A.

Private acts and the Bill of Rights

1.Against whom are the bill of rights claimed (answered by YNOT)? Are there exceptions to the
rule?
2.Are the bill of rights self-executory?
B.Rights to life, liberty, and property
1.Procedural and substantive due process
2.Void-for-vagueness doctrine
3.Hierarchy of rights
C.Equal protection
1.Requisites for valid classification
People v cayat
a. it must be real and substantial distinction – substantial difference as to make real
distinction
b. it must be germane to the purpose of the law
c. it must not be limited to existing conditions only
d. it must apply to all members who belongs to the same class
2.Rational basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny tests
Reading list
Due Process
1.Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940
**due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character
**NOTE na facts: CIR has executive and judicial power, Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." which it decided on a matter not substantiated by evidence

Ruling: The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before
it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
 (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence
must be "substantial.”

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except
as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. There was violation of
due process
2.Ichong vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
** DUE PROCESS AGAINST POLICE POWER OF STATE

Limitations on police power. —The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are
found in the following provisions of our Constitution: SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection
with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can
the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process
test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded
on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.

Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
 arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio.

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the
restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must
not be unduly oppressive.

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the
police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of
the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has
a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men;
that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to
prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by
petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to
their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also
found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control
of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering
the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control
and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable
but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the
bill, which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If
the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no
allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and
who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of
our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of
other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons

who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power
that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is

none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject
to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or
country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and
domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people
can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
—

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic
control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution
must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would
promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue
now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing
their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus
they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced
by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is
convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to
Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum
for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of
the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is
provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of
the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of
the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose
and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and
unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its
duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with
the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the
Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable.
These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which
are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown
out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that
there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may
be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

3.Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 (LANDMARK CASE)
** clash of VALIDITY OF police power v its limit (due process)

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due
process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow
room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have
preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as
they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go
no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and
nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to
hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in
judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the
bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one
or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal,
on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster
described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials
who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a
worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission
of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the
loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and
lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may
be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or
the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

***insertion police power*** The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of
the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is
simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public
needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of
the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even
before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb —
in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance
to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.
And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema
lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual
interests to the benefit of the greater number.

In the light of the tests (lawful necessity and method) mentioned above, we hold with the
Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to
the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in
the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt
that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if
male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order
will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident
depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise,
so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as,
not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would
still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

**omission of due process- It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice
and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these
minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly
taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial
only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of
the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require
their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the
executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being
accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held
in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof
should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and
conviction of the accused.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
4.Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989
( case law for administrative agency of when due process is required )
** QUASI JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Contentions

On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process
because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a
hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is
a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before
the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the
consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to
respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is
adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.

Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of
the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order
applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is
adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question
need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTC's
legislative function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in
the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public convenience; and
that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is
currently engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.

Ruling: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 9 we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and
when it is legislative, thus:

Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates-
when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to
petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact-based
upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making
a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner.
Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by
the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent
performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of
which demands previous notice and hearing.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit:

It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative
body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See
Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If
the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the
requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of
future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not
involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case
of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S.
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside
from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In
so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body
 acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but
where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and
its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although
patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an
initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of
an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better
position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned
order.

At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.

While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce
entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be
applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.
In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act
which provides:

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the
Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance
with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and
exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
 xxx xxx xxx

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed,
observed and followed thereafter by any public service; ...

There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC,
there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos.
546 and 196.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it
is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon
the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident
in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted
PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the
services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the condition
that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the
Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12

While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of
information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the
basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it
but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity
to controvert.

Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It
becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending
the final determination of the case. 13 An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates,
even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if
the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the
prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period
covered by the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a
reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its
property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on
substantive due process.

5.Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993
** ACADEMIC DUE PROCESS

It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at
without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree as
we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students'
rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National
University,22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch23 and Non v. Dames II24 have been meticulously
respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were
expelled.

Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang
Tibay case25 and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases
essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the
instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university
herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.26

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident,27 the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of the
students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the
others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to
file their statements.

Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners'
notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991.30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter
which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School
Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated
February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations
before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler
and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent
students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners'
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. 31 Granting that they were
denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due
process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a
hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as
being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-
neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.

Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their
evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was
reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witnesses.33 Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded
by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions.
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly
defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of
the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not
worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be overemphasized
that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee
and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is
merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of
criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we
have had occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a
student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having
given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School
Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the
subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient
for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.
6.Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994
** QUASI JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

PHILPHOS claims that it was denied due process when respondent Mediator-Arbiter granted
the amended petition of respondent PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new opportunity to
be heard.

We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does here. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.2 Where, as in the instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the
Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due
process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.3 Moreover,
petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; 4 instead, it opted to submit its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in
its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

7.Aniag vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994

** CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
CONTENTIONS:
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the
preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge
sheet. Consequently, making him a respondent in the criminal information would violate his
constitutional right to due process.
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec.
263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that "the principals, accomplices and accessories, as
defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses." It points out
that it was upon petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the firearms in question outside
petitioner's residence, submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited
by the City Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the
firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written explanation about the incident. Finally, COMELEC
claims that violation of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial.
RULING:

the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor
to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process
which requires that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. 30

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to
enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver,
and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident. This
does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his
defense.31 Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals,33 we held
that —
 While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional
in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened
criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.

petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate
the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party
respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to
exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that
petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not
apprised that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.
it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC
cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for
himself. The motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right.
8.Alonte vs. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998
**CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

Jurisprudence11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require

(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles
find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."

In Tabao vs. Espina,14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules.
It reminds that —

. . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases,
the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an
accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution
as to its evidence.

Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or
defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law
but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who
has an unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness.

While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that —

Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997

with their respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to
cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to
respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two
affidavits — one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her
desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is
that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may be
waived." (emphasis supplied) —

it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences."16 Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a
waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver.17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise
should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present
evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2)
the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates
been set by respondent Judge for the purpose;19 and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act
charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. 20 There can be
no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill
of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most
undeserving.

9.Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573

The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:

Standards of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination of

employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance
of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.

In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee's last
known address.

Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee
while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow
the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment
of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and
full backwages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where
the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted.

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must
give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to
be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized
causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department
of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for
health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without
just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized
cause but due process was not observed.

In the first situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid and the employer will not suffer any
liability.

In the second and third situations where the dismissals are illegal, Article 279 mandates that
the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement.

In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be
cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for
non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

10.Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,632 SCRA 146

** void for vagueness and overbreath
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
CONTENTIONS

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the
crime of terrorism46 under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free
speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

RULING: For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to

outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines
are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court
stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-
speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes." 50 It added
that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is
not vague.51

While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated that
a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct
a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense 53 under the
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in
precise language.54

The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear
and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of
a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated that
allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its
validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted
at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle
for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled
that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by
their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
[only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute
(under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the
same plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.59

A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.60

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A
litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
"chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long
as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be
challenged" and "underscored that an ‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not
be allowed."64

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a
penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would
be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes,
if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A
facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would,
essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair
the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an
accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to
third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him.

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only
to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before
the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some
of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute
is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and
can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes
that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove
that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent
an actual or imminent charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the
vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however,
that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety." 72 It stressed that
"statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."

Equal protection of the Laws

1.People vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937
Remedy availed: But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from
an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that
statute.

It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1.
Constitution of the Philippines.)

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision
thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent
domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United
States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356;
30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct.,
Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf.
C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith,
Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable
must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act
would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for
all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation
officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious
reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming
within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act.
Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should
appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now —
and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of
Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not
made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations
suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in
the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary
result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure,
abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court
should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the
denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference
between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibitions. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because
of their effect in operation. If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it
is unconstitutional.
Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several
provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the
salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that year — and
thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years.
While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here
indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a
government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the
equality clause but "a rope of sand".
2.Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968

whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause
and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1)
it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only
to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

3.Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to
guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila
who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people
in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider
valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is
being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
4.Dumlao vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him

personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates
for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC
(as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates

should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General
has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood
in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65
years old may also be good elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify
retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,
who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which
he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would
like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs.
Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21
SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the
law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in
question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it
may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies"
5.Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect
Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. 16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working
conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture,
confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence
that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should
act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male
chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was
largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in
massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government
acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned.
There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as
classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.
Discrimination in this case is justified.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance
the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the
midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment
will be for their own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review
of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18),
meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of
permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare

and protection of Filipino workers. 19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within
an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed
by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of
the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property
from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of
contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is
based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of
minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the
women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an
element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to
their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it
would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the
assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)

6.Himagan vs. People, G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994

Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that
it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in
criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive
suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and
its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to
members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are
not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive
suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A.
6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six
(6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can
be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause
does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the
classification is based on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the
law; 16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be
impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real
and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists
here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
7.Almonte vs. Vazquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the
complaint in this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This
contention lacks merit. As already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to
act on any complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus,
Art. XI, § 12 provides:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations and shall
in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.

Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners
complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale
respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully
disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice
to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because
it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the
filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into
account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against
official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because
those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants
are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
8.Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254
CONTENTION
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the
freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a
determinate employment period and a fixed salary package. 32 It also impinges on the equal
protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by
putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal
dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their
dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no
substantial distinction between the two groups;33 and that it defeats Section 18,34 Article II of
the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino
workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.
RULING

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by
workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal
degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the
burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.65

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate,
when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the
classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2)
it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it
applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest;67 b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show
that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is
at least substantially related to serving that interest;68 and c) strict judicial scrutiny69 in which a
legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right70 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class71 is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should
be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right,
or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.
OBITER

Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a
tool of effective judicial intervention.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases
of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to
take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the Philippine
Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a
reasonable measure of equality.

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification
that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford
protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on
the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

xxxx

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative
power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call
for the abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.

INVALID CLASSIFICATION NOT PASOK TO COMPELLING INTEREST BECAUSE THE OSG IS SAYING
THAT THE CLASSIFICATION IS TO MITIGATE THE SOLIDARY LIABLITY OF THE PLACEMENT
AGENCIES WHILE IT DOES NOT TO OTHER SECTORS

the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with
fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category
consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal
dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired
portion of their contracts.

The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the
respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but was awarded his
salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs in Oriental and PCL who
had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were awarded their
salaries for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs involved
in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer period of 3 months out of their 12-month
contracts before being illegally dismissed were awarded their salaries for only 3 months.

To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an
employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical
OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly salary rate of
US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and under the same employer, and were
illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause, OFW-A will be entitled to
US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas
OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the
unexpired portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14
months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.

It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired
portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in
case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their
basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is
less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the
latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

Among OFWs With Employment Contracts of More Than One Year

Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court now has
misgivings on the accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation.

The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By
its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite extent of time. 105 Corollarily,
that "every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways: first, the
unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion
for such unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must be
more than one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not
reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the determination of when the
subject clause "for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
shall apply is not the length of the original contract period as held in Marsaman,106 but the
length of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases
when the unexpired portion of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically
requires that the original contract period be more than one year.

Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs
whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less
than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in
their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to
their salaries for three months only.

To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject clause, the
Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month contract at a salary
rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on
the 13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months remaining in the contract period
of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of the latter's monetary benefits. Thus,
OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months
unexpired portion of the contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's
salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand,
OFW-D is spared from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11 months left in the
latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to
his/her total salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged,
it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-
term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution,
the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it
serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 124 It is akin to the paramount interest of
the state125 for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in
safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, 126 or in maintaining access to
information on matters of public concern.1

9.Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22,2010

COMELEC CONTENTION
The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential
treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on
material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes of the law;
RULING:

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law
and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the
Fair Election Act,17 which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered
ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only
upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected
official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.

These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive
ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The
Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in
any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators
deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on
their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than
those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into
the wisdom of this classification.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people.49 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote.50 Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed
resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
10.Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the
President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1
in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an
"adventure in partisan hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that
of former President Arroyo.67

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and
corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of
controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino
people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the
recognized exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who
abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not
germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption."69 In order to attain
constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with "graft
and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law
with equal force."

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of
right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of
the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to
provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.74

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature.79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for
a valid classification.

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him." 84

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to

preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
11.Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in
the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality."

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
"gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception
leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December
20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced
into subordinate positions, compared with men."

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-
bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence
from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on
the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need
to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the
basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their
respective protocols.
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation
that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically.
12.Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 732 SCRA 22
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling changein the circumstances that would
warrant us to revisit the precedent.

We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by anillegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due
process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced."97 It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications." 99

In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.100

The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.101 A law is void on this
basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection
clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not fall
within the class.103 A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribesa
reasonable classification.104

A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class."105

The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.

In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished

between fixed-period overseas workers and fixedperiod local workers. 106 It also distinguished
between overseas workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas
workers with employment contracts of at least one year. 107 Within the class of overseas workers
with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at
least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when
they were illegally dismissed.108

The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a

"legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." 109

Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection. 110 Thus, this court in Serrano,
"[i]mbued with the same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs."

We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of
illegally terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed in
the same manner.112 Their money claims were computed based onthe "unexpired portions of
their contracts."113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the
money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year
to a cap of three months worth of their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the money
claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term employment. 115

We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a
term of less than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of
their employment contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with
employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their
salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts. 117

Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates a
sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year:
those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled
to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed
with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated clause,
and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only." 118

We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or
substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of
money claims resulting from illegal termination.

We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to
"establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers,
their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes." 124 Further, we find
specious the argument that reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds to the
benefit of the [overseas] workers."
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard
of protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivizedby
the reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more
flexibility to violate our overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating
overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated.
Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job
overseas for the longer contract period disregard other opportunities only to be terminated
earlier. They are left with claims that are less than what others in the same situation would
receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to protect
them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator.

What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant
that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken,
the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is
effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the
law’s intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,from a more practical
and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for
purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .

The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs — the benefits
accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are takenfrom the pockets of
the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong.
Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their
violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser
protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her
by operation of law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal
easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always bea
consideration a foreign employer will take into account in termination of employment
decisions. . . .126

Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates
the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses suchas placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed ofOFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution
commands. The idea thatprivate business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling
state interest is odious."