GPF SPECIAL REPORT

How We
Forecast the
Future
 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Table of Contents
Introduction
Geopolitics..........................................................................................................................3
Intellectual Foundations of Geopolitical Forecasting............................................4
Methodological Foundations of Geopolitical Forecasting...................................6
Steps for Geopolitical Forecasting (graphic)..................................................................8

Global Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Northern Hemisphere....................................................................................................10
Southern Hemisphere....................................................................................................10
Contemporary Analysis.................................................................................................10

Framework & Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Components of a Geopolitical Forecast...................................................................12
Geopolitical Timeframes...............................................................................................12

Regional Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
North America..................................................................................................................15
Europe................................................................................................................................. 16
Russia................................................................................................................................17
Central Asia........................................................................................................................18
Middle East........................................................................................................................19
South Asia..........................................................................................................................20
East Asia..............................................................................................................................21
South America..................................................................................................................22
Sub-Saharan Africa.........................................................................................................23

Country Net Assessments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

United States.....................................................................................................................25
Mexico.................................................................................................................................25
Germany..........................................................................................................................26
United Kingdom..............................................................................................................26
Poland...............................................................................................................................27
Italy....................................................................................................................................27
Russia................................................................................................................................28
China.................................................................................................................................28
Australia...........................................................................................................................29
Japan.................................................................................................................................30
India..................................................................................................................................30
Turkey...............................................................................................................................31
Iran.....................................................................................................................................31
Israel..................................................................................................................................32
Brazil.................................................................................................................................32

Conclusion
Major Global Tensions...................................................................................................33

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“Geopolitics” is frequently used as an-
other name for international relations,
usually related to military actions. This
is misleading. Geopolitics is the study
of national and sometimes subnation-
al power, and the manner in which na-
tions and large factions interact. It has
three main components: economics,
politics and the military. The three can
be viewed as distinct but in fact are in-
extricably linked. There can be no mili-
tary without an economy, no economy
without a political order, and so forth.
These things are so intimately connect-
ed that, while dissecting the whole into
its parts has value, it can also falsify re-
ality. A nation is economic, political and
military simultaneously, and the three
— along with subsets like technology or
religion — constitute the nation and its
power.
Nations exist in a state of nature, a
struggle of all against all, mitigated by
alliances and truces. There is always a
search for Perpetual Peace, as Imman-
uel Kant spoke of it. The search has al-
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Introduction
ways failed. Its failure is in the nature
of humans, their fears and desires, and
in the nature of the large groups of hu-
mans — nations — that reflect these
fears and desires. The shared fate of
citizens binds them together, and their
interests clash with those of other cit-
izens in other nations. Conflict, from
warfare to economic competition to po-
litical rivalry, is the inevitable outcome
of the reality of nations living side by
side. We know that war kills, but so can
economics, or at least it can generate
misery. And politics carries its own
sometimes brutal price. There is always
a wish for goodwill, and the constant re-
ality of the neighbor.
Our task is to understand the pattern of
conflicts and forecast the actions na-
tions will take. This is far from a perfect
science, but it is a necessary one. To
have a sense of the patterns and forc-
es that compel behavior is the only way
to understand what will happen in the
world. Pious hopes never work. Clear
and unsentimental thinking might.
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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Introduction

Intellectual Foundations of
Geopolitical Forecasting
It is commonly assumed that the world
is unpredictable. The reason for this
belief is the assumption that history is
made according to the will of political
leaders, and that to a great extent they
make their decisions freely. If that is
true, then history has no inherent order.
This is simply untrue. To understand
why, we need to start from the begin-
ning. Otherwise, the details won’t make
sense.
The view of two of the greatest philos-
ophers of modernity, Niccolo Machia-
velli and Friedrich Hegel, is often mis-
understood. In “The Prince,” Machiavelli
instructed a ruler on how to rule. But a
ruler who had the will to become a rul-
er and stay a ruler already knows how
to rule. Machiavelli was not teaching
the leader; he was teaching the rest of
us what the leader already knew. There
was no school for princes. They either
understood power or they failed. The
prince faced the reality of his city or
nation, and that reality had to be under-
stood if the prince were to survive. And if
the prince understood that reality, then
his decisions would have nothing to do It is necessity that renders politics and
with his subjective will, and everything geopolitics largely if not perfectly pre-
to do with recognizing what he must dictable. Politicians rise to power be-
do. The prince was not free to act as he
chose. Certainly, he could destroy his
regime through random behavior, but
princes who believed in the illusion that
their will rules wouldn’t become princes
because the rise to power requires rigid
awareness of what reality demands.
Hegel developed a brilliant model of
how history works. He observed that
humans are distinguished by reason,
and that their understanding of reason
evolves through civilizations. Reason is
simply our understanding of ourselves
and each other, and each step in this
process is logical. Hegel introduced the
world historical figure, the figure who
changes history. The strength of the
world historical figure is not his ran-
dom will but his clear understanding of
the moment in which he lives and the
moment that is coming. Such figures
— Moses or Napoleon, for instance —
are not in control; they are subordinat-
ing themselves to the necessary. Their
power comes from recognizing what is
necessary and executing it.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Introduction
cause they understand what is neces- within these cycles. The idea that groups
sary, use the powers of their office as is of humans should have escaped the
necessary, and fall when their ability to cycle of necessity would mean that hu-
understand the necessary fails them. mans have somehow transcended the
The secret of power is that you may universe. Indeed, while we can imagine
hold it only if you submit to necessity. that a single human has found a small
The ruler bends to necessity, not the window of transcendence, dealing with
other way around. large numbers means limiting the free-
dom of individuals and provides more
As Machiavelli argued, it is easier to predictability. So the idea that a nation
know necessity from a distance. A lead- can free itself from the cycles of human
er must act instinctively, grasping real- life and the universe is difficult to imag-
ity, power and necessity with little con- ine. Many objects caught in the same
templation. To understand the process, cycles tend to have less independence
you must be intimately aware of it but of action than fewer objects would.
not a part of it. That allows you to see
the necessity of unfolding events and Nations comprise millions and some-
to grasp the next moment. times even billions of people, all being
born, living and dying in perpetual mo-
The universe is built on impersonal but tion. But the very size of the universe of
predictable forces. The cycles of the a nation, and the necessities imposed
sun, the orbit of the Earth, the seasons by nature and other nations, embed
on Earth and the cycles of a human life them in a matrix that can, in general, be
all follow a pattern. The collective life forecast.
of groups of human beings takes place

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Methodological Foundations of
Geopolitical Forecasting
The nation-state, the foundation of the
current international system, operates
on two principles. The first is that it is
located in a particular place with bor-
ders. Over time these borders might
change, but at any moment it is geo-
graphically defined. The second prin-
ciple is citizenship. With some excep-
tions, all those living for an extended
time within the confines of the state are
citizens, and as such have obligations
and rights to the nation-state. In very
general terms, the citizens of a nation
share certain characteristics such as
language and culture, and they have a
common interest in the state securing
its interests and security. Obviously,
this is a vastly insufficient definition for
a nation-state, which is never cultural-
ly, religiously, ethnically or demograph-
ically uniform. Even so, being aware of
these distinctions and the importance
of migration and non-state actors and
many other things, this definition of the
nation-state is useful as the basis of
forecasting.
Nations have interests, the most im-
portant of which rest in three core di-
mensions. The first we call imperatives,
what a nation must have in order to re-
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Introduction
main secure. The second is constraints,
or the limits imposed on nations. The
third is power, or the means at their
disposal to secure their imperatives
and overcome their constraints. Pow-
er is multifaceted but can generally be
grouped into three categories: econom-
ic, military and political.
This is easier to see through a real-world
example. Consider Japanese-American
relations before World War II.
The United States achieved its imper-
ative to dominate North America and
exclude any threats to the continent,
insulating itself from invasion or dan-
gers to its trade. The implementation of
this imperative required that it become
the most powerful naval force in both
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. To that
end, it seized Spain’s holdings in the Pa-
cific (the Philippines, Guam and other
islands) and the Hawaiian Islands. Its
North American imperative may have
been secured, but it rested largely on
this Pacific framework. If an Asian pow-
er challenged the U.S. there, it could
undo the whole experiment. Since the
only power that could do so was Japan,
Japan became Washington’s prima-
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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Introduction
ry foreign policy issue. This appears to be a simplistic explana-
tion — and to some extent it is — but
Japan was an isolated, non-industri- geopolitics is built on the extraction of
al island when the U.S. and European the essential and ignoring of the pe-
powers began to consider occupation. ripheral. This requires more detail to ex-
Japan’s imperative was to remain in- plain the process geopolitically, but the
dependent. From this imperative grew point is that the U.S.-Japanese war was
the need to develop industry to ward predictable and was predicted on both
off enemies. Its constraint was that it sides. The imperatives of each, and
lacked almost all the minerals needed the constraints on other actions, creat-
to operate industry. Tokyo thus began ed two powers that were incapable of
to extend its political power to secure agreeing to a political solution.
those minerals, and it developed a sig-
nificant naval force. On the one hand, the application of
geopolitical methodology is mechani-
The U.S. imperative was to prevent any cal. Core elements of nations must be
power from dominating the Pacific. The laid out next to those of others to pre-
American imperative and the Japanese dict their behavior. On the other hand, it
imperative collided as the constraints must be more sophisticated, taking into
imposed by each on the other grew. The account all things, from domestic polit-
U.S. sought to use economic power to ical imperatives to cultural constraints.
force a political settlement with Japan. But without a framework for under-
Japan understood this to be an attempt standing this, all the other dimensions
to force it into submission, which the become incomprehensible. Only then
U.S. needed in order to control Japan in are we able to forecast.
the Pacific. The result was war.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Introduction
STEPS FOR GEOPOLITICAL FORECASTING

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Global Model

Global Model
The world is divided into two hemispheres: Northern and Southern. The North-
ern Hemisphere is dominated by two continents: North America and Eurasia.
While the Northern Hemisphere contains about 67 percent of the globe’s land-
mass, it is home to 90 percent of the human population. As a result, actors
in the Northern Hemisphere almost always drive geopolitical developments,
while the Southern Hemisphere plays a more peripheral role.
These hemispheres are best viewed as consisting of four major islands.

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Northern Hemisphere
Eurasia is the largest of these is- South America was invaded by Ibe-
lands, stretching from Western Europe
to China. The sheer size of the island
segments it not only by nations but
by civilizations. The eastern portion is
dominated by China, the western by a
fragmented mass of Christian nations
that have constantly waged war against
each other. Between these two centers
rest somewhat isolated entities: Rus-
sia, India and some others. War and
trade between west and east is difficult.
The point where they meet is in the area
south of the European grasslands, from
Iran west to the Mediterranean. Eur-
asia — primarily western Eurasia, which
dominated the Atlantic — invaded North
America, South America and Africa.
North America is separated from Eur-
asia by the Atlantic and Pacific, and
from South America by an isthmus.
North America is unique in that it is
somewhat compact, with minimal barri-
ers blocking movement in all directions.
The European invaders were therefore
able to move rapidly westward. The key
nation today, the United States, faces
no challenges from within the island,
making it unique. Also unique is Amer-
ica’s domination of both the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans, creating a barrier to
attack from Eurasia.
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Global Model
Southern Hemisphere
rian powers, which destroyed the ma-
jor Native American empires but faced
enormous land barriers, such as the
Amazon rainforest and the Andes. Like
Eurasia, South America has land barri-
ers that make unification and extensive
combat difficult. South America cannot
therefore project significant force out-
side of the continent.
Africa is an island with deep geograph-
ic barriers, including deserts, rainfor-
ests and grassland. It has never been
able to unite under one power. Even
when it was invaded and mostly con-
trolled by the Europeans, much of it was
fragmented between European powers
and Arab powers to the north.
Contemporary Analysis
World War II redefined the global sys-
tem. First, it deprived Europe of its con-
trol of the African island. Second and
more important, it cost Europe major in-
fluence in the Atlantic and Pacific. Brit-
ain was forced out of its dominant role
in the Atlantic, and Japan, a archipela-
go off the Eurasian coast, lost its role
in the Pacific. The United States, secure
on land, emerged from World War II with
dominant control of both oceans. So
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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Global Model

as the United States retains this posi-

tion in the oceans it is invulnerable to
attack and can control trading patterns,
which are primarily maritime.

Eurasia is seeking to limit the conflicts

that cost it the oceans, either by inte-
gration (as in Europe) or by the emer-
gence of powerful land empires (as
with China). None have succeeded fully
in this as yet. The southern reaches of
Eurasia, the area from Iran to the Med-
iterranean, are in the normal disarray
that comes from being caught between
the force field of Eurasia, west and east.
India remains isolated — and, in that
sense, secure — by geography.

Dominance of the oceans is key to na-

tional security and prosperity. At this
moment, this power is in the hands of
North America, and North America is in
the hands of the United States. All of
the models that follow pivot on this de-
cisive fact.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Framework & Analysis

Components
o f a Forecast
A forecast is about the future. In order map of the world has evolved over time,
to make that forecast, the analyst must and will continue to evolve. But there is
be firmly rooted in the moment, both in a tendency to regard this moment as of
terms of time and place, and must es- overwhelming importance. Just as we
tablish how the present fits into the lon-
try to give both order and significance
ger-term geopolitical processes under- to place, we have to give it to time, to
way. Failure to do this risks losing sight
try to ensure that we don’t overestimate
of the bigger picture and risks inflatingpassing events or underestimate signif-
the importance of current events. icant ones. The most significant things
are, of course, the ones that have the
In prior sections we have tried to give longest-lasting consequence, as well
you a sense of place at the moment. This as the broadest geopolitical impact.

Geopolitical Timeframes

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Each element of time is nested in the
prior time element. The higher ele-
ments define the lower ones. The low-
er elements affect our personal lives
more clearly than the higher levels, but
it is the higher ones that shape every-
thing beneath. Thus, in forecasting we
must distinguish between a relatively
minor pivot and a more distant era. We
must look for the shift in the era, which
comes far less frequently but is far
more important than the constant bus-
tles of pivots and even more important
than the mere noise that permeates ev-
erything.
Time and place come together in some-
thing called the net assessment. The
net assessment is a concept borrowed
from Andrew Marshall, who for decades
headed the Office of Net Assessment at
the Pentagon. He focused on creating
a net assessment of military forces by
aggregating information of all types to
arrive at a conclusion containing critical
dimensions that must be considered,
www.geopoliticalfutures.com
HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Framework & Analysis
and more important, on the resulting
strategy and outcomes. This method
has been extended to all dimensions
of the nation-state (political, economic
and military) to determine the impera-
tives driving them, and to define relative
power and strategies. For our purposes,
net assessments will include countries
and regions that are strong enough and
geographically positioned to influence
events.
Space constrains action and generates
imperatives. Imperatives are what we
must do, constraints are what we are
unable to do. The net assessment ex-
amines place and time, and the impera-
tives and constraints that are the reali-
ties within which nations (and all of us)
live. When we cannot do what we must,
we fail. When we can, we succeed. If
constraints and imperatives are under-
stood, and measured against time and
place, we can grasp the core of the na-
tion and its future. Hence the term, net
assessment.
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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

Regional Model
The segmentation of Eurasia and the separation of island landmasses from
one another leads to the formation of distinct geopolitical systems within the
global model. More often than not, these systems are defined loosely in region-
al geographic terms. It is useful to continue the process by thinking regionally,
even if the regional model ultimately provides limited information, since the
concept of a region is to some extent arbitrary. It is a stepping stone toward
specificity.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

North America
Protected by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, North America consists of Canada,
the United States and Mexico — the three largest powers — and Central America
and the Caribbean. The U.S. dominates the region thanks to its abundant natu-
ral resources and series of geographic advantages that make it less constrained
than its immediate neighbors. (Canada’s climate, for example, prevents popula-
tion spread throughout its territory, and Mexico’s fractious geography makes uni-
fied governance difficult.) This enabled the U.S. to develop a strong navy charged
with protecting maritime approaches, which was critical for gaining and maintain-
ing control of the Caribbean and Central America amid nearby European holdings.
It was later expanded to include blue-water capabilities that enabled power pro-
jection abroad. The United States is the primary architect and chief beneficiary of
the current world order.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

Europe
Europe lacks impermeable geopolitical barriers but harbors myriad hostile nationali-
ties, so European geopolitics is primarily an internal affair. There are major exceptions
to this, of course, most notably Great Britain, which had the English Channel, and the
Iberian Peninsula, which had the Pyrenees. The Iberians and British used naval power
to circumvent Europe, focusing on the southern islands, and on the Asian periphery.
Each was drawn into European conflicts that ultimately broke their power. Europe is
no longer the imperial power it once was, but collectively it remains as politically, eco-
nomically and militarily influential as ever, thanks in part to the European Union, an
unprecedented experiment in geopolitical integration. Yet the fault lines that divide
Europe never went away. Germany and France compete for political leadership of the
EU as they push divergent visions for the bloc’s political, security and economic goals.
Economic divisions pit southern states against northern ones, and there is a division
between Eastern European members and Western members over Russia. Nationalism
is on the rise as the EU fails to deliver on its promise of universal prosperity.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

Russia
At the heart of Eurasia is Russia, which serves as a land bridge that connects the
Eurasia landmass from east to west. Russia is the dominant power in Eurasia,
but it is extremely sensitive to potential threats to its stability. Constantly drawn
into peninsular wars and affairs, Russia historically sought alternative venues
to power. Since Russia has limited territory east of the Urals, its interests were
drawn southward. But, constrained by the maritime chokepoints that made its
navy hostage to other powers, Russia has always had to shift its focus back to
its west. Despite its apparent strength, it is weakness that motivated Russia to
extend its influence throughout the region and to thus insulate itself from outside
threats — a strategy that puts the region in a state of near-constant instability. It
therefore strives to increase control over territories inside Russia and in its near
abroad to pacify hotbeds of instability, strengthen the borders and increase mili-
tary presence in buffer states.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

Central Asia
Central Asia is a highly strategic location vulnerable to invasion. Its position in
Eurasia makes it a crossroads for comparatively more powerful actors. As a re-
sult, developments outside the region are the primary force shaping Central Asia,
and what happens in the region can have spillover effects in Russia, western Chi-
na, Afghanistan and even the Middle East. Centuries of invasions and foreign rule
contributed to the emergence of weak states with deep internal vulnerabilities.
Central Asia’s modern-day borders were artificially drawn by the Soviets and do
not strictly reflect ethnic or national divisions, so it is sewn with internal ethnic
tensions. Geography and Soviet-era infrastructure contribute to ongoing tensions
among the five Central Asian states. At the core of the tension is a competition
over scarce resources, especially water. Central Asia’s stability is now in question;
the U.S. military has withdrawn from Afghanistan, and remittances from migrant
laborers have declined as borders have become more difficult to cross during
the pandemic. Russia leads the region’s stabilization efforts and appears to have
contained major security threats from Afghanistan for now.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

The Middle East

This is the area east of the Mediterranean and Red seas, south of the Caucasus, and
north and west the Arabian Sea. It is surrounded by deserts that are reasonably perme-
able. It is therefore the only other major global region that matches Europe in its ability
to generate conflict between and within nation-states. Its rich history, however, is more
recently overshadowed by colonial oppression, violence and instability. No one power
dominates the region. This generates competition among potential regional leaders (cur-
rently Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran) and dynamic alliance systems. But as with all
things Middle Eastern, nothing is static. Whereas the region once was broadly aligned
between Israel and Arab countries, there is now an emerging Arab-Israeli alliance to con-
front Iran and Turkey. With efforts to diversify its economy and collaborate with Israel
on regional trade and technological developments, the UAE is starting to cast a shadow
over the Gulf’s de facto leader, Saudi Arabia, and position itself as the Gulf’s primary pow-
er. Competition over energy sources and maritime rights in the Eastern Mediterranean
is beginning to define Middle East alliances, with Israel and southern European and Gulf
countries coming together to counter Turkish assertiveness in the region.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

South Asia
South Asia is its own geopolitical microverse: a densely populated region that
is home to India — one of the world’s fastest growing consumer markets and its
largest democracy — a variety of militant movements, religious nationalism, abun-
dant natural resources and prized access to the oceans’ busiest sea lanes. Mod-
ern India is the center of gravity in South Asia. The country is both a nation-state
and a confederation of hostile regions forged by British imperialism. It is insu-
lated from foreign land threats but is constantly managing internal stresses. It
therefore gives comparatively less attention to foreign threats, save for Pakistan
and the Indian Ocean Basin. (Pakistan, like India, is a nuclear power, and the two
hate each other.) India fears being encircled by China, particularly if it involves
improving ties with Pakistan. The country has a number of latent geographic ad-
vantages, owing largely to its position astride the world’s busiest sea lanes, and
is trying to focus more on projecting power in the maritime realm.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

East Asia
The most populous region on the planet is perhaps now also the most geopolitical-
ly dynamic, thanks to decades of rapid economic growth and to an alliance network
that helps give the U.S. control of the Pacific Ocean. China is the center of gravity
in this region. It is a confederation with a single dominant majority from which it
draws power. Modern China is secure from attack from Eurasia but vulnerable to at-
tack from the sea. It has never had naval interests but has never been as dependent
on the sea for trade as it is now. China’s rapid rise brought to the fore persistent
vulnerabilities. The central government faces regional threats often aggravated by
domestic economic disparities. China’s ability to weaponize regional dependencies
on its economy, as well as the U.S. withdrawal from regional trade frameworks and
mixed signals on military commitments, is generating strategic paralysis among
China’s neighbors. Secondary powers in the region are slowly developing security
and trade frameworks intended to curb Chinese leverage.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

South America
South America is peripheral to the global system because it is physically far re-
moved from major trade routes in the Northern Hemisphere. Prominent geograph-
ic barriers keep intrastate warfare at bay, so security threats are primarily of an
internal nature. The geographic barriers and long-term impact of colonial gover-
nance on political systems and economic development have made it extreme-
ly difficult for a country or the region to amass enough political and economic
weight to project power beyond its borders. Brazil has the most potential to be a
regional power, thanks to the size of its territory, population and natural resource
deposits. But internal economic disparities and no direct access to the Pacific
leave the country constrained. Further constraining the region is the fact that the
Western Hemisphere has been dominated by the United States since the start of
the 20th century. South America thus has little influence in global events, even
though it often feels their consequences.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Regional Models

Sub-Saharan Africa
With its countless ethnic groups, tribes, languages and nations, sub-Saharan Af-
rica is immeasurably diverse. But the countries here share a history of foreign
exploitation and thus a legacy of endemic poverty, corruption and stifled political
development that often prevents them from capitalizing on their economic po-
tential. (The one thing African nations tend to agree on is that they should not be
colonial subjects again.) And because outside powers will always be drawn to the
promise of the region’s resources, sub-Saharan Africa will be defined by the com-
petition between these powers. Each one competes differently. China, for exam-
ple, offers more economic benefit than, say, Russia. The Horn of Africa is currently
the most relevant part of sub-Sahara Africa to the global system, thanks to its
proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. Ethiopia is the dominant country in the region
but still working to overcome domestic constraints and thus not fully throwing its
weight around.

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 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments

Country Net Assessments

Against this backdrop, we can formulate current net assessments for individ-
ual countries within their respective systems/regions, particularly nations with
some potential global effect.

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United States
The U.S. political system is under severe
stress, with the country deeply divided
over socio-economic issues. Dealing
with these issues will absorb much of
the government’s time but not complete-
ly constrain it from interacting with the
rest of the world. (Historically, the U.S.
has shown an ability to maintain con-
sistent foreign policy even when faced
with internal disorder.) Europe is divided
and weak, but Russia cannot dominate
Europe. Therefore, the U.S.’s main focus
in foreign policy rests on countering Chi-
na and preventing China from breaking
out of the Pacific. To accomplish this,
the U.S. must rely on participation from
allies, even as it continues to use eco-
nomic power over military warfare, draw
down forces from the Middle East and
work to contain Russia.
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments
Mexico
Mexico’s political system suffers from
an internal power struggle emerging be-
tween some state governments and the
federal government. The division is more
than partisan politics; it falls along geo-
graphic lines between more developed
states in the north and less developed
states to the south. Though the govern-
ment continues to grapple with limited
financial resources, a high debt-to-GDP
ratio, pension reform and some degree
of energy self-sufficiency, its economy
remains locked in with the United States.
Domestic insecurity is still a problem.
Mexico City practically relies on the mili-
tary again for security operations as vig-
ilante groups exercise their will in certain
locations. From the south, Mexico faces
periodic waves of Central American mi-
grants seeking passage to the US as they
try to leave harsh economic and security
conditions in their home countries.
25 © 2022 Geopolitical Futures

Germany
Located in the center of Europe, Germa-
ny is the economic engine of the Euro-
pean Union and arguably its political
leader. It is politically stable but in recent
years is worried about immigration. Ger-
many currently faces no military threat,
so maintaining its free trade zone is par-
amount since growth depends largely
on exports. But Berlin is finding it more
difficult to maintain trade ties inside and
outside the EU when business activity is
declining. Trade relations outside of Eu-
rope with places such as China, Iran and
Russia are hindered by the threat of U.S.
sanctions, but the need to supplement
other markets is important for Germany.
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments
United Kingdom
The U.K. is preparing for life after Brex-
it. There is no real settlement yet. The
Northern Ireland question is largely re-
solved, but questions about implemen-
tation remain. Farther afield, London is
focused on economic alternatives to
Europe. A handful of trade deals are in
place (Japan, Canada) largely to pre-
serve relationships the U.K. had as an
EU member state, with several others in
the pipeline. The U.K. is attempting to
strike a free trade agreement with the
U.S. (as well as with Australia and New
Zealand) in exchange for alignment with
U.S. security activities around the world.
Complementarily, the U.K. is starting to
realign its military capabilities.
26 © 2022 Geopolitical Futures

Poland
Poland, an emerging power in its own
right, is sandwiched between two much
stronger powers: Germany and Russia.
This forces the government in Warsaw
to maintain relations with another great
power able to at least reinforce Poland if
worse comes to worst. Poland is there-
fore deeply engaged with the U.S., which
has increased its presence on Polish ter-
ritory. Poland is not satisfied with EU pol-
icy generally, especially plans to link the
distribution of funding with democratic
standards set by the bloc, but is eco-
nomically and financially dependent on
Europe. Poland sees instability in Belar-
us and Ukraine as an opportunity to con-
tain Russia and so begins its slow emer-
gence as a leader in Eastern Europe.
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments
Italy
Northern, central and southern Italy dif-
fer economically, so the COVID-19-in-
duced slowdown is affecting the coun-
try unevenly. For example, southern Italy,
which is characterized by high unem-
ployment and a large informal sector,
is at high risk of growing poverty. Italy
has one of Europe’s most indebted gov-
ernments, its financial sector remains
volatile and rescuing banks during an
economic slowdown is extremely chal-
lenging. Generally speaking, Rome is
split over economic and financial mea-
sures. It wants more financial flexibility
but is in no position to dictate terms to
the EU. The financial inequity, combined
with a scramble over funds and delays
in EU financial allocations, have created
cross-party frustration with the EU. Eu-
rosceptic movements in Italy exist, but
they haven’t gained much momentum;
instead, Italy is taking a more assertive
role in the EU by leading disgruntled
southern/Mediterranean members in
opposing the northern bloc.
27 © 2022 Geopolitical Futures

Russia
Russia’s economy, which relies heavily on
oil and natural gas, is in trouble. So long as
the oil market is unstable, Russia’s econ-
omy will be as well. The state has had to
intensify spending on social benefits and
stimulus as economic hardships mount,
but it still has significant amounts of cash
reserves. Even so, with poverty growing
and the standard of living deteriorating,
the population will soon begin to question
why the government continues to spend
on campaigns abroad when things are bad
at home — if it hasn’t done so already. Mos-
cow, however, believes it has little choice in
this regard. Its buffer zones (which now in-
cludes the Arctic) are simply too important
to ignore, hence the frozen conflict in Don-
bass, the support of Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko, growing threat to
central asia from Afghanistan and the de-
ployment of troops to the South Caucasus.
These moves fulfill Russian security needs
but bring Moscow into direct conflict with
Turkish interests. (This is also true of Chi-
nese interests in Central Asia.)
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments
China
The Communist Party of China is grap-
pling with some of the most intense
political and economic pressures it’s
faced since 1989. There have been
very few signs of persistent discon-
tent among the masses since it suc-
ceeded in containing COVID-19 at
home, and little ability for dissidents
to mobilize amid Beijing’s lockdown
measures. There also have been very
few signs of a major power struggle
in senior levels, despite President Xi
Jinping’s moving aggressively to con-
solidate power ahead of the next Par-
ty Congress and launching ambitious
regulatory offensives against tech
and other sectors. China’s quick eco-
nomic rebound bolstered the CPC’s
narrative at home, as did Western
countries’ comparatively greater dif-
ficulties in managing the pandemic.
But China has not proved immune
to external forces, with global sup-
ply chain and inflationary pressures
threatening to derail the domestic
economic recovery. Moreover, Bei-
jing’s aggressive moves to reform the
28 © 2022 Geopolitical Futures
 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments

property sector have put the country on

the brink of a nightmare-scenario finan-
cial crisis. Australia
The fallout from the pandemic has in-
tensified trade tension with the U.S. but
has also limited the ability of either side
to use economic weapons to hurt each
other. The focus of U.S. economic pres-
sure has shifted from trade to emerging
technologies and finance. Nonetheless,
the pair remain locked in a volatile eco-
nomic marriage, while strategic tension
between China and the U.S. and its al-
lies has only intensified. To sustain sup-
port from the People’s Liberation Army,
the party machinery and the public amid
these pressures, Xi’s government has This year Australia faced punitive eco-
been forced to lean more heavily on na- nomic measures from China such as
import bans and cutting off investments
tionalist shows of strength in its periph- and students. The country is politically
ery. This includes intensified operations stable but deeply internally divided over
around Taiwan aimed at making Taipei how aggressively to confront China. It’s
think reunification is a fait accompli. But laying the groundwork for more robust
it also includes more than mere rhetoric. cooperation with Quad partners and
China is building out a defensive, anti-ac- others in the West — as illustrated by
cess/area denial buffer in its periphery. the landmark AUKUS deal with the U.S.
This shows that China is betting big on and the U.K. — and it’s more aggressive-
asymmetric capabilities and next-gener- ly pushing back on Chinese influence in
ation technologies to offset its conven- the South Pacific. Australia is also reori-
tional military shortcomings. China is enting its military forces to more aggres-
also activating forces in disputed waters sively contest chokepoints on the south-
to force weaker neighbors to negotiate ern end of the first and second island
on its terms, even as it tries to build a chains and probe deep into the South
China Sea.
network of naval bases throughout the
Indo-Pacific.

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Japan
Japan was falling into a recession even
before the pandemic. Now it’s grappling
with an array of economic pressures: the
loss of export demand, spats with South
Korea and China, demographic pres-
sures, etc. Japanese high-tech industries
are also losing competitiveness to South
Korea, China and Taiwan. Even so, Japan
remains politically stable. It managed a
generational transition of power without
much drama. Political pressures from
Japanese nationalists and Japanese
pacifists continue to complicate Japa-
nese decision-making, as do Japan’s ris-
ing fiscal constraints. This is seen in the
slow but steady pace of Japan’s devel-
opment of power projection capabilities.
Since it needs to do more to look out for
its vital sea lanes, Japan is becoming in-
creasingly active in Southeast Asia and
with Quad partners. Its main focus is
keeping the U.S. close.
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments
India
The pandemic has shattered India’s
economy and prevented it from taking
full advantage of the modest shift in
global manufacturing away from China.
The Modi administration is attempting
to modernize the nation by consolidat-
ing control over the Hindu core. India
remains beset by persistent low-level
chaos resulting from its deep internal
schisms and socio-economic pressures.
Deep-seated federalism tends to impede
needed economic and legal reform. India
is trying but mostly failing to shift its fo-
cus away from land-based threats to its
more vital sea lanes. (This is compelling
its crackdown in Kashmir, as it tries to
secure that particular frontier.) To that
end, it’s deepening its military cooper-
ation with other maritime powers, par-
ticularly Quad states and littoral states
in Southeast Asia, East Africa and the
Red Sea. It’s also accelerating work on
key basing infrastructure near maritime
chokepoints.
30 © 2022 Geopolitical Futures

Turkey
Turkey is trying to reclaim influence in
areas formerly under the Ottoman Em-
pire and to become a commercial pow-
er again. However, its campaigns in the
Caucasus, the Levant, North Africa and
the Eastern Mediterranean are being un-
dermined by long-term economic crisis
and associated political opposition. The
government in Ankara is thus narrowing
its interests, straying from Libya, north-
west Syria and the Horn of Africa while
keeping a steady foothold in the Eastern
Mediterranean.
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Country Net Assessments
Iran
With mountainous terrain and limited
access to the Indian Ocean, Iran has a
hard time reaching its own periphery.
The narrowness of the Strait of Hormuz
and the proximity to Gulf rivals prevent
Tehran from being a true naval power.
Iran therefore resolved to build influence
westward into the Eastern Mediterra-
nean to become a maritime power. With
a weak economy and second-rate con-
ventional military capabilities, Iran proj-
ects influence through Shiite proxy net-
works and through asymmetric warfare,
building a campaign that extends from
Iraq to Lebanon, Syria and the Palestin-
ian territories. It’s a fragile network that
butts up against a hostile power in Isra-
el. And while it seeks to create instability
abroad, Iran endeavors to maintain sta-
bility at home, even if that means crack-
ing down on opposition forces.
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Israel
Israel is starting to adjust its foreign
policy to focus on tactical challenges
instead of existential threats. Foremost
among them is Iran, so it has carried
out a campaign in the Levant to counter
Iran-backed militias. Its budding regional
alliance with Arab nations gives it even
more leverage and allows Israel to assert
greater leadership in the Middle East.
Emerging Gulf-Israeli peace also produc-
es a shift in regional attention from the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the Israe-
li-Arab front against Iran.
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HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Country Net Assessments
Brazil
Brazil’s economy was poorly positioned
to withstand the pandemic. Inflation and
interest rates are on the rise while the
middle class is shrinking. The country
had to postpone several structural eco-
nomic reforms that were planned for this
year. Politically, the population remains
divided on opposite ends of the spec-
trum, even though there are small efforts
being made to establish a political coali-
tion closer to the center. Trade and out-
side investment, which is increasingly
difficult to come by, remain key pillars of
economic recovery, so relationships with
other Latin American countries have pri-
marily taken a back seat. (Brazil must
deal with its neighbors but no longer
sees them as a means for pursuing Bra-
zilian interests.) Brazil is more directly
engaged with bal- ancing its relationship
between the U.S. and China. Ties with
Europe have soured recently over man-
agement of the Amazon, and this has
slowed trade and business ties.
32 © 2022 Geopolitical Futures

Major Global Tensions
Tensions and conflict can arise be-
tween geopolitical systems and within
geopolitical systems when the players
involved act to satisfy their competing
needs.
The central actor in the global sys-
tem is the United States, the dominant
North American power and the only one
native to both oceans. The U.S. has the
option to preempt threats in the Eastern
Hemisphere or defend the oceans as it
sees fit. Its core interest is controlling
the sea lanes and so it adopted a strat-
egy that focuses on the littoral of Asia
and on the European Peninsula. The po-
sition between the two oceans protects
the continent and makes naval power a
priority.
Two issues define Europe’s behavior.
One is maintaining internal cohesion
while avoiding the large-scale conflicts
to which it has succumbed so many
times throughout history. The current
solution is the European Union, which
primarily fosters economic cohesion.
The second issue is Russia, which is
more or less threatening depending on
a country’s proximity to and economic
dependence on it. This divides Europe
www.geopoliticalfutures.com 33
HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Conclusion
and opens the door to the conflict it
wants to avoid.
Russia is trying to maintain its balance
between internal economic pressures,
low-level threats from the European
Peninsula, and the United States. Rus-
sia’s diverse population and its geopo-
litical imperatives instill in Moscow a
fear of outside forces that would seek
to destabilize it. Hence why Russia pre-
serves a buffer zone around its borders
at vulnerable points (Eastern Europe,
the Caucasus, etc.). Maintaining rela-
tions with China is secondary, since the
two are already widely separated geo-
graphically by grasslands and Siberia.
China’s potential value for Russia lies in
its ability to serve as a major consumer
of Russian energy, especially as some
European countries rethink their supply
lines. Russia still wields more influence
in Central Asia than other countries,
and is therefore looking for an accom-
modation with some peninsular powers
as a means of balancing its economy.
China is trying to solve its historical
problems: how to sustain trade with
Europe over land, and how to develop a
more efficient sea route under its con-
© 2022 Geopolitical Futures

trol. Through the centuries, China solved
the problem by transferring goods to
intermediaries via land and limiting its
sea operations. Today, it is exploring
both possibilities, which brings it up
against the U.S. Navy. The efforts have
historically been preempted by internal
conflicts that China is now suppress-
ing.
India is exploring opportunities created
by U.S.-China tensions. India remains
beset by, but also relatively at ease
with, persistent low-level chaos re-
sulting from its deep internal schisms
and socio-economic pressures. The
dependency on federalism to manage
its affairs continues to impede needed
economic and legal reforms. It cannot
allow internal divisions to be exploited
by external powers and seeks to allevi-
ate social pressures through economic
growth and development. Its economy
is less export-oriented than China’s and
so has room to grow. It is strategical-
ly secure, thanks to its geography and
the comparative weakness of Pakistan.
Facing a limited threat from China, In-
www.geopoliticalfutures.com 34
HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE
Conclusion
dia is exploring developing military co-
operation in the Pacific with the Ameri-
can alliance while maintaining relations
with Russia.
The Middle East is built on non-strate-
gic competition. National and subna-
tional groups interact with one another
based on tactical need and sometimes
even narrower considerations—ethnic
or affiliation, political persuasion, famil-
ial links, and so on. The major powers
in the region are Israel, Turkey, and to a
lesser extent Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Neither Israel nor Turkey has the appe-
tite to try to make the region coherent
beyond aligning with select regional
powers. Turkey — situated between Eu-
rope, Asia, the Mediterranean and the
Black Sea — is compelled to manage
competing forces in its periphery. It has
rivals in all directions and an impera-
tive to retain control over the Bosporus
Straits. For its security, Israel must re-
tain relations with at least one militari-
ly significant power so it has a military
edge in the Middle East and can keep
Russia as a cooperative regional power.
© 2022 Geopolitical Futures
 HOW WE FORECAST THE FUTURE

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