La filosofia analitica del linguaggio, Il paradigma dominante in semantica

Teoria dei linguaggio Unit 2

Analitical Phylosophy of language.
Developed entirely in the twentith century (1982, Fregue). It isnt identificated with a set of thesis on certain
philosophycal problems but whit a philosophical style, method:
·Attetion to clasifying the meaning of tge terms used search for argument rigous.
·Use of counter~examples to falsify thesis
·Recouse to the assumptions of common sense and tge results of science and mathermatics
·Use of fromal logic tools
Phylosophy of language and linguistics.
The relationship of this one still very close. The FDL has developed theories and developed problems that
were then transmited to linguistics.
Differences: ·The FDL deals mainly with the problems of meaning, which is only a part of the linguistic and
also the least developed one.
·The FDL looks not only at natural language and its concrete uses but also at formal languages.
·The FDL Has discurssed basic theoretical options converning the nature od the linguistics often give on
assumptions.

The Origins of the analitical Phylosophy of language

Many authors at the origins of the FDL shared the idea (now no longer shared) that reflection on language had
a central role in philosophy. R. Rorty (1967) spoke in this regard, for the English-speaking philosophy of the
first half of the last century, of a linguistic philosophy that realises the linguistic turning point.
• Central idea of linguistic philosophyPHI philosophical problems are language problems.
• Two ways in which this idea was developed:
1) Philosophy of ideal languageFG. Frege, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus), R.
Carnap.

2) Philosophy of ordinary language F L. Wittgenstein (Philosophical research), J.L. Austin, P. Strawson, P.

Grice.

The Phylosophy of ideal language

Philosophical problems arise from the imperfections of ordinary language F vagueness, ambiguity, masking
of the logical form of the utterances by their grammatical form. These problems are dissolved by replacing
this language with an artificial language in which these problems cannot even be formulated or reformulated
as normal scientific problems. The dominant paradigm originates from some ideas of the philosophers of ideal
language while rejecting the thesis that ordinary language is not subject to rigourous study.

The Phylosophy of ordinary Language

Philosophical problems ultimately concern the meaning of certain words (eg "truth", "justice", "knowledge")
and the analysis of language serves to solve these problems, in the sense that it is at least a necessary first step
to solve them. Pragmatics is born within the philosophy of ordinary language.

Formal Semantics
DOMINANT PARADIGM (Marconi 1999) = set of theses on the meaning and its study that are at the origin
of the philosophy of contemporary language and that dominated semantics until the second half of the
twentieth century. The dominant paradigm finds its greatest development in FORMAL SEMANTICS, a
discipline that develops since the late 1960s with D. Davidson (1917-2003) and R. Montague (1930-1971).
• Centre idea of formal semantics: Some theories and concepts developed by authors such as Frege, Russell,
Tarski, Wittgenstein in relation to the study of formal languages can also be applied to the study of natural
languages (while according to the aforementioned authors at the origin of the paradigm only formal languages
could be the subject of rigourous study)
This application will allow the construction of a rigourous semantic theory for natural language.

The central thesis of the dominant paradigm

 1) Conditions and significant of truth: Truth contitions is not Truth value. Knowldge of truth conditions
must be distinguised from th knowledge of the value of truth
2) The principle of compositionalyty: The meaning of a complex expression is determinated by rhat od
its constitunent expressions ans uts syntatuc structure. • If we add to the principle of compositionality
the idea, shared in the dominant paradigm, that the meaning of simple expressions (words) is
completely determined by their form and linguistic conventions, it follows that:
The meaning of an utterance, that is, its truth conditions, can be calculated using only linguistic
information (lexic + syntax)The information on the extralingual context in which an utterance is used
is irrelevant (or only marginally relevant) for the purpose of determining its truth conditions.
Thesis that will be criticised by that alternative approach to the dominant paradigm called
"Contextualism".
This thesis is a consequence of the previous two.
Semantic value: the meaning of a sub-pronouncement expression (which is part of an utterance) is identified
with the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of the statements in which it appears (called "semantic
value" of the expression).
In fact, if
1) the meaning of a statement is given by its Conditions of truth (first thesis) and

2) this meaning is determined by the meanings of the constituent expressions and by the syntactic structure of
the sentence (second thesis), then

3)the meaning of these expressions must be identified with the way in which they contribute to the truthful
conditions of the statement.

Referential Theorie vs Intensional Theorie.

• REFENTIAL THEORIES (Wittgenstein del Tractatus, Russell, Tarski, Davidson, Kripke): the expressions
refer directly to an object, their reference / denotation is the meaning of an expression ends in its reference.

• INTENSIONAL THEORIES (Frege, Carnap, Montague): the expressions refer to their reference in a
mediated way, that is, by virtue of a representation / concept / rule to which they are associated (sense /
intention) and which determines what the reference is.

Antimentalism
This thesis and the following are partly of a methodological natureThey express two ideas about how meaning
should not (the first) and should (the second) be studied. Anti-mentalism (antipsychologicalism): the meanings
of expressions are not mental entities. Therefore, the study of the mental elaboration of such expressions, and
more generally any psychological consideration, is irrelevant to the theory of meaning.

Anti-mentalism Frege's argument

Frege offers the following argument in support of anti-mentalism
Subject
If the meaning were a mental representation (which F. identifies with a mental image) then linguistic
expressions would have a different meaning for each one (the different mental image that each associates with
the expression). But the meaning of linguistic expressions is objective (shared by all speakers) and the
possibility of communication is based on this. The meanings are therefore extramental entities that the human
mind merely grasps Þ third kingdom in addition to that of physical objects and mental representations.