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Reed Stratton
Professor Dennis Lynch
EN 853: Philosophical Foundations of Rhetoric
3 May 2012
Mere Christianity as a Hall of Many Rooms:

CS Lewis’ Use of Metaphor in Uniting a Hostile Audience

From 1943-1945, CS Lewis, a literature professor and Christian philosopher at Oxford,

conducted a series of BBC talks about Christian beliefs. According to 1940’s listener research

from the BBC, over 50 percent of Lewis’ listeners identified as atheists. Of those who did have a

faith, many were slighted by divisions that had arisen amidst the multitude of Christian

denominations emerging in England. Lewis’ objective was to convey an undivided view of

Christianity that not only explained Christian beliefs, but also persuaded listeners, without

coercion, to adopt Christianity as a moral system. In doing so, Lewis never quotes the Bible but

relies on common sense, ethics, morality, vivid exposition, and apt rhetoric. Lewis favored

simplicity and accessibility in his work though he discussed sometimes fraught ethical notions.

He integrated metaphor as a tool for both explanation and persuasion even saying that “everyone

who wishes to think clearly should make himself master (of metaphor) as soon as he possibly

can” (as qtd in Kingsmill 51).

In this essay, I analyze the metaphors Lewis employed during these talks to explore how

metaphor can be used rhetorically to unite a hostile audience during a time of crisis. Because

Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual theory of metaphor emphasizes relational mappings between

the culturally and socially constructed beliefs underlying metaphor I will use it as a lens for the

analysis. Before beginning the analysis, though, I outline an overview of metaphor as a

subcategory of analogy. Then, I address some philosophical perspectives of metaphor as

rhetoric, and explain why Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Theory of Metaphor best serves
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my above-mentioned purpose. From Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, I derive a set of criteria by

which to analyze Lewis’ work and then evaluate the metaphors of Mere Christianity, focusing

on the following metaphors: basic Christianity as a hall of many doors; the human as machine;

and morality as a fleet of ships for the analysis. Implications to rhetoric are discussed in the last

section of the essay.

Overview of Metaphor
Metaphor is a genus of the species analogy. Rhetorical analogy directs a reader’s (or

listener’s) attention to similarities among already familiar concepts. Its formula is “A is to B as C

is to D” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 372). “Analogies are important in invention and

argumentation fundamentally because they facilitate the development and extension of thought”

(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 385). Because of its extended nature, Analogy comprehension

scans a latent collection of relationships in the reader’s mind. By way of his or her words, the

speaker highlights and reorganizes the latent relationships, providing the reader with novel

insight. According to Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidlers in “Rhetoric and

Analogies” an analogy aids in the goal of changing minds without introducing new ideas. Rather,

it represents a restructuring of known ideas, which bodes well for Lewis’ defense of the validity

of foundational Christianity in the minds of his skeptical audience. His apologetics attempt does

not rely on an assumed comprehension of Christian belief.

Lewis preferred that his audience rely on imagination as a path to belief. In his acclaimed

The Lion the Witch and the Wardrobe series, Lewis’ preferred the analogical technique of

allegory, an approach in which “the distinction between the two spheres appears beyond

argument” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 393), but in his apologetics work he often employed

personification and, occasionally, simile. Simile differs from metaphor in that it states that one

item resembles another while metaphor asserts that one item is another. Some theorists, namely
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Beardsley, contend that simile is true because of its focus on commonality between two items

and that metaphor is, at least literally, false, and that this falsehood stimulates a unique reader

response. The reader engages in cognitive exertion to decipher the falsity, so he/she struggles to

object to the statement because of the cognitively taxing demands of the metaphor, limiting

counterargument and forcing association (qtd. in Sopory and Dillard 383-384). To that extent,

metaphor describes as it explains. For example, if a speaker were to say Muhammad Ali is fire,

he is simultaneously illuminating attributes of Ali while describing Ali visually.

In Des Tropes, Dumarsais defines metaphor as the conversion of “a noun’s proper meaning

to another meaning, which it can only bear by virtue of a comparison that resides in the mind”

(qtd. in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 399). This definition articulates the rhetoricity of

metaphor, for it acts upon the mind. It acts upon the mind in the following ways: “simple

determination (the evening of life, an ocean of false learning); by means of an adjective (a

hollow account); the use of a verb (she began to squeal), or by possessives (our Waterloo)”

(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 402). An expansive definition may be similar to what Sopory and

Dillard call “an implied comparison between two dissimilar objects, such that the comparison

results in aspects that normally apply to one object being transferred or carried over to the second

object” (382). When this paper analyzes the metaphors of Lewis it focuses on semantic

comparisons in the form of A is B designed for the rhetorical effect of exposition and persuasion.

For example, war is hell couples concept A- war with concept B- hell though they are from

different semantic domains. I borrow the language of cognitive psychologist Dedre Gentner in

calling concept A the “target word” and concept B the “base word” (qtd. in Sopory and Dillard

383) because the metaphor maker seeks to delineate the first word by highlighting the

“entailments” (Lakoff) of the second word.

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Philosophical Perspectives of Metaphor

Metaphor as Poetic Flourish

It took metaphor hundreds of years to shake its reputation of being a simple adornment to

speech without making meaning. In fact, Aristotle himself was ambivalent about metaphor as a

rhetorical technique. In The Topics he says “everything is unclear that is said by metaphor” (as

qtd in Moran 390). However, in The Rhetoric he praises metaphor for its instructiveness, saying

“We learn above all from metaphors” (qtd. in Moran 386). The learning power of metaphor

matched his criteria of “Saphes” (qtd. in Moran 386) or lucidity required in sound rhetoric, and

he eventually touted metaphor’s power to improve the thinking of both the audience and the

speaker by identifying connections not apparent at first. He said, “It is a sign of sound intuition

in a philosopher to see similarities between things that are far apart” (qtd. in Moran 391).

Nonetheless, in book three of the rhetoric, Aristotle again derides metaphor, warranting that it

pleases but does not inform (qtd. in Moran 387). To some extent, more contemporary

philosophers like Immanuel Kant agreed with Aristotle but wondered whether metaphor had

some validity, acknowledging that metaphor was aesthetic but could also be a “tool for reasoning

and logic” (Nuyen 96) because non-literal information still makes meaning. In the Critique of

Pure Reason, Kant posits that pure concepts are connected with sensible intuitions through

schemata (qtd. in Nuyen 96), a set of inert associations that we carry with us based on

experiences. Metaphor, according to Kant, taps into this collected schematic. This notion

precedes thoughts of Lakoff and Johnson that assert that metaphor appeals to universal,

culturally-based analogical domains to make meaning.

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Metaphor as Meaning-Making

The first deviation from metaphor as a poetic flourish came in the 1920s from literary

critic and rhetorician IA Richards who posited that “metaphor is the omnipresent principle of

language” (qtd. in Kingsmill 15). He even concluded that “thought is metaphoric” by its nature

(qtd. in Kingsmill 15). The idea was groundbreaking and gained steam, when Kenneth Burke

grounded metaphor in the analogical nature of our thought. According to the doctorial

dissertation of Patrick McKercher, Burke’s first assertion of metaphor was its rootedness in

analogy, which is pivotal to thinking, which is more about recognition and association than

calculation. Metaphoric systems not only functional analogically, but they also grow and adapt to

changing circumstances, Burke asserted that "it is precisely through metaphor that our

perspective, or analogical extensions are made--a world without metaphor would be a world

without purpose" (as qtd. in McKercher 149).

Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Theory of Metaphor

UC Berkley linguist professor George Lakoff along with Mark Johnson, professor of

philosophy at Southern Illinois University are adamant claimants that metaphors are valuable and

essential to communication, and their metaphor research is praised among philosophers,

rhetoricians, and linguists. After researching the phenomena of the “conventional metaphor,”

they concluded that “much of our ordinary conceptual system and the bulk of our everyday

conventional language (is) structured and primarily understood in metaphorical terms”

(“Conceptual Metaphor” 453). In their book Metaphors we Live By they say that “metaphors are

the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another” (“Introduction”). Mental

domain here could be considered a category of meaning. For example, when I say the word “car”

your mind may begin making multiple associations and connections in words and phrases. You
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might think “wheels,” “drive,” “Henry Ford,” “journey,” “travel,” “road,” “road trip.” These

words are all the entailments of “car” as part of that conceptual domain.

Lakoff’s conceptual theory of metaphor (202) owes its existence to Michael J. Reddy

who proposed that metaphors work not by revealing a list of inherent attributes of the items

being compared but by plumbing our conceptual domains that are themselves relational.

Metaphor identifies relational structures more than attributes. Reddy first observed the relational

structure in our language that communication is often conceptualized as if our words are

containers into which we pack ideas (287). This conduit metaphor is exemplified by the

following: “whenever you have a good idea, practice capturing it in word,” “… put each concept

into words very carefully,” and “try to pack more ideas into fewer words” (Reddy 287).

According to Lakoff, with this concept, “Reddy showed, for a single very significant case, that

the locus of metaphor is thought, not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part

of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our everyday behavior

reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience” (203). Based on Reddy’s observation,

Lakoff concluded that metaphor had implications in everyday life (202). A website dedicated to

the craft of composition stated the following:

Metaphors, for Lakoff and Johnson, are primarily matters of thought and action, only

derivatively of language. Metaphors are culturally-based, and define what those with

certain presuppositions find real. The ‘isolated similarities’ are indeed those created by

metaphor, which simply create a partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms

of another kind of experience.” (Holcomb)

Because of this everydayness of metaphor, it is important to analyze the “metaphoric

nature of our activities” (Lakoff & Johnson 7) to reveal not only our cultural beliefs but also the
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value of metaphor in persuasion. Metaphor works for persuasion because it brings to mind the

commonly accepted master metaphors underlying much of our language such as the

communication is a conduit construction.

Lakoff and Johnsons’ ideas are based on assumptions that we think categorically about

the world around us and that these categories have the flexibility to expand and change.

Everything we learn is by association of phenomena as objects, object-attributes, or relations

between objects (Gentner 156). So, for example, when a child first learns the concept of “grass”

by touching it, she sees it as an object. As she grows she may start to understand it as a system of

objects, (lawn) object attributes (green, dewy, sweet-smelling, organic), and based on

relationships between objects (grass is like turf, grass is like weeds, grass is like leaves, grass is

like flowers, grass is like blades, etc.). To this child, metaphor works because our inherent

categories have the plasticity to expand and contract upon encountering metaphors. Lakoff calls

this the “systematicity of metaphor” (52). These categories have also been referred to as

“schema” by Kenneth Burke, who says “when a speaker names a situation by metaphor, the

hearers use that metaphor as a cue to scan through their analogy bank of schemas for one that the

speaker is suggesting can account for the situation. The hearers then instantiate the elements of

the situation into the template (schema) in order to understand the situation” (qtd. in McKercher

6). Our minds on metaphor are catalogues in constant revision. With this view, metaphor is more

than a flourish. McKercher says, “Schemas allow cognition because they allow recognition” (6).

Metaphor works well for rhetorically analyzing how a speaker uses it to reach his

audience because the schemas mentioned above are socially and culturally constructed. In

Metaphors We Live by, Lakoff and Johnson say, “The most fundamental values in a culture will

be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture”
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(22). This is exemplified in common metaphor systems in American culture. Because this

country values its capitalist economy, for example, we’ve acculturated the schema time is money.

“We are told to save our time. Time can be wasted. We can live on borrowed time as much as we

can invest time in our family and friends” (8). Therefore speakers much match latent associations

with the audience targeted. However, Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge that the culturally

constructed view of metaphor is even more complex because the association mappings differ

even within subcultures.

To illustrate, consider the subculture of contemporary American high school students in

middle class suburbs. Divide them into male and female groups based on the metaphors they use

when talking about sex. Many male members may brag about banging their girlfriends or long to

hit that when an attractive girl passes. Some may talk about doing a woman at a party, or hoping

to tap that ass later that night. The female counterparts, in addition to having fewer metaphors

(which is also revealing), may speak of hooking up with a guy, fooling around, or, possibly,

making love. Notice the contrasts in their domains of association. The guys adopt the schema sex

is attacking an object, while the girls internalize sex is connecting. These integrated systems

reveal inert values across the groups, shaped socially and culturally. In this way, metaphors are

values, which must be considered when using metaphors to persuade.

Criteria for Evaluating Persuasiveness of Metaphor

Because Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual theory contends that speakers use metaphors

everyday and that these metaphoric structures are culturally and socially determined, their theory

is ideal for analyzing the metaphors of Lewis’ attempt to persuade the World-War-2-Era BBC

listeners. I have extracted the majority of these criteria from Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors we
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Live by, with the exception of two, which were originated in Sopory and Dillard’s, “The

Persuasiveness of Metaphor: A Meta Analysis:”

Cultural Coherence (Lakoff)

Lakoff and Johnson say that metaphor is synonymous with literal language because it

taps into socially-constructed frameworks of meaning (3). Therefore, metaphors are most apt if

they acknowledge the cultural associative domains of the audience for whom they are designed.

The audience must be knowledgeable in the base word for it to be mapped to the conceptual

domain of the target word. For example, in formulating a message for contemporary middle

class Americans in the Midwest about the importance of time management, I would want to tap

into the cultural framework of “time is money” (Lakoff & Johnson 7) in order to create meaning

for the Midwesterners. They are familiar with time, and, according to Lakoff and Johnson, they

value it as they value money as seen in the conceptual metaphors they use (7) and the way they

talk. The cultures, and even the sub-cultures, the speaker addresses posses a semantic collection

of themes that can be accessed through metaphor, so those associations need to be targeted for

maximum effectiveness.

Experiential Coherence (Lakoff)

An effective metaphor articulates the physical sensations of experience, the “experiential

gestalts” (Lakoff & Johnson 76). Lakoff explains the five dimensions necessary in experientially

coherent metaphors as follows: the participants involved in the experience; the roles participants

play in the experience; the stages that occur in the process; the linear sequence of the event being

depicted; and the purpose of the event in the first place. For example Lakoff and Johnson’s

argument is war concept is coherent because participants are seen as enemies to win over one

another; both arguers adopt combative roles; the events of escalation are similar; “the finish of
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one turn at talking is expected to result in the beginning of the next turn” (Lakoff & Johnson 78);

and conversations that become arguments share in the objective of achieving victory over the

opponent (Lakoff & Johnson 78-80). Furthermore, the language replicates the sensations of

battle. “If you are engaged in a conversation and you perceive it turning into an argument, what

is it that you perceive over and above being in a conversation? The basic difference is a sense of

being embattled” (78). The heart rate elevates. The palms sweat. The audience may even lose

agency of pacing, tone, and pitch of voice, so the war experience is “felt in the skin” (Massumi

27).

Stimulated Elaboration (Sopory & Dillard)

In rhetoric, because listeners/readers are agentive, persuasion occurs largely in their

minds. Before we, as Foucault said, “act upon the actions” of our listener we must first act upon

thoughts, propelling a listener to a trajectory of associations. Metaphor excels in this purpose

because it can catalyze an explosion of associations within a reader, and relationships can “be

developed in many directions” (Perelman& Olbrechts-Tyteca 377). Stimulated elaboration

persuades by coaxing a listener to dwell on her own shrewdness. For example, if a speaker

positing a political argument utters big government will form like a mushroom cloud over this

country, the listener will make relational associations as a response to the odd juxtaposition. Her

network of inferences will expand, and the accuracy of the statement will galvanize in her mind.

In turn, she will feel validated as she uncovers latent relationships. As the elaboration expands,

because all metaphor is based on a culturally-defined set of concepts, the listener will delve into

her beliefs, so, essentially, this speaker will have convinced the listener that the mushroom cloud

observation is an accurate view of the world. According to Bryan Whaley of the University of
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San Francisco, “certain types of metaphors function as high-quality arguments whose processing

results in more elaboration than that of literal messages (qtd. in Sopory and Dillard 387).

Extendedness

According to Sopory and Dillard’s meta-analysis on the persuasiveness of metaphor, an

extended metaphor uses “one base to construct a number of different sub metaphors with the

same target” (389). I will distinguish stimulated elaboration from extendedness by this rule:

stimulated elaboration is inferred by the audience, and extendedness is stated by the speaker by

explicitly mapping conceptual domains (Lakoff & Johnson). Though stimulated elaboration is

more effective than extendedness because it moves the reader to a mental action, the latter can

enhance the speaker’s authority and clarify ambiguous connections, and extendedness is

important to Lakoff and Johnson because conceptual systems lead to other conceptual systems,

which enhances the complexity of the communication (148).

Highlighting and hiding

Lakoff and Johnson insist that one persuasive element of a metaphor is its “systemacity

(which) allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another (while) necessarily

(hiding) other aspects of the concept… that are inconsistent with the metaphor” (Lakoff &

Johnson 10). Mary McCloskey agrees and approaches this concept from a psychological

perspective stating, “A metaphor together with its context works like an assertion followed by a

quick denial of something you would expect to follow from it” (221). Because metaphors

masquerade as literal statements, they limit uncontrolled interpretations by implying that the

target word is what the base word is and is not what the base word is not. For example, in Lakoff

and Johnsons’ time is money schema we, at first, are not aware that you cannot get your time

back if you’ve spent it foolishly as you often can with money (12). Metaphors break down when
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the listener unearths a relational concept that’s inconsistent with the metaphor, which is why

metaphor critics condemn its use; however, a persuasive move in both rhetoric and exposition is

to establish presence on the argument you want to express while obscuring the presence of the

argument you don’t want to, namely counterarguments. Also, if you’ve used a metaphor that

encourages the reader to elaborate on it in his/her mind, you’ve taken step one towards

persuasion.

The Metaphors of Mere Christianity

CS Lewis’ Mere Christianity started as a collection of talks on BBC broadcasts from

1942-1944. Amidst the devastation of the Second World War and the disaster it wreaked on

England, Lewis took to the airwaves after the BBC recruited him to explain his Christian beliefs.

In the face of the division, he chose not to hale one denomination over another. Rather, he shared

the foundational beliefs of all Christians thus the name Mere Christianity. His rhetorical end-

game was to rally listeners to unity amidst war and malice, so I will evaluate how he did this

using the criteria mentioned above.

More than 50 percent of the Britons who heard these broadcasts on the BBC were self-

proclaimed atheists, so Lewis’ messages were shaped for listeners who were apathetic at best

about Christianity. Additionally, because of the destruction of the country, even Christians felt

ravaged and alienated. Quotidian black outs and howling air raid sirens were commonplace. At

night, the guards on the street ordered residents to cover their windows with black sheets to hide

their houselights from potential bombers. Despite the constant barrages of BBC news bulletins

about more men lost in the war, the station believed that “a nation at war needed food for its

intellect and its soul as well as for its body. The BBC acknowledged freely that religion, art, and

science were not luxuries but basic needs (qtd. in S. Johnson 2).
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Hall of Many Rooms

In his Forward, Lewis says his goal is to provide a synopsis of Christian beliefs

uncomplicated by denominational squabble, and he uses the following metaphor to explain: “It

(basic Christianity) is… a hall out of which doors open into several rooms. If I can bring anyone

into the hall, I shall have done what I attempted” (Lewis 3). Lewis crafts an orientational

metaphor that describes the state of being inside of an idea consistent with Lakoff and Johnson’s

conceptual mapping of “container metaphors” in which “various kind of states may… be

conceptualized as containers” (31). Thus, states of mind we access through pondering could be

places because “rooms and houses are obvious containers” (Lakoff & Johnson 31).

For optimal experiential coherence there must be a “correlation… between the concept

exploration of” Christian ideas “and the aspects of the actual activity of” exploring Christianity

(Lakoff & Johnson 83). Let’s start with the participants in both activities. They are the readers of

Mere Christianity. Many are milling about the hallway of Christianity, some opening doors,

some lingering, and others exiting. Depending on the hallway’s design, the parts of the

experience may consist of walls, lights, carpeting, door knobs, and emergency exit signs, but

these parts are not relevant to the exploration of basic Christianity so, in that aspect the

experience is not coherent. Next, upon analyzing the linear sequence of exploring Christianity,

we see consistency. First, an explorer moseys into the hallway, ignoring the intimidation of the

massive number of doors in the corridor. He lingers in the hall until he is comfortable opening

doors, which would be the next linear step. Lewis leads readers into the hallway and leaves the

next progression up to them. Thus, when considering these sub-elements of experiential

coherence, with the exception of the parts of experience, I contend that this metaphor is effective.
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The use of a hallway with many rooms will likely establish strong cultural coherence

with the BBC audience as well. According to an interactive BBC webpage, most of the flats in

cities in 1940s England were two stories. The kitchen and parlor were on the bottom floor. The

second floor consisted of a hallway and two or three rooms. At night, the adults of the house lit a

coal fire and retired to their first floor parlors to listen to the “wireless.” Lewis’ talks aired at

10:30pm on weeknights, so it was likely that the listeners had just been in their own hallways

with many rooms, kissing their children goodnight (“World War 2”). In this mindset, the hallway

would insinuate comfort and safety as would the parlor with the fire, which is probably why

Lewis entails every room in his hallway of Christianity with its own fire. Lewis accurately

engaged the culture of his listener with this thoughtful metaphor.

Since stimulated elaboration and extendedness are symmetrical in how they engage

listeners, both will be addressed here. After showing his audience the Christianity hallway,

Lewis says he wishes to bring people into it (Lewis XV). Elaborating, the reader infers that

Lewis is a host. Who else brings visitors into a hallway than someone who wishes to provide a

tour? The audience may also visualize the stretching distance of most hallways, intuiting a

winding vastness and complexity in foundational Christianity, which refuted wide-spread myths

at the time that Christianity is simpleminded or is “the opiate of the masses” as Marx claimed.

The value of this kind of elaboration is that it shifts the rhetoric from Lewis to his audience.

Because Lakoff and Johnson said that culturally-constructed experience is metaphoric (56), when

a listener elaborates on an analogy in her mind she delves into her own culture and society.

Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson have observed that experience is rooted in the physical

(59); therefore, Lewis does well to guide the audience through the environment of his

philosophies, letting the structural elements of a hall and doorway come into view as the readers
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“move” through it. Lewis’ metaphor choice is a part of the conceptual metaphor of “ideas and

arguments are buildings” (Lakoff & Johnson 46) because he says that Christianity is a house. In

case the listeners do not connect with the building-as-idea structure, Lewis explicitly extends the

metaphor. The rooms in the hall contain “fires, chairs, and meals,” (Lewis XV) which furthers

the orientation metaphor of this hall of rooms (Lewis XV) while coordinating with Lakoff and

Johnson’s additional conceptual observation that “ideas are food” (46). Aware of his listeners’

diversity and their suspicion of division, Lewis spatially expands the metaphor to accommodate

their multiple backgrounds, saying that the hallway is a place to wait and that visitors must try

different doors. “Some people” he says, “may find they have to wait in the hall for a

considerable time, while others feel certain almost at once which door they must knock at”

(Lewis XVI). The attempt at inclusion as part of persuasion is observable. In a last addition, he

insists that even if a listener hasn’t yet chosen a door, she must still “obey the rules which are

common to the whole house” (XV-XVI), preparing the reader for Lewis’ opening discussion of

the universality of the moral law.

The hallway trope, like all metaphors, has a shelf life. It can only be extended so far

before it spoils, but Lakoff wouldn’t fret about the partiality of metaphors, touting its ability to

highlight and hide (10). Because of their analogical thinking habits that we established earlier,

the listeners’ minds will embrace that a denomination is inviting, secure, comfortable, and

immersing and also that the doors leading to it will not be opened in Mere Christianity. The

metaphor obscures entailments of denominations unavailable through the semantic association of

rooms. For example, Christian denominations are often temporary and defected from ill will or

disagreement. The theology beneath denominations occasionally banishes the “rooms” from the

house, spawning contention between the established rooms. Occasionally, a denomination is

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called a cult, and its members battle for credibility. However, these entailments are unavailable

in the denomination-as-room trope. Therefore, Lewis illuminates the welcoming aspects of

Christianity and darkens the contentious ones, which helps him reach his goal of persuading his

apathetic audience.

The Human Machine

On the first part of “The Three Parts of Morality,” a section in the book, Lewis observes

that “In reality, moral rules are directions for running the human machine” (69). An ontological

metaphor, it differs from the orientational (Lakoff and Johnson 14) nature of the hallway of

rooms, but Lewis could be faulted for ambiguity. What part of the human is the machine actually

referring to? Is it the body? Is it the mind? If it is the mind, the metaphor consubstantiates

Lakoff’s semantic domain of the mind is a machine into which fit associations such as “my mind

isn’t operating; the wheels aren’t turning; and I am rusty” (27). Additional to the mind is

machine concept, Lakoff and Johnson assert that communication can be mapped as a machine

but that “Communication is not what one does with the machine, but is the machine itself” (qtd.

in “Metaphor”), so a machine can be associated with both how we live and how we

communicate, and this machine familiarity will enhance Lewis’ persuasiveness.

Regarding cultural coherence, the most salient examples of a machine for most 1940s

BBC listeners would be home appliances such as stoves, fridges, and the newly-designed front

loading washing machine (Powell-Smith). The “wireless” on which they heard Lewis’ broadcasts

would also be on their minds. However, because of rampant blackouts in England during the

war, home machines may have been a source of frustration for these listeners, so the word

“machine” may have been both familiar and frustrating, but I guess that does support Lewis
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warning that machines should be kept in good repair so they do not fail. In light of the blackouts,

machines were, in fact, failing often, so the audience would know the dysfunction of failure.

They, too, would know the sensory details associated with machines, which related to the

experiential coherence of the metaphor. Did the listeners actually move through the world as

machines? We can examine participants, parts, causation, and purpose—four of Lakoff and

Johnsons’ six dimensions of experience (80-81) in light of this analogy. The participants in

machine operation include an engineer who designed it; an operator to run it; and an instructor to

teach others how to use it. A Christian would consider God the operator and engineer, but this

audience was apathetic toward the Christian faith, so the participants may be unclear to the

listener. What about the parts of a machine? Machines contain working components like gears,

ratchets, and, to a lesser extent in the ‘40s, computer chips and motherboards. Thus the grinding,

digesting, circulating parts within us are consistent with this notion though they may not be

experienced in the same way with our senses. We don’t hear a steady industrial pounding in our

joints as we move through our daily lives (most of us at least!). Finally, analyzing causation and

purpose together, a machine exists because it is needed to complete a task. Many people, even

those who don’t believe in God, would prefer to have purpose, so this metaphor accommodates

that preference.

The human-as-machine trope stimulates elaboration in the mind of Lewis’ audience

because it is ontological (Lakoff), for it views a nonphysical entity, moral behavior, as an object,

a machine. With that in mind, the audience has the ability to ponder additional machine-like

implications of morality that would normally be abstract. They also have the motivation to

contemplate morality amidst the terror and destruction of war. “If both motivation and ability are

high and the message is compelling, the outcome is a greater number of thoughts agreeing with
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message advocacy and thereby greater persuasion” (Sopory and Dillard 387). Machines can kill

if they are not maintained properly. They can start fires that burn entire homes down (which

incidentally, connects with the Christianity-as-home metaphor earlier) Given the context, the

metaphor will stimulate elaboration. Danger, death, and destruction were ubiquitous to these

listeners.

Lewis explicitly extends the human as machine metaphor, telling us that both need a set

of guidelines to “operate” effectively. He says “every moral rule is meant to prevent a

breakdown, or a strain, or a friction in the running of the machine” (69). This part of the

metaphor is convincing, but once Lewis extends it by saying we need to consult an instructor

when learning how to use the machine (70), he weakens his claim because the audience may not

know who the instructor represents. Would they think it is God? The metaphoric extension is

flimsy, and it breaks down quickly. In reality, once an instructor has taught us to run a machine,

he, more or less, disappears and lets us to our own devices, but I don’t think this is the extended

message he wants his listeners to receive. In the book, Lewis eventually wishes to prove that God

is with us always; therefore, the instructor extension was unwise.

Does this metaphor effectively highlight what Lewis wants us to know and hide what

Lewis doesn’t want us to know? He claims we have a moral law for operating and that it doesn’t

“ruin our good time” (Lewis 75) but, instead, keeps us from “breaking down” by providing

guidelines (Lewis 80). This metaphor hides the fact that conformity is nearly impossible in a

pluralized society, which was as true in the ‘40s as it is now, but by using the set of instructions

attribute of a the machine, he says that we should just follow the instructions and the machine

will run well.

 Stratton 19

A Fleet of Ships

Lewis extends the human machine metaphor by comparing each member of society to a

ship sailing in a fleet, each its own machine. He says “You can get the idea plain if you think of

us as a fleet of ships sailing in formation. The voyage will be a success only, in the first place, if

the ships do not collide and get in one another’s way; and, secondly, if each ship is seaworthy

and her engines in good order” (Lewis 73). This construction appears mixed, which may have

initially confused listeners who did not readily associate “ship” with machine. It may have been

more appropriate for structural coherence to refer to us as human engines rather than human

machines.

Despite the inconsistency of the metaphor it is strong in cultural coherence. When World

War II began in 1939, the British Royal Navy consisted of 15 war ships, 7 air craft carriers, 66

cruiser ships, 184 destroyers, and 45 escort and patrol vessels. This collection of ships made it

the largest in the world at the time. In addition to fighting, these vessels escorted convoys across

the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and to allied countries (“Royal Navy”). Essentially, ships were a

vital component of the war, and Britons who heard Lewis’ broadcasts most likely experienced

them almost constantly around the island. Therefore, this metaphor is culturally coherent.

Experiential coherence. The vividness of this metaphor does not derive from experience.

Human beings don’t feel like the cold, gray steel of ship, nor are the participants, parts, stages,

linear sequences, or causations of being ethical empirically associated with ships with some

exceptions. For Lewis’ audience, the experience of embattlement they feel may be consistent

with a warship moving through the water, dodging attacks. Lewis attempts to persuade his reader

that she must first be running her ship properly before she can travel in a fleet with other ships.

This concept is grounded in the mapping of life is a journey identified by Lakoff in “The
 Stratton 20

Contemporary Theory of Metaphor.” This can be seen in conceptual metaphors like he has no

direction anymore, I don’t know which path to take, and my love is on the rocks (4). We see that

the underlying idea is journey though metaphors discuss many kinds of journeys, but in this case

Lewis uses a fleet of ships. There is also some shipness in the slow, creaky way most human

beings move through life on its “journey” and the linear sequence of moving from one end of the

ocean to the other with fellow ships nearby.

Persuasiveness of the fleet metaphor may depend, mostly, on the potential for stimulated

elaboration. Lewis’ intention is to convince the audience to understand people by mapping

similar entailments from the domain of people to the domain of ships (Lakoff), but unlike the

hallway of doors trope, the associations the 1940s audience has with ship may hinder

elaboration. A ship is massive. It fights and carries cargo. It can float, and it can be ridden upon.

A ship is not mapped to a human domain conceptually. Rather it is mapped in the vehicle

domain. According to Lakoff, “A vehicle is a superordinate category that includes such basic-

level categories as car, train” (206). The word fleet is equally weak in conveying a large

collection of people. On our own, we can think about moving abreast with others, but the

audience may realize that each country has its own fleet. Fleets engage in battle, so this metaphor

does not stimulate elaboration because it doesn’t address the conceptual domains of how we

ought to be on the same team because few fleets are on the same team as other fleets.

Teams often have defectors. Lewis extends this metaphor when he says that

uncooperative individuals may either stray from the fleet or collide with the other ships. The

image of the fleet traveling efficiently may have been effective for the reader, so he need not

extend the metaphor as much; however, this extension reinforces the main goal of the book: to

portray a unified perspective of Christianity free from the collision of contentious perspectives of
 Stratton 21

faith. The metaphor cannot stay afloat on its own because the audience may not understand the

concept of conformity, or, more likely, they will fear it after seeing what Hitler did in Germany,

so Lewis buoys it by stating that “the voyage will only succeed if the ships are seaworthy and

keep their engines in good order” (71). This extension expands the complexity of the human as

machine metaphor, stating that the human being is a machine inside of a ship, which is part of a

fleet. It must be correctly operated and maintained in order for both the ship and the fleet to

travel safely.

The fleet image highlights ethical conformity, moral absolutes, and standards of right and

wrong as societal needs. Also highlighted are the individual needs of self-actualization,

reflection, and self assurance in optimizing our own ships to function in society. When all

vessels remain on a standardized course the fleet is united, which reaffirms Lewis’ main

objective to convey a unified view of Christianity. Simultaneously, the trope hides the

squabbling within Christianity about denominational differences. It also obscures the destruction

caused in the name of Christianity by misguided Christians throughout history, and it focuses the

listener more on cooperation within a fleet than on the violent potential of the war ships at that

time with which Britons maybe familiar such as the German U-boat.

Implications to Rhetoric

Analyzing Lewis’ attempt to persuade the hostile/apathetic, war town audience of 1940s

England to adopt an undivided view of Christianity, reveals the following implications when

persuading an indifferent or uninterested audience during a crisis:

 As Lakoff and Johnson claim, conceptual domains are culturally and socially constructed,
so the base words of metaphors, which elucidate the target words, should be chosen with
the audience’s domains of conception in mind.
 Stratton 22

 Concrete metaphors stimulate elaboration in the mind, so they should be selected based
on the depth of the inferences the audience will make in the analogy, especially if the
audience is hostile. This shifts the burden of persuasion from the rhetor to the listener and
leaves a salient impression of the rhetor’s work in the mind. If the audience continues to
elaborate on the initial metaphor, the meaning will eventually be driven into the
audience’s culturally-constructed domains of conception, rendering the trope even more
persuasive.
 Though it may seem like a flaw at first, the partial nature of metaphor is necessary
because it enables the rhetor to highlight attributes of words and images that she wants
her audience to ponder while obscuring contradictory, ambiguous, or pejorative
associations.
 Metaphors with potential for extendedness should be used with discretion because
explicitly extending a metaphor may weaken it and, as a result, hinder credibility. If
choosing to extend a metaphor, however, a rhetor must bring his audience’s attention to
the less obvious elements of the metaphor in order to appear ingenious.
 Before a metaphor is employed, it should be analyzed for experiential coherence for
maximum effectiveness. A rhetor must consider the participants, parts, linear sequence,
causation, and purpose of both the target word and the base word in using a metaphor,
especially if the metaphor explains a process.

In a dissertation about CS Lewis’ perspective of metaphor, Patricia Kingsmill tells us that

Lewis was an adamant metaphor maker because of his belief that it, first and foremost, engages

the imagination, which has more potential to be persuaded than other cognitive functions. That

explains why Lewis trusted metaphor to help convey an undivided view of Christianity for a

war-torn country of skeptical believers. He leads them into the hall of Mere Christianity in hopes

that they will dwell in it and open doors. Once, in the hall, Lewis provides his viewpoint of what

we are in light of morality, that we are machines that have specifications for optimal operation. If

these specs are disregarded, the machines will cease at best and implode at worse, hindering the

fleet of machines operating abreast of us.

 Stratton 23

Metaphor is fuel powering the machines of our minds. Metaphor is true. Metaphor is

necessary. It reiterates the limits of literal language and serves as a tool to reach an audience

through imagination and even spirituality. CS Lewis said, “The very essence of our life as

conscious beings all day and every day, consists of something which cannot by communicated

except by hints, similes, metaphors, and the use of those emotions… which are pointers to it”

(qtd. in Kingsmill). Lewis and other apologeticists like St. Augustine used metaphor to reflect

their commitments to the teachings of Christ who identified lessons of the divine through the

concrete and dubious. In fact, Lewis once said, “There is no good trying to be more spiritual than

God. God never meant man to be a purely spiritual creature. That is why He uses material things

like bread and wine to put the new life into us. We may think this rather crude and unspiritual.

God does not... He likes matter: He invented it” (qtd. in Kingsmill 88).
 Stratton 24

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