. This provides that “nonviolent manifestations of
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. The form of expression is just as important as the information dissent reduce the likelihood of violence.”
conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The present case is in
point. This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as
“highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights speech.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
enjoy precedence and primacy.
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify speech. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to freedom of expression.
such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test
permitting dubious intrusions.” does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so “when Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, b. Freedom from prior restraint; censorship; Freedom from
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.” content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
Subsequent Punishment
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this
court discussed that some types of speech may be subject to If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned Tordesillas v Puno
regulation: acts of COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating
such restraints on freedom of speech. “When the speech restraints Whether or not the Advisory issued by the respondents is not
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial content-neutral and thus constitute prior restraint, censorship, and
the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may governmental interest is required for its validity,” and it is subject are content-restrictive, which resulted to a "chilling effect" in
not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the only to the intermediate approach. violation of the freedom of the press.
community or society. The difference in treatment is expected
The basic freedom of the press is invoked herein to condemn the
because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have
taking of some media practitioners to Camp Bagong Diwa, together
speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. prescribed in several cases. A content-neutral government
with Trillanes' group, who disobeyed the order to vacate the
regulation is suf iciently justi ied:
We distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political premises upon service of the warrant of arrest to the latter, as well as
speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a 1. if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; the subsequent public pronouncement and/or advisory, reminding
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “foster[ing] 2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental media practitioners that disobedience to lawful orders of duly
informed and civic-minded deliberation.” On the other hand, interest; authorized government of icers and personnel during emergencies
commercial speech has been de ined as speech that does “no more 3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression which may lead to collateral damage to properties and civilian
than propose a commercial transaction.” of free expression; and casualties in case of authorized police or military operations may
4. if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & result to criminal liability, as being in the nature of a prior restraint,
The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance producing a chilling effect on the exercise of press freedom,
however, de initely political speech.
of that interest. violating thus such constitutionally-protected right.
The right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute. Even some
On the irst requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the In as early as the 1935 Constitution, our jurisprudence has
forms of protected speech are still subject to some restrictions. The
COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. recognized four aspects of freedom of the press, to wit:
degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is
content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations can On the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest (1) freedom from prior restraint;
either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the be important or substantial, it must also be compelling as to justify (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication;
expression. the restrictions made. Compelling governmental interest would (3) freedom of access to information; and
include constitutionally declared principles. (4) freedom of circulation.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the Prior restraint refers to of icial governmental restrictions on the
rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction must dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
of imminence extremely high.’” not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive,
legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks
There is prior restraint when the government totally prohibits and/or
governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
in some way, restricts the expression of one's view or the manner of
licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
expressing oneself. There is none in this case.
payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even
The allowance of a review of a law or statute on its face in free speech
injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and A plain reading of the questioned advisory clearly shows that no
cases is justi ied by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected
printing of ices of certain newspapers, resulting in the media network or personnel is prohibited nor restricted from
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.
discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as reporting or writing on any subject matter or from being present and
previous restraint or censorship. Any law or of icial that requires covering newsworthy events, unlike the advisories/resolutions Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a
some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, subject of the cases above-cited. Respondents' questioned acts never combination of the following theoretical tests, to wit:
commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can hindered the members of the press from freely exercising their
(a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which were used in
be had at the courts. profession to cover any newsworthy events such as the Manila Pen
early Philippine case laws;
standoff.
Generally, prior restraint is understood to be any form of (b) the clear and present danger rule, which was generally
governmental restriction on, or interference to any form of Contrary to petitioners' contention, no form of threat can be deduced adhered to in more recent cases; and
expression in advance of actual expression, or exercise of the right. from the subject advisory. No other interpretation can be had of (c) the balancing of interests test, which was also recognized
respondents' pronouncements except that for being a reminder of in our jurisprudence.
In Chavez, the Court struck down the statements made by then DOJ
prevailing provisions of the law and jurisprudence, applicable to all
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC warning the media on airing the When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
and not only to media personalities, that resistance or disobedience
alleged wiretapped telephone conversations of then President Gloria regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required
to lawful orders of authorities may result to criminal, and even
Macapagal-Arroyo, as constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to
administrative, liabilities.
the exercise of free speech and of the press. suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest
We sustain thus the RTC's and the CA's inding that there is no prior form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach -
In Primicias, the City Mayor of Manila's refusal to issue permit for a
restraint nor an impermissible regulation on the petitioners' freedom somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other
public assembly was held to have violated the freedom of expression.
of speech and of the press considering that respondents' questioned law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based
In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, the Court held acts were merely brought about by the exigencies of the situation and restrictions.
that the COMELEC resolution totally prohibiting the conduct of exit ultimately, were valid exercise of their authority so as not to
polls in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly, and credible compromise the safety of the civilians at the scene of the incident. As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using
elections was annulled as the same is an absolute infringement of the the clear and present danger rule, while courts will subject
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.
Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec 2019 En Banc
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, a provision in a COMELEC resolution Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590, is an
On grounds of violation of the freedom of speech, of expression, and impermissible content-neutral regulation for being overbroad,
prohibiting the media to allow the use of a column or radio or
of assembly; denial of substantive due process; violation of the equal violating, thus, the free speech clause under Section 4, Article III
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues as
protection clause; and violation of the territoriality principle in
regards the rati ication of the act establishing the Cordillera The questioned provision is clearly a restraint on one's exercise of
criminal cases, petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Autonomous Region, was declared null and void and unconstitutional the right to campaign or disseminate campaign-related information.
Section 36.8 of R.A. 9189, as amended by R.A. 10590 and Section
by the Court as the same restricts, without justi iable reason, the The restraint, however, partakes of a content - neutral regulation as it
74(II)(8) of the COMELEC Resolution No. 10035, which prohibit the
choice of forum where one may express his view, tantamount to a merely involves a regulation of the incidents of the expression,
engagement of any person in partisan political activities
restriction of the freedom of expression. speci ically the time and place to exercise the same.
abroad during the 30-day overseas voting period.
In David, the Court declared as unconstitutional the warrantless Our point of inquiry focuses on the fourth criterion in the said
A facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of
search of the Daily Tribune of ices, the seizure of materials for intermediate test, i.e., that the regulation should be no greater
publication therein, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity, and speech on the ground of overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in
than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental
the arrogant warning of government of icials to media, among others, our jurisdiction. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
interest.
pursuant to President Arroyo's Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation,
and General Order No. 5, as the said acts constitute plain censorship. may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject In this case, the challenged provision's sweeping and absolute
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. On the prohibition against all forms of expression considered as partisan
political activities without any quali ication is more than what is

In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online
essential to the furtherance of the contemplated governmental
plaintiff, the article published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is irst
interest. On its face, the challenged law provides for an absolute and
worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain
substantial suppression of speech as it leaves no ample alternative
words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
means for one to freely exercise his or her fundamental right to
therein alluded to. What is more, its subtitle—:"PCAC raps L. access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize
participate in partisan political activities.
Policarpio on fraud"—is a comment or remark, besides being false. in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In
By banning partisan political activities or campaigning even during Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in
the campaign period within embassies, consulates, and other foreign "presumed to be malicious." the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to
service establishments, regardless of whether it applies only to informational privacy.
We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, recti ied a
candidates or whether the prohibition extends to private persons, it
major inaccuracy contained in the irst article, by stating that neither Restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not
goes beyond the objective of maintaining order during the voting
Col. Alba nor the PCAC had iled the aforementioned complaints with guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user
period and ensuring a credible election. To be sure, there can be no
the city iscal's of ice. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own
legally acceptable justi ication, whether measured against the
stencil involved in said complaints. But, this recti ication or Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
strictest scrutiny or the most lenient review, to absolutely or
clari ication does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the
unquali iedly disallow one to campaign within our jurisdiction
publication of the irst article, although it may and should mitigate it latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post
during the campaign period.
(Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends
Most certainly, thus, the challenged provision, whether on its face or of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
read with its IRR, constitutes a restriction on free speech that is Borjal v CA post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the
greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to
interest it aims to achieve. Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free privacy is negated.
struck down for being overbroad as it does not provide for speech and press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and
Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks
well-de ined standards, resulting to the ambiguity of its application, in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it, is
were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression.
which produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech and the eventual self-destruction of the right and the regression of human
expression, and ultimately, resulting to the unnecessary invasion of society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, The freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
the area of protected freedoms. nasty and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no freedoms, is not absolute. While the freedom of expression and the
absolute "unrestraint" in speech is to truly comprehend the right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously
c. Unprotected utterances quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought and protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as
action, genuine freedom being that which is limited by the freedom of the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone
Policarpio v Manila Times others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the
freedom from the press? constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of
It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their
discretion in determining the manner in which a given event should ⭐Belo-Henares v Guevarra name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.
be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of
as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he
disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to
not per se illegal. Newspapers may publish news items relative to posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about
insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling
Judicial, legislative or other of icial proceedings, which are not of complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however,
complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
con idential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has
with respect to such proceedings, which, being of icial and remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his
been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and
non-con idential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she
reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of
immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
complainant, as well as BMGI.
not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and
The defense is untenable.
without any comments or remarks.
c.1. Criticism of Judicial Conduct the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where
Pantanosas, Jr. v Pamatong 2016 En Banc unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. there is a set. Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of
On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards the programs therein shown. It is hardly the concern of the law to
It is the sworn duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional in irmity. deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be
respectful attitude, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to
It is the opinion of this Court that to avoid an unconstitutional taint
the judicial of ice, but for the maintenance of its supreme manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the
importance." It is precisely for this reason that the Lawyer's Oath
classi ication of ilms. It can, to safeguard other constitutional
enjoins all members of the bar to conduct themselves with good ⭐Pita v CA
objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage
idelity towards the courts in order not to erode the faith and trust of
and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults
the public in the judiciary. In People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in determining
only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is
the existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the
It is not disputed that the Motion for Inhibition iled by respondent the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose
Pamatong contained blatant accusations of corruption against restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its
minds are open to such immoral in luences and into whose hands a
complainant Pantanosas., and then some. As counsel for the plaintiffs validity.
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall."
in Civil Case No. 2006-176, it was incumbent upon respondent
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may "Another test," so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the
Pamatong to observe and maintain respect towards the judicial of ice
be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency."
then being occupied by complainant Pantanosas.
substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such Precisely, the question is: When does a publication have a corrupting
Lawyers have the right, both as an of icer of the court and as a citizen, danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained sensibilities?
channels the acts of courts and judges. However, closely linked to of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
such rule is the cardinal condition that criticisms, no matter how reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element It was People v. Padan y Alova that introduced to Philippine
truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. To cannot be ignored. Nor does it suf ice if such danger be only jurisprudence the "redeeming" element that should accompany
that end, the duty of a lawyer to his client's success is wholly probable. There is the requirement of its being well-nigh inevitable. the work, to save it from a valid prosecution.
subordinate to the administration of justice. The basic postulate, therefore, as noted earlier, is that where the
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in
movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs,
the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant
d. Obscene Matters and other such media of expression are concerned — included as
theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central
they are in freedom of expression — censorship, especially so if an
to Kottinger. Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
Gonzales v Katigbak entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a
proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto
The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classi ied "For safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
law enforcers.
Adults Only." There is the further issue then, also one of irst interest.
impression, as to the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusetts,
The law, however, frowns on obscenity. In the applicable law,
view of the objections raised. established "basic guidelines," to wit:
Executive Order No. 876, reference was made to respondent Board
The main objection was the classi ication of the ilm as "For Adults "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard," (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
Only." For petitioners, such classi ication "is without legal and factual words which can be construed in an analogous manner. Moreover, as standards' would ind the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be the prurient interest …;
expression. stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
patronage of the State." That is a constitutional mandate. offensive way, sexual conduct speci ically de ined by the
The test is whether to the average person, applying
applicable state law; and
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court
artistic, political, or scienti ic value.
Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown Despite the dismissal of the charge for violation of Ordinance No. Art, IX, B, Sec. 2(5). The right to self-organization shall not be denied to
the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant con iscation of the 7780, petitioners did not move to withdraw the present action, government employees.
literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. adamant that the Ordinance "violates the constitutional guarantees to
First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) free speech and expression, violates the right to due process, and Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 2. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
inding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing offends privacy rights." self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
SC dismissed the petition on the ground that Ordinance No. 7780, an
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, we countermanded the orders of the anti-obscenity law, cannot be facially attacked on the ground of They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We overbreadth because obscenity is unprotected speech. and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of decision-making processes affecting their rights and bene its as may be
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application
a defective warrant. We have greater reason here to reprobate the provided by law.
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of
questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or
penal statutes. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap BP Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985) 🔗
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because, and as
statutes in free speech cases.
we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or "obscene". Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v Comelec
They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
We make this resume. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that
in order; also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials which its application might be unconstitutional. and deliberated upon.
sought to be seized are "obscene”, and pose a clear and Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations
It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or
present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those
low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or
interference and action; that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or " ighting
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
words," i.e., those which by their very utterance in lict injury or tend
indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling
to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering
case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion. state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its
national security.
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly
issue the search warrant prayed for; A litigant who stands charged under a law that regulates unprotected not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article speech can still mount a challenge that a statute is unconstitutional an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
201 of the Revised Penal Code; as it is applied to him or her. In such a case, courts are left to examine
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may the provisions of the law allegedly violated in light of the conduct This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed with which the litigant has been charged. If the litigant prevails, the conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
"obscene". courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by concerning one's homosexuality and the activity of forming a
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as
well.
⭐Madrilejos v Gatdula 2019 En Banc
e. Right to Assemble; Freedom of Association With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas
Pastors and preachers from various churches iled a joint and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the
complaint-af idavit against the of icers and publishers of seven men's Bernas, 377 - 386 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a
magazines and tabloids which allegedly contained material which political party may campaign for a change in the law or the
were "clearly scandalous, obscene, and pornographic within the Art. II, Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic
meaning and in violation of Articles 200 and 201 of the Revised Penal means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
Code and Ordinance No. 7780 of the City of Manila.” principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that
territory.
challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by public service,” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service petition are included among the immunities reserved by the
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas shall be observed. sovereign people. The rights of free expression, free assembly and
may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the
of the population. A political group should not be hindered solely man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
public sector do not enjoy the right to strike.
because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in complete ful illment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
order to ind solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that In Re Marcial Edillon government through their suffrage but also in the administration of
are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public of icers.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State organized Bar, to which every lawyer
of the freedom of association guarantee. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
appropriate governmental of icers or agencies for redress and
To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on
because of COMELEC's action, from publicly expressing its views as Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
erring public of icers and employees.
a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
process with other equally-quali ied party-list candidates, we ind carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and
fundamental rights. the State, an integrated Bar is an of icial national body of which all property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to imprescriptible.
Jacinto v CA all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
Although the Constitution vests in public school teachers the right to discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
redress of grievances, there is no like express provision granting constitutes suf icient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
permitting dubious intrusions."
them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
to strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall be done in disbarment of the offending member. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
accordance with law. underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose —
There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration
that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive —
to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
would suf ice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of
law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide
human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely the
are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections an of icial national organization for the well-de ined but unorganized
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which
4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
the State has the right to prevent.
of Article XIII.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself quali ies its He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Malacañ ang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
exercise with the proviso “in accordance with law.” This is a clear Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
against their employer, herein private respondent irm. Said
manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their
or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate
workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police of icers
circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all shared by the subjects and bene iciaries of the regulatory program -
of the municipality of Pasig.
government of icers and employees from staging strikes, the lawyers.
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of PBM Employees v PBM Because the refusal on the part of the respondent irm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint prevent." Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception.
The sole justi ication for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent irm committed an
rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
unfair labor practice.
power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present public interest.
David v Arroyo danger. Here, petitioners were not even noti ied and heard on the
B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
revocation of their permits.
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, where the
right to peaceably assemble. freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. The best gauge of a Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time,
free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet
its media.
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it
necessary consequence of our republican institution and The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune of ices, and the The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on arrogant warning of government of icials to media, are plain because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that censorship. It is that of icious functionary of the repressive they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are
Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to the words "opinion," "protesting" and "in luencing" in the de inition
embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject.
subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. Undoubtedly, The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances"
upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and bene it
to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in
for the assembly itself, may be validly required. most de iant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is the rally.
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear
while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a always be obsta principiis. public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human
can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Bayan v Ermita on the Public Assembly Act or BP 880
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto is not relevant to the regulation.
The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the
policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for
proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot
the "no permit, no rally" policy and the Calibrated Preemptive an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where
be branded as criminals on that score.
Response (CPR) policy recently announced. no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any
The Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members time. Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an
of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet essential part of the law's system of regulation of the people's
dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañ ang's directive peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court
canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the inality of
This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of
a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly is not showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until
that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the modi ication would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
law. For without such an alternative forum, to deny the permit would would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be
It is true that the licensing of icial, here respondent Mayor, is not state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly
devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
proceedings.
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence freedoms.
As for the CPR, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means circumstances, still the assumption - especially so where the
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be assembly is scheduled for a speci ic public place - is that the permit
though some of it is protected.
that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a
which speci ically means the highest degree of restraint that the right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea challenge.
observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the that it may be exercised in some other place."
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only
same.
extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
f. Facial challenge
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its laws and defects, not
IBP v Atienza only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v Anti-Terrorism
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
Council not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech
Act of 1985 practically codi ied the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech or activities.
The public of icial concerned shall appraise whether there may be
cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
excepted. challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. The allowance of a facial
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal
or modi ication that the clear and present danger test be the standard Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly challenge in free speech cases is justi ied by the aim to avert the
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an broad the de inition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the at all times be abridged. This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no socially harmful conduct.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial standard to measure the prohibited acts. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
authority. facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his NOT operate on the same plane. inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that
discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
have been heard irst on the matter of his perceived imminent and
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must substantially overbroad if the court con ines itself only to facts as
grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is applied to the litigants.
the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
unfavorable action on the permit. (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the
conduct to avoid; and unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary lexing of the invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
modi ication. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent
Government muscle. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth governmental act in prior restraint of speech—that is, any "of icial declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression exemption from its application or its "burdensome effect," whether
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on in advance of actual publication or dissemination" —carries a heavy by the legislature or the courts.
its face," not merely "as applied for"; so that the overbroad law burden of unconstitutionality.
The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following doctrines:
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
The effect of government's mandate empowering lead networks from
more narrowly. (a) free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened
excluding other media is a prior restraint, albeit indirectly. The evil of
scrutiny or compelling interest test if government
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under prior restraint is not made less effective when a private corporation
substantially burdened the exercise of religion;
the due process clause has been utilized in examining the exercises it on behalf of government.
(b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test governed
constitutionality of criminal statutes.
cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful XVI. Freedom of Religion where the burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion
demand" in the de inition of terrorism must necessarily be resulted in the forfeiture of a government bene it; and
transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of (c) the Court could carve out accommodations or exemptions
speech clause. religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and from a facially neutral law of general application, whether
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination general or criminal.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech. or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be Sherbert and Yoder adopted a balancing test for free exercise
required for the exercise of civil or political rights. jurisprudence which would impose a discipline to prevent
manipulation in the balancing of interests.
g. Penumbral Right
⭐Estrada v Escritor
A free exercise claim could result to three kinds of accommodation:
The penumbra doctrine has primarily been used to represent implied By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of (a) those which are found to be constitutionally compelled, i.e.,
powers that emanate from a speci ic rule, thus extending the meaning of her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not required by the Free Exercise Clause;
the rule into its periphery or penumbra. constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be (b) those which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not required
held administratively liable, the Court had to determine the contours by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the
See J. Leonen’s Concurring Opinion in Rappler, Inc. v Bautista of religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution. Establishment Clause; and
Freedom of speech is affected when government grants bene its to In resolving claims involving religious freedom (c) those which the religion clauses prohibit.
some media outlets, i.e. lead networks, while unreasonably denying Mandatory accommodation results when the Court inds that
(1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether
the same privileges to the others. This has the effect of sti ling speech accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause, i.e, when the
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
especially when the actions of a government agency such as the Court itself carves out an exemption.
underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution; and
Commission on Elections have the effect of endowing a monopoly in
(2) in deciding respondent's plea of exemption based on the Free In permissive accommodation, the Court inds that the State may,
the market of free speech. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Exercise Clause (from the law with which she is but is not required to, accommodate religious interests.
Elections, we examined free speech in light of equality in
administratively charged), it is the compelling state
opportunity and deliberative democracy. Finally, when the Court inds no basis for a mandatory
interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.
Here, respondent contends that entering into the Memorandum of accommodation, or it determines that the legislative accommodation
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to runs afoul of the establishment or the free exercise clause, it results
Agreement does not trigger Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution
these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be to a prohibited accommodation. In this case, the Court inds that
as this provision involves its coercive power, while the
allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation
Memorandum of Agreement was consensual. Moreover, the provision
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without interests.
pertains to equal opportunity for candidates and not mass media
hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden
entities. Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three different results,
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion.
Freedom of expression is a fundamental and preferred right. Any Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a the question now remains as to how the Court should determine
which action to take. In this regard, it is the strict scrutiny-
compelling state interest test which is most in line with the the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental Peralta assailed the constitutionality of the printing, issuance and
benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach. right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the distribution of the INC commemorative centennial stamps, allegedly
most inalienable and sacred of human rights," paid for by respondent PhilPost using public funds.
It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state's interest is In his complaint, petitioner alleged that the printing and issuance of
underlying the Philippine Constitution. important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious the INC commemorative stamp involved disbursement of public
freedom sacred. The State must articulate in speci ic terms the state funds, and violated. Section 29(2) of Article VI of the 1987
In cases involving purely conduct based on religious belief, as in the
interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be Constitution. He argued that respondents' act of releasing the said
case at bar, the compelling state interest test, is proper, viz:
compelling. stamps was unconstitutional because it was tantamount to
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these
sponsorship of a religious activity; it violated the separation of the
limits. Thus, it is not the State's broad interest in "protecting the institutions Church and the State; and the non-establishment of religion clause.
Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct of marriage and the family," or even "in the sound administration of
justice" that must be weighed against respondent's claim, but the Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not
arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
State's narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
cohabitation which respondent's faith inds moral. In other in luence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may
words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.
be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching.
risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what The elevating in luence of religion in human society is recognized
The compelling state interest test involves a three-step process. We extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
explained this process in detail, by showing the questions which This, the Solicitor General failed to do. indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
must be answered in each step, viz:
The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold
First, Has the statute or government action created a burden on in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's
the free exercise of religion? from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. beliefs. The irst is absolute as long as the belief is con ined within
Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the
Second, Is there a suf iciently compelling state interest to justify
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
this infringement of religious liberty?
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. The The "Lemon test", which has been extensively applied by the U. S.
Third, Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not Supreme Court in issues involving the determination of
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal In arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as non-establishment of religion clause originated from the case of
of the state? the arrangement she had was "illegal per se because, by universally Lemon vs. Kurtzman. In that case, the Court used a three-pronged
recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad, test to adjudge whether the assailed governmental act violated the
As mentioned, what remained to be resolved, upon which remand improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience," the Solicitor First Amendment, as follows:
was necessary, pertained to the inal task of subjecting this case to General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for
the careful application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., 1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
determining whether respondent is entitled to exemption, an issue offend compelling state interests. 2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
which is essentially factual or evidentiary in nature. advances nor inhibits religion; and,
Thus, we ind that in this particular case and under these
The Solicitor General argues that marriage and the family are so distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor's conjugal 3. The statute must NOT foster "an excessive government
crucial to the stability and peace of the nation that the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case entanglement with religion.”
arrangement embraced in the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to
should not be recognized or given effect, as "it is utterly destructive It is plain, that the costs for the printing and issuance of the aforesaid
freedom of religion. 50,000 stamps were all paid for by INC. Any perceived use of
of the avowed institutions of marriage and the family for it reduces to
a mockery these legally exalted and socially signi icant institutions government property, machines or otherwise, is de minimis and
I. Non-establishment of religion certainly do not amount to a sponsorship of a speci ic religion.
which in their purity demand respect and dignity."
Also, We see no violation of the Constitutional prohibition on
The free exercise of religion is speci ically articulated as one of ⭐Peralta v Philippine Postal Corp 2018 En Banc
establishment of religion, insofar as the remaining 1,150,000 pieces
of stamps printed and distributed by PhilPost. determined through the judicial function of construction. Elementary
Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
is the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary and
First, there is no law mandating anyone to avail of the INC phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
usual meaning.
commemorative stamps, nor is there any law purporting to require meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and speci ic by
anyone to adopt the INC's teachings. The centennial celebration of the Petitioner and OSG claim that the terms "notoriously offensive" and considering the company of words in which it is found with or with
Iglesia ni Cristo, though arguably involves a religious institution, has "religious feelings" are vague. We disagree. which it is associated.
a secular aspect.
The said terms are not utterly vague as they are composed of words Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean
The printing of the INC commemorative stamp is no different. It is commonly used. As such, any person of ordinary intelligence may that what is prohibited is the use of public money or property for the
simply an acknowledgment of INC's existence for a hundred years. It understand the same in their ordinary and usual meaning. sole purpose of bene iting or supporting any church. The prohibition
does not necessarily equate to the State sponsoring the INC. contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily
Moreover, this Court cannot give credit to petitioner and the OSG's
intended for the furtherance of a particular church.
Indeed, what is prohibited is the State using its resources to solely contention that Article 133 of the RPC violates the non-establishment
bene it one religion. As stated above, the records do not show that the clause of Section 5, Article III of the Constitution. It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision
State has been using the resources and manpower of PhilPost for "does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes
At the outset, the non-establishment clause is a reinforcement of the
INC's sole advantage. On the contrary, the stamps printed and issued when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a
principle of separation of church and state. It is not equivalent to
by PhilPost, as seen through its website, feature various entities and temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in
separation of religion and state. It is not indifference nor denial of the
organizations, other than religious sects. general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious
religious nature of the Filipino society.
procession even as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way
Celdran y Pamintuan v People In this case, petitioner himself admitted that Article 133 of the RPC that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be
"protects all religion." It does not endorse nor give aid to one religion used for a political assemblage.
As an exception, a facial challenge grounded on the over the other. No excessive entanglement will result from the
In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the
void-for-vagueness doctrine may be allowed when the subject penal effectivity of Article 133 of the RPC as it does not punish every act
manner of appropriation of public money or property, not as to
statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech. Thus, in Disini, Jr., et which may be construed to attack one religion. It only covers those
whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere incidental bene it
al v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., this Court allowed facial acts which are "notoriously offensive" to the feelings of the faithful.
to any church.
invalidation of the criminalization of aiding and abetting cyberlibel In determining whether there was excessive entanglement of the State
because of its chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected in church matters, the following factors are considered: The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation
freedom of expression of the great masses that use the cyberspace, between Church and State. It simply means that the State cannot set
1) the character and purposes of the institutions that are
and boost a social media post by liking, commenting or sharing the up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
bene ited;
same. prefer one religion over another nor force nor in luence a person to
2) the nature of the aid that the State provides; and
go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to
Evidently, such is not the case here. Article 133 of the RPC does not 3) the resulting relationship between the government and the
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot
encroach on the freedom of expression as it does not regulate free religious authority.
punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
speech. The gravamen of the penal statute is the disruption of a
In this case, petitioner and the OSG have not endeavored to establish disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any
religious ceremony and/or worship by committing acts that are
how the State can be unduly involved with church matters. amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful inside a place
or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they
devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of a religious
a. Holding of Religious Rituals in Halls of Justice may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly
ceremony. There is nothing in the provision that imposes criminal
or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or
liability on anyone who wishes to express dissent on another
⭐Re Valenciano 2017 En Banc group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot
religious group. It does not seek to prevent or restrict any person
establish or sponsor an of icial religion.
from expressing his political opinions or criticisms against the
The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose."
Catholic church, or any religion. A facial challenge on the ground of In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government
"Appropriate" means "to prescribe a particular use for particular
the overbreadth doctrine is also impermissible in this case. neutrality in religious matters. Such government neutrality may
moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct
be summarized in four general propositions:
The absence of a statutory de inition of a term used in a statute will use, or for the payment of a particular demand."
not render the law "void for vagueness," if the meaning can be (1) Government must not prefer one religion over another or
teaching. But no public-school teachers shall either conduct religious

religion over irreligion because such preference would f. Public morals and religion
violate voluntarism and breed dissension; exercise or teach religion or act as a designated religious teacher in the
(2) Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes school building under the foregoing authority, and no pupils shall be
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v Comelec, supra.
because this too would violate voluntarism and breed required by any public-school teacher to attend and receive the religious
interfaith dissension; instruction herein permitted. Should the opportunity thus given to teach Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall
(3) Government action must not aid religion because this too religion be used by the priest, minister, or religious teacher for the be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; purpose of arousing disloyalty to the United States, or of discouraging free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause
[and] the attendance of pupils at such public school, or creating a disturbance calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."
(4) Government action must not result in excessive Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justi ication is
of public order, or of interfering with the discipline of the school, the
entanglement with religion because this too can violate inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We thus ind that it was
voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension. division superintendent, subject to the approval of the Director of
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
Education, may, after due investigation and hearing, forbid such
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
offending priest, minister, or religious teacher from entering the
b. Operation of sectarian schools Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
public-school building thereafter.
in luence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's
Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2). Educational institutions, other than those religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
Civil Code, Article 359. The government promotes the full growth of
established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must
the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will
solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to
establish, whenever possible:
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within lexible
The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity (1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
participation in all educational institutions. The control and laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
religious instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at
administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not
the option of the parent or guardian; xxxx
the Philippines. offend compelling state interests.
d. Tax Exemption The Assailed Resolutions have not identi ied any speci ic overt
c. Religious instructions in public schools immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that
Art. VI, Sec. 28(3). Charitable institutions, churches and personages or "there should have been a inding by the COMELEC that the group's
Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option expressed in writing by the parents or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-pro it cemeteries, and all members have committed or are committing immoral acts."
guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities from taxation. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional petitioner's admission into the party-list system would be so
cost to the Government. e. Public Aid to religion harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
Revised Administrative Code of 1917. SECTION 928. Provision for Art. VI, Sec. 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, suf icient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
religious instruction by local priest or minister. – It shall be lawful, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, bene it, or from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
however, for the priest or minister of any church to establish in the support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more
town where a public school is situated, either in person or by a system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals,
designated teacher of religion, to teach religion for one-half hour three teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
times a week, in the school building, to those public-school pupils minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal Respondent's blanket justi ications give rise to the inevitable
whose parents or guardians desire it and express their desire therefor in conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is
writing iled with the principal teacher of the school, to be forwarded to
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
the division superintendent, who shall ix the hours and rooms for such
II. Free Exercise of Religion distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the Iglesia ni Cristo v CA
people of the Philippines." Although the Court categorically held that
⭐Valmores v Achacoso the questioned ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not
not engaged in the business or occupation of selling said include religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A
Here, in seeking relief, petitioner Valmores argues that he is bound by "merchandise" for pro it, it also ruled that applying the ordinance to contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene Section 5, Article
his religious convictions to refrain from all secular activities on plaintiff and requiring it to secure a license and pay a license fee or III of the Constitution.
Saturdays, a day that is deemed holy by his church. On the other tax would impair its free exercise of religious profession and worship
We reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se
hand, respondents' refusal to excuse petitioner Valmores from and its right of dissemination of religious beliefs "as the power to tax
beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV
Saturday classes and examinations fundamentally rests only on the the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
fact that there were other Seventh-day Adventists who had enjoyment."
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
successfully completed their studies at the MSU-College of Medicine.
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
The Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their religious profession and worship carries with it the right to freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the
individual beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is
necessary to protect its citizens from injury or when public safety, only be justi ied like other restraints of freedom of expression on the duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding
peace, comfort, or convenience requires it. Thus, as faculty members grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
of the MSU-College of Medicine, respondents herein were duty-bound evil which the State has the right to prevent.
to protect and preserve petitioner Valmores' religious freedom. Austria v NLRC
Even worse, respondents suggest that the "sacri ices" of other Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos (Concurring Opinion of J. Mendoza)
Private respondents contend that by virtue of the doctrine of
students of the common faith justi ied their refusal to give petitioner
I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of separation of church and state, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have
Valmores exceptional treatment. This is non-sequitur.
donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by P.D. No. 1564 no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint iled by petitioner. Since the
While in some cases the Court has sustained government regulation which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for matter at bar allegedly involves the discipline of a religious minister,
of religious rights, the Court fails to see in the present case how "charitable or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold. it is to be considered a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State
public order and safety will be served by the denial of petitioner has no right to interfere.
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is
Valmores' request for exemption. Neither is there any showing that
not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a The contention of private respondents deserves scant consideration.
petitioner Valmores' absence from Saturday classes would be
religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a The principle of separation of church and state inds no application
injurious to the rights of others. Precisely, the 2010 CHED
charitable or public welfare purpose. in this case.
Memorandum was issued to address such con licts and prescribes
the action to be taken by HEIs should such circumstance arise. Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious
fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An
Estrada v Escritor, supra other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form
usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a
a. Freedom to propagate religious doctrine need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect government of the membership, and the power of excluding from
American Bible Society v City of Manila to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on
regulation. this de inition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship
The Court granted to plaintiff exemption from a law of general between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith,
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for
application based on the Free Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To
religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the
was required by an ordinance to secure a mayor's permit and a be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which
free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if allowed, may well justify
municipal license as ordinarily required of those engaged in the the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication,
requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or
business of general merchandise under the city's ordinances. Plaintiff ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and
enforce tithing.
argued that this amounted to "religious censorship and restrained the other activities with which attached religious signi icance. The case
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited
examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its constitutionally recognized and likewise af irmed by our
In Estrada v. Escritor, we emphasized that in determining whether
religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious statutes as a special contract of permanent union.
the acts complained of constitute "disgraceful and immoral behavior"
signi icance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship Accordingly, judicial employees have been sanctioned for
under civil service laws, the distinction between public and secular
of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is their dalliances with married persons or for their own
morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other should
purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of betrayals of the marital vow of idelity.
be kept in mind. The distinction between public and secular morality
faith, worship or doctrines of the church.
as expressed — albeit not exclusively — in the law, on the one hand,
and religious morality, on the other, is important because the
b. Religious belief and private employment jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. XVII. Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
Thus, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union expressed in criminal law like adultery or concubinage, must have a Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
secular purpose. inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350 was questioned. The
said R.A. exempt employees from the application and coverage of a For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
closed shop agreement-mandated in another law-based on religious behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of
objections. A unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based Any evidence obtained in violation of this xxxx section shall be
law, holding that "government is not precluded from pursuing valid on personal bias, speci ically those colored by particular mores. Nor inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be should it be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly
favorable to a religion or sect." Interestingly, the secular purpose of demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy Republic Act No. 4200 🔗
the challenged law which the Court upheld was the advancement of expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the
"the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion." constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) RA 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007) 🔗
should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may
be frowned upon by the majority. Ople v Torres
c. Religious belief and public employment
Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."
Pamil v Teleron unmarried woman gives birth out of wedlock:
Speci ic guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by
Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as (1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and
ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The not ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and substance x x x. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
presumption of validity calls for its application. immoral conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may
cause complications for both mother and child but it does The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of
not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no law its identi ication with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
Anonymous v Radam constitutional protection. Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we
which penalizes an unmarried mother under those
In an anonymous letter-complaint, respondent Ma. Victoria Radam, circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes will ind that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
utility worker in the Of ice of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, was the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried several provisions of our Constitution. Zones of privacy are likewise
charged with immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that persons. Neither does the situation contravene any recognized and protected in our laws.
respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a Wwe prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
in October 2005. The complainant claimed that respondent's document that accommodates various belief systems fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
behavior tainted the image of the judiciary. irrespective of dogmatic origins. burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justi ied by some
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308
For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving married to a woman other than the mother, then there is a
birth out of wedlock is not per se immoral under civil service laws. is predicated on two considerations:
cause for administrative sanction against either the father or
For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be the mother. In such a case, the "disgraceful and immoral (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to conduct" consists of having extramarital relations with a facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to married person. The sanctity of marriage is and social security providers and other government
a high degree.
instrumentalities and In the Matter of Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of determine
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
Camilo Sabio 1. whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
privacy and, if so,
basic services. PCGG Chair Sabio was invited in a Senate hearing with regard to the 2. whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to anomalies in Philcomsat. He declined citing Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. government intrusion.
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the 1 s. 1987 which provides that: "No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries
broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters are: irst, did the directors and of icers of Philcomsat Holdings
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
within its of icial cognizance." Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?; and second,
present danger.
did the government violate such expectation?
A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental
issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the
will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
Constitution. Senate's public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. The
unequivocally speci ied purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in
inquiry focused on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of
this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the their duties as of icers and directors of the said corporations,
of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis. particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving
con idential information and circumvent the right against the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members their of ices in a corporation where the government has interest.
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for " ishing expeditions" by and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, people have the right to information.
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and
PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we non-accountability. This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or there is an overriding compelling state interest. In Valmonte v.
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section 21 (Congress' Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public igures, the Members of
encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
to prevent. accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are
Article III, Section 7 (right to public information). Consequently, this subject to closer scrutiny.
Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
Gaanan v IAC repealed by the 1987 Constitution. Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the
PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its of icials are
(RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the
issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the be respected." First is the right to privacy. directors and of icers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate
interception of communications between the two parties using a
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGG's
telephone line.
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our ef icacy.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to Pollo v David
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no
the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and This case involves a search of an of ice computer assigned to a
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such government employee who was charged administratively and
for ordinary of ice use. interference or attacks." eventually dismissed from the service. The employee's personal iles
stored in the computer were used by the government employer as
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must evidence of misconduct.
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated of ice connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States, the US Supreme Court held
environment is, in ine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David.
that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
such privacy has been upheld.
made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated
his right to privacy and constituted a "search and seizure". Because We now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a Vivares v STC
the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the reasonable expectation of privacy in his of ice and computer The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of iles?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the writ of habeas data should be issued. Crucial in resolving the
the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner's computer controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence reasonable in its inception and scope? indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
requirement:
include "(1) the employee's relationship to the item seized; (2) In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
irst, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. The writ,
expectation of privacy; and it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to his privacy in the item." Thus, where the employee used a password unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the
recognize as reasonable (objective). on his computer, did not share his of ice with co-workers and kept writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on
the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In Mancusi v. DeForte which addressed the reasonable expectations search of that space and items located therein must comply with the
of private employees in the workplace, the US Supreme Court held Fourth Amendment. Without an actionable entitlement in the irst place to the right to
that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper. Viewed
an of ice at union headquarters that he shared with other union We answer the irst in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he from the perspective of the case at bar, this requisite begs this
of icials. had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his of ice question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1)
or government-issued computer which contained his personal iles. that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions,
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed of ice which if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, bridging the gap
workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of O'Connor v. Ortega he did not share with anyone, or that his of ice was always locked created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in
where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege OSNs leaves an indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are
hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
hospital of icials investigating charges of mismanagement of the employees from accessing his computer iles. informational privacy in OSN activities of its users?
psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital
employees and other irregularities involving his private patients Assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the On Habeas Data
under the state medical aid program, searched his of ice and seized aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a
subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such 1. The writ of habeas data is not only con ined to cases of extralegal
personal items from his desk and iling cabinets.
is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of of ice killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of habeas data,
In O'Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize computers, as in Simons. however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related one’s right to privacy, more speci ically the right to
reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees informational privacy.
government interests are weighed against the employee's reasonable on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they 2. Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
expectation of privacy. create, store, send or receive on the of ice computers, and that the CSC protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or
may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be collecting of data. To “engage” in something is different from
Board have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or
intrusion of privacy in the workplace. The employees' privacy legitimate business purposes. take part in something.”
interest in an of ice is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search The right to informational privacy on Facebook
entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent conducted on petitioner's computer, we answer in the af irmative.
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
right of the employer to maintain discipline and ef iciency in the The search of petitioner's computer iles was conducted in
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate not only for violations of life, liberty, and security, but also against
YES. The writ of amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy
the accessibility of a user’s pro ile as well as information uploaded threatened violations of such. But not all threats are protected by
primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited to,
by the user. the Amparo Rule. As previously elucidated by this Court, only actual
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
the case, can qualify as a violation. In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, this Court explains
activity, it is irst necessary that said user, in this case the children
that the remedy of a writ of amparo, being a summary proceeding,
of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts Having these guidelines in mind, we hold that petitioners failed to
requires only substantial evidence to provide rapid judicial relief
private, through the employment of measures to prevent substantially prove that their life, liberty and security are threatened
to the petitioner. More than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is
access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can with violation.
such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might determine as
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy
The petitioners' general statements are empty averments in the adequate to support a conclusion.
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
context of the Amparo Rule. Mere membership in these organizations
manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her Additionally, hearsay evidence, which is generally considered
or sectors cannot equate to an actual threat that would warrant the
right to informational privacy. inadmissible under the rules of evidence, may be considered in a
issuance of a writ of amparo.
writ of amparo proceeding if required by the unique circumstances
RA 10173 or the Data Privacy Act of 2012🔗, and Moreover, as the writ of amparo is sought individually and granted of the case. This Court in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis concluded that the
individually, then we should assess the situation of the petitioners "totality of the obtaining situation" must be taken into
RA 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 🔗 individually. Lumping together the previous and present experiences consideration to determine if a petitioner is entitled to a writ of
of petitioners may give off the impression that, indeed, taken amparo.
XVIII. Remedies For Violation of Constitutional Rights together, petitioners' life, liberty and security are threatened to be
The totality of petitioner's evidence undoubtedly showed that she
violated. But this way of presenting the obtaining situation is
became a person of interest after she had irst visited the funeral
misleading. A perusal of their individual circumstances negates the
a. Constitutional Writs home, where her photo was taken. PO2 De la Cruz tried to downplay
conclusion that they are each entitled to a writ of amparo.
the situation by claiming that petitioner's photo was not "posted" in
Habeas Corpus🔗 The iling of cases cannot be characterized as an unlawful act or the police station, but she likewise did not deny telling petitioner that
omission in the context of the Amparo Rule. she saw petitioner's photo at the police station. Whether petitioner's
Habeas Data🔗AM No. 08-1-16-SC photo was actually posted and distributed at the police station or was
The extraordinary writ of habeas data "provides a judicial remedy
just taken for future reference, the taking of the photo bolsters
to protect a person's right to control information regarding oneself,
Amparo 🔗AM No. 07-9-12-SC petitioner's claims that she was being monitored by the police.
particularly in instances where such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends." The Respondents try to paint petitioner's claims as the ramblings of a
Zarate v Aquino III
Habeas Data Rule likewise requires substantial evidence. paranoid and overly suspicious person, but even her daughter
The writ of amparo is a "remedy available to any person whose con irmed the numerous times the police drove by their house and
In the present petition, petitioners fail to show how their right to
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with being tailed whenever they set foot outside their house. This shows
privacy is violated given that the information contained in the "lists"
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public of icial or that petitioner was not merely imagining the threats against her and
are only their names, their positions in their respective
employee, or of a private individual or entity." her family.
organizations, and their photographs. All these data are of public
Section 5(c) of A. M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
knowledge and are readily accessible even to civilians, especially The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows that
since petitioners are known personalities who are often featured in petitioner and her children were the subject of surveillance because
requires every petition to state "the right to life, liberty and security
news reports. of their relationship with a suspected member of the New People's
of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or Army, creating a real threat to their life, liberty, or security.
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in ⭐Sanchez v Darroca 2019 Leonen En Banc Being Labinghisa's widow, despite being separated in fact from him
supporting af idavits." As an additional safeguard, Sections 17 & 18 for more than a decade, puts her at a precarious position in light of
Whether or not petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez was able to prove with
of the Rule requires substantial evidence. the current administration's aggressive efforts to stamp out the
substantial evidence her entitlement to the privilege of a writ of
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy as it is available amparo. communist struggle in the country, which is seen as the "scourge of
society."
order of the court because since then, the restraint has become (3) right to security of persons, free from fears and threats that
Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as evidenced by the
legal. vitiate the quality of life.
privileges they enjoy against State incursion into their relationships.
Hence, respondents' surveillance of petitioner and her children as Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court
witting or unwitting witnesses against her husband or his activities illegal deprivation of freedom of movement or illegal restraint explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
is correctible by a writ of amparo. is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus. Consequently, in the
absence of con inement and custody, the courts lack the power to act While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees
Similar to marital privilege, the right to privacy is also a basic, essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all
on the petition for habeas corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof
fundamental right. The Constitution recognizes every person's right other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person
must be refused.
to physical privacy, hence the explicit limitations on unwarranted is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life. In a broad sense,
State intrusion into personal affairs. The iling of the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and
before this Court while the Habeas Corpus Petition before the uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
Moreover, the RTC erred in failing to consider the gender and power
CA was still pending is improper. health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the
issues at play here, and how they affected the dynamics between the
parties. Male police of icers were investigating and surveilling the Even if the Court sets aside this procedural faux pas, petitioners and right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not
widow and daughter of an alleged communist, creating two (2) tiers co-petitioner Marcos failed to show, by prima facie evidence, only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are
of power: (1) law enforcer-civilian; and (2) male-female. entitlement to the issuance of the writ. Much less have they necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature,
exhibited, by substantial evidence, meritorious grounds to the grant temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."
In determining whether the petition must be granted, judges act as
of the petition. The right to liberty, on the other hand, was de ined in the City of
impartial inquisitors seeking to assure themselves that there is no
actual or future threat to the life or liberty of petitioners. In a way, The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., in this manner:
courts hearing writs of amparo assist in ferreting out the truth by of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was de ined by Justice
providing an antidote to the naturally intimidating atmosphere of coverage, in its present form, is con ined to these two instances or to Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free
police investigations, especially involving communist and other threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed without from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
rebels against the government. due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
proceedings. citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
Agcaoili, Jr. v Fariñas 2018 En Banc In Navia, et al. v. Pardico, the elements constituting "enforced facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject
disappearance," are enumerated as follows: only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."
The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" was
devised as a "speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., thoroughly
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only suf icient defense of deprivation of liberty; expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:
personal freedom." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or A closer look at the right to security of person would yield
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; various permutations of the exercise of this right.
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's
illegal." refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear."
whereabouts of the person subject of the Amparo petition; Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily
As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective, case
and, and psychological integrity or security.
law deems any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
as suf icient. Thus, as provided in the Rules of Court under Section Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
1, Rule 102 thereof, a writ of Habeas Corpus "shall extend to all cases of one's rights by the government.
of time.
of illegal con inement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is To reiterate, the writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee Nevertheless, and by way of caution, the rule is that a writ of Amparo
withheld from the person entitled thereto." the shall not issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently,
every petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo should be
A Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person (1) right to life; supported by justifying allegations of fact, which the Court in Tapuz
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or (2) right to liberty; and laid down as follows:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; of law; The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is taken for public use; other penal statute.
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
an assumed appellation; Rico v Deguma 2019 Resolution
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; respondent Judge Marciana Q. Deguma should be held liable for
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; damages under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code.
detailed in supporting af idavits; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for Article 32 provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, purposes not contrary to law; freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. For one to be liable, it is
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the suf icient that a claimant's constitutional rights were violated.
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct Whether malice or bad faith exists is not required.
Government for redress of grievances;
of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to (14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form; Nevertheless, this Court has provided that judges are exempt from
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; liability under this article unless their acts of omissions constitute a
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statutes. Thus,
omission; and be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against judges are not liable for civil damages as long as they acted in
(f) The relief prayed for. him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses exercise of their judicial functions and within their jurisdiction.
Even more telling is the rule that the writ of Amparo cannot be issued face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the From these, this Court does not ind respondent liable under Articles
in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer attendance of witness in his behalf; 27 and 32 of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, even if Article 32 did apply
imminent or continuing. (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's in this case, the Petition must still fail because petitioner's
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being constitutional rights were not violated. To reiterate, the right to
In this case, the alleged unlawful restraint on petitioners' liberty has information and access to public records is not absolute, but is
effectively ceased upon their subsequent release from detention. On induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
subject to the court's regulation and discretion. Besides, as this Court
the other hand, the apprehension of co-petitioner Marcos that she confession, except when the person confessing becomes a noted in its Resolution, it is not shown how petitioner was denied
will be detained is, at best, merely speculative. State witness; access to the records, considering that as a private complainant in the
(18) Freedom from excessive ines, or cruel and unusual criminal case, he must have been sent copies of these records.
b. Damages punishment, unless the same is imposed or in licted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially c. Claims for compensation
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 32. Any public of icer or declared unconstitutional; and
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly (19) Freedom of access to the courts. RA 7309 🔗
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the d. Mandamus
latter for damages: defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil Guingona v Comelec
(1) Freedom of religion; action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed In order that a petition for mandamus may be given due course, it
(2) Freedom of speech; independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), must be instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. tribunal, corporation, board, or person, which unlawfully excludes
publication; said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. However, if the
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may petition is anchored on the people's right to information on
(5) Freedom of suffrage; also be adjudicated.
matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution.
interest. The requirement of personal interest is satis ied by the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show
any special interest in the result. It is suf icient that petitioners are
citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful execution of the
laws.
It is not enough, however, that the information petitioners seek in a
writ of mandamus is a matter of public concern. For mandamus to lie
in a given case, the information must not be among the species
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In this case, respondent Comelec failed to cite any provision of law
exempting the information sought by petitioners from the coverage of
the government's constitutional duty to disclose fully information of
public concern.
e. Declaratory Relief as an Improper Remedy
DOTr v Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association 2018 En

Banc
This case concerns the constitutionality of establishing the "Oil
Pollution Management Fund," under Section 22(a) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9483 and Section 1, Rule of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), by imposing "ten centavos (10c) per liter for every
delivery or transshipment of oil made by tanker barges and tanker
haulers."
One of the requisites for an action for declaratory relief is that it must
be iled before any breach or violation of an obligation. Thus, there is
no actual case involved in a Petition for Declaratory Relief. It cannot,
therefore, be the proper vehicle to invoke the judicial review powers
to declare a statute unconstitutional.
It is elementary that before this Court can rule on a constitutional
issue, there must irst be a justiciable controversy. A justiciable
controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory.
To question the constitutionality of the subject issuances,
respondents should have invoked the expanded certiorari jurisdiction
under Section 1 of Article VIII. Thus, petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are the proper remedies where an action of the legislative

01 POLI Constitutional Law Review TEXT, NOTES and CASES

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01 POLI Constitutional Law Review TEXT, NOTES and CASES

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Political Law Review

Text, Notes and Cases

Compiled by Rehne Gibb N. Larena | JD-NT-4 | AY 2020-21 | University of San Carlos

TABLE OF CONTENTS c.4.3. Adherence to International Law 30 f.2. Special Sessions 48

e.1. Question Hour 65 D. Power of Appointment 81 A.4. Security of Tenure 98

breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the

in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American Altarejos v Comelec

of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per

accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of

such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by

declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of

their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s

Pobre v Santiago Adaza v Pacana, Jr. Liban v Gordon

Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with

religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from

such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written

together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be

proven in due time.

B. Privilege And Salary reiterated in Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III.

⭐Neri v Executive Secretary, supra. the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating

be appointed to any of ice which may have been created or the

rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of

call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such

These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential to the Government.

necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless

but as divisions of one and the same court.

d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is

quali ications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate

Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the

judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of

Marcelino v Cruz De Roma v CA de Castro v JBC (2010 Decision supra)

priority to subsistence ishermen and ish workers in rivers, lakes,

country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of speech

institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,

follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.

not sent to his registered address of place of business, such bare

2. to be determined personally by the judge

petitioners. af idavit iled in support of the warrant is physically attached to it,

duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness

the arresting of icer. g. Checkpoint Searches Bus Searches/Inspections

investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own

connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without

investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely

investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can

impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the

superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — Decision.

2. Involuntary servitudes against public order.

questions of law. Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but

information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going,

“highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights speech.

political activities without any quali ication is more than what is

teaching. But no public-school teachers shall either conduct religious

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process

e. Declaratory Relief as an Improper Remedy

DOTr v Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association 2018 En

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