Ratner 1996

Drawing a Better Line: UTI Possidetis and the Borders of New States
Author(s): Steven R. Ratner

Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 590-624
Published by: American Society of International Law
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DRAWING A BETTER LINE: UTI POSSIDETIS
AND THE BORDERS OF NEW STATES
ByStevenR. Ratner*
It is now conventionalwisdomthatthe proliferationof ethnic-basedviolence consti-

tutesthe greatestthreatto public order and human rightssince the liftingof the Iron
Curtain.The eruptionof hatreds,whethersuppressedor ignoredfora halfcenturyor
newlyarisen,has unleashed centrifugalforcesthatare pulling statesapart fromAfrica
to Europe to South and CentralAsia. To date, the response of the effectivedecision
makersin theinternationalcommunityhas been ambiguousand inconstant:the United
Nationsmemberstatesreiteratethe importanceof the unityof all states,but theyaccept
accomplishedbreakupsafterthe fact,all thewhileinsistingon the protectionof minori-
ties withinstates.Political philosophersstrugglewith the circumstancesunder which
secession and dissolutionare desirable; internationallaw declares the lack of eithera
blanketrightto,or prohibitionagainst,secessionand seeminglyrelegatesitsachievement
to a pure powercalculus.'
Secessionsand breakupsdo not, however,solelyconcern ethnicgroups seekingself-
detennination throughpoliticalindependenceand statehood.Theyarefundamentally issues
about controloverland-what GeorgesScelle called the "obsessiondu territoire."2 And
thenormsabout the extentof thatland whena new stateemergeshave traditionally been
of less interestto international
law thanwhethera new "subject" of international law has
emerged.3Should the map be drawnaccordingto lines sketchedout throughprocesses
now regardedas illegitimateand that may contributeto a worseningof human rights
conditionsin the new countries?Or mustwe resignourselvesto General RatkoMladics
solution,where"bordersare drawnwithblood"4 and remainextralegally ordained?
At the core of the legal debate over the territoryof new statesis the principleof uti
possidetis.Stated simply,utipossidetis
providesthatstatesemergingfromdecolonization
shallpresumptively inheritthe colonial administrative
bordersthattheyheld at the time
of independence. It largelygoverned the determinationof the size and shape of the
statesof formerSpanish Latin Americabeginningin the early1800s,as well as former
European Africaand SoutheastAsia beginining in the 1950s.The relevanceof utipossidetis
todayis evidencedby the practiceof statesduringthe dissolutionof the formerSoviet
Union,Yugoslaviaand Czechoslovakia,apparentlysanctifying theformerinternaladmin-
istrativelines as interstatefrontiers.5
* AssistantProfessor,University of Texas School of Law. I greatlyappreciate commentsfromHans Baade,

Lori Damrosch,GregoryFox, Mark Gergen,Jeffrey Herbst,Samuel Issacharoff, Douglas Laycock,Alexander
Murphy,Diane Orentlicher,Peter Spiro,JayWestbrook,David Wippman,and twoanonymousreviewersfor
thisJournal,as well as invaluablelibraryassistancefromDavid Gunn and JonathanPratter.
'See NYUGEN Quoc DINII, DROIT INTERNATIONALPUBI.IC 500 (PatrickDaillier & Alain Pellet eds., 5th
ed. 1994) (noting "'disengagement' of internationallaw"); JAMES CRAWFORD,THE CRFATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONALLAW268 (1979) (secession outside colonial contextnot per se lawfulor unlawful);LEE C.
BuCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETFRMINATION 45 (1978) ("Despite its apparentlyalegal
nature,the convictionthat the legitimacyof a claim to self-determination can be tested by the degree of
success that attendsthe claimants' undertakingis probablythe prevailingview among most international
jurists.").
2Georges Scelle, Obsession du Teritoire,in SYMBOLAFVERZIJLJ 347 (1958).
3ROBERT Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1963) (law on new states
"has looked to the sovereign,rathei than the territorial,elementof territorialsovereignty").
4Waffen Zimmermann,The Choicein theBalkans,N.Y. REv. BooKs, Sept. 21, 1995, at 4, 4.
5 See,e.g.,Charterof the Commonwealthof Independent States,June 22, 1993, Art.3, 34 ILM 1279, 1283
(1995); SC Res. 713, preambularpara. 8, UN SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 42, 42-43, UN Doc. S/INF/
47 (1991).
590
1996] UTI POSSIDETIS AND THE BORDERS OF NEW STATES 591
Reliance on utipossidetisduringthe post-Cold War breakupshas stemmedfromthree

argumentsor assumptions.First,utipossidetis reduces the prospectsof armed conflictby
providingthe only clear outcome in such situations.Absent such a policy,all borders
would be open to dispute,and new stateswould fall preyto irredentistneighborsor
internalsecessionistclaimants.Second, because a cosmopolitandemocraticstate can
functionwithinany borders,the conversionof administrative bordersto international
bordersis as sensibleas anyotherapproach and farsimpler.Third,and buttressing the
other two,utipossidetis is assertedas a defaultrule of internationallaw mandatingthe
conversionofall administrative boundariesintointernationalborders.This ruleemerged
duringthe decolonizationof LatinAmericaand Africabutwould applybylogical exten-
sion to the breakup of statestoday.The most significantelaborationof thisextension
came fromthe commissionchaired byJudge Robert Badinteradvisingthe European
Communityon legal questionsassociatedwiththe breakup of Yugoslavia.6
These viewsseem compelling;yet the easy embrace by governmentsof utipossidetis
and thesuggestionthatitis nowa generalrule ofinternationallaw to governthebreakup
of stateslead to two distinct,yetopposite,spillovereffectsthatendanger global order
at this time of ethnic conflict.First,a policyor rule thattransforms all administrative
bordersof modern statesinto internationalboundaries creates a significanthazard in
the name of simplicity-namely,the temptationof ethnicseparatiststo dividetheworld
furtheralong administrative lines.7If the Republic of Georgia's new bordersmustcoin-
cide with those of the formerGeorgian Soviet Socialist Republic, are not the future
Republic of Abhazia's just as clearlythose of the formerAbhaz Autonomous Soviet
SocialistRepublic?Would the Quebecois considersecession so readilyif the new state
had different bordersfromthose establishedby Canada and the United Kingdomfor
the purpose of integratingQuebec into the Dominion?
Second, the extensionof utipossidetis to modernbreakupsleads to genuine injustices
and instability byleavingsignificant populationsboth unsatisfied withtheirstatusin new
statesand uncertainof politicalparticipationthere.By hiding behind inflatednotions
of utipossidetis,stateleaders avoid engagingthe issue of territorialadjustments-even
minorones-which is centralto theprocessofself-determination. In thecase ofYugosla-
via,forinstance,althoughutipossidetis hardlycaused the eruptionof armed conflict,the
assumptionby statesof its applicabilityfromthe outsetpreventedany debate over the
adjustmentof boundariesand limitedthe universeof possible bordersto one-leaving
thosepeople on the "wrong" side of the borderripefor"ethniccleansing."8Elsewhere,
whetherwithregardto leftbank Dniestriansin the Republic of Moldova or Armenians
in Nagorno-Karabakh,utipossidetis mayprove a recipe forcontinued denial of human
dignityto minorities.
It is thustimeto reexaminethisoft-invoked principleofinternational law and relations.
Forapplicationofutipossidetis to thebreakupofstatestodaybothignorescriticaldistinctions
betweeninternallines and international boundariesand, more important, is profoundly
at odds withcurrenttrendsin internationallaw and politics.Manyinternalbordersdo
merittransformation intointernational boundariesbased on historicaland othercharacter-
istics;but the assumptionthatall such bordersmustbe so transformed is unwarranted.
6
SeeConferenceon Yugoslavia,Arbitration
CommissionOpinion No. 3 (Jan. 11, 1992), 31 ILM 1499 (1992)
[hereinafterOpinion No. 3].
7Cf. Hurst Hannum, Sef-Determination, and Europe:Old Winein New Bottles?,
Yugoslavia, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 69 (1993) (BadinterCommission'sviewsmay discourageconstitutional optionsshortof
dissolution).
8 For an account by a key negotiatorhighlightingthis aspect of European policy towardYugoslavia,see
DAVID OwEN, BALKANODYSSEY 33-34 (1995) ("The refusalto make [Yugoslavia'sinternal]bordersnegotiable
greatlyhampered the EC's attemptat crisismanagement. ..and subsequentlyput all peacemaking . . .
withina straitjacket
thatgreatlyinhibitedcompromises. . .").
592 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 90:590
My argumentproceeds in fourparts.PartI reviewsthe genealogyand legal contours

of the doctrine.Part II examines the relationshipbetweeninternaland international
bordersto evaluate the functionalrationaleand consequences of utipossidetis. Part III
discusseswhetherthe political and legal factorsthat underlaythe application of uti
possidetis to colonial breakupsjustifyits invocationtoday.And part IV ponders possible
alternativesto utipossidetis, includingtheirobvious hazards but less evidentpotential.
Mypurpose is thusto marrythe literatureon frontiers and politicalgeographywiththat
of internationallaw as a means of respondingto the variousclaims to territory.
This articlehas a modestgoal -to examine the proprietyof utipossidetis to contempo-
rarychallengesrelatedto stateunity.It does not seek,or need, to posita comprehensive
theoryof self-determination and secession,includingthe mostvexingquestion of the
appropriateunit of self-determination, which remainsthe goal of manylegal scholars
and politicalphilosophers.9Rather,I make severalpolicyassumptionsconsistentwith
manyviewsof self-determination withouttryingto examine all theirramifications.
First,I assume thatthe proliferation of states,each smallerand more ethnicallybased
than thatfromwhichit emerged,is not desirable.A presumptionin favorof such states
accentuatesarbitrary about humanbeingsand underminesthecosmopolitan
distinctions
tenetson whichall human rightslaw is based.'0 Indeed, the proliferation of such states
mightmake oppressionof minoritieswithinthemparticularly egregious." Smallerstates
mayalso prove economicallyhandicapped or at least create economic inefficiencies as
theyreplicategovernmental functionson smallerscales and erectnewbarriersto trade.'2
Second, and notwithstanding the above,I assumethat,in the processof theformation
of newstates,thecosmopolitan,multiethnic solution-democracy combinedwithrespect
for minorityrights-may eitherprove impossibleto constructor otherwisenot satisfy
the claims of certain minoritiesinhabitingdistinctterritories.Thus, when a state is
breakingup, forced cohabitationwithinunchangeable administrative borderswill not
alwaysmaximizeeitherpublic order or human rights.This does not equate withthe
assumptionthat there is or ought to be any broad, ex anterightto secession; I take
the positionthatthe internationalcommunityshould sanctionattemptedsecessions-
particularlyforcibleones-under the most limitedcircumstances,even if it may ulti-
matelyhave to acknowledgea faitaccompli.'3The question here, however,is whether
a set of internalbordersought to survivethisprocess.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF UTI POSSIDETIS

FromRomanLaw totheLaw ofNations
findsitsoriginsin the Roman law of the republicanera, as one of a series
Utipossidetis
ofjustice, would issue upon application of
of edicts thatthe praetor,or administrator
9 See,e.g.,BUCHHEIT, supranote 1; ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITYOF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991); AvishaiMargalit& Joseph Raz, NationalSelf-Determination,
87 J. PHIL. 439 (1990). For theories by legal scholars, see, e.g., Robert McCorquodale, A
Self-Determination:
HumanRights 43 INTEL & COMP.L.Q. 857 (1994); FredericL. Kirgis,Jr., TheDegrees
Approach, ofSelf-Determination
in theUnitedNationsEra,88 AJIL304 (1994); Lea Brilmayer, Secession
a\nd A Territorial
Self-Determination: Interpreta-
and WorldPublicOrder:Community
tion,16 YALEJ. INT'L L. 177 (1991); Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination Response
to TeritorialSeparation,16 VA.J.INT'L L. 779 (1976); RupertEmerson,Self-Determination, 65 AJIL459 (1971).
1 Cf.Louis B. Sohn, TheRights in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT
ofMinorities,
ON CvIVL AND POLITICAL, RIGHTS 270, 270-76 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (purpose of minority rights);MYRES
S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 561-68 (1980) (general normof nondiscrimination).
SeeBUCHHEIT, supra note 1, at 29-30. Cf THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 127 (J.Madison) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987) ("Extend the sphere [of a republic and] . .. you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens . . .").
12 See BUCHHEIT, supra note 1, at 29, 230-31. Exceptions are evident, notably Eritrea, and international
economic integration can mitigate this factor.
13
See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 123 (1995) (state practice
"overwhelmingly" opposed to recognizing generalized right to secession).
one partyduringthe initialstage of litigation.When twopartiesclaimed ownershipof

real property,the edict would grantprovisionalpossessionto the possessorduringthe
litigation,unless he had obtained the land clandestinely(clam),byviolence (vi), or in
a formrevocableby the other party(precario).14 Utipossidetis did not address the final
dispositionof the propertybut,rather,shiftedthe burden of proofduringthe proceed-
ings to the partynot holdingthe land. This representedan advantageforthe possessor,
who became the defendantin the case, even ifhe had wrongfully removedthe plaintiff
fromtheland. The edictcame to be summarizedin thephrase Utipossidetis, itapossideatis:
"As you possess,so mayyou possess.",15
Accordingto Moore, the earlyscholarsof internationallaw adopted the notion of uti
butalteredthedoctrinein twocriticalways:bychangingthescope ofapplication
possidetis
fromprivateland claims to the state's territorialsovereignty; and, most critically,by
transforming the provisionalstatusinto a permanentone.'6 This shiftseems hardly
surprisingin an era when the use of forcebystatesand anyresultingacquisitionof land
werelawful:possessionbecame ten-tenths of thelaw.'7This adaptation,ofcourse,proved
a complete reversalfrom the Roman law concept, which excluded even provisional
possessionto a partywho accomplishedit byviolence,and whichwould have suggested
a returnto the statusquo antebellum.'8
Uti possidetisand LatinAmerican

Independence
The juxtapositionof utipossidetis

and self-determinationbegan in LatinAmerica,where
the Creoles who wrestedindependence fromtheirSpanish brethrenbeginningin the
earlynineteenthcenturyseized upon the idea as a way of settingboundaries of the
new countries.Scorned by the peninsulares, the new Americansin the Latin American
bureaucracyhad formedpoliticalallegiances to the administrative unitsin which they
were raised and assignedfortheirjobs, ratherthan to Spanish Americawritlarge.'9As
a result,the three large groupingsof Spanish territoriesthat declared independence
beginningin 1810 proved short-lived, splittingalong theirown internallines into new
states.20
To the Creole leadership,adoption of a policyof utipossidetis
servedtwopurposes:to
ensure thatno land in South Americaremained terranulliusupon independence,open
to possibleclaimbySpain or othernon-American powers;and to preventconflictsamong
14W. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 734 (Peter Stein ed., 3d
rev. ed. 1963); JOHN BASSETT MOORE, COSTARICA-PANAMA ARBITRATION: MEMORANDUM ON UTI POSSIDETIS
5-8 (1913). Thus, the praetorwould addressboth parties,declaring,"I forbidforceto be done by eitherof
you wherebyone of you is preventedfrom enjoyingthe land as he now does, not clam vi aut precarto."
BUCKLAND, supra,at 740. See also DIG. J. 43.17.1; LEOPOLD WENGER,INSTITUTES OF THE RoMAN LAW OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 251, 415 (Otis HarrisonFisk trans.,Fred B. Rothman1986) (1940).
5 MOORE, supranote 14, at 8.
16 Id. at 8-11 (citingworksbyRivier,Bynkershoek, Oppenheim and Calvo); Eduardo Jimenezde Arechaga,
Boundaries in LatinAmerica:UtiPossidetis Doctrine,in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 449, 450
(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
171 appreciate thisinsightfromone of the Journal'sanonymousreviewers.See also MooRE, supranote 14,
at 9.
18 PAULDE LA PRADELLE, LA FRONTItRE: ETUDE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 86-87 (1928).
"
BENEDICTANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONAL-
ISM 56-59 (rev. ed. 1991); MARK A. BURKHOLDER & D. S. CHANDLER, FROM IMPOTENCE TO AUTHORITY: THE
SPANISH CROWN AND THE AMERICANAUDIENCIAS, 1687-1808, at 3-5 (1977).
20 Seegenerally
HUBERT HERRING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 260-91, 434-37 (1955); THE TIMES ATLAS
OF WORLDHISTORY223 (GeoffreyParkered., 4th ed. 1993) (dissolutionof United Provincesof the Rio de
la Plata into Argentina,Uruguay,Paraguayand Bolivia; of Gran Colombia into Venezuela, Colombia and
Ecuador; and of United Provincesof CentralAmerica into Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua
and Costa Rica).
the new statesof the formerempirebyadoptinga set of extantboundaries.21Consistent

withthelawat thetime,itincidentally ensuredthatall lands occupied onlybyindigenous
peoples would be part of the new state.22
The Latin Americanboundarieswere derivedfromvarious sortsof Spanish govern-
mentalinstruments settingup hierarchicaland other unitssuch as provinces,alcaldias
mayores, intendencias,court (audiencia)districts,Captaincies-General,
and Vice-Royalties.
The meaning of these units changed over time,as did the frontiersof each through
unilateraldecisionsof the Crown.23The leaders of the new republicsquicklybegan to
codifyutipossidetis in both treatiesand domesticlaw. For example,whenVenezuela split
fromGran Colombia to resumea separateexistencein 1830, the Constitutionspecified
thatits territory would comprise"all thatwhich,previouslyto the politicalchanges of
1810,was denominatedthe Captain-Generalship ofVenezuela,"24an administrativeunit
withinthe largerformercolonial division,the Vice-Royalty of New Granada.
Despite thisgeneral acceptance of the principle,the precise contoursand effectsof
utipossidetisremainedunclear.First,Latin statesaccepted the possibilitythattheirfinal
bordermightdifferfromthe utipossidetis line, thoughtheydid not plan major revisions
of the Spanish administrative borders.25Second, and more important,the acceptance
in principlecould notrectify
of utipossidetis confusionsstemmingfromshifting territorial
arrangementsunder the Crown,the absence of clearlydemarcatedboundaries due to
ignorance of the local geography,26 or political tensionsamong the new Latin states.
These factorsled to warfareamong them,as wellas peacefulresolutionsthroughbound-
arytreatiesor agreementsto arbitrate.27
Finally,statesand scholars seemed to have differentviews on the meaning of uti
possidetisas of a particulardate, leading to the use of two new terms,utipossidetis
juris
and utipossidetisfacto.The formerviewheld thatonlythe Spanish legal documentswere
dispositivefor locating borders,effectivepossession being irrelevant;while the latter
argued thatthe lands actuallyheld byeach stateat independence would determinethe
border.28In cases wherethearbitrationtreatiesdid not specifyan interpretation, arbitra-
tors took differentpositions.29Nevertheless,the juris addition became somewhatof a
2
See Beagle Channel (Arg./Chile), 52 ILR 93, 125 (1977) (five-personpanel); Fronti&es Colombo-
Venezueliennes (Colom./Venez.), 1 R.I.A.A. 225, 228 (1922) (SwissFed. Council); FrontierDispute (Burk.
Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ REP. 554, 661-62 (Dec. 22) (Abi-Saab,J.,sep. op.).
22
SeeARTHURS. KELLER, OLIVER J.LISSITZYN & F. J.MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTSOF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH
SYMBOLIC ACTS1400- 1800,at 6 (.1938); seealsoW. Michael Reisman,Protecting IndigenousRightsin International
Adjudication, 89 AJIL350, 352 (1995). ButcfCRAWFORD, supranote 1, at 177-81 (lands occupied byindigenous
peoples not terranulliusunder traditionallaw of nations).
23 Land, Island and MaritimeFrontierDispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 ICJREP.351, 387-
88 (Sept. 11) [hereinafterLand, Island].
24 CONST. Art.V (Venez. 1830), 18 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1119 (1833). SeealsoCONST. Art.IV (Hond.
1848), 36 id. at 1086 (1861) ("all the territory which, during the Spanish dominion, was known by the
appellationof Province"); L. D. M. Nelson, TheArbitration ofBoundary Disputesin LatinAmerica, 20 NETH. INT'L
L. REv. 267, 268-71 (1973).
25 See,e.g.,Definitive
Treatyof Peace and Friendship,Nov. 8, 1831, Bol.-Peru,Art.XVI, 19 BRIT. & FOREIGN
ST. PAPERS 1383, 1387-88 (1834) ("such cessions may be reciprocallymade, as may be necessaryfor an
exact and naturaldemarkation[sic]"); Treatyof Peace, Sept. 22, 1829, Colom.-Peru,Art.V, 16 id. at 1242,
1243 (1831).
26 S. WHITTEMORF BOGGS, INTERNATIONAI. BOUNDARIES: A STUDY OF BOUNDARY FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS
17 (1940); Jean-MarcSorel & Rostane Mehdi, L'Utipossidetis entrela consecration
juridiqueetla pratique:essaide
reactualisation,40 ANNUAIRE FRANC,AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 11, 26-27 (1994).
27 SeeWaldemarHummer,Boundary Disputesin LatinAmerica, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supranote 16, at 464, 465-
72. But seeJimenezde Arechaga,supranote 16, at 451. See also Gabriel Escobar, Peru,EcuadorSignAgreement
toEnd Fighting, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1995, at A23.
28 See,e.g.,HondurasBordersCase (Guat./Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A.1309,1323 (1933) (three-judge panel) (Hondu-
ras arguingforjuiis and Guatemala forfacto).
29 Compare FrontieresColomboVenezueliennes,1 R.I.A.A.225, 228-29 (1922) (endorsingjuris) withHondu-
rasBordersCase, 2 R.I.A.A.at 1324 (utipossidetis "makes possessionthetest"unlessclearlyusurpinga definitive
expressionof royalwill). See also MOORE,supranote 14, at 40-41 (addition of juris both unnecessaryand
19961 UTI POSSIDETIS AND THE BORDERS OF NEW STATES 595
fixturealongside utipossidetis, the primaryimportanceof thelegal instruments

signifying
of the Spanish Crown,thoughnot to the totalexclusionof evidenceof possession.30Uti
possidetis
factoreceived its greatestacceptance in Brazil,which rejected the Spanish-
Americaninterpretation and therebyclaimed,throughpossessionalone, large stretches
of land beyond the bordersset in treatiesby Spain and Portugal.3
Decolonization
in Africa
Beforethe arrivalof the Europeans,the notionoffrontiers as definedlineswas hardly

knownin Africa.Instead,frontiers were zones throughwhichone clan or tribepassed
fromone region to another;and any bordersdepended solelyon who would be paid
tribute.32The European colonialistswho arrivedin large numbersin the eighteenth
centurydid not draw lines immediately.Rather,each state made claims, leading to
the recognitionof spheresof influence,followedby more definedallocations,specific
delimitations,and eventual alterationsbased on experience.33Drawing these borders
withonlyslightknowledgeof or regardforlocal inhabitantsor geography,theEuropean
powersmade territorial allocationsto reduce armed conflictamong themselves.In that
sense alone were theyrational.34
The choice for Africaas decolonization approached was clear: either a wholesale
restructuringof bordersto rectify past injusticesor acceptance of existinglines as the
basis fornew states.Pan-Africanistsurged the former;3'but the European statesand the
indigenous elites opted for maintainingextant lines as the most feasible method for
speedy decolonization. One year afterthe formationof the Organizationof African
Unityin 1963, withmost of the continentdecolonized but several territorialdisputes
alreadybrewing,the OAU's heads ofstateand governmentpledged in theCairo Declara-
tion "to respectthe frontiersexistingon theirachievementof independence."36
Such a policywould servean externaland an internalpurpose: externally,it would
seek to preventirredentist tendenciesbyneighborsfromturninginto territorial claims
and the possible use of force.Internally,it would give clear notice to ethnicminorities
thatsecessionor adjustmentofborderswas not an option.37Africanand European elites
had strucka bargainto the benefitof both,permitting replacementof European rulers
misleading);C. H. M. Waldock,DisputedSovereignty in theFalklandIslandsDependencies,

25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
311, 325 (1948) (interpretive dispute rendersutipossidetis"so indefiniteand ambiguous thatit has become
somewhatdiscredited").
30 See Land, Island, 1992 ICJ REP. at 386-87 (noting that both partiesaccept utipossidetis
juris); Frontier
Dispute, 1986 ICJREP.at 565 (using utipossidetis and utipossudetis
jurisinterchangeably).
31 SeeDE LA PRADELLE, supranote 18, at 79-83; Jimenezde Arechaga,supranote 16, at 452-53 (Brazilian
formula"is exactlycontraryto whatwas intended").
32 Romain Yakemtchouk,Les Frontieres 74 REVUEGENERALE
africaines, DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
[RGDIP] 27, 32-35 (1970).
3 SAADIATouvAL, THE BOUNDARYPOLITICS OF INDEPENDENTAFRICA 16 (1972). See generallyTHOMAS PAKEN-
HAM,THE SCRAMBLEFOR AFRICA:WHITE MAN'S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 (1991).
34JeffreyHerbst, The creation
and maintenance in Africa,43 INT'L ORG. 673, 678-85
of nationalboundaries
(1989); TOUVAL,supranote 33, at 3-17. Seealso RaviL. Kapil, On theConflict
Potential
ofInherited
Boundariesin
Africa, 18 WORLD POL. 656, 660 (1966) (preponderance of straight lines in African borders).
35 SeeResolutionsAdopted by the All-African
People's Conference,Accra,December 5-13, 1958, in COLIN
LEGUM, PAN-AFRICANISM:
A SHORT POLITICAL.GUIDE 228, 231 (1962) (denouncing "artificial frontiers drawn
by Imperialistpowersto divide the peoples of Africa"and calling for "the abolition or adjustmentof such
frontiersat an earlydate").
360.A.U. Resolutionon Border Disputes, 1964, in BASICDOCUMENTS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS360, 361 (Ian
Brownlieed., 1971). The resolutionis oftenreferredto by its OAU documentnumber,AGH/RES.16(I). See
also Saadia Touval, TheOrganization ofAfricanUnityand AfricanBorders, 21 INT'LORG. 102 (1967).
37 SeeTouvAt.,supranote 33, at 90; Yakemtchouk, supranote 32, at 61; J. de Pinho Campinos,L'Actualitede
l".utipossidetis,"
in LA FRONTIERE 95, 107-09 (Societe FranSaisepour le Droit Internationaled., 1980).
byindigenousones.38Althoughthe OAU's stancewas not withoutits criticsin Africa,39

most leaders defended the policy.Border wars proved the exception,as Africanstates
eitheraffirmativelysettledtheirborder disputesor simplydid not push theirclaims.40
Internally,for a generationAfricanleaders firmlyrejected secession attemptson the
continent.4'
As forutipossidetis,
whilethe termdoes not appear in the OAU resolution,itsmeaning
had been transformed again.42No longerfocusedon retentionof administrativebound-
aries of one colonial power as in Spanish America,the principlein common parlance
now entailednotionsof treatysuccessionto addressboundariesbetweendifferent colo-
nial powers.Africawould inheritmostof the internaland externallinesof the European
colonizers,yieldingthemostinternationalfrontiers ofanycontinentrelativeto itsarea.43
in EasternEuropeand theSovietUnion
Dissolutions
The breakupsof theformerYugoslavia,the SovietUnion and Czechoslovakiaservedas
yetanotheropportunityto testthe durabilityof utipossidetis. The internalstructureof
Yugoslavia,fromitscreationat Saint-Germain-en-Laye untilitsoccupationduringWorld
War II, consistedat firstof twenty-tworegions,laterreallocatedintonine provinceswhose
bordersfollowedphysicaland historicallines.44Afterthewar,Tito reorganizedthe polity
into six republicsthatcorrespondedmore closelyto the pre-1918politicalunits-includ-
ing units withinAustria-Hungary (Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovinaand Croatia) and the
prewarSerbianstate-and leftsignificant ethnicminoritiesin each republic.45
When Yugoslavia'srepublicsbegan to declare theirindependencein 1991,theinterna-
tionalcommunityquicklyadhered to the idea thatthe internalfrontiers of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslaviacould not be alteredbythe use of force.The statements
and resolutionsto thiseffectby the European Community, the Conferenceon Security
and Co-operationin Europe, and the UN SecurityCouncil also evincedtheirconclusion
that,ifYugoslaviawere indeed to dissolve,the onlypredictablewaywould be along the
lines of the republics.46In January1992, the newlycreatedArbitrationCommissionof
theEC Conferenceon Yugoslaviaendorsedthispost-Cold War incarnationof utiposside-
tis.47These positionsfell on deaf ears, in thatthe border claims onlydissipatedin the
one area wherebothpartieshad simplydecided not to fight,namely,theborderbetween
Slovenia and Croatia. For the bordersamong Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, utipossidetis
remaineda mirage.
38
SeeHerbst,supranote 34, at 687 (utipossidetis ensured that"if an Africangovernmentis in controlof the
capital city,then it has the legitimaterightto controlthe nation-state").
39 SeeFrancisVallat,Firstreporton successionof Statesin respectof treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/278 & Adds.
1-6, reprinted in [1974] 2 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n,pt. 1, at 1, 77-80, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1(Part
1) (Somali claims to Ogaden region of Ethiopia and NorthernFrontierDistrictof Kenya); Kapil, supranote
34, at 663-70 (Moroccan and Somali claims); Touval, supranote 36, at 103-19.
40 SeeIan Brownlie,Boundary Disputesin Africa,in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supranote 16, at 460, 462-64; TouvAL,
supranote 33, at 279-90.
41 See,e.g.,GA Res. 1474 (ES-IV), UN GAOR, 4th Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, UN Doc. A/4510
(1960) (resolutionoriginatingin Afro-Asian drafton Katangaand Congo); O.A.U. Resolutionon the Situation
in Nigeria,1967, in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, supranote 36, at 364 (Biafra).
42 SeeThomas M. Franck,Postmodern and theRighttoSecession,
Tribalism inPEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 3, 5 (CatherineBrolmann,Ren&e Lefeber& Marjoleine Zieck eds., 1993) [hereinafter PEOPLES
AND MINORITIES].
43 MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 229 (1986).
4STEVEN L. BURG, CONFLICT AND COHESION IN SOCLALIST YUGOSLAVIA: POLITICAL DECISION MAKING SINCE
1966, at 16-17 (1983).
45 Id. at 24.
Responseto theDissolutionoftheSocialistFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia,86

46 SeeMarc Weller, TheInternational
AJIL569, 574-82 (1992).
47 SeeOpinion No. 3, supranote 6.
The administrative boundariesof the SovietUnion werefarmore complex,reflecting

a historyof redrawingbymanySovietleaders. In the 1920s,SovietRussia absorbed new
territories,includingstatesindependentonlysince the end of the worldwar (Ukraine,
White Russia, Georgia,Armenia and Azerbaijan), as well as areas in CentralAsia. By
1926, the USSR consistedof eightUnion Republicswhose dividinglines (includinglines
withinrepublics)took into considerationethnicfactors,althoughnot to the satisfaction
of many groups.48Stalin adjusted frontiersbetween and withinthe republics before
World War II, dividingethnic groups to strengthenhis politicalhand and emasculate
ethno-nationalism in thehinterland.49 In 1939 and 1940,as contemplatedin theMolotov-
RibbentropPact, the USSR invaded and annexed Estonia,Latvia,Lithuaniaand Roma-
nian Bessarabia,creatingfournew Union Republics,and annexed partsof Poland.50By
thewar'send, not onlyhad theSovietUnion expanded externally throughincorporation
of areas of EasternEurope, but itsinternalboundarieshad been adjustedagain, includ-
ing throughthe transferof partsof the formerBaltic Statesto the older Union Repub-
lics.5'Witha fewnotable exceptions,borderchanges leveled offafterthe war.52
The SovietUnion's dismemberment provedfarmore peaceful,initiallyat least.While
the Baltic Statesrejected the conversionof the USSR's internalbordersinto interstate
frontiers in lightof the territorytheyhad lostaftertheirincorporation,53the otherstates
agreed to retainthe administrative borders,a viewcodifiedin the 1993 Charterof the
Commonwealthof Independent States.54Nevertheless,the formerrepublicsstillmain-
tain claims against each other and do not appear to have yet achieved a consensus
regardingthe permissibility of secessionsand territorialrealignments.55
The internalborderwithinCzechoslovakiahad a farlongerpedigree.When theAllies
created CzechoslovakiaafterWorld War I, theycombined formerareas of the Austro-
HungarianEmpire-Bohemia, Moravia,Slovakia,partof Silesia,and Ruthenia.56Bohe-
mia and Moravia in the west had earlier been separate unitswithinthe Holy Roman
Empire,and thenpartof theAustrianEmpire,whileSlovakiahad been partof Hungary.
The borderbetweentheCzech and Slovakpartsof Czechoslovakiawas thusthehistorical
Moravian-Hungarian border.57During World War II, the Germansused thisline as an
48
See ROBERT J. KAISER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NATIONALISM IN RuSSIA AND TIIE USSR 107-08, 111 (1994);
MargotLight,Russiaand Transcaucasia, inTRANSCAUCASIAN BOUNDARIES 34,37-39 (JohnF. R. Wright,Suzanne
Goldenberg& RichardSchofieldeds., 1996).
49 See KAISER, supranote 48, at 111, 114; OLAF CAROE, SOVIET EMPIRE: THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND
STALINISM 143-49 (1953).
50TreatyofNon-Aggression betweenGermanyand the Union of SovietSocialistRepublics,SecretAdditional
Protocol,Aug. 23, 1939, in DOCUMENTS ON GERMANFOREIGN POLICY 1918-1945, ser. D, vol. 7, at 246 (1956).
Bessarabiajoined the MoldavianASSR (the area on the east bank of the DniesterRiverwithinthe Ukrainian
SSR) to formthe Moldavian SSR. PaI Kolst0 & Andrei Edemsky,TheDniesterConflict: BetweenIrredentismand
Separatism, 45 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 973, 978-79 (1993).
5' SeeKAISER, supranote 48, at 370.
52The mostprominentwere NikitaKhrushchev'sso-calledgiftof Crimea fromthe RSFSR to the Ukrainian
SSR in 1954 and the transfer of a large area in the Kazakh SSR to the Uzbek SSR in 1963. SeePaI Kolst0,The
New RussianDiaspora:Minority Protection in theSovietSuccessor
States,30 J. PEACE RES. 197, 204-05 (1993);
SvetlanaSvetova& Roman Solchanyk,Chronology ofEventsin Crimea,RADIO FREE EUR.-RADIO LIBERTY RES.
REP., May 13, 1994, at 27.
53 See,e.g.,YuryGolotyuk,EstablishmentofFirstPost-Soviet
Border
Begins,SEVODYNA,June 23, 1994,at 2, reprinted
and translated in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, July20, 1994, at 21.
54SeeCharter,supranote 5 ("recognitionof existingfrontiersand renouncementof illegal acquisitionof
territories").Althoughonly7 of the former12 non-Balticrepublicssignedthe Charter,the otherfiveacceded
in 1993-1994. Sergei Khabarov,Introductory Note,34 ILM 1298, 1299 & n.2 (1995).
55See,e.g.,Kolst0 & Edemsky,supranote 50, at 988-94; Svetova& Solchanyk,supranote 52. Seealso KAISER,
supra note 48, at 358-73; Philip Chase, Conflictin theCrimea:An Examinationof EthnicConflictunderthe
Contemporary 34 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 219, 222-39 (1995).
ModelofSovereignty,
56 ALAN SHARP, THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT: PEACEMAKING IN PARIS, 1919, at 148 (1991).
57C. A. MACARTNEY, HUNGARYAND HER SUCCESSORS: THE TREATYOF TRIANON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1919-
1937, at 73, 76 (1937).
internationalfrontierbetweenthe so-calledprotectorateof Bohemia and Moraviaand

the "independent" stateof Slovakia.58When Czechoslovakiawas dissolvingin 1993, the
two sides readilyagreed that this border would functionas the internationalborder,
and neitherhas claimsagainstthe other.59
Ascribing
a Legal Valence
The employmentbystatesof utipossidetis to respond to severalburstsof statecreation
overthe past twocenturiesappears to have endowed the principlewithsome normative
statusin the internationallegal order.Judgingbythe trendsof decision overnearlytwo
centuries,the contoursof thisprinciplein the decolonizationcontextseem to evince
fourgeneral characteristics.
First,statepracticeduringthe decolonizationof LatinAmerica,Africaand Asia lends
supportforregardingutipossidetis as a customarynormrequiringstatesto presumethe
inheritanceof theircolonial bordersunless,as occurredin some instances,the colonial
power(s) or another decision maker (such as the United Nations) had determined
otherwise.Most new statesinheritedtheircolonial borderswithoutalteration.In cases
of disputedboundaries,theyhave typically agreed to settlethemthroughreferenceto
uti possidetis.60
As noted, uti possidetisalso appears in numerous constitutionsin Latin
America,and the 1964 Cairo resolutionreflectedthe trendswithinAfricaat thattime.
Finally,the Declaration on the Grantingof Independence to Colonial Countriesand
Peoples indicatesa preference,thoughhardlyexplicit,forthe inheritanceof borders.6'
Nevertheless,expectationsregardinglawfulnessare not clear, withevidence lacking
as to whetherstatesregarded themselvesas required to retaincolonial bordersabsent
otheragreement.And themerepresenceof utipossidetis in constitutions,
bilateraltreaties
(includingarbitrationcompromis) or Resolution1514 does not demonstrateopiniojuris.
This gap suggestsa less than rock-solidbasis for a customarynorm and at least the
possibilitythatutipossidetis
was no more thana policydecisionadopted to avoid conflicts
duringdecolonization.62
The InternationalCourt ofJusticehas, of course, statedin dictumin Frontier Dispute
(BurkinaFaso/Mali) that uti possidetis is a "general principle" and a "rule of general
scope" in the case of decolonization.63It has neveradjudicatedwhetherutipossidetis is
a norm of customarylaw,because, in these typesof border disputes,both partieshave
stipulatedby compromis or otherwisethattheirboundarywould be determinedaccording
to thebordersin effectat thetimeofindependence.64Nevertheless, therepeatedassump-
58 Susan Greenberg,Borderline Case: Czechoslovakia's old internal

frontiersare beingrevived, GUARDIAN, Oct. 20,
1992, at 21.
59JiriMalenovsky, Problmessjuridiqueslies a la partition
de la TchUcoslovaquie,39 ANNUAIRE FRANAS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 305, 328 (1993).
" See, e.g.,Treatyof Arbitration, July16, 1930, Guat.-Hond.,Art.V, in Honduras Borders Case (Guat./
Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1309, 1322 (1933) ("the onlyjuridical line whichcan be established. . . is thatof the Uti
Possidetisof 1821"); Treatyof Arbitration,Sept. 14, 1881, Colom.-Venez.,Art. I, in FrontieresColombo-
Venezueliennes,1 R.I.A.A.225, 290 (1922).
6' GA Res. 1514 (XV), para. 4, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, 67, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960)
(requiringstatesto respectthe "integrityof [the] national territory [of dependent peoples]"); id., para. 6
(prohibitingthe "partial or totaldisruptionof the national unityand territorial integrity of a country").See
also RoSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAWAND How WE USE IT 122 (1994).
62 See Pinho Campinos, supra note 37, at 103 (legal statusambiguous); Daniel Bardonnet,Les Frontieres
terrestres
etla relativite
de leurtrace,153 RECUEIL DES CouRs 9, 56 (1976 V).
63 1986 ICJREP. at 565. Seealso TerritorialDispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 ICJREP. 6, 89 (Feb. 3) (Ajibola,J.,
sep. op.) ("principle of general application'). Cf IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
19 (4th ed. 1990) (distinguishing between "general principlesof internationallaw" and custom).
"' See,e.g.,FrontierDispute, 1986 ICJREP. at 557 (quoting 1983 compromis); id. at 565 ("there is no need,
for the purposes of the presentcase, to show thatthisis a firmlyestablishedprincipleof internationallaw
wheredecolonizationis concerned"); Land, Island, 1992 ICJREP. at 386.
tionbythe Court thatutipossidetis is a norm of internationallaw is probative.65

Without
definitivelyopining on the issue, one maythusassume some supportfor regardinguti
as a norm of regional customarylaw in Latin America and Africa,66
possidetis if not a
general norm as well,in the contextof decolonization.67
does not preventthe emergence of differentborders during
Second, uti possidetis
decolonization.In a significantnumberof situations,statesemergedfromcolonial rule
withotherthantheirpreindependenceborders.68 In addition,singlecolonies were split
at independence throughvarious processes.69 Utipossidetis was not, then, a uniform
practiceby or obligationupon colonial powers-although the General Assemblyhas
soughtto limitthose states'abilityto dividea colonial territory unilaterallyduringthe
independenceprocess.70Some have cited thesedivergencesto conclude thatutipossidetis
is devoid of legal content.7'
Moreover,in resolvingborder disputes lingeringfrom decolonization,states have
agreed to accept deviationsfromutipossidetis.72 In the 1933 HondurasBorders case, the
65 Sorel & Mehdi, supranote 26, at 12 (Frontier Disputemarks"consecration" of utipossidetisin international

law); W. Michael Reisman,TheConstitutional Crisisin theUnitedNations,87 AJIL83, 92 (1993) ("A statement
of the law . . . by a court obliged to decide accordingto law, cannot help but say somethingauthoritative
about the law.").
66 See FrontieresColombo-Venezueliennes, of 1810 is
1 R.I.A.A. 225, 229 (1922) (dictum that utipossidetis
law forpartiesunder "une theoriegenerale sud-americaine");Beagle Channel (Arg./Chile),52 ILR 93, 124-
25 (1977) (referringto it as "doctrine" and suggestinglegal force); id. at 230 (Gros, arb., concurring);
ALEJANDRoALvAREz, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AMERICAIN65 (1910); Marcelo G. Kohen, L'Utipossidetis revisite:
L'arre^t
du 11 septembre 1992 dans L'affaireEl Salvador/Honduras, 97 RGDIP 939, 956 (1993). But see Gerard
Cohen Jonathan, Les Iles Falkland (Malouines),18 ANNUAIRE FRANGAISDE DROIT INTERNATIONAL235, 239
(1972) ("perhaps" an inter-American rule); IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC
ENCYCLOPAEDIA 11 (1979) (customaryeffectin Africafor "those stateswhichhave unilaterallydeclared their
acceptance of the principle");Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere, Les Procedures de reglementdesdifferendsfron-
in LA FRONTIERE,supranote 37, at 112, 125.
taliers,
67 SeeKohen, supranote 66, at 957 ("une regle dispositiveque les Etatspeuventsubstituer par d'autres");
HIGGINS, supranote 61, at 123-24. Cf BROWNLIE, supranote 63, at 134 (emphasizingthat principleis not
mandatory).
68 To mentionthe mostnotable examples:Britainand France splitthe Germancolonyof Togo afterWorld
War I, and the Britisharea became part of Ghana, not Togo or a separate state. SeeA. RIGO SUREDA,THE
EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION151-63 (1973). These same powers split German Kamerun;
the northernpart of the Britisharea voted for mergerwithNigeria and the southernpart for mergerinto
the French area as Cameroun. SeeNorthernCameroons (Cameroon v. UK), 1963 ICJ REP. 15, 21-25 (Dec.
2). Britishand ItalianSomalia became independentas one stateand not two;KuriaMuria,an islandin British-
administeredAden (later South Yemen), became part of Muscat and Oman (now Oman) in 1967 afterits
people voted for separate status.See RIGO SUREDA, supra,at 199-202. And various enclaves of one statein
anotherwereabsorbed (throughthe euphemismof "retrocession")into thelatterat independence or thereaf-
ter,not made separate countries.See MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAWAND PRACTICE: THE
NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 19-21 (1982). For a forcibleincorporationof an enclave formally
rejectedby the internationalcommunity, see SC Res. 389, UN SCOR, 31stSess., Res. & Dec., at 18, UN Doc.
S/INF/32 (1976), and GA Res. 32/34, UN GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 169, UN Doc. A/32/45 (1977)
(East Timor).
69 See POMERANCE, supra note 68, at 19-20 (plebiscites on reversion of Belgian Rwanda-Urundi to two
countries and divisions of British Gilbert and Ellice Islands and of U.S. Trust Territories).
70 See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ REP. at 653 (Luchaire, J., sep. op.); BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 135. See
also GA Res. 49/18, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, vol. 1, at 17, UN Doc. A/49/49 (1994) (calling on
France to return Mayotte to Comoros Islands and preserve "unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro
Archipelago"); GA Res. 34/91, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 82, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (calling
on France to return islands to Madagascar); RIGO SUREDA,supra note 68, at 199-202 (UK rejection of Assembly
stance on Kuria Muria); POMERANCE,supra note 68, at 18-19 & nn.99-100, 30-31 & n.178.
71 SeeDutheil de la Rochere, supranote 66, at 125, 135; YEHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 342 (1965).
72 See, e.g., Gamez-Bonilla Treaty, Oct. 7, 1894, Hond.-Nicar., Art. II(6), in Arbitral Award made by the King
of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 ICJ REP. 192, 199-200 (Nov. 18) (allowing commission
and arbitrator to "grant compensations and even fix indemnities in order to establish, in so far as possible,
a well-defined natural boundary line") [hereinafter King of Spain]; Beagle Channel (Arg./Chile), 52 ILR 93,
132-33 (1977) (1881 boundary treatysupersedes unsatisfactoryuti possidetisused in 1856 treaty); Indo-Pakistan
Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) (India/Pak.), 50 ILR 2, 470 (1968) (three-person panel).
compromis authorizedthe tribunalto takeaccountof "interests"of the partiesthatmight

go beyond the uti possidetis line of 1821, and indeed to modifythat line as needed
throughan exchange of territory "which it maydeem just."73The panel determineda
line differentat points fromthe uti possidetis line, which often recognized territorial
encroachmentsof each side on the other's territories.74 And the ICJ has refusedto
regard utipossidetisas a peremptorynorm thatwould overridea provisionin compromis
givingan arbitratorauthorityto take into account otherhistoricaland legal factors.75
Third,utipossidetis does not bar postindependencechangesin borderscarriedout by
agreement.It is not a normofjus cogens, and precludesstatesneitherfromalteringtheir
borders nor even fromcreatingnew statesby mutual consent.76Dissolutionsmay be
foundin the practiceof LatinAmerica,77 as well as elsewhereafterWorldWar II.78 More
recently,the HelsinkiFinal Act did not rule out peacefulborderadjustmentsin Europe
(howeverunlikelytheymaybe) but banned onlychanges throughforce.79
Fourth,utipossidetis does not overrideotherlegal claimsarguingforbordersdifferent
fromthose of the prioradministrative units.Both the Vienna Conventionon the Law
of Treaties (1969) and the Vienna Conventionon Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties (1978) supportthisviewwithrespectto boundaries originallydeterminedby
treaties-i.e., those separatingcolonies of different European powers-by specifically
refraining fromadoptingthe maintenanceof such boundariesas a rule of conventional
law. AlthoughArticle62 of the 1969 Conventionprovidesthata fundamentalchange
of circumstancesmay not be invokedfor terminatingor withdrawing from "a treaty
establish[ing] a boundary,"80 theInternationalLaw Commissionstatesin itscommentary
thatthisprovisioneliminatesonlyone groundforchallengingthose treatiesand leaves
self-determination as a possible basis.8'
The 1978 Vienna Conventionstatesthat " [a] succession of States does not as such
affect. . . a boundaryestablishedby a treaty. . .8.2 Again, however,the term"as
such" leavesopen otherbasesfornonretentionofa boundary,such as self-determination
or theillegalityoftheearliertreaty.83Klabbersand Lefeberhavebuiltupon thislimitation
73Treatyof Arbitration, supranote 60, Art.V, at 1322.

74 See,e.g.,Honduras BordersCase (Guat./Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1309, 1352, 1356-57 (1933) (refraining from
"idealisticconception" of utipossidetis and recognizingline of de factocontrolalong stretchof border).
75 King of Spain, 1960 ICJREP. at 215.
76 SeeHIGGINS, supranote 61, at 123-24; Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination,34 VA.J. INT'L L. 1,
55-56 (1993). For one Africanleader who recognizedthatutipossidetis need not preclude boundarychanges,
see Jean-PierreLangellier,Quand le respect desftontieres
n'estplus "sacro-saint". ., LE MONDE, Oct. 19, 1977, at
11 (quoting OAU Secretary-General Mboumoua).
7 Seesupranote 20.
78 See SIHAw,supranote 43, at 213-14 (dissolutionof Mali federationafterSenegal's departure); FrankN.
Trager, TheFederation ofMalaysia:An Intermediate Failure?,in WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
REQuiSITES FOR SUCCESSFUL FEDERALISM 125, 143-50 (Thomas M. Francked., 1968) (dissolutionofFederationi
of Malaysiaafterseparationof Singapore). See also the otheressaysin WMy Federations Fail fordiscussionsof
federationsthatcollapsed before formalindependence.
79 Conferenceon Security and Co-operationin Europe, Final Act,Aug. 1, 1975, PrincipleIII, 14 ILM 1292,
1294 (1975), 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323, 324-25 (1975) (partiesregardfrontiers as "inviolable" and willrefrain
from"assaultingthese frontiers")[hereinafterHelsinskiFinal Act].
80
Openedforsignature May 23, 1969,Art.62, 1155 UNTS 331, 347.
81 Reportsof the Commissionto the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1,reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 259, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1("present articlewould not exclude the
operationof the principleof self-determination in anycase wherethe conditionsforits legitimateoperation
existed").
82 Opened forsignatureAug. 23, 1978, Art. 11, 3 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES
IN RESPECT OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 185, 189, UN Sales No. E.79.V.10 (1979), 17 ILM 1488,
1494 (1978).
83 SeeReportof the International Law Commissionon theworkof itstwenty-sixth session,UN Doc. A/9610/
Rev.1, reprintedin [1974] 2 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n, supranote 39, pt. 1, at 157, 201 (successionof boundaries
"would leave untouchedanyothergroundofclaimingthe revisionor settingaside of the boundarysettlement,
whetherself-determination or the invalidityor terminationof the treaty");Bardonnet,supranote 62, at 102.
to create a negativeversionof utipossidetis,providingsimplythatthe norm in the 1978

Vienna Conventionconcerningboundarytreaties-that theattainmentofindependence
is not per se a ground to invalidateexistingboundaries-also applies withrespectto
internalcolonial lines thatbecome internationalborders.84
Thus, utipossidetis
is agnosticon whetheror not secessionsor breakupsshould occur
and is not simplythe legal embodimentof a policycondemningthem.85It would not
purportto render unlawfulthe changes in the borders of Pakistanand Ethiopia as a
resultof the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 and Eritreain 1993-although it would
seem to suggestthat,in the absence of agreement,the bordersof the new statesshould
coincide withthose of East Pakistanand the formerEthiopianprovince,respectively.86
These traitsof utipossidetis
distinguishit fromanyidea of immutability and underline
anotherimportantlimitationof the principle:thatit is not equivalentto the legal ban
on the use of force-the norm of territorial integrity.87
That norm,clearlyjus cogens,88
prohibitschanges in interstateborders throughforce,and is reflectedin numerous
treatiesthatdo not forbidothertypesof changesin borders.89Utipossidetis, on the other
a
hand, offers presumptionthatthe bordersentitledto protectionunder Article2(4)
of the UN Chartershould be those thatcorrespondto colonial borders.90
As for the extension of uti possidetisto today's situations,the actions of states in
transforming existingbordersin the cases of Yugoslavia,Czechoslovakiaand the USSR
maysuggestsome movementtowardnormativeexpectations,as endorsedbytheBadinter
Commission.But the historyis briefand opinion remainsdivided.9'It is thusnecessary
to examine the proprietyof thisextension.
II. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LINES
A fullappraisalof the appropriatenessof utipossidetis

todayrequiresa closer examina-
tion of the truetargetof the doctrine-borders themselves.Internationaland internal
bordersserve highlydifferent functions,and the rote application of utipossidetis
also
raisespracticalproblemsin the determinationof boundaries.
84 SeeJan Klabbers& Rene Lefeber,Africa:Lost between Self-Determination

and UtiPossidetis, in PEOPLES AND
MINORITIES, supranote 42, at 37, 63.
85 SeeGregoryH. Fox, Self-Determination in thePost-ColdWarEra: A NewInternal Focus?, 16 MICH. J.INT'L L.
733, 751-52 (1995) (reviewing YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1994)).
86 For background,see generally Ved P. Nanda, SelfDetermination
in InternationalLaw: TheTragicTale ofTwo
Cities-Islamabad(WestPakistan)and Dacca (East Pakistan),66 AJIL 321 (1972); DAN CONNELL, AGAINST ALL
ODDS: A CHRONICLE OF THE ERITREANREVOLUTION (1993). The United Statesand France advocateddividing
EritreaafterWorldWar II, thoughtheydifferedon the arrangementsto governeach partof the territory. See
Recommendationsby the Deputies of the Foreign Ministersfor the FormerItalian Colonies of the Council
of Ministers(Aug. 31, 1948), [1948] 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 942, 945-46 (1974).
7
SeeRosalynHiggins,Comments, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES, supranote 42, at 29, 34-35; Sorel & Mehdi,
supranote 26, at 22; Pinho Campinos, supranote 37, at 106.
32SeeMilitaryand Paramilitary Activitiesin and againstNicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJREP. 14, 100-
01 June27).
"
See, e.g., ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, CHARTER Art. III(3), 479 UNTS 39, 74; Charter of Paris for a
New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 ILM 190, 196 (1991) (repeating obligation under UN Charter Art. 2(4)).
9" The OAU's Cairo Declaration has led to significant confusion on this question, for its commitment that
states "respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of independence," see supra text at note 36, can
be read as a mere duplication of Article 2(4) or as an equivalence between it and uti possidetis. In fact, the
declaration more accurately identifies those borders deserving protection in the first place. See TOuvAL, supra
note 33, at 90. See also Sorel & Mehdi, supra note 26, at 22 (many states incorrectlyview utipossidetisas rendering
any claim for border changes a violation of frontiers).
9' Compare,
e.g.,Alain Pellet,Notesurla commission de la Confirence
d 'arbitrage pourla paix en Yougosla-
europeenne
vie,37 ANNUAIREFRANCAISDE DROIT INTERNATIONAL329, 342 (1991) withHannum, supranote 76, at 55.
FunctionalDistinctions
The core functionaldistinction betweeninternational bordersand internaladministra-
tiveboundaries lies in a criticalantinomy:governmentsestablishinterstateboundaries
to separatestatesand peoples,whiletheyestablishor recognizeinternalbordersto unify
and effectively governa polity.The lines in each case promotecontroland efficiency,
but for opposing purposes.92As described by the geographer S. WhittemoreBoggs,
internationalboundaries"are in generalnegativeratherthanpositive."93 The historical
basis for thatseparationwas the physicalpreservationof the state.Statesused natural
features,such as rivers,mountain- rangesand lakes,or artificiallines to set up defenses,
or at leastwarningtracks,againstthe ambitionsof theirneighbors.94 Today boundaries
serve the more importantfunctionof limitingthe territorial jurisdictionof states.A
simpleline determineswhichstate,subjectto internationallaw,can prescribeand apply
lawsand policiesrelatingto the fullrangeofattributes ofpersonsand property, whether
citizenship,taxationor educational opportunities.95
Inherentin the notionofjurisdictionalseparationis the state'sauthority, and exercise
ofit,to controlmovementacrossborders.Immigrationstandards,customsduties,export
and importquotas,and otherconstraints on themovementofpeople, goods and intangi-
bles all operatewithrespectto,and because of,international borders.Statesmayfacilitate
free trafficthroughbilateralor multilateralarrangements,but the border enables the
stateto assertitsown prerogativeover transnational movements.96 If the statechose not
to differentiate itspolicies fromthose of itsneighboror limitin some waytransactions
betweenthem,itwould presumablyagree to a mergerand disappearanceof the border.
Despite Oppenheim's depiction of boundaries as "imaginarylines,"97theirrealityis
confrontedeveryday.
When those governinga state look internally, theirconcern is not withprotection
fromabroad,butwithbindingtogetheror managingseparateareas as a whole.98Because
a border by definitiondividesterritories, and thereforehas some separatingfunction,
it mightappear thatthe ideal policyfora nation-state would be the absence of internal
boundaries.99The statewithoutadministrative divisionsremainsrare,however,because
of the inabilityof most statesto governthemselveswithoutsome sharingof authority
withsubnationallevels.The patternwillrangefroma federalstructure to greaterconcen-
trationat thenationallevel,buteven theunitarystatewilllikelyhave some administrative
lines.These linesfragmentthestatein certainsituations;e.g., in federalentitiesthrough
different regimesof local laws,and actorswithinthe statemaypush devolutionat the
expense of effectivenational governance.But the underlyingassumptionis that of a
singlestate,withthe goal of continuedunity.100
Varietiesand purposesof internalborders.The originsand logic of particularinternal
frontiers varyacross states.Broadlyspeaking,statesmayeitherinheritsuch boundaries
92
Cf Land, Island, 1992 ICJREP.at 388 (notingstates'conversioninto internationalbordersof boundaries
"intended originallyforquite otherpurposes").
93BOGGS, supranote 26, at 10.
94SeeC. B. FAWCETT, FRONTIERS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 25-29 (1918).
95SeeAegean Sea ContinentalShelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 ICJ REP. 3, 35 (Dec. 19); Milan Sahovie &
WilliamW. Bishop, TheAuthority oftheState:Its RangewithRespecttoPersonsand Places,in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 311,316 (Max S0rensen ed., 1968).
96 See FAWCETT, supranote 94, at 29-31 ("a state places its watch and ward for incomersof all kinds");
BOGGS, supranote 26, at 10.
971 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw661 (Robertjennings& ArthurWattseds., 1992).
98RichardHartshorne,TheFunctional Approach 40 ANNALS ASS'N AM.GEOGRAPHERS 95,
in PoliticalGeography,
104-10 (1950).
99 SeeRONAN PADDISON, THE FRAGMENTED STATE: THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF POWER 19 (1983).
promotes"an indestructi-
100 Id. at 29 (quotingTexas v. White,74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,725 (1869) (Constitution
ble Union, composed of indestructible States")).
or establishthem.Thus, thefirstcategoryencompasses,in theterminology ofthegeogra-

phersHartshorneand Boggs,antecedentboundaries,whichpredatethecurrentcultural
landscape.'0' Examples include those correspondingto ancientlines of control,as with
manyEnglishcounties,or those traceableto old land grantsof a colonial power,as with
partsof the originalthirteenU.S. states.'02They also include lines in empiresor states
definingadministrativeunits that were formerlyindependent or quasi-independent
states,such as some withinAustria-Hungary and partsof modern Germany.103
As forestablishedboundaries,statesexpandinginto territories withoutinhabitantsof
thegoverningnationality-thedomesticequivalent,ofsorts,of terra nullius- havedrawn
pioneerboundaries,determinedbeforethearrivalofsettlers, as in muchoftheAmerican
and Canadian Westand Australia.'04 Like thebordersin imperialAfrica,theseemphasize
straight linesand usuallypaylittleregardto demographicpatternsofindigenouspeoples.
In the case of antecedentand pioneer boundaries,the state'spolicytowardunitytends
to play a relativelysmall part in the location of administrative lines- theyare either
inheritedor a productof a hastydecision undertakenforadministrative convenience.
Justas possible is the prospectthatthe centralgovernmenthas drawnthe bordersor
portions of them as part of the process of preservingthe state's unity,including in
response to centrifugalforces.'05Numerousstateshave created,abolished and redrawn
internalboundaries in the course of the nation-building process.The drawingof such
lines fostersunityin severalwaysbased on the state'sparticularobjectives.These goals
are preciselythose that drive the devolutionof power to or its sharingwithsubstate
entitiesin the firstplace-political, administrative and economic.'06
Politically,the centraland peripheralelitesseek to forgea nationalidentity, whether
throughobliterationof territorialunitswithcompetingsources of loyalty,or through
compromisewiththoseunitson bordersand otherissuesto ensuretheirrespectforthe
unityof the greaterpolity.'07Thus, both theBritishand Canadian Governmentsadjusted
the frontiers of Quebec and otherprovincesto integratetheminto Canada. Sometimes
Quebec has gained territory, while at othersit has been lost to otherprovinces.'08The
French revolutionary governmenteliminatedthe provincesof the ancien regime pre-
cisely to ensure tightcontrol fromParis, and created departements that remain,with
relatively smallchanges,to thisday.'09And theSovietUnion determinedthenumberand
bordersoftheunion and autonomousrepublicswiththegoal ofnationalunification -at
withsome moderationand, under Stalin,in an extraordinarily
first, cruel manner."0
"" BOGGS, supranote 26, at 28-30. Their typologyapplies to both internaland internationalborders. See
also T. S. MURTY, FRONTIERS: A CHANGING CONCEPT 217-21 (1978).
102 SeeRoY E. H. MELLOR, NATION, STATE, AND TERRITORY: A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 131 (1989) (England);
FRANKLIN K VAN ZANDT, BOUNDARIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SEVERAL STATES 81-166 (1966)
(easternU.S.).
1(3 See,e.g.,supratextat note 57.
14 See,e.g.,BOGGS, supranote 26, at 29 (quoting Hartshorne'sdescriptionof pioneer lines as " [t]otally
antecedent" boundaries); VAN ZANDT, supranote 102, at 228-58 (westernU.S.).
105SeeBOGGS, supranote 26, at 29-31 (categorizingthese boundaries as eithersubsequent,i.e., drawnto
reflectculturaldevelopmentof the region; or superimposed,i.e., drawnto cross culturallandscape of the
region). Cf WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 28-29
(1995) (U.S. stateboundariesdrawnin some cases to preventanystatewithmajorityof indigenouspeoples).
"' See PADDISON, supranote 99, at 49-55; Ivo D. Duchacek, Externaland InternalChallenges to theFederal
Bargain,PUBLIUS, Spring 1975, at 41, 49-50.
1(07See generally Alexander B. Murphy, TeritorialPoliciesin Multi-ethnicStates,79 GEOGRAPHICAL REV.
410 (1989).
1(8 Maryjanigan, Theroots ofthestruggle:
a turbulent
past hauntsQuebec,MACLEAN'S, Nov. 25, 1991, at 26.
9 SeeMELLOR, supranote 102, at 145-46.
l See KAISER, supra note 48, at 109-12 (on Moscow's merger of Georgia with Armenia and Azerbaijan into
one Union Republic until 1936 to prevent Georgia's secession; and reconstitution of Asian units during 1924-
1936). But seeCAROE, supranote 49, at 149. See alsoKAISER, supra,at 159, 367-68, 409-11; Light,supranote
48, at 39 (on Stalin's wartime forcible transfer of ethnic groups and elimination of their autonomous republics).
Administrative concernsdemand lines thatpermitgovernmentalagencies,at various

(Expanding the borders of a
levels, to divide up national responsibilitiesefficiently.
metropolitanarea to allowforbettersharingofpolice,publicutilitiesand welfareservices
move-
is one obvious example."') Economic needs call forlines to ensure the efficient
mentof peoples and goods withinthe state.These motiveshave also justifiednumerous
border changes,as well as unrealizedproposalsforrealignmentthatproved politically
infeasible.'12
The extent to which the centralgovernmentis willingand able to adjust internal
borders turnssignificantly on the degree to which the state's structureof governance
relies on devolution of power to these units. The classic federal states,such as the
United Statesand Switzerland,evince a traditionof generallystable territorial units."3
Devolutionmaybe reflectedin constitutional provisionsthatrestrictthe centralgovern-
ment'sabilityto alteradministrative boundaries.In the United States,Canada, Australia,
Germanyand Switzerland, thecentralgovernmentcan changethebordersofsubnational
unitsonlywiththeirconsent."14
Popularconceptions. do administrative
Not onlyfortheelitesin nation-states bordersserve
differentpurposesfrominternational borders.For theordinary resident,theadministrative
borderitself-even in the case of federalsystems-generally has contrasting implications
fordailylifecomparedto interstate borders.Whileschoolsystems, salestaxes,muchprivate
and publiclaw,and eventheofficial languagemaydiffer on eitherside oftheadministrative
line,itstandsapartfromtheinternational borderbytheease withwhichitmaybe crossed.
Traversingprovinciallines to commute,take a vacation,accept new employmentor visit
relativesis routine,involvingno passportsor customschecks.This facility mayprevailat
theinterstate levelforstateswitha historyof neighborly retain
relations,but theytypically
the rightto prevententryof variousundesirablepersons."5
Indeed, the integrative assumptionsand purposesof internalborderscan lead to their
reificationin termsof zones, more than particularlines. Zones straddlingthe line may
develop their own distinctidentity.In the United States,examples include the New
York/NewJersey/Connecticut metropolitanarea around New YorkCityand the Mary-
land/Virginiaregion surroundingthe Districtof Columbia; in Switzerland,one finds
the multicantonalareas around Zurichand Geneva. These zones betweeninternalunits
hark back to the classic internationallaw notion of the frontierzone."16 Accordingto
thisconception,the boundaryline is onlyone element of an entireregimegoverning
the area whereone stateends and the otherbegins. It recognizesthe need forthe law
to take into account the concerns for good-neighborlinessand cross-borderflowsof
people and goods. Stateshave routinelyconcluded arrangementsforinternationalbor-
der areas."7
"' See MELLOR, supra note 102, at 139-43.

112See PADDISON, supra note 99, at 136-38; Julian Minghi, Boundary Studies in Political Geography,53 ANNALS
ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 407, 424-27 (1963). See also Eric Fischer, On Boundaries, 1 WORLD POL. 196, 202-04
(1948) (persistence of some internal boundaries).
"3 See MELLOR, supra note 102, at 130-31.
114 See U.S. CONST. Art. IV, ?3; CAN. CONST. Art. 43; AUSTL. CONST. ??123-24; GRUNDGESETZ Art. 29 (Ger.);
PADDISON, supra note 99, at 135-38. See also Stephen Kinzer, East Germans,in Slap at West,Rject Joining State
with Berlin, N.Y TIMES, May 6, 1996, at A8. But see USSR CONST. Art. 72 (1977) (Novosti 1977) (providing
"right freely to secede," but without practical meaning).
115 See,
e.g., Council Directive 64/221, 1963-1964 OJ. SPEC. ED. 117 (restrictions on persons within free
trade area on limited grounds of public policy).
116 For the classic work on the frontier as zone, see DE LA PRADELLE, supra note 18, especially at 14-17, 225-
64. For a view from political geography, see FAWCETT, supra note 94, at 17-24. For geographical and legal
definitions, see BOGGS, supra note 26, at 22; Robert Y. Jennings, General Courseon PrinciplesofInternationalLaw,
121 RECUEIL DES CouRS 323, 428 (1967 II).
117For examples, see DE LA PRADELLE, supra note 18, at 265-88; J. R. V. PREScoTr, POLITICAL FRONTIERS
'AND BOUNDARIES 5-7 (1987).
Nevertheless,at the internationallevel, the linear aspects of the boundaryseem to

overwhelmitszonal aspects.As made clear in theLac Lanouxarbitration, moderninterna-
tional law has rejectedthe separatejuridical statusof the internationalfrontierzone as
a matterof customarylaw."8 It stilltreatsthe line as the only relevantlegal construct
forpurposesof limitingthejurisdictionand activitiesof a state.It has done so, it seems,
because the axiom that one state may not exercise itsjurisdictionin the territory of
anotherstate""9operatesmosteasilywithinthe legal simplicity of the line, as compared
to the intricatesocial constructof thezone. Moreover,therecognitionof extraterritorial
obligationshas permittedthe law to accept transboundaryregimeswithouta formaf
assaulton thesanctity ofboundariesper se.'20At the internallevel,however,withqualita-
tivelydifferent purposesand consequencesforadministrative units,thezonal characteris-
ticsof frontierstake on greaterimportance.Internationallaw seems to regarda state's
choice of and regimeforinternalboundaries as well withinthe domainergservo.'2'
Of course,internalboundariesdo matter,dependingupon the degree ofwhatRonan
Paddison calls nationalintegrationand nationalizationprevailingin the state.'22At one
extreme,such lines can seem irrelevantin termsof economic integration,outcomesof
national politicalraces and otherindicia of national unity.At the other,unitswiththe
strongestaversionto a national identity(such as Quebec) could come to regardthem
almostas iftheywere internationalones. In the middle,one findsstateswhose internal
bordersreflectdistinctidentitiesand patternsof behavior,in particular,bordersinher-
ited fromlong ago, such as those of Scotland and Bavaria.'23
Shortcomings ofutipossidetis.The ipsedixittransformation of all administrative borders
into internationalones suffers fromtwoflawsinherentin the distinctions betweenthese
sets of lines. First,it seems reasonable to posit thatwhen statesare breakingup, the
process of forgingnew national identitiesin the successorstateswill give the borders
special significance. The veryforcesthatpropelledthe creationof thenewstateare likely
to cause itto erectbarriers-to people, goods and evenideas-against itsneighbors.The
internationalborder betweenCroatia and Serbia, or the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
is not merelylegallydistinctfromthe previousinterrepublicanborder; the change in
itsstatushas clear consequencesforthepeople and governments ofthosestates.'24 These
boundaries impartwhat Michael Walzer has called a "dimension" of "physicalspace"
to the rightsand common lifeon each side.'25
When boundarylines assume thisnew significance, theirlocationbecomes even more
As noted,some internallines,especiallyof the inheritedvariety,
critical.'26 willfunction-
allymake optimalinternationalbordersbecause theydefinea trulydistinctcommunity
"8Affairedu Lac Lanoux (Fr./Spain), 12 R.I.A.A.281, 307-08 (1957) (five-person tribunal).

11
SeeS.S. "Lotus," 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7). See also MURTY,supranote 101, at 236-
37 (zonal characterrelevantfromanthropologicalview;linear characterfromlegal view).
120 See Trail Smelter Case (U.S./Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) (three-personpanel); Rio Declaration on
Environmentand Development,Principle 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), 31 ILM 874, 876 (1992);

Alexander Murphy,Emerging RegionalLinkageswithintheEuropeanCommunity: ChallengingtheDominanceofthe
State,84 TIJDSCHRIFrVOOR EcONOMISCHE EN SocIALE GEOGRAFIE 103, 108-11 (1993).
121 The various peace plans for Bosnia challenge even this position. See General Frameworkfor Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina,Dec. 14, 1995, Bosnia-Croatia-Serbia, Ann. 2, 35 ILM 75, 111 (1996) [hereinafter
Bosnia Agreement];Reportof the Secretary-General on theActivitiesof the InternationalConferenceon the
FormerYugoslavia,UN Doc. S/25479, at 16 (1993).
122
PADDISON, supranote 99, at 63-74, 108-15.
123On the effectof U.S. stateboundaries,see ArthurR. Stevens,StateBoundaries An
and PoliticalCultures:
Exploration AreaofMichigan,Indiana and Ohio,PUBLIUS, Winter1974, at 111.
in theTni-State
124 SeePhilipSherwell,Neighbors Newboundaiies
on theborderline: rekindleoldfear,SUNDAYTELEGRAPH(London),
Jan. 3, 1993, at 15.
125MICHAEL WALZER,JUST AND UNJUSTWARs 55, 57-58 (2d ed. 1992).
126
Cf. MICHAEL WALZER,SPHERES OF JUSTICE:A DEFENSE OF PLURALISMAND EQUALITY44 (1983) (notingthat
disputesover bordersarise withend of imperialrule because criticalissues are resolvedwithingeographical
units).
whoseunityand identity overrideotherconcerns.But otherconsiderationsand scenarios

also abound. Groups separatedby administrative lines withinone statemaywell prove
able to protecttheirintereststhroughinfluenceat the centrallevel,but maynot wish
to tolerateseparationinto different statesand the loss of thatpower.'27Families and
othercommunitiesseparatedbyadministrative bordersface special hurdlesiftheyfind
themselves in two states. Economic efficiencies or codependence taken for granted
in areas separated only by internallines may disappear when the border becomes an
internationalfrontier.'28 And military establishments integrated across administrative
lines face constraintsduringdissolution.'29
In response to thisfunctionalistcritique,a defense of utipossidetis could assertthat
internationalbordersnow mean less than ever,and thereforethattheirpreciselocation
is increasingly No doubtin certainpartsoftheworld-in particular,Europe-
irrelevant.
statesare reducingthe significanceof internationalborders,withclear benefits.'30 Yet
formost of the world theyremain one of the definingelementsof the polity.Even in
Europe, porositydoes not equate withirrelevance.'3'States breakingapart seem the
least likelyto regard the new border as irrelevant-even if secessionistsclaim thatthe
new statewillmaintainclose economic linkswithits neighbors.'32
Such a defense could also posit thatany administrative function
line can effectively
as a suitableinterstateboundary,as both law and politicalgeographyhave rejectedthe
doctrineof the naturalbordersof states.'33Bordersthemselves,whereverlocated, can
indeed solidifydifferencesbetweenneighboringpeoples and regions,and create new
and separatenationalidentitiesamong similargroupson the opposite sides.'34It is thus
unexceptionablethat conversionof administrative borders to interstateboundaries is
possible. But thispropositionneeds to be weighed againstthe competingconcerns-
particularlythe evolvinglaw of self-determination and human rights-which militate
againstforcinga people to live in a new statewheretheymayface persecution,an issue
explored in part III.
Second, conversionof administrative lines to internationallines disregardsthe inter-
connectionbetween the internalbordersand the forgingor maintenanceof national
unity.Politiciansdo not drawinternallines withthe possibilityof secessionin mind.'35
(If theyforesawthe emergenceof separatestates,theymightwell drawthe lines differ-
ently.)Thus, when the contractamong the territorial unitsor betweenthose unitsand
the center,or the center'smasterplan forunity,collapses throughdisintegration, why
assumethatone ofitscore elements-the locationoftheinternalborders-must remain
unchanged? Rather,this scenario calls into question the parties' original bargain or
'7 SeeBUCHHEIT, supranote 1, at 29-30.

128 See,e.g.,ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATIONOF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONALPOLITICS 61-
62 (1991) (describinglarge economic capacityof Katanga vis-a-vis the whole Congo); Mel McMillan, Ken
Norrie & Brad Reid, Canada and Quebecin a NewWorld:ThePQ's Economic Proposals,CONST. FORUM,Fall 1994,
at 11.
129See,e.g.,JamesRupert,Yeltsin CancelsTripto UkraineforTreatySigning,WASH. POST,Apr. 3, 1996, at Al5
(continuingdisagreementsover Black Sea fleet).
30 See,e.g.,Treatyon European Union, Feb. 7, 1992,Art.B, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 5, 31 ILM 247, 255 (1992)
(goal of European Union "the creationof an area withoutinternalfrontiers").
131See,e.g, Emma Tucker,A pillarin needofsupport: EU membersarestillfarfromentrustingjusticeand policing
to Brussels,FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 18, 1996, at 14; Janet McEvoy,One-Year-Old Schengen Falls Shortof
Expectations, ReuterEur. Comm. Rep., Mar. 25, 1996, availablein LEXIS,Nexis Library,CurnwsFile.
132SeeDraftbill on Quebec sovereignty, Art.2, 35th Leg., Quebec, 1stSess. (1994) (calling foragreement
of economic associationbetweenfutureindependentQuebec and Canada).
133See,e.g.,Claude Blumann,Frontieres in LA FRoNTIERE, supranote 37, at 3, 4-6; MELLOR, supra
et limites,
note 102, at 78-81; BoGGs,supranote 26, at 22-25.
34 SeeSHAw,supranote 43, at 186.
13' SeeOWEN, supranote 8, at 34-35 (on Yugoslavinterrepublican boundaries).
schemepremisedon thecontinuity ofthewholestate.'36In thecase ofQuebec, secession-

ists seeminglyseek to have theircake and eat it, too-to secede and take withthem
land givento Quebec as part of its integrationinto Canada.'37
PracticalImpediments
toUti possidetis
Whetherregardingthe decolonization of empiresor the dissolutionof states,new
governmentsor arbitrators attemptingto relyon the location of administrative bound-
aries to determineinternationallines mustbegin witha set of clearlydefinedborders.
If,as the World Court said in the Frontier turnson a " 'photo-
Disputecase, utipossidetis
graph' of the territorialsituation,'138 then those analyzingthe image and "pluggingit
into" the utipossidetisequation mustknowtwocore things-what thephotographshows
and when it was taken.In fact,the numberof borderdisputeseven wherepostcolonial
stateshave applied utipossidetisdemonstratesthe absence of spatialand temporalclarity
in manyboundaries.'39These two ambiguitiesremain in applyinguti possidetis in the
modern context.
The firstobstacleto applyingutipossidetis is posed bytheblurringof such lines during
the governanceof administrative units.The effective exerciseof territorial
jurisdiction
by colonial authorities-or effectivites-has provedsignificant in numerousarbitrations
as evidence of-and even substitutionfor-the line of utipossidetis.'40 The ICJ relied
in particularin Land, Island and Maritime
on effectivites Frontier
Dispute,examiningwhich
areas near the disputedborderwereunder the actual controlofvariousSpanishcolonial
authorities,and even givingweightto effectivites exercised by the newlyindependent
statesafterthe departureof the Spaniards.'4'
On the one hand, effectivites
mightraisefewpracticalproblemsin extendingutiposside-
tis to secessions and dissolutions,as the lines between administrative units mightbe
especiallyclear withina state.'42The centraland local officialsmightalso be farmore
cognizantof the scope of theirterritorial authoritythanwere the governorsof colonial
provincesand theirmastersin a distantEuropean capital.
But today,even where those borders are clearlydemarcated,the areas near them
mightjust as possiblybe under some typeofjointlegal controlof the neighboringunits,
or conceivablyunder central control.Although the Frontier Disputeopinion suggests
discountingdefactocross-borderauthorityifit conflictswitha clear line of legal title,'43
it does not make clear how to handle such dejurecross-border sharedauthority. Beyond
boundaryareas, title to land servinga national purpose-such as militarybases and
nationalparks-could restwiththe centralgovernment.'44 Centralgovernmentenclaves
make perfectsense in the contextof one statebut raiseprofoundproblemsin the event
136
Cf.Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties,supranote 80, Art.61(1), 1155 UNTS at 346 (withdrawal
fromtreatypermissibleowing to "permanentdisappearance or destructionof an object indispensable" for
treaty'sexecution);Duchacek, supranote 106,at 43-44 (federalismas "the partnershipofterritorial communi-
ties"); KYMLICKA, supranote 105, at 117.
137 SeeGRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES, SOVEREIGN INJUSTICE: FoRCIBLE INCLUSION OF THE JAMES BAY CREES
AND CREE TERRITORY INTO A SOVEREIGN QUtBEC 207-12 (1995). But seeThomas M. Franck,RosalynHiggins,
Alain Pellet,MalcolmN. Shaw & ChristianTomuschat,L'Integrite du Quebecdansl'hypothese
territoriale del'accession
a la souverainete,in 1 LES ATTRIBUTS D'UN QUtBEC SOUVERAIN 377, 402-05 (Commissiond'ftude des questions
afferentesa l'accession du Quebec a la souveraineteed., 1992).
138FrontierDispute, 1986 ICJREP. at 568.
131 See,
e.g.,Sorel & Mehdi, supranote 26, at 21-33; DE LA PRADELLE, supranote 18, at 83-86.
14( See,
e.g.,Honduras Borders Case (Guat./Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1309, 1324 (1933); FrontierDispute, 1986
ICJREP. at 587.
41 1992 ICJ REP. at 395-401. See also Kohen, supranote 66, at 964-66.
142See,e.g.,VAN ZANDT, supranote 102, at 4-14 (well-defined lines of U.S. states).
143 SeeFrontierDispute, 1986 ICJ REP. at 587 ("[Wlhere the territory . . . is effectively
administeredby a
State other than the one possessingthe legal tide,preferenceshould be givento the holder of the tide.").
144 Seesupranote 129.
608 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol.90:590
of dissolutionor secession, the absorptionof enclaves during decolonization hardly

servingas model precedents.'45
Withregardto temporalclarity,statesand arbitrators derivea set of bound-
typically
aries throughthe use of a criticaldate-one that"designate[s] thatpoint of timeafter
which no acts of the parties can validlyaffectthe legal situationin an international
dispute."'46The partiesto a borderdisputeoftenspecifythatdate in a treatyor compro-
mis.'47 It usuallycorrespondsto the year of independence of the statesinvolved,or a
time when the independence process was sufficiently advanced that changes by the
colonial authoritieswould be deemed irrelevant.'48
Althoughthe doctrineis meant to help exclude fromthe decision-makingprocess
self-serving evidencecreatedbya partyafterthe disputearose,'49the apparentsimplicity
of the criticaldate is misleading.Where the partieshave not agreed on a criticaldate,
arbitraltribunalshave shownfewclear patterns-employinga smorgasbordof formulas
to determinethe date, makingtheirdecisionswithoutrecourse to a criticaldate, and
admittingevidence createdafterthe date ifit shed lighton the earliersituation.50
For statescreatedfromsecessionsand dissolutions,thecriticaldate mayalso be difficult
to determine,as parties may have strongincentivesto adopt contrastingdates. The
independence movementmay have festeredfor manyyears,and the lines may have
changed significantly over time,includingduringthe processof dissolution.One could,
of course,simplyapplythe rule stipulatedin some arbitrationsand assume thatthe date
upon which secession or dissolutionfinallysucceeds (possiblyin termsof recognition
of new entities)is the criticaldate, and that those administrative
borderswill prevail.
But other positionsare arguable. In the formerSoviet Union, the Russian Federation
could base a claim to Crimea upon the latter'slong ties to Russia and seek a critical
date beforeKhrushchev's1956 "gift"to the UkrainianSSR.'5' Canada could claim that
the criticaldate fordeterminingthe bordersof an independentQuebec is not when it
secedes, but a date beforeCanada accorded it new lands.'52
III. UTI POSSIDETIS AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The functionaldistinctionbetweeninternaland internationalboundaries thatcalls

into question the simpleconversionof one to the otherdoes not sufficeto demonstrate
should not become a rule of customarylaw formodem breakupsand
thatutipossidetis
breakaways.For statesindeed chose such a transformationduringthe decolonizationof
both Spanish America and European Africa.Does that trend of decision of the early
nineteenthand middle twentieth centuriesrepresentgood law at the turnof the twenty-
'4- Seesupranote 68.

Date, 12 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 1251, 1267 (1963). Seealso id. at 1254 ("Events
'46L. F. E. Goldie, TheCritical
occurringbefore the criticaldate . . . are right-creatingfacts."); Gerald Fitzmaurice,TheLaw and Procedure
oftheInternational CourtofJustice,1951-4: PointsofSubstantive Law. PartII, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 37-44
(1955-56).
'47 See supranote 60 (Latin Americanreferenceto "uti possidetis of 1821").
'48 See FrontierDispute, 1986 ICJ REP. at 570 (findingirrelevantdiscrepancyover criticaldate as parties
agree pertinentperiod is end of French colonial rule); id. at 653 (Luchaire,J., sep. op.); ArbitralAwardof
31 July1989 (Guinea-Bissau/Sen.),83 ILR 1, 26-27 (1989) (three-personpanel), application tonullifyrejected,
1991 ICJ REP. 53 (Nov. 12) (acts by colonial power aftercommencementof self-determination process not
relevant);SHAW,supranote 43, at 187-91.
14' BROWNLIE,
sup-anote 63, at 130.
'15 SeeBLUM,supranote 71, at 208-21 and cases discussed therein.See also Land, Island, 1992 ICJ REP. at
401 (possibilityof more thanone date ifpartiesaccept modifications of borderafterindependence ); Sorel &
Mehdi, supranote 26, at 27-29; Kohen, supranote 66, at 962-64.
15' Seesupranote 52.
152 SeeNeil Finkelstein,George Vegh & CamilleJoly,Does QjubecHave a RighttoSecedeat International Law?,
74 CLAN. BARREv. 225, 260 (1995). But seeFrancket al., supranote 137, at 417.
first?The answerdemands scrutinyof the elementssurroundingthe prior use of uti

possidetisand the circumstancesin whichit would operate today.'53
One response to the decolonizationprecedentturnson a criticalfactualdistinction
betweenearlierepisodes and today. Utipossidetis in the decolonizationcontextdid not
engenderchangingthe kind of internalbordersthatitwould in a state'sbreakuptoday
because the boundariesbetweendifferent partsof a colonial empire did not servethe
same functionsas typicalinternalboundaries.While the border between,forexample,
one French colony and another in French Africawas less of a dividingline than that
between a French colony and a Britishcolony,'54in several senses it was more of a
dividingline thanthe borderbetweenone Frenchdepartmentand another,or between
Americanstates.
In a colonial empire,the governorsand other authoritiesof each territory generally
enjoyedextensiveinternalauthorityand independence,farmore than officialsof inter-
nal unitsin the metropole.'55In the FrenchAfricancolonies, the governors-general of
the twolargestgroupsof colonieswereindependentofParis,and thegovernorsbeneath
themwere givenwide latitudewithinthe individualcolonies.'56Nativecivilservantsalso
developed loyaltiesto theirimmediatecolony.'57Indeed, neighboringcolonies often
had different the metropole,suggestingthatthe lines dividingthem
legal statusvis-a-vis
had assumed what one mighttermsemi-international status.'58 Utipossidetis,
then,was
less functionallyillegitimatein the past thanitwould be todaybecause the bordersto be
transformed more closelyresembledinternationalboundariesthando theadministrative
lines of states.
More significant thanthe lack ofa functionalparallelbetweentoday'sinternalborders
and those betweencolonies of the same metropoleis the interveningevolutionof the
legal landscape regardingself-determination. This shiftsuggeststhatthe factorsin the
colonial contextthatpresumablymade utipossidetis acceptable law no longerprevail.
FromDecolonization
Self-Determination: toward
Democracy
Decolonization
toutcourt.DespitetheUN Charter'sdeliberatelytepidmandateconcern-
ing decolonization,'59by 1945 the emergenceof the United Statesand the SovietUnion
as superpowers(both of themstateswithoutcolonial empiresin the formalsense) and
153HIGGINS, supranote 61, at 3 ("To relymerelyon accumulatedpast decisions (rules) when the context
in whichtheywere articulatedhas changed-and indeed when theircontentis oftenunclear-is to ensure
thatinternationallawwillnot be able to contributeto [solving]today'sproblems. . ."); W. Michael Reisman,
SomeRefledions on InternationalLaw and Assassination undertheSchmitt Formula,17 YALE J.INT'L L. 687, 689
(1992) (need to "identifythe conditioningfactorsin the past thatshaped normativeexpectations[and] . . .
determinewhethertheycontinue to operate"). See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africain Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding SecurityCouncil resolution276
(1970), 1971 ICJREP. 16, 31 (AdvisoryOpinion ofJune 21).
151
Cf VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOFF, THE EMERGING STATES OF FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA 28
(1960) (frequencyof boundaryalterationsbetweenFrench colonies).
5 SeeWilliamB. Cohen, TheFrenchGovenors,in AFRICAN PROCONSULS: EUROPEAN GOVERNORS IN AFRIcA
19, 23-27 (L. H. Gann & PeterDuignan eds., 1978); AnthonyH. M. Kirk-Greene, On Governorshipand Governors
in BritishAfrica,in id. at 209, 232 (quoting Churchillthat "it would not be possible to govern the British
Empirefrom[owning Street,and we do not try,"but notingabilityof colonial officeto superviseifneeded);
JEAN SURET-CANALE, FRENCH COLONIALISM IN TROPICALAFRICA 1900-1945, at 308-13 (Pica Press1971) (1964).
156 See Cohen, supranote 155, at 23; SURET-CANALE, supranote 155, at 312. But cf THOMPSON & ADLOFF,
supranote 154, at 26-30 (governor-general assertingstrongcontrolovergovernors,but laterdecentralization).
'57 SeeANDERSON, supranote 19, at 123-31.
158 SeeFRAN oOIS LUCHAIRE,DROIT D'OUTRE-MER 100-05 (1959) (categoriesofterritories under 1946 Constitu-
tion); KENNETH ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAw 19-62 (1966) (categoriesof nationsin
BritishEmpire).
'59UN CHARTER Arts.73, 76(b) (obligatingstatesto "develop self-government" forcolonies and "promote
. . .progressivedevelopmenttowardsself-government or independence as maybe appropriate"forthe trust
territories).See also HIGGINS, supranote 61, at 111-14; CASSESE, supranote 13, at 37-43.
610 LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
THE AMERICAN [Vol.90:590
the wartimehumiliationof the leading colonial stateshad led to a growingsense that

colonialismhad run its course. The new organizationseized on thisagenda, propelling
statestowardacceptingthatthe core UN principleof self-determination'60 demanded,
at the least, the liberationof colonial peoples frommetropolitancontrol.'6'By 1960,
thispositionhad crystallized in GeneralAssemblyResolution1514,in whichtheAssembly
declared, withno opposing votes,that "[a] 11peoples have the rightto self-determina-
tion," and demanded that statescease any "repressivemeasures" thatwould impede
their"rightto complete independence."'162 The Assemblywould admit in Resolution
1541 thatthe self-government inherentin decolonizationneed not resultonlyin inde-
pendence,but thatthisdecisionwouldrestwiththecolonialpeoples alone.'63Fundamen-
tally,however,the communityhad determinedto focusself-determination upon, ifnot
simplyequate it with,decolonization.
It could have involved
Decolonization did not have to entailadoption of utipossidetis.
the redrawingof bordersalong other lines, as expounded by the pan-Africanist move-
ment.'64 Utipossidetis became the preferredpolicy because it kept decolonization-a
developmentregardedalmostuniversally as imperative-orderly.It meant thatcolonial
and local elites knew,more or less, what the map of Africaand Asia would look like
beforethe processbegan. This agreementon the appropriateunitof self-determination
eliminated that aspect of decolonization most likelyto delay the process or lead to
continental-or intercontinental-conflict. All thatremainedto achieveindependence
was workingout the details througha transitionalperiod (sometimesaccompanied by
a plebiscite)and selectionof a government.'65 This procedurerectifieda major compo-
nent of the injusticesexperiencedby colonial peoples, puttingmostAfricanand Asian
peoples at least one step closer to representativegovernmentand self-determination.
Decolonization throughutipossidetis thuspreventedthe perfectfrombeing the enemy
of the good.
At the same time,the fateof peoples withintheseformercolonial boundarieswas of
less concern to states,and thusinternationallaw offeredlittlechallenge to utipossidetis.
Althoughthepeople's overallrightto politicalparticipationremainedthestatedposition
of the internationalcommunity,'66 its degree of acceptance seemed less certain.Some
postcolonialleaderswould reveal themselves to be antidemocraticdespotsas bad as the
European variety.'67 And to those minorities withinthe new borders who could not
advance theiragenda forlack of sufficient ballots,statesshowedeven less notice.Ideally,
their grievanceswould be addressed throughhuman rightsprotections;as a matter
of state practice,theirwelfarewas more or less irrelevantto the overall goal of new
statehood.'68
'6( UN CHARTER Art.1(2).

161
SeeROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 103-06 (1963).
162
GA Res. 1514, supranote 61, paras. 2, 4, Supp. No. 16, at 67. For the vote, see UN GAOR, 15th Sess.,
947th plen. mtg.at 1274-75, UN Doc. A/PV.947 (1960).
163
Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, PrincipleVI, UN GAOR, 15thSess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, 29, UN Doc. A/
4684 (1960). Seealso POMERANCE, supranote 68, at 10-12.
164
See supranote 35.
165
SeegenerallyBEIGBEDiER, supranote 85, at 126-47; Enhancingthe effectivenessof the principleof periodic
and genuine elections:Reportof the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/46/609, at 27-28 (1991).
166
See,e.g.,UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights,Art.21, GA Res. 217 (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71, 75
(1948) (rightto participatory governmentand "periodic and genuine elections").
167
See,e.g.,ARNOLD RIVKIN, NATION-BUILDING IN AFRICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 47-60 (1969); GEORGE
B. N. AVFTTEY, AFRICA BETRAYED (1992).
168
SeeHURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CON-
FLICTING RIGHTS 71-72 (1990); Allan Rosas,Internal in MODERN LAw OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Self-Determination,
225, 227-28 (ChristianTomuschated., 1993); Franck,supranote 42, at 10.
Recognition of internalself-determination.
As European empiresgave way to new states,
the preoccupationwith decolonizationas a formof self-determination began to ebb.
Internationallaw came to regardself-determination as more than "the rightof peoples
of color not to be ruled bywhites."''69The decade afterthe adoptionof Resolution1514
was markedby twomajor developments.First,the 1966 InternationalCovenanton Civil
and PoliticalRightstransformed theUniversalDeclaration'sprovisionson politicalpartici-
pation into detailed,convention-based The inclusionat its frontend of a
obligations.'70
rightto self-determination not explicitly
limitedto decolonizationoffereda springboard
forassertionsof internalself-determination.'7' And the provisionson nondiscrimination
and minoritiesaimed at ensuringprotectionsforgroupswithinstates.'72
Second, the 1970 FriendlyRelationsDeclarationextendedthefrontiers ofself-determi-
nation with respect to the territorialaspect of states.'73Elaboratingon the Charter
principleof equal rightsand self-determination of peoples, it suggested,in a now near-
mythicparagraph,that the borders of statesmay not be sacrosanct.'74Regardlessof
whetherthispassage recognizesanyrightto secede,'75itat leastsignalsthatthe "national
unity"of a stateis earned byitsgovernment,and is not a faitaccompli. This seemingly
radicalviewin facthad an importantprecursorin the endorsementin 1921 of a limited
rightto separationby the second League of Nations commissionconsideringFinland's
sovereignty over the Aaland Islands.'76
In one sense, thisshiftmay have no impacton utipossidetis as a principleto govern
futurebreakups.Byopening up the possibility of lawfulbreakups,the FriendlyRelations
Declaration mightmean thatthe new entitiesought to conformto the administrative
unitsof the old. The need to avoid borderdisputeswould thusmatteras much as it had
duringthe breakup of empires,justifying continuedrecourseto utipossidetis.
But the declaration,togetherwiththe Covenant,recognizesotherimportantvalues.
For example, it may suggestthat newstatesought to be delineated in a way that is
conduciveto theirbeing led bya government"representingthewholepeople belonging
to the territory withoutdistinctionas to race, creed or colour."'77 This is not a recipe
forethnicallydeterminedlines; and the governmentof the formeradministrative unit,
169
Franck,supranote 42, at 10. Seealso HIGGINS, supranote 61, at 114-21.
17" Dec. 16, 1966,Art.25, 999 UNTS 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR]. SeeKarlJosef Partsch,FreedomofConscience
and Expression, and PoliticalFreedoms,in THE INTERNATIONAL BILI OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 10, at 209,
238-45.
171 SeeICCPR, supranote 170, Art. 1, 999 UNTS at 173; CASSESE, supranote 13, at 48-52, 59-62. See also
India's reservationto Article1, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS
AT 31 DECEMBER 1995, at 113, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/14, UN Sales No. E.96.V.5 (1996) (rejectingapplica-
tion beyondpeople under foreigndomination);id. at 116-17 (objectionsto reservationbyFrance,Germany,
Netherlands).
172 See ICCPR, supranote 170, Arts.2, 26-27, 999 UNTS at 173, 179. See generally PATRICK THORNBERRY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 141-247 (1991).
17 For a viewthatResolution1514 presaged thistransformation, see Suzuki,supranote 9, at 841-44.
174 See GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 124, UN Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter FriendlyRelationsDeclaration],whichlimitsthe assurancethatthe declarationshall not
authorizeor encourage any action to "dismemberor impair,totallyor in part,the territorialintegrity or
politicalunity"of states,to "States conductingthemselvesin compliance withthe principleof equal rights
and self-determination of peoples as describedabove and thus possessed of a governmentrepresentingthe
whole people belongingto the territory withoutdistinctionas to race, creed or colour."
175 See,e.g.,Robert Rosenstock,TheDeclaration ofPrinciples
ofInterationalLaw ConceringFriendly Relations:
A Survey, 65 AJIL713, 732 (1971); BUCHHEIT, supranote 1, at 92-94 (declarationrecognizessome rightto
secede); CASSESE, supranote 13, at 120 (declarationpermitssecession when internalself-determination "is
absolutelybeyondreach").
176 See The Aaland Islands Question: Report submittedto the Council of the League of Nations by the
Commissionof Rapporteurs,League of Nations Doc. B7/21/68/106,at 28 (1921) (separation"a last resort
when the Statelacks eitherthe willor the powerto enact and applyjust and effective guarantees[of minority
rights]"); id. at 34. The League eventuallydecided to retainthe islandsas partof Finland.
177 See supranote 174. Seealso McCorquodale, supranote 9, at 879-80.
unchanged in size or shape, maymeet thattestin manysituations.Yet it does open the

door to drawingborders so that individualswill not simplybe part of an oppressed
minorityin a new state.
Suppose a group representingthe majorityof an administrative unit of a state,but a
minoritywithinthat state,intends to split offbecause the state refusesto accord it
the representativegovernmentrequired under the FriendlyRelationsDeclaration.The
eventualnew stateis obligatedunder human rightslaw not to discriminateagainstits
own minorities.But suppose that,during the disintegrationor secession,the nascent
state shows that it has no intentionof adhering to that law. In this case, the areas
controlledby those minoritiesmightbe far betteroffwithinthe remnantsof the old
state(especiallyifone such minority was partof the majorityin the old state).The Serb-
dominated partsof Croatia mightbe one example; partsof the formerSoviet Union
mightbe others.'78
Thus, in some circumstances,retentionof the internallines in unalteredformmay
detractfromthenormsinherentin theFriendlyRelationsDeclarationand humanrights
law. To address the needs of a widerrange of people, ratherthan the majorityin the
new statealone, a more flexibleapproach is required-one thatwould ideallyrelyon
traditionalhuman rightsprotectionsbut would not preclude other remedies.When a
new stateis formed,itsterritory oughtnot to be irretrievablypredeterminedbut should
forman elementin the goal of maximalinternalself-determination.'79 Utipossidetis,for
itspart,assumesthatanybenefitsto internalself-determination fromchangesin borders
are alwaysoutweighedby the riskof conflict.
Towarddemocratic The yearssince 1970 have been characterizedbyfurther
participation.
landmarkselaboratingthe scope of internalself-determination. In declaringthat "all
peoples alwayshave the right,in full freedom,to determine,when and as theywish,
theirinternaland externalpolitical status,'180 the Helsinki Final Act contemplateda
rightof internalself-determination broader than thatin the FriendlyRelationsDeclara-
tion.8 By the early1990s,the end of the SovietUnion had led more governmentsand
internationalorganizationsexplicitlyto embrace the notion-always inherentin the
UniversalDeclaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-that the only
legitimateformof governmentis one selected by the people throughfree,fair and
periodic elections.'82
The trendsin statepracticetowardequating the rightof internalself-determination
withdemocracydo not categoricallynegativeutipossidetis as the lawfulresponse in the
eventof breakups.Presumably,new statesbased on priorinternalborderscould allow
periodic and genuine elections,satisfyingthe basic elementof the democraticentitle-
ment.Justas utipossidetis proveda prerequisiteto nation buildingafterdecolonization
by promotingstabilityand reducingthe possibilityof conflict,'83 so could it also prove
a conditionfortrueinternalself-determination.
178For the question of minorities

withinminorities,see infratextat note 187.
'79 Cf HurstHannum, Synthesis in PEOPLESAND MINORITIES, supranote 42, at 333, 335; Kw-
ofDiscussions,
LICKA,supranote 105, at 113 ("fair way to . . . draw boundaries . . . [involves]ensuringthat all national
groups have the opportunityto maintainthemselvesas a distinctculture,if theyso choose").
18( HelsinkiFinal Act,supranote 79, PrincipleVIII, 14 ILM at 1295.
' Compare FriendlyRelationsDeclaration, supranote 174, at 124 (governmentsrepresentativeif theydo
not discriminateon basis of "race, creed or colour"); see also Antonio Cassese, TheHelsinkiDeclarationand
Self-Determination, in HUMANRIGHTS,INTERNATIONAL LAWANDTHE HELSINKIACCORD83, 100-03 (Thomas
Buergenthaled., 1977).
182 See,e.g.,CharterofParisfora New Europe, supranote 89, 30 ILM at 193-95; GA Res. 48/131,preambular
para. 2, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 250, UN Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (role of UN assistancein
electionsfor"the strengthening and buildingof institutionsrelatingto human rightsand the strengthening
of a pluralisticcivilsociety").
183 SeeFrontierDispute, 1986 ICJREP. at 567.
Yet the recognitionin internationallaw of the primacyof politicalparticipationdoes

exertsome pull on the sanctityof utipossidetis.If the overridingpurpose of a stateis to
permititspeople to advance theirvalues througha democraticprocess,then the forma-
tion of a nezvstateought to take thatgoal into account. One methodof promotingthis
policyis to ensure thatthe inhabitantsof the new statetrulyseek membershipin it and
adjust the frontiersso as to produce an acceptable degree of participation.Of course,
ifthe administrativebordersalreadyserveto definea politydedicatedto democracyand
supportedby the populace, modificationwillbe unnecessary.184
The special natureof transitionsto new statehoodwas recognizedby the firstLeague
of Nations legal commissionto examine the Aaland Islands question,which acknowl-
edged thatthe rightsof unwillingparticipantscannot be readilydiscountedduringthe
formationof newstates.Thus, the inclusionof the islandswithinFinlandwhen the latter
formedpartof Russiadid not mean thattheywould lawfully be a partofan independent
Finlandiftheirpeople did notwishto be.'85The claimsofpeoples caughtin a transitional
situationdifferfromthose of peoples long presentin a state offeringthem full civil
rights:whateverthe latter'sorigins,theywould seem to have a weak claim to border
adjustmentsthatwould put them in a neighboringstate.'86The formergroup would
seek the mostdemocraticoutcome in the already-fluid situationof new stateformation;
the otherwould appear to promoteinstability withoutregard to the costs of upsetting
a democraticstatusquo.
This view is not withoutrisks.To meet the needs of all dissatisfiedgroups trapped
withina new statecould lead to a perpetuationof secessionsor a patchworkof enclaves
of one statewithinanother.Thus, democratictheorycannotbe carriedto thisextreme,
and other methodswillbe required to enable disaffectedgroups to participatein the
politicalprocess.'87Nevertheless,under certaincircumstances, such as those in the for-
merYugoslaviaand partsof the formerSovietUnion, an adjustmentof the frontiermay
prove necessaryfordemocracybuilding.
Revisited
TheBadinterCommission
Withthese normativesea changes now apparent,we returnto the BadinterCommis-
sion's Opinion No. 3. There thecommissionstatedthatutipossidetis "is todayrecognized
as a general principle" and that this "principle applies all the more readily" to the
formerYugoslavrepublics.'88The commission,however,erred in its comprehensionof
thenatureand purposeof utipossidetis. is not simplyan abstractlegal formula
Utipossidetis
... Cf THOMASM. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONALLAWAND INSTITUTIONS 168 (1995) (uti possidetis
strongerfordemocraticstateprotectingminoritiesthan a statepersecutingthem).
Entrustedbythe Council of the League of Nations
85 SeeReportof the InternationalCommissionofJurists
withthe Task of Givingan AdvisoryOpinion upon the Legal Aspectsof the Aaland Islands Question,LEAGUE
OF NATIONS OJ. Spec. Supp. 3, at 10 (1920):
If one part of a State actuallyseparatesitselffromthatState,the separationis necessarilylimitedin its

effectto the populationofthe territorywhichhas takenpartin the act ofseparation. . . . [I]f a separation
occurs froma politicalorganismwhichis more or less autonomous,and whichis itselfdefactoin process
of politicaltransformation [namelyFinland],thisorganismcannotat theverymomentwhenit transforms
itselfoutside the domain of positivelawinvokethe principlesof thislaw in orderto forceupon a national
group a politicalstatuswhichthe latterrefusesto accept.
See also Nathaniel Berman, "But theAlternative is Despair".EuropeanNationalismand theModernist Renewalof
Law, 106 HARV.L. REV.1792, 1862-68 (1993).
International
'86 SeeFRANCK, supranote 184, at 168 (claimsof minorities But seeHarry
strongerwhen statedisintegrating).
A PhilosophicalPerspective,in SELF-DETERMINATIONIN THE COMMONWEALTH23, 27-31
Beran, Self-Determination:
(W. J. Allan Macartneyed., 1988).
187See,e.g.,Lani Guinier,No TwoSeats:TheElusiveQuestforPoliticalEquality,77 VA. L. REv. 1413, 1458-87
(1991) (votingschemebased on "interestrepresentation"to promotepoliticalvoice ofminorities);KYMLICKA,
supranote 105, at 131-51 ("group representation"idea).
'18 Opinion No. 3, supranote 6, 31 ILM at 1500 (citingFrontierDispute, 1986 ICJ REP.at 565).
to be pulled out and applied automatically everytimean entityseeksstatehood.Rather,

whatevernormativeforceutipossidetis has enjoyeddepended on twocore considerations:
the universally agreed policygoal itwas serving-orderlydecolonization-and the lack
of anycompetingnormsof internalself-determination. Withdecolonizationnow histori-
cally complete (more or less) and the law now cognizant of notions of internalself-
determinationand politicalparticipation,thefoundationsforutipossidetis are weak,and
the validityof the principlefornoncolonial breakupssuspect.
The dissolutionof Yugoslavialacked either of these pillars of uti possidetis: first,it
raised policy issues, equities and ramificationsfar more complex, and on which an
internationalconsensus was lacking,than those related to the removal of European
controlfromAfricaand Asia. These included the stability of the resultingunits,the fate
of minoritiesand the consequences forneighboringstates.'89And second, it took place
in a legal landscape farmore cognizantof participatory rightsthan existedduringthe
decolonizationera.
The errorof the BadinterCommissionis highlightedby its misinterpretation of the
keyjudicial precedenton whichit relied-the 1986 FrontierDispute case. The ICJCham-
ber definedutipossidetis in thatcase as "a principlewhichupgraded formeradministra-
tive delimitations,establishedduringthecolonialperiod,to internationalfrontiers"and
"therefore[as] a principleof a general kindwhichis logicallyconnectedwiththisform
ofdecolonizationwhereverit occurs."'19o Both the italicizedwordsand the contextof the
case-a disputebetweentwoformerFrenchcolonies-indicate thatthe Court limited
itsviewson the normativestatusof utipossidetis to the emergenceof nation-states from
traditionalself-identifiedEuropean empires.Byreferring to decolonization,ratherthan
self-determination, the Chamberproperlyavoided anysuggestionthatan upgradingof
administrative boundarieswould applyduringthe breakupof nonimperialstates-even
if the new statesregardedthemselvessimplyas subjugatedpeoples in an empire (e.g.,
theformerSovietrepublics).The commission'sbrief,broad opinion makesno reference
to the limitationsin the ICJ ruling;instead,its conclusions go well beyond accepted
notionsof utipossidetiswithoutproffering a basis forits extension.'9'
The commissionseems to have assumed that,regardlessof any differencesbetween
Yugoslaviaand the decolonizations,or between the law in 1960 and in 1991, only uti
would avoid anarchybypreventingattacksbyone formerYugoslavrepublicon
possidetis
another.'92Thus, it concluded thatonlyby recognizingthe transformation of internal
boundaries into internationalbordersprotectedby Article2(4) could it stop the war.
This suppositionseemed consistentwiththe European Community'sSeptember 1991
declarationrejectingterritorial changeswithinYugoslaviabroughtabout byviolence.'93
But condemnationof forceto change the statusquo-clearly warrantedin the context
of Yugoslavia-does not coincide witha legal transformation of the statusquo into a
permanentsolutionby default.'94
of Terra Nullius
Titleand theRejection
Territorial
Alongside the postwarand post-Cold War developmentsregardingself-determina-
tion has been a change in the law governingthe titleof a state,or a people, to land.
MISHAGLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD
189Seegenerally BALKAN WAR 235-42 (rev. ed. 1993);
OWEN, supranote 8, at 341-46.
'90 1986 ICJ REP. at 566 (emphasisadded).
191 SeeJochenA. Frowein,Self-Determination as a Limitto Obligations Law, in MODERN LAW
underInternational
OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supranote 168, at 211, 216-17; Hannum, supranote 76, at 55.
192
Opinion No 3, supranote 6, 31 ILM at 1500 (includingreferencesto ban on force); author'sinterview
with Robert Badinter (June 29, 1994). Judge Badinter has stated that the decision to recognize Bosnia-
Herzegovinaas a stateled to the war in the formerYugoslavia.
193 Citedin Weller,supranote 46, at 577. See also SC Res. 713, supranote 5, preambularpara. 8.
194
Seesupratextat notes 87-90.
Under orthodox doctrine,title turned on classic formsof acquisition-occupation,

accretion,cession, conquest and prescription.'95 This law developed when onlyEuro-
pean stateshad standingas full subjects of internationallaw, and theiruse of force
against each other and indigenous peoples was regarded as lawful.'96A territory was
open to acquisitionthroughoccupation ifit was terranullius- "belonging" to no one
at the time.'97The law evolvedto require effectiveoccupation,not mere discovery,for
a stateto maintainterritorialsovereignty over the land.'98Indigenous peoples seemed
to qualifyas "no one," if not legally-which would open up their land to lawful
occupation -then at least effectively-as Europeans acquired theirland throughpacts
forcedupon them.'99
Terranullius,however,has no place in contemporaryinternationallaw. In the most
literal sense, it is anachronisticbecause nearlythe entire global landmass is already
under the accepted sovereigntyof one stateor another,in addition to a fairnumber
of overlappingclaims. Except for some oceanic rocks,a fewdisputed territoriesand
Antarctica,todayno land lies outside the territorialsovereigntyof some state.200 But
more important,thebroaderidea thatthelong-terminhabitantsofland have no legally
cognizable claim or titleto it is profoundlyat odds withinternationalhuman rights
law and thuslegallyobsolete.20'The ICJbelatedlyrecognized the inapplicabilityof the
concept to organized indigenous peoples in the Westemn Sahara case, albeit through
perhaps a somewhatrosyinterpretation of colonial practice.202
The UN membershave
haltinglymoved since then towardrecognitionof these rights,rejectingthe analogy
of these peoples to floraand fauna.203
Instead,internationallaw now accepts,at a minimum,thatlong-terminhabitantsof
a territoryhave rightsthatcan overridethe claimsof governments.204 Those inhabitants
havevalidconcernsas partofthegeneralpopulation.205 Indeed, byvirtueoftheirunique
attachmentand historicclaims to certainlands, theyare entitledto a special voice in
195 BLUM,supranote 71, at 3.

196 SeeJennings,supranote 116, at 416-18.
197 WesternSahara, 1975 ICJ REP. 12, 39 (Oct. 16). See also Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829,
845 (1928) (sole arbitratorHuber) (referringto "uninhabited regions or regions inhabited by savages or
semi-civilized peoples"); Malcolm Shaw, The Western Sahara Case,49 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 119, 127-34 (1978).
198 Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 846; Legal Statusof EasternGreenland, 1933 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 53, at
45-46 (Apr. 5).
'99Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A.at 858 (acquisitionof colonial territorythroughcontractscreatingsuzerain-
vassalrelationship);Shaw,supranote 197, at 127-30 (notingdifferent viewsregardingAfrica);KELLER, LISSIT-
ZYN & MANN, supranote 22, at 6 (Latin America). Cf.WesternSahara, 1975 ICJ REP. at 39, and CRAWFORD,
supranote 1, at 177-81 (terranulliusneverapplied to indigenouspeoples).
200J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 163 (HumphreyWaldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 121 (1989).
201
SeeDINH, supranote 1, at 503-04; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supranote 97, at 687 n.4.
202
SeeWesternSahara, 1975 ICJREP. at 39 (assertingthatin 19th century"territoriesinhabitedby tribes
or peoples havinga social and politicalorganizationwere not regardedas terraenullius"); Shaw, supranote
197, at 133-34 (Court "sidestep[s] . . . those late nineteenth-century theoriesdenyingany formof interna-
tional legal personalityinherentin non-EuropeanstyleState entities").
203 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, paras. I.20, II.28-.32, in WoRLD CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIENNA DECLARATIONAND PROGRAMMEOF ACTION, JUNE 1993, at 35, 52-53, UN Doc.
DPI/1394-39399-August 1993-20M (1993); Riadza Torres,TheRightsofIndigenous Populations:TheEmerging
International Norm,16 YALEJ.INT'L L. 127, 151-63 (1991).
204WesternSahara, 1975 ICJ REP. at 68 (absent ties of territorialsovereignty, people of disputed territory
have rightto self-determinationunder Resolution1514). See alsoReisman,supranote 22, at 354-57.
205 See,e.g.,DraftUnited Nations Declaration on the Rightsof Indigenous Peoples, in Report of the Sub-
Commission on Preventionof Discriminationand Protectionof Minoritieson its forty-sixth session, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 105, reprinted in 34 ILM 546, para. 2 ("right to be free
fromany kind of adverse discrimination"); id., para. 4 ("right to maintain and strengthentheirdistinct
political, economic, social and cultural characteristics,as well as their legal systems") [hereinafterUN
DraftDeclaration].
616 THEAMERICAN
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OF INTERNATIONAL
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the strategy forinternalself-determination.206 By implication,thiswould include a say

on the size and shape of entitiesresultingfromthatprocess.
This welcomeadvance in the law,even ifnot solidifiedtodayin termsof conventions,
customor compliancemechanisms,calls into questionthe normativity of utipossidetis
as
applied to statebreakupstoday.Justas one purposeof utipossidetis duringdecolonization
was to eliminatethe possibility of appropriationof lands thatsome statesmightregard
as terraenullius,207so the rejectionin law of thatconcept eliminatesone of the purposes
of the doctrine.If the land inhabitedbyindigenouspeoples is not terranullius,it seems
highlyquestionablethata new statehas the rightto inheritthatland at the expense of
the indigenouspeoples livingthere.Thus, althoughindigenouspeoples appear to lack
a unique rightto secede froman existingstate,208 a new claimantstateought not to be
able to "take itsindigenouspeoples withit" fromthe old statebyassumingitssize and
shape are determinedby prior internalborders.An example arises in the case of the
lands in Quebec inhabitedby the Cree Indians. Their rightsunder internationallaw
affectnot only the underlyinglawfulnessof Quebec's attemptsat secession, but the
contoursof an independentQuebec as well. To assume thatQuebec mustencompass
all theselands,eveniftheindigenouspeoples indicateanotherpreference,would ignore
theirspecial claim to land and extend,to a new state,antiquatednotionsof territorial
sovereignty.
IV. TowARDRATIONAL
LINE DRAWING
Once uti possidetisis examined functionallyand legally,both its geographic and its
normativeunderpinningsseem increasinglysuspect.Yet its defenderscan fall back on
the twoprincipalclaimsnoted at the beginningof thisarticle:(1) because liberaldemo-
craticstatescan functionwithinanyborders,the legal changes describedabove do not
requireabandonmentoftheprinciple;and (2) anyalternativeto utipossidetis is simplynot
feasible.210
These argumentsplace a burden on proposals to move beyond utipossidetis.
The firstis based on our cosmopolitanideal-to build pluralist,democraticsocieties
withinwhateverbordersstateshave upon theirbirth.The Westand mostAfricanelites
saw thisas the hope forAfricaand itscolonial-imposedborders.21' But democracy,even
where it has sprouted in new states,does not guarantee the rightsof minorities,or
More important,in
address those groups that do not wish to be part of the polity.212
those statesof the formerYugoslaviaand SovietUnion where human rightshave not
takenroot,the assumptionthatpostindependencebordersmustcoincide withpreinde-
pendence lines has meant expulsionsand refugeecrises,"ethnic cleansing" withinthe
state,and even genocide.
206
See,e.g., ConventionConcerningIndigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,June 27,
1989, Arts.13-19, 28 ILM 1382, 1387-88 (1989); UN DraftDeclaration,supranote 205, preambularpara. 6
(recognizing"rightsto theirlands, territories and resources,whichderivefromtheirpolitical,economic and
social structuresand fromtheircultures,spiritualtraditions,historiesand philosophies"); id.,para. 3 ("right
of self-determination").
207
Seesupratextat note 21.
208
SeeTorres,supranote 203, at 162; HANNUM, supranote 168, at 96 & n.339.
209
SeegenerallyGRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES,supranote 137, at 196-99 (arguingthatrightsof indigenous
peoples preventindependentQuebec fromincorporatingCree lands). But seeFrancket al., supranote 137,
at 435-43.
21( A thirddefensecould note thatsome administrative bordersmean somethingand shouldnotbe tampered
with,a pointacknowledged,but irrelevantto thosemanyadministrative bordersthatlack functional,historical
or otherjustification.
211 SeeYakemtchouk, supranote 32, at 60; SHAw,supranote 43, at 186.
212
SeegenerallyRenee de Nevers,Democratization in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
and EthnicConflict,
SECURITY 61 (Michael E. Browned., 1993).
Thus, as much as liberalinternationalistsshould cherishthe idea of diversepeoples

livingtogether,we cannot always,asJohn Chipmanpointsout, "impose a cosmopolitan
diktat."'213Instead,we mustacknowledgethatcertainnew statesare not currently able
or willingto guaranteethe human rightsof minoritiesin discreteterritories, and must
consideralternativesto leavingthosegroupsat the mercyof new governments.Cosmo-
politanismmustremainthe goal, not onlybecause people can then identifythemselves
beyondreal or imaginedblood lines,but also because manyminoritieslivewithinareas
whereborder changes are not feasible.214 But in certaininstancesaccount mayhave to
be taken of the need to avoid leavingpeoples in new stateswhere theydo not wishto
be or thatwillnot treatthemwithdignity.215
This stripsthe defense of uti possidetisand immutability to its negativecore-the
absence of any othersolution. Utipossidetisthusrepresentsthe classic example of what
Thomas Franckhas called an "idiot rule" -a simple,clear norm thatoffersan accept-
able outcome in most situationsbut whose veryclarityunderminesits legitimacyin
others.216 The rule may assume thatno border is more rationalthan another,or that
the issue of borders is simplyso complex and emotional that stateswill alwaysprove
unable to reallocateterritorypeacefully.Eitherway,anysolutionotherthan acceptance
of past injusticeswould be too complicated to be applied, would lead to chaos, and
would thereforeprove illegitimate.This argumentalso won the day duringthe African
decolonizations,usuallywith good reason; and it seems to underlie certain creative
proposalsconcerningintrastateconflicttoday.217
In the remainderof this article,I set out four guidelines for decision makersthat
suggestthatthe optionsare not so starkand laythe basis fora principledalternativeto
utipossidetis.These do not representa comprehensiveframeworkfor decision,which
extendsbeyondthisarticle.Moreover,to move beyond the "idiot rule," it seems likely
thatstateswillneed to developsome typeofinstitutional mechanism,such as a mandatory
or optional regional arbitrationor conciliationcommission,to help resolvethe matter
in theeventnegotiationsbog down.218 Theyshould also considerforestalling recognition
of new statesuntilbordersare resolved,as well as lend theirfullsupportto a negotiated
or arbitratedoutcome.Whateverthe applicationprocess,the possibilitiesmustbe shown
so thatthe mechanismscan be created,or engaged.
A NewNormative Point
Starting
First,the functionaland legal argumentsagainst the automatic transformation of
frontierssuggesta compellingneed to respectthe originalRoman-lawmeaning of uti
to preservethe statusquo onlyuntilstatescan resolvetheircompetingclaims,
possidetis:
ratherthan apply the gloss fromdecolonization wherebystateseffectively presumed
independence-daylines to be permanent.Reversionto the Latin notion, somewhat
213John Chipman,ManagingthePoliticsofParochialism, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,

supranote 212, at 237, 261.
214 Seesupratextat note 187.
215
Cf Margalit& Raz, supranote 9, at 459 (conditioningapproval of secession on group's "respect [for]
the basic rightsof its inhabitants,so that its establishmentwill do good rather than add to the ills of
thisworld").
216THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 67-77 (1990). I appreciatethisinsight
fromGregoryFox.
217
CompareMORTON H. HALPERIN & DAVID J. SCHEFFER, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
86 (1992) (proposingresidentsof new statesbe able to choose citizenshipof neighboringstate); TED ROBERT
GuRR, MINORITIES AT RISK:A GLOBAL VIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 298-313 (1993) (proposing in-
creased minorities'rightswithinexistingstates) withGIDON GOTTLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE: A NEW AP-
PROACH TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF SOvEREIGNTY 46-47, 75-76 (1993) (proposal fordiffering
sets of bordersfordifferent purposes).
218
See,e.g.,Conventionon Conciliationand Arbitration withinthe CSCE, Dec. 15, 1992, 32 ILM 557 (1993).
618 THE AMERICAN
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ironically,servesto update the principlefromits decolonizationformto take account

of constitutivechanges in the internationalorder concerninghuman rightsand self-
determination.2"9 It furthersuggestsendorsingthe cautiousand negativeiterationof uti
possidetisused byKlabbersand Lefeberto characterizetheprinciplein itsdecolonization
sense as a guide forthe breakup of states:thatthe attainmentof independence is not
per se a groundto invalidateexistingboundaries.220 If,duringthe creationof states,the
new entitiescannot agree on an appropriatedivisionof territory, theyshould respect
existinglines of control-likely to be designatedby administrative lines-until an au-
thoritative determinationis reached on new boundaries.22'
As a result,the provisionalstatuswill remain until the partiesaccept the costs and
benefitsof those bordersor new ones. In manysituations,stateswilland should retain
the borders. But at least theywill consider improvingthe welfareof individualsand
long-termstability byrevisingfrontiers.And, equallyimportant,the prospectof border
revisionsmaycause some secessionistgroupsto rethinktheirclaimsto statehoodentirely.
This positiondifferscritically
fromthe BadinterCommission'sview.The commission
adopted a defaultrule thatinternallines translateinto internationalbordersunless the
partiesagree otherwise,turningalterationof boundariesinto the exception,ratherthan
part of the policy.222A provisionalgloss accepts the utilityof the statusquo as a way
to avoid conflictand suggeststhat these boundaries deserveconsideration,and some
deference,during the process of definingthe size of a state attainingindependence;
but it fallsshortof sanctioningperpetuationof the statusquo ifnew statesare created.
The mostimmediateconsequence of thisstartingpointis an admittedly heavyburden
on decisionmakers,whethernationaldiplomatsor internationalcommissionsor courts:
to deal directlywiththe location of internationalborders,ratherthan retreatbehind
the simple,but anachronistic,decolonizationformof utipossidetis. To date, states,courts
and scholarshave agreed on the unexceptionablepropositionthatthereis no universal
rule for arrivingat an ideal line to divide territory-whetherby adopting linguistic
boundaries,naturalfrontiersor uti possidetis.223
But ratherthan looking for the ideal
line, we mustset more modest goals. Decision makersfaced withpotentialor accom-
plished breakupsmustgauge if thereis a significantly betterline than thatin place and
draw the best line under the circumstances-significantly betterbecause the displace-
mentcostsof adjustingborderscannot be ignored.
The communitypolicies behind thatbetter,more rational line are hardlyobscure.
The philosophersMargalitand Raz posited in theirtheoryof self-determination that
"the shape and boundaries of political units are to be determinedby their service
to individualwell-being."224 This notion reflectsthe essence of human rightsas an
undergirdingconcept in the implementationof self-determination.225 The human
219 Cf W. Michael Reisman,Sovereignty

and HumanRightsin Contemporary Law, 84 AJIL866, 873
International
(1990) (need to update old normsto account forconstitutive
changes).
220 Seetextat and note 84
supra.
221
Such a viewof utipossidetisapplies onlyto the formerinternalboundaries,not the internationalbound-
aries. For example, the border betweenItalyand Yugoslaviadoes not become provisionalwhen it becomes
the borderbetweenItalyand Slovenia.Moreover,thisproposal is limitedto recentand futurebreakups,and
does not suggestrevisingthe postindependencebordersin Africa,a policythatmightrun afoul of important
normsof stability and finalityof borders.See infratextat notes 227-29. But seeCharles WilliamMaynes,The
NewPessimism, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1995, at 33, 48 (proposing"incentivesto redrawbordersto obtain more
viable states"); Makau wa Mutua, WhyRedrawtheMap ofAfrica:A Moraland LegalInquiry,16 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1113 (1995).
222 Opinion No. 3, supranote 6, 31 ILM at 1500 ("Except where otherwiseagreed, the formerboundaries
become frontiersprotectedby internationallaw.").
223
SeeMichael Bothe, Boundaries, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA,supranote 16, at 443, 445-46.
224
Margalit& Raz, supranote 9, at 457.
225
SeeSuzuki,supranote 9, at 835-41; S. JamesAnaya,TheCapacityofInternational Law toAdvanceEthnicor
NationalityRightsClaims,75 IowA L. REv. 837, 841-44 (1990).
rightsat stake are those not onlyof the populace of the claimantnew state,but of its
neighborsin the old stateor other statesas well. From a differentdiscipline,political
scientistshave spoken of rationalfrontiersas those thatreduce the riskof conflictby
correspondingto some existingdivisionof people.226This reflectsthe basic policies
of minimumpublic order.
Such a positionin no wayunderminesthe importantnorm of stability and finality
of
boundaries.That normprovidesthatifstateshave resolveda borderdisputethrougha
process meetingappropriatestandardsof lawfulness,then it should be presumed that
theirdisputeis overand the borderpermanent.227 Of obviousmeritin a semianarchicar
world,the normembodies a decisionbystatesto denyto theirneighborsa continuously
availableprocessto challenge a boundary.228The normdoes not, however,require that
a provisional,de facto,or disputed, let alone illegitimateor illegal, border become
permanent;and thusit does not mandate the statusquo as a solutionto unresolvedor
active claims.229
And a new interpretationof uti possidetis recognizes that once those
bordersare finallydetermined,theyshould remain stable.
forthePeacefulSettlement
Respect ofDisputes
Supplementinganyproposal thatstatesconsiderborderchangesis a requirementthat
the process take place throughpeaceful means alone. For statesthathave alreadysplit
up, thisrequirementmeans nothingmore or less than adherence to Article2(4) of the
Charter.If a state claims territory
held by another state,it may not lawfullyuse force
againstthatotherstatemerelyby assertingthat,by dint of its territorial claim,it is not
actingagainstthe territorial or politicalindependence of thatstate.230
integrity
As forongoing attemptsat secessionor dissolution,internationallaw does not forbid
theuse offorcein civildisputes,althoughaspectsofjus in belloapplyto internalwars.23'A
blanketprohibitionon forcewould redound to the detrimentof legitimategovernments
fightingunjustifiedsecessionistor other insurgentmovements,as well as of resistance
forcesattemptingto overthrowtyranny. However,when the eliteswithinthe statehave
accepted the secession or dissolution,theyshould abstain fromusing force to adjust
boundarieswithwhich theyare not satisfied,and begin negotiations.While new state-
hood need not hinge upon an agreementon borders,it seems prudentfor decision
226See,e.g.,Stephen Van Evera, Hypotheses on Nationalismand War,18 INT'L SECURITY 5, 8, 21-22 (1994);
Herbst,supranote 34, at 678-79.
227 Temple of PreahVihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 ICJREP.6, 34 (June 15); Territorial Dispute (Libya/
Chad), 1994 ICJREP. at 37. SeealsoVienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties,supranote 80, Art.62(2) (a),
1155 UNTS at 347 (rebussic stantibus does not applyto boundarytreaties).
228 KaiyanHomi Kaikobad, SomeObservations on theDoctine ofContinuity and FinalityofBoundaies,54 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 119, 119 (1983). For the generalprinciplebehind the norm,see Grisbadama Case (Nor./Swed.),
Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130 (1909) (three-personpanel) ("a stateof thingswhichactuallyexistsand has
existedfora long timeshould be changed as littleas possible").
229 SeeTemple of PreahVihear,1962 ICJREP.at 34 (relying on normafterfindingThai acquiescencejustified
Cambodia's claims); TeiritorialDispute, 1994 ICJREP. at 37 (relyingon norm afterdetermining1955 treaty
definitely establishedboundary);Kaikobad,supranote 228, at 125-26. SeealsoNorthernCameroons,1963 ICJ
REP.at 32-34 (acknowledgingend of disputebyGeneralAssembly'sacceptance of plebiscite). Cf.Bardonnet,
supranote 62, at 71, 106 (political principlethatdoes not extinguisheven authoritatively addressed claims,
as long as statesact lawfully).
230 FriendlyRelationsDeclaration,supranote 174, at 122 (banning forceto solve "territorial disputesand
problemsconcerningfrontiers of States" or to "violate internationallines of demarcation"). Seealso SC Res.
502, UN SCOR, 37th Sess.,Res. & Dec., at 15, UN Doc. S/INF/38 (1982) (FalklandIslandsinvasion);SC Res.
660, UN SCOR, 45th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 19, UN Doc. S/INF/46 (1990) (Iraqi invasionof Kuwait).
231 See,e.g.,Geneva ConventionRelativeto the Protectionof CivilianPersonsin Time of War,Aug. 12, 1949,
Art.3, 6 UST 3516, 3518, 75 UNTS 287, 288-90; ProtocolAdditionalto the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August
1949, and Relatingto the Protectionof Victimsof Non-International ArmedConflicts(Protocol II), Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 UNTS 609; Prosecutorv. Tadie, Appeal onJurisdiction, UN Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, at 53-68, paras.
96-127 (1995), reprinted in 35 ILM 32, 62-70 (1996).
makers to agree on them before independence. Prior negotiationsprovide the best

opportunityfor revisionsto conciliate disaffectedminorities,and offera possible side
benefitof preventingthe dissolutionaltogether.This procedure, of course, is what
variousmediatorsurged on the Yugoslavpartiesin 1991, and the latter'sreadiness to
ignore it highlightsthe risksfacingall remedies-including utipossidetis-inthisfield.
theRelevanceofExistingInternalBorders
Assessing
Withthesebasic policiesin mind,diplomats,conciliatorsand arbitrators should scruti-
nize administrativeboundariesfortheirsuitabilityas internationalfrontiers.
This process
is the criticalprerequisiteto determiningwhethera substantially betteralternativeis
available and drawinga finalline. Severalfactorsmeritconsideration.
First,weightmustbe givento the age oftheline.Borderscenturiesold count formore
than those decades old, not onlybecause of an aversionto opening closed issues,232but
also because of the likelihood thatthe populationswill have adjusted to long-standing
borders.233 They may also have developed a sufficient sense of communityidentityto
justifyretentionof traditionalborders.234 Recent borders,such as those created after
Stalin's incorporationof the trans-Dniester region into the Moldavian SSR following
Bessarabia'sannexationin 1940, would have a poorer claim to transformation.235
Moreover,the alterationof administrativebordersduringthe processof self-determi-
nationwould remainsuspectin the eventof a consummatedsecessionor breakup.Such
changes could occur if the centralgovernmentdrew new lines in a failed attemptto
staveoffdivision,analogous to Nigeria'sreallocationof internallines in 1967 as partof
its (successful)effortto unite the countryagainstthe Biafransecession.236This suggests
that the criticaldate for determiningthe borders of new entitiesmay in some cases
precede theirindependence. In the 1989 Guinea-Bissau/Senegal maritimeboundaryarbi-
tration,the panel recognizedthata colonyundergoingself-determination need not be
bound bytheagreementsconcluded bytheimperialpoweronce thatprocesshas begun,
even ifit precedes formalindependence.237
Second, theprocess
bywhichthelinewasdrawnwillmeritconsideration.A constitutionally
authorizedline, forinstance,oughtto have a greaterpresumptionof permanencethan
one determinedsolely at the command of a dictator.238 But as constitutionscan be
deceivingin manyways,the more fundamentalquestionseems to be the equalityof the
participantsin the process leading to the creation of the boundary.If a boundaryis
forcedupon an area bya powerfulcentralauthority, or a powerfulneighboringadminis-
trativeunit,it would not reflecteven the minimalwishesof the inhabitants,and their
inabilityto change thatborder ought not to be probative.239 Nevertheless,despite the
232
SeeGrisbadama Case, Hague Ct. Rep. at 130.
233
Cf Brilmayer, supranote 9, at 199-200 (immediacyof historicalgrievanceas factortojustifysecessions).
234
SeeKaikobad, supranote 228, at 130-34; Fischer,supranote 112, at 222; MURTY,supranote 101, at 56.
But seeAlexanderB. Murphy,HistoricalJustifications forTerritorial
Claims,80 ANNALS ASS'NAM. GEOGRAPHERS
531 (1990) (putativehistoricalclaims as means to recoverlost lands).
235
SeeKolst0 & Edemsky,supranote 50, at 978.
236
SeeCharles R. Nixon, Self-Determination:
TheNigeria/Biafta
Case,24 WORLDPOL. 473, 482-92 (1972).
Awardof31July1989 (Guinea-Bissau/Sen.),83ILR at 26-30. The panel foundthatsuch a process
237 Arbitral
has acquired internationaldimensionsifthe metropolitanstateis forcedto take "exceptional measures,"i.e.,

"means whichare not thoseused normallyto deal withoccasional disturbances."Id. at 29. The quoted passage
is dicta, as the panel found that PortugueseGuinea remained under firmcolonial control at the time of
Portugal'smaritimetreatywithFrance. Id. at 30.
238 SeeVon Evera,supranote 226, at 21-22; cf BUCHANAN, supranote 9, at 127-49 (developingconstitutional
rightto secede); KYMLICKA, supranote 105, at 117 (consequences of varyingmodalitiesof incorporation).
239 Cf.FrontierDispute, 1986 ICJ REP. at 596-97 (acceptance by French LieutenantGovernor-General of
border proposed by Governor-Generalnot evidence of acquiescence since writersof letters"not of equal
standing. . . [whereas] the idea of acquiescence . . . presupposesfreedomof will"); Brilmayer,supranote
9, at 200 (evaluatingrelativepower of group makingclaims). See alsoTemple of Preah Vihear, 1962 ICJREP.
abstractappeal of lending more weightto lines freelyarrivedat than to those imposed

on peoples, the formermaystillbe inappropriateforinternationalborderson the basis
of an earliercritiqueof utipossidetis-thatis, theirlocation mightwell have been prem-
ised on the continuedunityof the state,and separationbreaksthatbargain.240
Last, because neitherage nor origin directlyaddresses functionalsuitabilityas an
internationalfrontier,negotiatorsand arbitrators willhave to takeaccountof the viability
oftheentitiesthatwould emergefromsecessionsor breakupsalong existinglines. On the
one hand, stateshave been unwillingto consider the size or shape of a claimant to
statehood in the decision to accord recognition,especiallyterritoriesemergingfrom
colonial rule.24'But political geographersroutinelystudythe effectof geographyon
nationaldevelopment;242 and theoristsof self-determination have evaluatedthese issues
in consideringthe proprietyof secession.243 Even the ICJhas acknowledgedthe impor-
tance of economic issues by consideringthe efficientexploitationof resourcesin ad-
dressingdisputedsea borders.244
Thus, decision makerswould be well-advisedto considerwhetherthe administrative
lines would allow the new states-including the remnantof the priorstate-to govern
themselvesadequatelyand develop economically.If the borderscontain irrationalele-
mentsforthe governanceand economyof separatestates,as maywell be the case given
the distinctfunctionsof internaland interstateborders,the decision makerswill have
to consideralternatives.This question,too, is notwithoutambiguity; forexample,a state
need not be crippledif the existinglines renderit landlocked (e.g., Belarus) or reliant
on sources of energyfromabroad (e.g., manyof the formerSoviet states). But some
lines maybe especiallytroublesomeeconomically,such as those thatdepriveone state
of access to other statesand the sea, or divide a specificresource.245 In those cases,
recognitionof bordersshould be postponed until suitable arrangementsare made
e.g., corridorsto otherstatesor the sea.
As for shape, administrative lines that create exclaves (one part of a unit that is
separatedfromthe bulk of the unit and surroundedbyanotherunit) willbe especially
problematicas internationalfrontiers.Although such areas have functionedin rare
cases, theyface tremendousobstaclesto successfulintegrationin the state.246 Similarly,
a secession thatleaves the old entitydiscontiguous,such as would arise in the case of
Quebec, raisessimilarproblems.In the abstract,administrative lines defininga compact
territory,withoutunusual elongationsand preferably withoutsignificant interiornatural
barriers,will make the state (whetherthe remnantof the old or the new) easier to
governadministratively.247
at 136-42 (Spender,J., dissenting)(Thailand should not be regarded as acquiescing in border as it lacked

abilityto check accuracyof Frenchmap); Rann of Kutch,50 ILR at 414-15 (Bebler, arb.,dissenting)(silence
of vassal stateKutchagainstUK claims not convincingevidence of acquiescence).
240 Seetextat and note 136
supra.
241
SeeCRAwFORD,supranote 1, at 36-37, 139-41. On noncolonial states,see GA Res. 47/231, 47/232, UN
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, vol. 2, at 6, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1993) (admissionof Monaco and Andorra).
242 See,e.g. MELLOR,sura note 102, at 58-73; PrestonE. James,Some Fundamental El-mentsin theAnalysisof
theViability ofStates,in ESSAYSIN POLITICALGEOGRAPHY 33 (Charles A. Fisher ed., 1968); Hartshorne,supra
note 98, at 106- 10.
243 See,e.g.,BUCHHEIT, supranote 1, at 230-32; Suzuki,supranote 9, at 861-62.
244
See,e.g.,NorthSea ContinentalShelfCases (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJREP. 3, 51-52 (Feb. 20)
(on exploitationof oil depositsin allocation of continentalshelf).
245 SeeMELLOR, supranote 102, at 70; cf NorthSea ContinentalShelfCases, 1969 ICJREP. at 51-52 (unity
of depositsa factorin delimitationof continentalshelf).

246
SeeG. W. S. Robinson,Exclaves,49 ANNALS ASS'N Am.GEOGRAPHERS 283, 295 (1959). The Nakhichevan
area of Azerbaijan,separatedfromthe restof the countryby part of Armenia,is not technicallyan exclave
because it bordersa thirdcountry(Iran), thoughit faces similarproblems.
247
MELLOR, supranote 102, at 68-69.
Self-Determination
in Transitional
Situations:
Reexamining
thePlebiscite
Model
A provisionalinterpretation of utipossidetis,
coupled witha prohibitionon the use of
forceand scrutiny of existingadministrative borders,stilldoes not directlyconfrontthe
core issue of human rightsarguingagainstextensionof the decolonizationformof uti
possidetis;
namely,its failureto account for the harm to individualwell-beingthatmay
resulteitherfroma lack of commitmentby the new state (definedby the old borders)
to protectcertaingroups or fromtheirdesire to locate elsewhere.That shortcoming
necessitatesa directrole forthe affectedpopulationsin arrivingat lines to replace the
administrative borders.Thus, someformof consultationwiththe populace of a disputed
territoryon its future,though perhaps not a binding vote, is needed, if not already
legallyrequired.248 A policyto thisend entailsa renewedlook at one of the successes
of the VersaillesTreaty,at timesemployedby the United Nations-the internationally
supervisedplebiscite.
Plebiscitesprovide a direct mechanismfor peoples of a disputed territory to voice
theirpreferencesregardingtheir status.AfterWorld War I, the Allies used them to
dispose of a smallnumberof areas thathad not been allocated byrewardingthevictors
withthe spoils.249 Since WorldWar II, stateshave used the plebiscitealmostexclusively
in the decolonizationcontext.Oftenunder UN supervision,plebiscitesconfirmedthe
wishesof manycolonial peoples forindependence,and occasionally(as in the Northern
Cameroons) boundarieswere altered on the basis of thosewishes.Stateshave also not
hesitatedto undermineplebiscites-witness Indonesia's interferencewiththe vote in
West Irian in 1969-or to preventthem when theyfeared negativeresults-as with
India's refusalto abide bytheSecurityCouncil's 1947 demand fora plebiscitein Kashmir,
and Morocco's continualfrustration of the planned UN-supervisedpollingin the West-
ern Sahara.250
Seekingthevoice of the people in contestedareas seems a logical outflowof modern
trendsof self-determination, but plebiscitescontain the seeds of theirown frustration,
engenderingsome opposition to them as optimal policies.251 These centeron (1) the
location and size of the plebiscitearea; (2) the votingunit withinthe plebiscitearea;
and (3) the location of the line to be drawnas a resultof the plebiscite.Each is likely
to become the subject of intense political negotiationsduring self-determination dis-
putes,as each partyseeks to definethe termsof the plebisciteso as to secure the most
territory.252
But the issue is not beyond imaginativesolutionsthroughdiplomacyor third-party
decision making.In certainareas, the populationdistribution maybe so obvious,or the
land so sparselyinhabited,as to warrantlimitingthe vote to a core area, e.g., only
248
See WesternSahara, 1975 ICJREP. at 33 (noting requirementof consultationduring decolonization
except if population not a "people" or "special circumstances"obtain); CASSESE, supra note 13, at 190
(binding expressionof will required); Shaw, supranote 197, at 148-49. Cf BROWNLIE, supranote 63, at 170
(binding plebiscitenot required); Bosnia Agreement,supranote 121, Ann. 2, 35 ILM at 111 (drawingline
betweentwo "entities"withina statewithoutrecourseto plebiscite).Presumably,Hong Kong and Macao do
not constitutedisputedterritories in the eyes of those overseeingtheirdecolonization.
249The VersaillesTreatycalled forplebiscitesin Schleswig,the Saar, Allenstein,Upper Silesia,and Marien-
walder.See 1 SARAH WAMBAUGH, PLEBISCITES SINCE THE WORLD WAR 3-45 (1933), whichremainstheauthorita-
tiveaccount. See also id. at 42 (Allies avoided a plebiscitein everyarea of "firstimportance" except Upper
Silesia).
250 SeeSTEVEN R. RATNER, THIE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE
COLD WAR 100-01, 109-13, 131 (1995).
251 CompareKolst0, supra note 52, at 207-08 (shortcomings for revising borders of former Soviet republics)
w?th1 WAMBAUGH, supranote 249, at 485-96. SeealsoVisuvanathanRudrakumaran,The"Requirement"
ofPlebiscite
in Territorial 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 23 (1989).
Rapprochement,
252 See RIGO SUREDA, supra note 68, at 152-68 (disputes over divisions used in plebiscites in British Togoland
and British Cameroons).
partof Kashmir.253 Evaluatingthe interwarperiod, Sarah Wambaughoffereda sensible

approach to the size of the area when the partiescannot agree-one determinedby
the sides' furthestclaims-and also noted the importanceof historicaland economic
factorsin determiningthe unit of voting.254
As forthe line resultingfromtheplebiscite,almostanycontiguousline willleave some
voterswhere theydo not wishto be, perhaps keepingalive the claimsof irredentists or
leading to migrationof the disaffected.But statepracticedoes not appear to demand
thatthe line followthe plebisciteresultsexactly,whateverthe consequences regarding
the creation of enclaves or economicallyirrationalconfigurations.In one significant
internalplebiscitesince decolonization,Switzerlandmanaged to draw a line creating
the new canton ofJuraout of the canton of Bern in 1976. Althoughthe Government
followedthe general resultsof the vote by placing the northernpart of the contested
area in the new canton and leavingthe southerndistrictsin the canton of Bern,several
communesended up witha statustheyhad opposed.255Decision makerscould consider
approachesthatleave a minimumnumberofpeople disaffected or ensurethatthe losers
on one side are balanced by thoseon the other.256The plebisciteand new line can only
make more people betteroff,not all people. Moreover,geographicfactorswill play a
role and maydictatewho willnot end up in theirpreferredlocation.
Principlesof equityused by internationalcourtsand statesin border disputescould
also have an importantrole in drawinga finalline.257In the Frontier Disputecase, for
example,Judge Abi-Saab pointed out that,whenjudges need to determinea border,
theirdegreesoffreedomto drawa line usingequitableprinciplesincreaseas thenumber
of knownborder points decreases.258 While leavingmuch to the biases of arbitrators,
equityofferssome framework withinwhichcourtscan takeaccountofa varietyofrelevant
factors.
V. CONCLUSION
If thehallmarkof an effectivelegal systemis some degree ofpredictability of outcome,

an assaulton extendingthe decolonizationformof utipossidetis to the breakupof states
would appear at firstto underminethe cause. For thatformulationis clearlythe easiest
short-run methodfordeterminingthe bordersof a newstate.But law,of course,is about
justice and legitimacyas well. And self-determination, by its nature,is an enormously
complex and rich process in internationallaw. If its goal is to enable individualsand
groups to realize theirhuman rights,then the complexityof the territorialelement
cannot be wishedawaythroughinvocationof a hallowedformula.
This articlehas soughtto demonstratethatthe defaultrule requiringinheritanceof
priorboundariessuffers fromfunctionaland normativeflawswhenapplied to administra-
tivelines withinstates.In particular,the extensionof utipossidetis to these situationsis
highlysuspectbecause of (1) the differencebetweeninternaland internationalborders,
as well as betweeninternalstate bordersand the internalcolonial lines to which the
principlewas formerly applied; (2) the supplantingof the policyimperativeunderlying
(decolonization)withtheuncertainty
utipossidetis surroundingstatebreakups;and, most
253
See Ali Khan, TheKashmir Disute: A PlanforRegionalCooperation, 31 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 495, 532-35
(1994); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONOFJURISTS,HUMANRIGHTS IN KASHMIR:REPORT OF A MISSION 95-96 (1995).
254
1 WAMBAUGH,supranote 249, at 494, 503.
255
See PADDISON, supra note 99, at 131-32. For an example from before the modem era of self-determination,
see 1 WAMBAUGH,supra note 249, at 251-61 (process of line drawing after Upper Silesia vote).
256
See 1 WAMBAUGH,supra note 249, at 504-05.
257
See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ REP. at 567-68 (using equity to divide a pool equally); Land, Island, 1992
ICJ REP. at 514-15 (relying on equity to give effect to unratified treaty); MooRE, supra note 14, at 29.
258 Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJREP. at 662-63 (Abi-Saab, J.,sep. op.).
624 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONAL[AW [Vol. 90:590
important,(3) the constitutivechanges in internationallaw, principallythe emphasis

on internalself-determination and participatory governmentand the demise of terra
nullius.These factorsall require recognitionin the law and policies governingmodern
breakupsor attemptsat them.The resultsmaybe unsatisfying to some,and thequestions
raised (includingthe lack of centralizedenforcementmechanisms)maylead manyto
conclude that utipossidetisshould develop into a rule for these situations.Even under
the approach suggestedhere, the scrutiny of existingbordersmayyielda determination
that many should become the boundaries of new states,and perhaps the burden of
proofshould lie on thosewho seek to challenge them.
To adopt thatcourse of action uniformly and automatically,however,perpetuatesa
subterfuge:a formalizedself-determination thatenables a new stateto formalong the
administrativelinesof theold territorial
unitbutneglectstheunderlyingterritorial issues
thatpromptedthe dissatisfaction in the firstplace, and perhapslaysthe groundworkfor
a new round of interstateconflictsand attemptedsecessions.It rewardsthe leaders of
secessionistmovementsbymore readilygrantingthema new territory, but offersuncer-
tain prospectsforthe human rightsand politicalparticipationof the inhabitantsor the
public order of the region. Only by directlyengagingthe territorial question,withall
itsdimensions,is the internationalcommunitylikelyto controlthe breakup of statesin
an orderlymannerconsistentwithhuman dignity.

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Drawing a Better Line: UTI Possidetis and the Borders of New States

Author(s): Steven R. Ratner

It is now conventionalwisdomthatthe proliferationof ethnic-basedviolence consti-

* AssistantProfessor,University of Texas School of Law. I greatlyappreciate commentsfromHans Baade,

Reliance on utipossidetisduringthe post-Cold War breakupshas stemmedfromthree

My argumentproceeds in fourparts.PartI reviewsthe genealogyand legal contours

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF UTI POSSIDETIS

one partyduringthe initialstage of litigation.When twopartiesclaimed ownershipof

Uti possidetisand LatinAmerican

The juxtapositionof utipossidetis

the new statesof the formerempirebyadoptinga set of extantboundaries.21Consistent

fixturealongside utipossidetis, the primaryimportanceof thelegal instruments

Beforethe arrivalof the Europeans,the notionoffrontiers as definedlineswas hardly

misleading);C. H. M. Waldock,DisputedSovereignty in theFalklandIslandsDependencies,

byindigenousones.38Althoughthe OAU's stancewas not withoutits criticsin Africa,39

Responseto theDissolutionoftheSocialistFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia,86

The administrative boundariesof the SovietUnion werefarmore complex,reflecting

internationalfrontierbetweenthe so-calledprotectorateof Bohemia and Moraviaand

58 Susan Greenberg,Borderline Case: Czechoslovakia's old internal

tionbythe Court thatutipossidetis is a norm of internationallaw is probative.65

65 Sorel & Mehdi, supranote 26, at 12 (Frontier Disputemarks"consecration" of utipossidetisin international

compromis authorizedthe tribunalto takeaccountof "interests"of the partiesthatmight

73Treatyof Arbitration, supranote 60, Art.V, at 1322.

to create a negativeversionof utipossidetis,providingsimplythatthe norm in the 1978

II. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LINES

A fullappraisalof the appropriatenessof utipossidetis

84 SeeJan Klabbers& Rene Lefeber,Africa:Lost between Self-Determination

or establishthem.Thus, thefirstcategoryencompasses,in theterminology ofthegeogra-

Administrative concernsdemand lines thatpermitgovernmentalagencies,at various

"' See MELLOR, supra note 102, at 139-43.

Nevertheless,at the internationallevel, the linear aspects of the boundaryseem to

"8Affairedu Lac Lanoux (Fr./Spain), 12 R.I.A.A.281, 307-08 (1957) (five-person tribunal).

Environmentand Development,Principle 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), 31 ILM 874, 876 (1992);

whoseunityand identity overrideotherconcerns.But otherconsiderationsand scenarios

'7 SeeBUCHHEIT, supranote 1, at 29-30.

schemepremisedon thecontinuity ofthewholestate.'36In thecase ofQuebec, secession-

of dissolutionor secession, the absorptionof enclaves during decolonization hardly

III. UTI POSSIDETIS AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The functionaldistinctionbetweeninternaland internationalboundaries thatcalls

'4- Seesupranote 68.

first?The answerdemands scrutinyof the elementssurroundingthe prior use of uti

the wartimehumiliationof the leading colonial stateshad led to a growingsense that

'6( UN CHARTER Art.1(2).

unchanged in size or shape, maymeet thattestin manysituations.Yet it does open the

178For the question of minorities

Yet the recognitionin internationallaw of the primacyof politicalparticipationdoes

If one part of a State actuallyseparatesitselffromthatState,the separationis necessarilylimitedin its

to be pulled out and applied automatically everytimean entityseeksstatehood.Rather,

Under orthodox doctrine,title turned on classic formsof acquisition-occupation,

195 BLUM,supranote 71, at 3.

the strategy forinternalself-determination.206 By implication,thiswould include a say

Thus, as much as liberalinternationalistsshould cherishthe idea of diversepeoples

213John Chipman,ManagingthePoliticsofParochialism, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,

ironically,servesto update the principlefromits decolonizationformto take account

219 Cf W. Michael Reisman,Sovereignty

makers to agree on them before independence. Prior negotiationsprovide the best

has acquired internationaldimensionsifthe metropolitanstateis forcedto take "exceptional measures,"i.e.,

abstractappeal of lending more weightto lines freelyarrivedat than to those imposed

at 136-42 (Spender,J., dissenting)(Thailand should not be regarded as acquiescing in border as it lacked

of depositsa factorin delimitationof continentalshelf).

partof Kashmir.253 Evaluatingthe interwarperiod, Sarah Wambaughoffereda sensible

If thehallmarkof an effectivelegal systemis some degree ofpredictability of outcome,

important,(3) the constitutivechanges in internationallaw, principallythe emphasis

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