Nationalities Papers (2020), 1–14

doi:10.1017/nps.2020.25

ARTICLE

Occasional Nationalists: The National Ideology of Ultras

Mateusz Grodecki*
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, The Maria Grzegorzewska University, Warsaw, Poland
*Corresponding author. Email: grodecki.mateusz@gmail.com

Abstract
Drawing on a post-structuralist, post-Marxist discursive approach to nation, this paper aims to (1) explore the
constitutive elements of the national ideology of Polish ultras, (2) study what means of expression are used in
their choreographies in order to disseminate their vision of the nation, and (3) map the events that stimulate
the production of choreographies related to national issues. The study is based on the content analysis of ultras’
displays using data from a print fanzine devoted to football fandom culture in Poland. The results indicate that
the national ideology of Polish ultras can be viewed as a resistance ideology. They also reveal that the national
ideology of ultras is only presented in particular contexts and is not a dominant issue in their performances.
The study introduces the concept of occasional nationalism, which can be a useful analytical tool to map and
quantify the presence of nation in practices of articulation of a particular community.

Keywords: ultras; Poland; occasional nationalism; discourse analysis; national identity

Introduction
On August 2, 2017, Legia Warsaw was facing FK Astana in the qualification round of UEFA (Union of
European Football Associations) Champions League. The day before was the 73rd anniversary of the
Warsaw Uprising. Legia ultras used the opportunity of an international cup game to present their
provocative choreography and commemorate the Warsaw Uprising. They displayed a huge banner
showing a soldier in a Nazi uniform holding a gun to the head of a crying child that wore a military hat
with the Polish flag on it. The image was accompanied with a caption: “During the Warsaw Uprising,
Germans killed 160,000 people. Thousands of them were children.” The choreography was echoed in
the media worldwide. The message was clear: the executioner can be clearly defined in terms of ethnic
criteria—the German nation. The aim of the choreography was to make this voice heard in the
international discourse on historical policy.
However, the choreography was not only an attempt to make an impact on the international
discourse on historical policy. It was also a manifestation of national ideology. Spectacular choreog-
raphies of this kind, which show symbols, historical figures, and values that are associated with ultras’
vision of the nation, are frequently presented at football stadiums. Considering that local cultures of
ultras internalize national ideologies present in public discourses and transform them into ideologies
distinctive for this social environment (Spaaij and Viñas 2005; Testa and Armstrong 2008; Djordjević
and Pekić 2018; Faje 2018; Perasović and Mustapić 2018), it can be argued that ultras use football
games to articulate their national ideology.
This study draws on a post-structuralist, post-Marxist discursive approach to nation (Laclau and
Mouffe 1985; Sutherland 2005). In this view, nation is defined as a form of discourse which is fluid
in nature. It is a result of a struggle of national ideologies which compete for conceptual hegemony.
Gaining conceptual hegemony means that a vision of the nation connected with the hegemonic
ideology is embedded in a cultural context and is therefore perceived as obvious. In this study, ultras

© Association for the Study of Nationalities 2020.

2 Mateusz Grodecki

are viewed as one of the actors who struggle for the conceptual hegemony of their national ideology
through discourse. To do this, they use football stadiums as a space where they introduce
constitutive elements of their nationalism. This article aims to explore the current character of
the national ideology of Polish ultras and the tools that they use in their ideological struggle by
(1) revealing the constitutive elements of the national ideology of the ultras, (2) studying what
means of expression are used in their choreographies to disseminate their vision of the nation, and
(3) mapping the processes and events that stimulate the production of choreographies related to
national issues.
Defining nation as a discourse and approaching it through the analysis of practices of articu-
lation of ideology makes it possible to explore different perspectives of everyday (banal) nation-
alism, which is concerned with how (what social constructs are connected with the nation), where,
and by whom the nation is (re)produced (Hearn and Antonisch 2018, 602). Moreover, it gives the
opportunity to study two additional dimensions of banal nationalism: when (defined as an
institutional context) and how often manifestations of national ideology occur (in comparison
with manifestations of other identities). The study introduces the concept of occasional nationalism,
which can be a useful analytical tool to map and quantify the presence of nation in practices of
articulation of a particular community.
The case of Poland was selected for two reasons. Firstly, since Polish ultras’ culture is homog-
enous in terms of the character of national ideology, Polish ultras groups—contrary to most
European countries—do not compete with one another in order to achieve the conceptual
hegemony of their national ideology. This ideological cohesion creates a unique environment,
which makes the community of Polish ultras (and the field of stadium discourse which they use)
more efficient in competing with other actors for the hegemony of their nationalism in the public
sphere. This provides an opportunity to examine the issue of ultras’ nationalism from a wider
perspective than that of a case study of a particular group, and therefore it is possible to reveal more
general mechanisms in the (re)production of national ideology. Secondly, football is the most
popular sport in Poland, and their choreographies therefore appear in TV coverage and images
diffused by the media and social media for wider audience. The circulation of stadium discourse
means that Polish ultras are actors with some influence on the field of national discourse.1
The article opens with an overview of up-to-date studies on the nationalism of ultras groups,
followed by the conceptualization of discourse, national ideology, and nationalism applied in this
study. The next sections are devoted to the methods of data gathering and the results of discourse
analysis, leading to their discussion and final conclusions.

National Ideologies in Ultras’ Culture

Sociologists have long noticed that sport is an effective carrier of nationalism (e.g., Hobsbawm
2012), as it reproduces national identity by the virtue of international competition (Billig 1995) and
is thus used as a tool in state identity policies (Houlihan 1997). Football, as one of the most popular
sports in the world, naturally fits in the frame (e.g., Archetti 1994; Duke and Crolley 2014).
Nationalism is reproduced by sport institutions that set out the rules of international competition
and define the means by which the nationality of competitors is expressed (national colours,
anthems, etc.). The national ideology of ultras’ culture, however, is not only a product of football
institutions. It stems from wider processes and is reproduced using different means. As a result, it
often takes different forms.
The term ultras refers to a specific type of an organized football fan groups. Being ultras means
emotional attachment to a particular club, constructing identity in reference to it, supporting it
from the stands, and often engaging in physical confrontations with supporters of rival teams
(Guschwan 2007, 254). However, the most characteristic of ultras’ activities are spectacular
choreographies that are presented during games and refer to different topics (praising own group
or club, insulting or ridiculing the opponents, manifesting political, national ideologies, etc.). Born
 Nationalities Papers 3

in the late 1960s in Italy, the ultras’ culture arrived in Poland at the turn of the century and was
internalized in the culture of Polish football supporters during that period. As physical confron-
tations became monopolized by hooligan groups, Polish ultras focused on competition with their
rivals in terms of the size and scale of choreographies (Grodecki 2018, 117).
The emergence of nationalist ideology in ultras’ cultures relates to several broader processes that
differ depending on local (national) history. In Italy, the rise of nationalist and even xenophobic
attitudes of ultras groups is viewed as reflecting a more general sentiment in Italian society in the
1980s, when it was struggling with an increasingly inefficient economy and consequently started to
become more reluctant toward the rising waves of immigrants (Guschwan 2007, 254–257). In post-
communist countries like Russia and Serbia it stems from the dominance of nationalism in public
discourse at the time of transformation. The nationalism of this period stigmatized all leftist
ideologies as connected with communism (see Djordjević and Pekić 2018; Gloriozova 2018). In
some countries, the emergence of nationalism in ultras’ culture is also related to the advent of the
skinhead subculture (Spaaij and Viñas 2005; Zaimakis 2018; Gloriozova 2018). “By osmosis rather
than as a result of ideological formation’ (Spaaij and Viñas 2005, 86), ultras began to identify with
ideologies calling for the revival of historical nationalisms. In Russia, football supporters adopted
some nationalist symbols of this subculture, such as swastikas, Celtic crosses, and skulls (Gloriozova
2018). In other countries—Grecce (Zaimakis 2018), Romania (Faje 2018), and Turkey (Battini
2012)—the presence of nationalism on the terraces, to some extent, resulted from the intentional,
political implementation of national ideologies in the field of football.
The nationalism of ultras can also differ in character. On the one hand, at the stadiums in such
countries as Cyprus (e.g., APOEL FC; see Maniou 2019), Greece (Zaimakis 2018), and Italy (e.g., S.S.
Lazio and AS Roma; see Testa and Armstrong 2010) ethnic nationalism can be seen in choreog-
raphies and banners containing neofascist and xenophobic slogans. AS Roma and S.S. Lazio ultras
groups even describe themselves as neofascist. Their ideology is based on faith in the unique
character of each nation, the critique of multiculturalism, and historical sentiments expressed in the
nostalgia for a strong Italy and idealization of national heroes (Testa and Armstrong 2010). In
Serbia, the national ideology of ultras is marked by religious orthodoxy because religion is one of the
main lines of ethnic divisions in the Balkans (Dojrdjević and Pekić 2018).
It needs to be stressed, however, that the presence of certain nationalist elements does not always
translate into wider attitudes. In Turkey, for instance, despite a strong presence of national symbols
and slogans concerning ethnic conflicts, ultras groups have a quite inclusive membership policy
when it comes to political and national ideologies (but not necessarily when it comes to the
distribution of power in such groups) (Battini 2012). In Serbia, nationalist ideology does not
translate into current political behaviors, as football supporters tend to describe themselves as
antisystem and apolitical. Rather, this ideology serves as a kind of identity strategy situating them in
opposition to wider left-wing attitudes, which Serbian football supporters identified with commu-
nism (Djordjević and Pekić 2018, 357–360). In Italy, the nationalism of Lazio and Roma ultras has
the markings of a resistance ideology, which means that they resist other ideologies (in this case
liberal and conservative) but do not offer any constructive proposals (Testa and Armstrong 2008,
477–478).
The above findings provide some evidence of connections between the national ideologies of
football supporters and wider social and political changes, emphasize the role of resistance ideology
against communism and left-wing attitudes more broadly, and point out the impact of the skinhead
subculture. All these factors are also highlighted in the analyses of nationalism in Polish ultras’
culture, where it is characterized as far right-wing, conservative, and anti-liberal (Chwedoruk 2015),
or antisystem in general (Kossakowski 2017; Grodecki 2018), with the important role of Cathol-
icism (Mazurkiewicz 2018). Contemporary research on Polish football fans also reveal an identity
overlap between self and the country (Kossakowski and Besta 2018, 877), which indicates the
dominance of national identity over other identities, including local ones built by the attachment to
a local football club.
4 Mateusz Grodecki

These general characteristics of nationalism in Polish ultras’ culture mostly go back to the period
of emergence and institutionalization of football fandom culture in Poland at the turn of the 1970s
and 1980s. At that time, during anti-communist protests in the country, it began to develop its anti-
state (anti-communist state) attitudes and pronational identity (Kossakowski 2017, 83–91). The
right-wing, pronational characteristics of fandom culture in Poland were also strengthened by the
advent of the skinhead subculture in the country in the late 1980s and its close connections with far-
right nationalist ideology (Grodecki 2018). Consolidation of conservative values, on the other hand,
stems from the government’s actions against football supporters before EURO 2012. These values
became ideological figures that enabled supporters to position themselves against the neoliberal
logic guiding the government and UEFA (Antonowicz and Grodecki 2018). This process was
interpreted in terms of Mannheim’s instinctive traditionalism, which implies the emergence of
attachment to traditional lifestyles in response to the ongoing social changes (Chwedoruk 2015). In
this regard, conservative performances of Polish supporters are also explained as a reconstruction
and reaffirmation of manhood and masculinity, which was criticized by liberal elites (Kossakowski,
Szlendak, and Antonowicz 2018, 10).
As can be seen, the culture of Polish ultras is homogenous in terms of the general nature of their
nationalism (conservative, antisystem, and anti-communist). Although it would be interesting to
examine why there is no diversity in this respect between major Polish ultras groups, this is not the
aim of the article.2 This situation is unique in Europe, where different ultras groups promote
different national and political ideologies. This ideological cohesion means that particular ultras
groups in Poland do not compete with one another for conceptual hegemony. As a result, they are
more efficient in competing with other actors for the hegemony of their nationalism in the public
sphere. This provides an opportunity to examine the issue of ultras’ nationalism from a perspective
wider than a case study of a particular group, therefore making it possible to reveal more general
mechanisms in the (re)production of national ideology.

Theoretical Approach: Discourse and National Ideology

This article draws on a post-structuralist, post-Marxist discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe 1985;
Sutherland 2005) that considers the nation as a form of discourse continuously reshaped and
redefined. In this view, discourse is a field of (national) ideologies in which they compete for
conceptual hegemony (Sutherland 2005, 186). Hegemony is defined as the Gramscian concept of
cultural hegemony (Gramsci 1992). Achieving hegemony in discourse means that the vision of the
social world—with its norms, values, and their definitions—that is provided by an ideology is
perceived as taken for granted.
Nationalism is approached here as a (national) ideology (e.g., Minogue 1967; Verdery 1995;
Łuczewski 2012; Dumitrica 2019)—“a set of statements, images and symbols concerning a nation”
that are changeable and processual in nature, and which “nationalise social reality by defining its
particular elements as national [. . .] and, on the other hand, by giving meaning to nation as such”
(Łuczewski 2012, 65, 68). National ideologies connect a nation with different social objects and
constructs, such as religion or class. Above all, they connect a nation to a community, territory, and
history defining who and what belongs to a nation as well as who and what does not belong
(Łuczewski 2012, 65–70).
By its presence in discourse, national ideology (1) creates an “imagined community” (Anderson
1983) by embedding images of the nation in a particular community, enclosing them in one
category of nation; (2) connects nation with different social constructs (national symbols, religion,
territory, history, behaviours, etc.) (Łuczewski 2012; Fox 2017); (3) reproduces images of the nation
and social constructs related to it (Sutherland 2005; Dumitrica 2019); (4) builds a sense of belonging
of individuals to their own nation (Smith 2008); (5) enables political mobilization (Brubaker 1996)
and mobilization of members of the nation at the time of a potential threat (Billig 1995; Skey 2010).
In general, nationalist ideology emphasizes an overlap between political representation and the
 Nationalities Papers 5

nation (nation=state) (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 2012); and builds a sense that the world is
naturally divided into nations and hence that nationality is inscribed in human nature
(Jaskułowski 2012, 183–184), cultivating a sense that nations are something obvious (Billig 1995).
The struggle for ideological hegemony occurs between hegemonic (majority) and counter-
hegemonic (minority) nationalisms. Hegemonic nationalism is defined as an ideology whose
postulates are embedded in society and thus are perceived by the actors as obvious. The aim of
counterhegemonic nationalist movements “is to rearticulate social reality using an alternative
national construct” (Sutherland 2005, 194). They try to achieve this by undermining the existing,
hegemonic social order and creating an identity crisis.
In view of the findings of other studies on ultras and nationalism—which indicate that ultras
groups internalize national ideologies present in public discourses at some historical point and
transform them into ideologies distinctive for their social environment—ultras can be viewed as one
of the actors creating national ideology. Exploiting the spectrum of football audiences, they use
football stadiums as a space where they introduce their national ideology to the public sphere by
means of various displays and performances (choreographies, banners, etc.) and therefore aim to
struggle with other national ideologies.
Moreover, several studies show that ultras’ nationalism takes the form of resistance ideology
against hegemonic national ideologies. Considering these findings, it can be assumed that Polish
ultras will present counterhegemonic ideology by expressing their resistance against hegemonic
Polish national ideologies. In the Polish context, sociologists distinguish at least a few major
(hegemonic) national ideologies which compete with one another in several aspects (Łuczewski
2012, 470–471). On the one hand, there are anti-communist and post-communist (anti anti-
communist) ideologies. The former includes a positive assessment of the 1989 systemic transfor-
mation, right-wing views, and a high level of Catholic religiosity. Anti-communist ideology derives
from anti-communist nationalism of the 1989 systemic transformation, which was a resistance
ideology against communism. Apart from offering national identity and being anti-individualistic,
it did not contain any normative postulates (Budyta-Budzyńska 2010). The latter is characterized
by a negative assessment of the transformation, a milder assessment of the period of the People’s
Republic of Poland (PRL), and left-wing views (Grabowska 2004). On the other hand, there is a
division into liberal and anti-liberal ideology (Kennedy 2002). Liberal ideology is more conducive
to effective transformation from socialism to capitalism. Its assessment of the communist past is
negative, as it views the old system as an essential negation of the liberal democratic order. It also
edifies supporters of the new order and simultaneously stigmatizes its opponents as backward
people who are frustrated and unable to cope with the new reality. Liberal ideology defines Europe
and civil society as values opposite to religion and nation (modern and inclusive versus anach-
ronistic and exclusive). Both ideologies (liberal and anti-liberal) were transformed in the Polish
context into two major political visions of the nation (Łuczewski 2012, 472), which can be
described as the Polish-Catholic ideology and the Polish-European ideology.
The methodological approach adopted here fits the aims of the study as it allows to examine which
constructs of social life ultras connect with the nation by analyzing their practices of articulation. The
practice of articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity
is modified as a result” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105). Practices of articulation of national ideology
will be approached here in two dimensions. Firstly, the analysis of texts (and symbols) aims to reveal
which social constructs Polish ultras connect with the nation. Secondly, I map when these practices
occur, what relations are created between the nation and the social context in which it is manifested.
Moreover, considering the findings of other studies showing that ultras’ nationalism takes the form
of resistance ideology against hegemonic national ideologies, applied discourse theory reveals how
ultras attempt to undermine hegemonic meanings. The logic of the study follows an analytical
postulate of a discursive approach to nation which advocates “looking at a nationalist ideology’s
articulation [. . .] before putting this in the context of a quest for conceptual hegemony” (Sutherland
2005, 199).
6 Mateusz Grodecki

Methods of Data Gathering

In this study, content analysis was applied to deliver data on the constitutive elements and forms of
expression of ultras’ nationalism as articulated at football stadiums. It involved the investigation of
the content and message of (1) choreographies, (2) occasional banners, and (3) large flags in club
colors regularly displayed at matches that included national symbols or made references to images
of the nation (when analyzed in conjunction, all three forms are hereafter referred to as displays.)
They are the main source of articulation of constitutive elements of national ideology in stadiums.
Moreover, information about them is gathered systematically by a print fanzine devoted to football
fandom culture in Poland called To My Kibice (It’s Us, the Fans; TMK), which makes them the only
forms of articulation that can be analyzed comprehensively.
The analysis focuses only on stadium space and does not consider other public spaces where
ultras’ national ideology can be presented, like graffiti and murals (see Gibril 2018). The analysis of
stadium discourse makes it possible to capture the messages presented in the discourse intention-
ally. These messages are built for the purpose of ideological struggle for hegemony, as the content of
displays is a result of group consensus and approval by the leaders (see Grodecki 2019). These
features allow to treat ultas’ displays at stadiums (choreographies, occasional banners, large flags) as
a representation of their nationalism.
The source of data for content analysis was the TMK fanzine. The analysis of fanzines in sport
sociology has already developed some research tradition (Haynes 1995; Millward 2008; Antono-
wicz, Jakubowska, and Kossakowski 2020) and thus formed some methodological approaches
which focus on capturing the meanings and interpretations ascribed by fans, mainly in their articles.
In this study, however, the TMK fanzine was only used as a reliable source of regular data on
stadium discourse, and the substance of articles was not analysed. The aim here is to reveal those
elements of national ideology of ultras that are intentionally introduced in their displays as a means
to compete with other ideologies. The circulation of TMK discourse is limited to the fan environ-
ment and therefore does not have an impact on public discourse.
As written on the cover of the magazine, TMK is “a chronicle of the supporters’ scene.” Published
monthly since 2001, it is the most popular and influential fanzine in Poland, describing football games
in the highest Polish leagues from the ultras’ perspectives. The TMK is the only source that regularly
collects data on ultras’ displays and thus enables analysis of constitutive elements and means of
expression of ultras’ nationalism articulated at the stadiums in regular manner. The study analyzed
TMK reports from football matches of Polish clubs. The reports in question contain descriptions and
photos of choreographies and occasional banners. In the case of matches that are more interesting in
terms of ultras’ rivalries, TMK also provides more detailed descriptions and photo galleries.
The analysis considered 12 consecutive issues of TMK, from February 2018 to January 2019,
featuring ultras’ reports covering all Ekstraklasa games in 2018 and containing descriptions of
choreographies and occasional banners. Ekstraklasa games were selected due to their higher
viewership and the fact that the ultras’ choreographies from this league are described in TMK on
a regular basis. The time range of the analysis was chosen for two reasons: (1) the aim of the study
was to provide the most recent characteristics and expressions of the national ideology of ultras’
culture, and so the data had to be the most current; (2) 2018 was the centennial year of Poland’s
independence (November 11, 1918), which presumably would increase presence of different
elements of national ideology (also those presented by ultras) in public discourse.
In 2018, the Ekstraklasa calendar included 16 fixtures of the 2017/18 season and 20 fixtures of the
2018/19 season–288 games in total played by 18 clubs. Apart from those, the analysis also covered
13 ultras’ reports from the games of Polish clubs in the European cups, as international rivalry tends
to be conducive to manifesting national identity. The number of reports from international
competitions was relatively low due to the fact that in the 2017/18 season there were no Polish
clubs playing in European cups in spring, and in the 2018/19 season all of them were eliminated in
the first qualification rounds of UEFA European League and UEFA Champions League.
 Nationalities Papers 7

The results of the analysis are presented in three main categories: (1) a quantitative analysis
showing how many choreographies, occasional banners, and flags addressing national issues were
displayed in ultras sectors, which is connected with examination of their contexts and the number of
choreographies addressing nonnationalism issues; (2) an analysis of constitutive elements of ultras’
national ideology; (3) the characteristics of ultras’ choreographies, occasional banners, and flags in
terms their means of expression.

Occasional Nationalists
The 288 reports from Ekstraklasa games and the 13 reports from matches in European cups played
in 2018 provide information on nine choreographies and 18 occasional banners related to national
issues presented in ultras sectors. It follows that special displays related to national issues appeared
on average in every eleventh analyzed match. What is more, the examination of pictures of ultras
sectors published in TMK reports revealed 18 large flags making reference to national issues or
containing national symbols.
The sheer numbers, however, do not reflect the full context of displays related to national issues.
The analysis revealed that they had been mainly displayed around important local anniversaries
(the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, the Greater Poland Uprising, and deathdays of historical
figures), national history anniversaries (the centenary of Poland’s independence, the Cursed
Soldiers Day, the outbreak of the Second World War), and a political campaign #GermanDeath-
Camps, initiated by the Polish government.3 In total, eight out of nine choreographies and 16 out
of 18 occasional banners making reference to national issues were presented in ultras sectors
during the games played around the historical event anniversaries and the #GermanDeathCamps
campaign. In the context of performative public sphere, then, Polish ultras are occasional
nationalists–elements of national ideology only appear in stadium discourse around important
anniversaries and socio-political unrest.
Their occasional nationalism is further confirmed by the frequency of addressing different issues
in choreographies. The data presented in Table 1 indicates that the vast majority of choreographies
refer to ultras and their culture (34 and a further 6 referring to rival groups of supporters) and to
their own clubs (20).4 Those containing elements of national ideology rank third, which means that
they appeared almost four times less often than choreographies on ultras’ culture two times less
often than those devoted to ultras’ clubs. As stated above, the issue of nation appears in ultras’
choreographies only occasionally—during national holidays, important events in local history, and
in situations seen as threatening to Polish national interests. What tends to dominate stadium

Table 1. Frequency of Choreographies.

Category Frequency

Ultras 34

Club 20

Nation 9

Rival 6

Locality 3

Anti-police 1

Anti-owner 1

Total 74

Source: The author’s own study.

8 Mateusz Grodecki

discourse is the elements of intergroup rivalry. The focus of choreographies is issues related to
ultras’ culture, football fan rivalry, and their own clubs, which can be interpreted as a manifestation
of ultras’ identity and local identity, respectively. National identity is manifested only occasionally.

Elements of Supporters’ National Ideology

Analysis of displays related to national issues revealed some constitutive elements of national ideology
in ultras’ culture, which have been categorized into four analytical frames: permanent struggle of
nations, nationalization of locality, national heroes and their attitudes, and anti-communism.

A Permanent Struggle of Nations

A permanent struggle of nations is the ontological foundation of traditional nationalism, namely,
the assumption that the world is naturally divided into nations that have different interests and
compete with one another in pursuing them. This element of national ideology can be noticed
mainly in the choreographies and occasional banners commemorating the anniversaries of armed
conflicts involving Poland: the outbreak of the Second World War, the Warsaw Uprising (1944),
and the Greater Poland Uprising (1918). The form of commemorating those events emphasizes
the fight for the nation as the highest value, such as by defining the people fallen in battle as
national heroes.5 This highlights that ultras glorify the attitudes connected with the defence of
one’s own nation against another. By glorifying such attitudes ultras groups reproduce the vision
of the world where a permanent struggle of nations takes place and giving one’s life for one’s own
nation is the highest value. A more aggressive form of this nationalism can be seen on one of the
flags of Lech Poznań ultras, bearing the slogan “Death to the enemies of the homeland” (Śmierć
Wrogom Ojczyzny). Apart from stressing the homeland as a fundamental value, this slogan also
disseminates the vision of a permanent struggle in the homeland with other groups, portraying
them as a constant threat to the interest of the nation.
A permanent struggle of nations is also apparent in occasional banners related to the #German-
DeathCamps campaign. In this case, the field of struggle between nations was historical policy. The
Polish national interest was perceived by ultras to be threatened by the interest of Western countries,
which, in their view, exonerated Germany from the responsibility for World War Two genocide by
referring to concentration camps located in Nazi-occupied Poland as “Polish.” The ultras interpreted
the narrative of “Polish death camps” as an intentional attack of other nations. In response, many
ultras groups presented the slogan #GermanDeathCamps to defend the interest of their nation. The
fact that they joined this campaign also confirms that the occasional nature of national identity is
activated in moments of symbolic threat to the nation.

Nationalization of Locality
The next element of the performative national ideology of ultras is the nationalization of locality.
This process is visible in two dimensions: banal nationalism and the historical. In the dimension of
banal nationalism, local symbols—such as the name of the town, city, or region, or the name and
crest of the club—appear in conjunction with and are framed by national colors and symbols. One
typical example of this mechanism is the Legia Warsaw’s flag, with the coat of arms of the city on the
left, the crest of the club on the right, and the name Legia in the middle; all three elements appear on
the white-and-red Polish national flag.
In the historical dimension, events from local history are connected to the wider historical
context of national history and symbols. Manifestation of Polishness in this kind of displays clearly
indicates that local historical events provide an opportunity to fit local identity into national
identity. However, accounting for the frequency of issues in ultras’ choreographies (see Table 1),
what cannot be overlooked is the occasional character of this process. In the context of the
 Nationalities Papers 9

nationalization of locality it means that the domination of national identity is only observed during
commemoration of local historical event anniversaries, wherein ultras connect the history of their
local community with that of the nation.

National Heroes and Their Attitudes

Another element of the national ideology of ultras’ culture is apparent in the displays commem-
orating certain historical figures, both individuals (e.g., the choreography of Korona Kielce ultras
commemorating Wojciech Szczepaniak, a courier of the Home Army) and groups (e.g., the Warsaw
insurgents and the Cursed Soldiers).6 These figures are presented as heroes in view of their attitudes
toward the nation, which gained them recognition among ultras. Such attitudes are most often
summed up as slogans presented during choreographies and on occasional banners. Consequently,
they can be interpreted as projections of virtues and attitudes that Poles should have according to
ultra’s national ideology.
In this approach, the Cursed Soldiers (Żołnierze Wyklęci) symbolize both the constant struggle for
the nation as the greatest value and the resistant nature of the ultras movement, which identifies itself
with the heroes of the Second World War who were persecuted by communist authorities.7 The
commemoration of Wojciech Szczepaniak—a young courier of the Home Army captured by Nazi
soldiers with documents of the resistance movement—by Korona Kielce ultras comes as an example
of the glorification of both loyalty toward compatriots and resistant attitudes. Subjected to weeks of
torture, Szczepaniak did not reveal any names of his fellow conspirators, which led to his execution. It
is quite apparent, then, that ultras’ national ideology nationalizes the attitudes of historical figures:
resistance against the occupant (enemy of the nation), putting national interests first, and collec-
tivism. Therefore, by nationalizing these attitudes ultras groups disseminate and reproduce the vison
of a nation as the highest value for its members.

Anti-communism
Historical figures also appear in ultras’ displays owing to their anti-communist attitudes. This
category includes occasional banners and choreographies featuring the Cursed Soldiers, Janusz
Waluś, and a choreography commemorating the introduction of martial law to Poland (December
13, 1981) presented by Lechia Gdańsk ultras.8 The choreography featured the white eagle (the
national symbol of Poland) holding the heads of two Polish generals responsible for the decision—
General Jaruzelski and General Kiszczak—in its claws. The accompanying inscription read, “The
crow will not beat the eagle.” (WRONa Orła nie pokona—WRON is the Polish acronym for the
Military Council of National Salvation, Pol. Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego, which intro-
duced martial law; adding the letter a turned WRON into the Polish word wrona, “a crow.”) The
message here is clear: the eagle, symbolizing true Poles, tears apart two traitors of the nation. It needs
to be stressed that anti-communism is a very important element of Polish ultras’ national ideology.
Over a quarter of choreographies and occasional banners related to national issues (seven out of 27)
included anti-communist content.
Anti-communism’s centrality in Polish ultras’ national ideology may also reveal its origins.
Nationalism is often identified as an ideological response to the vacuum left by communism
(Brubaker 1996). Although in general terms the two ideologies are opposites—they postulate
different solutions to the same problems (see Gellner 1964)—both of them have some common
characteristics, including anti-individualism and a binary vision of the world. In ethnically
homogeneous countries nationalism is considered a remedy for social anomie from systemic
transformation. The nationalism of the transformation period is also characterized as a resistance
ideology—it was against communism, but apart from offering a national identity it did not provide
any normative postulates (Budyta-Budzyńska 2010, 247, 265).
The demise of communism coincided with the institutionalization of the subculture of football
supporters in Poland. What is more, in the period few stadiums were used as a venue of collective
10 Mateusz Grodecki

protests against communist authorities. Opposition against communism involved manifesting Polish-
ness and the use of national symbols. (One great example is the emblem of the Solidarity movement
embedded into the Polish national flag.) Anti-communism attitudes expressed in language of national
symbols thus established practices of articulation that linked nation with collective resistance.

Means of Expression
As demonstrated in the previous sections, ultras use different means of ideological expression in
stadium spaces: they define actors whom they view as a threat to national interests in terms of their
nationality; they fit local symbols and local historical events to national frames and thus nationalize
elements of their locality; and they use historical figures, on the one hand, as a personalization of
desirable attitudes toward the nation of Poles (war heroes, the Cursed Soldiers) and, on the other
hand, as a metaphor of anti-national features.
However, traditional national symbols (e.g., the national colors, flag, and coat of arms) are the
most common means of expressing ultra’s national ideology. They appear in the form of white-and-
red strips of cloth, white-and-red colors of the flares, drawings of the national coat of arms, and
banners painted onto Poland’s flag. Such elements appeared in eight out of nine choreographies. In
one case, the presentation of a choreography that did not contain any national symbols was
accompanied by the singing of the national anthem (TMK 2018, 25), which is a standard practice
on such occasions. National symbols were also used on 10 out of 18 occasional banners. It must be
stressed, however, that five out of eight remaining banners were related to the #GermanDeathCamps
campaign—which was connected with German national colors—and two others showed the figures
connected with anti-communist attitudes. This means that only one out of 18 banners were not
directly related to the issue of nation. Still, it was surrounded by the national colors on large flags. As
for such flags, 17 out of 18 included national symbols. These flags typically contained the same
elements: the name of the club, the crest of the club or the coat of arms of the city, and the national
coat of arms, all of which are drawn onto the Polish flag.
Interestingly, no symbols expressly connected with the skinhead subculture were observed. Only
one flag of Lech Poznań supporters can be interpreted in these categories. (Legion Piła ultras wrote,
“Legion Piła. The blood of our race” [Legion Piła. Krew naszej rasy].) However, it did not include
any slogans or symbols directly related to the nation.

Discussion and Final Conclusions

The analysis of ultras’ displays revealed some constitutive elements of their contemporary nation-
alism: permanent struggle of nations, nationalization of locality, glorification of national heroes,
and anti-communism. Based on these constitutive elements, some characteristics of contemporary
nation building processes by ultras groups can be captured.
Firstly, a permanent struggle of nations suggests that ultras define the world as naturally divided
into nations—themselves defined on the basis of ethnicity—that compete with one another. In this
view, then, the interests of their own nation are under constant threat from other nations, and they
need to be defended. The study also shows that ultras engage in this struggle using stadium space
and that by doing this they try to support and defend national interests.
Secondly, the strong presence of anti-communism in described form suggests that supporters
have internalized anti-communist national ideology from the period of collapse of the communist
system (Budyta-Budzyńska 2010). This confirms findings of existing studies (Kossakowski 2017)
and in other post-communist countries (Djordjević and Pekić 2018; Gloriozova 2018), which point
out that nationalism of the transformation period was adopted by organized groups of football
supporters emerging at the time.
The anti-communist nationalism of the transformation period was a resistance ideology: apart
from offering national identity as a social construct against communism, it did not provide any
 Nationalities Papers 11

ontological postulates. The resistant character of contemporary ultras’ displays is apparent with
regard to both of these aspects: resistance against historical communism is one of the most visible
issues (7 out of 27), and there are no ontological postulates in the analyzed content. Their resistant
character can also be seen in two additional dimensions: glorification of resistance attitudes (11 out
of 27; the Cursed Soldiers [4]; insurgents [6]; Wojciech Szczepaniak [1]) and supporting resistance
campaign (#GermanDeathCamps [5]). As it is today, then, the national ideology of Polish ultras can
be still viewed as a resistance ideology. All these dimensions of resistance in ultras’ displays have one
common feature: they refer to historical events, historical ideologies, historical figures, and
historical policy. It seems that the nation is being perpetuated as a construct of resistance by
displays commemorating these historical events and used as a resistance construct in the moment
when national interest is perceived to be threatened.
The strong presence of historical events and historical figures in the displays (17 out of 27) also
suggest the small nation type of collective memory, in which the history of a nation is viewed as
dependent on the actions of external actors. In the case of Poland, this involves a conviction that the
Polish nation has the misfortune of being located between Germany and Russia (Kilias 2004, 211).
Indeed, ultras’ historical displays referred mostly to the Second World War (military aggression and
the occupation of the country by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union) and the communist period
(political dependence on the Soviet Union), as well as to the #GermanDeathCamps campaign.
Surprisingly, no content expressing resistance against hegemonic Polish national ideologies has
been recorded. It needs to be stressed, however, that this only applies to the shape of Polish ultras’
national ideology as it is today—liberal politics have been attacked by ultras in Poland many times
in the past (see Chwedoruk 2015; Kossakowski, Szlendak, and Antonowicz 2018). Also, in the
period under examination there were no choreographies or occasional banners connecting nation
with religious slogans or symbols. Only two flags (presented by ultras of Miedź Legnica and
Termalica Nieciecza) featured a slogan related to religion: “God, Honor, Homeland” (Bóg, Honor,
Ojczyzna). This is another startling outcome of the study, as the anti-communist national ideology
of the period of systemic transformation was strongly connected with the Catholic religion
(Łuczewski 2012), and choreographies using religious symbols were presented on many occasions
in the past (Mazurkiewicz 2018).
As shown in the analysis, ultras use almost exclusively traditional national symbols as their
means of expression of national ideology. These symbols are also used in the process of
nationalization of locality. What is more, ultras use historical figures (mostly related to armed
conflicts) as projections of particular attitudes. Historical figures presented by the ultras in their
choreographies are not unambiguously recognized as national heroes by hegemonic nationalisms.
(The national status of Cursed Soldiers is still a debated issue, both in historical and political terms,
and Wojciech Szczepaniak is a local historical figure without national recognition; only the Warsaw
insurgents are considered national heroes by all national ideologies.) This can be viewed as a
counterhegemonic strategy that aims to redefine national discourse by creating alternative mean-
ings (Sutherland 2005, 194).
Connections with nation are also created by the social contexts in which national discourse and
ideologies appear. The study shows that manifestations related to national issues in ultras’
displays are presented only in particular contexts. These can be categorized as follows: (1) national
holidays and anniversaries of historical events important for the nation; (2) anniversaries of local
historical events connected with national history; and (3) moments of symbolic threat to the
nation. All three are predetermined cultural contexts, ones in which other national ideologies are
used in public discourse. The reason for this is probably that these particular contexts have been
connected with articulations of nationalism by the nation-state, the institution of hegemonic
nationalism. Therefore, they are predetermined and widely recognized occasions to articulate
national ideology. Ultras’ displays of nationalism are also occasional in the sense that they are not
the dominant issue. Football and ultras rivalry dominate here. However, the dominance of issues
related to ultras’ culture and local animosities can be a result of the ideological cohesion of Polish
12 Mateusz Grodecki

ultras’ culture. Therefore, in the everyday routine of league games the ultras focus on the
intergroup, symbolic rivalry, which stresses differences between groups rather than a common
vision of the nation.
Occasional nationalism is a form of banal nationalism, understood as practices of everyday
nationalism that are driven by structural, institutional, and cultural patterns of expression
(Knott 2015). It combines two dimensions: when (defined as an institutional context in which
ideology is manifested) and how often manifestations of national ideology occur
(in comparison with manifestations of other identities). Combining these two dimensions
and analyzing them using a discursive approach, emphasizing the analysis of practices of
articulation of the nation, can reveal in what contexts these practices occur—what relations are
created between the nation and the social context in which it is manifested—and what the level
of intensity of these contexts in everyday social life is. Thus, occasional nationalism can be a
useful analytical tool to map and quantify the presence of the nation in practices of articulation
of a particular community.
Financial Support. This work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland (grant number 2018/31/B/HS6/00148).

Disclosure. Author has nothing to disclose.

Notes
1 According to Ekstraklasa.org site the average attendance at Ekstraklasa games, the top football
league in Poland, in the 2017/18 season was 9,442 (Esktraklasa 2018). Kurdupski (2018) reported
that in the same season Ekstraklasa games has attracted an average of 106,100 TV viewers
per game.
2 There is one exception: Ruch Chorzów ultras. the resistance identity of this group is based on their
Silesian heritage rather than Polish national identity (see Woźniak 2015). However, Ruch did not
play in Ekstraklasa in 2018.
3 The campaign #GermanDeathCamps was aimed against Western media and politicians using the
term “Polish death camps” with reference to the concentration camps set up by German Nazis in
occupied Poland during the Second World War.
4 The category ultras includes choreographies related to particular elements of ultras culture
(e.g., drawings of flares), or to ultras’ culture in general, and those glorifying the ultras’ own
group. The category club includes choreographies related to the ultras’ own clubs: their history,
players, and trophies. The category rival includes choreographies insulting or ridiculing the
opponents, both the supporters and the clubs. The category locality includes choreographies
related to the city and town or region where the club is located, without the use of national
symbols or elements.
5 On such occasions, ultras often sing “Honor and Glory to the Heroes!”.
6 Home Army (Armia Krajowa) were Polish resistance forces operating in Poland under German
and Soviet occupation during the Second World War.
7 Cursed Soldiers is the term referring to armed groups which refused to accept the subjugation of
the Polish state to the Soviet Union after the Second World War and engaged in guerrilla warfare
against communist authorities and security services. The name Cursed Soldiers is derived from
the communist propaganda against those soldiers.
8 Janusz Waluś is a Pole who emigrated to South Africa in the 1980s, where he joined the nationalist
movement aiming to preserve the racial segregation. In 1993, he assassinated Chris Hani, the
leader of the South African Communist Party. Considering these facts, it is difficult to unam-
biguously interpret the slogan “Freedom for Janusz Waluś” (Wolność dla Janusza Walusia).
However, different discussions concerning the supporters’ discourse stress his anti-communism
rather than the ethnic and racial aspects (TMK 2017, 64).
 Nationalities Papers 13

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Cite this article: Grodecki, M. 2020. Occasional Nationalists: The National Ideology of Ultras. Nationalities Papers: 1–14,
doi:10.1017/nps.2020.25