The Seventeenth Century Crisis: Historiographical Debates

-Aishwarya Mukhopadhyay

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Introduction

The idea behind a ‘seventeenth century crisis’ is not new, for even during the contemporary time,
people like John Goodwin (1642) commented how it was a period of discord. The mid-seventeenth
century, Voltaire concluded, constituted “a period of usurpations almost from one end of the world to
the other’; and he pointed not only to Cromwell in Europe but also to Muley-Ismail in Morocco,
Aurangzeb in India and Li Tsu-Cheng in China.”1

The period of 17th century has been a topic for debate and discussion for a very long time. Primarily
there are three parts to the debates: the nature of the crisis, the time period of the crisis, and if there
was a crisis at all. The crisis has roughly four dimensions: economic, political, socio-cultural and
climatic. Recent writing has also shown how this crisis actually took the shape of a worldwide crisis,
affecting east and south Asia. But this also remains hotly debated.

In this essay we shall be looking into the main facets behind the crisis by studying the different
scholars who have contributed to the literature surrounding the debate.

E. Hobsbawm: A General Crisis of the European Economy

In 1954 E. J. Hobsbawm published his essay "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century" in the English
Journal Past & Present. A Marxist historian and scholar of English history, Hobsbawm saw a general
crisis of European economy, marked by a break from the feudal culture. To him, it was a crisis in the
mode of production in the last stage of transition from feudalism to capitalism, the latter marked by
the Industrial Revolution. Hobsbawm points to the general argument of regression- citing the decline
of Italy, Spain and Germany, and advance of the “Maritime Powers”- England, Netherlands, Sweden
and Russia. For England, he specifically mentions it to be a “decisive advance”2

Population declined with the exception of Netherlands, “Spain was a by-word for depopulated”, while
English population slumped after 1630s. Morality rate was higher and areas were deindustrialised.
There was thus, a general commercial crisis- the Baltic and Mediterranean declined, as did the volume
of trade, and it is unlikely he argues that homegrown industries made up for this scarcity. The
expansion of Europe also passed through a crisis- the Spanish and Portuguese empire contracted, there
was the collapse of the Dutch West Indian Company and the English Africa Company.

This was also the time of social revolt- from France’s Fronde rebellions to Catalan, Neapolitan and
Portuguese revolutions, maritime and peasant unrest in Bordeaux and Brittany, the Ukrainian
revolution and the Bohemian peasant uprising of 1680 bear testimony to the fact. Also, absolutism
brought with it its own woes. The whole business was now officially controlled by government, and
Hobsbawm argues that the pomp and splendour of the age distracted the people from the more
pressing problems.

The only immunity of states from this crisis was if they had undergone a bourgeois revolution. By
comparing the price history, Hobsbawm argues that the crisis began about I620; perhaps with the
slump period from I619 into the early I620s. The only signs of revival outweigh those of crisis in the
Maritime States but it was the period of great fluctuations- constant “boom and depression”.

1
Parker, Geoffrey and Smith Leslie M. (ed.) “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century”, Pp. 4
2
Hobsbawm, Eric. “The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century”, Pp. 34
Capitalism during the 17th century is generally described as a parasite operating under the constraints
of a feudal apparatus. Hobsbawm held that if capitalism is to rise, feudal or agrarian society must be
revolutionized. There must be enough capital to furnish investment and there must be enough labour
power to increase production, and these changes must also be manifested in the colonial system.
However, peasants and much of the general population rarely used money except when dealing with
the state. Under the self-sustaining localized agrarian economies of feudalism, there are an insufficient
number of buyers of mass produced goods. This makes mass production uneconomical and thus
capitalistic profits impossible. Mercantilist enterprise business adapts itself to operating in this feudal
framework, accepting its limitations and the peculiar demand for its services and becomes parasitic.3
But trade could, even under feudal conditions, produce large enough aggregate profits to give rise to
large-scale production, if it was properly organised in concentrated pockets, yet the growth of markets
was slim.
He argues that in the case of Italy, it was primarily due to the diversion of resources that led to Italy’s
ruin, as did the lack of trade- the Italian people did not have the buying capacity for luxury textiles,
and hence, trade declined. In eastern Europe, there was the contradiction- feudalism was strengthened,
while the peasants were transformed into “less of a cash customer”4, and there was a decline among
the minor nobility as well. The overseas colonies were also stuck in the trap of bullionism, and the
Americas exported more than they imported. In Europe, export was not expanded due to mercantilist
policies, and when the single bonus of bullion was exhausted, it led to decline and an economic crisis.
Within Europe, the homegrown industries remained underdeveloped, and no revolt targeted or led to
specialisation of labour. There was not much technological innovation, and during the period of
diminishing returns, the population could not protect itself, either from landlords or from the grips of
famine. There was also the rise in labour costs, which however, did not affect them positively, given
the scenario of scarcity.
There were two obstacles in the way of Industrial Revolution in the 17th century- one, that the social
and economic structure was not developed enough, and two, simply the presence of labour and
specialisation did not lead to this result, as seen in Birmingham. The I7th century crisis resulted in a
considerable concentration of economic power. Directly and indirectly this concentration served the
ends of future industrialization, due to mercantilist policies. The economic concentration took place in
various forms, in East and West, under conditions of expansion, contraction or stagnation.
Administrative measures like the Prussian excise might intensify this process but were not wholly
responsible for it.
This crisis aids the Industrial Revolution in two ways. First, the resulting economic concentration in
the state sped the process of capital accumulation that favoured the `putting-out' industry at the
expense of craft production5 and second, it helped solve the problem of providing surplus agricultural
goods by creating a market that led peasant farmers to adopt higher yield per acre crops. Hence, for
Hobsbawm, the crisis provided its own solution by forcing a change in production methods, increased
capital investment to answer needs of colonial system and war production, and the creation of a
regional `home market' among the north-western Atlantic states.
Alexandra Lublinskaya challenges many of the premises of Hobsbawm’s arguments. Lublinskaya
argues that while levels of accumulated capital were probably less than optimal, there were avenues
one could pursue to overcome this barrier. There were a large number of commercial and industrial
companies to finance and invest in businesses requiring large sums of capital. Thus, apparatuses for
acquiring large sums of capital to enable capitalistic enterprise did exist prior to the 17th century.
However even if it is a given that there was an inadequate concentration of capital in prior to the 17th
century to establish capitalism, Hobsbawm still fails to demonstrate how the crisis affected to use of
capital. Lublinskaya shows that there was a concentration of disperse manufactures in Germany, Spain
and especially France who had already established large scale manufacturing using division of labour

3
Ibid. Pp. 40
4
Ibid. Pp. 44
5
Hobsbawm, Eric. “The Crisis of the 17th Century—II”, Pp. 50
since the early 16th century. Hence, it can hardly be said that conditions for growth of capitalism was
missing in the 17th century.
Hugh Trevor Roper: A crisis in institutions
Hugh Trevor-Roper responded to Hobsbawm’s idea of a general economic crisis and though he
accepted the idea of a general crisis, he perceived it differently. To Trevor-Roper in his 1959 essay,
‘The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’, he addresses the problem to be of a more political
nature. He criticised Hobsbawm for not basing his arguments on solid evidence and said that it was
too English-centric, calling the idea of a “bourgeois capitalist” revolution, a mere “priori hypothesis”6.
Trevor-Roper argues that though the sixteenth century did see discord, the revolutions it saw, namely
the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, were less profound than those of the coming centuries.
There is not much change in society he cites, “Aristocratic monarchical society is unbroken”7 and
marked by lack of technological innovation. However, a distinctive feature is the rise of princes in the
16th century, which led to the rise of the “Renaissance Court” and governance, marked by the decline
eclipse of European cities. This was also the age of economic expansion, marked by capturing
colonies and formation of allies.
This differs in the 17th century, which did not “absorb these revolutions”, it marks the end of the
Renaissance, and the beginning of the “years of change”. To Trevor-Roper, the real problem lies in the
defects of the social structure- the structural weaknesses of the western monarchies. Contemporaries
saw it as a political revolution, the struggle between the Crown and the Estates. This is demonstrated
heavily in Spain. France, Germany, England, Denmark and Sweden.
Renaissance State: An important feature is the idea of the Renaissance state to Trevor-Roper, where
one finds the growth in number of courtiers and lesser officials. These officials usually received small
customary payments, a “trivial fee”8, leaving most of them free to do corrupt activities, what he calls
“casual profits”. These casual profits increased with time, and every time new offices were created,
there was a new burden on the subjects. For example, Queen Elizabeth preferred giving her courtiers
leases (with the right to exploit) than cash as salaries. Hence, even if taxes were low, there was no
choice but to tax peasants more, like the King of France obliged his peasants to buy more salt than
needed to raise his yield from the gabelle. The Church as well had become bureaucratic, aggravated
by the Counter-Reformation.9
17th century: Thus the 17th century was marked by an increase in the number of costly officials- offices
were sold to the highest bidder and the purchaser sought to raise profits by extracting from the
country, increasing the “margin of waste”10. These costs were further aggravated by war, like the
Thirty Years War, however, the nobility and Crown continued to lead lavish lives11.
In 1620, there was a political crisis in Prague, resuming the war of Philip II, bringing in new forms of
tax and exploitation. There was a great depression, the “universal decay of trade of 1620”. On top of
that, there was a hatred for the Court, courtiers, the bureaucracy, and towards Puritanism, by the
general masses. Most states adopted austere rules, like the Archbishop forbade long hair in Oxford, in
1624, Philip II of Spain passed sumptuary laws and banished the ruff.
There were also differences in society- in England, the cost of the Court fell most heavily on the
gentry, who were the tax-paying class, while in France, the nobles were exempted from taxes, and it
6
Trevor-Roper, Hugh. “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, The Reformation and Social Change”,
Pp. 50
7
Ibid. Pp. 46
8
Ibid. Pp. 57
9
The Church, it was said, was burdened with absentee clergy, tithe eating laity, a swollen number of
ecclesiastical officers, and parasitic lessees who lived happily on ‘‘beneficial leases’’ of Church lands, thus
reducing taxes on Church land.
10
Trevor-Roper, Hugh. “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, The Reformation and Social Change”,
Pp. 63
11
Ibid. Pp 64
was the peasants who bore the brunt of taxes. The revolt of the tax-paying classes was also seen in
Cortes, Spain by the arbitrsitas. Essentially, there were demands for emancipation from the burden of
the peasantry, abolition of hereditary offices, reduction of fees. This was also the time where identities
got mixed up -men who deemed themselves part of the “country” found themselves to be part of the
“Court”.
The Renaissance courts knew that to survive, they had to cut down on their bureaucracy and
strengthen their mercantilist programme- thus, we see the rise of a national economy, marked by
limited imports and controlled prices of food and labour. There was investment in capacity building of
the lower strata- local education, creating skilled workers at the base of society, and there was an
attempt to reduce Academies in France, monasteries in Spain.
In Spain, however, there was not much effort made to reform the existing machinery of the state,
rather they continued to be exploited. Though taxes were tried to redistributed, rate of taxes did not
decrease. In Netherlands however, there was economic reform, the social problem of tax-heavy state
apparatus was purged, and Amsterdam became the “new Venice in the north”. In France, there was the
rise of absolutism and of Colbert. The Fronde rebellions had “burnt up the overgrown patronage of the
great nobles” and the Court. It saw some administrative changes at this time, systemising the sale of
offices, however under Colbert and Richelieu, the state continued its mercantilist policies. In England,
Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury and Francis Bacon did try to curb the bureaucracy, but to no avail. The
system had actually grown. The English economy encouraged formation of capital and investment and
paid less attention to the base of the society. In the 1640s, there were revived efforts to curb the
“waste”, and hence the “triumphant enemies of the English court were simply the country” folk, who
rebelled against the parasitic bureaucracy.
Thus, the revolts were actually against a dynamic absolutism, marked by its oppressive taxation,
violation of customary laws, threatening to disrupt social balance of the population.
Mousnier: A crisis affecting all Mankind
For Mousnier the 17th century crisis was actually the crisis of culture. He argues that the participation
of the nobility in the peasant revolts of the Fronde refutes Trevor-Roper’s arguments. To Mousnier,
there is a difference between the high-level bureaucrats and the lower moderate officials. The Fronde
is not the critical moment in early modern France but instead the French Wars of Religion of the late
sixteenth century. For him too, it was less an economic crisis but one involving changes in the social
framework. For Mousnier the crisis affected all Mankind. The crisis was permanent with fluctuations
and shifts. There was contention among the nobility and the bourgeois, while the masses were faced
with food shortages, and are hence, revolting.
The powers in Europe as well are declining, especially the power of the Pope, the Habsburgs and there
is the rise of expansionist France. There is a general discord for the Church is also facing trouble,
science is uncertain and is reflected in the arts by the baroque style which expresses this discord. “The
struggle against this general crisis fails: all sober forms of government organization, of systems of
thought such as Cartesianism or of soberness of style as in Classicism, of international ideas regarding
balance of power and international law were unable to check the crisis. This period therefore also ends
in crisis: economic depression, lengthy, expensive wars, new uncertainty in thought and faith.”
Elliott: Questioning the crisis
Elliott disagrees with Trevor Roper regarding the issue of Court and Country, by arguing that Spain
spent a lot of resources on war and navies than on Court and offices- there was no parasitic
bureaucracy and the burden lay on the taxpayers of Castille. The revolts of 1640 were due to Count
Duke Olivare’s extension of taxes to areas beyond Castille. With reference to Spain, Elliot argues that
the decline of Spain is due to loss in population, productivity and overseas wealth. There was
widespread migration due to plague and expulsion of moriscos led to decline in the tax-paying group.
Thus, it was not the tension between Court and Country but a series of unwise economic decisions
leading to exploitation of tax payers and decrease in productive investment that led to the decline of
Spain. He also claims that the ‘crisis’ in Spain was actually in the 1560s, and hence he dates back the
crisis theory by nearly a century.
Christopher Hill: Characterising the crisis
Christopher Hill in the Introduction of the Trevor Aston edited volume also comments on the general
crisis of the 17th century. He traces out the recent historiographical debate, stating that most of the
historians have tried to give causal reasons for the phenomenon. However, many countries also
reacted to the crisis in religious forms, and inherently there was a difference between religion and
society. Hill points out the features of the 17th century crisis. To him they are:
● An economic and political crisis affecting western and central Europe
● There were different reactions to the crisis, and these differences are varied and hence, worth
studying
● The national circumstances should be analysed in terms of the social and political structures
and religious institutions and beliefs
● The crisis impacted different regions differently- in Netherlands and England, there were
revolts leading to significant political changes while the effects on France and Sweden
represent a “halfway house”.12
● The history of Netherland or England, differs from that in France, Spain or Italy because of
the choices made which led to successful or abortive revolts respectively
● Thus, Hill advocates this method of comparative analysis as it comes as near as it can to
scientific laboratory testing
Geoffrey Parker: Role of climate
Geoffrey Parker, of the Annales school, in the Introduction of the edited volume by The General
Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, discusses how certain periods in history contain examples of
widespread crisis. Parker believes that the answer to the causes of the crisis can be found in the
climatic conditions of the period. He cites the work of John Eddy, who worked on the Maunder
Minimum- the scarcity of sunspots during the late 17th century. This is corroborated by contemporary
accounts of astronomers, like John Hevelius, G. D. Cassini and John Flamsteed. Recent research on
glacier movements and harvest dates in Europe has shown that harvests in the mid-17th century
occurred far later than normal and suggests long winters and excessive rain as the principal culprits.

This change in climate leads to the lingering of snow in Central Asia, and westerly winds blow
eastwards, what is known as El-Nino, affecting Ethiopia, northwest India and Europe. The
temperatures decline in the Northern Hemisphere while the fall in this temperature triggers extreme
climatic events. Le Roy Ladurie’s talks about the Maunder Minimum and the climate thesis. He
connected climatic anomalies with political upheavals in France and England between 1648 and 1650.

Also, measurements of carbon show that there was an increase in carbon at this time, associated with
reduction un solar energy. This phenomenon was not just seen in Europe, but evidence of it is also
found in Korea, China, Vietnam and India. A fall of one-degree Celsius in overall temperature led to
the ‘Little Ice Age’, restricting growth of vegetation. According to F. Braudel, 80-90% of the
population depended on crop yields and this goes on to show that the decline in production led to food
scarcity, increased morality due to diseases and migration.13
Economists have termed this as a ‘high-level equilibrium trap’, due to equal input and output, a stage
of stagnation is reached, as pointed out by Steensgaard. As for the population, in the late 16th century,
population drifted from towns to cities, and migrations generally led to an increased size of the cities,
like in Madrid and London. The literature interestingly conveys a sense of fear towards these
migrants. Epidemics also caused huge loss to the populations, removing almost 20 to 30% of the total
population. In many cases harvest failure also precipitated industrial and commercial crises, for the

12
Aston, Trevor. (ed.) “Crisis in Europe: 1560-1660”, Pp 3
13
Parker, Geoffrey and Smith Leslie M. (ed.) “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century”, Pp. 9
sharp rise in food prices led to a falling demand for manufactured goods, which in turn led to
widespread unemployment among wage earners. Many families therefore lost their main source of
income just as the price of essential items escalated.
There were thus many popular strikes- 374 revolts were seen in the 17th century14. Rebels tended to
target grievances that could, in theory, be redressed —the policies and demands of government—and
the commonest victims of the rioters were normally the officials who tried to enforce those policies,
especially tax-collectors.

Parker connects the climatic reason and political crisis and says that much of southern Portugal
rebelled in 1637 when drought forced the price of bread to unprecedented heights, there were popular
revolts spread throughout Catalonia in spring 1640 as prolonged drought threatened catastrophic
harvest failure, as well as in Osaka. Three disastrous harvests preceded the Irish Rebellion in 1641;
the catastrophic harvests of 1647 and 1648 helped to precipitate major revolts in Sicily, central Italy,
Poland, and Russia; while the harvest of 1650 was the worst of the century in Sweden, creating the
backdrop for near-revolution when the Estates of the kingdom met in Stockholm.

The price inflation also meant that few soldiers could be employed and hence, few governments could
wage war. Thus, as Ogilvie points out, there was a need to redistribute the taxation burden to increase
revenue and there thus developed a resistance to the new taxation policies. There was also religious
tension as there were a lot of reforms made during this time like the Russian Orthodox Church
underwent a liturgical reform in the 1640s and 1650s.

Niels Steensgaard: Interrelating the crisis

Niels Steensgaard divides the crisis of the 17th century into four parts based on the previous research
conducted in his 1970 article ‘The Seventeenth Century Crisis’:
● A general economic crisis
● A general political crisis
● A crisis in the development of capitalism
● A crisis encompassing all mankind
There is also another kind of argument posed wherein the very idea of crisis is doubted by scholars
like A.D. Lublinskaya, and writers like Ivo-Schoffer have also doubted a general crisis given the
Dutch ‘Golden Age’.
The economic crisis has many facets to it, and statistical data available needs to be revaluated with
more care and precision. According to him, population was declining, not due to a low morality rate,
but due to low birth rate- primarily because the mindset of people was changing. There was deliberate
family planning- the “most important variable in this respect is women’s age on first entering
marriage, but the number of pregnancies within marriage also shows fluctuations, which must be the
outcome of decisions founded upon either economic considerations or ‘mentalités collectives’.”15
Agriculturally speaking, the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War brought rising prices, which continued
in Denmark, France and northern Italy until the 1620s, in Germany and Holland until the 1630s and in
England, Belgium and Austria until the 1640s. Prices thereafter were low all over Europe until the
middle of the eighteenth century, although in Germany a tendency to rise can be demonstrated
somewhat earlier. He cites Silcher van Bath who shows decline in the yield ratio in Germany in the
second half of the sixteenth century; in England, Germany, France and eastern Europe in the first half
of the seventeenth century; and in England, France, Germany and Scandinavia in the second half of
the seventeenth century. Also, after the middle of the seventeenth century, there was a considerable
reduction in the export of corn from the Baltic region.

14
Parker, Geoffrey and Smith Leslie M. (ed.) “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century”, Pp. 11
15
Ibid. Pp. 35
With regard to industries Steensgaard takes up different sections like woollen textiles and says that the
earlier sectors did decline in the 17th century, but this was primarily in the late 17th century. For
example, Dutch textile exports continued to increase till 1640s. The actual figures of decline stem in
from the late 17th century in Italy and Spain. Thus, there were fluctuations, but at different times, and
two factors marking a qualitative shift were of great importance according to him- the conversion to
rural industry, and the change-over to the production of lighter textile materials.
Steensgaard points out that there was thriving trade in England and Netherlands- trade declined
primarily in Spain. According to P. Channu the peak was reached in 1608, the thirteen-year moving
average culminated in 1614–15, and thereafter there was a drop until the middle of the century in the
annual tonnage dispatched to a level somewhat below half of the maximum. There are signs of a trade
depression in the Baltic only from about the middle of the century. Trade with Asia continued though
there was some decline from 1620-50. Thus, it was not a crisis of production, but that of distribution,
due to the state-imposed levies.
In the public sector, if one reckons protection to be a service, in the economic-theoretical meaning of
the word, the whole question of a seventeenth-century crisis falls to the ground. Never before was
Spain so thoroughly protected as under Philip IV, or Germany during the Thirty Years’ War. The
production of protection was the seventeenth century’s ‘leading sector’.16 Thus, by interrelating these
factors, Steensgaard concludes that there was an economic crisis which affected only states at certain
points only.
The political aspect, was actually marked by a dynamic growth of absolutism. He disagrees with
Trevor-Roper’s Court-Country dualism and argues that the common feature of all the states at this
point were the growing rate of taxes- it was taxes that disrupted the social order.17 He cites Mousnier
who wrote about the increasing taxation policies and how it reached a breaking point for the
peasantry. Even the Russian historian Porshnev agrees and adds that the wars were a governmental red
herring concealing their true function: the subjugation of the exploited classes. Thus, absolutism was
an institution for the repression of the peasantry in the interest of the upper classes. Scholars like Lane
thus, see the governemtn as a violent organisation and van Klaren shows how corruption was actually
a part and parcel of the ‘ancien régime’.
Steensgaard in another article ‘The Seventeenth-Century Crisis and the Unity of Eurasian History’
sees Europe as a “gestalt of interdependent states and regions”18. He argues that the crisis in Europe
was actually not simlply limited there, but also in different parts of East and South Asia, citing the
work of William Atwell. J. F. Richards argues that in the early 1630s, there was a “well-documented
and unusually severe” shortage and mortality in Gujarat and Deccan regions of India. Perlin advocates
that even Asia (India, China) and West Africa was included in this gestalt along with Europe. F.
Braudel argues that the demographic development in China and Europe showed similar trends
between the 14th and 17th century. Even fiscal systems from Europe to Japan seemed to be under strain
in this period- Ming China developed an excellent system of taxation, but administrative laxity and
corruption led to failure in implementation. Thus, according to Steensgaard, these observations can be
linked together as symptoms of political and economic crisis.
The Divergent school led by K. Pomeranz believe that there is no divergence between the West and
East till the 1800s. Europe’s rise was actually accidental due to colonial exploitation, the economy of
the east was actually at par. The idea of a general crisis also cannot be applied, what is more feasible
according to Pomeranz is studies in the studies in the local shift in the economy.

Peter Kriedte: Demographic trends

16
Parker, Geoffrey and Smith Leslie M. (ed.) “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century”, Pp. 44
17
Ibid. Pp 46
18
Steensgaard, Niels. “The Seventeenth-Century Crisis and the Unity of Eurasian History”, Pp. 685
For Peter Kriedte the demographic decline showed both- a Malthusian as well as a social crisis. The
growing population during the 16th century had put heavy pressure on the fixed ceiling of agricultural
output. According to Thomas Malthus, in a natural economy, population has a natural growth rate and
increases geometrically while the natural resources necessary to support the population grows
arithmetically. This results in a crisis till it is resolved with a drop-in population. The impact of
demographic factors had long term consequences on family life and birth patterns. The earlier growth
of population seems to have created problems of food supply and shortage of food brought about a
change in the reproductive behaviour of people. Thus, the average marrying age of women rose, for
example in Colyton in England from 27.1 in 1600-49 to 19.4 in 1700. Similar trends were reflected in
Geneva as well. This prevented an increase in the gap between the size of the population and the
availability of food- leading to deterioration of the overall economic situation, enabling landlords to
appropriate larger portions of agricultural income.
Ivo-Schoffer: Debating the extent of the crisis
The Dutch scholar Ivo-Schoffer in his article ‘Did Holland’s Golden Age Coincide with a Period of
Crisis’ points out that while there is agreement of a general crisis affecting Europe, Netherlands at this
time actually flourished. He cites that there is a general human nature to confine history by imposing
uniformity- that the idea of a crisis affecting Europe is imposed on every country, to the extent,
unrelated events are given special meanings. Like, Baroque art which was once seen to be dramatic, is
now seen to be signifying crisis. The historian Merriman points out that there were six contemporary
revolutions which could be studied in relation to the English revolution- Fronde in France, rebellions
in Catalonia, Naples, Portugal and William II’s attack on Amsterdam19. However, Schoffer critiques
Merriman that his description is limited by land geography. We tend to “look” for revolts in different
countries, after stalwarts like Hobsbawm and Trevor-Roper agree on the idea of a crisis. However, if
we assess the Dutch case, there was hardly any revolt, but rather a marked prosperity. A century is a
long time, and a “crisis” cannot encompass a whole century- mankind proceeds from crisis to crisis.
Every century thus, has its revolts, and between 1640-60, there were eight disturbances in
Netherlands. However, for Schoffer, the revolts started in 1566 for the Dutch, and continued till 1618.
Schoffer cites Robert Mandrou who speaks of the “cultural phenomenon”, how the folk literature
style, Baroque seemed to be lamenting the “suffering of its own civilisations”20, and thus, a grand and
opulent style like Baroque is now seen as a “pathetic protest. In contrary, we must study style and
expression and inspirations of the artist.
It is believed that the 17th century was a period of economic and political crisis, particularly in relation
to distribution of food resources. However, Schoffer points out that malnutrition affected everybody,
and only about 10% of the total population – like vagrant beggars went “permanently hungry”. 40%
of the population of Europe lived on the verge of starvation due to a one-sided distribution of
prosperity. On top of that, since 70-80% of the population was engaged in agriculture, famines were
bound to affect masses. Thus, there were peasant revolts and civil wars related to this- but this was not
unique to the seventeenth century and happened throughout.
The Dutch Republic enjoyed greater tranquillity. Only in 1672 and 1696 were there riots by the
Undertakers. Holland was densely populated and vulnerable to disturbance in food production.
However, due to cattle-breeding and the fishing industry, people did get access to food. In other parts
of Europe, the increase in one line of luxury goods scarcely impacted the masses, and the limits of
expansion were soon reached. But these are dependent on data, open to interpretation. Mousnier
interprets this as a depression crisis, but to Schoffer, it was but simply a slump in the latter part of the
17th century. The data is judged against the 16th century boom, an exceptional period, there is too
much faith in statistics, which attaches disproportionate value, there might be national and regional
variation which is ignored, and there maybe inter-cyclic waves of slump and recovery, where one
chooses to highlight just the slump.

19
Parker, Geoffrey and Smith Leslie M. (ed.) “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century”, Pp. 90
20
Ibid. Pp 93
Schoffer critiques Mousnier who placed great emphasis on fluctuations from year to year, greater than
the 16th century. Schoffer ages that indeed there were fluctuations, but these are not unique- it was the
end of the exceptional boom in the 16th century economy. The fall in the import of silver from
Spanish-America was also a stabilising factor for the economy, according to him, for it had been
ravaged by inflation- the circulation of money had probably slowed down, but the total supply of
currency was not reduced to a minimum. There was a new supply, especially from Brazil and copper
met the emergency. As for the population, which shows a “spectacular drop”21, there was actually a
slight rise he argues. Plagues, epidemics and local disasters kept the population below the general
level of overpopulation. Mercantilism actually posed a bigger problem, for it closed off the economic
barriers, left limited means for economic welfare.
Schoffer talks about the shift of power from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, especially the Low
Countries- the fall of Italy, the Spanish Empire and the Italian city-states bear testimony to the fact.
Interestingly, Spanish silver doing its way to Amsterdam exchange banks- and thus, Schoffer brings
into question the entire idea of a “crisis”, for countries like Sweden revived its copper and iron
production, while Portugal also progressed towards prosperity.
The Dutch advanced in trade and navigation, in fact Dutch skippers gave grains to Italy during its
famine. The nobility’s estates were splitting up, the price fluctuations were to his disadvantage and the
impoverished gentry were unable to keep up their rank. On the other hand, the middle class too were
feeling the pressure of the system. But due to state centralisation, old social tensions died a lingering
death, for there was a unity of the state and the nobility- the middle class too preferred to be part of
the bureaucracy, and by the 18th century there was the rising middle class. In Holland, there was a
loose federation of states which were given political coherence, and institutions were created to
facilitate cooperation, reducing the chance of discord. Ultimately the Dutch system actually became
aristocratic.
Theodore Rabb: A crisis in the arts?
T. K. Rabb’s seminal ‘The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe’ consolidates the argument
about a general crisis. Drawing from Paul Hazards’ description of intellectual ferment in the years
around 1700, and R. Mousnier’s identification of a broad “century of crisis”. T. Rabb outlines an era
of turmoil and uncertainty extending from mid-16th century to the 17th century, that was resolved by
the scientific revolution.
Rabb argues that the crisis of the 17th century was reflected in the arts: he believes there to be a
distinct shift from “belligerence to restraint, from upheaval to calm”. To Rabb, the crisis had three
characteristics:
● Must be short-lived
● Must be distinct in terms of a phase
● Has to be worse than the period which follows it
What is significant is the discontinuity of the period- for Rabb it is a crisis in the “location of
authority” much like how Trevor-Roper views the crisis to be.
Rabb calls the 16th century and early 17th century a “growing fever”. In the cultural sphere, Rabb cites
several; factors which act as evidence of a ‘growing unease’- the rise of mysticism, larger than life
Baroque art of Bernini and Rubens and a growing emphasis on introspection and restraint. To Rabb,
like Elliot and Steensgaard, he asserts that the main impetus for the centralisation of state power was
warfare. In the economic sphere, Rabb disagrees with Hobsbawm that a crisis cannot be found in
terms of economics or demography. The most severe years of economic stagnation was 1619-22.
However, he agrees that the eventuality leads to capitalism.
Rabb particularly focussed on art and emphasized on the perception of realities- the 17th century
according to him is characterised by passivity and subdued feelings. Paintings were now decorative

21
Ibid. Pp 98
and pleasing. To him, there was a change in the focus of the aristocracy and a “critical mass” theory of
bureaucratisation. Rabb suggests continued scholarship on changes in art, the position of the
aristocracy and on comparative studies to understand the ‘discontinuity’ of the 17th and 18th century.
Peter Burke in 2009, emphasizes that the connection made in art are elusive. The arts do not suffer a
crisis in the 17th century. However, there was a crisis in the representation in natural philosophy, that
became a general crisis, the contrast in the tone and mood was evident in the period. The 17th century
painters had other goals besides linking art to the general crisis.
Jan de Vries: Questioning the economic crisis
In ‘The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750’, Jan de Vries reemphasises on the
importance of the economic crisis. According to him, the fundamental problem of the debate is the
matter of periodisation, and to him, it needs to be contextualised in the wake of Confessionalization22
and Enlightenment.
De Vries questions the kind of economic crisis that affected the 17th century and if the label of crisis
appropriate. There is a distinct pattern of long term changes shared in broad outline by all of Europe:
prices were either increasing or decreasing in a cyclical manner. They rose in the 13th century during
the Black Death, falling thereafter. It revived in the late 15th century, rising till the 16th, the era of price
revolution. In the 17th century there was an inflection in the Mediterranean and North Europe,
following which there was a decline. The amplitude of livestock prices was less, while the prices of
industrial products was even more muted.23. This brings is to the idea of ‘la longue duree’- eras of
growth and depression, called Phase A and Phase B respectively.
De Vries connects this to the endogenous (unique to technologies and reproductive factors of the
society) and exogenous (factors like plague beyond the control of society) and cites that there was a
decline in the population- though it increased till 1660, after which it fell due to repeated famine, war
and plague24. He argues that there is a “suggestive correlation than a convincing causation” in the
relationship between climate and the general crisis. Climate however, can have a direct effect on
morality.
The crisis economy of the 17th century was fundamentally impacted by the reduction in official silver
shipments.25 Repeated harvest failures and plagues, decline in Mediterranean population led to
collapse of export industries and demise of long-distance trade links, withering of commercial cities.
To top it off, the Thirty Wars affected the Holy Roman Empire, France had the combined pressure of
failing agricultural returns and peasant unrest, while England faced severe competition with the
Dutch.

The 17th century however, did not show universal regression, but that it hit different sectors at
different times. There were low prices and failing yields, demographical trends show a decline- this
price decline is fundamentally due to the decline in the purchasing power of the people. The public
sector and the protection theory also fails for during the period of absolutism and mercantilism, to de
Vries, the ‘protection sector’ was the most flourishing sector. Increased public demand would
probably more than compensate for the reduced private demand, but not necessarily within the same
production areas. Moreover, the difference in the level of taxes and the taxation systems would have
different effects on the production costs and thereby on the ability to compete in the various
production centres.

Conclusion

22
Confessionalization pursues the consequences of the Protestant and Catholic Reformation as the Churches
formed large religiously oriented communities in collaboration with the early modern state, promoting a new
religious, social, sexual and political discipline.
23
De Vries, Jan. “The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years”, Pp. 157
24
Ibid. Pp. 158
25
Ibid. Pp. 169
In conclusion, it is difficult to asses whether there was truly a general crisis during the 17th century.
However, what can be assessed is that there was a decline in trade, agricultural production,
population, and the era saw rebellions and social discord. However, the time period of a century is a
long time, and these changes were seen at certain points in some pockets. However, this period did
have a lasting impact: there was a regional shift of power from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic,
there was a qualitative shift in the means of production, displacement of industry from the urban to the
rural sector, it led to the first phase of industrialisation in Europe, a decline in the guild system, there
was a widening gap between the East and West and large scale demographic lost, coupled with the
strengthen of the European aristocracy in the wake of absolutism.
Bibliography
● Aston, Trevor. (ed.) “Crisis in Europe: 1560-1660”, London: Routledge, 1965
● De Vries, Jan. “The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years”, The
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Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Autumn, 20009), pp 151-194
● Hobsbawm, Eric. “The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century”, Past &
Present, No. 5 (May, 1954), pp. 33-53
● Hobsbawm, Eric. “The Crisis of the 17th Century—II”, Past & Present, No. 6 (Nov., 1954),
pp. 44-65
● Parker, Geoffrey and Smith Leslie M. (ed.) “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century”,
London: Routledge, 1997
● Steensgaard, Niels. “The Seventeenth-Century Crisis and the Unity of Eurasian History”,
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24. No 4 (Oct., 1990), pp. 683-697
● Trevor-Roper, Hugh. “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, The Reformation and
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● http://vle.du.ac.in/mod/book/view.php?id=5320&chapterid=976