Queries from Bar takers (18 Aug 2023)

(NOTE: Some answers to the queries are excerpts from my book entitled “Law on Property and
Essentials of Land Registration, 2024 Edition). Please make sure that this will only be for the
Augustinian Bar takers. Thank you. Atty. Reyes III).

1)Re the picture: Did RA 11573 repeal the provision on acquisitive prescription under PD 1529?
(To clarify if the 30-year acquisitive prescription is already abandoned)

2. What is the effect of RA 11573 to the prescriptive periods applicable for quieting of title? (To
clarify if the 30-year prescriptive period in quieting of title is already abandoned)

ANSWER:

(Excerpt of manuscript of “Law on Property and Essentials of

Land Registration” by Reyes III , 2024 Edition).

Illumined by the ruling in Pasig Rizal, the two (2) ways of applying for tilting
under PD 1529 can now be better appreciated. Again, looking at Section 14
(now section 6 under RA 11573), of PD 1529, it can be observed that there
are 3 paragraphs describing who may apply under this law, thus:

SEC. 6. Section 14 of [PD 1529] is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file at any
time, in the proper Regional Trial Court in the province where the land
is located, an application for registration of title to land, not exceeding.
twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their: duly
authorized representatives:

"(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not
covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
this section.

"(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or

abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or accretion under the
provisions of existing laws.

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 "(3) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.

"Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.

Par. 2 of the old PD 1529 (prior to the enactment of RA 11573) which

enunciated that “Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under existing laws”, has been deleted under RA 11573. This
does not mean, though, it is submitted, that acquisitive prescription will not
be available as a legal basis for titling at present.

Par. 1 (of PD 1529), refers to titling where the basis is “confirmation of

imperfect title”.

This ground based on an “imperfect title”, as will be explained in

Chapter 10 on land registration, could be invoked and applied for in either of
two (2) ways: 1)a public grant, ie., through judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title with the DENR. It presupposes that the land being applied for
is public land and the applicant is seeking a state grant or endowment to be
issued in the form of a “patent”; ie., free patent. Or, 2) by filing a petition
for land registration in court, ie., judicial legalization. Either way, the years
of possession required is 20 years.

Pars. 2 and 3 (of PD 1529 as amended by RA 11573) in turn refer to

titling on the basis of “accretion or accession” (under Articles 457 and 440,
NCC, respectively) and “acquisitive prescription” under the Civil Code. As
explained above, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires 10 years of
possession of private land, while in extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
possession must have been for 30 years. (see Articles 1117, 1134 and 1137,
New Civil Code).

Yet Pasig Rizal failed to discuss clearly whether pars. 2 and 3 would
now include acquisitive prescription as a legal basis for a claim of ownership
by private individuals. It is submitted however that what they now imply is
that “private lands” as referred to in paragraph 2 may be acquired by
accretion or accession under the Civil Code, while paragraph 3 which deals
with acquisition of ownership of lands “in any manner allowed by law”, may
include acquisitive prescription. Thus:

ORDINARY v. EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

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 ARTICLE 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real
rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good

faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. (1940a)

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Article 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of
ten years. (1957a)

Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith. (1959a)

Acquisitive prescription therefore, may now be availed by a private

person in reference to lands that are patrimonial properties whether “by
nature” (Article 421, NCC) or “by conversion” (Art. 422, NCC). When the
patrimonial property is “by nature”, the prescriptive period will start to run
as soon as it is declared as “alienable and disposable” land pursuant to
Pasig Rizal. In turn, the prescriptive period for patrimonial property “by
conversion” must conform to the ruling in Malabanan that there must be a
law passed by congress or a presidential proclamation, on top of the same
being declared as alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
without which, prescription will not start to run as the land involved remains
as property of public dominion.

In effect, contrary to some opinions, it is humbly submitted that Pasig

Rizal merely modified Malabanan, and did not totally abandon it.

Thus, in light of the passage of Republic Act No. 11573, proving

entitlement to public lands on the basis of an “imperfect title” or by
“acquisitive prescription” for years of possession required, had become much
easier. It is safe to say that what used to be a tall order of proving first that
both occupation and possession started at the latest on June 12, 1945, and
then it must be continuous, notorious, adverse and under a bona fide claim
of ownership, had been eased up to a mere 20-year possession of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain for those applying under Par. 1 of
Section 14 (now section 6) of PD 1529 as amended by RA 11573, and 10
years or 30 years for those applying under Pars. 2 and 3.

With profound respect, this now opens up two (2) options to choose
from to a private person who is a claimant of patrimonial property:

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(1)invoke 20 years of possession prior to filing of application for titling
pursuant to RA 11573; or, (2) acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code
(10 or 30 years as the case may be).

Comparing the advantages and disadvantages

between RA 11573 and acquisitive prescription
under the Civil Code.

As mentioned earlier, ordinary acquisitive prescription only requires 10

years of possession while extraordinary acquisitive prescription, 30 years.
So by invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription, a claimant may enjoy the
advantage of lesser length of time than RA 11573 which requires 20 years.

Then again, it may not really be so all the time because their
respective reckoning points may differ.

1) RA 11573 refers to a land grant of property of public domain which

expressly became available for private ownership by its declaration
as alienable and disposable. “In Republic v. Roasa, it was clarified
that a possessor or occupant of property may be a possessor in the
concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is
alienable and disposable agricultural land. Thus, the computation of
the period of possession may include the period of adverse
possession prior to the declaration that the land is alienable and
disposable. (Apolinario Valdez et al., v. Heirs of Antero Catabas,
G.R. No 201655, August 24, 2020).

2) ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION (10 years or 30 years).

Although it may be true that when ordinary acquisitive prescription
is availed, it would be advantageous to the claimant/ applicant
because only 10 years of possession is required as opposed to 20
years under RA 11573. However, as held in Pasig Rizal, the
reckoning point for the 10-year period starts not from actual
possession, but from the declaration that the land is A & D. Thus:
“This final proviso unequivocally confirms that the classification of
land as alienable and disposable immediately places it within the
commerce of man, and renders it susceptible to private acquisition
through adverse possession”.

In sum, under RA 11573, the period of possession may be counted

from actual possession by the claimant/ applicant even if the land involved
is still of public dominion at the start of the possession for so long as at any
time before the filing of the application for titling under RA 11573, the same
is declared as A and D which converts the land into patrimonial property.

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 By contrast, when the legal basis is acquisitive prescription, the period
is only counted from the time when land of public dominion is declared as A
and D and not anterior to that precisely because as held in Pasig Rizal, it is
such declaration that the land is A & D that expressly makes it “susceptible
to private acquisition through adverse possession”.

Yet it must be underlined that sheer possession of any kind that does
not resemble the one envisaged by law will never ripen into ownership. (see
Republic v. Spouses Guillermo Alonso and Inocencia Britanico-Alonso, G.R.
No. 210738, 14 August 2019). This now gives clarity to those land cases
filed for ejectment or reconveyance, claiming both possession and ownership
on the basis of tax declarations. It must be emphasized that a claim of
ownership and other entitlements to land anchored solely on mere
possession, without more, no matter how long, will not serve as basis for
ownership or possessory rights in favor of the claimant.

Filing cases therefore on such tenuous grounds, it is submitted, will

not accomplish much if not that such cases are doomed to fail. This is
because the applicant or claimant’s failure to overcome the overwhelming
presumption of state ownership by being able to pinpoint a law where their
claim is hinged on, will mean that the Regalian Doctrine will prevail.
(Excerpt of manuscript of “Law on Property and Essentials of Land
Registration” by Reyes III , 2024 Edition).

3. When does the curative effect of RA 11573 apply?

Ans: RA 11573 applies to all pending applications for titling such that even as to those which are
on appeal, the period of OCEN possession shall be reduced to 20 years and the reckoning point
will no longer be “June 12, 1945 or earlier”, but “20 years prior to the filing of the application
for titling”.

4. ABC Corp. purchased a parcel of land from Mr. X prior to the effectivity of RA 11573. At the
time of the sale, the land has been OCEN possessed by Mr. X for more than 20 years but he has
not filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Will the passage of RA 11573
and the subsequent application of Mr. X cure the defect of the sale?

Ans: Yes. Please note that pursuant to the ruling in Pasig Rizal, for as long as the land is A & D,
and pursuant to the “prior-state-use doctrine”, if the land was never used for public use or public
service, then it becomes susceptible to acquisition by OCEN possession. So, in this sense, RA
11573 can be given a retroactive application. ABC Corp. can apply for titling based on the
OCEN possession of Mr. X, the predecessor-in-interest. The facts are akin to Pasig Rizal.

This was explained in Rep. v Pasig Rizal,

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Thus,

To be sure, the curative nature of RA 11573 can easily be discerned from its declared purpose, that is, "to
simplify, update and harmonize similar and related provisions of land laws in order to simplify and remove
ambiguity in its interpretation and implementation." Moreover, by shortening the period of adverse possession
required for confirmation of title to twenty (20) years prior to filing (as opposed to possession since June 12,
1945 or earlier), the amendment implemented through Section 6 of RA 11573 effectively created a new right in
favor of those who have been in possession of alienable and disposable land for the shortened period
provided. The retroactive application of this shortened period does not impair vested rights, as RA 11573
simply operates to confirm the title of applicants whose ownership already existed prior to its enactment.

5. Question: You are a Family Court judge and before you is a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage(Under Article 36 of the FC) filed by Maria against Neil. Maria claims that Neil is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
because Neil is a drunkard, a womanizer, a gambler, and a mama’s boy-traits that she never
knew when Neil was courting her. Although summoned, Neil did not answer Maria’s petition
and never appeared in court. To support her petition, Maria presented three witnesses—
herself,Dr. Elsie Chan , and Ambrosia. Dr. Chan testified on the psychological report of Neil that
she prepared. Since Neil never acknowledged nor responded to her invitation for interviews, her
report is solely based on her interviews with Maria and the spouses’ minor children . Dr. Chan
concluded that Neil is suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, an ailment that she found
to be already present since Neil’s early adulthood and one that is grave and incurable. Maria
testified on the specific instances when she found Neil drunk, with another woman, or
squandering the family’s resources in a casino. Ambrosia, the spouses’ current household help,
corroborated Maria’s testimony. On the basis of the evidence presented, will you grant the
petition?

We would like to ask Sir, if kung ano nga case ang applicable , Sir, kay some of us used Tan-
Andal v Andal (that is highlighted in the bar syllabus) and the others used Pugoy-Solidum v
Republic of the Philippines( case decided by Hernando in 2022), which have contradictory
rulings with each other but somewhat the same facts.

Ans:

Jurisprudence leans towards the doctrine that the examination of the psychologically
incapacitated spouse is not required. Pugoy-Solidum does not contradict Tan-Andal.

In Pugoy-Solidum, the SC found that the “factual bases” meaning the interviews with witnesses
were insufficient to support a conclusion that psychological incapacity existed. It is the lack of
good quality interviews and inadequate competence of interviewees that were in question.

Pugoy-Solidum does not contradict Tan-Andal. Indeed, even if the respondent spouse is not
interviewed, for so long as the interviews with petitioner and her witnesses are sufficient, there
can be a finding of existence of psychological incapacity. In fact, (see below), as held in Georfo,
the interviews with petitioner and her own sister, were deemed sufficient because the sister lived
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with the spouses for a while prior to the marriage. Hence, juridical antecedence was established
by the testimonies of petitioner and her sister.

The latest cases are Asejo (2023) and Georfo (2023).

Courts must be sensitized to the power dynamics in the family.

Our courts should be sensitized to the power dynamics in a family setting, specifically between
the husband and the wife. When we routinely categorize a husband's refusal to be gainfully
employed and support his family as plain "immaturity" or "irresponsibility" and shrug it off, as in
this case, we perpetuate the unequal and discriminatory gender imbalance in the spouses'
relationship. Constancia came to court for relief from the "immature" and "irresponsible"
behavior of Justiniano, which has taken a fatal toll on their married life. And yet, instead of such
relief, she was told that Justiniano's immaturity and irresponsibility must be tolerated and merely
accepted. Even as courts ought to uphold marriage as an inviolable social institution, so must
courts be ready to sever marital bonds upon a clear showing of psychological incapacity that
impedes a meaningful and nurturing partnership of equals. No incompatibility exists between
these bounden duties, as ultimately the institution of marriage is safeguarded when those who
partake in it are truly fit to discharge its attendant obligations. (Constancia Javate-Asejo v.
Justiniano Zantua Asejo and Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247798. January 18,
2023).

Psychological incapacity; psychiatric examination is not required.

Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not an illness which has to be medically or
clinically identified. Therefore, psychiatric examination is no longer required in Article 36
petitions. In cases where a psychiatric report is offered as an expert's opinion, the
psychiatric evaluation of the alleged incapacitated spouse is not indispensable. The
psychiatric evaluation may be based on collateral information or other sources.(Agnes
Padrique Georfo v. Republic of the Philippines and Joe-Ar Jabian Georfo, G.R. No. 246933.
March 6, 2023).

Psychiatric evaluation of alleged incapacitated spouse is not indispensable.

During trial, Dr. Andres Gerong (Dr. Gerong), a clinical psychologist, was presented as a
witness. Dr. Gerong conducted psychological interviews with Agnes and her sister, Cherry
Mae P. Valencia (Cherry Mae). He notified Joe-Ar of the psychological evaluation but he did
not respond. X x x
While the testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist is no longer required in psychological
incapacity cases, Dr. Garcia was presented as an expert in psychiatry. In coming up with the
interpretation, she conducted a psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination,
which are established principal techniques in psychiatric disorder diagnosis. It would have been
ideal to have Mario undergo a psychological evaluation, but in cases where the person is not
available, incapable, or refuses to be examined, "it is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base
a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from

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the person evaluated.(Agnes Padrique Georfo v. Republic of the Philippines and Joe-Ar
Jabian Georfo, G.R. No. 246933. March 6, 2023).