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324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 689

People vs. Jalosjos
*

G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

Public Officers; The privileges and rights arising from having

been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.—True, election is
the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise
of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of
its

_______________

* EN BANC.

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690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jalosjos

importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been

elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to
ascertain the applicable law.
Same; All top officials of Government—executive, legislative and
judicial are subject to the majesty of law; Privilege has to be granted
by law, not inferred from the duties of a position.—We start with the
incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law.
There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that
election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather
than exemption.
Same; The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms.—The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily
addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
Same; Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of
the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests.—Because of
the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code
could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject
to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal, x x x For offenses
punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest.
Same; The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.—The accused-
appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from

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the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The

members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations.
Same; One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.—One rationale
behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction,
is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others. A person charged with crime is taken
into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in
United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the
complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused
may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk
of his absconding.
Same; Election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.—We,
therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.

GONZAGA-REYES, J., Concurring Opinion

Public Officers; The continued incarceration of accused-

appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his
rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.—The
trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory
rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In People v. Divina
we held that the trial court’s judgment of conviction imports that the
evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the
continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and
constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional
liberty pending appeal of his conviction.

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People vs. Jalosjos

Same; Accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory

rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua is not entitled to the
privilege of parliamentary immunity.—The accused-appellant, having
been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege
of parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above stated
rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction of the
constitutional privilege is not in order.
Same; Doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to
criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during
his previous term.—Accused-appellant’s contention that his
reelection constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an
expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even
the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec,
Aguinaldo v. Santos and in Salalima v. Guingona we laid down the
doctrine that a public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove therefor. This doctrine
of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the
re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. The
administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from
his penal liability.

MOTION to be allowed to discharge duties as Congressman.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Prospero Cresceni; Gancayco, Balasbas & Associates
Law Offices; Saguisag & Associates; Balisado Law Office; and
Lazaro Law Firm for accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged

member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts

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People vs. Jalosjos
1

and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.

The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons
in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to
balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial
interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal
law.
 The accused-appellant’s “Motion To Be Allowed To
Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives”
was filed on the grounds that—

1. Accused-appellant’s reelection being an expression of

popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling,
giving priority to any right or interest—not even the
police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected
representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties
amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the
renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained
lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide
member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to
discharge his mandate.

________________

1 RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.

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People vs. Jalosjos

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the

conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the “mandate of

sovereign will.” He states that the sovereign electorate of the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Con-gressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.
 True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects
to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation
of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the
applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top
officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are
subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate
misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment
to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the
common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted
by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

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People vs. Jalosjos

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the

Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; x
x x.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the

peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal.
 The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity
as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment,

there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive
interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within
carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:

x x x but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member

involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule

minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject
Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that
he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has

696

696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jalosjos

also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough

that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’
function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution which states that—

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason

why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11,
Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement
of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant’s
2 reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Santos, which states, inter alia, that—
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not
for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily

seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case
involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not

_______________

2 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].

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People vs. Jalosjos

removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He

remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal
or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must
protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to
others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration
3 of justice. As stated in United
States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State
action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to
the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court,
the accused may be denied bail and thus 4 subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate
which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by
unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if
permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular
place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-
appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture
despite a call from his colleagues in the House of
Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the
same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-
appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not
be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being
contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a
mockery of the aims of the State’s penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons, to wit:

_______________

3 19 Phil. 208, 212.

4 Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].

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People vs. Jalosjos

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics

held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the
issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House
of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the
clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati
Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City.
In this case, accused-appellant commuted by
chartered plane and private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer

at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was
likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:

a) to join “living-out” prisoners on “work-volunteer

program” for the purpose of 1) establishing a
mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany
trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he
was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project
area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City.
 c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati
City for his heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to

him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling
temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency
nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in
a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that
of a spe-

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People vs. Jalosjos

cial class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the

correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are 5

the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified

by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to
the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no
other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the
utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it
comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going
to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression
of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass,
he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a
strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting
arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to
the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights
of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would
remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First

District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard
and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the
House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch
of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the
concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail
his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always

________________

5 44 SCRA 37 [1972].

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People vs. Jalosjos

complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to

leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any
other member of the House of Representatives “[h]e is
provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214,
North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex,
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of
staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department
coordination, he is also provided with an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City,
where he attends to his constituents.” Accused-appellant
further admits that while under detention, he has filed several
bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been
receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly
stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate
as a member of the House of Representative consistent with
the restraints upon one who is presently under detention.
Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have
been allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To
give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full
term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: “x x x6 nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws.” This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in

_______________

6 Art. III, Sec. 1.

701

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 701

People vs. Jalosjos
7

rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of

government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the
people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the
24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function
depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to
nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace
and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly
or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
8
against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
gov-

_______________

7 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

8 Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.

702

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jalosjos

eminent authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups9

may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes 10 of the law and apply to all those belonging to the

same class.
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man’s personal liberty;
coercion exercised upon a 11person to prevent the free exercise
of his power of locomotion.
More explicitly, “imprisonment” in its general sense, is the
restraint of one’s liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by
judgment12of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the
accused. The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place
to place,13 or of his free action according to his own pleasure
and will. Imprisonment is the detention of another 14 against his

will depriving him of his power of locomotion and it “[is]

something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the
notion of15 restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior
barrier.”

________________

9 See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p. 548.

10 See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza
v. Commission on Elections, 96 SCRA 763 (1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil.
12.
11 Black’s Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
 12 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing US v. Safeway
Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan. 140 F 2d 834, 839 and US v. Mitchell, 163 F.
1014, 1016 at p. 470.
13 Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112 N.J.L. 429.
14 Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1087.
15 Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.

703

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 703

People vs. Jalosjos

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, 16 by its

nature, changes an individual’s status in society. Prison
officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving
the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of
attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for
re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these
demands 17 require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against
the accused-appellant’s claim that re-election to public office
gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police
power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,

Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), And also in the separate opinion of
Hon. Justice Reyes.
Bellosillo and Puno, JJ., We concur with the main and
separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the majority as well as the separate
opinion.
Vitug, J., I concur in both the ponencia and the
separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur in this as well as in the separate
opinion of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., See separate concurring opinion.

_________________

16 Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction and

Prisoners’ Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.
17 Ibid.

704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jalosjos

CONCURRING OPINION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

For resolution in this case is a motion filed by accused-

appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos, who has been convicted by the
trial court of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of
acts of lasciviousness, which judgment is currently pending
appeal before this Court. As a member of the House of
Representatives, accused-appellant claims that his
constituents are deprived of representation by reason of his
incarceration pending appeal of the judgment of conviction
and that he should therefore be allowed to discharge his
legislative functions, including attendance of legislative
sessions and committee meetings.
I concur in the ponencia of my colleague Madame Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago in holding that accused-appellant’s
motion is bereft of any legal merit.
The Bill of Rights provides—

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ 1 of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics supplied)

This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for

offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence
of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, viz.—

SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with
a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted
to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

_______________

1 1987 Constitution, Art. III, sec. 13.

705
 VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 705
People vs. Jalosjos

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of

statutory rape, which
2 is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In
People v. Divina we held that the trial court’s judgment of
conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime
charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration
of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated
curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal
of his conviction.
Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity
from arrest to legislators provide legal justification for
accused-appellant’s motion. The Constitution states that—

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for 3 any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

I agree with the ponencia that to allow accused-appellant to

attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified
broadening of the privilege from arrest bestowed by the
Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the
legislative history of this provision nor the general principles of
official immunity support an expanded interpretation of such
privilege. 4

Unlike the present Constitution, the 1935 Constitution

limited the privilege from arrests to “all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace.” This provision was taken
from the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which was in turn
based upon the American Constitution. In accordance with

________________

2 221 SCRA 209 (1993).

3 Art. VI, sec. 11.
4 Art. VI, sec. 15.—The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech
and debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

706

706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 People vs. Jalosjos

American precedents, the words “treason, felony and breach

of the peace”
5 have been construed to include all indictable
offenses. Thus, under the 1935 Constitution the freedom from
arrest only encompassed
6 civil arrests.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the privilege was
broadened to include arrests for crimes punishable by
imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of
the privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress
immunity from arrest remained the same—to ensure that they 7

are not prevented from performing their legislative duties. In

fact, the 1986 Constitutional Commission rejected the
proposal of one of its members to expand the scope of the
parliamentary immunity to include searches because, unlike
arrests, it was not demonstrated that the conduct of searches
would prevent members 8 of Congress from discharging their
legislative functions.
It is a well-established principle that official immunity is a
necessary adjunct to the vigorous and effective performance
of official functions. Members of Congress, in particular, who
are called upon to exercise their discretion and judgment in
enacting laws responsive to the needs of the people, would
certainly be impeded in the exercise of their legislative
functions if every dissatisfied person could compel them to
vindicate the

________________

5 Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972), citing Williamson v. United States,

207 U.S. 425.
6 Art. VIII, sec. 9—A member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning
from the same; but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved to the custody of the law within twenty-four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall
cease upon its failure to do so. A member shall not be questioned nor held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Batasan or in any
committee thereof.
7 1987 Constitution, II RECORD 90.
8 Ibid., 178-185.

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VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 707

People vs. Jalosjos
wisdom of their enactments in an action9 for damages or
question their official acts before the courts.
It was never the intention of the framers of the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions to shield a member of Congress from the
consequences of his wrongdoings. Thus, despite the widening
of its scope to include criminal offenses, the privilege from
arrest is still circumscribed by the nature or the gravity of the
offense of which the accused is charged. Hence, the
commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by
afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall
within the scope of the constitutional privilege. A member of
Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for
relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional
10

penalties. As enunciated in Martinez v. Morfe, “when it

comes to freedom from arrest, it would amount to the creation
of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would
be considered immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same.”
The accused-appellant, having been convicted of statutory
rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, an afflictive
penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of
parliamentary immunity and, proceeding from the above
stated rationale for legislative immunity, a liberal construction
of the constitutional privilege is not in order.
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual
circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege
from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and
academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that
stage of the criminal process at which personal jurisdiction is
sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his
arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely
being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been
arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.

________________

9 Mechem, F. R., A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers

(1890), 431.
10 Supra.

708

708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jalosjos

Accused-appellant’s contention that his re-election constitutes

a renewal of his mandate and that such an expression of the
 popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police 11

power of the State12 is hollow. In Aguinaldo v. Comelec,

13

Aguinaldo v. Santos and in Salalima v. Guingona we laid

down the doctrine that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or
condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected
14

official may have committed during his previous term. The

administrative liability of a public officer is separate and
distinct from his penal liability.
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory. Since the Constitution itself provides for
the immunities from the general application of our criminal
laws which a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of
such immunities must similarly be based upon an express
constitutional grant.
I vote to deny the motion.
Motion denied.

Note.—View that rank may have its privileges but certainly

a blatant disregard of law and administrative rules is not one
of them. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997])

——o0o——

________________

11 Res., G.R. Nos. 105128-30, May 14, 1992.

12 212 SCRA 768 (1992).
13 257 SCRA 55 (1996).
14 Salalima v. Guingona, id.

709

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