PHILOSOPHY OF LAW-FINALS
to the class of communications that are absolutely
[G.R. No. L-62449. July 16, 1984.] PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ATTY. RAUL H.
SESBRENO, accused-appellee
Facts:
Atty. Raul Sesbreno was the plaintiff's counsel who was
accused of filing a pleading with alleged defamatory
statements against the counsel of the defendant, Atty.
Ceniza.
In the initial formal hearing of Civil Case, Atty. Ceniza filed
an Urgent Motion to Transfer Hearing wherein the receipt of
such motion was denied by Atty. Sesbreno. However,
evidence of receipt of notice was shown by Atty. Ceniza.
The court ordered Atty. Sesbreno to show cause why he should
not be declared in contempt for misrepresentation, to which he
filed a motion of reconsideration which was again opposed by
Atty. Ceniza charging Sesbreno with misrepresentation,
prevarication, and "telling a barefaced and documented lie.
Replying to these remarks, Sesbreno then filed his "REPLY"
imputing that “Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza is an irresponsible
person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a liar and
irresponsible childish prankster”, which became the subject
matter of the libel case filed against him.
Respondent’s argument: In response, he filed a motion to
quash information contending that the pleading was covered
under the DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS; hence, no civil or criminal liability can
arise therefrom.
City Fiscal's Office of Cebu City decision: The information
was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Court of Appeals Decision: Affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
How it came to SC: The appeal was certified to us by the
Court of Appeals on a finding that it involves a pure question
of law.
Issue: Whether the remarks in the pleading are covered by the
Doctrine of Absolutely Privileged Communication
Held: Yes. Although the language used by defendant-appellee
in the pleading in question was undoubtedly strong, since it
was made in legitimate defense of his own and of his client's
interest, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged
and cannot be the basis of an action for libel.
Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings,
including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong
privileged.
The purpose is to let members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses speak their minds
freely and exercise their respective functions without
incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution in the
furtherance of the causes they uphold.
The doctrine of privileged communication, moreover, is
explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an
exception to the general principle that every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true, in
the absence of "good intention" and "justifiable motive"
This doctrine is not without qualification.
Qualification:
A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid
being considered libelous –
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings
should be legitimately related to the cause in hand
or subject of inquiry. It need not be in every case
material to the issues.
As to the degree of relevancy, the courts are
inclined to be liberal.
Both counsels were enjoined to rein up their tempers. Greater
care and circumspection must be exercised in the preparation
of their pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and
offensive language
Others:
Libel – refers to “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.”
[G.R. Nos. L-21528 & L-21529. March 28, 1969.]
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
Facts: Two criminal cases were filed against Rosauro Reyes –
Criminal case No. 2595 for oral defamation and Criminal Case
No. 2594 for grave threats.
These complaints arose when the petitioner led a group of
about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of
the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley
Point wherein he was a former civilian employee. The
demonstration was directed against Agustin Hallare and a
certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the
dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange.
They carried placards bearing statements such as "Agustin,
mamamatay ka"; "Frank do not be a common funk" to “blow
off steam”.
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW-FINALS
Agustin Hallare, becoming apprehensive sought the protection
of Col. Monzon and the latter accompanied him to his home
where Reyes and other demonstrators followed. The three
jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's
residence after having gone by it twice. Rosauro Reyes got off
his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right
hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door,
he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin,
mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita."
Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the
premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of
Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both
charges. On the day of the hearing, the prosecution moved to
amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave
threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally." The defense
counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused
had already been arraigned on the original information and
that the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the
accused."
Lower court decision: Convicted.
Court of Appeals’ Decision: Affirmed the Lower Court’s
decision.
How is came to SC: Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied, hence, this appeal by
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the petitioner was liable for grave threats and
oral defamation.
Held:
1. Affirmed the conviction for grave threats.
It cannot be denied that the threats were made
deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of
anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of
petitioner one month before the incident. They were
made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in
the mind of the person threatened the belief that
the threat would be carried into effect." We,
therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in
upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of
grave threats.
We find that all the elements of the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized by its paragraph were alleged therein namely:
(1) that the offender threatened another person with the
infliction upon his person of a wrong;
(2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat
was not subject to a condition.
2. Acquitted of Oral defamation.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the
utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo."
This is a common enough expression in the dialect
that is often employed, not really to slander but rather
to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever,
taken in its literal sense by the hearer.
In a previously decided libel case (Yebra), the Court
held that libelous statements are merely preparatory remarks
culminating in the final threat. These statements therein
derogatory to the person named do not constitute an
independent crime of libel.
[G.R. No. 229440. July 14, 2021.] PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, INC., DONNA CUETO (writer), ARTEMIO T.
ENGRACIA, JR.,(Assoc. Editor & News Editor) and
ABELARDO S. ULANDAY,(Editor-in-Chief) petitioners, vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondent.
Facts:
• Enrile filed a civil action of damages for libel against the
Philippine Daily Inquirer over a news article published by the
latter implicating the former in the issue over the coco levy
fund and that he also benefited from the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcos family.
The newspaper, in defense, argued that the article was merely
based on the PCGG’s reports, specifically from its
Chairperson, Commissioner Yorac, and such mention of
Enrile’s name was only incidental and that it did not impute
any crime against Enrile
Issue: Was the questioned article libelous?
Held: No.
Libel has the following elements: ( I P I M )
(a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another;
(b) publication of the imputation;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and,
(d) existence of malice
a. 1st element is lacking: The article was merely a factual
report not one imputing a discreditable act or
condition.
When the article is taken in its entirety, it merely reports the
statements supposedly made by PCGG Chairperson.
The perspective of the reader should be the judicial guidepost
in determining whether an utterance is libelous. The article
merely impresses on the reader that "Yorac said the
following" instead of "Enrile is a plunderer and a Marcos
crony."
4th element is lacking: Malice is not present in the publishing
of the subject article.
b. This is a Qualified Privilege Communication
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious (malice in law).
 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW-FINALS
However, such presumption does not exist in the
following:
1. private communication in the performance of any
legal, moral, or social duty;
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature
These are Qualifiedly privileged communications (contains
defamatory imputations which are not actionable unless found
to have been made without good intention or justifiable
motive. To successfully claim that an utterance covered under
qualifiedly privileged communications is libelous, the plaintiff
thereon, in this case, Enrile, must prove the existence of
malice in fact, or actual malice, which Enrile failed to
prove.)
The subject matter of the article is a fair report on matters of
public interest as it involves coco levy fund which is a form of
special public funds. (It is the subject matter that needs to be
of public nature.)
c. Falsity alone or inaccuracy does not prove actual
malice
Again, what constitutes malice is not the fact that the
articles contain matters which are false. For there to be
malice, it must be that the articles were published with the
knowledge that the matters in the article were false.
It was error for the CA to conclude that the article was
published with the knowledge that they were false. To
recall, the article was published on December 4, 2001,
while the letters of Chairperson Yorac disclaiming
ownership of the statements were executed only on
December 6, 2001. (Therefore, there can be no knowledge.)
 Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person
defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. The article did not contain such.
Others: There are two types of malice
1. Malice in law is a presumption of law: it dispenses with the
proof of malice when words that raise the presumption are
shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive
malice, legal malice, or implied malice.
2. Malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy
and injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated by
ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice,
actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice.
[A.C. No. 13521. June 27, 2023.] IN RE: ATTY. LO
RENZO G. GADON'S VIRAL VIDEO AGAINST RAISSA
ROBLES
Facts: The Court issued a Resolution taking cognizance of
the subject video clip of Atty. Gadon, who was speaking in
front of a camera while inside a parked car, fuming and
cursing at Raissa Robles. He lashed out while jabbing his
finger towards the camera:
“Hoy, Raissa Robles, puki ng ina mo, hindot ka. Putang
ina mo. Ano'ng pinagsasabi mong hindi nagbayad si BBM
ng taxes? May certification 'yan galing sa BIR. Puking ina
mo! Hindot ka! Putang ina mo, Raissa Robles!
Magpakantot ka sa aso! Puking ina mo! Hindot ka!
Putang ina mo”
He was charged separately by Robles with the following
criminal complaints:
a. one (1) count of qualified violation of the Safe
Spaces Act,
b. one (1) count of cyber libel, as defined and penalized
under Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 committed on or
about 21 December 2021 in Quezon City; and
c. one (1) count of libel, as defined and penalized under
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
The Court found that Atty. Gadon's language in the
video recording against Robles was violative of Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), not to
mention constitutive of prima facie gender-based online
sexual harassment under Sections 3 (e) and 12 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11313. The Court likewise placed
him on preventive suspension from the practice of law
effective immediately.
Gadon’s arguments:
1. That his behavior in the video clip was provoked by
sarcastic tweets and replies of Robles alleging that
BIR has no record at all of Bongbong’s tax payments.
2. That his comments were not made for the public but
for Atty. Robles alone. It was she who publicized the
video.
3. Citing Reyes v. People, 24 Atty. Gadon emphasized
that the phrase "putang ina mo" was "a common
enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure."
4. That Robles did not feel threatened by the subject
video clip, but was merely insulted.
5. That Justices Leonen and Caguioa had any hand in the
filing of the Admin case against him
Issue: Should Atty. Gadon be disbarred?
Held: Yes. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Atty. Gadon has shown himself to be unfit to be part of the
legal profession.
a. Guilty of Direct Contempt in Court & Violation of
Section 14, Canon II on Propriety for insinuating
malicious accusations against Senior Associate
Justice Leonen and Justice Caguioa.
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW-FINALS
Section 14-Statements insinuating improper motive
on the part of any such officer, which are not
supported by substantial evidence, shall be ground
for disciplinary action.
b. Violated Canon II on Propriety
Atty. Gadon's repeated use of the words"puki ng ina
mo," "hindot ka," and "putang ina mo," as well as his
utterance of "magpakantot ka sa aso," in the subject
video clip are profane, to say the least, and
indisputably scandalous that they discredit the entire
legal profession.
SECTION 2. Dignified conduct. — A lawyer shall respect
the law, the courts, tribunals, and other government
agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and act
with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor towards fellow
members of the bar.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Used highly offensive and obscene language to insult
Robles. Directed towards a woman, the language was
misogynistic and sexist
SECTION 3. Safe environment; avoid all forms of abuse or
harassment. — A lawyer shall not create or promote an
unsafe or hostile environment, both in private and public
settings, whether online…
To this end, a lawyer shall not commit any form of physical,
sexual, psychological, or economic abuse or violence
against another person. A lawyer is also prohibited from
engaging in any gender-based harassment or
discrimination
SECTION 4. A lawyer shall use only dignified, gender-fair
in all personal and professional dealings. To this end, a
lawyer shall not use language which is abusive,
intemperate, offensive or otherwise improper
SECTION 36. Responsible use. — A lawyer shall have the
duty to understand the benefits, risks, and ethical
implications associated with the use of social media.
c. Guilty of gender-based online sexual harassment
under Sections 3 (e) and 12 of R.A. No. 11313.
Gender-based online sexual harassment refers to an
online conduct targeted at a particular person that
causes or likely to cause another mental, emotional
or psychological distress, and fear of personal safety,
sexual harassment acts.
The contention of Atty. Gadon that Robles was not
threatened but merely insulted is not tenable since the
violation pertains to the acts of the perpetrator, not to
the reaction of the recipient.
d. Aggravating circumstances
- The Court likewise notes that numerous
administrative cases have been filed against Atty.
Gadon (5 admin cases) and other 4 cases are
pending
Others:
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be
determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be
an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
G.R. No. 233577. December 5, 2022.] LEO A.
LASTIMOSA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Garcia’s complaint stemmed from Lastimosa’s
column “Arangkada” published on The FREEMAN dated June
29, 2007 entitled “Si Doling Kawatan” or “Doling a Thief.” In
that article, Lastimosa, also a broadcast journalist of radio
DYAB, described Doling as a barangay captain, a
fishmonger, loudmouth, abrasive, cruel, and arrogant.
Prosecution:
 Lastimosa had been a constant and vocal critic of
Garcia which resulted in the filing of several other
libel cases against him.
 The prosecution asserts that the article "Si Doling
Kawatan" was about Garcia, and that Lastimosa
wrote the same to tarnish her reputation as
governor, and as a Cebuana woman, mother and
grandmother.
 Lastimosa's older articles prove that Lastimosa
had intimated in the past that Garcia was corrupt,
ill-tempered, or foul-mouthed, the same words
used in the present column describing “Doling”
 nine of his 15 Media students of UP observed that
a plain reading of the said article pointed to
Garcia as the character "Doling.”
Lastimosa:
 Lastimosa maintained that the article was merely a
work of fiction in the third person narrative form. He
said that "Doling" did not refer to Garcia since the
personal circumstances of "Doling" were different
from Garcia’s. (Doling was described in the article as
a “Brgy. Captain” and a “fish-monger” (tigabligya’g
isda) which Garcia was not.
RTC Ruling: Convicted Lastimosa of Libel. P6,000 with
SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT in case of
INSOLVENCY. Php2,000,000.00 for and as moral
damages.
RTC Ratio:
 All the elements of the crime had been established by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
 Garcia was sufficiently identified in the article
relying on Atty. Seares' testimony that nine of his
15 students thought that the article was about
Garcia.
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW-FINALS
 Lastimosa's older articles about Garcia used same the
words used to describe "Doling" in the article.
Ruling of the CA: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
as to the amount of moral damages which is reasonably
reduced to Php500,000
CA Ratio:
 Published with malice as extrinsic evidence shows
that the defendant bore a grudge against the offended
party.
 Article clearly identified Garcia.
While it is essential that the victim be identifiable in
order to maintain a libel suit, it is not necessary that the
person be named. It is enough if by reference the
allusion is apparent or if the publication contains
matters of description or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the article may
know the person alluded to.
Jurisprudence laid the rule that this requirement is
complied with where a third person recognized or
could identify the party vilified in the article.
Issue: Whether the imputations constitute libel
Held: No. There is no libel. Lastimosa is acquitted of the
crime charged.
"For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites
must concur: (DeMaPI)
a) it must be defamatory;
b) it must be malicious;
c) it must be given publicity and
d) the victim must be identifiable."
Absent any one of these elements precludes the
commission of the crime of libel.
SC Ratio:
1st element (Defamatory)-Present. The Article is
defamatory with the use of words "abrasive," "cruel,"
"arrogant," and worst, "a thief."
2nd element (Malice)- Present. The law presumes malice
except for criticisms against public officials or public figures
are considered privileged. However, the said exception does
not apply where the comment or criticism was about, or
extends to the private life of the public figure. The imputations
extended to the private life of the person; thus, malice is
present.
3rd element (Publicity)- Present. Lastimosa does not deny
writing and publishing the subject article.
4th element (Identifiable victim)- Not present.
Three ways to establish the identity of the person defamed
when he or she was not explicitly mentioned in the writing:
a. Identification through intrinsic reference —the
words used readily establishes the identity of the
person defamed
b. Identification through description — wherein the
identity of the person defamed could be established
by piecing together the descriptions and the facts and
circumstances surrounding the character
c. Identification through extrinsic evidence — whereby
extraneous pieces of evidence are presented to prove
the link between the character and the person
defamed, such as when a third person would testify
that when he or she read the writing, he or she knew
that it was referring to the person defamed because of
his or her own knowledge of the characteristics and
circumstances surrounding the person defamed
and/or the latter's relationship with the writer.
Garcia was not explicitly named in the Article.
 The only basis of the witness of his impression
that Doling refers to the Governor was the word
“Doling” which sounds like “Gwedolyn”, the
name of the Governor.
 The witness admitted that he had no knowledge
that Garcia was indeed a former brgy.
Captain, or a fish-monger, as Lastimosa
described “Doling” in the Article.
 Also, the core of his testimony — that nine of his
15 students in a media studies class recognized
"Doling" to be Garcia — does not establish
anything in evidence. None of the said nine
students was presented as a witness, and the
defense therefore did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine them.
While the requirement of identifiability is already
complied with even if just one other person identifies the
plaintiff as the subject of the defamatory words, it is
material to establish how such third person was able to
make the connection between the writing and the
plaintiff. In this case, there is none apart from the
auditory similarities between "Doling" and Garcia's first
name, Gwendolyn.
Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014.
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara
(Julienne), both minors, were graduating high school
students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
While changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital pictures of themselves
clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were
then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook profile.
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW-FINALS
Escudero, a computer teacher at STC's high school
department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres.
Held: No. The records are bereft of any evidence that
the photos are only visible only to Julienne, Julia and to
a selected few. After uploading the pictures on
Facebook, a Social Networking environment, they
cannot insist that they have an expectation of privacy.

Using STC's computers, Escudero's students logged in to
their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which
include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and
Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of
clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres.
STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school's
Student Handbook.
Sr. Purisima, STC's high school principal and ICM
Directress informed their parents the following day that,
as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining
the commencement exercises.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012,
Angela's mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of
Cebu City against STC, praying that defendants therein
be enjoined from implementing the sanction.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless,
barred the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites.
Petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data
RTC Ruling: Dismissing the petition for habeas data.
Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
threatened violation of the minors' right to privacy one
of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data. The photos, having been uploaded on
Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them,
lost their privacy in some way.
Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering
or uploading any kind of data or information online,
they are automatically and inevitably making it
permanently available online, the perpetuation of
which is outside the ambit of their control.
Given the millions of OSN users, " [i]n this [Social
Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded
in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."
OTHERS:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno's speech, The Common
Right to Privacy, explained three strands of the right to
privacy, viz.: (L In De )
(1) locational or situational privacy;
(2) informational privacy; and
(3) decisional privacy.
Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the
right to informational privacy — usually defined as the
right of individuals to control information about
themselves.
 Writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.

How it came to SC: Not satisfied with the outcome,

petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data

Issue: Whether or not there was indeed an actual or

threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors