Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs
Court of Appeals
NAZARIO, J
Point of the Case:
Constitutional provisions under Article II of the
Constitution are categorically declared by
the Supreme Court as non-self-executing
and are used as aids or as guides in the
exercise of judiciary’s power of judicial
review, and in legislature’s enactment of
laws.
FACTS
Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA)
• The Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) was launched by the
Department of Health (DOH) in 1999,
which provides five areas of general
reform.
o to provide fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals;
o secure funding for priority
public health programs;
o promote the development of
local health systems and
ensure its effective
performance;
o strengthen the capacities of
health regulatory agencies;
and
o expand the coverage of the
National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP).
• One in particular was the provision of
fiscal autonomy to government
hospitals that implements the
collection of socialized user fees and
the corporate restructuring of
government hospitals.
• The petitioners alleged that the
implementation of the
aforementioned reform had resulted
in making free medicine and free
medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantage Filipinos.
• Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is
void for violating Article II of the
Constitution.
• On May 24, 1999, then President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued
Executive Order No. 102, entitled
“Redirecting the functions and
Operations of the Department of
Health”, which provides for the
changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA is void for
violating various provisions of Article II of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
No, HSRA does not violate various provisions
of Article II of the Constitution. As a general
rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as
self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by
the inaction of Congress. However, some
provisions have already been categorically
declared by the Supreme Court as non-self-
executing. This Court specifically set apart
the sections found under Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts.
They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. These provisions, which
merely lay down a general principle are
distinguished from other constitutional
provisions as non-self-executing and,
therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts; they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Therefore, HSRA does not violate the
provisions under Article II of the Constitution.
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (BCDA) (Petitioner) v. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT (Respondents)
Ponente: Carpio, J
FACTS
• On March 13, 1992, Congress approved
Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 creating the
 Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA).
• Section 10 of RA. 7227, "the functions of
the BCDA Board of Directors (Board)
include the determination of the
organizational structure and the adoption
of a compensation and benefit scheme
at least equivalent to that
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)”.
Accordingly, the Board
determined the organizational
structure of the BCDA and adopted a
compensation and benefit scheme for
its officials and employees.
• On December 20, 1996, the Board
adopted a new compensation and
benefit scheme which included a
P10,000 year-end benefit granted to
each contractual employee, regular
permanent employee, and Board
member.
• In a memorandum dated August 25,
1997, Board Chairman Victoriano A.
Basco recommended to
President Fidel V. Ramos the
approval of the new
compensation and benefit
scheme. President Ramos
approved the new compensation
and benefit
scheme (October 9, 1997).
• In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end
benefit to its officials and employees. In
2000, the BSP increased the year-end
benefit from P30,000 to P35,000.
• Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7227
which states that the compensation and
benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be
at least equivalent to that of the BSP,
the Board increased the year-end
benefit of BCDA officials and employees
from P10,000 to P30,000.
• Based Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA) officials and
employees, received P30,000 as their
year-end benefit. Aside from the
contractual employees, regular
permanent employees, and Board
members, the full-time consultants of the
BCDA also received the year-end
benefit. (2000-2001).
• On October 1, 2002, the Board passed
Resolution No. 2002-10-193 approving the
release of a P30,000 year-end benefit for
2002.
• State Auditor Corazon V. Españo (COA)
issued Audit Observation Memorandum
No. 2003-004 stating that the grant of
year-end benefit to Board members was
contrary to Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Circular Letter No.
2002-2.
• In the Notice of Disallowance No. 03-001-
BCDA-(02), Director Rogelio D. Tablang
(COA), disallowed the grant of year-end
benefit to the Board members and full-
time consultants.
• BCDA President and Chief Executive
Officer Rufo Colayco requested the
reconsideration of Decision No. 2004-013.
Director Tablang denied the request. The
BCDA filed a notice of appeal with the
COA.
• The COA affirmed the disallowance of
the year-end benefit granted to the
Board members and full-time consultants
and held that the presumption of good
faith did not apply to them.
ISSUE
WON, BCDA Board members and full-time
consultants should be granted the year-end
benefit (YEB), because the granting of year-
end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and
18, Article II of the Constitution.
RULING
No. BCDA Board members and full-time
consultants are not entitled to the year-end
benefit (YEB).
Article II of the Constitution is entitled
Declaration of Principles and State Policies.
By its very title, Article II is a statement of
general ideological principles and policies. It
is not a source of enforceable rights.
DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that,
"Members of the Board of Directors of
agencies are not salaried officials of the
government. As non-salaried officials they
are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and
retirement benefits unless expressly provided
by law." RA No. 7227 does not state that the
Board members are entitled to a year- end
benefit.
Section 9 of RA No. 7227 specifies that Board
members shall receive a per diem for every
board meeting; limits the amount of per diem
to not more than P5,000; limits the total
amount of per diem for one month to not
more than four meetings; and does not state
that Board members may receive other
benefits.
With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM
Circular Letter No. 2002- 2 states that, "YEB
and retirement benefits, are personnel
benefits granted in addition to salaries. As
fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when
the basic salary is also paid." The full-time
consultants are not part of the BCDA
personnel and are not paid the basic salary.
The full-time consultants' consultancy
contracts expressly state that there is no
employer-employee relationship between
BCDA and the consultants and that BCDA
shall pay the consultants a contract price.
Since full-time consultants are not salaried
employees of the BCDA, they are not entitled
to the year-end benefit which is a "personnel
benefit granted in addition to salaries" and
which is "paid only when the basic salary is
also paid".
FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO,
plaintiffs- appellees, vs. NATIONAL COCONUT
CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants, NATIONAL
COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF
LIQUIDATORS, defendants-appellants.
Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J.
Facts
• Plaintiffs herein are court
stenographers assigned in Branch VI
of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
• During the pendency of a case,
Sycip Vs. National Coconut
Corporation, Alikpala (counsel for
defendant), requested the
stenographers for copies of the
stenographic notes taken by them
during the hearing.
• Plaintiffs delivered that 714 page
transcript and the bills for the
payment of their bills.
• National Coconut Corporation paid
564 to Bacani and 150 to Matoto. (1
pesos per page)
• The Auditor General disallowed the
payments of these fees and sought
the recovery of the amounts paid.
o Plaintiffs were required to
reimburse the amount on the
strength of a circular of DOJ
wherein the opinion was
expressed that the National
Coconut Corporation, being
a government entity, was
exempt from the payment of
the fees in question.
o The cashier was asked to
deduct 25 pesos from the
salary of Bacani and 10 pesos
from Matoto.
§ To prevent this
deduction, this action
was instituted in the
Court of First Instance.
Decision from the Court of First Instance
• that defendant National Coconut
Corporation is not a government
entity within the purview of section
16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
Issue
Whether the National Coconut Corporation
may be considered as included in the term
"Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" for the purposes of the exemption
of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.

Ruling
No, the term referred to in the “Revised
Administrative Code” as “Government of the
Philippine Islands” requires a little digression
on the nature and functions of the
government as instituted in the Constitution.
It can be inferred that the functions of the
government is required to exercise to
promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as
an attribute of sovereignty, and those which
it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people. To this latter class belongs the
organization of those corporations owned or
controlled by the government to promote
certain aspects of the economic life of our
people such as the National Coconut
Corporation. These are what we call
government-owned or controlled
corporations which may take on the form of
a private enterprise or one organized with
powers and formal characteristics of a
private corporations under the Corporation
Law. Thus, GOCCs do not acquire the status
of being part of the Government of the
Philippines even if they perform certain
functions of the government. While National
Coconut Corporation was organized for
"adjusting the coconut industry to a position
independent of trade preferences in the
United States" and of providing "Facilities for
the better curing of copra products and the
proper utilization of coconut by-products", a
function which our government has chosen
to exercise to promote the coconut industry,
however, it was given a corporate power
separate and distinct from our government,
for it was made subject to the provisions of
our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may
exercise are concerned.
Principles
• Section 16, Rule 130 of the ROC
Government of the Philippines is
exempt from paying the legal fees
provided for therein, and among
these fees are those which
stenographers may charge for the
transcript of notes taken by them that
may be requested by any interested
person (section 8)
• Sec. 2, Revised Administrative Code
Municipal Corporations
The Government of the Philippine
Islands' is a term which refers to the
corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of
government are exercised
throughout the Philippine Islands,
including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various
arms through which political authority
is made effective in said Islands,
whether pertaining to the central
Government or to the provincial or
municipal branches or other form of
local government
• Government as defined in US vs Dorr,
2 Phil., 332
that institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent
society makes and carries out those
rules of action which are necessary to
enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people
forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of
prescribing them
 Constitute
keeping of order and providing for the
protection of persons and property from
violence and robbery.
fixing of the legal relations between man
and wife and between parents and
children
regulation of the holding, transmission, and
interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for
crime
determination of contract rights between
individuals
definition and punishment of crime
administration of justice in civil cases
determination of the political duties,
privileges, and
relations of citizens
dealings of the state with foreign powers:
the preservation of the state from external
danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interests
Ministrant
Public works
Public education
Public charity
Health and safety regulations
Regulation of trade and industry
Principles in determining:
(1) that a government should do for the
public welfare those things which private
capital would not naturally undertake and
(2) that a government should do these
things which by its very nature it is better
equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals.
THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT and COOPERATIVE
FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (ACCFA) ,
petitioner, vs. CONFEDERATION OF UNIONS IN
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND OFFICES
(CUGCO), ACCFA SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION
(ASA), ACCFA WORKERS' ASSOCIATION (AWA)
and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.
Ponente: Makatintal
Facts
• The Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing
Administration (ACCFA) was a
government agency created under
Republic Act No. 821, as amended.
• Its administrative machinery was
reorganized and its name changed
to Agricultural Credit Administration
(ACA) under the Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844).
• On the other hand, the ACCFA
Supervisors' Association (ASA) and
the ACCFA Workers' Association
(AWA), hereinafter referred to as the
Unions, are labor organizations
composed of the supervisors and the
rank-and-file employees,
respectively, in the ACCFA (now
ACA).
G.R No. L-214484
• On Sept. 4, 1961, a CBA was entered
into between the Unions and the
ACCFA.
• A few months after, the Unions started
protesting due to alleged violation
and non-implementation of said
agreement.
• The Unions declared a strike for one
month from Oct. 25, 1962 to Nov. 26,
1962.
• The Unions together with CUGCO
filed a complaint with the Court of
Industrial Relations against ACCFA for
unfair labor practices:
o violation of the collective
bargaining agreement in
order to discourage the
members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to self-
organization,
o discrimination against said
members in the matter of
promotions, and
o refusal to bargain
 • The ACCFA denied the charges and
interposed as affirmative and special
defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR
over the case, illegality of the
bargaining contract, expiration of
said Contract and lack of approval
by the office of the President of the
fringe benefits provided for therein.
• CIR’s decision:
o To cease and desist from
committing further acts
tending to discourage the
members of complainant
unions in the exercise of their
right to self organization;
o To comply with and
implement the provision of
the collective bargaining
contract executed on
September 4, 1961, including
the payment of P30.00 a
month living allowance;
o To bargain in good faith and
expeditiously with the herein
complainants
• ACCFA moved to reconsider but was
turned down.
G.R No. L-23605
• During the pendency of the case, the
President of the Philippines on Aug. 8,
1963, signed the Agricultural Land
Reform Code.
o Reorganization of ACCFA to
ACA
• March 17, 1964, the Unions filed a
petition for certification with the CIR
praying that they be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agents for the
supervisors and rank-and-file
employees.
• The trial Court in its order dated
March 30, 1964 directed the
Manager or Officer-in-Charge of the
ACA to allow the posting of said order
"for the information of all employees
and workers thereof," and to answer
the petition.
• ACA denied that the Unions
represented the majority of the
supervisors and rank-and-file workers.
• It further alleged that the petition was
premature, that the ACA was not the
proper party to be notified and to
answer the petition, and that the
employees and supervisors could not
lawfully become members of the
Unions, nor be represented by them.
• However, in a joint manifestation of
the Unions dated May 7, 1964, with
the conformity of the ACA
Administrator and of the Agrarian
Counsel in his capacity as such and
as counsel for the National Land
Reform Council, it was agreed "that
the union petitioners in this case
represent the majority of the
employees in their respective
bargaining units" and that only the
legal issues raised would be
submitted for the resolution of the trial
Court.
• The lower court ordered that the
Unions will be the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the
employees of ACA.
• The ACA appealed that the CIR is
lacking jurisdiction to enter the
petition of the Unios for certification
election on the ground that ACA is
engaged in governmental functions.
ISSUE
Whether ACA performs governmental
functions
RULING
Yes, under Sec. 3 if the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, the ACA was established to
extend credit and similar assistance to
agriculture. The implementation of the policy
thus enunciated, insofar as the role of the
ACA therein is concerned, is spelled out in
Sections 110 to 118, inclusive, of the Land
Reform Code. It can be noted that in Sec.
113, the power to audit the operations of
farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire
into their affairs is in the nature of the visitorial
power of the sovereign, which only a
government agency specially delegated to
do so by the Congress may legally exercise.
The implementation of the land reform
program of the government according to
Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a
governmental, not a proprietary, function;
and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75
has placed the ACA under the Land Reform.
Project Administration, together with the
other member agencies, the personnel
complement of all of which are placed in
one single pool and made available for
assignment from one agency to another,
subject only to Civil Service.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the
Land Reform Code was enacted and the
various agencies, the ACA among them,
established to carry out its purposes. There
can be no dispute as to the fact that the land
reform program contemplated in the said
Code is beyond the capabilities of any
private enterprise to translate into reality. It is
a purely governmental function, no less than,
say, the establishment and maintenance of
public schools and public hospitals.
Principle
The ACA is a government office or agency
engaged in governmental, not proprietary.
These functions may not be strictly what
President Wilson described as "constituent"
(as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as
those relating to the maintenance of peace
and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights,
those relating to the administration of justice
and the determination of political duties of
citizens, and those relating to national
defense and foreign relations. Under this
traditional classification, such constituent
functions are exercised by the State as
attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
promote the welfare, progress and prosperity
of the people — these letter functions being
ministrant, he exercise of which is optional on
the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society,
however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government
quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only "because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare
than is any private individual or group of
individuals." continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to
meet the increasing social challenges of the
times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of
course this development was envisioned,
indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA
FONTANILLA , petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Ponente: Paras, J.
Facts
• NIA, through the SocGen, maintains
that on the strength of PD No. 552 and
the case of Angat River Irrigation
System, et. Al. vs Angat River Workers’
Union, et. al.
o the NIA does not perform
solely and primarily
proprietary functions but is an
agency of the government
tasked with governmental
functions, and is therefore not
liable for the tortious act of its
driver Hugo Garcia, who was
not its special agent
• Opinion in the Angat case:
The Angat System (like the NIA)
exercised a governmental function
because the nature of the powers
and functions of said agency does
not show that it was intended to
"bring to the Government any special
corporate benefit or pecuniary
profit,"
 • Dissenting opinion of Concepcion
and Reyes:
Angat River System is a government
entity exercising proprietary
functions.
• The Solicitor General argues that the
reasons presented by P.D. 552 for the
existence of the NIA indubitably
reveal that the responsibility vested in
said agency concerns public welfare
and public benefit, and is therefore
an exercise of sovereignty.
Issue
Whether NIA performs governmental
functions
Ruling
No, the NIA does not perform governmental
functions. While it may be true that the NIA
was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public
interest and public welfare, such fact does
not make the NIA essentially and purely a
"government-function" corporation.
Certainly, the state and the community as a
whole are largely benefited by the services
the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the
agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
Principles
Functions of the government:
1. Governmental or constituent
2. Proprietary or ministant
National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated
Unions, 11 SCRA 766
The
functions of providing water supply and
sewerage service are regarded as
mere optional functions of government
even though the service rendered
caters to the community as a whole and the
goal is for the general interest of society.
THE VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by Esmeraldo R. Acorda, Petitioner,
vs. Hon. ANGELO T. REYES in his capacity as
Secretary of National Defense; and Hon. EDGARDO
E. BATENGA in his capacity as Undersecretary for
Civil Relations and Administration of the Department
of National Defense, Respondents.
This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with a prayer to declare as void
Department Circular No. 04 of the
Department of National Defense (DND),
dated 10 June 2002.
Facts:
• Petitioner in this case is the Veterans
Federation of the Philippines (VFP)
• Respondent Angelo T. Reyes was the
Secretary of National Defense (DND
Secretary)
• VFP, a corporate body organized
under Republic Act No. 2640, dated
18 June 1960, as amended, and duly
registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
• The Secretary of National Defense
(DND Secretary) issued the assailed
Department Circular No. 04, dated 10
June 2002. Further implementing the
provisions of section 1 and 2 or RA no.
2640 and respondent Edgardo E.
Batenga was the DND
Undersecretary for Civil Relations and
Administration who was tasked by the
respondent DND Secretary to
conduct an extensive management
audit of the records of petitioner.
• The Secretary General of the VFP sent
an undated letter to respondent DND
Secretary, with notice to respondent
Undersecretary for Civil Relations and
Administration, complaining about
the alleged broadness of the scope
of the management audit and
requesting the suspension thereof
until such time that specific areas of
 the audit shall have been agreed
upon.
• The request was, however, denied by
the Undersecretary
• Petitioner thus filed this Petition for
Certiorari with Prohibition under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, praying for the following
reliefs:
For this Court to issue a temporary
restraining order and a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction to enjoin
respondent Secretary and all those
acting under his discretion and
authority from: (a) implementing DND
Department Circular No. 04; and (b)
continuing with the ongoing
management audit of petitioner’s
books of account; After hearing the
issues on notice –
a. Declare DND Department
Circular No. 04 as null and
void for being ultra vires;
b. Convert the writ of prohibition,
preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction Into a
permanent one.
• Petitioner vigorously argues that the
VFP is a private non-government
organization thus department
circular null and void, pressing on the
following contentions:
1. The VFP does not possess the
elements which would qualify it as a
public office, particularly the
possession/delegation of a portion of
sovereign power of government to
be exercised for the benefit of the
public;
2. VFP funds are not public funds
because –
a) No budgetary appropriations or
government funds have been
released to the VFP directly or
indirectly from the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM);
b) VFP funds come from membership
dues;
c) The lease rentals raised from the
use of government lands reserved for
the VFP are private in character and
do not belong to the government.
Said rentals are fruits of VFP’s labor
and efforts in managing and
administering the lands for VFP
purposes and objectives. A close
analogy would be any Filipino citizen
settling on government land and who
tills the land for his livelihood and
sustenance. The fruits of his labor
belong to him and not to the owner
of the land. Such fruits are not public
funds.
3. Although the juridical personality of
the VFP emanates from a statutory
charter, the VFP retains its essential
character as a private, civilian
federation of veterans voluntarily
formed by the veterans themselves to
attain a unity of effort, purpose and
objectives, e.g. –
4. The Administrative Code of 1987
does not provide that the VFP is an
attached agency, nor does it provide
that it is an entity under the control
and supervision of the DND in the
context of the provisions of said code.
5. The DBM declared that the VFP is a
non-government organization and
issued a certificate that the VFP has
not been a direct recipient of any
funds released by the DBM.
Issue:
Petitioner assails Department Circular No. 04
on the ground that it expanded the scope of
control and supervision beyond what has
been laid down in Rep. Act No. 2640.
Petitioner likewise claims that the assailed
DND Department Circular No. 04 was never
published, and hence void.
 Ruling
The petitioner is a public corporation is
determinative of whether or not we should
grant petitioner's prayer to declare
Department Circular No. 04 void.
THE FATE OF DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 04
The definition of the power of control and
supervision under Section 2 of the assailed
Department Circular are synonymous with
the foregoing definitions. Consequently, and
considering that petitioner is a public
corporation, the provisions of the assailed
Department Circular No.04 did not supplant
nor modify the provisions of Republic Act No.
2640, thus not violating the settled rule that
"all such (administrative) issuances must not
override, but must remain consistent and in
harmony with the law they seek to apply or
implement.
Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.
Department Circular No. 04 is an internal
regulation.
In sum, the assailed DND Department
Circular No. 04 does not supplant nor modify
and is, on the contrary, perfectly in
consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640.
Petitioner VFP is a public corporation. As
such, it can be placed under the control and
supervision of the Secretary of National
Defense, who consequently has the power to
conduct an extensive management audit of
petitioner corporation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The validity of the
Department of National Defense
Department Circular No. 04 is AFFIRMED.
JAVIER v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts
Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047
creating the National Book Development
Board (NBDB), having for its policy the State’s
goal in promoting the continuing
development of the book publishing industry,
Carolina R. Javier (Javier) was appointed to
its Governing Board as a private sector
representative. She was supposed to
represent the Philippines in a book
conference in Spain whereupon a cash
advance for traveling expenses was
received by Javier. Unfortunately, the trip
was cancelled, thus the Government sought
the return of the traveling allowance. Javier,
however, failed to return the same.
Accordingly, the NBDB’s Executive Director
filed information against Javier in the
Ombudsman for malversation of public funds
and property, in violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019. She was
formally charged in the Sandiganbayan for
violation of the said law. Also, the
Commission on Audit (COA) charged Javier
with Malversation of Public Funds under
Article 317 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Thereafter, another information was filed
before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the
charge made by the COA. Eventually, both
of the cases were consolidated. Javier filed a
Motion to Quash Information which the
Sandiganbayan denied. Again, she filed a
Motion to Quash Information in the criminal
case charging her with Malversation under
the RPC by invoking her right against double
jeopardy, again it was subsequently denied.
She filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
the same was denied.
In the present petition, Javier argues that the
Sandiganbayan has
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not
quashing the two informations charging her
with violation of the Anti-Graft
Law and the Revised Penal Code on
malversation of public funds. Her first
argument is that she is not a public officer,
and second, she was being charged under
two (2) informations, which is in violation of
her right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Javier is a public officer
HELD:
The powers and functions of the NBDB lead
us to conclude that they
partake of the nature of public functions. A
public office is the right, authority
and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from
the private sector to sit as a
member of the NBDB, the law invested her
with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, so that the
purpose of the government is
achieved. She was appointed to the
Governing Board in order to see to it that
the purposes for which the law was enacted
are achieved.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the
definition of a public officer
pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which
provides that a public officer includes
elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or
exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the
government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti- Graft
Law, one is a public officer if one has been
elected or appointed to a public office.
Petitioner was appointed by the President to
Governing Board of the NBDB. The fact that
she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of
no
moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides
that members of the Governing
Board shall receive per diem and such
allowances as may be authorized for
every meeting actually attended and
subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law,
the nature of one’s appointment,
and whether the compensation one receives
from the government is only
nominal, is immaterial because the person so
elected or appointed is still considered a
public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code
defines a public officer as any
person who, by direct provision of law,
popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or
shall perform in said Government
or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be
deemed to be a public officer.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs
public functions in pursuance
of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she
is a public officer who takes part
in the performance of public functions in the
government whether as an
employee, agent, subordinate official, of any
rank or classes. In fine, We hold
that petitioner is a public officer.
Anent the issue of double jeopardy, We can
not likewise give in to the
contentions advanced by petitioner.
Records show that the Informations in the
two Criminal Cases refer to offenses
penalized by different statutes, R.A. No.
3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary
that for double jeopardy to attach, the case
against the accused must have been
dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction,
upon valid information sufficient in form and
substance and the accused
pleaded to the charge. In the instant case,
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
Information for violation of the Anti-Graft
Law. She was not yet arraigned in the
criminal case for malversation of public funds
because she had filed a motion to quash the
latter information. Double jeopardy could
not, therefore, attach considering that the
two cases remain pending before the
Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner
had pleaded to only one in the criminal
cases against her.
It is well settled that for a claim of double
jeopardy to prosper, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is a
complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and in
substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the same is filed before a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4)
the accuses is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed
or terminated without his express
consent. The third and fourth requisites are
not present in the case at bar.