NOTES

Factors influencing the success of the Muslim League in the 1946 Punjab
elections

•The League's success in the elections can be attributed to the exploitation of separatist
symbols and the sense of communal identification communicated to a socially mobilized
community.

•The arguments raised about the League's success raise important questions about the
role of ideas, appealing to practical interests, social mobilization, and traditional social
networks in gaining support.

•The impact of the Second World War and the Unionist Party's policies on the province,
as well as the influence of the military vote, were also factors to consider.

•The League's organizational development and use of traditional channels of political

mobilization, such as Sufi and biraderi networks, were crucial to their success.

•Defeating the dominant Unionist Party in the Punjab countryside was a formidable task
for the League.
The Growth and Organization of the Muslim League in Punjab, 1937-1946

•In 1937, the Muslim League had little influence in the villages and towns of Punjab. The
failure to gain Unionist Party support further weakened their popularity.

•However, by 1946, League branches were established in both rural and urban districts
of Punjab due to the campaign launched in 1944 to open primary and district League
branches and enroll new members.

•The League intensified its activities leading up to the elections, extending its
organization down to the tehsil level to reach villages.

•The Rawalpindi Division saw significant progress, with numerous primary branches
established and thousands of new members enrolled.

•Other areas, like Mianwali, struggled to establish a strong organization despite initial
efforts.

•Only 150,000 members were enrolled in the League as of May 1945.

•The concept of biraderi, or kinship group, held significant influence over Muslims in
Punjab at both the village and provincial levels.

•The League's organizational growth was overshadowed by its success in gaining the
support of multiple Unionist Party Assembly members in Jhang and Sheikhupura
districts.
Decline of the Unionist Party's Power Base in the 1946 Punjab Elections

•The Unionist Party lost support from landlord and pir representatives, weakening its
position in the Legislative Assembly and its control over peasant support networks.

•The League shifted its focus to gaining elite support rather than establishing local
branches.

•The Nawab of Mamdot, President of the League, refused to allow primary League
branches on his estate, showing the League's ambivalent attitude towards grassroots
development.

•Important families like the Hayats, Noons, and Daultanas joined the League, causing a
significant blow to the Unionist Party's leadership and influence.

•The Unionist Party also lost the support of prominent pirs and sajjada nashins, who
played a crucial role in their 1937 electoral success.

•The League's success in districts like Multan, Jhang, Jhelum, and Karnal was
attributed to the support of leading pirs and sajjada nashins.
Relationship between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League

•The Jinnah-Sikander Pact governed the Unionist Party from October 1937 and was
controversial from the beginning.

•Iqbal claimed that Sikander only agreed to the pact to capture and suppress the
League.

•Sikander and Malik Barkat Ali disagreed on the political consequences of the pact.

•Sikander believed that the parties in the Punjab would remain unchanged, while Malik
Barkat Ali said the Unionist Party would undergo a transformation.

•The pact created a political dualism in the province, allowing the Muslim elite to remain
loyal to the Unionist Party while supporting the League at the national level.

•As the League's power grew, the question of the Unionist Party's independence in
provincial affairs became more significant.

•Jinnah hesitated to resolve the ambiguities created by the pact, still influenced by his
failed intervention in Punjab politics in 1936.
The rupture between the Unionist Party and the League in 1944-1946

•In 1944, efforts from the Punjab to assist Jinnah in his work prompted him to confront
the Unionist Premier, resulting in talks with Khizr to clarify the relationship between the
Unionist Party and the League at different political levels.
•Talks broke down over Khizr's insistence on retaining the Unionist Party name in the
new coalition ministry after the establishment of a Muslim League Assembly Party.

•The League denied recognizing the Jinnah-Sikander Talks of 1937 as a binding pact,
leading to Khizr's expulsion from the League.

•Unionist supporters were portrayed as traitors to Islam, intensifying conflict between

the Unionist Party and the League.

•Jinnah opposed the establishment of a Muslim League Workers' Board and thus
doomed the independent venture.

•The collapse of the Khizr-Noon Talks in 1945 led to an influx of Unionist supporters to
the League and increasing uncertainty due to the impending departure of the British
from India.

•The Unionist Party's non-communal approach was deemed irrelevant in the

transformed political landscape of 1946.

•The communalism of Hindu and Sikh district officials and threats from the League
against its opponents further strengthened the belief that the Unionist Party had lost its
relevance.
Biraderi Loyalty and Political Accommodation in Punjab

•The strength of biraderi loyalty in Punjab contributed to the rapid growth of the
League's support.

•Despite their history of loyalty to the Unionist Party, the Daultana and Hayat families
followed Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat into the League.

•Personal attachment to the Unionist Party did not mitigate the impact of pressures to
join the League.

•The Punjabi landlord's remarkable capacity for political accommodation can be traced
back to the days of Ranjit Singh and is still evident in contemporary politics.

•Several Muslim Leaguers issued statements attacking Khizr's attitude at the Simla
Conference.

•The Eastern Times reported on the league's desertion of the Unionist Party when it
couldn't safeguard their local interests.

•Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash responded to League allegations concerning the
Unionist Party's use of official pressure during the elections.
•Sayed Ghulam Mustafa Shah Gilani's report as Hon. Sec. Rawalpindi Division Muslim
League.

•Craik's letter to Linlithgow, discussing the political situation in Punjab.

•G. S. Chhabra's book on the advanced history of Punjab, referencing Ranjit Singh's
strategic alliances with Muslim families.

•The Unionist Party responded to the League's disruption of its rural support by
reactivating the Zemindara League.

•The Unionist Party moved closer to the Congress, hinting at a post-election coalition.

•Tikka Ram, the Jat Revenue Minister, declared that there was no difference between
the Unionist Party and the Congress.
The Impact of Wartime Policies on Political Parties in Punjab

•The Congress party's policy of uplift for agricultural communities and Muslim-Hindu
unity was exploited by the League for its own advantage.

•The Unionist Party lost popularity due to its reliance on government control in deserted
districts, leading to association with disliked officials.

•The Unionist Party resorted to pressuring voters, causing resentment in village

communities and damaging their popularity.

•Economic dislocations during the war made the Unionist Party unpopular among
supporters in eastern districts.

•Wartime policies caused economic difficulties such as shortages, high prices, and
inflation, affecting wage earners, fixed income individuals, and the Unionist Party's
zamindar supporters.
Economic Challenges and Agrarian Prosperity in Ambala District

•When rationing was introduced, villagers received smaller quotas than urban
population, and most kerosene supplies did not reach the villages.

•Increase in agricultural savings and land redemptions reflected the inability of rural
income to be spent on consumer goods.

•In 1944, there was a sustained fall in agricultural prices, leading to difficulties for the
Unionist Party to alleviate the situation.

•The Central Food Department's ban on grain movement between Punjab and United
Provinces caused frustration and encouraged smuggling.
•Grain prices recovered in March 1931, but by March 1933, the prices had fallen
significantly.

•Retail price index in Lahore rose from 100 in August 1939 to 398 in March 1946.

•Zemindars became reluctant to market their goods due to political insecurity,

unfavorable prospects for the 1946 rabi crop, and the allure of the black market.
The Impact of Wheat Famine and Grain Requisitioning on the 1946 Punjab
Elections

•Wheat, maize, and gram disappeared from the open market by December 1945,
resulting in a wheat famine in many towns.

•Large landlords in West Punjab brought grain to the mandis, but petty zemindars in
East Punjab did not contribute.

•The Unionist Government had to requisition grain from villages to fulfill the demand,
which caused opposition and disturbances during the elections.

•The Muslim League took advantage of wartime economic discontent and organized
protest meetings about alleged communal favoritism in rationing.

•The League aimed to politically mobilize peasants by helping them overcome economic
problems with medical supplies, cloth, and increased ration allowances.

•They presented Pakistan as a solution to the villagers' social and economic problems.

•The League workers attempted to solve economic issues in the villages, akin to Mao's
strategy in China.

•Criticism was raised against the League's manifesto for trying to appease various
interest groups within the province.

•The League also courted Punjabi servicemen for their support during the elections.
Political Importance of Indian Army Recruits in Punjab during the War

•Around 800,000 Indian Army recruits, constituting a significant percentage of the total,
gained political importance during the war.

•Their presence in key constituencies like Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Mianwali caused
challenges to the League due to strong Unionist opposition and organizational
weakness.

•The Unionist Party aimed to maintain loyalty in recruiting areas by providing aid to
servicemen's families and dependents, including free medical aid and schooling.
•The League faced grievances among Punjabi servicemen before the elections due to
the post-war economic slump, leading to high unemployment rates upon their return
home.
Success of League Propaganda in the Punjab Election, 1946

•The Unionist Government's plans to resettle servicemen on land were not ready,
leaving no reward for their efforts.

•The League set up a committee to provide immediate aid to unemployed ex-

servicemen, following the Congress example.

•The League addressed various concerns of servicemen including the Palestine

Question, the use of Muslim troops in Indonesia, and the fate of Punjabi members of the
India National Army.

•The League's decision to establish a Defence Committee for I.N.A. members on trial
gained support in recruiting districts.

•Pir Fazl Shah's influence favored the League's success in Muslim recruiting areas.

•The League used Islamic appeals and symbolism in its propaganda, promoting political
unity among Indian Muslims.
Utilization of Mosques and Religious Appeals in the Propaganda of the Muslim
League

•Mosques were used as centers to spread League propaganda due to their significance
in Muslim life.

•A proposal was made to use 5,000 mosques in Pakistan areas as League missionary
sub-centers.

•League meetings were regularly held in mosques, particularly after Friday prayers.

•The Quran was showcased during elections as the League's symbol, with pledges to
vote for it being made on it.

•Students were trained to appeal to the electorate along religious lines, attending
lectures on the Muslim League in the light of Islam and Islamic History.

•The students from Punjab played a crucial role in the League's success and their
efforts were praised by the Punjab Provincial Muslim League.

•Students were advised to join prayers at mosques, lead them like 'Holy Warriors', and
incorporate emotional appeals and Quranic texts in their speeches.

•Poetry, especially that of Iqbal, was recited at meetings.

•During the 1945 Christmas vacation, there were 1550 members of the Punjab Muslim
Students' Federation and 250 Aligarh students working on the League's behalf.
The Role of Student Workers and Religious Propaganda in the 1946 Punjab
Elections

•Student workers supported the Congress in the 1937 elections and worked for the
Unionist Party during the early months of the war.

•The Punjab Muslim Students' Federation engaged in extensive League propaganda

activity in June and July of 1941.

•Student workers played a crucial role in disrupting the 1943 Lyallpur Jat Mahasabha
Conference, removing the threat of intercommunal Jat support for the Unionist Party.

•Student workers helped mobilize support for the League in the eastern districts of the
province where large landlords were scarce.

•The Unionist Party started incorporating religious elements into their propaganda and
introduced an Islamic flag at their election camps.

•Sir Chhotu Ram proposed the use of Ulema to campaign against the League, but their
influence was weak in the countryside.
Peasant Religious Life in Punjab and the Role of Maulvis and Pirs

•In the Punjab province, even in small villages, mosques were present, but religious life
for peasants revolved around pirs and shrines, not maulvis and mosques.

•The influence of local pirs outweighed that of the village maulvis, especially in the
western districts of the province.

•The ulema from Deoband and Firangi Mahall did support the League and held
conferences, but their role in mobilizing support for the League among rural areas
remained minimal compared to pirs.

•Pirs gained popularity due to the belief that they inherited baraka from the Sufi Saints
who played a significant role in the province's conversion to Islam.

•Pirs' shrines provided welfare facilities such as sick dispensaries and soup kitchens,
offering relief to the surrounding areas.

•The Urs celebrations held at shrines were the most important date, where food was
distributed, and the saint's soul was believed to have united with God.

•Initially, pirs gained authority through popular veneration and the piri-mureedi
relationship, where disciples took an oath of obedience. However, this relationship lost
its earlier élitism in the twentieth century due to the proliferation of shrines and the
indiscriminate taking of oaths.
The Political and Social Importance of Pirs in Punjab

•Almost every Muslim in the Punjab is loyal to a pir, and lacking one is frowned upon.

•Pir Syed Fazl Shah of Jalalpur claims to have 200,000 murids.

•Piri-mureedi relationship is based on absolute obedience from the murid to the pir.

•Pirs were politically important in the countryside, as central governments granted them
land in return for loyalty.

•The Chishti order initially refused relations with the state but were forced into it in the
14th century.

•Many pirs became large landlords due to state grants and individual endowments.

•Shrines in Punjab had large landholdings, such as the descendants of Baba Farid who
owned 43,000 acres.

•British administration associated with pirs through seats in provincial and divisional
Darbari.

•Pirs acquired religious, economic, and social importance in the 20th century.

•Pirs played a crucial role in local and provincial politics, endorsing candidates and
creating their own political parties.
The Role of Sufi Shrines in Political Movements in Punjab

•The Unionist Party's victory in the 1937 elections was attributed to its support from
leading pirs and the Sufi Shrine in Ajmer.

•In 1946, the Muslim League formed the Mash-eikh Committee, consisting of influential
religious figures, to gain Sufi support for their cause.

•The Unionist Party sought support from 14 leading pirs and Sajjada Nashins in 1937.

•The League followed the All-India level action proposed in 1943, requesting prayers
and sacrifices for an independent Muslim India.

•Politicians, including Khizr, had personal attachments to pirs and sought their
guidance.

•Strong familial connections between politicians and pirs facilitated the League's
creation of the Masheikh Committee.
•Urs ceremonies provided a platform for the League's growth in rural areas from 1944.

•Pirs actively participated in League propaganda and elections, with shrines frequently
used for meetings and issuing supportive fatwas.
Mobilization of support for the Muslim League through religious appeals in the
1946 Punjab Elections

•An announcement from the Dargarh of Hazrat Shah Nur Jamal, calling for supporters in
his Silsilah to help the Muslim League and vote for it.

•A fatwa issued from the Qadiri dargarh of Hazrat Shah Muqim Mujravi at Hujra, urging
his murids to support the Muslim League candidate in the Shakargarh constituency.

•The Sajjada Nashin of the shrine of Pir Sayed Mohd. Ghaus using Urs ceremonies to
appeal to his murids to support the Muslim League.

•Sayed Ymdad Ali Shah Gilani, Sajjada Nashin Dargarh Hzrat Shah Muqim Nujravi,
making a passionate appeal to give every vote to the Muslim League's nominated
candidates and revive the glory of the Muslim Government.

•Examining whether religious appeals were crucial in gaining support for the League in
the new Canal Colony areas, which had experienced immense economic growth.
Social and Political Controls in Colony Towns

•Colony towns like Jaranwala experienced a 72% population growth.

•British implemented social engineering to maintain communal life and traditional ties.

•Land grants were given to landlords in colonization schemes to provide social and
political leadership.

•Lifestyle change only occurred for nomadic 'Jangli' inhabitants.

•Pirs had religious and social influence in colonies and acquired reserved land.

•Pirs played a significant role in villages as zaildars and improving landlords.

•The League gained support in colonies in 1946 elections due to the influence of pirs
and landlords.

•Various reasons led to the allegiance shift of pirs to the League, including factional
rivalries and relationship with the government.
Influence of Political Loyalty on Sajjada Nashins' Support for the Muslim League

•Sajjada Nashins of small shrines, reliant on government patronage, were less likely to
join the League, compared to those from influential shrines.

•The brother of the Sajjada Nashin of the Gilani shrine in Jhang District held a
government position in Chenab Canal Colony.

•Assessment reports of different districts and colonies in Punjab are referenced.

•The Muslim League gained significant popular votes in Jhang, Montgomery, and
Lyallpur Districts.

•Pir Makhad was traditionally aligned against the Khan of Makhad, who supported the
League.

•Sajjada Nashins from the Qadiri Dargarh at Batala, like Pir Mian Syed Badr Mohy-ud-
Din, remained loyal to the Unionists.

•Pir Mian Syed Badr Mohy-ud-Din had a high social position due to his family's loyalty to
the central government.

•Pirs of Chishti revivalist shrines, such as Taunsa, Golra, Sial, and Jalalpur, were highly
influential supporters of the League.

•These pirs actively supported the League to bring greater religious influence into rural
politics, without misgivings about a future Pakistan controlled by Muslim politicians.

•They saw the establishment of a state based on the Shariat as an extension of their
local religious work into larger political arena.

SUMMARY

The 1946 Punjab Elections: Unraveling the Muslim League's Success and Its
Impact on the Subcontinent
Modern Asian Studies: The 1946 Punjab Elections by I. A. Talbot. In this article, Talbot
examines the reasons behind the Muslim League's success in the 1946 Punjab
elections, which had a significant impact on the future of the subcontinent. He questions
the common explanations given for the League's victory and argues that a more
detailed examination of the process is required.

Factors Contributing to the Muslim League's Success in the 1946 Punjab

Elections
The Muslim League's success in the 1946 provincial elections in the Punjab province of
India can be attributed to various factors, including its organizational development, its
use of traditional channels of political mobilization, and the impact of the Second World
War on the province. The task of defeating the Unionist Ministry in the Punjab
countryside, where all but 10 of the 85 Muslim seats were situated, appeared
formidable. However, the League's ability to provide patronages and its use of the
traditional biraderi and Sufi networks helped it achieve a political breakthrough. The
League's organizational development in the province, as well as its ability to appeal to
communal identity and immediate practical interests, were also important factors in its
success.

The Muslim League's Rise in Punjab: Winning Over the Unionist Party
The Muslim League's growth in the Punjab province of Pakistan was slow and patchy
until the early 1940s, but it managed to win over the support of many Unionist Party
members in the years leading up to the partition of India.

The Punjab Unionist Party's Setback: Losing Landlords and Pirs in the 1946
Elections
The Punjab Unionist Party, which ruled the province until 1947, suffered a major
setback in the 1946 elections due to the defection of many of its landlord and pir
representatives. This not only weakened the party's position in the Legislative Assembly
but also robbed it of control over the networks through which its peasant support had
been mobilized during elections. The Muslim League, which emerged as the major
winner in the elections, gained the support of many leading pirs and sajjada nashins,
whose spiritual and temporal influence over their followers in the villages played a
crucial role in its success.

The Jinnah-Sikander Pact and the Decline of the Unionist Party in Punjab
The Unionist Party's loss of elite support in Punjab can be attributed to the Jinnah-
Sikander Pact of 1937, which created political dualism within the province. The Pact
allowed the Muslim élite to retain loyalty to the Unionist Party in provincial politics while
supporting the Muslim League at the national level. This ambiguity was never resolved,
and the League's increasing power and prestige during the war years made the
question of the Unionist Party's independence in provincial affairs more significant.

Unionist-League Rapprochement Fails: Fueling Communalism and Strengthening

the Muslim League
Jinnah failed to win Unionist support for the Muslim League in the Punjab in 1946,
leading to a bitter dispute and intensified propaganda depicting Unionist supporters as
traitors to Islam. The collapse of the Khizr-Noon Talks ended any hope of a Unionist-
League rapprochement before the elections, leading to a flood of Unionist supporters
joining the League. Growing communalism, threats from the League, and agitations in
some villages further strengthened this trend.

Decline of the Unionist Party and the Rise of the Muslim League in Punjab
The Unionist Party in the Punjab faced a rapid decline in support due to the growth of
the Muslim League, which was aided by the strength of biraderi loyalty in the region.
Many Punjabi landlords switched allegiances to the League, as they had done for
centuries due to their remarkable capacity for political accommodation. The Unionist
Party responded by reactivating the Zemindara League and moving closer to the
Congress, foreshadowing a post-election coalition between the two parties.

Decline of the Unionist Party in the 1946 Punjab Elections

The 1946 Punjab elections saw a decline in popularity for the Unionist Party, which had
been the dominant political force in the province for several decades. This was due to a
range of factors, including economic dislocations caused by the war, increasing reliance
on government machinery, and pressure tactics used during the election campaign. As
a result, the party lost support among both rural and urban communities, as well as its
traditional allies in the agricultural sector.

Rationing Disparities, Smuggling, and Agricultural Pressures: A Look at Ambala

District in the 1940s
Rationing in Ambala District resulted in villagers receiving smaller quotas than urban
population. Kerosene supplies rarely reached villages. Agricultural prosperity was
reflected in increased savings and land redemptions, but not improved standard of
living. A fall in agricultural prices in 1944 led to pressure on the Unionist Party. The
higher prices in U.P. than Punjab encouraged smuggling. Retail price of gur fell from 10
seers to 25 seers. The price index in Lahore rose from 100 to 398 by March 1946.
Political insecurity, black market enticement, and 1946 rabi crop prospects led to
reluctance to market produce.

Revolutionizing Punjab: The Muslim League's Successful Political Mobilization

and Criticisms
The 1946 Punjab elections were marked by the Muslim League's successful strategy of
politically mobilizing peasants by helping them overcome economic problems. The
League also exploited wartime economic discontent and criticized the Unionist
government's grain requisitioning policies. It attempted to gain control of the rationing
machinery and distributed medical supplies, cloth, and other essential items in the
villages. The League's propagandists visited villages to solve social problems and
promote Pakistan as the solution. However, the League's manifesto was criticized for
opportunistically attempting to placate every conceivable interest group in the province.

The Political Significance of Indian Army Recruits during World War IIIndian Army
recruits during World War II, mostly Muslims, were politically significant as they
constituted a large proportion of the electorate in key constituencies. The Unionist Party
had provided aid to soldiers' dependants to maintain their loyalty, but many returned
home to face high levels of unemployment.

The Impact of Muslim League's Strategies and Appeals in the Punjab Elections of
1946The Punjab elections in 1946 saw the Muslim League gain significant support from
servicemen in the Rawalpindi and Jhelum districts, despite earlier weaknesses in the
area. The League's success was due in part to its exploitation of wartime economic
grievances and its use of Islamic appeals and symbolism. The League's decision to
establish a Defence Committee for members of the India National Army also helped
secure support.

Muslim League's Propaganda and Religious Appeals for Pakistan's Support

The Muslim League used mosques and religious symbols to spread propaganda and
gain support for Pakistan. Students were also trained to appeal to voters along religious
lines, with the Quran and poetry being used as tools for emotional appeal.

The Influence of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation in the 1946 Elections
The Punjab Muslim Students' Federation played a crucial role in the 1946 elections by
wrecking the Lyallpur Jat Mahasabha Conference, prising Muslim Jats and Gujjars
away from their inter-communal tribal loyalties, and employing Islamic symbolism.

The Influence of Pirs in Mobilizing Support for the Muslim League in Punjab
The role of ulema in mobilizing support for the Muslim League in Punjab remained
minimal compared to that of pirs, who had religious influence due to their inherited
baraka from Sufi Saints. The pirs' popularity sprang from their ancestors' roles in
converting people to Islam. The pirs' shrines provided welfare facilities and food during
Urs celebrations, which were the most important dates in any shrine's calendar. The
piri-mureedi relationship was no longer exclusive, and almost every Muslim in Punjab
had a connection to a pir.

The Political and Economic Influence of Pirs in the Punjab Region

The piri-mureedi relationship in the Punjab region had a significant impact on politics as
pirs were granted considerable political importance within the countryside. Despite their
religious influence, many pirs also acquired considerable economic importance as large
landlords due to state inam grants. The British administration further associated pirs
with their rule by conferring titles and honors on them. In the 1937 elections, the
Unionist party's victory was largely due to the support it gained from pirs.

The Muslim League's Collaboration with Sufi Religious Leaders in Punjab for an
Independent Muslim India
The Muslim League in Punjab sought support from Sufi religious leaders in their fight for
an independent Muslim India in the 1930s and 1940s.

The Role of Religious Appeals in the 1946 Punjab ElectionsThe 1946 Punjab
Elections saw Muslim League candidates gaining support through religious appeals,
with Sufi leaders and shrines issuing fatwas and announcements commanding their
followers to vote for the League. The appeal was based on both loyalty to the Pir and
the glory of Muslim history, with the promise of a Muslim government rising again in
India.

The British Colonial Strategy: Maintaining Control and Preserving Traditional

Influences
The British deliberately created rural structures in the colonies to maintain social and
political controls. Despite economic growth, there was no breakdown of communal life
or traditional ties. The only significant change was in the lifestyle of the nomadic Jangli
inhabitants. Pirs and landlords retained their traditional influence in the colonies, and the
Muslim League gained support from them in the 1946 elections.

The Influence of Pir Shrines on the 1946 Punjab Elections

The 1946 Punjab elections saw the Muslim League gain significant support from
influential pir shrines, while smaller shrines were less able to rely on government
patronage and thus had to align with the League. Pir Mian Syed Badr Mohy-ud-Din, for
example, was loyal to the Unionists due to his family's tradition of loyalty to the central
government. The pirs of Chishti revivalist shrines, on the other hand, saw the League as
an opportunity to infuse greater religious influence into politics.

Ajmer's Influence: Chishti Shrines and the Muslim League in Punjab

The Chishti shrines in the Punjab supported the Muslim League during the 1940s due to
the influence of the premier shrine of their order at Ajmer. Other influential pirs from the
Qadiri Order also played a significant role in mobilizing support for the League in the
province.

The Role of Biraderi and Piri-Mureedi Loyalty in the 1946 Punjab Elections
The 1946 Punjab elections saw the Muslim League gaining a majority of the Muslim
seats, with biraderi loyalty and piri-mureedi loyalty playing an important role in
mobilizing political support for the party. The League made efforts to capture the
support of provincial organizations such as the Gujjar Conference, and even removed a
ban on the membership of Begum Shah Nawaz to utilize her influence as Vice-
President of the Provincial Arian Conference.

The Muslim League's Success in the 1946 Punjab Elections: Leveraging Religion
and Traditional Networks
The Muslim League's success in the 1946 Punjab elections was due to their use of
religious appeals and traditional channels of political mobilization, such as the Sufi and
biraderi networks, rather than appealing to the wider sense of loyalty to their Millat.

The Muslim League's Success in Punjab: The Influence of Landlords and Pirs
The Muslim League effectively captured the support of many landlords and pirs in the
Punjab, leading to its success in the 1946 elections. The League's spread into the
villages was a recent development, and its position as a rival party to the Unionists
constituted a radical new dimension in Punjabi politics. The Jinnah-Khizr Talks in 1944
were a crucial turning point, prompting many rural elites to switch their loyalty from the
Unionists to the League due to social, economic, and religious reasons. The Unionist
Party's identification with British rule proved costly, as it lost the support of the village
voters.

Mobilizing Peasant Support: The Muslim League's Success in the 1946 Punjab
Elections
The 1946 Punjab elections were won by the Muslim League due to its ability to provide
answers to the economic dislocation of the countryside caused by the War, and its
promise that Pakistan's creation would solve their social and economic difficulties. The
importance of interests, rather than ideas, in mobilizing peasant support was revealed.
The League's demand for Pakistan was legitimized by its religious appeal, but its
potency lay in its expression of the Muslim peasant's interests