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Article history: The development of energy sharing community is demanded for the on-site consumption of distributed
Received 1 December 2022 generations and efficient utilization of renewable energy. This paper proposes a two-stage stochastic
Received in revised form 16 March 2023 energy sharing model considering the photovoltaic (PV) power uncertainties to minimize the social
Accepted 17 April 2023
cost of PV prosumers and community energy storage (CES) in community. The proposed optimization
Available online 22 April 2023
model derives the optimal schedule of community under the worst case in the first stage. The
Keywords: regulation model for PV prosumers is formulated in the second stage to address the PV uncertainties
Energy sharing including three regulation methods: the demand response, the charging/discharging schedule, and the
PV prosumers transactive energy schedule. Particularly, a modeling approach based on the data-driven uncertainty
Community energy storage set is introduced to find the worst probability distribution. The formulated two-stage problem can be
Stochastic optimization solved by the column-and-constraint generation algorithm, where the coupled model is decomposed
Energy hub into a main problem and a sub problem and solved by iteration. Numerical simulation results show
the effectiveness of the proposed energy sharing optimization model to decrease the energy cost.
Experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of multi-ports energy hub used in energy sharing
community.
© 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.segan.2023.101051
2352-4677/© 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
B. Gu, C. Mao, D. Wang et al. Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 34 (2023) 101051
Table 1
Comparison of energy sharing optimization and operation strategy.
Ref. No Energy storage Solution frame- Objective Revenue Control mode Optimization
device work/algorithm allocation horizon
[7] PES, CES MAM Min. total operation cost Hierarchical DA
[8] CES MPC First stage: Min. operation cost Hierarchical DA, RT
Second stage: Max. self-sufficiency and
self-consumption
[9] CES MO Min. electricity cost Centralized DA
Min. CO2 emission
[13] CES NCG Min. the social operation cost Centralized DA
[15] CES NCG Min. total energy cost Distributed DA
[16] CES SO, SG First stage: Min. CES economic loss Hierarchical DA, RT
Second stage: Max. total profit
[17,19] CES ADMM Min. social energy cost ✓ Distributed DA
[18] CES CG Min. total operation cost Centralized DA
[20,21] CG Max. social welfare ✓ Distributed DA
[22] PES CG Min. social energy cost ✓ Distributed DA
[23] CES MO Min. total operation cost Centralized DA
[24] PES SO Min. total operation cost Distributed DA, RT
[25] PES SO Min. the electricity cost Distributed DA, RT
[26] PES, CES RO First stage: Min. total operation cost Hierarchical DA, RT
Second stage: Min. adjustment cost
[27] PES SO Upper level: Max. total profit Distributed DA, RT
Lower level: Max. prosumers profit
[28] PES RO First stage: Min. total operation cost Hierarchical DA, RT
Second stage: Min. regulation cost
[29] PES MO Min. electricity cost ✓ Centralized DA
This paper PES, CES SO First stage: Min. total operation cost ✓ Distributed DA, RT
Second stage: Min. regulation cost
*MAM: multiagent method; MPC: model predictive control; MO: multi-objective optimization; NCG: non-cooperative game; SO: stochastic optimization; SG:
Stackelberg Game; ADMM: alternating direction method of multipliers; CG: cooperative game; RO: robust optimization; DA: day-ahead; RT: real-time
first stage of the model, the objective function is to minimize the where ηsl1 is the coefficient of price-based DR.
social cost of community, and the cooperative operation scheme
,
⎨ 0∆ 0 < ∆pr < pr ,min
⎧
of PV prosumers and CES is formulated as the day-ahead optimal p r −pr ,min
schedule. Based on the day-ahead economic dispatch schedule η sl1
= pr ,max −pr ,min
, pr ,min < ∆pr < pr ,max (3)
sl1
η , ∆pr > pr ,max
⎩
in the first stage, PESs input/output power, load profiles, and max
purchasing/selling power of PV prosumers and CES are adjusted
In Eq. (3), ∆pr is the difference of the peak price and the valley
in the second real-time dispatch stage under the uncertainties of price. Prosumers participate in DR of energy sharing community
PV profiles. Since the objective function is to maximize the overall if ∆pr is bigger than the minimum response price. ηsl1 is linear
profit of community, the reasonable allocation of profit among with ∆pr if ∆pr is between pr ,min and pr ,max . The comprehensive
participants in community is worthy consideration. Thus, a Nash cost function of DR can be formulated in (4) and (5).
bargaining-based model is formulated to solve the problem. The ⏐ ⏐
dr sl
detailed model and algorithm are depicted as follows. Cpro1,n,h = ε dr1 ⏐pn,1h ⏐ ∆H (4)
⏐ ⏐
⏐ ⏐ ⏐ ⏐
dr ⏐ sl ⏐ ⏐ sl ⏐
3. System modeling Cpro2,n,h = ε dr2 ⏐pn,2h ⏐ ∆H + ε drcon ⏐pn,2h ⏐ ∆H (5)
dr
Before the detailed mathematical formulation, it is assumed where Cpro1,n,h is the quantitative cost of the unwillingness for
that the number of PV prosumers is N, which is denoted as N . The the price-based DR of prosumer n at time slot h and ε dr1 is the
dr
dispatch horizon of energy sharing community is a scheduling cost coefficient. Cpro2,n,h is the quantitative cost of the preferences
day denoted as H with 24 time slots ∆H. of prosumers. ε dr2
is the cost coefficient of the prosumers sat-
isfaction, which is negative in (5). The community acts as an
3.1. PV prosumers modeling aggregator integrating prosumers to participate in the optimal DR
with the contracts. ε drcon is the punishment cost coefficient of the
default DR.
Before formulating the functions of PV prosumers in energy
For any prosumer n in the prosumers community N , the
sharing community, it is necessary to formulate a DR model of
objective function is to minimize the electricity cost during the
prosumers firstly. In this work, a DR model that comprehensively
scheduling day. The cost function of a PV prosumer is formulated:
considers the price and preferences of prosumers is proposed. The
load of each prosumer can be divided into the fixed load and the
ec dr bc
shiftable load (SL). Cpro,n,h = Cpro,n,h + Cpro,n,h + Cpro,n,h (6)
l l sl sl
pn0,h = pnd,h + pn,1h + pn,2h (1) where
bat ,max
ces,h , pces,h ≤ pces
0 ≤ pchar dis
which is the difference between the cost of energy purchasing (27)
from the grid at the electricity price (EP) λbh and the income of
µ char
ces,h +µ dis
ces,h ≤1 (28)
energy selling to the grid at the feed-in-tariff (FT)λsh . Cpro
dr
,n,h is the
bc
cost for DR of prosumer n at time slot h.Cpro,n,h is the quantitative ηmin
ces Sces ≤ Sces,h ≤ η max
ces Sces (29)
degradation cost of BESS charging/discharging of prosumer n. ε bc Sces,h = (1 − ξces )Sces,h−1 + (ηces pces,h − ηces
char char
pces,h )∆H
dis dis
(30)
bc
is the degradation cost coefficient of BESS. It is noted that Cpro ,n,h
Sces,0 ≤ Sces,H .
}
(31)
is not included for prosumers without BESSs.
Sets X and Y are the constraint sets for prosumer n and
3.2. Community energy storage modeling CES, respectively. Eqs. (14)–(24) are the constraints set for PV
prosumer n. Eqs. (15)–(18) are the constraints for the DR load and
For CES in the energy sharing community, the objective func- the actual load. ηdr is the proportional parameter of SL. Eq. (18)
tion is also to minimize the electricity cost during the scheduling is the DR preference constraint for different prosumers. Eq. (19)
pv
day. The cost function of CES is formulated: is to ensure the power balance at any scheduling time slot. pn,h
tr
ec
Cces,h = Cces bc is the output power of PV and pn,h is the power of prosumer
,h + Cces,h (10)
n sharing with CES. If ptr n,h >0, prosumer n transmits the power
where to CES at time slot h; If ptr n,h <0, prosumer n absorbs the power
from CES at time slot h. Eqs. (20)–(24) are the constraints for the
,h = λh pces,h ∆H − λh pces,h ∆H
ec b b s s
Cces (11)
prosumers equipped with the private BESSs. Eq. (20) indicates
bc
Cces ,h =ε ces
(pchar
ces,h + ces,h )∆H
pdis (12) the charging/discharging power limits for the private BESSs of
prosumer n. Eq. (21) is the charging/discharging binary variables
Eq. (10) is the cost function for CES at time slot h includ-
ec constraint. Eq. (22) represents the limits for the state of charge
ing equations (11) and (12). Cces ,h is the energy cost of CES (SoC) of BESSs under the normal operation. Eq. (23) is the formula
calculated by (11), which is the same as the calculation pro-
ec bc of SoC, which is calculated by the SoC of the last hour and
cess of Cpro,n,h . Cces,h is the quantitative degradation cost of CES the charging/discharging power in current hour. ξn is the scale
charging/discharging. ε ces is the degradation cost coefficient of
coefficient of the energy leakage. ηnchar and ηndis are the efficiency
CES.
parameters of charging/discharging. Eq. (24) ensures that the SoC
at the last hour of a scheduling day returns to the initial state.
3.3. Energy sharing system modeling
Note that Eqs. (20)–(24) are not included by prosumers without
BESSs.
The objective function and constraints are mathematically for-
Eqs. (25)–(31) is the constraints set for CES. In Eq. (25), ptr ces,n,h
mulated in this subsection based on the cost functions of PV
is the power of CES sharing with prosumer n. If ptr ces,n,h >0, CES
prosumers and CES. The objective function of community with
energy cooperation is to minimize the social energy cost in the transmits the power to prosumer n at time slot h; If ptr ces,n,h <0,
scheduling day H. The corresponding objective and constraints CES absorbs the power from prosumer n at time slot h. Eq. (25)
for the prosumers and CES are as follows: ensures the power balance of the energy sharing between any
prosumer and CES in community. Eq. (26) is to ensure the power
H ∑
N
∑ balance of CES at any scheduling time slot. Eq. (27) indicates the
min ( Cpro,n,h + Cces,h ) (13) charging/discharging power limits for CES. Eq. (28) is the charg-
xn ∈X
y∈Y h=1 n=1 ing/discharging binary variables constraint. Eq. (29) represents
subject to: the limits for the SoC of CES under the normal operation. Eq. (30)
is the calculation formula of SoC like in (23). ξces is the scale
X = xn |∀h ∈ H, ∀n ∈ N ,
{
coefficient of the energy leakage for CES. ηces char
and ηces
dis
are the
pbn,h , psn,h ≥ 0 (14) efficiency parameters of charging/discharging. Eq. (31) ensures
l sl sl
that the SoC of CES at the last hour of a scheduling day returns
pln,h = pn0,h + pn,1h + pn,2h (15) to the initial state like in (24).
−η sl1 l0
pn,h ≤
sl
pn,1h ≤η sl1 l0
pn,h (16) The objective function (13) with constraints set {X , Y } can be
denoted as F1. If the collected day-ahead PV profiles of prosumers
dr l0 sl sl2 dr l0
−η ≤ pn,h+ ≤η pn,1h pn,h pn,h (17) community N are accurate, the decision set of prosumer n {pbn ,
∑H ⏐⏐ sl1 psn , pdr
n , pn
char
, pdis tr b
n , pn } and the decision set of CES {pces , pces ,
s
⏐
sl2 ⏐
h=1 ⏐pn,h + pn,h ⏐ char dis tr
pces , pces , pces,n } can be the scheduling decision variables for the
1− ∑ H l0 ≥ σn,min (18)
energy sharing community. However, the optimal value of F1 will
h=1 pn,h
deteriorate due to the uncertainties of PV profiles. Thus, the reg-
pv
pn,h + pbn,h + pdis char l s tr
n,h = pn,h + pn,h + pn,h + pn,h (19) ulation cost model of prosumers for the PV power uncertainties
is necessary.
0≤ pchar
n ,h , pdis
n,h ≤ pnbat ,max (20)
µ char
n,h +µ dis
n ,h ≤1 (21) 3.4. Regulation modeling under PV uncertainties
s,min s,max
η n Sn ≤ Sn,h ≤ η n Sn (22)
The regulation objective function of PV prosumers in commu-
Sn,h = (1 − ξn )Sn,h−1 + (η char char
n pn,h −η n pn,h )∆H
dis dis
(23) nity is to minimize the regulation cost caused by the PV uncer-
tainties in the scheduling day H. The corresponding objective and
Sn,0 ≤ Sn,H .
}
(24)
constraints are as follows:
H ∑
N
Y = y |∀h ∈ H,
{ ∑ pl
min (Cntrc brc
,h + Cn,h + Cn,h ) (32)
ptr tr
n,h + pces,n,h = 0 (25) zn ∈Z
h=1 n=1
N
∑ where
pchar s
ces,h + pces,h + ptr dis b
ces,n,h = pces,h + pces,h (26) trc ,b b
n=1 ,h = ε
Cntrc λh ∆pbn,h ∆H + ε trc ,s λsh ∆psn,h ∆H (33)
4
B. Gu, C. Mao, D. Wang et al. Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 34 (2023) 101051
n,h + ∆pn,h ) ∆H
−ηndis (pdis dis
}
(40) min c T y + max min bT x (47)
y u∈U x∈F (y ,u)
Sn,0 ≤ Sn,H .
}
(41)
subject to:
Eqs. (33)–(35) are the regulation cost items. Cntrc
,h is the ad-
ditional cost from the additional buying energy ∆pbn,h and the AT y ≥ d , y ∈ S y (48)
additional selling energy ∆psn,h . Cnbrc
,h is the regulation cost for where F (y , u) = {x : Gx ≥ h − Ey − M u, x ∈ S x }, S x ⊆ R+ , S y ⊆ m
pl
private BESSs of prosumer n. Cn,h is the cost of PV curtailment Rn+ . u is the uncertainty vector. The second stage constraints
pv
calculated by the practical PV output p̂n,h and the scheduling PV F (y , u) is a linear function of u. Combining the objective functions
pv
output pn,h . ε is the loss coefficient of PV curtailment.
pl F1 and F2, the objective function of energy sharing commu-
Set Z is the constraint set for the regulation stage of pro- nity based on the social energy cost in the first stage and the
sumers. Eqs. (36)–(41) are similar to Eqs. (19)–(24), referring to regulation cost in the second stage can be expressed as
previous subsection for specific description. { H ∑
∑ N
The objective function (32) with constraints set Z can be min ( Cpro,n,h + Cces,h )+
xn ∈X
denoted as F2. y∈Y h=1 n=1
H ∑
N
}
3.5. Bargaining-based profit allocation
∑ pl
max min (Cntrc
,h + Cnbrc
,h + Cn,h ) (49)
u∈U zn ∈Z
h=1 n=1
To ensure the willingness of prosumers and CES to join energy
sharing community for energy cooperation, the profit from the subject to
energy sharing framework need to be allocated fairly. The Nash X = {xn |∀h ∈ H, ∀n ∈ N , (14) − (24)} (50)
bargaining method, which is a frequently used cooperative game
framework, is suitable to achieve the fair and Pareto optimal Y = {y|∀h ∈ H, (25) − (31)} (51)
profit allocation in energy sharing community. The standard Nash Z = {zn |∀h ∈ H, ∀n ∈ N , (36) − (41)} (52)
bargaining based profit allocation model is formulated as follows:
where constraints set {X , Y , Z } are as mentioned before. Com-
N
( N
) pared with the traditional two-stage stochastic optimization, the
second stage max–min function in (49) can be converted to the
∏ ∑
max (Cndiff − Cnadd ) Cces
diff
+ Cnadd (42)
wn ∈W expected regulation cost function with the ambiguous probability
n=1 n=1
distribution:
subject to: { H ∑
N
{ ∑
min ( Cpro,n,h + Cces,h )+
W = wn |∀h ∈ H, ∀n ∈ N , xn ∈X
y∈Y h=1 n=1
{ H ∑
N
}}
∑
Cndiff − Cnadd ≥0 (43) max EP min (Cntrc
,h + Cnbrc
,h + pl
Cn,h ) (53)
} p∈Ω zn ∈Z
N
∑ h=1 n=1
diff
Cces + Cnadd ≥ 0. (44) In (53), the ambiguous probability distribution p represents
n=1 the probability distribution for the discrete scenarios to happen.
diff diff
where Cn and Cces are the differences between the costs of The further description of the max–min problem in (53) is as
prosumers and CES after joining energy sharing community and follow:
that before joining. Cnadd is the additional cost of prosumer n by K
{ H ∑
N
}
∑ ∑ pl
bargaining based profit allocation model. Eq. (42) can be further max pk min (Cntrc brc
,h + Cn,h + Cn,h ) (54)
p∈Ω zn ∈Z
equivalently transformed into the following form: k=1 h=1 n=1
p0 = Nk /M (59)
Pr p − p0 1 ≤ θ1 ≥ α1
{ }
(62)
y ∈ S y , xl ∈ S x , η ∈ R, ∀l ≤ k (71)
≤ θ∞ ≥ α∞
{ }
Pr p − p0 ∞
(63)
(71) where k is the number of the iterations. The optimal solu-
The relationship between the confidence level α and the de- tions can be derived and denoted as x1∗ , . . . , xk∗ , y ∗k+1 , ηk∗+1 .
{ }
viation limit θ can be expressed by Updating LB, LB is c T y ∗k+1 + ηk∗+1 .
K 2K The SP is to obtain the worst-case probability distribution in
θ1 = ln (64) the second stage with the acquired variable y ∗k+1 and return the
2M 1 − α1
distribution to the MP for next iteration. Accordingly, the SP can
1 2K
θ∞ = ln (65) be formulated as
2M 1 − α∞
SP (y) = max min bT x (72)
In (64) and (65), the limits θ1 and θ∞ are close to zero with u∈U x∈F (y ,u)
the increase of the number of the PV historical data M.
subject to
The data-driven uncertainty set contains the historical data
and excludes the extreme scenarios. Compared with the box Gx ≥ h − Ey − M u, x ∈ S x (73)
uncertainty set or the ellipsoidal uncertainty set, the decision
variables of the data-driven stochastic optimization are less con- where SP provide an upper bound (UB) of Eq. (53).
servative [33]. UB = min UB, c T y ∗k+1 + SP (y ∗k+1 )
{ }
(74)
4.2. C&CG algorithm If the difference between LB and UB is less than the given con-
vergence error ε , the iteration ends, otherwise the next iteration
will be performed. The complete algorithm procedure is shown
The data-driven two-stage stochastic optimization model of
in Table 2.
the energy sharing community can be solved by the C&CG algo-
rithm [31]. The algorithm is used to divide the model (53) into
5. Simulation results
the main problem (MP) and the sub-problem (SP) for iteration.
The MP is to solve the optimal schedule of community that
5.1. Basic data
satisfies the constraints under the worst-case probability distri-
bution p, and provide a lower bound (LB) of Eq. (53). Assume that
The results of case study are discussed in this section to
xl is the optimal solution of (66).
evaluate the performance of the two-stage distributed stochastic
η = max min bT x (66) optimization framework in this work.
u∈U x∈F (y ,u)
In this case study, it is assumed that the energy sharing com-
Accordingly, the MP of general two-stage stochastic optimiza- munity consists of five PV prosumers equipped with the rooftop
tion model (47) can be formulated as PV panels with the capacities range from 60 kW to 80 kW. The
actual initial demand profiles of each prosumer, coming from the
MP = min c T y + η (67) realistic demand data of buildings in a city of China, are shown in
y
6
B. Gu, C. Mao, D. Wang et al. Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 34 (2023) 101051
Table 3
Parameters of ces and pes.
Table 4
Statistical comparison results.
Without cooperation Cooperation
Mean Variance (×103 ) Mean Variance (×103 )
Prosumer 1 15.81 1.31 −1.56 0.028
Prosumer 2 19.69 0.56 −3.92 0.039
Prosumer 3 16.47 0.51 −3.90 0.027
Prosumer 4 21.51 1.17 −1.48 0.108
Prosumer 5 21.69 0.55 −6.13 0.159
CES 0.00 0.00 109.28 25.72
Community 95.17 14.84 92.29 30.54
Fig. 2(a). The predicted PV power profiles are shown in Fig. 2(b). 5.3. Regulation profiles in the second stage and energy costs
The EP and FT profiles of the power grid are shown in Fig. 2(c)
similar with the prices in [16]. The SL of prosumers are set to The regulation profiles of PV prosumers in the second stage are
30% of the demand at any time slot. The detailed parameters of shown in Fig. 4(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). The solid lines represent the
CES and private BESSs of prosumers are shown in Table 3, where optimal schedule in the first stage and the dotted lines represent
prosumer 1 and prosumer 4 are equipped with the household the optimal schedule considering the real-time operation in the
BESSs to realize the home energy management. The reasonable second stage under PV uncertainties. The regulation means of
capacity ranges of CES and private BESSs are set to prevent the prosumers include the load transfer, the change of net demands
7
B. Gu, C. Mao, D. Wang et al. Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 34 (2023) 101051
Table 5 Table 6
Cost comparison results(¥). Profit allocation results(¥).
Without cooperation Cooperation Before allocation After allocation
Cost.1 Cost.2 Total Cost.1 Cost.2 Total Total Cost Profit Total Cost Profit
Prosumer 1 179.2 3.7 182.9 −25.3 3.4 −21.9 Prosumer 1 −21.9 204.8 133.17 49.73
Prosumer 2 321.5 30.2 351.7 −43.2 28.1 −15.1 Prosumer 2 −15.1 366.8 301.97 49.73
Prosumer 3 257.1 18.5 275.6 −40.6 20.7 −19.9 Prosumer 3 −19.9 295.5 225.87 49.73
Prosumer 4 236.8 18.1 254.9 −10.6 14.4 3.8 Prosumer 4 −3.8 251.1 205.17 49.73
Prosumer 5 336.7 39.5 376.2 −71.5 25.5 −46.0 Prosumer 5 −46 422.2 326.47 49.73
CES 0 0 0 1242.0 0 1242.0 CES 1242.0 −1242 −49.73 49.73
Community 1331.3 110.0 1441.3 1050.8 92.1 1142.9 Community 1142.9 298.4 1142.9 298.4
Table 7
Results of different combinations.
α1 Total costs/¥
α∞ =0.5 α∞ =0.9 α∞ =0.99
0.2 1126.50 1130.17 1130.17
0.5 1142.92 1142.92 1142.92
0.9 1142.92 1142.92 1159.34
Table 8
Comparison of computational efficiency and cost.
Num. of Pro. Adopted method Robust
Time (s) Cost (¥) Time (s) Cost (¥)
5 33.4 1142.9 51.2 1560.7
10 61.2 2903.6 218.1 3717.4
20 324.3 4089.1 1895.5 5131.4
30 587.6 5340.0 3630.8 6058.2
Fig. 4. The load, net demands and private BESS power profiles of (a) prosumer 1, (b) prosumer 2, (c) prosumer 3, (d) prosumer 4, (e) prosumer 5, and SoC of CES
(f). The solid lines are profiles in the first stage and the dotted lines are profiles with the regulation in the second stage.
6. Experimental results
Fig. 7. The experimental results of (a) startup procedure, (b) and (c) energy sharing waveforms, (d) operation mode switching procedure, (e) and (f) reactive power
compensation waveforms.
Data availability
Fig. 8. The waveforms of HIL simulation when grid is abnormal.
Data will be made available on request.
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