1.

DEL SOCORRO vs VAN WILSEM

Facts:

-Norma and Ernst married in Holland. They had a son. And then they got divorced in Holland
when son was still 18 months old.

-Ernst made a promise to support their child but he did not do it. He came to the Philippines and
remarried and stayed in Cebu.

-Norma sent her demand letter for support from Ernst but he refused to freceive the letter.

-Norma filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Provincial Prosecutor in Cebu against Ernst for
unjust refusal to support his minor child.

-RTC dismissed the case because Ernst is an alien and as a foreign national he is not subject
to our national law(Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to
his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who
fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which
mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
facie case exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law;

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Yes. Respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child
with petitioner.

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine
laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they
are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support

his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s
son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this
score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his
child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents
of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.

Article 195. The separation of property ceases:

(1) Upon reconciliation of the spouses, in case of legal separation;

(2) When the civil interdiction terminates;

(3) When the absent spouse appears;

(4) When the court, at the instance of the wife, authorizes the husband to resume the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the court being satisfied that the husband will
not again abuse his powers as an administrator;

(5) When the husband, who has abandoned the wife, rejoins her.

In the above cases, the property relations between the spouses shall be governed by the same
rules as before the separation, without prejudice to the acts and contracts legally executed
during the separation.
The spouses shall state, in a public document, all the property which they return to the marriage
and which shall constitute the separate property of each.

This public document shall be recorded in the Registry of Property.

In the cases referred to in this article, all the property brought in shall be deemed to be newly
contributed, even though all or some may be the same which existed before the liquidation
effected by reason of the separation. (1439a)

6. ZALAMEA VS. CA AND TRANSWORLD AIRLINES INC.

FACTS:

-Sps. Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 tickets from Manila agent of Transworld for a
flight to New York to LA. The spouses tickets were discounted while their daughter was on a full
payment.

-On the day of the flight, they were placed on a waitlist because their seats were already taken.
The first 22 were allowed to board including Mr. Zalamea who was in possession of the full
paying ticket, the others not able to fly.

-Mrs. Zalamea and her child still not able to board on the next flight as it was also full so they
booked another flight were they were force to pay. When they went home in the Philippines,
they filed an action for breach of contract of TWA before the RTC Makati where it ruled in favor
of them and against TWA

-CA- in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked and that even a person with a
confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it
ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so
gross as to amount to bad faith.

Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with
forty-eight other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over
discounted tickets.

ISSUE

WON TWA should be held liable to the Zalameas.

HELD:

YES. That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed.
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign
laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.

- Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.7
- Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to
the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law
of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline.8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable
law in this case would be Philippine law.

- Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith
in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if
they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have
incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its
passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or
would have the choice to ride with another airline

5. WILLIAMETTE IRON AND STEEL WORKS VS. AH MUZZAL

FACTS:

This case involves the liability of the defendant, a former resident of the State of California, now
residing in the Philippine Islands, for obligations contracted by a California corporation of which
he was a stockholder at the time said obligations were contracted with the plaintiff-appellee in
this case.

The section of the Civil Code of California under which the plaintiff seeks to recover reads:

“SEC. 322. Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and personally liable for such
proportion of all its debts and liabilities contracted or incurred during the time he was a
stockholder as the amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the
subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation. Any creditor of the corporation may
institute joint or several actions against any of its stockholders, for the proportion of his claim
payable by each, and in such action the court must (1) ascertain the proportion of the claim or
debt for which each defendant is liable, and (2) a several judgment must be rendered against
each, in conformity therewith. If any stockholder pays his proportion of any debt due from the
corporation, incurred while he was such stockholder, he is relieved from any further personal
liability for such debt, and if an action has been brought against him upon such debt, it must be
dismissed, as to him, upon his paying the costs, or such proportion thereof as may be properly
chargeable against him. The liability of each stockholder is determined by the amount of stock
or shares owned by him at the time the debt or liability was incurred; and such liability is not
released by any subsequent transfer of stock.”

Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant, for the first cause of
action, to pay to plaintiff the sum of P2,837.34, with interest; and to pay also the amount of
P1,590.63, for the second cause of action, with interest. The defendant is further ordered to pay
the amount of P500 as reasonable attorney’s fees in prosecuting this action, and to pay the
costs of these proceedings.”

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that plaintiff has proven the existence of the
foreign law involved in this action.
HELD:

NO. Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court does not exclude the presentation of
other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In the case at bar, the
Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco,
California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same
was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law. Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California,
since the year 1918, under oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the California Civil Code and
stated that said section was in force at the time the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff
were incurred, i. e., on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently
established the fact that the section in question was the law of the State of California on the
above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure will convince
one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove
the existence of a foreign law.

“The foreign law is a matter of fact . . . You ask the witness what the law is; he may from his
recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say what it is.” (Lord Campbell concurring
in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice Denman in a well known English case where a witness was
called upon to prove the Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he
referred to a book containing the decrees of the Council of Trent as controlling, Jones on
Evidence, Section Edition, Volume 4, pages 3148-3152.) Aside from the testimony of Attorney
Bolton Ragland’s Annotated Civil Code of California was presented as evidence. This book
contains that State’s Civil Code as adopted March 21, 1872, with the subsequent official statute
amendments to and including the year 1929.

5. ORION SAVINGS BANK VS. SUZUKI

FACTS:

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with
Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer,
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and
Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
That the mortgage in favor of Orion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged
Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and
That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.

ISSUES:
Orion's petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:[15]
The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner's duplicate copies of the CCTs;
Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any conveyance or
encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.

RULING:
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this
position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-
settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and... arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.[20] To
consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fair play, justice, and due... process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to
lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine
law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law,
provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership
of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea"[29] to prove
the existence of Korean Law. This... certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal
nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office,
as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.[30]
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine
Law.[
Principles:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country
or state where it is located.[21] The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property its
immobility. Immovables are part of the... country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them
have their natural center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as
the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to
another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or... lost.[23] This general principle includes all
rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.

4. LAVADIA VS HEIRS OF JUAN LUNA

FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar,
Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife,
herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna, whom he initially married in a civil ceremony
conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in
a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In Atty. Luna’s
marriage to Eugenia, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna,
Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia,
and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and Eugenia eventually
agreed to live apart from each other whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership of property. On January 12, 1977, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with Eugenia from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court
of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on
the same date, Atty. Luna contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad. Thereafter, Atty. Luna
and Soledad returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where Atty. Luna was the managing partner. On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through
Atty. Luna purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project at Gamboa St., Makati
City. Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners; the parties stipulated that the interest of Atty. Luna over the condominium unit would be 25/100
shares. Atty. Luna thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz
and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death
of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997. After the death of Atty. Juan, his share in the condominium unit
including the law books, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z.
Luna, Atty. Luna’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law
firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

A complaint was filed by Soledad against the heirs of Atty. Luna with the RTC of Makati City on
September 10, 1999 alleging that the subject properties (the share in the condominium unit and the law
books) were acquired during the existence of the marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad through their
joint efforts that since they had no children, Soledad became co-owner of the said properties upon the
death of Atty. Luna to the extent of 3/4 pro-indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share in the said
properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of Atty. Luna which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s
last will and testament; and that the heirs of Atty. Luna through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded Soledad from
her share in the subject properties.

The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the share in the condominium unit was acquired by
Atty. Juan through his sole industry and thus plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the said property. However, she was declared to be the owner of the books found in the
condominium unit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna
did not terminate his prior marriage, thus it adjudged nothing to the respondent and gave all the
properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from his first marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit and the law books of the deceased
husband is part of his conjugal property with his second wife, petitioner herein – NO.

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

The first marriage between Atty. Luna. and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality
rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained
Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.
Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on
July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution, and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for
the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among
Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the
death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did
not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code.

The approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic was insufficient
in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia.
The approval took place only as an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce. With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine
law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not
also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains
of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carries the burden of proof to confirm such
fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property. However, as found by the CA, the petitioner, as the
party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence, did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of
his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litis
legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law books
pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

ISSUES

1. Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage

2. Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court

3. HERALD DACASIN (American) VS. SHARON DACASIN (FILIPINO)

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born
on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit
Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. [3]
In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent
sole custody of
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement [4] ) for the
joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes
arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook... to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
Issues:
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit and enforce
the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties' child.
Ruling:
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is
void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner's suit and call
for the remand of the case to settle the question of
Stephanie's custody.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for... joint parental authority when
spouses live together. [21] However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under
the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint... custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give... custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code
on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a
mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug... addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any
State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may... obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the... marriage.
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner's suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we
remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie's custody. Stephanie is now nearly
15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the... mandatory maternal custody regime
under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings -
the best interest of the child. [30] As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the
child's... parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the
interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court's
jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving
Stephanie's interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled
doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child's best interest. [31]
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling.

2. PAULA LLORENTE VS. CA AND ALICIA LLORENTE

In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente
got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already living
illicitly with Ceferino Llorente, a brother of Lorenzo and the two even have a son.

Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually,
Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing that Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the she will agree
to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the US.

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an
American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.

In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their
children and left nothing for Paula. In 1983, Lorenzo went to the court for the will’s probate and to have
Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated,
Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.
RTC ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.

The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the Philippines.

HELD:

YES. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when
he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.
 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no
longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule
is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects of
the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

Regarding on the issue of Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected because he is an alien
and is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for
probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in
order to prove the validity of the will.