TABLE OF CONTENTS

OF
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Based on the 2021 Bar Syllabus)

TOPICS PAGE

I. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

A. Nature and concept of a constitution 1

B. Parts of a constitution 1
C. Amendments and revisions 1
D. Methods of interpreting the Constitution 2

II. BASIC CONCEPTS

A. Declaration of principles and state policies 2

B. Sovereignty 4
C. State immunity 4
D. Separation of powers 7
E. Checks and balances 8
F. Delegation of powers 8

G. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

1. Police power 9
2. Eminent domain 10
3. Taxation 12

III. NATIONAL TERRITORY 12

IV. CITIZENSHIP

A. Kinds of citizenship, purpose of distinguishing citizenship

and kinds of citizenship 12
B. Who are citizens 12
C. Who can be citizens 13
D. Modes of acquiring citizenship 13
E. Modes of losing and reacquiring citizenship 13
F. Dual citizenship and dual allegiance 15

V. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. LEGISLATIVE POWER
1. Scope and limitations 16
2. Principle of non-delegability; exceptions 17
 B. CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS; COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATIONS
1. Senate 18
2. House of Representatives 18
a. District representatives and questions of apportionment 18
b. Party-list system 19

C. Legislative privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications 21

D. Quorum and voting majorities 22
E. Discipline of members 23
F. Process of law-making 23

G. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

1. Nature 24
2. Powers 24

H. POWERS OF CONGRESS
1. Legislative inquiries and oversight functions 25
2. Non-legislative 26
a. Informing function 26
b. Power of impeachment 26

I. Initiative and referendum 27

VI. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, AND TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-

PRESIDENT 27

B. PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS, AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

1. Presidential immunity 28
2. Presidential privilege 29

C. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

1. General executive and administrative powers 31
2. Power of appointment 31
a. In general 31
b. Limitations on the exercise/power 32
c. Types of appointment 33
3. Power of control and supervision 34
a. Doctrine of qualified political agency 34
b. Executive departments and offices 34
c. Local government units 34
4. Emergency powers 35
5. Commander-in-chief powers 35
a. Calling out powers 35
b. Declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; extension 36
6. Executive clemency 37
 a. Nature and limitations 37
b. Forms of executive clemency 38
7. Diplomatic power 39
8. Powers relative to appropriation measures 40
9. Delegated powers 41
10. Residual powers 41
11. Veto powers 41

D. RULES OF SUCCESSION 42

VII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. CONCEPTS
1. Judicial power 43
2. Judicial review 43
a. Requisites 43
b. Operative fact doctrine 44
c. Political question doctrine 44

B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY 44

C. APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY

1. Qualifications of members of the judiciary 45
2. Judicial and Bar Council 46
a. Composition 46
b. Powers 46

D. THE SUPREME COURT

1. Composition 46
2. Powers and functions 46

VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. Common provisions 48
B. Institutional independence safeguards 49
C. Powers and functions 49
D. Composition and qualifications of members 50
E. Prohibited offices and interests 51

IX. BILL OF RIGHTS

A. CONCEPT OF BILL OF RIGHTS

1. Privacy and autonomy 51
2. Relation to human rights 52

B. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

1. Concept of right to life, liberty and property 52
2. Kinds of due process 52
a. Substantive 52
 b. Procedural 52
i. Judicial 53
ii. Administrative 53
c. Levels of scrutiny 53

C. EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

1. Concept 54
2. Requisites for valid classification 54
3. Levels of scrutiny 54

D. RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1. Concept of privacy 55
2. Concept of a search 55
3. Requisites of a valid warrant 56
4. Warrantless searches 56
5. Warrantless arrests and detention 59
6. Exclusionary rule 59
7. Effects of unreasonable searches and seizures 59
8. Effects of illegal detention 60

E. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

1. Concept of communications, correspondence 60
2. Intrusion, when and how allowed 60
3. Exclusionary rule 61

F. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

1. Concept 61
a. Continuum of thought, speech, expression, and speech acts 61
b. Purposes of free speech doctrines 61
c. Balance between unbridled expression and liberty 62
2. Types of regulation 62
a. Prior restraint and subsequent punishment 62
b. Content based and content neutral 62
c. Incitement and advocacy 63
d. Specificity of regulation and overbreadth doctrine 64
e. Speech regulation in relation to election 64
f. Speech regulation in relation to media 65
3. Judicial analysis, presumptions and levels and types of scrutiny 65
4. Special topics in free expression cases 66
a. Hate speech 66
b. Defamation and libel 66
c. Sedition and speech in relation to rebellion 66
d. Obscenity/pornography 67
e. Commercial speech 67
f. National emergencies 67
g. Speech of public officers 67
5. Cognate rights 67
a. Freedom of assembly 67
b. Freedom of association 68
 c. Freedom of information 68

G. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
1. Basic principles 68
a. Purpose 68
b. Concept of religion 69
2. Principle of separation of church and state 69
3. Non-establishment clause 69
4. Free exercise clause 69

H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

1. Scope and limitations 71
2. Watch-list and hold departure orders 71

I. EMINENT DOMAIN
1. Concept 71
2. Just compensation 72
3. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase 72
4. Expropriation by local government units 73

J. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS 73

K. ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND FREE ACCESS TO COURTS 73

L. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

1. Scope and coverage 74
2. Application 74
3. Immunity statutes 74

M. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

1. Availability 75
2. Requisites 75
3. Waiver 76

N. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

1. Criminal due process 76
2. Bail 76
3. Presumption of innocence 77
4. Right to be heard 78
5. Assistance of counsel 78
6. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation 79
7. Right to speedy, impartial, and public trial 79
8. Right of confrontation 80
9. Compulsory process 80
10. Trials in absentia 80

O. RIGHT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES 81

 P. RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES AND CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND
INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS 81

Q. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBTS 81

R. RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

1. Requisites; scope 82
2. Limitations 83

S. RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 83

T. EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER 84

X. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. General principles xx
B. Modes of acquiring title to public office xx
C. Modes and kinds of appointment xx
D. Eligibility and qualification requirements xx
E. Disabilities and inhibitions of public officers xx
F. Powers and duties of public officers xx
G. Rights of public officers xx

H. LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. Preventive suspension and back salaries xx
2. Illegal dismissal, reinstatement, and back salaries xx

I. Immunity of public officers xx

J. Distinguish: de facto and de Jure officers xx
K. Termination of official relation xx

L. CIVIL SERVICE
1. Scope xx
2. Appointments to the civil service xx
3. Personnel actions xx

M. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. Types of accountability xx
a. Administrative xx
b. Criminal xx
2. The Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor xx
3. The Sandiganbayan xx

N. TERM LIMITS xx

XI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. General principles xx
B. Administrative agencies xx
 C. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1. Rule-making power xx
a. Kinds of administrative rules and regulations xx
b. Requisites for validity xx
2. Adjudicatory power xx
a. Administrative due process xx
b. Administrative appeal and review xx
c. Administrative res judicata xx
3. Fact-finding, investigative, licensing, and rate-fixing powers xx

D. JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Doctrine of primary administration jurisdiction xx
2. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies xx
3. Doctrine of finality of administrative action xx

XII. ELECTION LAW

A. SUFFRAGE
1. Qualification and disqualification of voters xx
2. Registration and deactivation of voters xx
3. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings xx
4. Local and overseas absentee voting xx
5. Detainee voting xx

B. POLITICAL PARTIES
1. Jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections over political parties xx
2. Registration of political parties xx

C. CANDIDACY
1. Qualifications and disqualifications of candidates xx
2. Filing of certificates of candidacy xx
a. Effect of filing xx
b. Substitution and withdrawal of candidates xx
c. Nuisance candidates xx
d. Effect of disqualification xx

D. CAMPAIGN
1. Premature campaigning xx
2. Prohibited contributions xx
3. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda xx
4. Limitations on expenses xx
5. Statement of contributions and expenses xx

E. BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS AND BOARD OF CANVASSERS

1. Composition xx
2. Powers xx

F. REMEDIES
1. Petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy xx
 2. Petition for disqualification xx
3. Failure of election; call for special election xx
4. Pre-proclamation controversy xx
5. Election protest xx
6. Quo warranto xx

XIII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT xx

B. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
1. Concept; distinguished from Government-Owned or
Controlled Corporations xx
2. Classifications xx
a. Quasi-corporations xx
b. Municipal corporations xx
i. Elements xx
ii. Nature and functions xx
iii. Requisites for creation, conversion, division, merger or
dissolution xx

C. PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY xx

D. POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

1. General welfare clause xx
2. Eminent domain xx
3. Taxing power xx
4. Closure and opening of roads xx
5. Legislative power xx
a. Requisites for valid ordinance xx
b. Local initiative and referendum xx
6. Ultra vires acts xx
7. Corporate powers xx
8. Liability of local government units xx
9. Settlement of boundary disputes xx
10. Local officials xx
a. Vacancies and succession xx
b. Discipline xx
i. Elective officials xx
(a) Grounds xx
(b) Jurisdiction xx
(c) Preventive suspension xx
(d) Removal xx
(e) Administrative appeal xx
(f) Doctrine of condonation xx
ii. Appointive officials xx
11. Recall xx
12. Term Limits xx
XIV. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

A. Exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources xx

B. Franchises, authorities, and certificates for public utilities xx
C. Acquisition, ownership, and transfer of public and private lands xx
D. Practice of professions xx
E. Organization and regulation of private and public corporations xx
F. Monopolies, restraint of trade, and unfair competition xx

XV. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Concept of social justice xx

B. Economic, social, and cultural rights xx

C. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Powers xx
2. Composition and qualification of members xx

XVI. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

A. Academic Freedom xx

XVII. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Concepts xx
B. Relationship between international and Philippine domestic law xx

C. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Article 38, International Court of Justice Statute xx
2. Effect of United Nations Declarations, Security Council
Resolutions xx
3. Effect of actions of organs of international organizations
created by treaty xx

D. SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Stated xx
2. International organizations xx
3. Individuals xx
4. Others xx

E. JURISDICTION OF STATES
1. Basis of jurisdiction xx
a. Territoriality principle xx
b. National principle and statelessness xx
c. Protective principle xx
d. Universality principle xx
e. Passive personality principle xx
2. Exemptions from jurisdiction xx
a. Act of State doctrine xx
 b. International organizations and their officers xx

F. Diplomatic and consular law xx

G. Nationality and statelessness xx
H. General principles of treaty law xx
I. Doctrine of state responsibility xx
J. Refugees xx

K. TREATMENT OF ALIENS
1. Extradition xx
a. Fundamental principles xx
b. Procedure xx
c. Distinguished from deportation xx

L. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights xx
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights xx
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights xx

M. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

1. Categories of armed conflicts xx
a. International armed conflicts xx
b. Internal or non-international armed conflict xx
c. War of national liberation xx
2. Core international obligations of States xx
3. Principles of international humanitarian law xx
a. Treatment of civilians xx
b. Prisoners of war xx
4. Law on neutrality xx

N. LAW OF THE SEA

1. Baselines xx
2. Archipelagic States xx
a. Straight archipelagic baselines xx
b. Archipelagic waters xx
c. Archipelagic sea lanes passage xx
d. Regime of islands xx
3. Internal waters xx
4. Territorial sea xx
5. Contiguous zone xx
6. Exclusive economic zone xx
7. Continental shelf xx
8. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea xx

O. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1. Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration xx
2. Precautionary principle xx

I. THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
A. NATURE AND CONCEPT OF A
CONSTITUTION
Q: What is a constitution?
A: It is a body of rules and maxims by
which the powers of sovereignty are
habitually exercised. (COOLEY,
Constitutional Limitations, p. 4)
With particular reference to the
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines;
• it is a written instrument enacted by
the direct action of the people
• by which the fundamental powers of
the government are established,
limited, and defined, and
• by which those powers are
distributed among the several
departments
• for their safe and useful exercise,
• for the benefit of the body politic.
(MALCOLM & LAUREL, Philippine
Constitutional Law [1936], p. 6)
B. PARTS OF A
CONSTITUTION
Q: What are the parts of
constitution?
A:
1) Constitution of Liberty – the
series of prescriptions setting forth
the fundamental civil and political
rights of the citizens and imposing
limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing
the enjoyment of those rights, e.g.,
Article III;
2) Constitution of Sovereignty –
the provisions pointing out the
mode of procedure by which formal
changes in the fundamental law
may be brought about, e.g., Article
XVII; and
3) Constitution of Government
– the series of provisions outlining
the organization of the
government, enumerating its
powers, laying down certain rules
relative to its administration and
defining the electorate, e.g., Article
VI, VII, VIII, and IX. (Defensor
Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 127325, June
10, 1997)
C. AMENDMENTS AND
REVISIONS
Q: What are the distinctions
between an amendment and a
revision?
A: An amendment and a revision may be
distinguished in the following manner:
1) Revision broadly implies a
change that alters a basic principle
in the Constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or
the systems of checks and
balances.
2) There is also a revision if the
change alters the substantial
entirety of the Constitution.
3) Amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces,
deletes, without altering the basic
principles involved.
4) Amendment generally affects
only the specific provisions being
changed. (Lambino v. COMELEC,
a G.R. No. 174153, October 25,
2006)
Q: May the petitioners file a petition
with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite on
their petition for an initiative to
amend the Constitution by adopting
a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government and by providing for
transitory provisions?
A: No, an initiative to change the
Constitution applies only to an
amendment and not revision. Revision
broadly implies a change that alters basic
principles in the Constitution like altering
the principle of separation of powers or
the system of checks and balances. The
initiative of the petitioners is a revision
and not merely an amendment.
(Lambino v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. Nos. 174153, October 25, 2006)
1
Q: Can the Congress amend or revise
the Constitution?
A: No, Congress can only propose
amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. (Sec.1., Art., XVII, 1987
Constitution)
Q: How may the amendment or
revision of the Constitution be
proposed by Congress?
A: Any amendment or revision to the
Constitution may be proposed by the
Congress through:
1) A vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
2) A constitutional convention. (Sec.
1., Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: May the people propose any
amendment to the Constitution?
A: Yes, any amendment to this
Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by:
• the people through the initiative
upon the petition of at least
twelve (12) per centum of the
total number of registered
voters,
• of which every legislative district
must be presented by at least
three (3) per centum of the
registered voter therein. (Sec.
2., Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution)
D. METHODS OF INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION
Q: What are the methods of
interpreting the Constitution?
A: The following are the methods of
interpreting the Constitution:
1) Verba legis – whenever
possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
(Francisco v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003)
2) Ratio legis et anima – the
words of the Constitution should be
interpreted following the intent of
the framers. (Civil Liberties Union
2
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
83896, February 22, 1991)
3) Ut magis valeat quam pereat
– the Constitution has to be
interpreted as a whole. (Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 83896,
February 22, 1991)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
A. DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICES
Q: Are the provisions in Article II
self‐executing?
A: No, by its very title, Article II of the
Constitution is a “declaration of
principles and state policies.” However,
principles in Article II are not intended to
be self‐executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws. (Tondo Medical v.
CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007)
Q: What is a Republican State?
A: It is a state wherein all government
authority emanates from the people and
is exercised by representatives chosen
by the people. (Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R.
No. 130716, December 9, 1998)
Q: What are the manifestations of
Republicanism?
A: The following are the manifestations
of Republicanism:
1) Ours is a government of laws
and not of men. (Villavicencio v.
Lukban, G.R. No. 14639, March 25,
1919)
2) Rule of Majority (Plurality in
elections) (Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
148334, January 21, 2004)
 3) Accountability of public officials
(Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643,
September 4, 2008)
4) Bill of Rights (Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
148334, January 21, 2004)
5) The legislature cannot pass
irrepealable laws (City of Davao
v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No.
127383, [August 18, 2005)
6) Separation of powers. (Director of
Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-
30001, June 23, 1970)
Q: What is the state policy regarding
war?
A: The state renounces war as an
instrument of national policy. (Sec.2.,
Art. II, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the Doctrine of
Incorporation?
A: It means that:
• the rules of International law
form part of the law of the land
and
• no legislative action is required
to make them applicable in a
country.
By this doctrine, the Philippines is
bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered
to be automatically part of our laws.
(Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295,
May 2, 1997)
Q: What is the Principle of Civilian
Supremacy?
A: Civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military. (Sec.3., Art.
II, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the policy of the State on
foreign policy?
A: The State shall pursue an
independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states, the
paramount consideration shall be
national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-
3
determination. (Sec.7., Art. II., 1987
Constitution)
Q: What is the policy of the State on
social justice?
A: The State shall promote social justice
in all phases of national development.
(Sec.10., Art. II., 1987 Constitution)
The State shall promote a just and
dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.
(Sec.9., Art. II., 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the policy of the State on
the role of women?
A: The State recognizes the role of
women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. (Sec.14.,
Art. II., 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the policy of the State on
the role of the youth?
A: The State recognizes the vital role of
the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs. (Sec.13., Art. II., 1987
Constitution)
Q: What is the policy of the State on
ecology?
A: The State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
(Sec.16., Art. II., 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the policy of the State on
the economy?
A: The State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their
welfare. (Sec.18., Art. II., 1987
Constitution)
The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. C. STATE IMMUNITY
(Sec.19., Art. II., 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the Doctrine of State
Q: What is the policy of the State on Immunity?
Cultural minorities?
A: Under this doctrine, the State cannot
A: The State recognizes and promotes be sued without its consent. (Sec. 3, Art.
the rights of indigenous cultural XVI, 1987 Constitution)
communities within the framework of
national unity and development. Q: What is the basis of the Doctrine
(Sec.22., Art. II., 1987 Constitution) of State Immunity?

Q: What is the policy of the State on A: It reflects nothing less than a

the role of non-governmental recognition of the sovereign character of
sectors? the State and an express affirmation of
the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
A: The State shall encourage non- from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based
governmental, community-based, or on the very essence of sovereignty.
sectoral organizations that promote the (Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, G.R.
welfare of the nation. (Sec.23., Art. II., No. 104269, November 11, 1993)
1987 Constitution)
There can be no legal right against the
Q: What is the policy of the State on authority which makes the law on which
the transparency of public the right depends (Republic vs. Villasor,
transactions? G.R. No. L‐30671, November 28, 1973).

A: Subject to reasonable conditions Q: Can a government agency be sued

prescribed by law, the State adopts and based on money claims involving
implements a policy of full public liability arising from a contract?
disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. (Sec.28., Art. II., 1987 A: Yes, express consent was provided
Constitution) for by Act No. 3083, which states that
"the Philippine government consents and
B. SOVEREIGNTY submits to be sued upon any money
claims involving liability arising from
Q: What is sovereignty? contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of a civil action between
A: It is the supreme and uncontrollable private parties."
power inherent in a State by which that
State is governed. (GARNER, p. 238, At the same time, it is inarguable
170) that the Department of Agriculture's
contract with the Sultan Security Agency
Q: What are the characteristics of was a proprietary act, which essentially
sovereignty? means that the DoA cannot invoke the
principle of the non-suability of the
A: The following are the characteristics State. (Department of Agriculture v.
of a sovereign state: NLRC, G.R. No. 104269, November 11,
1993)
1) Permanence;
2) Exclusiveness; Q: May government funds and
3) Comprehensiveness; properties be seized under writs of
4) Absoluteness; execution or garnishment to satisfy
5) Indivisibility; judgments rendered in a case
6) Inalienability; and wherein the State give its consent to
7) Imprescriptible. (Laurel v. be sued?
Misa, 77 Phil. 856)
A: No, the universal rule that where the
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600 State gives its consent to be sued by
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant’s action
‘only up to the completion of proceedings

4
anterior to the stage of execution’ and
that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments,
is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required
by law. (Republic vs. Villasor, G.R. No. L‐
30671, November 28, 1973).
Q: Will the Doctrine of State
Immunity apply to a foreign
government?
A: This doctrine also applies to a foreign
government because of the sovereign
equality of all the states. Accordingly,
immunity is enjoyed by other States
consonant with the public international
law principle of par in parem non habet
imperium. The head of state, who is
deemed the personification of the State,
is inviolable, and thus, enjoys immunity
from suit. (JUSMAG Philippines v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 108813, December 15, 1994)
Q: Is the waiver or consent of the
United States government needed to
sue the Joint United States Military
Assistance Group to the Republic of
the Philippines (JUSMAG)?
A: Yes, JUSMAG was performing a
governmental function on behalf of the
United States under the Military
Assistance Agreement between the
Philippines and the US. It consists of Air,
Naval and Army group and its primary
task was to advise and assist the
Philippines on the air force, army, and
naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG is
one against the United States
government, and in the absence of any
waiver or consent of the latter to the suit,
the complaint against JUSMAG cannot
prosper. (JUSMAG Philippines v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 108813, December 15, 1994)
Q: May the State waived its
immunity?
A: The State may waive its immunity
under the following circumstances:
1) Express consent of the State
may be manifested through a
general or special law. It can only
5
be given by an act of the legislative
body.
2) Implied consent is given
when the State itself commences
litigation or when it enters into a
contract. There is implied consent
when the state enters into a
business contract. (US v. Ruiz,
G.R. No. L‐35645 May 22, 1985)
Q: Can the United States
government invoke state immunity
in entering into contracts for the
repair of wharves in its naval base in
Zambales?
A: A State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
the present case, the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the US
and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the
highest order. They are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes. (US v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L‐35645
May 22, 1985)
Q: Will the State’s waiver of
immunity to be sued apply to all
contracts entered by the
government such as when a
government agency entered into a
contract with a private security
agency for the latter to provide
security services?
A: No. A distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and
another which is done in its proprietary
capacity. A State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual
and this can be deemed to have given its
consent to be sued - only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions.
(Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC,
G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)
Q: May an incorporated
governmental agency invoke state
immunity and have its funds exempt
from execution and garnishment?
A: An incorporated agency may not
invoke state immunity if its charter
provides that the agency can sue and be
sued, then the suit will lie. If such was an
entity with the capacity to sue and be
sued, the funds of which could thereafter
be held liable to execution and
garnishment in the event of an adverse
judgment. (PNB vs. CIR G.R. No. L-
32667, January 31, 1978)
Q: Can the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC), a
government-owned entity be sued
and its funds be garnished?
A: Yes, the PHHC can be sued, any
judgment against it can be enforced by a
writ of execution and its funds can be
garnished. The PHHC was a now that such complaint cannot prosper
government-owned entity. It has a
personality distinct and separate from
the government. It has all the powers of
a corporation under the Corporation Law.
Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and
may be subjected to court processes just
like any other corporation. By engaging
in business through the instrumentality
of a corporation, the government divests
itself of its sovereign character to render
the corporation subject to the rules
governing private corporations. (PNB vs.
CIR G.R. No. L-32667, January 31, 1978)
Q: May an unincorporated
governmental agency invoke state
immunity?
A: An unincorporated agency has no
juridical personality of its own. To
determine its suability, one has to inquire
into its principal functions of the agency.
1) If the function is governmental,
there can be no suit without its
consent. (Sanders v. Veridiano II,
G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988)
2) If the function is proprietary, the
suit will lie, because when the
State engages in principally
proprietary functions, then it
descends to the level of a private
individual, and may, therefore, be
vulnerable to suit. (Civil
Aeronautics Administration v.
6
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
51806, November 8, 1988)
Q: May foreign government officials
invoke state immunity in a complaint
against them for changing the status
of their employees?
A: Yes, the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties. Sanders, as director
of the special services department of
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision
over its personnel and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments,
discipline, dismissal, and other related
matters. The same can be said for
Moreau. If the trial will proceed damages
will not be on the petitioners’ capacity
but of their principal, the US
government. Thus making the action a
suit against that government without its
consent. There should be no question by
unless the US government sought to be
held ultimately liable has given its
consent to be sued. (Sanders v.
Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10,
1988)
Q: Can the Civil Aeronautics
Administration be sued in a claim
based on a quasi-delict?
A: Yes, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration is in charge of the
administration of Manila International
Airport, it is performing proprietary
functions, hence it can be sued even
when the claim is based on a quasi-
delict. (Civil Aeronautics Administration
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51806,
November 8, 1988)
Q: Will the Doctrine of State
Immunity apply when complaints
are filed against public officials?
A: Yes, the doctrine of State Immunity
from suit applies to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in
the performance of their duties within
the scope of their authority.
However, it does not apply where
the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or
unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others neither does it apply where the
public official is being sued not in his
official capacity but his personal
capacity, although the acts complained
of may have been committed while he
occupied a public position. (DOH v.
Philippine Pharmawealth, G.R. No.
182358, February 20, 2013)
Q: Does the principle of estoppel
apply to a local government issuing
licenses and business permits when
claiming state immunity?
A: No consent to be sued and be liable
for damages can thus be implied from
the mere conferment and
exercise of the power to issue business
permits and licences. As this Court has
repeatedly held, waiver of immunity from
suit, being in derogation of sovereignty,
will not be lightly inferred. Moreover, it
deserves mentioning that the City of
Bacolod as a government agency or
instrumentality cannot be estopped by
the omission, mistake, or error of its
officials or agents. Estoppel does not also
lie against the government or any of its
agencies arising from unauthorized or
illegal acts of public officers. Hence, we
cannot hold petitioners estopped from
invoking their immunity from suit on
account of having raised it only for the
first time on appeal. (The City of Bacolod
v. Phuture Vision Co., Inc., G.R. No.
190289, January 17, 2018)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
D. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Q: What is the concept of separation
of powers?
A: The legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has
no power to make or execute the law.”
(Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013)
Q: The Pork Barell System is
commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the member
of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from
Congressional Pork Barell to the
2013 Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF). Did the
Congress in passing the 2013 PDAF
Article violated the principle of
7
separation of powers making such
unconstitutional?
A: Yes, the PDAF article is
unconstitutional. The post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release, and
fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress’s role
must be confined to mere oversight that
must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or
step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013)
Q: What is the Principle of the
blending of powers?
A: It is an instance when powers are not
confined exclusively within one
department but are assigned to or
shared by several departments.
Examples of the blending of powers are
the following:
1) The power of appointment can
be exercised by each department
and be rightfully exercised by each
department over its administrative
personnel. (Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Springer, G.R.
No. 26979, April 1, 1927);
2) General Appropriations Law –
President prepares the budget
which serves as the basis of the bill
adopted by Congress. (Banda v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20,
2010);
3) Amnesty granted by the
President requires the concurrence
of the majority of all the members
of the Congress (Marcos v.
Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211,
September 15, 1989); and
4) COMELEC does not deputize law‐
enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the
government to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections alone. (Poe-
 Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697, March
8, 2016)
E. CHECKS AND BALANCES
Q: What is the principle of checks
and balances?
A: The Constitution provides for an
elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the working of
the various departments of the
government. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15,
1936)
Q: What is the benefit of the
principle of checks and balances?
A: The benefit of this concept is that no
branch of the government is clothed with
too much power because each branch
exercises some check over the other.
(Francisco v. House of Representative,
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
F. DELEGATION OF POWERS
Q: What is the principle of non-
delegation of powers?
A: This principle mandates that
Congress cannot delegate its powers to
another department. Thus, Congress
cannot surrender or abdicate its
legislative powers for doing so well be
unconstitutional. (Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179431-32, June 22, 2010)
Q: May the COMELEC by issuing a
Resolution supplant or modify a law?
A: Although the power to make laws
cannot be delegated by the Legislature to
any other authority, a power that is not
legislative may be delegated. Under
certain circumstances, the Legislature
can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to
adopt and promulgate IRRs. As earlier
said, the delegated authority must be
properly exercised. This simply means
that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra
vires as to be issued beyond the limits of
the authority conferred. An
administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress, for administrative IRRs
8
are solely intended to carry out, not to
supplant or to modify, the law. The
administrative agency issuing the IRRs
may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the
provisions of the law it administers and
enforces, and cannot engraft additional
non-contradictory requirements not
contemplated by the Legislature. (Lokin,
Jr. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 179431-32,
June 22, 2010)
Q: What are the permissible
delegations of powers under the
1987 Constitution?
A: Under the 1987 Constitution, the
following are the permissible delegation
of legislative powers:
1) Delegation to the people
through initiative and referendum.
(Sec. 1, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
2) Emergency powers delegated by
Congress to the President. (Sec.
23, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
3) Congress may delegate tariff
powers to the President. (Sec. 28
[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
4) Delegation to administrative
bodies – also known as the power
of subordinate legislation. (Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine
Overseas Employment
Administration, G.R. No. 76633,
October 18, 1988)
5.) Delegation to local
Governments (Abakada Guro Party
List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056,
September 1, 2005)
Q: What is the meaning of delegation
of legislative powers to
administrative bodies?
A: Delegation to administrative bodies
refers to the authority vested by
Congress to the administrative bodies to
“fill in the details” which Congress cannot
provide due to lack of opportunity or
competence. Such includes the making
of supplementary rules and regulations.
Such have the force and effect of law.
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, G.R. No. 76633, October
18, 1988)
Q: Is there a valid delegation of
powers when the Philippine
Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) promulgate
Memorandum Circular No. 2 industry before the date set by such
stipulating the death benefits and
burial expenses for the family of an
overseas worker?
A: Yes, the Court held that there was a
valid delegation of powers particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With
the proliferation of specialized activities
and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more
and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called
the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in statute by “filling in” the
details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to
provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is
one such administrative regulation.
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, G.R. No. 76633, October
18, 1988)
Q: What are the two tests for a valid
delegation of legislative powers?
A: The following are the two tests for a
valid delegation of legislative power:
1) Completeness test – the law
must be complete in all its
essential terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature so
that there will be nothing left for
the delegate to know when it
reaches him except to enforce it.
(Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy, G.R. No.
124360, November 5, 1997)
2) Sufficient standard test – a
sufficient standard is intended to
map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority by defining
the legislative policy and indicating
the circumstances under which it is
to be pursued and effective. (Tatad
v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy, G.R. No. 124360,
November 5, 1997)
9
Q: Does Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180
leaving to the discretion of the
President to advance the date of full
deregulation of the downstream oil
law a violation of the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of
power?
A: No, Section 15 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No.
8180 that full deregulation will start at
the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is
complete on the question of the final
date of full deregulation. The discretion
given to the President is to advance the
date of full deregulation before the end
of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the
standard to guide the judgment of the
President --- he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil
and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso with the US
dollar is stable. (Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360,
November 5, 1997)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
G. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF
THE STATE
Q: What are the fundamental
powers of the state?
A: The fundamental powers of the state
are:
1) Police Power;
2) Power of Eminent Domain; and
3) Power of Taxation.
1) POLICE POWERS
Q: What are the characteristics of
police power?
A: Police power easily outpaces the other
two powers. It regulates not only
property but also the liberty of persons.
Police power is considered the most
pervasive, the least limitable, and the
most demanding of the three powers. It
may be exercised as long as the activity
or property sought to be regulated has
some relevance to the public welfare.
(Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G. R.
159796, July 17, 2007)
Q: Is there an undue delegation of
the power to tax on the part of the
Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC) imposing a “Universal
Charge” to all electricity end-users
after a period of (1) one year after
the effectivity of the EPIRA Law?
A: No, the universal charge as provided
for in section 34 is not a tax but an
exaction of the regulatory power (police
power) of the state. The universal charge
under section 34 is incidental to the
regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the
provision assailed is not for generation of
revenue, and therefore it cannot be
considered as tax, but an execution of
the state’s police power thru regulation.
(Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G. R.
159796, July 17, 2007)
Q: What are the requisites for a valid
exercise of police power?
A: The following must concur for a valid
exercise of police power:
1) Lawful subject- the interest of
the public in general, as
distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the
exercise of the power. This means
that the activity sought to be
regulated affects the general
welfare.
2) Lawful means – the means
employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive on individuals.
3) Express grant by law;
4) Must be exercise within
territorial limits; and
5) Must not be contrary to law.
(Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20,
1987)
10
2) EMINENT DOMAIN
Q: What is the power of eminent
domain?
A: It is the inherent power of the State
to take or appropriate private property
for public use. The Constitution requires
that private property shall not be taken
without due process of law and payment
of just compensation. (Manila Memorial
Park v. Sec. of DSWD, G.R. No. 175356,
December 3, 2013)
Q: Is the tax deduction scheme
under RA 7432 or the Seniors
Citizens Act an exercise of the
State’s police power or power of
eminent domain?
A: As a form of reimbursement, the law
provides that business establishments
extending the 20% discount to senior
citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction. The law is a legitimate
exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. The subject
regulation may be said to be similar to,
but with substantial distinctions from,
price control or rate of return on
investment control laws which are
traditionally regarded as police power
measures. (Manila Memorial Park v. Sec.
of DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December 3,
2013)
Q: What are the requisites for the
valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain?
A: The following are the requisites for the
valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain:
1) Taking of private property
2) Genuine necessity
3) Public use
4) Just compensation
5) Due process (Manapat v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 110478, October
15, 200)
Q: Is the issue of “genuine
necessity” a justiciable question?
A: Yes, in Lagcao v. Judge Labra, the
Court declared that the foundation of the
right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be public. As a rule, the
determination of whether there is a
genuine necessity for the exercise is a
justiciable question. However, when the
power is exercised by the Legislature,
the question of necessity is essentially
political.
In the instant cases, the authority to
expropriate came from P. D. No. 1072,
issued by then Pres. Marcos in 1977. At
that time, and as explicitly recognized
under the 1973 Constitution, President
Marcos had legislative powers. Perforce,
the expropriation of the subject
properties – identified with specificity in
the P.D. — was directed by legislation.
The issue of necessity then assumed the
nature of a political question. (Manapat
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110478,
October 15, 200)
Q: What are the requisites for a valid
taking of private property?
A:
1) The expropriator must enter a
Private property
2) Entry must be for more than a
Momentary period
3) Entry must be under warrant or
color of legal Authority
4) The property must be devoted
to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or
injuriously affected
5) Utilization of property must be
in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property
(Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi, G.R.
No. L‐20620, Aug. 15, 1974)
Q: Does taking of the property take
place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property
as a lessee?
A: The “taking” of Castellvi’s property
for purposes of eminent domain cannot
be considered to have taken place when
the Republic commenced occupying the
property as lessee thereof. The Court
finds merit in the contention of Castellvi
that two essential elements in the
“taking” of property under the power of
eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the
condemnor must be for a permanent, or
11
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting
the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of
its beneficial use, were not present when
the Republic entered and occupied the
Castellvi property in 1947. (Republic v.
Vda. De Castellvi, G.R. No. L‐20620, Aug.
15, 1974)
Q: What is the concept of public use?
A: The idea that “public use” is strictly
limited to clear cases of “use by the
public” has been abandoned. The term
“public use” has now been held to be
synonymous with “public interest”,
“public benefit”, “public welfare”, and
“public convenience.” (Reyes v. National
Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511,
January 20, 2003)
Q: Does the failure of the National
Housing Authority (NHA) to fulfill
the purpose of relocating squatters
to the expropriated lands constitute
a deviation from public purpose
thereby forfeiting their rights under
expropriation judgment?
A: No, the public purpose was not
abandoned by failure to relocate the
squatters to the expropriated lands. The
low-cost housing project of the NHA on
the subject lots to be sold to qualified
low-income beneficiaries is not a
deviation from a public purpose; it is in
furtherance of social justice. (Reyes v.
National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
147511, January 20, 2003)
Q: What is the concept of just
compensation?
A: The concept of “just compensation”
has long been settled by the Court as the
full and fair equivalent of the property
which must be paid to the owners of the
land within a reasonable time from its
taking. This is because, without prompt
payment, “compensation cannot be
considered ‘just’ since the property
owner is being made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss.” (Yared v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 213945, January
24, 2018)
Q: Does the payment of just
compensation include the income-
generating potential of the
property?
A: Yes, the Court recognizes that the
owner's loss is not limited to his property
alone but includes its income-generating
potential. The government, upon its
taking of the landholding, must properly
compensate the landowner through its
payment of the full valuation of the
property with the imposition of legal
interest. This is the only way to achieve
a fair exchange for the property and the
potential income loss of the landowner
(Yared v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018)
3) TAXATION
Q: What is the power of taxation?
A: The power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no
limits, so that security against its abuse
is to be found only in the responsibility of
the legislature which imposes the tax on
the constituency that is to pay. (Mactan
International Airport Authority v. Marcos,
330 Phil. 392)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
III. NATIONAL
TERRITORY
Q: What is the territory?
A: Territory is the fixed portion of the
surface of the Earth inhabited by the
people of the State. As an element of a
State, it is an area over which a state has
effective control. (Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385 (Resolution), December
6, 2000)
Q: What is the archipelagic doctrine?
A: The water around, between, and
connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines. (Sec.1., Art. I,
1987 Constitution)
12
IV. CITIZENSHIP
A. KINDS OF CITIZENSHIP,
PURPOSE OF DISTINGUISHING
CITIZENSHIP AND KINDS OF
CITIZENSHIP
Q: What is citizenship?
A: It is a membership in a political
community that is personal and more or
less permanent. (In re: Fong Choy v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-24687, September
21, 1968)
Q: What are the kinds of citizenship?
A: The following are the kinds of
citizenship under the 1987 Constitution:
1) Natural-born citizen – Those
who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship shall be
deemed as natural-born citizens.
(Sec.2., Art. IV., 1987
Constitution)
2) Naturalized under the law.
B. WHO ARE CITIZENS
Q: Who are citizens of the 1987
Constitution?
A: The following are the citizens under
the 1987 Constitution:
1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution
2) Those who are citizens under
the Treaty of Paris
3) Those declared as Filipino
citizens by judicial pronouncement
before the overruling of the Roa
doctrine or the application of the
jus soli principle. (Tio Tiam v.
Republic, G.R. No. 9602, April 25,
1957)
4) Those who are naturalized
under the law (Act No. 2927)
 5) Those who are citizens under
the 1935 Constitution
6) Those who are citizens under
the 1973 Constitution
7) Those whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the Philippines
8) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers who elect
Philippine citizenship upon
attaining the age of majority
C. WHO CAN BE CITIZENS
Q: Who can be citizens of the
Philippines?
A: The following can be citizens of the
Philippines:
1) Those Filipino women who have
lost their Philippine citizenship;
D. MODES OF ACQUIRING
CITIZENSHIP
Q: What are the modes of acquiring
Philippine citizenship?
A:
1) By Birth –
a. jus sanguinis – the acquisition
of citizenship based on blood
relationship
b. jus soli – the acquisition of
citizenship based on place of
birth
2) By Naturalization – it is a legal
act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the privilege of a
native-born citizen (Garcia v.
Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2,
2001)

2) Those natural-born Filipinos who 3) By Marriage of a woman to a

have lost their Philippine foreigner whose laws automatically
citizenship, including their minor make the wife a citizen of his
children, on account of political or country. (C.A. 63, Sec.1, par. [7])
economic necessity under Sec. 4,
of Commonwealth Act No. 63., E. MODES OF LOSING AND
provided the applicant is not a
person:
REACQUIRNG CITIZENSHIP

a. opposed to organized Q: What are the modes of losing

government or affiliated with citizenship?
any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach A:
doctrines opposing organized 1) By naturalization in foreign
government; countries;

b. defending or teaching 2) By express renunciation of

necessity or propriety of citizenship (expatriation)
violence, personal assault, or
association for the 3) By subscribing to an oath of
predominance of their ideas; allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign
c. convicted of crimes involving country upon attaining twenty-one
moral turpitude; or (21) years of age or more.
Provided, a Filipino citizen may not
d. suffering from mental divest himself of Philippine
alienation or incurable citizenship while the Philippines is
contagious disease. (R.A. 8171) at war with any country;

4) By rendering service to or
accepting a commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.

5) By cancellation of the certificate

of naturalization;

6) By having been declared by a

competent authority, a deserter of
the Philippine armed forces in time

13
 of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted; or
7) In the case of a woman, upon
her marriage to a foreigner, if
under the laws in force of her
husband’s country, she acquires
his nationality. (C.A. 63, Sec. 1)
Q: What is meant by an express
renunciation of citizenship?
A: Express renunciation was held to
mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication. (In re: Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 83882,
January 24, 1989)
The mere application or possession of an
alien certificate of registration does not
amount to renunciation. (Mercado v.
Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26,
1999)
Q: Does a naturalized citizen
obtaining a renewal of his foreign
passport constitute a renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship?
A: Yes, the Court held that the petitioner,
with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen
when he applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport and represented
himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or were to
be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. (In re: Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 83882,
January 24, 1989)
Q: Does a dual citizen applying for or
possessing an alien certificate of
registration amount to a allegiance to the Republic of the
renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship?
A: No, the mere application or
possession of an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to
14
renunciation. This did not result in the
loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did
not renounce Philippine citizenship and
did not take an oath of allegiance to the
United States. (Mercado v. Manzano,
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999)
Q: When is rendering service to a
foreign country done with the
consent of the Republic of the
Philippines?
A: Rendering service to a foreign
country is done with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines if either of the
following circumstances is present:
a. The Philippines has a defensive
and/or offensive pact of alliance with
the said foreign country; or
b. The said foreign country maintains
armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Philippines;
Q: What are the modes of
reacquiring citizenship?
A:
1) By naturalization;
2) By repatriation; or
3) By a direct act of Congress (C.A.
63, Sec. 2, par. [3])
Q: What is repatriation under R.A.
No. 8171?
A: R.A. No. 8171 is an act providing for
the repatriation of:
a. Filipino women who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipino who have lost
their Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity.
(R.A. No. 8171, Sec. 1)
Q: How is repatriation effected
under R.A. No. 8171?
A: Repatriation shall be effected by:
• taking the necessary oath of
Philippines
• and registration in the proper civil
registry
• and in the Bureau of Immigration.
(R.A. No. 8171, Sec. 2)
Q: What is the duty of the Bureau of
Immigration after the applicant shall
have fulfilled the above acts?
A: The Bureau of Immigration shall
thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as a Filipino
citizen to the repatriated citizen. (R.A.
No. 8171, Sec. 2)
Q: What is the Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003?
A: R.A. No. 9225 also known as the
“Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003” approved on
August 29, 2003, provides that, upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
1) Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, before the effectivity
of the said R.A., have lost their
Philippine citizenship because of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country, are deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship; and
2) Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of
the said R.A., become citizens of a
foreign country retain their Philippine
citizenship. (Sec. 3)
Q: May a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen still be
considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship?
A: Repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality. This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On
the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his
citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
(Bengson v. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No.
142840, May 7, 2001)
Q: What is meant by the retroactive
effect of repatriation?
A: It is not only the law itself (P.D. No.
725) which is to be given retroactive
effect, but even the repatriation granted
under said law is to be deemed to have
retroacted to the date of his application
15
therefor. (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
120295, June 28, 1996)
Q: Can mere participation in the local
elections be deemed as reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship?
A: The petitioner claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that
that the alleged forfeiture was between
him and the US. If he wanted to drop his
American citizenship, he could do so
under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 120295, June 28, 1996)
F. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Q: What is dual citizenship?
A: It is a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a citizen of said states.
(Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083,
May 26, 1999)
Q: Who are considered dual citizens?
A:
1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
2) Those born in the Philippines of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country;
3) Those who marry aliens if by the
laws of the latter’s country the former
are considered citizens unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
(Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No.
135083, May 26, 1999); and
4) Natural born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 9225, become citizens of a
foreign country, and afterward take the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. (R.A. No. 9225, Sec. 3,
par [3])
Q: What is dual allegiance?
A: It refers to the situation where a
person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No.
135083, May 26, 1999)
Q: Can mere dual citizenship be a
ground for disqualification to hold or
run for office in the local position?
A: No. Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. What is inimical is not
dual citizenship per se, but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160
(Local Government Code) must be
understood as referring to “dual
allegiance”. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. (Mercado v.
Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26,
1999)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
V. LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT
A. LEGISLATIVE POWER
Q: What is legislative power?
A: Legislative power is the authority to
make, amend, or repeal laws. (Springer
v. Government of Philippine Island, 277
U.S. 189, 202)
1) SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
Q: What is the scope of legislative
power?
A:
1) General legislative power – this
power refers to the overall authority to
enact laws for the people and the
State unless the Constitution itself
limits the subject matter on which it
may legislate.
2) Specific powers – they are powers
which the Constitution expressly
directs or authorizes Congress to
exercise.
16
3) Implied powers – that authority
enjoyed by the legislature to
effectively exercise its constitutionally
granted powers, like the power to
conduct an investigation in aid of
legislation (Sec. 21, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution), or to determine the
rules of its proceedings (Sec. 16 [3],
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
Q: What are the specific powers of
Congress as mandated by the
Constitution?
A: Among the specific powers of the
Congress as mandated by the
Constitution are:
1) Power to declare the existence
of war. (Sec. 23, [1]) Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
2) Power to delegate emergency
powers to the president. (Sec. 23,
[2] Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
3) Power of appropriation. (Sec.
24-25, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
4) Power of taxation. (Sec. 28 [1-
2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
5) Power to concur in treaties
through the senate and the house
of representatives. (Sec. 21, Art.
VII, 1987 Constitution)
6) Power to concur with the grant
of amnesty. (Sec. 19, Art. VII,
1987 Constitution)
7) Power to act as a board of
canvassers for presidential and
vice-presidential elections. (Sec. 4,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the limitations of
legislative powers?
A: The following are the limitations of
legislative powers:
1) Substantive: limitations on the
content of laws, such as the bill of
rights, appropriations, taxation,
or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
2) Procedural: limitations on the
manner of passing laws.
 3) Congress cannot pass
irrepealable laws.
4) Congress, as a general rule,
cannot delegate its legislative
power. (City of Davao v. Regional
Trial Court, G.R. No. 127383,
August 18, 2005)
2) PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DELEGABILITY; EXCEPTIONS
Q: What is the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power?
A: The Constitution provides that the
legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provisions
of initiative and referendum. Based on
this provision and under the principle of
separation of powers, the legislative
powers shall be exclusively exercised by
Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum. This premise
mandates that Congress cannot
generally delegate its legislative power
to another department. (Lokin, Jr., v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431-32, June 22,
2010)
Q: May the COMELEC by issuing a
Resolution supplant or modify a law?
A: Although the power to make laws
cannot be delegated by the Legislature to
any other authority, a power that is not
legislative may be delegated. Under
certain circumstances, the Legislature
can delegate to executive officers and
administrative boards the authority to
adopt and promulgate IRRs. As earlier
said, the delegated authority must be
properly exercised. This simply means
that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra
vires as to be issued beyond the limits of
the authority conferred. An
administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress, for administrative IRRs
are solely intended to carry out, not to
supplant or to modify, the law. The
administrative agency issuing the IRRs
may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the
provisions of the law it administers and
enforces, and cannot engraft additional
non-contradictory requirements not
contemplated by the Legislature. (Lokin,
17
Jr. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 179431-32,
June 22, 2010)
Q: What are the exceptions to the
principle of non-delegation of
legislative powers?
A:
1) The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of
the national development program
of the Government. (Sec. 28 [2]
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
2) In times of war or other national
emergencies, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe,
exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment
thereof. (Sec. 23[2], Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
3) The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by
the Congress or local legislative
body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least
ten per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be
represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters
thereof. (Sec. 32, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
4) Delegation to the local
government units.
5) Delegation to Administrative
bodies.
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
B. CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS;
COMPOSITION;
QUALIFICATIONS
1) SENATE
Q: What is the composition of the
Senate?
A: The Senate shall be composed of
twenty-four (24) Senators who shall be
elected at large by the qualified voters of
the Philippines, as may be provided by
law. (Sec. 2, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications of a
senator?
A: No person shall be a Senator unless:
1) He is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and
2) On the day of the election, is at
least thirty-five (35) years of age
3) Able to read and write
4) A registered voter, and
5) A resident of the Philippines for
not less than two (2) years
immediately preceding the day of
the election. (Sec. 3, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
2) HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
Q: What is the composition of the
House of Representatives?
A: The House of Representatives shall
be composed of:
a. not more than two hundred and fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed
by law,
b. who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area
c. in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and
d. based on a uniform and progressive
ratio, and
e. those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and
18
sectoral parties or organizations. (Sec.
4[1], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the composition of party-
list representatives in the Congress?
A: The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the:
a. labor
b. peasant
c. urban poor
d. indigenous cultural communities
e. women
f. youth and
g. such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious
sector. (Sec. 4[2], Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications of a
member of the House of
Representatives?
A: No person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless:
1) He is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and
2) On the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age,
3) Able to read and write, and,
4) Except for the party-list
representatives, a registered voter
in the district in which he shall be
elected, and
5) A resident thereof for not less
than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
(Sec. 6, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
a. DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES
AND QUESTIONS OF
APPORTIONMENT
Q: Who are the district
representatives?
A: District representatives are those who
were elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area. (Sec.
5, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Q: How are legislative districts
apportioned?
A: Legislative districts are apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area. They are
apportioned in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants
and based on a uniform and progressive
ratio. (Sec. 5, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Each city with a population of at
least 250,000 shall have at least one (1)
representative. Each province shall have
at least one (1) representative. (Sec. 5,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the conditions for
apportionment?
A:
1) Elected from legislative districts
which are apportioned by the
number of inhabitants of each area
and based on a uniform and
progressive ratio:
a. Every representative of
Congress shall represent a
territorial unit with more or
less 250,000 population. All
the other representatives
shall have the same or nearly
the same political
constituency so much so that
their votes will constitute the
popular majority.
b. It must respond to the
change in times. The number
of House representatives
must not be so big as to be
unwieldy.
2) Each legislative district shall
comprise contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory.
3) Each city with a population of at
least 250,000 or each province
shall at least have one (1)
representative.
4) Legislative districts shall be re‐
apportioned by Congress within 3
years after the return of each
census (Senator Aquino III v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April
7, 2010).
19
Q: Is a population consisting of
250,000 citizens an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district
in a province?
A: There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose
a legislative district. The use by the
subject provision of a comma to separate
the phrase “each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty-thousand”
from the phrase “or each province” point
to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province.
Notably, the requirement of the
population is not an indispensable
requirement but is merely an alternative
addition to the indispensable income
requirement. (Senator Aquino III v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7,
2010).
b. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
Q: What is the concept of the party-
list system?
A: Party‐list representatives shall
constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives in the House of
Representatives. (Sec. 5 [2], Art. VI,
1987 Constitution)
Party‐list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House
of Representatives from national,
regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the COMELEC.
Q: What are the qualifications of
party‐list nominees?
A:
1) Natural‐ born citizen of the
Philippines
2) Registered voter
3) A resident of the Philippines for
at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election
4) Able to read and write
5) Bonafide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to
represent at least 90 days
preceding election day
6) At least 25 years of age. (R.A.
7941)
Q: How shall the party-list
representative seats be allocated?
A: In determining the allocation of seats
for party‐list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2) The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least 2% of
the total votes cast for the party‐
list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3) Those garnering a sufficient
number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.
4) Each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not
more than 3 seats.
In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two
percent. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as “additional seats”
are the maximum seats reserved under
the party‐list system less than the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. 7941 allowing for rounding off of
fractional seats. (BANAT v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009)
Q: How is the 80-20 rule observed in
apportioning the seats in the lower
house?
A: The 80-20 rule is observed in the
following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list
representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall be
no more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that
will be from legislative districts, and 50
would be from party-list representatives.
However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the
20
membership of the lower house as in
fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. This
is the formula: (Current Number of
Legislative District Representatives ÷
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
(BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271,
April 21, 2009)
Q: Is the 20% allocation for party-
list representatives provided in Sec
5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution
mandatory, or is it merely a ceiling?
A: Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941
mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives
found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art
VI, left the determination of the number
of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. (BANAT v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009)
Q: Is the 2% threshold and
“qualifier” votes prescribed by the
same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional.
A: No. We rule that, in computing the
allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the 2% threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats
as found in the second clause of Sec
11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the 2% threshold makes
it mathematically impossible to achieve
the maximum number of available party-
list seats when the available party-list
seat exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the 2% threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives. We, therefore, strike
down the 2% threshold only concerning
the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b)
of RA 7941. The 2% threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution, and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of
Representatives.” (BANAT v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009)
Q: Are major political parties
allowed to participate in the party-
list elections?
A: Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941
prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. (BANAT
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21,
2009)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
C. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES,
INHIBITIONS, AND
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Q: What is immunity from arrest?
A: It grants the legislators the privilege
from arrest while Congress is “in session”
for offenses punishable by not more than
6 years of imprisonment. (Sec. 11, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution), whether or not he
is attending the session. (People v.
Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, Feb. 3,
2000)
Q: Can a Congressman who is
convicted for statutory rape and acts
of lasciviousness pending appeal be
allowed to discharge mandate as a
member of the House of
Representatives?
A: No. The privilege of arrest has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. True,
the election is the expression of the
sovereign power of the people. However,
despite its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. The
higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than an
exemption. The confinement of a
21
Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations.
(People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-
76, Feb. 3, 2000)
Q: What is legislative privilege?
A: No member shall be questioned or
held liable in any forum other than his
respective Congressional body for any
debate or speech in Congress or any
committee thereof. (Sec. 11, Art. VI,
1987 Constitution; Pobre v. Sen.
Santiago, 597 SCRA 1, Aug. 25, 2009)
Q: Can a Senator’s negative
utterances in her privilege speech as
a response to the decision of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) be
punished as a direct contempt of
Court and be subjected to other
disciplinary actions against her?
A: No. The Court sided with Sen.
Defensor-Santiago's defense that she
should be afforded parliamentary
immunity from suit under Sec. 11, Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution. Although
there was no express admission on the
part of the lady senator that she did
indeed say those words, there was no
categorical denial either, which the Court
ultimately regarded as an implied
admission. Still, the Court held that
parliamentary immunity is essential
because, without it, the parliament or its
equivalent would "degenerate into a
polite and ineffective forum." However, it
should be noted that "legislators are
immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence,
but the public good." (Pobre v. Sen.
Santiago, 597 SCRA 1, Aug. 25, 2009)
Q: What are the limitations of
legislative privileges?
A: Under the 1987 Constitution, the
following are the limitations on
legislative privileges:
1) Protection is only against the
forum other than the Congress
itself. Thus, for defamatory
remarks, which are otherwise
privileged, a member may be
sanctioned by either the Senate or
 the House of Representatives, as NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
the case may be. words limit for the 2020 QQRs video

2) The “speech or debate” must be D. QUORUM AND VOTING

made in the performance of their MAJORITIES
duties as members of Congress.
Q: What is a quorum?
Q: What are the prohibitions
attached to a member of Congress A: A quorum is a number that enables a
during his term? body to transact its business and gives
such a body the power to pass a law or
A: The prohibitions attached to a ordinance or any valid act that is binding.
member of Congress during his term are: (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821,
March 4, 1949)
1) Incompatible office – “No senator
or member of the House of
Q: How is a quorum computed?
Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the
A: In computing quorum, members who
Government, or any subdivision,
are outside the country and, thus,
agency, or instrumentality thereof,
outside of each House’s jurisdiction are
including government-owned and
not included. The basis for determining
controlled corporations or their
the existence of a quorum in the Senate
subsidiaries during his term without
shall be the total number of Senators
forfeiting his seat” (Sec. 13, Article VI,
who are within the coercive jurisdiction
1987 Constitution)
of the Senate. (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R.
No. L-2821, March 4, 1949)
2) Forbidden office – Neither shall a
senator or a member of the House of
Q: What is the effect if there is no
Representatives be appointed to any
quorum?
office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased
A: Each House may adjourn from day to
during the term for which he was
day and may compel the attendance of
elected. (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987
absent members in such manner and
Constitution)
under such penalties as each House may
provide. (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-
Q: What are the particular
2821, March 4, 1949)
inhibitions attached to a legislator’s
office?
Q: What is the effect if there is no
quorum?
A: The following are the particular
inhibitions attached to the office of a
A: Each House may adjourn from day to
legislator:
day and may compel the attendance of
absent members in such manner and
1) From “personally” appearing as
under such penalties as each House may
counsel before any court of justice or
provide. (Avelino v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-
before the Electoral Tribunals, or
2821, March 4, 1949)
quasi-judicial or other administrative
bodies (Sec. 14, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution). Q: Can there still be quorum if there
were only 12 senators left in the hall
2) Upon assumption of office, all who continued the session and
members of the Senate and HoR must elected a Senate President?
make full disclosure of their financial
and business interests. They shall A: It was held that there is a quorum
notify the House concerned of a that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine,
potential conflict in interest that may all the 4 justices agree that the Court is
arise from the filing of proposed confronted with the practical situation
legislation of which they are authors. that of the 23 senators who may
(Sec. 12, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) participate in the Senate deliberations in
the days immediately after this decision,
12 senators will support Senator Cuenco
and, at most, 11 will side with Senator

22
Avelino, it would be most injudicious to
declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively
upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about
the tenure of the President of that body
being amenable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter
held with 13 or more senators, to avoid
all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum
and for the benefit of all concerned, the
said 12 senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify
all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt. (Avelino
v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4,
1949)
Q: What does the majority vote
mean?
A: The majority vote refers to the
political party with the most number of
backings; refer to the party, faction or
organization with the most number of
votes but not necessarily more than one
half (plurality). When referring to a
certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply “means the number
greater than half or more than half of any
total.” (Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No.
134577, November 18, 1998)
Q: Is the defeated senator in the
election for Senate President
automatically become the minority
leader?
A: No, while the Constitution mandates
that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more
than one-half of all the members thereof,
it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the “minority,” who could
thereby elect the minority leader. Verily,
no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader. (Santiago v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November
18, 1998)
23
E. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
Q: May each house of congress
punish its members for disorderly
behavior?
A: Yes, each house may punish its
members for disorderly behavior and,
with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its
members, suspend, for not more than 60
days, or expel a member. (Sec. 16 [3],
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the interpretation of
disorderly behavior?
A: It is the prerogative of the House
concerned and cannot be judicially
reviewed. (Osmeña v. Pendatun, G.R.
No. L-17144, Oct. 28, 1960)
Q: Can serious imputations of
bribery against the President made
by a Congressman in delivering a
privilege speech before the House of
Representatives be considered as
disorderly behavior?
A: What constitutes disorderly conduct is
within the interpretation of the legislative
body and not the judiciary because it is a
matter that depends mainly on the
factual circumstances of which the House
knows best. Anything to the contrary will
amount to the encroachment of power.
Parliamentary immunity does not protect
him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof. (Osmeña v. Pendatun,
G.R. No. L-17144, Oct. 28, 1960)
F. PROCESS OF LAW-MAKING
Q: What are the rules in passing a
bill?
A: The following are the rules on the
passage of bills:
1) No bill passed by either House
shall become a law unless it has
passed 3 readings on separate
days.
2) Printed copies of the bill in its
final form should be distributed to
the Members 3 days before its
passage
 3) Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be
allowed.
4) The vote on the bill shall be
taken immediately after the last
reading of a bill.
5) The yeas and the nays shall be
entered in the Journal.
The certification of the President, due to
the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency,
dispenses with the reading on separate
days and the printing of the bill in the
final form before its final approval.
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R.
No. 115455, Oct. 30, 1995)
Q: Does R.A. No. 7716 or the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law
violative of Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution for it did not originate
exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of House Bill as
claimed by the petitioner?
A: No. The phrase “originate
exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and
not to the revenue law. It is sufficient
that the House of Representatives
initiated the passage of the bill which
may undergo extensive changes in the
Senate. To insist that a revenue statute
and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be
to deny the Senate’s power not only to
concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. (Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455,
Oct. 30, 1995)
Q: When does a bill become a law?
A: A bill becomes a law when:
1) Approved and signed by the
President.
2) The presidential veto is
overridden by a 2/3 vote of all
members of both Houses.
3) Failure of the President to veto
the bill and to return it with his
objections to the House where it
24
originated, within 30 days after the
date of receipt.
4) A bill calling a special election
for President and Vice-President
under Sec. 10. Art. VII becomes
law upon its approval on the third
reading and final reading.
(Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 168056, 168207, September 1,
2005)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
G. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
AND THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
Q: What is the nature of an electoral
tribunal?
A: The electoral tribunal has rule‐making
power.
It is independent of the Houses of
Congress and its decisions may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court only
upon a showing of grave abuse of
discretion. (Lazatin v. HRET, G.R. No. L‐
84297, Dec. 8, 1988).
Q: Is a member of the Congress
sitting on the electoral tribunal
disqualified if he is also the one who
sought to be disqualified?
A: No. The mere fact that the members
of either the Senate or the House sitting
on the electoral tribunal are those which
are sought to be disqualified due to the
filing of an election contest against them
does not warrant all of them from being
disqualified from sitting in the ET.
(Lazatin v. HRET, G.R. No. L‐84297, Dec.
8, 1988).
Q: What is the power of the electoral
tribunal?
A: Each electoral tribunal shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members. (Sec. 17, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution)
This includes determining the
validity or invalidity of a proclamation
declaring a particular candidate as the
winner. Each ET is also vested with rule-
making power. (Lazatin v. HRET, G.R.
No. L-84297, Dec. 8, 1988)
Q: What is the composition of the
Commission on Appointment?
A: There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the:
1) President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman,
2) 12 Senators and
3) 12 Members of the House of
Representatives
elected by each House based on
proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. (Sec.
18, Art. VI)
Q: What are the powers of the
Commission on Appointment?
A: Under the 1987 Constitution, the
following are the powers of the
Commission on Appointment:
1) The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it
within 30 days of Congress from its
submission.
2) The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of its members.
3) The Commission shall meet only
while Congress is in session, at the
call of its chairman or a majority of
all its members. (Sec. 18, Art. VI)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
H. POWERS OF CONGRESS
1) LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS
Q: What are legislative inquiries?
A: It may refer to inquiries related to the
implementation or re-examination of any
law or appropriation, or in connection
with any proposed legislation or for the
formulation of or in connection with
future legislation, or will aid in the review
or formulation of a new legislative policy
or enactment. (Senate Rules
Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation)
Q: What is the nature of legislative
inquiries?
A: The power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is inherent in the power to
legislate, and as such, the same may be
exercised by the Congress even in the
absence of any (express) constitutional
grant. (Senate v. Ermita, supra)
Q: Can it be exercised by a
committee of Congress?
A: Yes. The power may be exercised by
each House of Congress or any
committee thereof even if there is no
pending legislation as long as the
inquiry:
a. is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it; and
b. must be material or necessary to
the exercise of power in it vested
by the Constitution, such as to
legislate or to expel a member.
(Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, G.R. No. 89914,
November 20, 1991)
Q: What are the matters that can be
the subject of inquiries in aid of
legislation?
A: Indefinite. The field of legislation is
very wide, and because of such, the field
of inquiry is also very broad and may
cover administrative, social, economic,
political problems (inquiries), the
discipline of members, etc. Suffice it to
say that it is “intrinsic” in and co-
extensive with legislative power.
(Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820,
July 18, 1950)
Q: What are the limitations of
legislative inquiries?
A:
1) The persons appearing in or
affected by such legislative
inquiries shall be respected.
2) The Rules of procedures to be
followed in such inquiries shall be
published for the guidance of
those who will be summoned.
of 3) The investigation must be in
aid of legislation.
25
 4) Congress may not summon the
President as a witness or
investigate the latter because of
the doctrine of separation of
powers except in impeachment
cases.
5) Congress may no longer
punish the witness in contempt
after its final adjournment. The
basis of the power to impose such
a penalty is the right to self-
preservation. And such right is
enforceable only during the
existence of the legislature.
(Lopez v. Delos Reyes, G.R. No.
L-34361, Nov. 5, 1930)
6) Congress may no longer
inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the
court. (Bengzon v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, G.R. No.
89914, Nov. 20, 1991)
Q: What is the oversight function or
question hour?
A: The heads of departments may:
1) upon their own initiative with
the consent of the President, or
2) upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each house
shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter about their
departments.
Written questions shall be submitted
to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
at least three (3) days before their
scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions but may cover matters
related thereto.
When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires, the
appearance shall be conducted in
executive session. (Sec. 22, Art. VI,
1987 Constitution)
Q What is the scope of the power of
oversight?
A:
1) Monitor bureaucratic compliance
with program objectives;
26
2) Determine whether agencies are
properly administered;
3) Eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty;
4) Prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority; and
5) Assess executive conformity
with the congressional perception
of public interest. (Opinion of J.
Puno, Macalintal v. COMELEC,
2) NON-LEGISLATIVE
a. INFORMING FUNCTION
Q: What is the concept of informing
function of the Congress?
A: The informing function of the
legislature includes its function to
conduct legislative inquiries and
investigation and its oversight power.
The power of Congress does not
end with the finished task of legislation.
Associated with its principal power to
legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure
that the laws it enacts are faithfully
executed. (Senate of the Phils. v. Ermita,
G.R. Nos. 169777, 169659, 169660,
169667, 169834 & 171246, April 20,
2006)
Q: What is the nature of the power of
oversight?
A: The power of oversight has been held
to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. Woodrow Wilson
emphasized that “Even more important
than legislation is the instruction and
guidance in political affairs which the
people might receive from a body which
kept all national concerns suffused in a
broad daylight of discussion.” (Opinion of
J. Puno, Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
157013, July 10, 2003)
b. POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
Q: What is the power of
impeachment by the Senate?
A: It is a method by which persons
holding government positions of high
authority, prestige, and dignity and with
definite tenure may be removed from
office for causes closely related to their
conduct as public officials. (Corona v.
Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No.
200242, July 17, 2012)
Q: What is the nature of the power to
impeach?
A: The power to impeach is essentially a
non-legislative prerogative and can be
exercised by Congress only within the
limits of the authority conferred upon it
by the Constitution (Gutierrez v. House
of Representatives Committee on
Justice, G.R. No. 193459, Feb. 15, 2011)
Q: Who has the power to try and
decide in impeachment cases?
A: The Senate has the sole power to try
and decide all cases of impeachment.
(Sec. 3 [6], Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
i. INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM
Q: What are the initiative and
referendum?
A: Initiative is the power of the people
to:
1) propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and
enact legislation.
2) approve or reject legislation
through an election called for that
purpose. (Defensor Santiago v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
127325, March 19, 1997)
Q: What are the kinds of an initiative
under R.A. 6735?
A:
1) Initiative on the Constitution
– Refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
2) Initiative on statutes – Refers
to a petition to enact national
legislation.
3) Initiative on local legislation
– Refers to a petition proposing to
enact a regional, provincial,
municipal, city, or barangay law,
resolution, or ordinance. [RA 6735,
Sec. 3 (a)]
27
Q: What are the kinds of a
referendum?
A:
1) Referendum on Statutes -
Refers to a petition to approve or
reject a law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress.
2) Referendum on Local Law –
Refers to a petition to approve or
reject a law, resolution, or
ordinance enacted by regional
assemblies and local legislative
bodies.
(Defensor Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 127325, June 10,
1997)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
VI. EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
A. QUALIFICATIONS,
ELECTION, AND TERM OF THE
PRESIDENT AND VICE-
PRESIDENT
Q: What are the qualifications of a
President?
A:
1) A natural-born citizen of the
Philippines;
2) A registered voter;
3) Able to read and write;
4) At least 40 years of age on the
day of the election; and
5) A resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately
preceding such election. (Sec. 2,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the term of office of the
President?
A:
1) The President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term
of 6 years which shall begin at
noon on the 30th day of June next
following the day of the election
and shall end at noon of the same
date, 6 years thereafter.
2) The President shall not be
eligible for any re-election.
 The Vice-President may serve for
more than 2 successive terms.
3) No person who has succeeded
as President and has served as
such for more than four years shall
be qualified for election to the
same office at any time. (Sec. 4,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications and
terms of office of the Vice-
President?
A: Vice-President shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be
elected with, and in the same manner, as
the President. He may be removed from
office in the same manner as the
President. (Sec. 3, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
B. PRIVILEGES,
INHIBITIONS, AND
DISQUALIFICATIONS
1. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
Q: What is presidential immunity?
A: The President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case.
(Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871,
February 18, 2010)
Q: Who may invoke this privilege of
immunity from suit?
A: This privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President under his office
and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person on
the President’s behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as
a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
(Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585,
November 14, 1988)
28
Q: Can this privilege of immunity
from suit be waived?
A: Yes, there is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege (Soliven v.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14,
1988)
Q: What is the purpose of the grant
to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit?
A: The grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a
job that, aside from requiring all the
office holder’s time, also demands
undivided attention. (Soliven v.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14,
1988)
Q: What are the rules on Presidential
immunity during tenure?
A:
1) The President is immune from suit
during his tenure. (In re: Bermudez,
G.R. No. 76180, Oct. 24, 1986)
2) An impeachment complaint may be
filed against him during his tenure.
(Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
3) The President may not be
prevented from instituting a suit.
(Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585,
Nov. 14, 1988)
4) There is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. He may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege.
(Soliven v. Makasiar, ibid.)
5) Heads of departments cannot
invoke the President’s immunity.
(Gloria v. CA, G.R. No. 119903, Aug.
15, 2000)
Q: What is the rule on Presidential
immunity after tenure?
A: Once out of office, even before the
end of the 6-year term, immunity for
non-official acts is lost. Immunity cannot
be claimed to shield a non-sitting
President from prosecution for alleged
criminal acts done while sitting in the
office. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, March 2, 2001)
Q: What is the duration of
presidential immunity?
A: After his tenure, the Chief Executive
cannot invoke immunity from suit for
civil damages arising out of acts done by
him while he was President which were
not performed in the exercise of official
duties. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, March 2, 2001)
Q: Is presidential immunity
concurrent with the President’s
tenure or term of office?
A: The intent of the framers of the
Constitution is clear that the immunity of
the president from suit is concurrent only
with his tenure and not his term. (In the
Matter of the Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011)
Q: Can a department secretary
invoke presidential immunity?
A: No. A department secretary cannot
invoke presidential immunity in a petition
directed against him and not the
President where the questioned acts are
those of the petitioners and not of the
President. (Gloria v. CA, G.R. No.
119903, August 15, 2000)
Q: Are unlawful acts of public
officials considered as acts of the
State?
A: No. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser. (In the
Matter of the Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of
Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011)
29
2. PRESIDENTIAL PRIVILEGE
Q: What is the concept of executive
privilege?
A: It is the right of the President and
high-level executive officials to withhold
information from Congress, the Courts,
and ultimately, the public. (Senate of the
Phils. v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 169777,
169659, 169660, 169667, 169834 &
171246, April 20, 2006)
Q: What is the degree to determine
the necessity to withhold
information?
A: The necessity for withholding the
information must be of such a high
degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case. (Senate v. Ermita, supra)
Q: What are the requisites for the
executive privilege to be validly
claimed by the president?
A:
1) The communications relating to the
power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries which
is a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President;
2) The communication was received by
a member of the Cabinet which
through proximity test is covered by
the executive privilege; and
3) No adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and the
unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. (Neri v.
Senate, supra)
Q: What are the kinds of executive
privilege?
A:
1) State secret privilege– Invoked
by Presidents on the ground that the
information is of such nature that its
disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives.
2) Informer’s privilege– Privilege
of the government not to disclose the
identity of persons who furnish
information in violations of law to
 officers charged with the enforcement President and the public official
of the law. covered by the executive order;

3) Generic privilege for internal 2) Military, diplomatic, and other

deliberation– Said to attach to national security matters which in the
intra-governmental documents interest of national security should
reflecting advisory opinions, not be divulged;
recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which 3) Information between inter-
governmental decisions and policies government agencies before the
are formulated. conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements;
4) Presidential communications
privilege; 4) Discussion in closed-door Cabinet
meetings; and
5) Deliberative process privilege.
(In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, 5) Matter affecting national security
June 17, 1997) and public order. (Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, supra; E.O. No.
Q: What are the elements of 464, Sec. 2, par. (a) validly upheld in
Presidential Communications Senate v. Ermita, supra)
Privilege?
Q: Who is a person covered by
A: executive privilege?
1) The protected communication
must relate to a “quintessential A: Person “covered by the executive
and non-delegable presidential privilege” is a person in possession of
power.” information which is, in the judgment of
the head of the office concerned,
2) The communication must be privileged as defined in Section 2 (a) of
authored or “solicited and E.O. No. 464. (Senate v. Ermita, supra)
received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. Q: What are the prohibitions or
The judicial test is that an advisor disqualifications of the President,
must be in “operational proximity” Vice-President, Cabinet members,
with the President. and their deputies or assistants?

3) The presidential A:
communications privilege remains 1) Shall not receive any other
a qualified privilege may be emolument from the government or
overcome by a showing of any other source. (Sec. 6, Art. VII,
adequate need, such that the 1987 Constitution)
information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the 2) Shall not hold any other office or
unavailability of the information employment during their tenure
elsewhere by an appropriate unless:
investigating authority. (Senate v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, a. Otherwise provided in the
2006) Constitution

Q: What is the scope of executive b. The positions are ex-officio and

privilege? they do not receive any salary or
other emoluments therefore
A: Executive privilege covers all
confidential or classified information 3) Shall not practice, directly or
between the President and the public indirectly, any other profession
officers covered by the executive orders, during their tenure
including:
4) Shall not participate in any
1) Conversations and business
correspondence between the

30
 5) Shall not be financially interested
in any contract with, or any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the
Government, including GOCCs
6) Shall avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of office
7) Shall avoid nepotism. (1987
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 13)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
C. POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT
1. GENERAL EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
Q: What is the concept of the
executive power of the President?
A: It is the power vested in the
President of the Philippines. The
President shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that
laws are faithfully executed. (Sec.
17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the scope of executive
power?
A:
1) Executive power is vested in the
President of the Philippines. (Sec. 1,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
2) It is not limited to those outlined in
the Constitution. (Marcos v.
Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, Oct. 27,
1989)
3) The privilege of immunity from suit
is personal to the President and may
be invoked by him alone. It may also
be waived by the President, as when
he files suit. (Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R.
No. 82585, Nov. 14, 1988)
Q: What is the concept of the
administrative power of the
President?
A: Power concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative
31
efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules, and
regulations. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.
127685, July 23, 1998)
Q: What is the concept of the power
of administrative reorganization by
the President?
A: The President has the continuing
authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify
functions, services, and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials; it is
effected in good faith if it is for the
economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. (MEWAP v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No.
160093, July 31, 2007)
2. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
a. IN GENERAL
Q: What is the power of
appointment?
A: The appointing power is executive in
nature. (Government v. Springer, G.R.
No. L-26979, April 1, 1927) Since
appointment to office is an executive
function, the legislature may not usurp
such function. The legislature may create
an office and prescribe the qualifications
of the person who may hold the office,
but it may neither specify who shall be
appointed to such office nor appoint him.
(Manalang v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-
6898, April 30, 1954)
Q: Is there encroachment on the
power of appointment when the Civil
Service Commission revokes an
appointment?
A: None. There is no encroachment on
the discretion of the appointing authority
when the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
revokes an appointment on the ground
that the removal of the [incumbent]
employee was done in bad faith. In such
an instance, the CSC is not directing the
appointment of another but simply
ordering the reinstatement of the
illegally removed employee. (Cerilles v.
CSC, G.R. No. 180845, November 22,
2017)
Q: What are the appointments made 4) The spouse and relatives by
solely by the President? consanguinity or affinity within the
4th civil degree of the President
A: shall not, during his tenure, be
1) Those vested by the Constitution on appointed as:
the President alone;
a. Members of the Constitutional
2) Those whose appointments are not Commissions;
otherwise provided by law; b. Members of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
3) Those whom he may be authorized c. Secretaries;
by law to appoint; and d. Undersecretaries; or
e. Chairman or heads of bureaus or
4) Those other officers who are lower in offices, including GOCC and their
rank whose appointment is vested by subsidiaries. (Sec. 13 [2], Art. VII,
law in the President alone. (Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution)
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
5) Appointments extended by an
b. LIMITATIONS ON THE Acting President shall remain
effective unless revoked by the
EXERCISE/ POWER
elected President within ninety
(90) days from his assumption or
Q: What are the limitations of the
re-assumption of office. (Ibid.)
appointing power of the President?
6) President or Acting-President
A:
shall not make appointments
1) The Members of the Cabinet and
except temporary ones to
their deputies and assistants shall
executive positions two (2) months
not unless otherwise provided in
immediately before the next
this Constitution hold any other
presidential elections and up to the
office or employment during their
end of his term when the continued
tenure. (Sec. 13 [1], Art. VII, 1987
vacancy will prejudice public
Constitution)
service or endanger public safety.
(Sec. 15, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution); and
2) One cannot be validly appointed
and assume as DOJ Secretary and
7) The President shall have the
concurrently as Solicitor General.
power to make appointments
The prohibition applies regardless
during the recess of the Congress,
of whether either or both the
whether voluntary or compulsory,
appointments are merely
but such appointments shall be
temporary or in an acting capacity.
effective only until disapproval by
(Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644,
the Commission of Appointments
February 19, 2013)
or until the next adjournment of
the Congress. (Sec. 16 [2], Art.
3) The appointment to the post of
VII, 1987 Constitution)
Solicitor General cannot be merely
by one’s office (ex-officio) as DOJ
Secretary and vice versa.
Q: What are the exceptions against
Similarly, the concurrent
the holding of multiple offices?
designations cannot be justified by
arguing that the powers and
A: The only two (2) exceptions against
functions of the OSG are required
the holding of multiple offices are:
by the primary functions or
included by the powers of the DOJ,
a. Those provided for under the
and vice versa. By law and by the
Constitution, authorizing the Vice
nature of their powers and
President to become a member of
functions, these two (2) offices are
the Cabinet. (Sec. 3, Art. VII, 1987
independent and distinct from each
Constitution); and
other. (Funa v. Agra, supra)
b. Posts occupied by Executive
officials specified in Sec. 13, Art.

32
 VII without additional
compensation in ex officio
capacities as provided by law and
as required by the primary
functions of the officials’ offices.
(Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30,
2006)
Q: Does the power of the succeeding
President to revoke the
appointments made by an Acting
President apply to appointments in
the Judiciary?
A: No. The power of the succeeding
President to revoke appointments made
by an Acting President refers only to
appointments in the Executive
Department. It has no application to
appointments in the Judiciary because
temporary or acting appointments can
only undermine the independence of the
Judiciary due to their being revocable at
will. (De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002,
March 17, 2010)
c. TYPES OF APPOINTMENT
Q: What are the types of presidential
appointments?
A:
1) Regular presidential
appointments, with or without
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and “recess” or “ad-
interim” appointments. (PLM v. IAC,
G.R. No. L-65439, November 13,
1985)
2) Appointments made by an
Acting President on certiorari (Ong
v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
184219, January 30, 2012); and
3) Midnight appointment – an
appointment made by the President
two (2) months immediately before
the next presidential elections up to
the end of his term. This type of
appointment is prohibited by the
Constitution. (Velicaria-Garafil v.
Office of the President, G.R. Nos.
203372, 206290, 209138 & 212030,
June 16, 2015)
33
Q: What are the exceptions to
midnight appointments?
A:
1) Only temporary appointments
can be extended;
2) Appointments only in the
Executive Department; and
3) When it is necessary to make
such an appointment because
continued vacancies will prejudice
public service or endanger public
safety. (PLM v. IAC, G.R. No. L-
65439, November 13, 1985)
Q: Is the rule against midnight
appointments applicable to
appointments in the Supreme Court?
A: The Court held that the rule against
midnight appointments does not apply to
appointments made by the President for
a member of the Supreme Court. (De
Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, April 20,
2010)
The ruling in De Castro v. JBC
granted the authority to then-President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to appoint Chief
Justice Renato Corona as the successor
of retired Chief Justice Reynato Puno.
Q: Does the rule against midnight
appointments applies also to
appointments made by a local
executive official?
A: Said prohibition applies only to
presidential appointments. No law
prohibits local executive officials from
making appointments during the last
days of their tenure. (De Rama v. CA,
G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)
Q: What is an ad interim
appointment?
A: It is an appointment made by the
President while Congress is not in session
or during recess. It is made before
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointment and shall cease to be valid
if disapproved by the Commission of
Appointment or upon the next
adjournment of the Congress.
An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment unless
otherwise indicated. (PLM v. IAC, G.R.
No. L-65439, November 13, 1985)
Q: What is the effect of disapproval
of an ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointment?
A: When the Commission
Appointment disapproves an ad interim
appointment, the appointee can no
longer be extended a new appointment,
since the disapproval is a final decision of
the Commission of Appointment in the
exercise of its checking power on the
appointing authority of the President.
Such disapproval is final and binding on
both the appointee and the appointing
power. (Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002)
Q: What is the effect when an ad
interim appointment is by-passed by
the Commission on Appointments?
A: When an ad interim appointment is
by-passed because of a lack of time or
failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize, there is no
final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its
content to the appointment. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renew
the ad interim appointment. (Matibag v.
Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2,
2002)
Q: What is a regular appointment?
A: It is an appointment made by the
President while Congress is in session. It
is made after the nomination is
confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment and once confirmed, it
continues until the end of the term of the
appointee. (Pacete v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments, G.R. No.
L-25895, July 23, 1971)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
3. POWER OF CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION
a. DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED
POLITICAL AGENCY
on Q: What is the Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency?
A: The doctrine of qualified political
agency declares that, save in matters on
which the Constitution or the
circumstances require the President to
act personally, executive and
administrative functions are exercised
through executive departments headed
by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are
presumptively the acts of the President
unless disapproved by the latter.
(Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory
Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23,
2015)
b. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
AND OFFICES
Q: May Department Heads exercise
power of control on behalf of the
President?
A: Yes. The President’s power of control
means his power to reverse the
judgment of an inferior officer. It may
also be exercised on his behalf by
Department Heads. (Gonzales III v.
Office of the President of the Philippines,
G.R. Nos. 196231 & 196232, January 28,
2014)
Q: When can the Executive Secretary
reverse the decision of another
department secretary?
A: The Executive Secretary when acting
“by the authority of the President” may
reverse the decision of another
department secretary. (Lacson-
Magallanes v. Paño, G.R. No. L-27811,
Nov. 17, 1967)
c. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS
Q: What is the power of general
supervision?
A: This is the power of a superior officer
to ensure that the laws are faithfully
34
executed by subordinates. (Dadole v.
COA, G.R. No. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002)
Q: What is the power of general
supervision over the local
government units by the President?
A: The power of the President over LGUs
is only of general supervision. Thus, he
can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of an LGU if he finds that the
latter acted contrary to law. The
President or any of his alter egos cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned LGU acts within the
parameters of the law and the
Constitution. (Dadole v. COA, G.R. No.
125350, Dec. 3, 2002)
Q: What is the effect if the President
interferes in the affairs and activities
of an LGU which acted in conformity
with law?
A: Any directive, therefore, by the
President or any of his alter egos seeking
to alter the wisdom of a law‐conforming
judgment on local affairs of an LGU is a
patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy, as well as
the doctrine of separation of powers of
the executive and the legislative
departments in governing municipal
corporations. (Dadole v. COA, G.R. No.
125350, Dec. 3, 2002)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
4. EMERGENCY POWERS
Q: What are the emergency powers
of the President?
A: Congress may authorize the
President “to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared
national policy.” It is submitted that,
based on this provision, the President
may be given emergency legislative
powers if Congress so desires. This is
confirmed by the explanation made on
the floor of the 1971 Convention which is
the source of this provision, that
emergency powers can include the power
to rule by executive fiat. (BERNAS,
Reviewer, p. 254)
35
Q: What are the conditions for the
exercise of the President of
emergency powers?
A:
1) There must be a war or national
emergency;
2) There must be a law authorizing
the President to exercise
emergency powers;
3) Exercise must be for a limited
period;
4) Exercise must be necessary and
proper to carry out a declared
national policy; and
5) Must be subject to restrictions
that Congress may provide. (Sec.
23 [2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Note: Such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment of Congress unless
sooner withdrawn by Congress. (Sec. 23
[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
5. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
POWERS
a. CALLING OUT POWER
Q: What is the scope of the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the
President?
A:
1) Command of the armed
forces – absolute authority over
the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces.
(Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No.
170165, Aug. 15, 2006)
2) Calling out powers – Call the
armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. The only
criterion for the exercise of this
power is that whenever it becomes
necessary. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. Nos. 243522, 243677,
243745 & 243797, February 19,
2019)
3) Suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
(Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos.
 243522, 243677, 243745
243797, February 19, 2019)
Q: What is the effect of making the
President the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces?
A: By making the President the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces, the principle announced in Sec. 3,
Art. II is bolstered. Thus, the
Constitution lessens the danger of a
military take-over of the government in
violation of its republican nature.
Q: Can the President prevent the
Army General from a legislative
investigation?
A: Yes. The President as Commander-
in-Chief can prevent the Army General
from appearing in a legislative
investigation and, if disobeyed, can
subject him to court-martial. (Gudani v.
Senga, G.R. No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006)
Q: Does the Constitution require the
President to declare a state of
rebellion to exercise her calling out
power?
A: No. The Constitution does not require
the President to declare a state of
rebellion to exercise her calling out
power. Sec. 18, Art. VII grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief a
“sequence” of “graduated powers.”
(Sanlakas v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No.
159085, Feb. 3, 2004)
Q: Does a declaration of a state of
emergency give new power to the
President?
A: No. The declaration of a state of
emergency is merely a description of a
situation that authorizes her to call out
the Armed Forces to help the police
maintain law and order. It gives no new
power to her, nor the police. Certainly, it
does not authorize warrantless arrests or
control of media. (David v. GMA, G.R.
No. 171409, May 3, 2006)
& b. DECLARATION OF MARTIAL
LAW AND SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS; EXTENSION
Q: What is the nature of martial law?
A: Martial law is a joint power of the
President and the Congress.
1) The President’s proclamation or
suspension is temporary, good for
only 60 days;
2) He must, within 48 hours of the
proclamation or suspension, report
his action in person or in writing to
Congress;
3) Both Houses of Congress, if not
in session must jointly convene
within 24 hours of the
proclamation or suspension to
review its validity; and
4) The Congress, voting jointly,
may revoke or affirm the
President’s proclamation or
suspension, allow their limited
effectivity to lapse, or extend the
same if Congress deems
warranted. (Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Q: How are the President and the
Congress exercise martial law?
A: It is evident that under the 1987
Constitution the President and the
Congress exercise the power
sequentially and jointly since after the
President has initiated the proclamation
or the suspension, only the Congress can
maintain the same based on its
evaluation of the situation on the ground,
a power that the President does not
have. (Fortun v. GMA, ibid.)
Q: What are the guidelines on the
declaration of martial law?
A:
1) There must be an invasion or
rebellion, and
2) Public Safety requires the
proclamation of martial law all over
the Philippines or any part thereof.
36
 3) Not more than 60 days following
which it shall be automatically
lifted unless extended by
Congress.
4) The duty of the President to
report to Congress is within 48
hours personally or in writing.
5) Authority of Congress to affirm
or revoke or allow the lapse or
extend the effectivity of
proclamation: by a majority vote of
all of its members voting jointly.
(Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Q: What are the limitations of the
declaration of martial law?
A:
1) It does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution;
2) It does not supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies;
3) It does not authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction over
civilians where civil courts can
function;
4) It does not automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. (Sec. 18 [2], Art.
VII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: Can civilians be tried by military
courts?
A: Civilians cannot be tried by military
courts if the civil courts are open and
functioning. (Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558,
May 22, 1987)
Q: What are the requisites for the
suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus?
A: Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution itself sets the parameters
for determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the declaration of
martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
namely:
1) actual invasion or rebellion; and
37
2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power.
Without the concurrence of the two
conditions, the President's declaration of
martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
must be struck down.
Q: What are the limitations of the
suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus?
A:
1) Applies only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected
with invasion; and
2) Anyone arrested or detained
during suspension must be
charged within 3 days. Otherwise,
he should be released. (Sec. 18,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
6. EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
a. NATURE AND LIMITATIONS
Q: What is the nature of executive
clemency?
A: Executive clemency is granted to
relieve the harshness of the law or
correct mistakes in the administration of
justice. The power of executive clemency
is non‐delegable and must be exercised
by the President personally. (Echegaray
v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601,
October 12, 1998)
Q: Can the judiciary grant clemency?
A: Clemency is not a function of the
judiciary; it is an executive function. The
grant is discretionary, and may not be
controlled by the legislature or reversed
by the court, save only when it
contravenes its limitations. (U.S. v.
Guarin, G.R. No. 9900, March 15, 1915)
Q: What are the limitations of the
pardoning power of the President?
A:
1) Can be granted only after
convictions by Final judgment
 2) Cannot be granted in cases of
civil or legislative Contempt.
3) Cannot absolve convict of civil
Liability.
4) Cannot be granted in cases of
Impeachment. (Sec. 19, Art. VII,
1987 Constitution)
5) Cannot be granted for violations
of Election laws without favorable
recommendations of the
COMELEC. (Sec. 5, Par. C, Article
IX, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
6) Cannot restore Public offices
forfeited.
b. FORMS OF EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY
Q: What are the forms of executive
clemency?
A:
1) Pardons (conditional or plenary);
2) Reprieves;
3) Commutations;
4) Remission of Fines and
Forfeitures;
5) Parole; and
6) Amnesty (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Q: What is the pardoning power of
the President?
A: An act of grace, which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed from
punishment, which the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. (Monsanto v.
Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989)
Q: What is the effect of pardon?
A: As a consequence, pardon granted
after conviction frees the individual from
all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But
unless expressly grounded on the
person’s innocence (which is rare), it
cannot bring back a lost reputation for
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
(Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239,
Feb. 9, 1989)
38
Q: What are the kinds of pardon as
to the presence of condition?
A:
1) Absolute pardon– One
extended without any conditions;
totally extinguishes criminal
liability (See: RPC, Art. 89[4]).
2) Conditional pardon – One under
which the convict is required to
comply with certain requirements.
(Sales v. Director of Prisons, G.R.
No. L-3972, October 13, 1950)
Q: What are the kinds of pardon as
to effect?
A:
1) Plenary pardon– Extinguishes
all the penalties imposed upon the
offender, including accessory
disabilities
2) Partial pardon– Does not
extinguish all the
penalties; partially extinguishes
criminal liability. [See RPC, Art.
94(1)]
Q: What is a reprieve?
A: It is the deferment of the
implementation of the sentence for a
while; it does not annul the sentence but
merely postpones or suspends its
execution. (Revised Rules and
Regulations of the Board of Pardons and
Parole, November 26, 2002)
Q: What is commutation?
A: It is the reduction or mitigation of the
penalty, from the death penalty to life
imprisonment, remittances, and fines. It
is a pardon in form but not in substance
because it does not affect his guilt; it
merely reduces the penalty for reasons
of public interest rather than for the sole
benefit of the offender. (CRUZ, Philippine
Political Law, p. 444)
Q: What is the remission of fines and
forfeitures?
A: Merely prevents the collection of fines
or the confiscation of forfeited property.
It cannot have the effect of returning
property which has been vested in third
parties or money already in the public
treasury. (BERNAS, Philippine
Constitution Reviewer, p. 315.)
Q: May an act of Congress limit the
power of the President to remit fines
and forfeitures?
A: No. The power of the President to
remit fines and forfeitures may not be
limited by any act of Congress. But a
statute may validly authorize other
officers, such as department heads or
bureau chiefs, to remit administrative
fines and forfeitures. (Risos-Vidal v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015)
Q: What is probation?
A: A disposition under which a defendant
after conviction and sentence is released
subject to conditions imposed by the
court and to the supervision of a
probation officer. (Probation Law of
1976, Presidential Decree No. 968, July
24, 1976)
Q: Is probation a right of a convicted
criminal?
A: No. It is not a right granted to a
convicted offender, but a special
privilege granted by the State to a
penitent qualified offender who does not
possess the disqualifications under P.D.
No. 968, as amended. (Probation Law of
1976, Presidential Decree No. 968, July
24, 1976)
Q: Is the Probation Law a penal law?
A: The Probation Law is not a penal law
for it to be liberally construed to favor the
accused. (Maruhom v. People, G.R. No.
206513, Oct. 20, 2015)
Q: What is parole?
A: The suspension of the sentence of a
convict granted by a Parole Board after
serving the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence penalty, without
granting a pardon, prescribing the terms
upon which the sentence shall be
suspended. (Revised Rules and
Regulations of the Board of Pardons and
Parole, November 26, 2002)
39
Q: What is amnesty?
A: The grant of general pardon to a class
of political offenders either after
conviction or even before the charges are
filed. It is the form of executive clemency
which under the Constitution may be
granted by the President only with the
concurrence of the legislature. (Magdalo
Para Sa Pagbabago v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190793, June 19,
2012)
Q: What are the requisites for the
grant of an amnesty?
A:
1) The concurrence of a majority of
all the members of Congress (Sec.
19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
and
2) A previous admission of guilt.
(Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-18184,
Jan. 31, 1963)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
7. DIPLOMATIC POWERS
Q: What is the scope of the
diplomatic powers of the President?
A:
1) Negotiate treaties and other
international agreements. (Art. VII,
Sec. 21)
2) Appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls.
3) Receive ambassadors and other
public ministers accredited to the
Philippines. (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 2002 ed., p. 239).
4) Contract and guarantee foreign
loans on behalf of RP. (Sec. 20, Art.
VII).
5) Deport aliens (Tan Tong v.
Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-7680,
April 30, 1955)
6) Decide that a diplomatic officer who
has become persona non grata be
recalled.
7) Recognize governments and
withdraw recognition.
Q: Does a treaty or international 3) It must be governed by
agreement require the concurrence international law (China National
of the Senate? Machinery and Equipment
Corporation v. Sta. Maria, G.R. No.
A: A treaty or international agreement 185572, Feb. 7, 2012).
entered into by the President requires
the concurrence of the Senate, (Art. VII, 8. POWERS RELATIVE TO
Sec. 21) which may opt to do the
APPROPRIATION MEASURES
following:
Q: What are some of the powers of
a. Approve with 2/3 majority;
the President relative to
b. Disapprove outright; or
appropriation measures?
c. Approve conditionally, with
suggested amendments which if
A:
re-negotiated and the Senate’s
1) The President recommends the
suggestions are incorporated, the
appropriation for the operation of
treaty will go into effect without
the Government as specified in the
the need for further Senate
budget. (Sec. 25 [1], Art. VI, 1987
approval.
Constitution);
Q: What is the nature of the power of
2) The President, may, by law, be
the President to deport aliens?
authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for
A: This power is vested in the President
his respective office from savings
by his office, subject only to restrictions
in other items of his respective
as may be provided by legislation as
appropriations. (Sec. 25 [5], Art.
regards the grounds for deportation.
VI, 1987 Constitution; Demetria v.
(Sec. 69, Revised Administrative Code).
Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27,
1987, and Araullo v. Aquino III,
In the absence of any legislative
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014]
restriction to authority, the President
may still exercise this power.
3) The President shall have the
The power to deport aliens is limited by
power to veto any particular item
the requirements of due process, which
or items in an appropriation,
entitles the alien to a full and fair
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto
hearing. The alien is not entitled to bail
shall not affect the item or items to
as a matter of right. (Tan Sin v. The
which he does not object. (Sec. 27
Deportation Board, G.R. No. L‐11511,
[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Nov. 28, 1958)
4) Power to execute or implement
Q: What is an executive agreement? GAA through a program of
expenditures to be approved by
A: An executive agreement is a “treaty” the President. (TESDA v. COA, G.R.
within the meaning of that word in No. 196418, Feb. 10, 2015)
international law and constitutes
enforceable domestic law (Nicolas v.
Q: What is budgetary power?
Romulo, G.R. No. 175888, Feb. 11,
2009).
A: Within thirty (30) days from the
opening of every regular session, the
Executive agreements do not require
President shall submit to Congress a
legislative concurrence (Bayan Muna v.
budget of expenditures and sources of
Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, Feb. 1, 2011).
financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue
Q: What are the requisites of a valid measures. (Sec. 22, Art. VII, 1987
executive agreement? Constitution)
A: Congress may not increase the
1) The agreement must be between appropriation recommended by the
states; President for the operation of the
2) It must be written; and Government as specified in the budget.
The form, content, and manner of

40
preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law. (Sec. 22, Art. VII,
1987 Constitution)
Q: Why is budgetary power vested
upon the Executive Department?
A: The power is properly entrusted to
the executive department as it is the
President who, as chief administrator
and enforcer of the laws, is in the best
position to determining the needs of the
government and propose the
corresponding appropriations therefore
based on existing or expected sources of
revenue. (CRUZ, Philippine Political Law,
p. 462)
9. DELEGATED POWERS
Q: What are the permissible
delegations of powers under the
1987 Constitution?
A:
1) Delegation to the people through
initiative and referendum. (Sec. 1, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution)
2) Emergency powers delegated by
Congress to the President. (Sec. 23,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
3) Congress may delegate tariff
powers to the President. (Sec. 28 (2),
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
4) Delegation to administrative bodies
– also known as the power of
subordinate legislation.
5) Delegation to Local Governments
Q: What is the power of subordinate
legislation?
A: This refers to the authority vested by
Congress to the administrative bodies to
“fill in the details” which Congress cannot
provide due to lack of opportunity or
competence. Such includes the making
of supplementary rules and regulations.
Such have the force and effect of law.
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, G.R. No. 76633, October
18, 1988)
41
Q: What are the requisites for a valid
delegation of emergency powers to
the President?
A:
1) There must be war or other national
emergencies;
2) The delegation is for a limited
period only;
3) Delegation is subject to restrictions
as Congress may prescribe; and
4) Emergency powers must be
exercised to carry a national policy
declared by Congress. (Section 26,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
10. RESIDUAL POWERS
Q: What is the residual power of the
President?
A: The powers of the President cannot
be said to be limited only to the specific
power enumerated in the Constitution.
Executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated. The
framers did not intend that by
enumerating the powers of the President
he shall exercise those powers and no
other. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. These
unstated residual powers are implied
from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for the President to
comply with his duties under the
Constitution. (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R.
No. 88211, Oct. 27, 1989)
11. VETO POWERS
Q: What are the rules on Presidential
veto?
A: If the President disapproves a bill
enacted by Congress, he should veto the
entire bill. He is not allowed to veto
separate items of a bill.
Item-veto is allowed in case of
Appropriation, Revenue, and Tariff bills.
(Sec. 27 [2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the doctrine of
inappropriate provisions?
A: It refers to a provision that is
constitutionally inappropriate for an
appropriation bill may be singled out for
veto even if it is not an appropriation or
revenue item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig,
G.R. No. 87636, Nov. 19, 1990)
Q: What is executive impoundment?
A: It refers to the refusal of the
President to spend funds already
allocated by Congress for a specific
purpose. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type.
(Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105,
Aug. 19, 1994)
Q: Can the President veto a law?
A: No. What the president may validly
veto is only a bill and neither the
provisions of law 35 years before his
term nor a final and executory judgment
of the Supreme Court. (Bengzon v.
Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
D. RULES OF SUCCESSION
Q: What are the rules to be applied if
there is a vacancy before the
beginning of the term of the
President?
A:
1) In case of death or permanent
disability of the President-elect.
The Vice-President-elect shall
become President.
2) In case of failure to elect the
President. The Vice-President shall
act as the President until the
President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
3) In case no President and Vice-
President shall have been chosen
and qualified, or where both shall
have died or become permanently
disabled. The Senate President, or
in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representative
shall act as President until a
President or a Vice-President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
Congress shall by law provide for how
one who is to act as President shall be
selected until a President or a Vice-
President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability or inability of
42
the officials. (Sec. 7, Art., VII, 1987
Constitution)
Q: What are the rules to be applied if
the vacancy occurs during the
incumbency of the President?
A:
1) In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or
resignation of the President, the
Vice President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired
term.
2) In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President
and the Vice-President, the Senate
President, or in case of his inability,
the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as
President until the President or
Vice President shall have been
elected and qualified. (Sec. 7, Art.,
VII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the rules and procedure
to be followed if a vacancy occurs in
the offices of the President and Vice-
President?
A:
1) At 10:00 A.M. of the third day after
said vacancy occurs – Congress shall
convene under its rules without need
of a call.
2) Within 7 days — Congress shall
enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a
Vice President.
3) Said special election shall be held
— Not earlier than forty-five (45)
days nor later than sixty (60) days
from the time of such call.
4) The bill calling such special election
— Shall be deemed certified under
Sec. 26, par. 2, Art. VI of the
Constitution and shall become law
upon its approval on third reading by
Congress.
5) Appropriations for such special
election — Shall be charged against
any current appropriations and shall
be exempt from the requirements of,
Sec. 25, par. 4, Art. VI of the
Constitution.

6) The convening of Congress and the
special election — cannot be
suspended or postponed
7) No special election shall be called
— If the vacancy occurs within
eighteen (18) months before the date
of the next presidential elections.
(Sec. 10, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
VII. JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT
VII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
A. CONCEPTS
1. JUDICIAL POWER
Q: What is the concept of judicial
power?
A: The duty of the courts of justice:
• to settle actual controversies
involving rights, which are
legally demandable and
enforceable and
• to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or
instrumentality of the
Government. (Sec. 1 [2], Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)
2. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Q: What is the power of judicial
review?
A: This is the power of the SC to
determine the constitutionality of a law,
treaty, ordinance, presidential issuance,
and other governmental acts.
Q: Does the judiciary assert any
superiority over other departments?
A: No. When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over
other departments; it does not, in
reality, nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn
43
and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed as
‘judicial supremacy’, which properly is
the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. (Angara v. The Electoral
Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15,
1936)
a. REQUISITES
Q: What are the requisites of judicial
review?
A:
1) Actual case or controversy – a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims which can be
resolved based on existing law and
jurisprudence. (Guingona v. CA, G.R.
No. 125532, July 10, 1998)
2) The constitutional questions must
be raised by the proper party. To
establish legal standing, he has to
make out of sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and
secure relief as a citizen or a
taxpayer. (David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,
171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 &
171424, May 3, 2006)
3) The constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity.
4) The decision on the constitutional
question must be determinative of
the case itself.
Q: What are the requisites of an
actual case or controversy?
A: The controversy must be
• definite and concrete,
• bearing upon legal relations of
parties who are pitted against
each other due to their adverse
legal interest. (John Hay People’s
Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R.
No. 199775, October 24, 2003)
and
• must not be moot and academic.
Q: What are the conditions for the
Court to decide moot and academic
cases?
A: The Court will still decide cases
otherwise moot and academic if;
a. there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;
b. there is an exceptional character
of the situation and paramount
public interest is involved;
c. the constitutional issue raised
require the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
d. the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. (Calida v.
Trillanes IV, G.R. No. 240873
(Resolution), [September 3,
2019])
Q: What is required for a taxpayer to
be a proper party?
A: For taxpayers, there must be a claim
of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional.
(Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919,
February 14, 2009)
Q: What is required for a voter to be
a proper party?
A: For voters, there must be a showing
of obvious interest in the validity of
election law in question. (David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396,
171409, 171485, 171483, 171400,
171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006)
Q: What is required for a concerned
citizen to be a proper party?
A: For concerned citizens, there must be
a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must
be settled early. (Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5,
1994)
Q: What is required for a legislator to
be a proper party?
A: For legislators, there must be a claim
that the official action complained of
encroaches on their prerogatives as
44
legislators. (PHILCONSA v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994)
b. OPERATIVE FACT
DOCTRINE
Q: What is the operative fact
doctrine?
A: Under this doctrine, the law is
recognized as unconstitutional but the
effects of the unconstitutional law,
before it declares nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and
fair play. It is a rule of equity (League of
Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951,
Nov. 18, 2008).
c. POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
Q: What is the political question
doctrine?
A: The term political question connotes
what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or
with which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular measure. (Tañada v. Cuenco,
100, Phil, 1101)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND AUTONOMY
Q: What are the constitutional
guarantees of judicial independence
and autonomy?
A:
1) The SC is a constitutional body and
may not be abolished by law.
2) Members are only removable by
impeachment. (Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987
Constitution)
3) The SC may not be deprived of its
minimum and appellate jurisdiction.
(Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution);
appellate jurisdiction may not be
 increased without its advice or
concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
4) The SC has administrative
supervision over all inferior courts
and personnel. (Sec. 6, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution)
5) The SC has exclusive power to
discipline judges/justices of inferior
courts. (Sec. 11, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
6) The members of the judiciary
enjoy the security of tenure. (Sec. 2
[2], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
7) The members of the judiciary may
not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. (Sec. 12,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
8) The salaries of judges may not be
reduced; the judiciary enjoys fiscal
autonomy. (Sec. 3, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
9) The SC alone may initiate the
promulgation of the Rules of Court.
(Sec. 5 [5], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
10) The SC alone may order
temporary detail of judges. (Sec. 5
[3], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
11) The SC can appoint all officials
and employees of the Judiciary. (Sec.
5 [6], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the concept of judicial
privilege or deliberative process
privilege?
A: The privilege against disclosure of
information or communications that
formed the process of judicial decisions.
(In re Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court
Officials & Employees, Notice, February
14, 2012)
Q: Where does judicial privilege or
deliberative process privilege apply?
A: It applies to confidential matters,
which refer to information not yet
publicized by the Court like:
1) raffle of cases
45
2) actions are taken in each case in
the Court’s agenda, and
3) deliberations of the Members in
court sessions on case matters
pending before it. (In re Production
of Court Records and Documents
and the Attendance of Court
Officials & Employees, Notice,
February 14, 2012)
Q: Is judicial privilege or
deliberative process privilege
exclusive to the Judiciary?
A: No. This privilege, however, is not
exclusive to the Judiciary and it extends
to the other branches of government due
to our adherence to the principle of
separation of powers (In Re: Production
of Court Records and Documents and the
Attendance of Court Officials and
Employees as Witnesses under the
Subpoenas of Feb. 10, 2012, and the
Various Letters of Impeachment
Prosecution Panel dated Jan. 19 and 25,
2012, Feb. 14, 2012).
C. APPOINTMENTS TO THE
JUDICIARY
1. QUALIFICATIONS OF
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
Q: What are the qualifications to be
a member of the Judiciary in
general?
A: One must be of:
• proven competence
• integrity
• probity and
• independence. (Sec. 7 [3], Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications to be
a member of the Supreme Court?
A:
• Natural born citizen of the
Philippines
• at least 40 years of age
• for 15 years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the
practice of law. (Sec. 7 [1], Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications to be
a member of the Court of Appeals
and other lower collegiate courts?
A:
• Natural born citizen of the
Philippines
• Member of the Philippine bar
• but Congress may prescribe other
qualifications. (Sec. 7[1 and 2],
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications to be
a judge in the Regional Trial Court
and lower courts?
A:
• Citizen of the Philippines
• Member of the Philippine bar,
• but the Congress may prescribe
other qualifications, (Sec. 7 [1
and 2], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
2. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL
a. COMPOSITION
Q: What is the composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council?
A:
1) Chief Justice, as ex-officio
chairman
2) Secretary of Justice, as an ex-
officio member
3) A representative of Congress, as
an ex-officio member
4) A representative of the
Integrated Bar
5) A Professor of law
6) A Retired member of the SC
7) Private sector representative
8) Clerk of the SC, as Secretary de
officio (Sec. 8[3], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
b. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
Q: What is the function of the
Judicial and Bar Council?
A: The principal function of the Judicial
and Bar Council is to:
• recommend the appointees to the
judiciary and
• exercise other functions and
duties as the Supreme court may
46
assign. (Sec. 8[5], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
D. THE SUPREME COURT
1. COMPOSITION
Q: What is the composition of the
Supreme Court?
A: The Supreme Court shall be
composed of:
• 1 Chief Justice and
• 14 Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof. (Sec. 4, [1], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
2. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
Q: What are the powers and
functions of the Supreme Court?
A:
1) Exercise original jurisdiction
2) Exercise appellate jurisdiction
3) Act as an Electoral Tribunal for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Contests Sitting En Banc over all
contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualification of the
President and Vice-President. (Sec. 4,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
4) Temporary assignments of judges
of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require and not
exceed 6 months without the consent
of the judge concerned. (Sec. 5 [3],
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
5) Order a change of venue or place
of trial, to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. (Sec. 5 [4], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
6) Rule-making power (Sec. 5 [5],
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
7) Power of appointment (Sec. 5 [6],
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
 8) Power of administrative Q: What is the scope of jurisdiction
supervision (Sec. 6, Art. VIII, 1987 of the Supreme Court acting as an
Constitution) Electoral Tribunal?

9) Contempt powers (Inonog v. Ibay, A: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009)
Q: What are the cases under the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court?
A: The Supreme Court exercises original
jurisdiction
defined by Sec. 4, par 7, Art VII, of the
1987 Constitution, would not include
cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
(Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434,
March 3, 2004)

a. Over cases affecting ambassadors, Q: What is the power of appointment

other public ministers and consuls of the Supreme Court?
(Sec. 5 [1], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution); A: This refers to the power of the
Supreme Court to appoint all officials and
b. Over petitions for certiorari, employees of the Judiciary following the
prohibition, mandamus, quo Civil Service Law. (CONSTI, Art. VIII,
warranto, and habeas corpus (Sec. Sec. 5, par. 6)
5 [1], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution);
Q: What is the power of
c. Review of the factual basis for the administrative supervision of the
declaration of martial law or Supreme Court?
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. (Sec. 18 [3], Art. A: This refers to the power of the
VII, 1987 Constitution) Supreme Court to exercise
administrative supervision over all courts
Q: What are the cases under the and the personnel thereof. (Sec. 6, Art.
appellate jurisdiction of the VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Supreme Court?
Q: What are the cases that must be
A: The Supreme Court exercises heard by the Supreme Court En
appellate jurisdiction: banc?

a. Over final judgments and orders of A:

lower courts in all cases in which the 1) All cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of any constitutionality of a treaty,
treaty, international or executive international or executive agreement,
agreement, law, presidential decree, or the law. (Sec. 4 [2], Art. VIII, 1987
proclamation, order, instruction, Constitution);
ordinance, or regulation is in
question; 2) All other cases which under the
Rules of Court may be required to be
b. All cases involving the legality of heard en banc, including those
any tax impost, assessment, or toll, involving the constitutionality,
or any penalty imposed in relation application or operation of
thereto; Presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of other regulations (Sec. 4 [2], Art.
any lower court is in issue; VIII, 1987 Constitution);

d. All criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher; and
e. All cases in which only a question
of law is involved. (Sec. 5 [2], Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)
3) Cases heard by a Division when the
required majority in the division is not
obtained (Sec. 4 [3], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution);
4) Cases, where the SC modifies or
reverses a doctrine or principle of law

47
 previously, laid either en banc or in
division (Sec. 4 [3], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution);
5) Administrative cases involving the
discipline or dismissal of Judges of
lower courts (Sec. 11, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution); and
6) Election contests for president or
vice-president (Sec. 4 [7], Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution).
Q: What is the scope of the rule-
making power of the Supreme
Court?
A:
1) The protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights
2) Pleadings, practice, and procedure
in all courts
3) Admissions to the practice of law
4) The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
5) Legal assistance to the
underprivileged (Sec. 5 [5], Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the limitations of the
rule-making power of the Supreme
Court?
A:
1) It should provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases.
2) It should be uniform for all courts
of the same grade.
3) It should not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.
Q: What is the concept of the
contempt power of the Supreme
Court?
A: Contempt of court has been defined
as a defiance of the authority, justice, or
dignity of the court; such conduct as
tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect
or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during
litigation. (Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009)
48
Q: What is direct contempt?
A: Direct contempt, which in summary,
is committed in the presence of or so
near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same,
including disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do
so. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec.1)
Q: What is indirect contempt?
A: Indirect contempt is not committed in
the presence of the court and can be
punished only after notice and hearing.
(Zarate v. Balderian, A.M. No. MTJ-00-
1261, March 31, 2000).
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Q: What are the Constitutional
Commissions?
A:
1) Civil Service Commission (CSC)
2) Commission on Elections
(COMELEC)
3) Commission on Audit (CoA) (Sec. 1,
Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the common inhibitions
among all members of the
Constitutional Commissions?
A:
1) No Member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure,
hold any other office or employment.
2) No member of a Constitutional
Commission shall be engaged in the
practice of any profession or in the
active management or control of any
business which in any way be affected
by the functions of his office.
3) No member of a Constitutional
Commission shall be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in
any contract with, or any franchise or
 privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
(Sec. 2, Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
B. INSTITUTIONAL
INDEPENDENCE SAFEGUARDS
Q: What are the safeguards ensuring
the independence of the
Commissions?
A:
1) They are constitutionally-created;
may not be abolished by a statute of
its judicial functions. (Sec. 1, Art. IX-
A, 1987 Constitution)
2) Each is conferred certain powers
and functions which cannot be
reduced by statute. (Art. IX-B, C and
D, 1987 Constitution)
3) Each is expressly described as
independent. (Sec. 1, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution)
4) Chairmen and members are given
fairly long terms of office for 7 years.
(Sec. 1 [2], Art. IX-B, C and D, 1987
Constitution)
5) Chairmen and members cannot be
removed except by impeachment.
(Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
6) Chairmen and members may not
be reappointed or appointed in an
acting capacity (Sec. 1 [2], Art. IX-B,
C and D, 1987 Constitution)
7) Salaries of chairmen and members
are relatively high and may not be
decreased during the continuance in
office. (Sec. 3, Art. IX-A, and Sec. 17,
Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution)
8) Commissions enjoy fiscal
autonomy. (Sec. 5, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution)
9) Each commission may promulgate
its own procedural rules. (Sec. 7, Art.
IX-A, 1987 Constitution)
10) Chairmen and members are
subject to certain disqualifications
and inhibitions calculated to
49
strengthen their integrity. (Sec. 2,
Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution)
11) Commissions may appoint their
own officials and employees following
Civil Service Law. (Sec. 4, Art. IX-A,
1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the scope of the
prohibition on the reappointment of
all members of the Constitutional
Commissions?
A: The word “reappointment” means a
second appointment to one and the same
office. Hence, the prohibition on
reappointment does not per se preclude
the promotional appointment or upgrade
of a commissioner to a chairman, subject
to this proviso: the appointee’s tenure in
the office does not exceed 7 years in all.
(Funa v. The Chairman, COA, supra)
Q: Can the prohibition on
reappointment apply to disapproved
or to by-passed ad interim
appointments?
A: No. The prohibition on reappointment
Sec. 1 (2) Art. IX-C of the Constitution
applies neither to disapproved nor to by-
passed ad interim appointments. A
disapproved ad interim appointment
cannot be revived by another ad interim
appointment because the disapproval is
final under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, and not because a
reappointment is prohibited under Sec.
1, Art. IX-A of the Constitution. A by-
passed ad interim appointment can be
revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval
under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution and such a new
appointment will not result in the
appointee serving beyond the fixed term
of 7 years. (Matibag v. Benipayo, supra)
C. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
Q: What are the rules in the decision-
making process of each
Constitutional Commissions?
A:
1) Each Commission shall decide
matter or cases by a majority vote of
all the members within 60 days from
submission.
 a. COMELEC may sit en banc or in
2 divisions.
b. Election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, are
decided in division, with motions
for reconsideration filed with the
COMELEC en banc.
c. The SC has held that a majority
decision decided by a division of
the COMELEC is a valid decision.
2) As collegial bodies, each
Commission must act as one, and no
one member can decide a case for the
entire commission. (Sec. 7, Art. IX,
1987 Constitution)
D. COMPOSITION AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF
MEMBERS
Q: What is the composition of the
Civil Service Commission?
A: The Civil Service shall be
administered by the Civil Service
Commission composed of:
• a Chairman and
• two Commissioners (Sec. 1[1],
B., Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications of the
members of the Civil Service
Commission?
A:
• Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines
• At the time of their appointment,
at least 35 years of age
• With proven capacity for public
administration, and
• Must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding
their appointment. (Sec. 1[1], B.,
Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the composition of the
Commission on Election?
A: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of:
• a Chairman and
• six Commissioners (Sec. 1[1], C.
Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
50
Q: What are the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on
Election?
A:
• Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines
• At the time of their appointment,
at least 35 years of age,
• Holders of a college degree, and
• Must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be
Members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Sec. 1[1], C. Art. IX,
1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the composition of the
Commission on Audit?
A: There shall be a Commission on Audit
composed of:
• a Chairman and
• two Commissioners, (Sec. 1[1],
D. Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What are the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on
Audit?
A:
• Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines
• At the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age,
• Certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing
experience,
• or Members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten
years, and
• Must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding
their appointment.
At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same
profession. (Sec. 1[1], D. Art. IX, 1987
Constitution)
 E. PROHIBITED OFFICES AND
INTERESTS
Q: What are the inhibitions of the
members of each Constitutional
Commissions?
A:
1) Shall not, during tenure, hold any
other office or employment. (Sec.
2, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution)
2) Shall not engage in the practice of
any profession. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-A,
1987 Constitution)
3) Shall not engage in the active
management or control of any
business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his
office. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution)
4) Shall not be financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or any franchise or
privilege granted by the
government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or -controlled
corporations or their subsidies.
(Sec. 2, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution)
Q: What are the disqualifications
under the 1987 Constitution covered
by the Civil Service Commission?
A:
1) No candidate who has lost in any
election shall, within one year
after such election, be appointed
to any office in the Government
or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of
their subsidiaries. (Sec. 6, Art.
IX-B, 1987, Constitution)
2) No elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
(Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, 1987,
Constitution)
3) Unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government
51
or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
(Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, 1987,
Constitution)
4) No elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the
Congress, any present,
emolument, office, or title of any
kind from any foreign
government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be
considered as additional, double,
or indirect compensation. (Sec. 8,
Art. IX-B, 1987, Constitution)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
IX. BILL OF RIGHTS
A. CONCEPT OF BILL OF
RIGHTS
Q: What is the concept of the Bill of
Rights?
A: The Bill of Rights is the mechanism
for the delicate balance between
governmental power and individual
liberty, without which man is stripped of
his humanity and society becomes a
putrid dump of lost lives. (People v.
Legaspi, G.R. No. 117802, April 27,
2000)
1. PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY
Q: May the bill of rights be invoked
against private persons?
A: No, the constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise power is imposed. (People v.
Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18,
1991)
 2. RELATION TO HUMAN
RIGHTS
Q: What is the purpose of the Bill of
Rights?
A: The Bill of Rights is designed to
preserve the ideals of liberty, equality,
and security against assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience
with general principles. (PBM Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills,
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973)
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. (West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624
(1943)
B. DUE PROCESS OF LAW
1. CONCEPT OF RIGHT TO
LIFE, LIBERTY AND
PROPERTY
Q: What is the meaning of the right
to life?
A: It includes the right of an individual
to his body in its completeness, free from
dismemberment, and extends to the use
of God-given faculties which make life
enjoyable. (Justice Malcolm, Philippine
Constitutional Law, pp. 320-321)
Q: What is the meaning of the right
to liberty?
A: It includes the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. It includes the
right of the citizen to be free to use his
facilities in al lawful ways. (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660)
Q: What is the meaning of the right
to property?
A: It is anything that can come under
the right of ownership and be the subject
of a contract. It represents more than the
things a person owns; it includes the
52
right to secure, use, and dispose of
them. (Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197)
2. KINDS OF DUE PROCESS
a. SUBSTANTIVE
Q: What is substantive due process?
A: It requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property. If
a law is invoked to take away one’s life,
liberty, or property, the more specific
concern of substantive due process is not
to find out whether said law is being
enforced following procedural formalities
but whether the said law is a proper
exercise of legislative power. (Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465,
January 18, 2000)
Q: What are the requisites of
substantive due process?
A:
1) The interests of the public in
general, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require
the intervention of the State.
2) The means employed are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive on
individuals. (Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila, 41 Phil 103)
b. PROCEDURAL
Q: What is procedural due process?
A: In essence, procedural due process
refers to the method or manner by which
the law is enforced. (Corona v. United
Harbor Pilots Association of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 111953, December
12, 1997)
Q: What are the requisites of
procedural due process?
A:
1) Impartial court or tribunal clothed
with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it.
2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the
 defendant and over the property
which is the subject matter of the
process.
3) The defendant must be allowed to
be heard.
4) Judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing. (Marquez v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 187912-
14, January 31, 2011)
i. JUDICIAL
Q: What are the requisites of judicial
due process?
A:
1) An impartial and disinterested
court clothed by law with
authority to hear and determine
the matter before it.
2) Jurisdiction lawfully acquired
over the defendant or the
property which is the subject
matter of the proceeding
3) Notice and opportunity to be
heard be given to the defendant
4) Judgment to be rendered after
a lawful hearing clearly explained
as to the factual and legal bases.
(Art. VII, Sec. 14, 1987
Constitution)
ii. ADMINISTRATIVE
Q: What are the requisites of
administrative due process?
A:
1) Right to a hearing - includes the
right to present’s one case and
submit evidence in support thereof;
2) The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented;
3) Evidence presented must be
substantial;
4) The decision must have something
to support itself;
5) The decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing or
at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties;
53
6) The tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the
facts and the law of the controversy;
and
7) The decision must be rendered in
a manner that the parties can know
the various issues involved and the
reason for the decision rendered.
(Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February
27, 1940)
c. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
Q: What is the nature of the levels of
scrutiny?
A: Relevant to the chore of weighing
conflicting values are so-called standards
of review or levels of scrutiny, or those
instruments of measurement for the
validity of rules and regulations,
adjustable and flexible depending on the
interests and values involved. (City of
Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308
(2005)
Q: What do the levels of scrutiny
mean?
A: It simply means that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind of the
person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects what is at the
most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is wider.
(City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA
308 (2005)
Q: What are the levels of scrutiny?
A: These would be the:
• Deferential review or rational
relationship test
• Intermediate review or
heightened scrutiny and
• Strict scrutiny
Determining whether there is
sufficient justification for the
government’s action depends very much
on the level of scrutiny used. (City of
Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA 308
(2005)
Q: What is the deferential review?
A: It means that laws are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest, without courts
seriously inquiring into the substantiality
of such interest and examining the
alternative means by which the
objectives could be achieved. (See
Justice V.V. Mendoza’s discussions in
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA
394 (2001)
Q: What is the intermediate review?
A: It means that the substantiality of the
governmental interest is seriously looked
into and the availability of less restrictive
alternatives are considered. (See Justice
V.V. Mendoza’s discussions in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001)
Q: What is strict scrutiny?
A: In strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than
substantial governmental interest and on
the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
Strict scrutiny is a judicial standard
for determining the quality and the
amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. It is used today
to test the validity of laws dealing with
the regulation of speech, gender, or race
and facial challenges are allowed for this
purpose. (See Justice V.V. Mendoza’s
discussions in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
369 SCRA 394 (2001)
C. EQUAL PROTECTION OF
LAWS
1. CONCEPT
Q: What is the concept of equal
protection of the laws?
A: All persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It guarantees equality, not the
identity of rights. (Ichong v. Hernandez,
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
54
Q: What does equal protection of
laws forbid?
A: Equal protection of laws forbids
distinctions based on impermissible
criteria unrelated to a proper legislative
purpose, or class or discriminatory
legislation, which discriminates against
some and favors others when both are
similarly situated. It does not forbid
discrimination as to persons and things
that are different. (Ichong v. Hernandez,
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
2. REQUISITES FOR VALID
CLASSIFICATION
Q: What are the requisites for a valid
classification?
A:
1) There must be a substantial
distinction which makes for real
differences.
2) The substantial distinction
must be germane to the purpose
of the law.
3) It must not be limited to
existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
(Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos.
19293, December 7, 2010)
3. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
Q: What is the concept of rational
basis scrutiny on the equal
protection of laws?
A: The rational basis scrutiny demands
that the classification reasonably relates
to the legislative purpose. The rational
basis test often applies in cases involving
economics or social welfare, or to any
other case not involving a suspect class.
Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Export Association, Inc., 800 SCRA 313
(2016)
Q: What is the concept of
intermediate scrutiny on the equal
protection of laws?
A: When the classification puts a quasi-
suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be
treated under intermediate or
heightened review. Classifications based
on gender or illegitimacy receive
intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not
only further an important governmental
interest and be substantially related to
that interest, but the justification for the
classification must be genuine and must
not depend on broad generalizations.
Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers &
Export Association, Inc., 800 SCRA 313
(2016)
Q: What is the concept of strict
scrutiny on the equal protection of
laws?
A: The strict scrutiny review applies
when a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove
that the classification is necessary to
achieve compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest. Mosqueda v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Export
Association, Inc., 800 SCRA 313 (2016)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
D. RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES
1. CONCEPT OF PRIVACY
Q: What is the concept of privacy
under Sec. 2 Art. III, 1987
Constitution?
A: The right to privacy, or the right to
be let alone, was institutionalized in the
1987 Constitution as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
(Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415)
Q: What is the concept of zones of
privacy?
A: Zones of privacy are recognized and
protected in our laws. Within the zones,
any forms of intrusion are impermissible
unless excused by law and by the
customary legal process. In Petition of
Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo Sabio;
55
Miguel v. Senator Richard Gordon, 535
Phil. 687 (2006)
Q: What are the three strands of the
right to privacy?
A: The right to be let alone is not
unqualified. There are three strands of
that:
a. Locational or Situational privacy
b. Informational privacy
c. Decisional privacy
Q: What is locational or situational
privacy?
A: It refers to the privacy that is felt in
physical space, such as that which may
be violated by trespass and unwarranted
search and seizure. (Vivares v. St.
Theresa's College, G.R. No. 202666,
September 29, 2014)
Q: What is informational privacy?
A: It refers to the right of individuals to
control information about themselves.
(Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, G.R.
No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
Q: What is decisional privacy?
A: It is the right to independence in
making certain important decisions.
(Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
Nos. 203335, February 18, 2014])
2. CONCEPT OF SEARCH
Q: What is the concept of search
under Sec. 2, Art. III, 1987
Constitution?
A: Right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except:
• upon probable cause
• to be determined personally by
the judge
• after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may
produce, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and persons or things
 to be seized. (Sec. 2, Art. III, 1987
Constitution)
3. REQUISITES OF A VALID
WARRANT
Q: What are the requisites for the
issuance of a valid warrant of arrest?
A:
1) It must be made upon probable
cause
2) Determination on probable cause
must be made personally by the judge
3) Such determination is made after
examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce
4) It must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized. (Sec. 2, Art. III,
1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the concept of probable
cause?
A: It means such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that, in
themselves, are sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely on them and act in
pursuance thereof. (People v. Syjuco, 64
Phil, 667)
Q: What is the meaning of probable
cause on the issuance of a search
warrant?
A: It means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. (Prudente
v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14,
1989)
Q: Who determines the existence of
probable cause?
A: The determination of probable cause
is the function of the judge; and the
judge alone makes this determination.
(People v. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, July
25, 1990)
56
Q: What is required upon a judge for
the issuance of a search warrant?
A: The judge must strictly comply with
the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant including the need to personally
examine the applicant and the witnesses
through searching questions. (Columbia
Pictures v. Judge Flores, G.R. No. 78631,
June 29, 1993)
The examination must be probing
and exhaustive and not merely
routinary, general, peripheral, or
perfunctory. (People v. De Los Reyes,
G.R. No. 140657, October 25, 2004)
Q: What is meant by the requirement
of the particularity of descriptions in
a search warrant?
A: The search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized so that the
law enforcement officers serving the
warrant must:
a. readily identify the properties to
be seized and thus prevent them
from seizing the wrong items; and
b. leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to
be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and
seizures. (People v. Tee, G.R. No.
140546-47, January 20, 2003)
4. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
Q: What are the requisites for a valid
waiver?
A: For the valid waiver of a constitutional
right against unreasonable search, it
must appear that:
• the right exists
• the person involved knew, either
actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and
• the said person has an intention
to relinquish the right. (De Garcia
v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689)
Q: Is the search made in airports
unreasonable?
A: No, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of searches conducted on
passengers attempting to board an
aircraft whose carry-on baggage, as well
as checked-in luggage, are subjected to
x-ray scans, and the passengers
themselves are made to pass through
metal detectors. Given the minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline
travel, these searches are reasonable.
(People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881,
December 18, 2000)
Q: What is the effect if an airline
passenger refuses to be searched?
A: Holders and his hand-carried luggage
are subject to search for, and seizure of
prohibited materials or substance.
Holders refusing to be searched shall not
be allowed to board the aircraft which
shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air
carrier. (R.A. No. 6235, Sec. 9)
Q: What are the requisites of a valid
stop and frisk?
A:
1) The search and seizure must
precede the arrest;
2) The arresting officer should
properly introduce himself and make
initial inquiries, approach and restrain
a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, to check the
latter’s outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons.
3) The apprehending officers must
have a genuine reason, per police
officer’s experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has
weapons or contraband concealed
about him. (People v. Chua, G.R. No.
136066-67, February 04, 2003)
Q: Is probable cause required in
limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons?
A: Probable cause is not required in
limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons. But a genuine
reason must exist in light of a police
officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed.
(Malacat v. CA, G.R. No. 123595, Dec.
12, 1997)
57
Q: What is the requirement of a
warrantless search of moving
vehicles?
A: When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such
would be constitutionally permissible
only if:
• the officers made it upon probable
cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains an item, article or
object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction. (People v.
Breis, G.R. No. 205823, citing
People v. Libnao)
Q: Why are warrantless searches in
vessels and aircrafts permissible?
A: Searches and seizures without search
warrant of vessels and aircraft for
violations of customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement because the vessel can be
quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search must be
sought before the warrant could be
secured. (Hizon v. CA, G.R. No. 119619,
December 13, 1996)
Q: What is the purpose of allowing
warrantless searches in
automobiles?
A: Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed to prevent
violations of smuggling or immigration
laws, provided such searches are made
at borders or constructive borders like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of
the State. (People v. Manago, G.R. No.
212340, August 17, 2016)
Q: What are the guidelines of a valid
warrantless search of moving
vehicles at checkpoints?
A:
1) Those which are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed;
2) The vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body
search;
 3) The inspection of the vehicle is
limited to visual search. (Abenes v.
People)
Q: What is the plain view doctrine?
A: The plain view doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur:
1) The law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a
particular area;
2) The discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and
3) It is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. (Argana
v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13,
2019)
Q: What objects can be subjected to
seizure in a warrantless search?
A: The objects falling in plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in a position
to have that view are subject to seizure
even without a search warrant and may
be introduced in evidence. (People v.
Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28,
2019)
Q: When does plain view doctrine
apply?
A: The plain view doctrine is usually
applied whenever the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. (People v. Musa,
G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993)
Q: Why is an article seized?
A: An article may be seized because of
their close connection or intimate nexus
with the crime. (People v. Hua, G.R. No.
139301, September 29, 2004)
Q: What are the requisites for a valid
search incidental to a lawful arrest?
A:
1) A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an
58
offense without a search warrant
(Sec. 13, Rule 126, Rules of
Court).
2) The search may extend beyond
the person arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under
his immediate control. (Espano v.
Court of Appeals)
Q: Can a warrantless search precede
the arrest?
A: A search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to arrest at the outset of
the search. Thus, where a warrantless
search preceded a warrantless arrest but
was substantially contemporaneous with
it, what must be resolved is whether the
police had probable cause for the arrest
when the search was made or not.
(Aparente v. People, G.R. No. 205695,
September 27, 2017)
Q: May a lawful search without a
warrant be made without being
preceded by an arrest?
A: A lawful search without a warrant may
be made even without being preceded by
an arrest. There are many instances
where a warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which
is the “stop and search” at a military or
police checkpoints. (Posadas v. CA, G.R.
No. 89139, August 2, 1990)
Q: What is the scope of custom
searches?
A: Searches made at borders or
constructive borders for violation of
immigration and smuggling laws.
Custom searches however are not
available in dwelling places. (Papa v.
Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, February 28,
1968)
Q: When may visual search at
checkpoints be a valid warrantless
search?
A: Routine inspections in checkpoints
are not regarded as violative of an
individual’s right against unreasonable
searches, and thus, permissible if limited
to the following:
 1) Where the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the
public fairgrounds;
2) Simply looks into a vehicle;
3) Flashes a light therein without
opening the car’s doors;
4) Where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body
search; and
5) Where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area (Papa v.
Mago, supra)
Q: What are the requisites of a valid
checkpoint?
A: Requisites of a valid checkpoint:
1) It must be warranted by the
exigencies of public order;
2) It must be conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists; and
3) The inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search (Abenes
v. CA, G.R. No. 156320, February
14, 2007)
Q: May warrantless searches be
conducted during exigent
circumstances?
A: It enunciates the rule that under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant should be lawfully
dispensed with. (People v. De Gracia,
G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994)
Q: What are the requisites of a valid
random drug test?
A:
1) It must be random; and
2) It must be suspicionless
(Laserna v. DDB, G.R. No.
158633, November 3, 2008)
5. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
AND DETENTION
Q: When are warrantless arrests
lawful?
A: A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a
person;
59
1) When in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
2) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on the personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
3) When the person to be arrested is
a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment, or has
escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. (Sec. 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court)
Q: What are the requisites for an in
flagrante arrest?
A:
1) The person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that
he had just committed, is
committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and
2) Such an overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. (Antiquera v.
People, G.R. No. 180661, December
11, 2013)
6. EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Q: What is the exclusionary rule
under the 1987 Constitution?
A: Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. (Sec. 3[2], Art. III, 1987
Constitution)
7. EFFECTS OF
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES
Q: What is the concept of the
Doctrine of Fruits of Poisonous Tree?
A: Evidence obtained in violation of
Sec.2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding because it is the fruit of
the poisoned tree.
Q: When can objections to the
legality of the search warrant be
deemed waived?
A: Objections to the legality of the
search warrant and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained thereby are
deemed waived when not raised during
trial. (Demaisip v. CA, G.R. No. 89391,
January 25, 1991)
Q: Can the illegality of the arrest be
invoked to reverse the conviction
secured on the strength of
testimonial evidence given in an
open court?
A: Even if the accused were illegally
arrested, such arrest does not invest
eye-witness accounts with constitutional
infirmity as the fruits of the poisonous
tree; thus where the conviction could be
secured on the strength of testimonial
evidence given in open court, the
illegality of the arrest cannot be invoked
to reverse the conviction. (People v.
Salazar, G.R. No. 99355, August 11,
1997)
8. EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL
DETENTION
Q: May the extrajudicial confession
of a person detained be admissible in
evidence in any proceedings?
A: Yes, provided that any extrajudicial
confession made by a person arrested,
detained, or under custodial
investigation shall be:
• in writing and signed by such
person
• in the presence of his counsel or
• in the latter’s absence, upon a
valid waiver, and
• in the presence of any of the
parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or
priest or minister of the gospel as
chosen by him;
Otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as
evidence in any proceeding. (R.A. 7438)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
60
E. PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND
CORRESPONDENCE
1.CONCEPT OF
COMMUNICATIONS,
CORRESPONDENCE
Q: What is privacy communication
and correspondence?
A: The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable
except:
• upon lawful order of the court, or
• when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law. (Sec.3, Art. III., 1987
Constitution)
Q: What constitutes the right to
privacy?
A: The right to privacy has been
concisely defined as the right to be left
alone. It involves:
• the right of a person to be free
from unwarranted publicity and
• the right to live without
interference by the public in
matters with which the public is
not necessarily concerned. (DE
LEON, Philippine Constitutional
Law, p. 433)
2. INTRUSION, WHEN AND
HOW ALLOWED
Q: Is the right to privacy absolute?
A: No. The right of privacy or “the right
to be let alone,” like the right of free
expression, is not an absolute right. A
limited intrusion into a person’s privacy
has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and
the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him
constitutes a public character. Succinctly
put, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked to resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public
interest. (Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V.
Capulong, G.R. No. 82380, April 29,
1988)
Q: What interest is sought to be
protected by the right to privacy?
A: The interest sought to be protected
by the right of privacy is the right to be
free from unwarranted publicity, from
the wrongful publicizing of the private
affairs and activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of legitimate
public concern. (Ayer Productions Pty.
Ltd. V. Capulong, G.R. No. 82380, April
29, 1988)
3. EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Q: What is the exclusionary rule in
the privacy of communications and
correspondence?
A: Any evidence obtained in violation of
the right to privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. (Sec.3, Art. III., 1987
Constitution)
F. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION
1. CONCEPT
a. CONTINUUM OF THOUGHT,
SPEECH, EXPRESSION, AND
SPEECH ACTS.
Q: What is freedom of speech and
expression?
A: No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or the
press, or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the
government for a redress of grievances.
(Sec.4, Art. III., 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is the scope of freedom of
speech?
A: Freedom of speech includes the
freedom not to speak and remain silent.
(Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
[1977])
Q: What is the scope of freedom of
expression?
A: Protected speech includes every form
of expression, whether oral, written,
tape, or disc recorded. It includes motion
pictures as well as what is known as
61
symbolic speech such as the wearing of
an armband as a symbol of protest.
Peaceful picketing has also been included
within the meaning of speech. (Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,
G. R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Q: Can the State prohibit the people
from hearing what a person has to
say?
A: No. The freedom of speech and
expression also includes the right to an
audience, in the sense, that the state
cannot prohibit the people from hearing
what a person has to say, whatever may
be the quality of his thoughts. (Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 [1977])
Q: Is speech limited to vocal
communication?
A: Speech is not limited to vocal
communication. Conduct is treated as a
form of speech sometimes referred to as
‘symbolic speech such that when speech
and non-speech elements are combined
in the same course of conduct, the
‘communicative element’ of the conduct
may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the
right to freedom of expression the form
of expression is just as important as the
information conveyed that it forms part
of the expression. (Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, G. R. No.
205728, January 21, 2015)
b. PURPOSES OF FREE
SPEECH DOCTRINES
Q: What is the purpose of free
speech doctrines?
A: The right to speak one’s mind freely
is a highly valued freedom in a republican
and democratic society. (Lopez v.
People, 642 SCRA 668 [2011])
The right to think is the beginning of
freedom, and speech must be protected
from the government because speech is
the beginning of thought. Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234
(2002)
 c. BALANCE BETWEEN
UNBRIDLED EXPRESSION
AND LIBERTY
Q: How does the Court strike a
balance between freedom of
expression and liberty?
A: Freedom of expression is not
absolute, nor is it an unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible
use of language which prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this
freedom. Thus, all speeches are not
treated the same. Some type of speech
may be subjected to some regulation by
the State under its pervasive police
power, so that it may be not injurious to
the equal rights of others or those of the
community or society. (Chavez v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15,
2008)
2. TYPES OF REGULATION
a. PRIOR RESTRAINT AND
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Q: What is the concept of freedom
from censorship or prior restraint?
A: Freedom from prior restraint is
largely freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the
form of censorship, and regardless of
whether it is wielded by the executive,
legislative or judicial branch of the
government. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008)
Q: What does the freedom from prior
restraint seek to prevent?
A: It prevents governmental acts that
require the approval of a proposal to
publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the
payment of license taxes for the privilege
to publish; and even injunctions against
publication. Even the closure of the
business and printing offices of certain
newspapers, resulting in the
discontinuation of their printing and
publication, are deemed as previous
restraint or censorship. (Chavez v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15,
2008)
62
Q: How is a law or an official infringe
the freedom from prior restraint?
A: Any law or official that requires some
form of permission to be had before
publication can be made, infringes the
constitutional right, and remedy can be
had at the courts. (Chavez v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008)
Q: What is the concept of freedom
from subsequent punishment?
A: This is a limitation on the power of
the State from punishing publication or
dissemination. Without this assurance,
the individual would hesitate to speak for
fear that he might be held to account for
his speech, or that he might be
provoking the vengeance of the officials
he may have criticized. (BERNAS,
Reviewer, p. 248)
b. CONTENT BASED AND CONTENT
NEUTRAL
Q: What is the concept of content-
based regulation?
A: Content-based restraint or
censorship refers to restrictions based on
the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. The cast of the restriction
determines the test by which the
challenged act is assailed with. It bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity, and the
Court must use the clear and present
danger rule. (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008)
Q: What is the ground for a valid
prior restraint on speech based on
its content?
A: The government must show the type
of harm the speech sought to be
restrained would bring about especially
the gravity and the imminence of the
threatened harm otherwise the prior
restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on
speech based on its content cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears, “but only
by showing a substantive and imminent
evil that has taken the life of a reality
already on the ground.” (Chavez v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15,
2008)
Q: How must a valid prior restraint c. INCITEMENT AND
on speech based on its content be ADVOCACY
determined?
Q: May the social advocacy of a non-
A: As formulated, “the question in every
candidate be regulated by the State?
case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a
A: No, the message of the petitioner,
nature as to create a clear and present
taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a
danger that they will bring about the
social issue that it deeply believes.
substantive evils that Congress has a
Through rhetorical devices, it
right to prevent. It is a question of
communicates the desire of Diocese that
proximity and degree.” The regulation
the positions of those who run for a
which restricts the speech content must
political position on this social issue be
also serve an important or substantial
determinative of how the public will vote.
government interest, which is unrelated
It primarily advocates a stand on a social
to the suppression of free expression.
issue; only secondarily — even almost
(Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338,
incidentally — will cause the election or
Feb. 15, 2008)
non-selection of a candidate. (Diocese of
Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728,
Q: What is the concept of content- January 21, 2015)
neutral regulation?
Q: When will regulation of election
A: Content-neutral regulation includes
paraphernalia be valid?
controls merely on the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the
A: Regulation of election paraphernalia
time, place or manner, and under well-
will still be constitutionally valid if it
defined standards.
reaches into the speech of persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak
There is no presumption of
as members of a political party if they are
unconstitutionality. It uses the
not candidates, only if what is regulated
intermediate approach test. (Chavez v.
is declarative speech that, taken as a
Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15,
whole, has for its principal object the
2008)
endorsement of a candidate only.
(Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R.
Q: When is the intermediate No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
approach test used?
Q: What are the requisites of a valid
A: The test is used when the speech
regulation of election
restraints take the form of a content-
paraphernalia?
neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its
A: The regulation should be:
validity. Because regulations of this type
are not designed to suppress any
a. provided by law,
particular message, they are not subject
b. reasonable,
to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny
c. narrowly tailored to meet the
but an intermediate approach
objective of enhancing the
somewhere between the mere rationality
opportunity of all candidates to be
that is required of any other law and the
heard and considering the primacy of
compelling interest standard applied to
the guarantee of free expression, and
content-based restrictions. The test is
d. demonstrably the least restrictive
called intermediate because the Court
means to achieve that object.
will not merely rubberstamp the validity
(Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC,
of law but also require that the
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
restrictions be narrowly-tailored to
promote an important or significant
Q: When is the regulation in the
governmental interest that is unrelated
demonstrably least restrictive
to the suppression of expression.
means?
(Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338,
Feb. 15, 2008)
A: It is when the regulation is only
concerning the time, place, and manner
of the rendition of the message. In no

63
situation may the speech be prohibited
or censored based on its content. For this
purpose, it will not matter whether the
speech is made with or on private
property. (Diocese of Bacolod v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015)
d. SPECIFICITY OF
REGULATION AND
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
Q: What is the concept of facial
challenge involving statutes of free
speech?
A: An examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
based on its actual operation to the
parties but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities. (Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.
v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, Oct. 5, 2010).
Q: What is the concept of
overbreadth doctrine?
A: The overbreadth doctrine is a ground
to declare a statute void when “it offends
the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulations may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.” (Estrada v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-
41, January 21, 2015)
e. SPEECH REGULATION IN
RELATION TO ELECTION
What is the concept of political
speech?
A: Political speech is motivated by the
desire to be heard and understood, to
move people to action. It is concerned
with the sovereign right to change the
contours of power whether through the
election of representatives in a for the unwilling viewer or auditor
republican government or the revision of
the basic text of the Constitution. We
evaluate restrictions on freedom of
expression from their effects. We protect
both speech and medium because the
64
quality of this freedom in practice will
define the quality of deliberation in our
democratic society. (Diocese of Bacolod
v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 205728, January
21, 2015)
Q: Is regulation of speech in the
context of electoral campaigns made
by non-candidates constitutional?
A: Regulation of speech in the context of
electoral campaigns made by persons
who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party
which are, taken as a whole, principally
advocates of a social issue that the public
must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is
inconsistent with the guarantee of
according the fullest possible range of
opinions coming from the electorate
including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the
criteria for the choice of a candidate.
(Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra)
Q: What is the concept of captive
audience doctrine?
A: When a listener cannot, as a practical
matter, escape from intrusive speech,
the speech can be restricted. It
recognizes that a listener has a right not
to be exposed to an unwanted message
in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided. A
regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine is in the guise of censorship,
which undertakes selectively to shield
the public from some kinds of speech on
the ground that they are more offensive
than others. (1-United Transport
Koalisyon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020,
April 14, 2015)
Q: When are the restrictions based
on the captive audience doctrine
valid?
A: Such selective restrictions have been
upheld only:
• when the speaker intrudes on the
privacy of the home or
• the degree of captivity makes it
either impossible or impractical
to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based
on the captive-audience doctrine may
not be justified if the supposed “captive
audience” may avoid exposure to the
otherwise intrusive speech. (1-United
Transport Koalisyon v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
f. SPEECH REGULATION IN
RELATION TO MEDIA
Q: Can the Court curtail speech
uttered on the televisions?
A: Yes, the Court, applying the balancing
of interest doctrine, ruled that the
government’s interest to protect and
promote the interests and welfare of the
children adequately buttresses the
reasonable curtailment and valid
restraint on petitioner’s prayer to
continue as program host of Ang Dating
Daan during the suspension period.
Soriano’s offensive and obscene
language uttered on a prime‐time
television broadcast, without doubt, was
easily accessible to the children. His
statements could have exposed children
to a language that is unacceptable in
everyday use. As such, the welfare of
children and the State’s mandate to
protect and care for them, as parens
patriae, constitute a substantial and
compelling government interest in
regulating Soriano’s utterances in the TV
broadcast. (Soriano v. MTRCB, G.R. No.
165636, Apr. 29, 2009)
3. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS,
PRESUMPTIONS AND LEVELS
AND TYPES OF SCRUTINY
Q: What are the tests for a valid
governmental interference to the
freedom of expression?
A: Under jurisprudence, the following
are the tests for a valid governmental
interference to the freedom of
expression:
1) Clear and Present Danger test
(Schenck v. US, 249 US 47, 1919)
(Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
27833, April 18, 1969)
2) Dangerous Tendency Test
(Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-
8974, October 18, 1957)
3) Grave-but-Improbable Danger
test (Dennis v. US, 341 US 494,
1951)
65
4) Balancing of interest test
(Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
27833, Apr. 18, 1969)
5. Miller Test on Indecent Speech
(Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No.
164785, March 15, 2010)
Q: What is the Clear and Present
Danger test?
A: It is a test used to determine whether
the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree. (Schenck v. US, 249 US 47,
1919)
The danger created must not only be
clear and present but also traceable to
the ideas expressed. (Gonzales v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18,
1969)
Q: What is the Dangerous Tendency
Test?
A: It states that if the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency in which
the state has a right to prevent, then
such words are punishable. It is not
necessary that some of the definite or
immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in
general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used to be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil; which
the legislative body seeks to prevent.
(Gitlow vs. New York 268 U.S. 652.)
(Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-
8974, October 18, 1957)
Q: What is the Grave-but-
Improbable Test?
A: It is a test used to determine whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such an invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger. (Dennis v. US, 341 US 494,
1951)
Q: What is the Balancing of Interest
Test?
A: It is a test used to determine which
of the two conflicting interests demands
the greater protection under the
particular circumstances presented:
(a) when particular conduct is
regulated in the interest of public
order; and
(b) the regulation results in an
indirect, conditional, and partial
abridgment of speech. (Gonzales
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833,
Apr. 18, 1969)
Q: What is the Miller Test on
Indecent Speech?
A: It is used to determine whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. (Soriano v.
Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, March 15,
2010)
4. SPECIAL TOPICS IN FREE
EXPRESSION CASES
a. HATE SPEECH
Q: What is hate speech?
A: Hate speech refers to all forms of
expressions:
• that discriminates against and
• actively incites hostility
• or foments violence against any
person or group of persons based
on ethnicity, race, and religion.
(House Bill No. 6963)
b. DEFAMATION AND LIBEL
Q: What is libel?
A: Is the public and malicious imputation
of crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead. (REVISED PENAL CODE,
Art. 353)
66
Q: Is libel a constitutionally
protected speech?
A: Libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the
government must protect private
individuals from defamation. (Disini v.
Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 203335
Feb. 11, 2014)
Q: Is Cyber libel a new crime?
A: Cyber libel is not a new crime since
Art. 353, with Art. 355 of the Penal Code,
already punishes it. In effect, Sec.
4(c)(4) merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes “similar means”
for committing libel. Furthermore, the
United Nations Human Rights Committee
did not enjoin the Philippines to
decriminalize libel. It simply suggested
that defamation laws be crafted with care
to ensure that they do not stifle freedom
of expression. Free speech is not
absolute. It is subject to certain
restrictions, as may be necessary and as
may be provided by law. (Disini v.
Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 203335
Feb. 11, 2014)
c. SEDITION AND SPEECH IN
RELATION TO REBELLION
Q: What is the relation of sedition to
freedom of expression?
A: Our Legislature has spoken in article
142 of the RPC and the law must be
applied. This kind of legislation must be
weighed carefully vis-à-vis the
fundamental right to freedom of speech.
Such freedom, although secured by the
Constitution, does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish without
responsibility whatever one may choose.
It is not an unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment
of those who abuse this freedom.
[Espuelas vs. People (1951)]
Q: Can the State restrain any citizen
in criticizing the government?
A: The privilege of any citizen to criticize
his government and government officials
and to submit his criticism to the "free
trade of ideas" and to plead for its
acceptance in "the competition of the
market" is not to be restrained. However,
let such criticism be specific and
therefore constructive, reasoned or
tempered, and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government
set-up. [Espuelas vs. People (1951)]
Q: When is the protection of the
constitutional guaranty removed?
A: When the use of irritating language
centers not on persuading the readers
but on creating a disturbance, the
rationale of free speech cannot apply and
the speaker or writer is removed from
the protection of the constitutional
guaranty. [Espuelas vs. People (1951)]
d. OBSCENITY/
PORNOGRAPHY
Q: What is obscenity?
A: The word "obscene" and the term
"obscenity" may be defined as meaning
something offensive to chastity;
decency, or delicacy. (People v.
Kottinger, G.R. No. 20569, [October 29,
1923])
Q: Who has the burden of proving a
film is an unprotected expression?
A: It was observed that movies,
compared to other media of expression,
have greater capacity for evil and are
consequently subject to more regulation.
The burden of proving the film is
unprotected expression must rest on the
censor. (Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51, March 1, 1965)
e. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Q: What is commercial speech?
A: Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech that is not accorded
the same level of protection as that given
to other constitutionally guaranteed
forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection. The State cannot
rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expression.
(Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, Feb. 18, 2014)
67
f. NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
Q: What is the restriction of free
speech during a national
emergency?
A: In the recent case of David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court declared
unconstitutional the government threats
to close down mass media
establishments that refused to comply
with government prescribed “standards”
on news reporting following the
declaration of a State of National
Emergency by President Arroyo on 24
February 2006.
The Court ruled that “the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices
and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are
declared unconstitutional.
g. SPEECH OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS
Q: Is the legislative privilege of
speech by public officers a protected
speech?
A: Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Legislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not
for their public indulgence, but the public
good. The privilege would be of little
value if they could be subjected to the
cost and inconvenience and distractions
of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or the hazard of a judgment
against them based upon judge’s
speculation as to the motives.” (Pobre v.
Santiago, A. C. 7399)
5. COGNATE RIGHTS
a. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
Q: What is freedom of assembly?
A: The right to assemble is not subject
to prior restraint. It may not be
conditioned upon prior issuance of a
permit or authorization from government
authorities. However, the right must be
exercised in such a way as will not
prejudice the public welfare. (De la Cruz,
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183
&129221, March 25, 1999)
b. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Q: What is freedom of association?
A: The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged. (Art. III, Sec. 8)
Q: What is constitutes the right to
associate?
A: The right to associate may also mean
that an organization would have:
• the right to choose who its
members are, excluding or
expelling those whose personality
traits may run into conflict with
the group’s philosophy,
• or refusing participation to a
group in a parade where that
group’s message would not
conform with the organizer’s idea
of what the activity is all about
and
• when it comes to associations
directly related to one’s
employment, the right to abstain
from joining a labor organization
is subordinate to the policy of
encouraging unionism as an
instrument of social justice. (Bank
of the Philippine Islands v. BPI
Employees Union-Davao Chapter-
Federation of Unions in BPI
Unibank, 627 SCRA 590 (2010)
c. FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION
Q: What is the freedom of
information?
A: Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. (Sec. 28, Art. II. 1987
Constitution)
Basic to this right to be informed is
the necessity for laws to be published to
be effective. It makes no sense
presuming knowledge if the government
itself has not made provisions for the
dissemination of statutes and regulations
68
which affect the people’s lives and
interests.
Q: Will an unpublished handwritten
addendum to a Presidential
Proclamation be recognized as a
valid part of such Proclamation?
A: The Court held in Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v.
Military ShrineServices-Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office, Department of
National Defense, 697 SCRA 359 (2013),
that a handwritten addendum to a
Presidential Proclamation which was not
included in the published version as it
appeared in the Official Gazette will not
recognize such addendum as a valid part
of the Proclamation.
Q: What kind of administrative
circular must be published?
A: Administrative circulars that are not
merely internal or interpretative in
nature must also be published. GMA
Network, Inc. v. Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board, 514
SCRA 191 (2007)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
G. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
1.BASIC PRINCIPLES
a. PURPOSE
Q: What is the purpose of freedom of
religion?
A: Freedom of religion guarantees
complete freedom to believe without any
interference from the State. The right to
act, or to translate that belief into action,
however, may be subject to certain
regulations consistent with the mandate
of the State to promote the welfare of
everyone and to provide for an orderly
society. Nevertheless, this right on the
part of the government is not to be
lightly assumed, as it must have to be
weighed carefully with any religion-
grounded freedom or interest that may
be interfered with. (Spouses Imbong v.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 8,
2014)
 b. CONCEPT OF RELIGION
Q: What is the concept of freedom of
religion?
A: No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. (Sec. 5., Art. III, 1987
Constitution)
2. PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE
Q: What is the principle of
separation of church and state?
A: It is based on mutual respect. The
State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the Church, much less question
its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it.
On the other hand, the Church cannot
impose its beliefs and convictions on the
state and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that
they are good. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
3. NON-ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
Q: What is the non-establishment
clause?
A: No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. (Sec.5., Art.
III, 1987 Constitution)
Q: What is meant by the non-
establishment clause?
A: The non-establishment clause bars
the State from establishing, through laws
and rules, moral standards according to
a specific religion. Prohibitions against
immorality should be based on a purpose
that is independent of religious beliefs.
When it forms part of our laws, rules, and
policies, morality must be secular. Laws
and rules of conduct must be based on a
secular purpose. (Perfecto v. Judge
69
Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22,
2015)
Q: What are the exceptions to the
non-establishment clause?
A: The following are the exceptions to
the non-establishment clause:
1) Prohibition on the appropriation of
public money or property for the use,
benefit, or support of any religion.
(Sec. 29, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
2) Exemption from taxation of
properties actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious
purposes. (Sec. 28 [3], Art. VI, 1987
Constitution)
3) Optional religious instruction in
public elementary and high schools.
(Sec. 3, Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution)
4) Government sponsorship of town
fiestas, some purely religious
traditions have now been considered
as having acquired secular character
(Garces v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-53487,
May 25, 1981)
5) Postage stamps depicting the
Philippines as the venue of a
significant religious event – benefit to
the religious sect involved was merely
incidental as the promotion of the
Philippines as a tourist destination was
the primary objective. (Aglipay v.
Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459 March 13,
1937)
4. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Q: What are the aspects of the free
exercise clause?
A:
1) Right to believe, which is absolute
(Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No.
119673 July 26, 1996);
2) The right to act on one’s belief,
which is subject to regulation. (Iglesia
ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673 July
26, 1996)
Q: What is the meaning of the right
to believe?
A: The individual is free to believe (or
disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the
hereafter:
• He may indulge his theories about
life and death;
• worship any god he chooses or
none at all;
• embrace or reject any religion;
• acknowledge the divinity of God
or of any being that appeals to his
reverence;
• recognize or deny the immortality
of his soul in fact,
• cherish any religious conviction as
he and he alone sees fit. (Iglesia
ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673
July 26, 1996)
Q: What is the meaning of the right
to act on one’s belief?
A: Where the individual externalizes his
beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the
public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. As
great as this liberty may be, religious
freedom, like all the other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be
enjoyed only with proper regard for the
rights of others. (Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA,
G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996)
Q: What are the governmental tests
concerning the free exercise clause
and non-establishment clause?
A:
1) Benevolent Neutrality Approach
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-
1651, Aug. 4, 2003)
2) Clear and Present Danger Test
(Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 1919)
3) Compelling State Interest Test
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-
1651, Aug. 4, 2003)
4) Conscientious Objector Test
(International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Art. 18)
Q: What is the Benevolent Neutrality
Approach?
A: It is an approach that looks further
than the secular purposes of government
70
action and examines the effect of these
actions on religious exercise. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes the religious nature
of the Filipino people and the elevating
influence of religion in society; at the
same time, it acknowledges that the
government must pursue its secular
goals. In pursuing these goals, however,
the government might adopt laws or
actions of general applicability which
inadvertently burden religious exercise.
Benevolent neutrality gives room for
accommodation of these religious
exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches
in the wall of separation to uphold
religious liberty, which after all is the
integral purpose of the religion clauses.
(Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651,
Aug. 4, 2003)
Q: What is the Clear and Present
Danger Test?
A: In the Clear and Present Danger Test,
the question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. (Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 1919)
Q: What is the Compelling State
Interest Test?
A: It is used to determine if the interests
of the State are compelling enough to
justify an infringement of religious
freedom. (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No.
P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003)
Q: What is the three-step process in
Compelling State Interest Test?
A:
1) Has the statute or government
action created a burden on the free
exercise of religion? – Courts often
look into the sincerity of the religious
belief, but without inquiring into the
truth of the belief since the free
exercise clause prohibits inquiring
about its truth.
2) Is there a sufficiently compelling
state interest to justify this
infringement of religious liberty? – In
this step, the government has to
establish that its purposes are
 legitimate for the State and that they
are compelling.
3) Has the State in achieving its
legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the State? – The
analysis requires the State to show
that how it is achieving its legitimate
State objective is the least intrusive
means, or it has chosen a way to
achieve its legitimate State end that
imposes as little as a possible
intrusion on religious beliefs. (Estrada
v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, Aug.
4, 2003)
Q: What is the Conscientious
Objector Test?
A: It is a test used to determine an
individual who has claimed the right to
refuse to perform military service on the
grounds of freedom of thought,
conscience, and/or religion.
(International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Art. 18)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
1. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
Q: What is the scope of liberty of
abode and freedom of movement?
A: The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of:
• national security,
• public safety or
• public health, as may be
provided by law. (Art. III, Sec.
6)
71
2. WATCH-LIST AND HOLD
DEPARTURES ORDERS
Q: May the right to travel be
restricted by the issuance of a Hold
departure order?
A: There are only three considerations
that may permit a restriction on the right
to travel:
• national security,
• public safety or
• public health
As a further requirement, there
must be an explicit provision of statutory
law or the Rules of Court providing for
the impairment. (Genuino v. de Lima,
G.R. No. 197930; Arroyo v. de Lima,
G.R. No. 199034; Arroyo v. de Lima,
G.R. No. 199046, April 17, 2018)
Q: What is the purpose of the further
requirement for a legislative
enactment to restrict the right to
travel?
A: The requirement for a legislative
enactment was purposely added to
prevent inordinate restraints on the
person's right to travel by administrative
officials who may be tempted to wield
authority under the guise of national
security, public safety or public health.
This is in keeping with the principle that
ours is a government of laws and not of
men and also with the canon that
provisions of law limiting the enjoyment
of liberty should be construed against the
government and in favor of the
individual. (Genuino v. de Lima, G.R. No.
197930; Arroyo v. de Lima, G.R. No.
199034; Arroyo v. de Lima, G.R. No.
199046, April 17, 2018)
I. EMINENT DOMAIN
1. CONCEPT
Q: What is the concept of eminent
domain?
A: The power of the nation or the
sovereign state:
• to take, or to authorize the taking
of private property
• for public use
• without the owner’s consent,
• conditioned upon payment of just
compensation. (Brgy. Sindalan,
 San Fernando, Pampanga v. CA,
G.R. No. 150640, March 22,
2007)
Q: What are the two mandatory
requirements under the concept of
eminent domain?
A: It is well settled that the taking of
private property by the Government’s
power of eminent domain is subject to
two mandatory requirements:
1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and
2) that just compensation be paid
to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the
nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property
expropriated. (MIAA and Air
Transportation Office v. Lozada, G.R. No.
176625, Feb. 25, 2010)
2. JUST COMPENSATION
Q: What is the concept of just
compensation?
A: The concept of just compensation has
long been settled by the Court as the full
and fair equivalent of the property which
must be paid to the owners of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking.
This is because, without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be
considered just since the property owner
is being made to suffer the consequences
of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.
(Yared v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018)
Q: What is the way to achieve just
compensation?
A: The Court recognizes that the owner’s
loss is not limited to his property alone
but includes its income-generating
potential. The government, upon its
taking of the landholding, must properly
compensate the landowner through its
payment of the full valuation of the
property with the imposition of legal
interest. This is the only way to achieve
a fair exchange for the property and the
72
potential income loss of the landowner.
(Yared v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018)
Q: Where does the determination of
just compensation be based?
A: The determination of just
compensation must be based on reliable
and actual data. (The Manila Banking
Corporation v. Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, G.R. No.
230144, January 22, 2018, citing
Republic of the Philippines v. C. C. Unson
Company, Inc., G.R. No. 215107,
February 24, 2016)
Q: Where does the original
jurisdiction over the final
determination of just compensation
vested?
A: The final determination of just
compensation is strictly within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Special Agrarian Court. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Manzano, G.R. No.
188243, January 24, 2018)
3. ABANDONMENT OF
INTENDED USE AND RIGHT
OF REPURCHASE
Q: When the property is taken
through eminent domain is no longer
needed for the public purpose for
which it was expropriated, does the
former owner have the right to
repurchase it?
A: Yes, concerning the element of public
use, the expropriator should commit to
using the property according to the
purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter
desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as
it would lack one indispensable element
for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular
public purpose for which the property will
be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due
process of law, and the judgment would
violate the property owner’s right to
justice, fairness, and equity. (MIAA and
Air Transportation Office v. Lozada, G.R.
No. 176625, Feb. 25, 2010)
4. EXPROPRIATION OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS
Q: What are the requisites before the
Local Government Units can exercise
the power of Eminent Domain?
A: The following are the requisites for
the LGU to exercise the power of eminent
domain:
1) An ordinance is enacted by the
local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, on behalf
of the LGU, to exercise the power
of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.
2) The power of eminent domain is
exercised for public use, purpose
or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.
3) There is a payment of just
compensation.
4) A valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner
of the property sought to be
expropriated, but the said offer
was not accepted. (Municipality of
Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp.,
292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998)
J. NON-IMPAIRMENT OF
CONTRACTS
Q: What is the concept of non-
impairment of contracts?
A: No law impairing the obligation
contracts shall be passed. (Sec. 9, Art.
III, 1987 Constitution)
Q: Where does the concept of non-
impairment of contracts apply?
A: This constitutional provision is
applicable only if the obligation of the
contracts is impaired by a legislative act
(statute, ordinance, etc.). The act need
not be by a legislative office, but it should
be legislative in nature. Furthermore, the
impairment must be substantial.
(Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives
73
Assoc. v. DILG Secretary, G.R. 143076,
June 10, 2003)
K. ADEQUATE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE AND FREE
ACCESS TO COURTS
Q: What is the scope of free access
to courts?
A: This right is the basis for Sec. 17,
Rule 5 of the New Rules of Court allowing
litigation in forma pauperis. Those
protected include low paid employees,
domestic servants, and laborers.
(Cabangis v. Almeda Lopez, G.R. No.
47685, Sept. 20, 1940)
Q: May an indigent foundation be
entitled to free access to courts?
A: In Re: Query of Mr. Roger C.
Prioreschi re Exemption from Legal and
filing Fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., 596 SCRA 401 (2009),
the Court held that only individuals may
be granted exemption from filing fees.
Indigents foundations, even if serving
indigents, are not entitled. Accordingly,
the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is
working for indigent and underprivileged
people is of no moment.
Q: What is the purpose of limiting
the right to have free access to
courts only to natural persons?
A: The clear intent and precise language
of the provisions of the Rules of Court
with regards to free access to courts
indicate that only a natural party litigant
may be regarded as an indigent litigant.
The Constitution has explicitly premised
the free access clause on a person’s
poverty, a condition that only a natural
person can suffer. (Re: Query of Mr.
Roger C. Prioreschi re Exemption from
Legal and filing Fees of the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., 596 SCRA
401 (2009))
 L. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
1. SCOPE AND COVERAGE
Q: What is the scope of coverage of
the right against self-incrimination?
A: This constitutional privilege has been
defined as a protection against
testimonial compulsion, but this has
since been extended to any evidence
“communicative in nature” acquired
under circumstances of duress. (People
v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, Sept. 30, 1987)
2. APPLICATION
Q: When may the right against self-
incrimination be applied?
A: The right against self-incrimination
applies to:
1) Criminal cases
2) Civil cases
3) Administrative cases
4) Impeachment
5)Other legislative investigations that
possess a criminal or penal aspect
(CRUZ, Constitutional Law [2014], p.
664)
Q: Can the application of the right to
self-incrimination extend to private
investigations?
A: It does not apply to private
investigations done by a private
individual. (BPI v. CASA, GR.No.149454,
May 28, 2004)
Q: What is the effect if the privilege
against self-incrimination is violated
outside of court?
A: When the privilege against self-
incrimination is violated outside of court,
say, by the police, then the testimony, as
already noted, is not admissible under
the exclusionary rule. (Chavez v. CA,
G.R. No. L-29169, Aug. 19, 1968)
Q: What is the effect if the privilege
against self-incrimination is violated
by the court itself?
A: When the privilege is violated by the
court itself, that is, by the judge, the
court is ousted of its jurisdiction, all its
proceedings are null and void, and it is
74
as if no judgment has been rendered.
(Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. L-29169, Aug.
19, 1968)
3. IMMUNITY STATUTES
Q: What are the classifications of
immunity statutes?
A:
1) Used-and-Derivative-Use-
Immunity
2) Transactional Immunity (Mapa v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295,
April 26, 1994)
Q: What is the Used-and-Derivative-
Use-Immunity?
A: In Used-and-Derivative-Use-
Immunity, a witness is only assured that
his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used
against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution. (Mapa v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994)
Q: What is the scope of the Used-
and-Derivative-Use Immunity?
A: It only prevents the prosecution from
using the witness' testimony, or any
evidence derived from the testimony,
against him. However, should the
prosecutor acquire evidence
substantiating the supposed crime
independent of the witness's testimony
the witness may then be prosecuted for
the same crime. (Mapa v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April
26, 1994)
Q: Why does Used-and-Derivative-
Use Immunity afford less
protection?
A: It does not protect the witness quite
as much, because here the witness is
only protected from future prosecution
based on exactly what he or she says on
the witness stand, and not from any
evidence the prosecutor finds to
substantiate the witness’ crime. (Mapa v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April
26, 1994)
Q: What is Transactional Immunity?
A: In Transactional Immunity, a witness
can no longer be prosecuted for any
offense whatsoever arising out of the act
or transaction. (Mapa v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994)
Q: What is the scope of Transactional
Immunity?
A: It completely protects the witness
from future prosecution for crimes
related to his or her testimony. Gives the
witness the most protection from
prosecution because that witness can
never be prosecuted in the future for any
crimes related to his or her testimony.
(Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
100295, April 26, 1994)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
M. RIGHTS OF PERSONS
UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
1. AVAILABILITY
Q: What are the rights of a person
under custodial investigation?
A: These are the rights to which a
person under custodial investigation is
entitled:
1) Right to remain silent
2) Right to competent and
independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice
3) Right to be reminded that if he
cannot afford the services of
counsel, he would be provided
with one
4) Right to be informed of his rights
5) Right against torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation or
any other means which vitiate the
free will
6) Right against secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado,
or similar forms of detention
7) The right to have confessions or
admissions obtained in violation
of these rights considered
inadmissible in evidence.
(Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
1966)
75
Q: When may the rights of a person
during custodial investigation be
available?
A:
1) During custodial investigation; or
2) As soon as the investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry unto an
unsolved crime and direction is aimed
upon a particular suspect, as when the
suspect who has been taken into police
custody and to whom the police would
then direct interrogatory questions
which tend to elicit incriminating
statements. (People v. Marra, G.R. No.
108494, September 20, 1994)
Q: Is the practice of inviting a person
under custodial investigation
mandatory?
A: Sec. 2 of R.A. 7438 (An Act Defining
Certain Rights of Person Arrested,
Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation and the Duties of the
Arresting, Detaining and Investigating
Officers) provides that custodial
investigation shall include the practice of
inviting a person who is under
investigation in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have
committed.
2. REQUISITES
Q: What are the requisites for the
application of the rights during
custodial investigation?
A:
1) the arresting officer shall inform
him of the reason for his arrest;
2) he shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be
used against him;
3) the person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer,
or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means — by telephone, if
possible, or by letter, or messenger.
The arresting officer shall see to it
that this is accomplished;
4) No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it is in the presence
of counsel engaged by the person
 arrested, by any person on his behalf,
or appointed by the court upon
petition either by the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. (People v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 94757,
[February 7, 1992], 282 PHIL 1004-
1016)
3. WAIVER
Q: What are the requisites for a valid
waiver of the rights of a person
during custodial investigation?
A:
1) Made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently
2) In writing
3) With the presence of counsel.
(People v. Galit, GR. No. L-51770,
Mar. 20, 1985)
N. RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED
1. CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
1. Q: What are the requisites of
criminal due process?
A:
1) Accused is heard by a court of
competent jurisdiction
2) Accused is proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law
3) Accused is given notice and
opportunity to be heard
4) Judgment must be rendered after
a lawful hearing. (Mejia v. Pamaran,
G.R. No. 56741-42, April 15, 1988)
2. BAIL
Q: What is bail?
A: It is the security given for the release
of a person in custody of law, furnished
by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon
his appearance before any court as
required. (Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of
Court)
Q: When may the right to bail be
invoked?
A: The right bail emanates from the right
to be presumed innocent. It is accorded
to a person in custody of the law who
may because of the presumption of
innocence he enjoys, be allowed
76
provisional liberty upon filing security to
guarantee his appearance before any
court, as required under specific
circumstances. (People v. Fitzgerald,
G.R. No. 149723, October 27, 2006)
Q: Who may invoke the right to bail?
A: Any person under detention, even if
no formal charges have yet been filed,
can invoke the right to bail. (Teehankee
v. Rovira, 75 Phil 634; People v. San
Diego, 26 SCRA 522)
Q: Is bail allowed under extradition
proceedings?
A: Yes, revisiting Purganan, the Court
reasoned out that if bail can be granted
in deportation cases, it saw no
justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases clearly, the
right of a prospective extradite to apply
for bail must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human
rights. (Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,
Jr., 521 SCRA 470)
Q: What is the modern trend in
international law regarding the
granting of bail to extraditees?
A: The modern trend in public
international law is the primacy placed
on the worth of the person and the
sanctity of human rights, citing the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Fundamental among
the rights enshrined in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are
the rights of every person to life, liberty,
and due process. (Government of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region v.
Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470)
Q: Why is bail allowed in extradition
proceedings even if it is not a
criminal proceeding?
A: The Court explained that while
extradition is not a criminal proceeding,
it is characterized by the following:
a. it entails deprivation of liberty on
the part of the potential extradite
and
 b. the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also
“the machinery of criminal law”
An extradition proceeding, while
ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process.
(Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 521
SCRA 470)
Q: What is the effect of detention for
an extended period of more than 2
years to the rights of an extraditee?
A: By any standard, detention for an
extended period of more than two (2)
years is a serious deprivation of a
potential extraditee’s fundamental right
to liberty. Also, while the Philippines’
extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, a right
to due process under the Constitution.
(Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 521
SCRA 470)
Q: When is bail a matter of right?
A:
1) Before or after conviction by the
metropolitan and municipal trial
courts, and
2) Before conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. (Rules of Court, Sec. 4,
Rule 114)
3) Before final conviction by all
children in conflict with the law for an
offense not punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. (Sec.
28, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC)
Q: When is bail a matter of
discretion?
A:
1) Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment
2) Regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution, a person
charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion
77
perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is not strong; (Rules
of Court, Sec. 5, Rule 114) and
3) A child in conflict with the law
charged with an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt
is strong. (Sec. 28, A.M. No. 02-1-18-
SC)
Q: When bail shall be denied?
A: If the penalty imposed by the trial
court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail,
or his bail shall be canceled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice
to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi‐
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped
from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
e. That there is an undue risk that he
may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal. (Sec. 5, Rule
114, Rules of Court)
3. PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE
Q: What is the concept of
presumption of innocence?
A: It is fundamental in the Constitution
and basic in the Rules of Court that the
accused in a criminal case enjoys the
presumption of innocence until proven
guilty. Likewise, it is well-established in
jurisprudence that the prosecution bears
the burden to overcome such
presumption. (People v. Hilario, G.R. No.
210610, January 11, 2018)
Q: What is the effect if the
prosecution fails to establish the
existence of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt?
A: If the prosecution fails to discharge
this burden, the accused deserves a
judgment of acquittal. (People v. Hilario,
G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018)
Q: What is the effect if the
prosecution established the
existence of proof beyond a inference
reasonable doubt?
A: If the existence of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is established by the
prosecution, the accused gets a guilty
verdict. To merit conviction, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of
its own evidence and not on the
weakness of evidence presented by the
defense. (People v. Hilario, G.R. No.
210610, January 11, 2018)
Q: What is the equipoise rule?
A: When the evidence of both sides is
equally balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused (Corpuz v.
People, G.R. No. 74259, Feb. 14, 1991).
Q: What are the rules concerning the
presumption of innocence?
A:
1) The prosecution has the burden to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Colcol., Jr., 219 SCRA 107, February
19, 1993)
2) The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its evidence and not in the
weakness of the defense. (People v.
Solis, 182 SCRA 182, February 14,
1990)
3) Conviction of an accused must be
based on the strength of the
prosecution evidence and not on the
weakness or absence of evidence of
the defense. (People v. Mirondo, G.R.
No. 210841, Oct. 14, 2015)
4. The prosecution bears the burden
to overcome such presumption. If the
prosecution fails to discharge this
burden, the accused deserves a
judgment of acquittal. (Delariva v.
78
People, G.R. No. 212940, Sept. 16,
2015)
5. Generally, flight, in the absence of
a credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference
of guilt might be established. (People
v. Samson, G.R. No. 214883, Sept. 2,
2015)
Q: Why is unjustified flight a
circumstance from which an
of guilt might be
established?
A: Generally, flight, in the absence of a
credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference of
guilt might be established, for a truly
innocent person would normally grasp
the first available opportunity to defend
himself and assert his innocence. It has
been held, however, that non-flight may
not be construed as an indication of
innocence either. (People v. Samson,
G.R. No. 214883, Sept. 2, 2015)
4. RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Q: What is the concept of the right to
be heard?
A: Among the fundamental rights of the
accused is the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. Verily, this right is
even guaranteed by the Constitution
itself. This right has been recognized and
established to make sure that justice is
done to the accused. The rights of an
accused during a trial are given
paramount importance in our laws and
rules on criminal procedure. (Moslares v.
Third division, CA, G.R. No. 129744, June
26, 1998)
5. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Q: What is the concept of the right to
assistance of counsel?
A: The right of a person under
investigation is to have a “competent and
independent counsel preferably of his
own choice”. The purpose is to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something else.
(People v. Evanoria, 209 SCRA 577, June
8, 1992)
Q: What is required by the right to
assistance of counsel?
A: The accused must be amply accorded
legal assistance extended by a counsel
who commits himself to the cause of the
defense and acts accordingly; an
efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance, and not simply a perfunctory
representation. (People v. Bermas, G.R.
No. 120420, Apr. 21, 1999)
6. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF
THE ACCUSATION
Q: What is the purpose of informing
the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him?
A:
1) To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make his
defense
2) To avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against
further prosecution for the same
cause
3) To inform the court of the facts
alleged so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction if one should be had. (US
v. Karelsen G.R. No. 1376, Jan. 21,
1904)
Q: What are the requisites for the
accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against
him?
A:
1) The information must state the
name of the accused
2) A designation is given to the
offense by statute
3) Statement of the acts or omission
so complained of as constituting the
offense
4) Name of the offended party
5) Approximate time and date of
commission of the offense
6) Place where the offense was
committed
79
7) Every element of the offense must
be alleged in the complaint or
information.
Q: May the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him be
waived?
A: The right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against the
accused may not be waived, but the
defense may waive the right to enter a
plea of not guilty. (People v. Bryan
Ferdinand Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37,
January 29, 2002)
7. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY,
IMPARTIAL, AND PUBLIC
TRIAL
Q: What are the factors to determine
that the right to a speedy trial of the
accused has been violated?
A: To determine whether accused-
appellants right to a speedy trial was
violated, four factors must be
considered:
1) length of the delay;
2) the reason for the delay;
3) the defendant's assertion of his
right; and 4) prejudice to the
defendant." (People v. Domingo,
G.R. No. 204895, March 21,
2018)
Q: What is the right of the accused to
an impartial trial?
A: Impartial trial means that the
accused is entitled to the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge, one who is free
from interest or bias. (Luque v. Kayanan,
G.R. No. L-26826, August 29, 1969)
Q: What is the right of the accused to
a public trial?
A: In a constitutional sense, a public trial
is not synonymous with a publicized trial.
The right to a public trial belongs to the
accused. The requirement of a public trial
is satisfied by the opportunity of the
members of the public and the press to
attend the trial and to report what they
have observed. (In Re: Petition for Radio
and Television Coverage of the Multiple
Murder Cases against Maguindanao
Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-
11-5-SC, Oct. 23, 2012)
Q: How does the Court reconcile the
accused’s right to a public trial,
freedom of the press, and
information?
A: The accused’s right to a public trial
should not be confused with the freedom
of the press and the public’s right to
know as a justification for allowing the
live broadcast of the trial. The tendency
of a high-profile case like the subject
case to generate undue publicity with its
concomitant undesirable effects weighs
heavily against broadcasting the trial.
Moreover, the fact that the accused has
legal remedies after the fact is of no
moment, since the damage has been
done and maybe irreparable. It must be
pointed out that the fundamental right to
due process of the accused cannot be
afforded after the fact but must be
protected in the first instance. (In Re:
Petition for Radio and Television
Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases
against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy
Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, Oct.
23, 2012)
8. RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION
Q: What is the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him?
A: One of the most basic rights of an
accused person under our justice system
is the right to confront the witnesses
against him face to face. Subsumed in
this right to confront is the right of an
accused to cross-examine the witnesses
against him or her, i.e., to submit
questions on matters stated during direct
examination, or connected with it. '' (Kim
Liong v. People, G.R. No. 200630, June
4, 2018)
Q: How may cross-examination be
done?
A: The cross-examination may be done
"with
• sufficient fullness and
• freedom to test [the witness']
accuracy and truthfulness and
• freedom from interest or bias, or
the reverse, and
• to elicit every important facts
bearing upon the issue.'' (Kim
80
Liong v. People, G.R. No. 200630,
June 4, 2018)
Q: May the right of confrontation be
waived?
A: As the Court has elucidated in People
v. Seneris (No. L-48883, August 6, 1980,
99 SCRA 92) (Seneris), this right, though
fundamental, may be waived expressly
or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the same.
9. COMPULSORY PROCESS
Q: What are the means to secure the
attendance of the witnesses and the
production of evidence?
A:
1) Subpoena ad testificandum and
subpoena duces tecum (Rules of
Court, Rule 21, Sec. 1)
2) Depositions and other modes of
discovery
3) Perpetuation of testimonies
10. TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
Q: What is a trial in absentia?
A: Trials in absentia allows the accused
to be absent at the trial. (Lavides v. CA,
G.R. No. 129670, Feb. 1, 2000)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
words limit for the 2020 QQRs video
Q: What are the elements of trial in
absentia?
A:
1) Accused has been validly arraigned
2) Accused has been duly notified of
the dates of hearing
3) Failure to appear is unjustifiable
(Borja v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-45667,
June 20, 1977)
Q: What are the instances that the
presence of the accused is
mandatory during a trial?
A:
1) During arraignment and plea
(Rules of Court, Rule 116, Sec. 1)
2) During the trial, for identification
(Republic v. Agbulos, G.R. No. 73875,
May 18, 1993), unless the accused
has already stipulated on his identity
 during the pre-trial and that he is the Dionisio, 22 SCRA 299) To violate the
one who will be identified by the constitutional guarantee, the penalty
witnesses as the accused in the must be:
criminal case. (People v. Presiding • flagrantly oppressive,
Judge, G.R. No. L-64731, Oct. 26, • wholly disproportionate to the
1983) nature of the offense as
• to shock the moral sense of the
3) During promulgation of the community. (People v. Estoista,
sentence, unless for a light offense 93, Phil 647)
(Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 6)
Q: What is the purpose of a
O. RIGHT TO SPEEDY punishment imposed by law?
DISPOSITION OF CASES
A: Punishment is supposed to be the
price that has to be paid by those found
Q: What is the concept of the right to
guilty of crimes against the State. A way
speedy disposition of cases?
of making amends for violation of
society’s rules. It is how society may
A: The right to speedy disposition of
somehow exact a form of retribution. De
cases is different from the right to a
La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
speedy trial to the extent that the former
Appeals, 541 SCRA 22 (2007); Corpuz v.
applies to all cases, whether judicial,
People, 724 SCRA 1 (2014)
quasi-judicial, or administrative cases
(Sec. 16, Art. III, 1987 Constitution));
whereas, the latter applies to criminal Q: Where is right against excessive
cases only. (Sec. 14 [2], Art. III, 1987 fines and cruel and degrading and
Constitution) inhuman punishments geared
towards?
Q: When is the right to speedy
A: The constitutional guarantee on
disposition of cases deemed
punishments is geared towards seeing to
violated?
it that whatever penalty is imposed does
not become such that it violates the very
A: The right to a speedy disposition of a
notion of a civilized society where the
case, like the right to a speedy trial, is
mandates of substantive due process
deemed violated only:
reign. Penalties could not be grossly
• when the proceedings are
disproportionate to the infraction of
attended by vexatious,
society’s rules. De La Salle University,
capricious, and oppressive
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 541 SCRA 22
delays; or
(2007); Corpuz v. People, 724 SCRA 1
• when unjustified postponements
(2014)
of the trial are asked for and
secured; or
• even without cause or justifiable Q: NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR
motive, a long period is allowed to DEBTS
elapse without the party having
his case tried (Roquero v. Q: What is the coverage of Sec.20,
Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. Art. III of the 1987 Constitution?
181851, March 9, 2010).
A:
P. RIGHT AGAINST 1) Debt – any civil obligation arising
EXCESSIVE FINES AND from a contract. It includes even
debts obtained through fraud since no
CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND distinction is made in the
INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS Constitution. (Ganaway v. Quillen,
G.R. No. 18619, February 20, 1922)
Q: Does the severity of the
punishment by the statute 2) Poll tax – a specific sum levied
constitute cruel and unusual upon any person belonging to a
punishment? certain class without regard to
property or occupation. (CRUZ,
A: No, mere severity does not constitute Constitutional Law [2014], p. 610)
cruel or unusual punishment. (People v.

81
 R. RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY
1. REQUISITES; SCOPE
Q: What is the concept of the right
against double jeopardy?
A: The guarantee against double
jeopardy is another assurance of fairness
that a person is not exposed more than
once to the danger of being punished for
the commission of the same offense.
(Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 499
SCRA 375 2006)
Q: What is the scope of the right
against double jeopardy?
A: It must be remembered that the
guarantee is concerning the same
offense. Thus, it may be that a single act
could give rise to two or more offenses,
prosecution for which will not give rise to
a violation of the constitutional
proscription. (Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 499 SCRA 375 2006)
Q: Is conviction or acquittal under
either national law or local
ordinance a bar to prosecution for
the same act?
A: If the act gives rise to a violation of
national law and a local ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
be a bar to prosecution for the same act.
(See separate opinion of Justice Tinga in
Gonzales v. Abaya, 498 SCRA 445 2006)
Q: Does double jeopardy attach if the
same act is tried by both a military
court and a civil court?
A: It has also been noted that double
jeopardy attaches if one is tried by both
a military court and a civilian court over
the same act. (See separate opinion of
Justice Tinga in Gonzales v. Abaya, 498
SCRA 445 2006)
Q: What are the requisites to invoke
the right against double jeopardy?
A:
1) Valid complaint or information;
2) Filed before a competent court;
3) The arraignment of the accused;
4) To which he had pleaded; and
5) The defendant was previously
acquitted or convicted, or the case
82
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
(Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos.
211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)
Q: What is the effect when a Motion
to Dismiss/Quash based on the
ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense is granted?
A: Where a Motion to Dismiss/Quash is
based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the
Sandiganbayan cannot proceed to
dismiss the case based on the
insufficiency of evidence. As a
consequence, jeopardy would not attach.
People v. Dumlao, 580 SCRA 409 (2009)
Q: What is the effect of filing an
appeal to the right of the accused
against double jeopardy?
A: Errors in an appealed judgment [of a
criminal case], even if not specifically
assigned, may be corrected motu proprio
by the court if the consideration of these
errors is necessary to arrive at a just
resolution of the case. The rationale
behind this rule stems from the
recognition that an accused waives the
constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy once he appeals from the
sentence of the trial court. As such, it is
incumbent upon the appellate court to
render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether it be favorable or
unfavorable to him. (People v. Miranda,
G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018)
Q: Is prosecuting an accused both
for rape under the RPC and sexual
abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 a
violation of his or her right to double
jeopardy?
A: In People vs. Udang, the trial court
erred in ruling that prosecuting an
accused both for rape, under Article 266-
A(l) of the Revised Penal Code, and
sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, violates his or her
right to double jeopardy. (People v.
Udang, G.R. No. 210161, January 10,
2018)
Q: When is the grant of demurrer to
evidence equivalent to the acquittal
of the accused?
A: In a demurrer to evidence, as in the
case of Macapagal-Arroyo, the accused
imposes a challenge on the sufficiency of
the prosecution's entire evidence. This
involves a determination of whether the
evidence presented by the prosecution
has established the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. Should the
trial court find the prosecution's evidence
insufficient in this regard, the grant of
the demurrer to evidence is equivalent to
the acquittal of the accused. (Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162,
February 6, 2018)
Q: Can the prosecution file an appeal
to challenge a judgment of
acquittal?
A: Generally, a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory. The
prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal
so as not to violate the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
(People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
228494-96, March 21, 2018)
Q: What are the exceptions wherein
the prosecution can file an appeal to
challenge a judgment of acquittal?
A: Two exceptional grounds can be
challenged in a certiorari proceeding
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
1) in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of
discretion by the court; and
2) where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process. (People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
228494-96, March 21, 2018)
2. LIMITATIONS
Q: What are the exceptions to the
right against double jeopardy?
A:
1) When the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, G.R. No.
172777, and De Asis Delfin v.
Bangayan, G.R. No. 172792, Oct. 19,
2011)
83
2) The accused was not acquitted nor
was there a valid and legal dismissal
or termination of the case.
3) Dismissal of the case was during
the preliminary investigation.
4) It does not apply to administrative
cases.
5) Dismissal or termination of the
case was with the express consent of
the accused.
6) When the case was provisionally
dismissed.
7) The graver offense developed due
to supervening facts arising from the
same act or omission constituting the
former charge.
8) The facts constituting the graver
charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or
information.
9) The plea of guilty to a lesser
offense was made without the
consent of the prosecutor and the
offended party except as otherwise
provided in Sec. 1(f) of Rule 116.
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S. RIGHT AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Q: What are the exceptions to the
rule against involuntary servitude?
A:
1) Punishment for a crime for which
the party has been duly convicted
2) Personal military or civil service in
the interest of national defense (Sec.
4, Art. III; People v. Soza, 38 O.G.
1676)
3) In naval enlistment, a person who
enlists in a merchant ship may be
compelled to remain in service until
the end of a voyage (Robert v.
Baldwin)
4) Posse comitatus or the
conscription of able-bodied men for
 the apprehension of criminals (U.S. v.
Pompeya 31 Phil245)
5) Return to work order issued by the
DOLE Secretary or the President
(Kasipagan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy
v. Gotamco Sawmills, 45 O.G. Supp.
No. 9, p. 147)
6) Minors under patria potestas are
obliged to obey their parents (Art.
311, Civil Code)
T. EX POST FACTO LAW AND
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
Q: What is an ex post facto law?
A: An ex post facto law is any law that
makes an action, done before the
passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action. (United State v.
Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De
Conde, G.R. No. L-18208, Feb. 14, 1922)
Q: What are the kinds of ex post
facto law?
A:
1) Makes an act, which was innocent
when done, criminal and punishes
such action
2) Aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than when it was committed
3) Changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was
committed
4) Alters the legal rules of evidence
and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the
offense to convict the defendant
5) Assumes to regulate civil rights
and remedies only. In effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was
lawful
6) Deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. (Nuñez v.
84
Sandiganbayan and People, Jan. 30,
1982)
Q: Will the enactment of a penal law
that favors the accused by changing
the imposed penalty be considered
as an ex post facto law as what is
stated in Rep. Act No. 10951?
A: No, Republic Act No. 10951 has since
come into effect during the pendency of
this case. It likewise specifically
stipulates that its provisions shall have a
retroactive effect. Section 100 adds that
this retroactivity applies not only to
persons accused of crimes but have yet
to be meted their final sentence but also
to those already "serving sentence by
final judgment. This retroactivity is in
keeping with the principle already
contained in Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code that penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor
the person guilty of a felony." Given
these circumstances, it is proper for this
Court to adjust the penalty to be imposed
on the accused-appellant. (People v.
Mejares, G.R. No. 225735, January 10,
2018)
Q: What is a bill of attainder?
A: A legislative act that inflicts
punishment without trial, its essence
being the substitution of legislative fiat
for a judicial determination of guilt.
(People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14,
Dec. 27, 1972)
NOTE: This here marks the 500-600
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