CHAPTER V

EXTERNAL SCAN

External Environment Scan

1. Environmental scan is a systematic process of identifying the relevant past, present and
future factors that will influence the nation’s performance. The external envt of China is studied
under four parts as under:-

(a) Part I : Near Regional

(b) Part II : Far Regional
(c) Part III : Global
(d) Part IV : Detailed Scan of the Focus Primary Adversary

2. The distribution of countries under the three regions has been done as under:-
 2

(a) Near Regional. Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Thailand,
Laos, Bhutan, Vietnam, India, Russia and Pakistan.

(b) Far Regional. Philippines and Australia.

(c) Global. USA, EU & NATO, AUKUS, QUAD, IPEF and AU.

PART I: NEAR REGIONAL

3. The near regional countries have been evaluated and classified into Preferred Position
(PP), Compelled Neutrality (CN), Adversarial Position (AP), Neutral (N) as under:-

Ser No Country Positives Negatives Classification

(a) Japan • China Japan • Territorial disputes

economic • Rising nationalism, mil
interdependence orientation and alignments
• Historic distrust AP
• Powerful industry & R&D
• Strong work ethic and
dedication

(b) India • Investment and • Bdy Dispute

market opportunities • Emergence as Regional
• India’s strained Power
AP
relation with Pakistan • India’s influence in IOR, Indo
Pacific
• Atmanirbhar Bharat

(c) Taiwan • Trade • Territorial Dispute/

• Historic Challenging China’s sovernity
AP
commanalities • Alliance with US
•

(d) Russia • Oil & gas res, iron • Politically isolation

ore • No access to Western
• Hyper sonic & cruise technology
msl tech
PP
• UN SC permanent
member
• Communism
• Mil Industrial Base

(e) Pakistan • All weather • Internal security situation PP

 3

friendship • Falling economy and threat

• Imp ally in the of turning into a failed state
Islamic world and a tool
to restrain India
• CPEC as part of
BRI and a gateway to
Arabian Sea
(f) North • Balanced diplomatic • Hostile attitude toward US.
Korea relations with China and • A one-man dictatorship
Russia • A grave global security
PP
• Advanced threat with nuclear capabilities
cyberwarfare
capabilities
(g) South • Balanced diplomatic • Unstable and dictatorial
Korea relations with China and nuclear state in proximity
Russia • Strong strategic partnership
AP
with US
• Maritime territorial dispute

(h) Mangolia • China is Mongolia’s • NATO partner nation status to

Largest trading Partner Mongolia
• Rich in Minerals, • Rising military exchange with
copper, coal, the US
CN
molybdenum, tin, • Tibetan Buddhism of Gelugpa
tungsten and gold sect, followed by Dalai Lama
• Deep cultural
relations.

PART II: FAR REGIONAL

4. The far regional countries have been evaluated and classified into Ally, Friend of Ally,
Neutral, Competitor, Friend of Competitor, Opportunist as under:-

Ser No Country Positives Negatives Classification

(a) Philippines • Trade & commerce • Territorial disputes

Competitor
• Bilateral agreements • IPEF membership

(b) Australia • Historic trade & • Alliance with the USA Competitor
commerce • partner to various groupings
• Australia’s low and alliances aimed at
Human Resources base containing China such as QUAD
as opportunity for China and AUKUS
• Deteriorated trade
4

relationship
• Maritime competition for
sphere of influence
 5

PART III: GLOBAL

5. The global countries/ organisations have been evaluated and classified into Competitor,
Collaborator or Neutral as under:-

Country/
Ser No Positives Negatives Classification
Org

(a) USA • Trade & commerce • Primary global competitor

• Strategy to contain/ deter
Competitor/
China
Prime
• Driver in containing China in
Adversary
Indo Pacific
• Military competitor

(b) EU & • Trade & commerce • Adverse remarks on Uighur

NATO • Market for China region/ HR Violation allegations
Neutral
• US & UK containing China in
Indo Pacific

(c) AUKUS, • Nil • Containment of China

QUAD & • Mil tech transfer against
Competitor
IPEF China
• Can threaten Chinese SLOC

(d) AU • Mkt • Cultural disconnect

• Energy Collaborator
• Resource
 6

PART IV: DETAILED SCAN OF THE FOCUS PRIMARY ADVERSARY

UNITES STATES OF AMERICA

General

1. The United States of America is the world's third largest country in size and nearly
the third largest in terms of population. Located in North America, the country is bordered
on the west by the Pacific Ocean and to the east by the Atlantic Ocean. Along the northern
border is Canada and the southern border is Mexico. There are 50 states and the District
of Columbia. More than twice the size of the European Union, the United States has high
mountains in the West and a vast central plain. The lowest point in the country is in Death
Valley which is at -282 feet (-86 meters) and the highest peak is Denali (Mt. McKinley) at
20,320 feet (6,198 meters).1

2. The U.S. Armed Forces are one of the largest military forces in terms of personnel
and are considered the world's most powerful military. The U.S. Armed Forces has
significant capabilities in both defense and power projection due to its large budget,
resulting in advanced and powerful technologies which enables a widespread deployment
of the force around the world, including around 800 military bases outside the United
States.

3. In order to carry out G-DOTMLPF Analysis of United States as the primary

adversary of China, three domains have been identified as given below:-

(a) Indo Pacific Region including Taiwan.

(b) Space and Cyber.

(c) Polar/ Arctic Region.

MIL GEOGRAPHY

Indo-Pacific Region

4. In the context of study of mil geography of US under G-DOTMLPF as the primary

adversary of China, it is pertinent to mention that China is not likely to attack US territory.
It is in the context of overlapping mil interest in the region of Indo Pacific incl South China
Sea and Taiwan strait that the two militaries can come face to face. Hence the mil
geography study of US will be oriented towards Indo Pacific and Taiwan Strait region and
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).

1
United States. (2014, March 25). Geography. https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/geography/countries/article/
united-states
 7

Fig : Unified Combatant Commands Areas of Responsibility

5. US Unified Combatant Commands. Unified combatant commands are joint

military commands consisting of forces from multiple military departments, with their chain
of command flowing from the president, to the secretary of defense, to the commanders of
the combatant commands. There are eleven unified combatant commands that come in
two types. Geographic commands, such as Africa, Central, European, Indo-Pacific,
Northern, Southern and Space commands are responsible for planning and operations in
a certain geographic area. Functional commands, such as Cyber, Special Operations,
Strategic, and Transportation commands are responsible for a functional activity that
crosses geographic boundaries. Each service organizes, trains, and equips forces that are
then presented to the unified combatant commands through service component
commands.2 From China’s point of view, US is a prime adversary as China is the rising
power which is likely to challenge the US supremacy in the days to come.

6. United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is one of six geographic

combatant commands defined by the Department of Defense's Unified Command Plan
(UCP). As a geographic combatant command, USINDOPACOM is in charge of using and
integrating United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces within the
USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) to achieve U.S. national security objectives
while protecting national interests. The USINDOPACOM AOR covers more of the globe of
any of the other geographic combatant commands and shares borders with all of the other
2
United States Armed Forces. (2022). In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= United_States_
Armed_Forces&oldid=1114929663
 8

five geographic combatant commands. The commander of US Indo-Pacific Command

reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense and is
supported by multiple component and sub-unified commands including: U.S. Forces
Korea, US Forces Japan, U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Army Pacific.

Incorrect Bdy
Depiction

Fig :AoR of USINDOPACOM3

7. There are few regions as culturally, socially, economically, and geopolitically

diverse as the Asia-Pacific. The 36 nations comprising the Asia-Pacific region are home to
more than 50% of the world's population, 3,000 different languages, several of the world's
largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties.
Two of the three largest economies are located in the Asia-Pacific, along with ten of the
fourteen smallest. The AOR includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest
democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation. More than one third of Asia-Pacific
nations are smaller, island nations, including the smallest republic in the world and the
smallest nation in Asia.

8. The region is a vital driver of the global economy and includes the world's busiest
international sea lanes and nine of the ten largest ports. The Asia-Pacific is also a heavily
3
https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/
 9

militarized region, with seven of the world's ten largest standing militaries and five of the
world's declared nuclear nations. Given these conditions, the strategic complexity facing
the region is unique. In concert with other U.S. government agencies, USINDOPACOM
protects and defends the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests.

9. Polar/ Arctic Region. There are a number of definitions of what area is contained
within the Arctic. The area can be defined as north of the Arctic Circle (about 66° 34'N),
the approximate southern limit of the midnight sun and the polar night. Another definition
of the Arctic, which is popular with ecologists, is the region in the Northern Hemisphere
where the average temperature for the warmest month (July) is below 10 °C (50 °F); the
northernmost tree line roughly follows the isotherm at the boundary of this region. 4 No
country owns the geographic North Pole or the region of the Arctic Ocean surrounding it.
The surrounding six Arctic states that border the Arctic Ocean—Canada, Kingdom of
Denmark (with Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the United States—are limited to
a 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off their coasts. The
military presence of nations in the Arctic regions is as shown below:-

Fig: Map points indicate location, not size, of military presence

Sources: Heritage Foundation, Reuters, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, National Defence
and the Canadian Armed Forces, Norwegian Ministry of Defence and Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty

Mil Geography: If so then What Analysis

4
"Arctic." Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc. Retrieved 2 May 2009. Addison, Kenneth (2002).
Fundamentals of the physical environment. Routledge. p. 482. ISBN 978-0-415-23293-7.
 10

10. The United States as the prime adversary of China has taken a series of steps to
contain China globally in general & in Indo-Pacific Region in particular. The various
alliances formed in the region (QUAD, AUKUS, IPEF etc) strongly indicate the American
intention of building partnership in military as well as non-military areas to restrict the
growing influence of China. These measures by the United States definitely pose obstacle
in the China’s path to to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049.
Therefore China needs to match or surpass U.S. global influence and power, displace
U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and revise the
international order to be more advantageous to Beijing’s system and national interests.
China will need to take necessary measures in terms of its Economic Policy, Foreign
Policy, Energy Security Policy and Military Strategy to overcome the challenges posed.
The military aspects for achieving the same by China will include the fwg:-

(a) Indo-Pacific Region. Continue with the stated defense policy aims to
safeguard its sovereignty, security, and development interests. The military strategy
to continue to be based on the concept of “active defense.” The national defence
aims continue on the lines as stated in the 2019 Defence White paper and the ones
more relevant wrt US moves are as under:-

(i) To deter and resist aggression;

(ii) To safeguard national political security, the people’s security and
social stability;
(iii) To oppose and contain “Taiwan independence”;
(iv) To safeguard the PRC’s maritime rights and interests;
(v) To safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests;

(b) Space and Cyber. China needs to safeguard the PRC’s security interests in
outer space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. In this regard there is
need to continuously modernise and enhance the efficiency of PLA Strategic
Support Force (SSF).

(c) Polar/ Arctic Region. China aspires to become a “polar great power” by
2030. Arctic along with the Antarctic, the seabed, and space are ungoverned or
under-governed spaces. There is a need explore these areas including mil
presence for gaining access to resources from the polar regions.
 11

DOCTRINE

Pol Directive

11. The United States calls itself as an Indo-Pacific power. The region, stretching from
Pacific coastline of USA to the Indian Ocean, is home to more than half of the world’s
people, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest
militaries. The passage of time has underscored the strategic necessity of the United
States’ consistent role. At the end of the Cold War, the United States considered but
rejected the idea of withdrawing our military presence, understanding that the region held
strategic value that would only grow in the 21st century. Since then, administrations of
both political parties have shared a commitment to the region. The George W. Bush
Administration understood Asia’s growing importance and engaged closely with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and India. The Obama Administration
significantly accelerated American prioritization of Asia, investing new diplomatic,
economic, and military resources there.

12. More members of the U.S. military are based in the region than in any other outside
the United States. It supports more than three million American jobs and is the source of
nearly $900 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States. In the years ahead, as
the region drives as much as two-thirds of global economic growth, its influence will only
grow—as will its importance to the United States. The United States has long recognized
the Indo-Pacific as vital to our security and prosperity.

Concept/ Strat for Indo-Pacific Region.

13. US has formulated its objectives in the Indo Pacific through the Indo-Pacific
Strategy of The United States 5 formulated in Feb 2022. The United States as given in
the strategy will pursue five objectives in the Indo-Pacific -each in concert with our allies
and partners, as well as with regional institutions. These objectives are as under:-

(a) Advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific . Our vital interests and those of
our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, where governments can
make their own sovereign choices, consistent with their obligations under
international law; and where seas, skies, and other shared domains are lawfully
governed. Our strategy, therefore, begins with building resilience within countries,
as we have done in the United States. In the region, that includes our efforts to
support open societies and to ensure Indo-Pacific governments can make
independent political choices free from coercion; we will do so through investments
in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society. The United States
will bolster freedom of information and expression and combat foreign interference
5
U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2022, from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
 12

by supporting investigative journalism, promoting media literacy and pluralistic and

independent media, and increasing collaboration to address threats from
information manipulation. Consistent with the first-ever United States Strategy on
Countering Corruption, we will also seek to improve fiscal transparency in the Indo-
Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform. Through our diplomatic engagement,
foreign assistance, and work with regional organizations, the United States will be a
partner in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and accountable
democratic governance. And we will work with partners to stand up to economic
coercion. Beyond individual countries’ borders, the United States will also work
closely with like-minded partners to ensure that the region remains open and
accessible and that the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according
to international law. In particular, we will build support for rules-based approaches
to the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

(b) Build Connections within and Beyond the Region . A free and open Indo-
Pacific can only be achieved if we build collective capacity for a new age; common
action is now a strategic necessity. The alliances, organizations, and rules that the
United States and our partners have helped to build must be adapted; where
needed, we must update them together. We will pursue this through a latticework of
strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions. We will modernize our long-standing
alliances, strengthen emerging partnerships, and invest in regional organizations—
the collective capacity that will empower the Indo-Pacific to adapt to the 21st
century’s challenges and seize its opportunities.

(c) Drive Regional Prosperity. Alongside our partners, the United States will
put forward an Indo-Pacific economic framework—a multilateral partnership for the
21st century. This economic framework will help our economies to harness rapid
technological transformation, including in the digital economy, and adapt to the
coming energy and climate transition. The United States will work with partners to
ensure that citizens on both sides of the Pacific reap the benefits of these historic
economic changes, while deepening our integration. We will develop new
approaches to trade that meet high labor and environmental standards and will
govern our digital economies and cross-border data flows according to open
principles, including through a new digitaleconomy framework. We will work with
our partners to advance resilient and secure supply chains that are diverse, open,
and predictable, while removing barriers and improving transparency and
informationsharing. We will make shared investments in decarbonization and clean
energy, and work in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to promote
free, fair, and open trade and investment, during our host year, in 2023, and
beyond.
 13

(d) Bolster Indo-Pacific Security. Integrated deterrence will be the cornerstone

of our approach. We will more tightly integrate our efforts across warfighting
domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the United States, alongside
our allies and partners, can dissuade or defeat aggression in any form or domain.
We will drive initiatives that reinforce deterrence and counter coercion, such as
opposing efforts to alter territorial boundaries or undermine the rights of sovereign
nations at sea. We will continue to modernize our treaty alliances with Australia,
Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand; steadily advance our Major Defense
Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider; and build the
defense capacity of partners in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

(e) Build Regional Resilience to Transnational Threats . The United States

will work with partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets, strategies, plans, and
policies consistent with limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees
Celsius, and will seek to serve as the preferred partner as the region transitions to a
net-zero future. Through initiatives like Clean EDGE, we will incentivize clean-
energy technology investment and deployment, seek to drive energy-sector
decarbonization, and foster climate-aligned infrastructure investment. The United
States will work with partners to reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate
change and environmental degradation and will support critical-infrastructure
resilience and address energy security. We will also work to safeguard the health
and sustainable use of the region’s vast oceans, including through the legal use of
their resources, enhanced research cooperation, and the promotion of beneficial
commerce and transportation.

14. To implement its Indo-Pacific Strategy, US has outlined ten core lines of effort in
the next 12 to 24 months. These are as under:-

(a) Drive New Resources to The Indo-Pacific . We will open new embassies
and consulates, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and increase
our strength in existing ones, intensifying our climate, health, security, and
development work.

(b) Lead an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework . We will launch a new

partnership that will promote and facilitate high-standards trade, govern the digital
economy, improve supply-chain resiliency and security, catalyze investment in
transparent, high-standards infrastructure, and build digital connectivity—doubling
down on our economic ties to the region while contributing to broadly shared Indo-
Pacific opportunity.

(c) Reinforce Deterrence. The United States will defend our interests, deter
military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners—including
across the Taiwan Strait—and promote regional security by developing new
 14

capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives,

and a more resilient force posture.

(d) Strengthen an Empowered and Unified ASEAN . We are committed to the

East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, and will also seek new ministerial-
level engagements with ASEAN. We will implement more than $100 million in new
U.S.-ASEAN initiatives. We will also expand bilateral cooperation across Southeast
Asia, prioritizing efforts to strengthen health security, address maritime challenges,
increase connectivity, and deepen people-to-people ties.

(e) Support India’s Continued Rise and Regional Leadership . We will

continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work
together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia;
collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our
economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-
Pacific.

(f) Deliver on the QUAD. US will advance work on critical and emerging
technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and
advancing common technology principles. The Quad will build a green shipping
network, and will coordinate the sharing of satellite data to improve maritime
domain awareness and climate responses.

(g) Expand U.S.-Japan-ROK Cooperation. Nearly every major Indo-Pacific

challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and partners,
particularly Japan and the ROK. We will continue to cooperate closely through
trilateral channels on the DPRK. Beyond security, we will also work together on
regional development and infrastructure, critical technology and supply-chain
issues, and women’s leadership and empowerment.

(h) Partner to Build Resilience in the Pacific Islands . The United States will
work with partners to establish a multilateral strategic grouping that supports Pacific
Island countries as they build their capacity and resilience as secure, independent
actors. Together, we will build climate resilience through the Pacific Region
Infrastructure Facility; coordinate to meet the Pacific’s infrastructure gaps,
especially on information and communications technology; facilitate transportation;
and cooperate to improve maritime security to safeguard fisheries, build maritime-
domain awareness, and improve training and advising.

(j) Support Good Governance and Accountability . We will support Indo-

Pacific governments’ capacity to make independent political choices by helping
partners root out corruption, including through foreign-assistance and development
 15

policies, leadership at the G7 and G20, and a renewed role in the Open
Government Partnership.

(k) Support Open, Resilient, Secure, and Trustworthy Technologies . We

will promote secure and trustworthy digital infrastructure, particularly cloud and
telecommunications vendor diversity, including through innovative network
architectures such as Open RAN by encouraging atscale commercial deployments
and cooperation on testing, such as through shared access to test beds to enable
common standards development.

Doctrines/ Strategy

15. In concert with other U.S. government agencies, USINDOPACOM protects and
defends the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and
partners, USINDOPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by
promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to
contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach
is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.

16. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Area of Responsibility

(AOR) encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the waters off the west
coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole.
USINDOPACOM headquarters is located in the Nimitz-MacArthur Building on Camp H.M.
Smith just outside of Honolulu, Hawaii. The Vision, Msn & Focus Areas for
USINDOPACOM are as under:-

Map of U.S. Indo-Pacific Military Bases

 16

Source: Reformatted from Lt. General Mike Minihan,” United States Indo Pacific
Command,” NDU WMD, July 7, 2020, https://uploads.fas.org/2020/09/PACOM2020_NDU-
WMD-Brief2020_Minihan070720.pdf

(a) Vision. USINDOPACOM ensures a Free and Open Indo-Pacific alongside a

constellation of like-minded Allies and Partners, united by mutual security, interests,
and values in order to deter adversary aggression, protect the Homeland, and be
ready to fight and win in armed conflict.

(b) Msn. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command will implement a combat credible

deterrence strategy capable of denying our adversaries sustained air and sea
dominance by focusing on posturing the Joint Force to win before fighting while
being ready to fight and win, if required.

(c) Focus Areas.

(i) Joint Force Lethality - We must continue to develop and field

capabilities necessary to deter aggression and prevail in armed conflict
should deterrence fail.

(ii) Design & Posture - We will adapt from our historical service-centric
focus in Northeast Asia to a new more integrated joint forces blueprint w hich
is informed by the changing threat environment and challenges of the 21st
Century across the entire Indo-Pacific.

(iii) Exercises, Experimentation, & Innovation - Targeted innovation

and experimentation investments will evolve the joint force while developing
symmetrical capability to counter adversary capabilities.

(iv) Allies & Partners - Through increased interoperability, information-

sharing, and expanded access across the region, we present a compatible
and interoperable coalition to the adversary in crisis and armed conflict.

Time Dimension

17. Indo-Pacific Region. The Indo-Pacific region lacks a multilateral entity with the
strength, resolve, and congruence of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
established to deter aggression as in Europe. The Quad nations of the United States,
Australia, Japan, and India will need to become that collective, viable, and credible
deterrence solution. While debate surrounding the military deterrence creation by Quad
will undoubtedly continue however all instruments of power across the diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic (DIME) spectrum will be in play in the years to come.
The questions that needs to be answered for Quad members in the years to come by say
 17

2030 or 2040 is: What will it take, in terms of strategy, investments, and will, for the Quad
to credibly deter the rise of an Indo-Pacific hegemon, and how can the Quad collectively
provide a military deterrence solution?

Fig: Maj Wpn Sys comparison , 2030-2040 estimates6

Note: All US numbers at 50 percent to account for other global activities and US homeland
defense.

18. In July 2020, Japanese, Australian, and US naval vessels conducted a small,
trilateral exercise in the South China Sea. Five Australian ships, a Japanese destroyer,
and the USS Reagan Carrier Strike Group conducted maneuvers in the Philippine Sea
prior to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in Hawaii. At AUSMIN, former Secretary
of Defense Mark Esper stated, “These exercises not only bolster interoperability, but also
send a clear signal to Beijing that we will fly, we will sail, and we will operate wherever
international law allows and defend the rights of our allies and partners to do the same.”93
As highlighted earlier, a key line of effort in the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative is
“Exercises, Experimentation and Innovation,” seeking 2.87 billion USD in funding.
Davidson argues “U.S. forces must be capable of fighting in highly contested
environments against technologically advanced opponents, while also minimizing
detection across domains. The Joint Force lacks the capacity to integrate service
recommended weapons and capabilities into a warfighting concept that deters the
adversary and puts us in a position to win. This challenge can only be met by conducting a
series of high-end, multi-domain exercises with a continuous campaign of joint
experimentation.”7

6
Indo-Pacific Deterrence and the Quad in 2030 by Lt Col Justin L. Diehl, USAF. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2022, from
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/07/2002595021/-1/-1/1/18%20DIEHL.PDF

7
Aaron Mehta, “Inside US Indo-Pacific Command’s $20 Billion Wish List to Deter Chinaand Why Congress May
Approve It,” Defense News, 2 April 2020.
 18

Fig: Indo-Pacific by 20308

19. Regional deterrence is currently in place with US presence at bases in Japan and
South Korea and sustained maritime presence. The priority is to identify gaps across the
Quad system and remedy those gaps with the Quad nations that can fill them. If China
continues to robustly enhance its military capabilities and outward expansion, then the
Indo-Pacific will undoubtedly be living under the umbrella of a hegemon in 2030. Missile
ranges are only increasing, hypersonic weapons will be fielded by the mid-2020s, and
basing sanctuaries will be scarce.

20. Cyber. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is a capability-based Unified

Combatant Command similar to U.S. Special Operations Command and is the military’s
primary organization for both offensive and defensive cyber activity. Msn of
USCYBERCOM is to achieve and maintain superiority in the cyberspace domain to
influence adversary behavior, deliver strategic and operational advantages for the Joint
Force, and defend and advance our national interests.

21. U.S. Cyber Command has a wide range of missions, from offensive and defensive
cyber operations to monitoring DOD networks and assisting with the defense of critical
infrastructure. Its primary role is to ensure the DOD’s ability to operate in a world that is
increasingly dependent on cyber. To this end, three enduring lines of operation for
USCYBERCOM are as follows:

8
Indo-Pacific Deterrence and the Quad in 2030 by Lt Col Justin L. Diehl, USAF. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2022, from
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/07/2002595021/-1/-1/1/18%20DIEHL.PDF
 19

(a) Provide mission assurance for the Department of Defense (DoD) by directing
the operation and defense of the Department of Defense Information Networks (i.e.
the DoDIN) and its key terrain and capabilities;

(b) Defeat strategic threats to the United States and its national interests; and

(c) Assist Combatant Commanders to achieve their missions in and through

cyberspace.

22. The Cyber Mission Force is the operational arm of U.S. Cyber Command, and CMF
teams are distributed across various mission sets. Due to the nature of cyber and the
classification of methods, analyzing USCYBERCOM’s capability as reflected in open-
source (i.e., unclassified) literature is nearly impossible. However, the United States is
considered to be one of the world’s most capable cyber actors, an assessment that is
based on its wide range of infrastructure and strategies and the advanced technologies
that the U.S. is known to employ.

23. Space. U.S. Space Command conducts operations in, from, and to space to deter
conflict, and if necessary, defeat aggression, deliver space combat power for the
Joint/Combined force, and defend U.S. vital interests with allies and partners. Area of
Responsibility for USSPACECOM begins 100km above the surface of the earth, and
extends outward from the planet indefinitely. Operating domain, however, extends around
the globe itself, and encompasses all three elements of US space systems: the on-orbit
asset, the link, and the ground segment. USSPACECOM has successfully demonstrated
capabilities and processes through coalition-integrated global exercises such as GLOBAL
LIGHTNING 21 and PACIFIC SENTRY 21. USSPACECOM is a joint organization
comprised of representatives from all military branches, Active and Reserve, the National
Guard, Government civilians, and contractors. Currently, we have 45 percent of our
authorized end strength in place, augmented by 50 Reserve and Guard personnel, and a
300-person contractor force to fill in the skill and capacity gaps. In context of China,
USSPACECOM mentions that ‘Our competitors have demonstrated their intent to hold our
space capabilities at risk. Therefore, we will always defend our national interests, deter
aggression and support our allies and partners.’

24. Polar/ Arctic Region. The U.S. on 07 Oct 2022 unveiled its new national strategy
in the Arctic, warning of "increasing strategic competition" exacerbated by Russia and
China and calling for greater cooperation among allies to "uphold international law, rules,
norms and standards" in the region. The strategy, which is an update of a 2013 document
released by former President Barack Obama's administration, covers the U.S. agenda in
the region over the next 10 years i.e. 2022 to 2032. The document said that as an Arctic
nation itself, the U.S. has the "authority and responsibility" to steward and protect the
region. The strategy mentioned that "The United States seeks an Arctic region that is
peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative,". The strategy raised concern over
 20

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as Chinese efforts to gain influence in the region.
The U.S. said it seeks to "effectively compete and manage tensions" in the Arctic. The
U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region9 is built around four pillars as under:-

(a) Pillar 1: Security. We will deter threats to the U.S. homeland and our allies
by enhancing the capabilities required to defend our interests in the Arctic, while
coordinating shared approaches with allies and partners and mitigating risks of
unintended escalation. We will exercise U.S. government presence in the Arctic
region as required to protect the American people and defend our sovereign
territory.

(b) Pillar 2: Climate Change and Environmental Protection : The U.S.

government will partner with Alaskan communities and the State of Alaska to build
resilience to the impacts of climate change, while working to reduce emissions from
the Arctic as part of broader global mitigation efforts, to improve scientific
understanding, and to conserve Arctic ecosystems.

(c) Pillar 3: Sustainable Economic Development . We will pursue sustainable

development and improve livelihoods in Alaska, including for Alaska Native
communities, by investing in infrastructure, improving access to services, and
supporting growing economic sectors. We will also work with allies and partners to
expand highstandard investment and sustainable development across the Arctic
region.

(d) Pillar 4: International Cooperation and Governance . Despite the

challenges to Arctic cooperation resulting from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the
United States will work to sustain institutions for Arctic cooperation, including the
Arctic Council, and position these institutions to manage the impacts of increasing
activity in the region. We also seek to uphold international law, rules, norms, and
standards in the Arctic.
Nuclear Dimension

25. The United States has long pledged to refrain from using nuclear weapons against
most non-nuclear weapon states, but has neither ruled out their first use in all cases nor
specified the circumstances under which it would use them. This policy of “calculated
ambiguity” addressed U.S. concerns during the Cold War, when the United States and
NATO faced numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe.
At the time, the United States not only developed plans to use nuclear weapons on the
battlefield to disrupt or defeat attacking tanks and troops, but it also hoped that the risk of
a nuclear response would deter the Soviet Union from initiating a conventional attack. This
is not because the United States believed it could defeat the Soviet Union in a nuclear
war, but because it hoped the Soviet Union would know that the use of these weapons
9
National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2022, from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf
 21

would likely escalate to all-out nuclear war, with both sides suffering massive destruction.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has modified its declaratory policy to
reduce the apparent role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, but has not
declared that it would not use them first. The present number of nuclear warheads
worldwide in 2022, by country and deployment status is as under:-

Fig: No of Nuclear Warheads Worldwide in 2022, by Country and Deployment Status

Source: Statista 202210

10
https://www.statista.com/statistics/696410/size-and-composition-of-nuclear-arsenals-around-the-world/
 22

ORG

Chain Of Comd

26. The President of the United States is, according to the Constitution, the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and Chief Executive of the Federal
Government. The Secretary of Defense is the "Principal Assistant to the President in all
matters relating to the Department of Defense", and is vested with statutory authority to
lead the Department and all of its component agencies, including military command
authority second only to the President.

Fig: US Military Control by the President

27. The President and the Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the
Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch (10
U.S.C. § 162) runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the
Combatant Commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other
branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the
combatant commands, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, i.e., the Secretary of the Army (10 U.S.C. § 3013),
the Secretary of the Navy (10 U.S.C. § 5013), and the Secretary of the Air Force (10
U.S.C. § 8013). The Military Departments, organized separately within the Department,
operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military
Department.

Org Structure

28. Org Structure of Dept of Defence. The United States Department of

Defense (DoD) is an executive branch department of the federal government charged
with coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government directly
 23

related to national security and the United States Armed Forces. The secretary of defense,
appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, is by federal law the
head of the Department of Defense, "the principal assistant to the President in all matters
relating to Department of Defense", and has "authority, direction, and control over the
Department of Defense". The org of the Office of the Secretary of Defence is as under:-

Fig: Org Structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, USA

29. Org Structure of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is a body of
senior uniformed leaders in the Department of Defense who advise the secretary of
defense, the Homeland Security Council, the National Security Council and the president
on military matters. The org structure of JCS is as under:-
 24

Fig: Org Structure of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

30. Org Structure of USINDOPACOM. The Org structure for mil control of U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) responsible for Indo Pacific is as under:-
 25

Fig: Org Structure of the Office of the USINDOPACOM

Doctrine & Org : If so then What Analysis

31. The United States has worked out its strategies for to contain/ counter in Indo-
Pacific, Cyber & Space domain as well as polar/Arctic Region. The servicewise
infeerences for China are as under:-

(a) Military Modernization Objectives & Targets.

(i) Military Mechanization. The goal of mechanization of PLA Forces

has been broadly achieved as per the intended timeline of 2020. This has
 26

also significantly enhanced informationization and greatly improved strategic

capabilities of China. It has now allowed PLA’s weapons and equipment to
be networked into “systems of systems” and utilize more advanced
technologies suitable for “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare.

(ii) By 2027. Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization,

informatization, and intelligentization, while boosting the speed of
modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel and weapons
and equipment. This will provide China with more credible military options in
a Taiwan contingency and also effectively counter the U.S. military in the
Indo-Pacific region, and compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table
on Beijing’s terms.

(iii) By 2035. To comprehensively advance the modernization of military

theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and
equipment in step with the modernization of the country and basically
complete the modernization of national defense and the military.

(b) Military Capabilities for Global Power Projection .

(i) The PRC should continue to increase its military capabilities to

achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan, South
China Sea, or Korea contingency.

(ii) The PRC’s should continue to improve air and ground-based missile
strike capabilities to enable other military assets to operate farther from
China.

(iii) The PRC’s should continue to build a multi-carrier force. The PLA’s
next generation of carriers to have greater endurance for its global military
presence.

(c) Cyber & Space. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater
command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space,
cyber, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions
and capabilities. China should continues to develop counterspace capabilities—
including direct ascent, coorbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy
capabilities—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in
the space domain during a crisis or conflict. China should also continue to devote
significant resources to grow all aspects of its space program, from military space
applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific
endeavors, and space exploration.
 27

(d) Nuclear Capabilities. Over the next decade, the PRC should aim to
modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PRC should invest in and
expanding, the number of its land, sea and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and
construct the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear
forces. Aim to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and at least
1,000 warheads by 2030.

(e) Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The PLA established the JLSF in 2016
to streamline the PLA’s joint strategic and campaign-level logistics. The JLSF
should continue in establishing support relationships among joint logistic units and
other PLA service logistics elements and integrating civilian logistics into military
operations.
 28

TRAINING

System of PME & Service Specific Training

1. The details of institutes that are offering PME for US AF is as follows:-

2. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part,

was intended to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise enhance the
effectiveness of military operations, and improve DOD’s management and administration.
With the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress also intended to, consistent with the
congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 and
among other things, reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority in DOD.

3. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as amended, also:

a. established various joint officer management policies, including requiring

JPME for certain joint assignments and promotion categories

b. required officers to successfully complete an appropriate program at a JPME

school, among other things, to be designated as joint qualified—a prerequisite for
promotion to brigadier general or rear admiral lower half rank except under certain
circumstances

c. required the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to periodically review and revise the
curriculum of JPME schools to enhance the education and training of officers in
joint matters.
 29

4. In addition, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005 required the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive framework
for officer JPME. The PME continuum consists of five military educational levels that
correspond to the five phases of a military officer’s career:

(a) Pre-Commissioning
(b) Primary
(c) Intermediate
(d) Senior
(e) General/Flag Officer.
 30

5. As figure 1 indicates, intermediate- and senior-level PME and JPME programs—the

focus of our review—are designed for officers at pay grades O-4 through O-6. With the
exception of the Air Force Academy, the opportunity to absorb additional professional
military education institutions at the military academies is limited by physical, financial, and
environmental constraints. All three academies are at or over capacity for classroom and
dormitory facilities. The U.S. Military and U.S. Naval academies have very little land
available to build additional facilities. The services differ in how they interpret the definition
of professional military education as defined in the Military Education Policy Document.
For example, the Army considers an officer’s basic course in a warfare specialty such as
infantry or logistics as part of professional military education, while the Air Force does not.
Therefore, because of how the services define this education, the Army has more
professional military education schools that could be consolidated than the Air Force. 32
different schools involved in conducting 60 different courses. During academic year 1992-
93, over 36,000 students were enrolled in these schools.

6. Professional military education (PME) for U.S. Air Force officers is part of a
complex system for preparing officers of all services for command and staff work in a joint
context. The system must accommodate thousands of officers every year — some in-
residence at service schoolhouses, some through fellowship opportunities at varying
locations, and still others through distance learning. There is an apparent imbalance in the
assignment of Air Force officers to specific PME programs: A greater proportion of officers
who are ranked lower by the central developmental education board are assigned to PME
at Air University than those higher on the rankings, who tend to be assigned to non–Air
Force schoolhouses or fellowship programs.

Key Findings

7. There is a systemic tendency to value options other than Air University. In-
residence seats are consistently allocated to the top officers as ranked by order of merit,
but the officers ranked most highly do not usually attend in-residence PME at Air
University.
8. More officers who were ranked lower by the central developmental education board
are assigned to PME at Air University.

9. Some senior leaders cite problems with PME, but this concern is not universal. The
National Defense Strategy notes that PME has “stagnated” and does not foster the skills
and abilities needed for independent action during combat. Within the Air Force, there are
many suggestions for how the entire PME system might better prepare officers for the
future, but most senior Air Force leaders whose statements the authors reviewed did not
call for a wholesale revision.
 31

10. Officers do not rank the quality of Air University schoolhouses highly Surveyed
officers view PME at Air Force schools less favorably than other options; few ranked Air
University options as top quality. Officers who had attended Air University programs were
more likely than others to say that the course content needs improvement.

11. There is considerable discontent with Air University's location. Survey respondents
and Air Force leadership voiced concerns about the location at Maxwell Air Force Base in
Alabama. The quality of local public schools and employment options for spouses are the
top concerns and impede the ability to recruit top-notch faculty to the area.

Military Professional Education System.

12. Career military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the Armed
Forces of the United States are the beneficiaries of sequential, regularly scheduled
periods of professional education. Military leaders return full-time to the "schoolhouse"
every three to five years during a twenty-plus year career. Each of these in-residence
educational experiences lasts from two months to a year or longer. When coupled with
advanced civil schooling, self-study, and on-the-job learning, these courses provide the
officer or NCO with the theoretical and practical knowledge needed for duties of increasing
complexity and scope as she or he advances in rank. For the sake of brevity, the U.S.
Army's Officer Professional Military Education (OPME) and Non-commissioned Officers
Education System (NCOES) will be used here as examples.

13. Professional military education focuses on leadership, management theory and

practices, military history and operational doctrine, national defense policy, planning and
decision-making, legal responsibilities, and professional ethics. Academic evaluations are
primarily performance-oriented, with criteria and learning conditions prescribed for each
task. Frequent informal feedback and periodic indepth performance evaluations are
provided. Emphasis is on enhancing the ability to function effectively as a leader and team
member, and in staff positions of combined arms and joint service organizations.

14. For the majority of commissioned officers, professional education begins with the
precommissioning phase, which is completed at one of the service academies (U.S.
Military Academy, Naval Academy, Air Force Academy, or Coast Guard Academy) or
through a Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program at a participating college or
university. Officer Candidate Schools provide opportunities for selected enlisted members
of the various services to complete the requirements for commissioning. These
educational programs prepare young men and women to assume the responsibilities of
junior officers (second lieutenants in the Army, Air Force, and Marines and ensigns in the
Navy and Coast Guard) in active-duty (full-time), Reserve, or National Guard units.
 32

15. For enlisted members of the Armed Services, professional education begins with
basic training, or boot camp, followed by advanced technical training in one of the many
occupational and vocational fields required by increasingly complex and technologically
advanced organizations. Members receive a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)
designation upon successful completion of this training. The military-skill training
component of precommissioning programs has much in common with basic training.
Following an initial tour of duty, selected Army enlisted members attend the NCOES Basic
Course, which focuses on small-unit leadership.

16. The second phase of OPME focuses on the technical and tactical duties of junior
officers specific to each branch and service. Army lieutenants attend the Officers Basic
Course for their initial branch assignment, such as the Armor Officers Basic Course at Fort
Knox, Kentucky. Marine Corps officers attend their infantry-oriented basic course at
Quantico, Virginia, and then may attend a specialty course such as the Army's Artillery
School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Naval ensigns selected for Surface Warfare or Submarine
Service attend basic courses in their specialty. Officers selected for flight training attend
flight school. Some officers attend special qualification courses such as the U.S. Army
Ranger School, material maintenance programs, nuclear propulsion, or language school
prior to their first unit assignments. Officers Basic Courses provide the functional
equivalent of enlisted MOS certification and the tactical leadership training provided during
the Basic NCO Course.

17. After completing three to five years of service with troop units, Army officers attend
a two-phased Captains Career Course. Phase one is a branch-specific advanced course
that prepares attendees for command of companies, batteries, or troops (military units
ranging in size from 60 to 200 soldiers), and for technical and staff responsibilities at
battalion and brigade levels. Experiential, case-based interactive learning with extensive
use of simulation devices and practical field applications predominate the instructional
methodologies.

18. Immediately following completion of phase one, Army officers attend phase two, the
six-week Staff Process Course at the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3).
CAS3 employs small-group instruction techniques designed to improve an officer's ability
to analyze and solve problems, communicate orally and in writing, interact effectively as a
key member of a military staff, and to apply operational doctrine and procedures in the
field. Each staff group is composed of twelve students from combat, combat support,
combat service support, and specialty branches in order to encourage interdisciplinary
thinking and combined arms doctrine. Naval officers attend similar courses to prepare
them for duty as divisional officers on board ships and submarines, and for staff positions.
In preparation for assuming duties as platoon sergeants, staff specialists, and first
sergeants, noncommissioned officers attend the installation-based Advanced
Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC).
 33

19. Selected Army officers receive education in nonbranch-related functional areas–

such as Systems Automation, Army Acquisition Corps, and Foreign Area Specialties at
residential military schools–through the Advanced Civil Schooling program, which includes
the Technological Enhancement Program, or through Training With Industry. Most
midcareer officers complete advanced academic degrees through government-funded
programs on duty time or personally financed off-duty study, while many
noncommissioned officers complete associate and bachelor's degrees while off duty.
Today, the American military is unique among the armies of the world in its high
percentage of officers with master's degrees and Ph.D.s.

20. The fourth stage of OPME is the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).
Attendance at resident CGSC is selective and prepares officers for command at battalion
and brigade levels and for senior staff positions. Nonresident/distance learning CGSC
courses are also offered for active-duty, Reserve, and National Guard officers.

21. Selected officers attend a sister service CGSC level course (i.e., Air Command and
Staff College) or an allied national institution such as the British Staff College. Emphasis is
placed on planning and direction of joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational)
operations, in accordance with the congressionally mandated Phase I of the Joint
Professional Military Education Program (DOD Reorganization Act of 1986). Selected
officers attend the Joint Forces Staff College as Phase II of this program. A small group of
officers is chosen to participate in a second year of intensive study at the School of
Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, focusing on military history and
the art of war, computerized war games, research, and doctrinal writing.

22. Army officers selected for command at battalion and higher levels attend pre-
command courses in preparation for these demanding assignments. The
Noncommissioned Officer Education System equivalent of CGSC and pre-command
courses is the Sergeants Major Academy. This final stage of NCOES prepares highly
qualified senior NCOs for service as Command Sergeants Major and as senior staff
assistants.

23. Attendance at one of the Senior Service Colleges is the final stage of OPME.
Emphasis is on strategic planning, policy, national security decision-making, and joint and
combined military operations. Some officers pursue Senior Service College Fellowship
studies at leading universities such as Harvard and Georgetown, at the NATO Defense
College, and at interdepartmental courses such as the Advanced Operational Studies
program, the Defense Systems Management College, or the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.

(a) College of Naval Command and Staff, Newport, Rhode Island

 34

(b) College of Naval Warfare, Newport, Rhode Island

(c) Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Air War
College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AlabamaMarine Corps Command and Staff
College, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia
(d) Marine Corp War College, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia
(e) Army’s Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
(f) Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
(g) Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

Jt Training & Exercise

24. Joint Training Deputy Directorate Program Management Activities. Deputy

Directorate Program Management Activities (DD PMA) provides program and training
policy management for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the training
enterprise in support of joint readiness. DD PMA is comprised of two divisions. The Policy
and Programs Division (PPD) develops and maintains CJCS Joint Training Policies and
publications, administers the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), administers
security cooperation authorities relevant to exercises and training (e.g., 10 U.S.C sect
321) and notifies the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense of
significant military exercises. The Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement and
Training Transformation (CE2T2) Division provides program management of the CE2T2
program, and is the primary interface to combatant command, Service, and Joint Staff J-7
CE2T2 stakeholders for all program related activities. These responsibilities include
governance, program planning, budget execution, program assessment, program
reporting, and process improvement.

25. The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the Global Force Management
Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the
Unified Command Plan (UCP) are the principal sources of guidance for CCMD steady-
state campaign, contingency, and posture planning efforts, which inform subsequent
development of supporting joint training programs. The GEF promulgates strategic
planning guidance to reflect both desired regional/functional objectives as well as
contingency planning guidance. The GEF directs the development of campaign and
contingency plans for Geographic Combatant Commands and Functional Combatant
Commands.

26. The GEF supports Military Departments, CSAs, and the NGB development of
campaign support plans (CSP) to organize and prioritize their actions in support of
CCMDs. The campaign plan (CP) becomes the mechanism for organizing, integrating,
and prioritizing the campaign; specifically all activities undertaken and resources applied
by the CCMD to include training and exercise events. These activities are designed to
 35

sustain peace and security under conditions that promote U.S. national security interests
or set the conditions for military success if deterrence fails. Specifically they are designed
to ensure the survival of the nation; prevent catastrophic attack against U.S. territory;
secure the global economic system; ensure the security, confidence, and reliability of our
allies and partners; protect U.S. citizens and property abroad; and preserve and extend
universal values.

27. The GEF and JSCP, through the priorities established by the commander in the
CP, provide exercise planners with clear guidance on priorities and objectives. As a result,
exercises should reflect GEF regional or functional priorities as well as campaign and
contingency plan objectives.

Joint Training System (JTS)

28. The JTS is a four-phase iterative set of processes that aligns joint training strategy
with assigned missions to produce trained and ready individuals, staffs, and units.
Although the application of the JTS is deliberate in concept, it is flexible in execution. The
JTS assists commanders at all echelons in defining the required level of individual and
collective task performance; determining the current level(s) of performance; executing
training programs to improve performance; and assessing those levels of performance
relative to mission capability requirements. The capabilities-based JTS set of processes is
focused on training requirements identification, planning, event execution, evaluation, and
assessment; however, the JTS is also a suitable means for harmonizing joint training with
joint force development requirements. The JTS four-phased approach is appropriate for
aligning and integrating valid joint concepts and solutions, along with lessons learned and
emerging doctrine, into joint training to address joint mission readiness as well as joint
force development requirements.

29. Importance of the Joint Training System (JTS). The JTS is designed to ensure
the U.S. Armed Forces are trained and prepared to employ a broad portfolio of military
capabilities that offer versatility across the full spectrum of mission requirements. More
specifically, it provides a capabilities-based method for aligning joint training programs
with assigned missions (GEF, GFMIG, JSCP, and UCP) consistent with command
priorities, capabilities (both current and proposed), and available resources (CP/CSP). a.
The Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) is a Webbased tool suite
that, in conjunction with the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) enterprise and
the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), provides a set of integrated
information management capabilities. These systems are used to identify, collect, analyze,
store, and disseminate the data required to support implementation of the JTS and sustain
a command joint training program. b. The DRRS enterprise consists of Joint, Service, and
OSD readinessfocused applications which collectively support readiness reporting and
assessment requirements. References to DRRS in this guide are generic, but for the most
 36

part will refer to DRRS-Strategic which incorporates the majority of DRRS capabilities c.
The Joint Knowledge Online supports web-based individual and staff training and provides
a repository of digital training resources, training courses and small staff exercise
scenarios for individual training plans and exercise events.

Tenets of Joint Training

30. The following six basic tenets of joint training are intended as guiding principles to
be applied by commanders and agency directors in developing their joint training plans
(JTP).

(a) Joint Doctrine. Effective joint training is based on joint doctrine. Joint
doctrine establishes the fundamentals of joint operations and provides guidance on
how best to employ U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common
objective. Joint doctrinal publications describe standard procedures and establish
uniform operational methods based on a common terminology. This baseline
assists commanders in developing standards for joint training, exercises, and
operations.

(b) Primary Trainers. Commanders and directors at all echelons are the
primary trainers and are responsible for preparing their command to accomplish
assigned missions. Commanders validate mission capability requirements and
determine joint training requirements. Commanders implement the processes of the
JTS, supported by JTIMS, to plan, develop, execute effective joint training events,
and evaluate joint training audience performance.

(c) Mission Focus. Commanders and directors will ensure their joint training
programs are focused on supported CCMD missions and their training
requirements are derived from their assessment of current capability against the
mission capability requirements established in each organization’s joint/agency
mission-essential task list (J/AMETL). The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)
provides the library of approved joint mission tasks. CCMDs, Services, RC, NGB,
CSAs, and the Joint Staff must select the Universal Joint Tasks (UJT) that become
their mission-essential tasks (METs) from the UJTL to communicate their capability
requirements. A successful training program can be achieved when commanders
and directors at every level consciously focus their training on METs. All personnel
and components shall train on their METs to commander established conditions
and standards to provide the required capabilities that enable commanders to
execute effectively their mission responsibilities.

(d) Realistic Training. Train the way you intend to operate. Joint training must
be based on relevant conditions and realistic standards. Training shall resemble the
 37

conditions of actual operations to the maximum extent possible and use existing
operational information networks. Commanders should also feel free to explore
recommended alternative ways to accomplish anticipated missions. An element of
realistic training, especially for the most senior leaders in the command is the
realistic portrayal of leaders and echelons above the command to improve realism
and engagement of the command’s senior leaders in joint training events.

(e) Centralize Planning and Decentralize Execution. In military operations,

centralized planning and decentralized execution provides organizational flexibility.
Decisions are made where and when necessary by subordinates, consistent with
available resources and the senior commander’s intentions, priorities, and mission
objectives. Training methods and modes must mirror operational techniques. The
intent is to apply available resources with enough flexibility to optimize training
efficiency.

(f) Link Training Assessment to Readiness Assessment. Ultimately, the

purpose of joint training is to improve capability and joint readiness to perform
operational missions. Commanders and their staffs use joint training assessment
data to support readiness assessment in DRRS. Once assessments are approved
in JTIMS, they migrate to DRRS and are made available in the DRRS mission
assessment function to synchronize and link to readiness assessments.

Joint Training System (JTS) In Perspective.

31. Throughout history, military training has evolved with the nature of the strategic
environment. The case can be made that U.S. and allied forces fought jointly during WWII
and previous conflicts. However, they did so out of necessity but not necessarily design, in
order to bring the greatest amount of force to the enemy in the most efficient manner
possible. Training to fight jointly did not come to full fruition in the U.S. military until the
1990s. Following the Operation Desert Storm after action review, the Chairman and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff determined the need to institutionalize a “mission-to-task”
(requirementsbased) training system aimed at improving joint readiness. CJCS policy and
guidance directed the evolution of joint training from events-based training to
requirements-based training that is embodied in the four-phase JTS. The JTS was initiated
by the Chairman in FY 1994, fully implemented in the CCMDs in 1998, and directed for
DoD-wide implementation in 2004. The JTS is now a capabilities-based system, having
evolved in consonance with other key DoD systems as national security and national
military strategies took on a capabilities-based construct.

Commander’s/Director’s Responsibilities
 38

32. As a commander or agency director, what are your responsibilities with regard to
joint or agency training and where can command or agency emphasis be placed with best
results? The following guidelines identify those areas where commanders and directors
have specific responsibilities. These responsibilities will be stressed throughout this guide
to show where the commander or director has specific input as well as overall
responsibility. Additional details and guidance are found in references a, b and c.

(a) Designate a staff office of primary responsibility for joint training and ensure
the JTS is employed to manage training within the command.

(b) Provide authoritative direction on all aspects of joint training to subordinate

commands and forces to include requirements for J/AMETL and JTP development.

(c) Annually review the J/AMETL and update in DRRS.

(d) Review and assess the adequacy of task linkages between command
J/AMETL and those of assigned and supporting forces.

(e) Provide commander’s and/or director’s training guidance to initiate JTP

development and refine, as necessary, throughout the development process.

(f) Approve and publish JTP annually.

(g) Consider resources available to meet joint/agency training requirements with

focus on lower cost training modes and use of distributed joint training enablers to
achieve multiple cross-CCMD joint training objectives. Initiate prioritization of
resource needs.

(h) Evaluate the performance of the training audience in achieving task

standards in every training event. Additionally, evaluate the effectiveness of training
events in achieving training objectives.

(i) Identify, validate, and track observations that apply across the Joint Force for
resolution within the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP).

(j) Assess the command’s ability to meet J/AMETL standards. Monthly, assess
the command’s proficiency using the results of training events in JTIMS, real-world
operations, experimental events, lessons learned in JLLIS, and security cooperation
activities, and report MET readiness in DRRS.
 39

(k) Identify and report in DRRS, JLLIS, and JTIMS any program or resource
shortfalls and the impact these shortfalls have on the command’s and/or agency’s
ability to accomplish its joint/agency training requirements.

33. The JTS goals are to improve the joint readiness of joint forces; to improve the
interoperability of units; and to achieve an integrated training effort that facilitates unified
action.

(a) Improve Joint Readiness

(b) Improve Interoperability
(c) Unified Action

34. JCS exercises contribute significantly to the training and readiness of U.S. military
forces. They are a principal means of providing both interservice training and combined
training with allied forces. They also provide excellent opportunities to test the plans and
doctrine U.S. Forces will employ in the event of war. The exercises' contributions to our
forces' readiness are demonstrated by the following statement, given by former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown, before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services in 1977 hearings: "Joint training exercises are essential to the preparation
of U.S. Defense. * * * Unless operating forces are trained and evaluated jointly, total force
readiness cannot be achieved.

35. JCS has authorized the commanders of unified and specified commands to
schedule, plan, and conduct joint/ combined exercises. The unified and specified
commanders may hold exercises employing their own forces within their own respective
geographic areas of responsibility without referral to JCS. Their authority for JCS
exercises is similar, except that the commanders must coordinate exercise scheduling
with JCS. The JCS Exercise Program is, with a few exceptions, a collation of the JCS
directed and coordinated exercises included in the sponsoring unified and specified
commands' individual exercise programs. JCS is responsible for

(a) providing the unified and specified commands procedural guidance for
developing and executing joint/combined exercises

(b) coordinating the scheduling of JCS directed and coordinated exercises

within established funding limitations

(c) approving the annual JCS Exercise Program for execution. In developing
their respective annual exercise programs, the unified and specified commands
should assess their needs for joint/combined exercises and structure their
programs to reflect the number and size of needed exercises. To do this, these
commands must examine their forces' readiness conditions, training requirements,
 40

and the plans and doctrine that require testing and tailor their programs to these
needs. Once exercise needs are identified, all available alternatives for satisfying
the needs --such as field training exercise, command post exercise, or coordinated
unilateral service exercises L/ --should be examined. Finally the exercises deemed
necessary should be fully justified on the basis of the above studies.

36. JCS exercise program development guidance to the unified and specified
commands should incorporate the above conditions. Further, since JCS acts as the
Secretary of Defense's military staff for operational direction of unified and specified
commands' forces and is responsible for approving the annual JCS Exercise Program, To
enable designers to plan the exercises to satisfy identified requirements and provide
benchmarks for effective exercise evaluation, exercise objectives should be as specific,
limited, and clearly defined as possible. JCS exercises provide excellent opportunities for
identifying and correcting weaknesses and deficiencies in joint forces' readiness, plans,
and doctrine. To take maximum advantage of these opportunities, the exercises should be
carefully and methodically evaluated. Resulting lessons learned should be adequately
addressed and improvements incorporated into ongoing operations and subsequent
exercises to preclude, to the degree possible, their recurrence.

Spl Training and Exercise with Others.

Ser Year Exercise

No
1 2012 Cold Response. 16,000 troops. Norwegian-led in Norway in March.
2 2014 Atlantic Resolve. Four companies of U.S. forces (about 150 troops
each) rotate continuously throughout the year, deployed in Estonia,
Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. Also U.S. Air Force Joint Terminal Attack
Controller from the 2nd Air Support Operations Squadron out of
Vilseck, Germany.
3 2015 Dragoon Ride. Small operation connected with Atlantic Resolve.
4 Spring Storm (Siil, Hedgehog). 13,000 troops including 7,000
reservists. Article 5-type scenario in Estonia in May.[8]
5 2016 Air Component
United States
Boeing B-52H Stratofortresses of the 2d Bomb Wing[9]
Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers[9]
General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons[9]Lockheed C-130
Herculeses[9]
Anaconda 2016. Polish-led exercises involving 31,000 military
personnel from 24 NATO and non-NATO countries, including 14,000
from the U.S., 12,000 from Poland and 800 from the UK.[10] Elements of
the NATO Response Force participated in the exercises.[11] Took place
 41

from 7 June to 17 June.[11]

Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons and U.K aviation Task
Force operate in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.
6 2017 Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, U.S. 10th Combat
Aviation Brigade, a U.S. Army Aviation Brigade of 400 soldiers and,
also from the U.S., 3500 army troops, 87 tanks and 144 Bradley
Fighting Vehicles operated in Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and
Latvia.
Rapid Trident. 2500 personnel, including Canadian. Location: Ukraine.
7 2018 Exercise Trident Juncture 2018. 50,000 troops. Held
in Trøndelag, Oppland and Hedmark, Norway mainly in October–
November. Stated purpose was to train the NATO Response Force.
Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern
Europe.
8 2019 Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern
Europe.
9 2020 DEFENDER-Europe 20. U.S.-led multinational exercise including
NATO participation. Included 20,000 soldiers deployed directly from
the U.S. to Europe.[13]
Dynamic Mongoose 20. NATO-led. 29 June to 10 July 2020 in the High
North. Ships, submarines, aircraft and personnel from six Allied nations
(France, Germany, Norway, UK, Canada and U.S.) exercised off the
coast of Iceland for anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare
training. According to scientists, sonar anti-submarine trainings during
Dynamic Mongoose 20 resulted in disastrous consequences for the
population of whales in the North Atlantic. British zoologists have
recorded the death of at least 29 marine mammals over several weeks
across Europe that caused irreparable damage to the fragile marine
ecosystem.[14]
Cold Response. Suspended due to the pandemic.
Bomber Task Force. Strategic bomber mission held since 2018 for U.S.
integration with NATO allies.[15]
Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern
Europe.
Six U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bomber aircraft from the 5th
Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, arrived at RAF
Fairford, England on 22 August 2020 for a planned training mission
where the aircraft conducted theater and flight training across Europe
and Africa.[16]
 42

On 4 September, the American B-52s entered the airspace of Ukraine

for the first time in history, where they made a long flight along the
borders of the Crimean peninsula.[17]
On 25 September, two U.S. bombers staged a mock attack run
on Kaliningrad, a Russian semi-exclave on the Baltic between Poland
and Lithuania, where Russia moved nuclear-capable missiles in 2018.
[18]
The flight path allowed the bombers effectively to fly a circle
around Kaliningrad. The simulated raid on the region was a test case
of neutralizing Russian missile systems.[19]
Altogether, in August-September 2020, two U.S. Air Force B-52
Stratofortress bomber aircraft, integrated with Norwegian F-35 and F-
16 fighter aircraft as well as Norwegian frigates, flew over international
waters in the vicinity of the Norwegian Sea.[20]
10 2021 In 2021, NATO expected to conduct 95 NATO exercises and NATO
countries were expected to conduct 220 other national and
multinational exercises.[12] The NATO exercises were to include 24
land-focused exercises, 24 air exercises, 9 maritime exercises and 20
multi-domain exercises.

37. Other exercises were to be conducted to train specific functions such as cyber
defence, crisis response decision-making, Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear
defense, logistics, communications and medical activities. The exercises included the
following:

(a) Soldiers from the Rapid Response Forces Division in the NATO exercise
GREEN GRIFFIN 21 on Oct. 4, 2021 at Lehnin, Germany. GREEN GRIFFIN is an
annual NATO training exercise of NATO allies and partner forces. The exercise
involved elements from the U.S. Army’s 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, the
Bundeswehr's Rapid Response Forces Division, the Netherlands Air Force, and the
Romanian Army’s Mechanized Brigade.

(b) Griffin Force I 2021. Training of land component of NATO Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force in enablement and rapid military mobility, 18 - 20
January in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.[12]
(c) Defender-Europe 21. 30,000 troops.[21] Mid-March through June. Included
"nearly simultaneous operations across more than 30 training areas"
in Albania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Kosovo and other countries.

(d) Locked Shields 21. "One of the world's largest and most complex live cyber
defence exercises, hosted annually by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence... The exercise simulates responding to a massive cyber
 43

incident, and includes strategic decision-making, legal and communication aspects.

Held 1 - 30 April in Estonia.

(e) CAPABLE DEPLOYER 2021 – NATO Allied Force Interoperability Exercise.

Romania, 2 May to 23 May. Planned and coordinated by the Multinational Logistics
Center.

(f) Wind Spring 21. Romania, 2 May to 27 May. Joint and multinational NATO
military operations.

(g) Ramstein Ambition 21 – The NATO Electronic Warfare Force Integration

Programme with regional elements of NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence
System conducted through the Combined Air Operation Centre (CAOC), which took
place between 3 May and 14 May.

(h) Spring Storm. 14,000 troops, 11 May to 31 May in Estonia. "A large live
exercise of the Estonian Defence Forces with participation from NATO's Enhanced
Forward Presence battlegroups and other Allied forces."

(i) Breeze 21. Live exercise led by Bulgarian Navy from 11-19 July. Size:
around 2500 people.

(j) Iron Wolf II 21. 4000 troops. Live exercise, 1-26 November in Lithuania to
train NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence.

(k) Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern Europe.

(l) Cold Response. Cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

(m) Neptune Strike 22 started in late January with aircraft carrier USS Harry S.
Truman and its battle group coming under NATO command for patrolling exercises
in the Mediterranean Sea.

(n) Cold Response 2022. 30,000 participants from 27 countries. Norwegian-led

in Norway starting 14 March expected to end in April.

Synergy & Synchronisation In Thinking, Planning and Action

38. Cross-Domain Synergy via the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)
Planning blends the collective knowledge of the many diverse communities within the joint
staff into a single, coherent plan which accomplishes the JFCs’ missions. It transforms
 44

national strategic objectives into activities by development of operational products that

include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment,
redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. This flexible and adaptable process is
applicable to planners across all domains and mirrors Service planning processes.

39. Planning involves a combination of conceptual planning and detailed processes.

Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 recognizes this dynamic by describing the benefits of operational
art and design in chapter III before describing the JOPP in chapter IV. Conceptual
planning enables cross-domain and cross-functional collaboration which fosters
innovative, cross-domain solutions. Operational art and the application of operational
design provide the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations.30 Detailed
methods are used to help provide form and function to the planning process. This section
will look at how conceptual planning can feed detailed planning through discussion,
debate, and brainstorming. These methods in combination assist the joint planner
understand the problem and to develop creative solutions.

40. JOPP is an orderly, analytical, structured process, which consists of a set of logical
steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the
best COA; and produce a plan or order.31 JOPP provides a proven process to organize
the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to
develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the
military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that
mission.

41. Conceptual Planning. Conceptual planning, or “brainstorming,” occurs early,

often, and regularly throughout the planning process to generate as many different options
for solving the military problem as possible within the allocated time. Brainstorming
sessions should inspire creative thinking, encourage open discussion from all participants,
and drive consideration of many, wide-ranging options. They should assemble experts
with differing perspectives to account for all available capabilities and elicit novel
approaches to solving the problem prior to detailed planning. While less time and fewer
planners may be available for Crisis Action Planning (CAP), planners should 30 U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, (Washington, DC: U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), IV-1. 31 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint
Operation Planning, IV-1. Joint Operational Planning integrates military actions with those
of the other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose to achieve the
specified objectives. Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP 23 still attempt to allocate time
for unstructured, unconstrained thinking. Cyberspace, space, and SOF planners are
particularly important participants due to their expertise in employing these specialized
capabilities. LNOs from the U.S. interagency and foreign nations can add unique
experiences. The range of perspectives gained by including many different subject matter
experts in the planning process facilitates the development of cross-domain solutions.
 45

These conceptual sessions will provide dividends to planners through exchanging

knowledge, collaborating on like ideas, and debating differences that can lead to
innovative thought and solutions. The results will assist planners during JOPP or CAP to
create the best possible plan in support of the JFC.

42. Detailed Planning. Joint operation planning occurs within the Adaptive Planning
and Execution (APEX) system, which is the department-level system of joint policies,
processes, procedures, and reporting structures. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Guide (CJCSG) 3130 Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework
defines APEX as “the Joint Capability to create and revise plans rapidly and
systematically, as circumstances require.” APEX is supported by communications and
information technology that is used by the Joint Planning and Execution Community
(JPEC) worldwide to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment,
sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations.
Figure III-2 shows the JPEC members. All domain planners are members of the JPEC.
Chapter 3 24 The JFC gains an understanding of the operational environment, defines the
problem, and develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation. JFCs
communicate their operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting
commands, agencies, and multinational/nongovernmental entities in their initial planning
guidance. The JFC’s timely communication with subordinates ensures their approach can
be translated into executable plans. This iterative process between the JFC’s maturing
operational approach and the development of the mission and concept of operations
(CONOPS) through JOPP facilitates the continuing development of possible COAs and
their refinement into eventual CONOPS and executable plans.

43. JOPP. Planners use JOPP to translate the creative thinking developed through
conceptual planning into a plan or order. It is a seven-step process that culminates with a
published operations order (OPORD) in CAP and results in an operations plan (OPLAN),
concept plan (CONPLAN), Base Plan, or commander estimate during contingency
planning.33 The JOPP starts with Mission Analysis (MA) followed by Course of Action
(COA) Development, COA Analysis, COA Comparison, and COA Selection and ends with
OPLAN production and rehearsals. Lead planners direct these efforts, and all supporting
planners analyze, simulate, exercise, and critique to produce the best plan. The resulting
plan should support the foreign and/or domestic theater campaign plan and global
synchronizing plans. The JOPP steps are provided at Figure III-3
 46

44. Planning Initiation. “Joint operation planning begins when an appropriate authority
recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or
actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority-the President, SecDef, or CJCS-initiates
planning by deciding to develop military options. The Guidance for Employment of Force
(GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and
related strategic documents provide initial guidance for deliberate planning.”35 Planners
from all domains must understand the guidance in these documents.

45. JFCs and lead planners must integrate all domain planners (air, land, maritime,
space, and cyberspace) as soon as possible. It is particularly important to include space
and cyberspace planners due to the unique authority levels, requirements, processes, and
time-sensitivities associated with employment of their domain capabilities. Some space
and cyberspace employment options could require an inordinate amount of time to gain
approval for execution. JFCs and lead planners must understand the capabilities and
limitations early in the planning process.

46. Mission Analysis. Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and
purpose of the operation and allows the JFC to issue guidance. The first step is defining
the problem. It is the most difficult and the most important step. It involves diagnosing the
situation to focus on the real problem and not on its symptoms. Domain planners will
accomplish all the steps outlined in Figure III-4 for their domain. Planners should
understand that the steps do not necessarily happen sequentially. Although some
activities occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel
processing of information by the JFC and staff, particularly in a CAP situation. During
mission analysis, it is essential that the tasks (specified and implied) and their purposes
are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations (restraints-
cannot do, or constraints-must do) on actions that the JFC or subordinate forces may take
 47

are understood; and the correlation between the JFC’s mission and intent and those of
higher and other commanders is understood. It is at the end of the mission analysis
process that all domain planners produce their staff estimates.
 48

47. If planners fail to account for each of the domains - air, land, maritime, space, and
cyberspace - staff estimates will be incomplete and the resulting COAs, OPORDs, and
plans will be sub-optimal. Once mission analysis is complete; the JFC receives a mission
analysis brief. An example of how the brief might be structured is provided at Figure III-6.
Figure III-6: Example Mission Analysis Briefing.

48. Course of Action Development (COA Dev) . “A COA is a potential way (solution,
method) to accomplish the assigned mission. The staff develops COAs to provide unique
choices to the commander, all oriented on accomplishing the military end state. A good
COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to
meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future
operations. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative.”39 Figure III-7
provides key inputs and outputs for COA Dev. The products of mission analysis drive COA
development. Since the operational approach contains the JFC’s broad vision to solving
the problem, the role of COA development is to expand this concept with the additional
details. These details must describe who will take the action, what type of military action
will occur, when the action will begin, where the action will occur, why the action is
required (purpose), how the action will occur (method of employment of forces), and upon
 49

whom will the action be directed. COAs must be substantially distinguishable from each
other. The JFC’s involvement in the early operational design process can help ensure that
only viable options are considered. If time and personnel resources permit, different COAs
could be developed by different teams to ensure they are unique. During this step,
planners screen the viable options proposed during conceptual planning and further
develop the COAs considered acceptable, feasible, suitable, and distinct. Figure III-7
Course of Action Development Inputs and Output. Bringing the capabilities of different
domains together mandates that planners from all domains participate and characterize
the potential contributions and limitations of their area of expertise. Cross-Domain Synergy
via the JOPP 29 Figure III-8: Course of Action Development40

49. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming. COA analysis is the process of
closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the JFC and staff to
tentatively identify COAs that are valid, and then compare these COAs. The JFC and staff
analyze each tentative COA separately according to the JFC’s guidance. While time-
consuming, COA analysis should answer two primary questions: Is the COA feasible, and
is it acceptable? Key inputs and outputs of COA analysis are provided in Figure III-
8Wargaming is the primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargaming is a disciplined
process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation. The
process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and
probable COAs; and characteristics of the physical environment. When time permits,
planners should wargame each critical event within a proposed COA using the action,
 50

reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction.

Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated more time
than any other step. At a minimum, each retained COA should be wargamed against both
the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. When considering these enemy COAs,
the analysis must consider all domains to ensure JFCs have a complete understanding of
the COA they approve for execution.

50. Course of Action Comparison. COA comparison is a subjective process in which

planners study each COA independently and evaluate/compare it against a set of criteria
established by the staff and JFC. The goal is to identify and recommend the COA that has
the highest probability of success against the enemy COA that is of the most concern to
the JFC. Figure III-9 depicts inputs and outputs for COA comparison. Figure III-10: Course
of Action Comparison42 42 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation
Planning, IV-37. To accurately consider all aspects of the mission, each domain must be
adequately represented for friendly forces, adversary forces, and wargame control groups.
Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP 31 JFCs modify the criteria list as required.
Normally, staff officers use a matrix, such as the example in Figure III-10 to compare
COAs with respect to their functional areas. Figure III-11: Staff Estimator Matrix
(Intelligence Estimate)
 51

51. COA Approval. In this step, the staff briefs the COA analysis and comparison
results, then recommends a COA to the JFC. The COA brief include the following: a.
Prepare and present the COA decision briefing. b. Commander selects/modifies the COA.
c. Refine Selected COA. d. Prepare the Commander’s Estimate.
 52

52. Plan/Order Development. From the JFC’s COA selection, the staff must now
produce an OPLAN or OPORD. Deliberate planning will produce an OPLAN, while CAP
typically will result in an OPORD. The JFC and staff, in collaboration with mission partners
and planners from across all domains, accomplish plan/order development. The JOPP
transforms the selected COA into a Concept of the Operations (CONOPS) that
accomplishes the JFC’s mission. It describes how the actions of the joint force
components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to
accomplish the mission, including branches and sequels. The CJCSM 3130.03 series that
provide detailed guidance on CONOPS content and format.

Think Tanks

53. You can think of a think tank as a research university blessed with a complete
absence of students and where, as a consequence, none of its professors has to teach---
all they have to do is research, research, research. At last count, the United States
had 1,984 think tanks---nearly a third of the world's total. Few of the think tanks are as
follows:-

(a) American Foreign Policy Council Issues covered include: Aid to the Former
USSR; Missile Threats & Defenses; Espionage, the KGB & the Russian Security
Services; Reform in Russia; U.S.-China Relations, and Chemical Weapons.
 53

(b) Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Funded by the U.S. Department of
Defense.

(c) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Non-Proliferation Project "An

internationally recognized source of information and analysis on weapons of mass
destruction" (from the website).

(d) Cato Institute - Defense Studies Maintains an extensive publications

program on topics such as military spending, NATO, and international security.

(e) The Center for Defense Information A private, nongovernmental, and

"independent monitor" of the military. Maintains the Arms Trade Database.

(f) Center for International Policy "Promoting a U.S. foreign policy based on
peace, international cooperation, demilitarization and respect for basic human
rights."(from the site) Topics include Cuba, Arms Trade, and Demilitarization.

(g) Center for Nonproliferation Studies "The world's largest non-governmental

organization devoted to combating the spread of weapons of mass
destruction."(from the site) Resources by subject and by region.

(h) Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Topics ranging from
Defense and Preventive Diplomacy to Infectious Disease.

(i) Center for the Study of Technology and Society A major focus of the Center
is National Security.
(j) Commonwealth Institute A local (Cambridge) public policy research
organization with current projecs in defense and military affairs.

(k) Council on Foreign Relations - National Security Publishes Foreign Affairs, a

leading journal on global issues.

(l) Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The FAS is a widely respected

organization of scientists concerned with arms control issues. see also Arms
Control Agreements

(m) Foreign Policy in Focus "A "think tank without walls" that functions as an
international network of more than 650 policy analysts and advocates."(from the
site)
 54

(n) Global Focus - Flashpoints Provides country reports on current conflicts,

ethnic violence, terrorism, nationalism, human rights, and foreign policy issues.

(o) Henry L. Stimson Center An independent, nonprofit, public policy institute

committed to finding and promoting innovative solutions to the security challenges
confronting the United States and other nations in the twenty-first century.

(p) Heritage Foundation Openly conservative in its views, the objective of

Heritage is to present to policy-makers and opinion leaders, and especially
members of Congress and their staff, factual and timely information on major issues
of the day. 'Key issues' include matters of both domestic and foreign policy.

(q) Hoover Institution (Stanford University) Publishes research on political

issues, foreign relations and diplomacy, economic issues, and security and
defense. Publishes Essays in Public Policy

(r) Institute for Global Communication (IGC)

(s) Manages a number of 'Nets', including PeaceNet. Choose 'search
documents' to find full-text material.

(t) International Institute for Strategic Studies The IISS publishes Strategic
Surveys focusing on trouble spots around the world. It also issues a World Directory
of Strategic Studies Centres.

(u) International Relations and Security Network (ISN) ISN hosts (with SIPRI)
Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST), a free-of-charge
database on weapons, political systems, armed forces and peace-keeping
activities.

(v) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to

Terrorism (START)
(w) The National Security Archive "The National Security Archive is an
independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George
Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes
declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)."
(from the site)

(x) Rand The publications of the Rand Corporation frequently focus on national
security issues of all sorts. This Web site provides a searchable index of documents
produced by Rand. Includes, citations, abstracts and Rand accession numbers.
Boston University currently owns aproximately 1500 of these publications.
 55

(y) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) SIPRI was

established as an international independent research institute "to conduct scientific
research on questions of conflict and co-operation of importance for international
peace and security, with the aim of contributing to an understanding of the
conditions for peaceful solutions of international conflicts and for a stable peace."

(z) Terrorism Research Center ”an independent institute dedicated to the

research of terrorism, information warfare and security, critical infrastructure
protection, homeland security, and other issues of low-intensity political violence
and gray-area phenomena’. (from the site)

(aa) World Policy Institute Examines critical world problems in the United States
and abroad. Organzed by 'research project', such as 'Arms Trade'. The 'North
America Project' explores issues of democracy, human rights, and environmental
quality in the context of North American economic integration.

(bb) U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute The Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI) is the primary research faculty of the U.S. Army War College. The
Strategic Studies Institute identifies international security issues likely to affect the
United States, its friends, and potential adversaries; analyzes national security
issues and, through the timely publication of studies and conduct of conferences,
informs Army leaders of policy options; and provides the U.S. Army with a source of
ideas, criticism, innovative approaches, and independent analyses. Of particular
value is this site's 'Hotlinks to Military and Strategy Related Sites'.

MATERIAL

Mil Tech & dependence

54. Because the U.S. has a technological culture, the U.S. military has become
technology dependent. This dependence has made the military more vulnerable and has
plunged the DoD into a perpetual cycle of purchasing technology to fill shortfalls resulting
from reductions in manpower, technology evolutions, and to maintain the leading edge.
Because technology is increasing in per-unit cost, the DoD purchases fewer items which
increases the impact of minimal losses in combat. It is feasible that while technology can
make warfighting more efficient, the military can become so technology dependent that the
organization no longer recognizes that technology has made it more vulnerable
strategically, operationally, and tactically. The United States military is going through a
cyclic downsizing of force strength when all the people are gone, where does the military
turn to backfill human capacity This thesis will address three fallacies associated with
overdependence on technology in the U.S. military first, that technology reduces
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manpower requirements, second that it is less expensive to use technology in lieu of

humans in warfighting. and finally, that incorporating technology in operations ensures a
decisive victory in today and future conflicts. Reversing technology dependence requires
better integration, complementary technologies among the services, decreasing the
innovation to fielding timeline, and practice in degraded technology environments.

55. The United States has been developing a culture of technology for centuries.
Technology can make processes more efficient and less costly. In the 18th Century, Eli
Whitney patented the cotton gin, making cotton harvesting more efficient and profitable,
and revolutionized manufacturing with the development of interchangeable parts.5 In the
19th Century, Henry Ford created the assembly line to streamline vehicle production.6
Contemplate whether or not the current households of America would be willing to revert
back to fireplaces as the sole. Technology is inseparably woven into American culture. A
technological culture adapts and incorporates technology in such a way that retrograding
is very difficult. The U.S. military is a melting pot of cultures including the technological
cultures introduced by each individual military member. This is a strength but can also be
a weakness. Because the majority of members of the U.S. military are raised in the
technological culture of the U.S., they bring varying levels of technology dependence to
the military. Military Strategy in Technological Culture Strategic culture is not as easy to
define; applying strategy to technology is even more daunting. According to Johnston, a
strategic culture consists of “predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early
or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the
philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.”

56. Strategic culture is also defined as, “an amalgam of a country’s set of shared
beliefs, assumptions, and narratives that shape its strategic decision-making process.”
The United States does not have a stated strategy or direction for technological
development despite the National Security Strategy (NSS) stating, “We continue to set the
pace for science, technology, and innovation in the global economy.” In the National
Military Strategy (NMS) 2015, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) states,
“The United States is the world’s strongest nation, enjoying unique advantages in
technology, energy, alliances, partnerships, and demographics. However, these
advantages are being challenged…emerging technologies are impacting the calculus of
deterrence and conflict management by increasing uncertainty and compressing decision
space.” However, the NSS offers no solution to this stated problem. Evidence of a
technological culture in the United States is reflected in the governing strategic documents
of today. Numerous strategy documents also cite “technological advantage” as an
objective. Although not explicitly stated, accepting that technology is an answer, and in
some cases the answer, technological culture is driving technology dependence in the
military. Many would question whether the United States will enter into any conflict without
the use of drones, 5th generation fighters, stealth bombers, or computers. U.S.
technological advantage is astounding. However, that advantage is tenuous as extremists
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and non-state actors challenge U.S. resolve to fight as the cost-benefit analysis tips the
scales where the cost of employing technology may outweigh the results. Technology is
expensive and when adversaries do not have the capital to spend, they turn to
inexpensive and innovative ways to gain the asymmetric advantage. For example,
terrorists could use a $3 sticker to defeat million dollar precision targeting efforts.

57. Vulnerability Assessment in Technological Culture Some would argue that

technology increases efficiency, increases effectiveness, and decreases vulnerabilities.
The introduction of technology into a complex system can create more problems than it
solves. Vulnerability is defined in three environments: intrinsic, internal, 16 and external
vulnerabilities. The definition of risk in Joint Pub 5.0 and the arguments presented by
Bijker on vulnerabilities in technological cultures reinforce the notion that the U.S. has a
technological culture and thereby is vulnerable to technology dependence. Dr. Jack
Douglas’ research illustrates that the proliferation of technology has generated a reliance
that threatens the American way of life. Douglas argues that the widespread use of
technology has an effect on American values, politics, and society as a whole. Consider
the use of remotely piloted aircraft to attack targets in locations thousands of miles from
where the operators sit. The initial use of unmanned aircraft spawned heated debates over
the ethics of their use in war; however, today drones are no longer for military use only.
Recently enthusiasts flying drones all over the U.S. has forced the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to institute policies concerning drone operations in proximity to busy
airspaces. Drone technology has become smaller and less expensive and drone uses
have expanded to include farmers surveying their fields and sports enthusiasts recording
their own athletic adventures. Using unmanned machines in war causes an ethical
dilemma in warfighting that is still under scrutiny. Some have associated the surgical strike
capability of drones to assassination. Over the past 15 years of drone warfare, ethical
challenges have begun to slowly redefine traditional American values concerning the
employment of robots in war. Keeping an American Airman from harm’s way in Nevada
while killing an adversary combatant on the other side of the planet is now seen as
acceptable. Despite Douglas’ 1971 statement, “there is still time to prevent the rise of this
technical tyranny,” it could be argued that the U.S. has become even more technology
reliant than even Douglas foresaw. While using drones may appear to reduce vulnerability
to U.S. service members, it actually increases the vulnerability of the warfighting system. If
a drone loses its satellite link, communication with its handler, or has a mechanical
malfunction, the loss of the asset can have tactical, operational, and strategic
ramifications. The loss of the RQ-170 drone in Iran in December 2011 will likely have
significant military, scientific, and political impact for years to come. Additionally,
vulnerabilities are introduced into the complex system as well. For example, reducing
satellite bandwidth to manned assets in order to facilitate the up-link and down-link
frequencies of unmanned systems makes the manned assets more vulnerable to
communication exploitation. Aircraft are given limited radio spectrum usage, usually
resorting to using ultra-high-frequency (UHF) radios instead of secure beyond line-of-sight
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(BLOS) satellite radios. Slower moving, less maneuverable, and hard to see drones into
the airspace also increases the collision risk to manned aircraft flying in proximity to
unmanned aircraft. There are significant technical requirements to fly, exploit, and
disseminate the data coming from the drone’s sensors and these channels are now
vulnerable to enemy exploitation, influence, and attack. So while the lives of one or two
servicemen in Nevada are no longer at risk in the warfighting environment, the lives of
others, the exploitation of information, and the vulnerability of the complex warfighting
system has logically increased.

58. Technological Culture Model Overview Models are helpful in taking complex
concepts and simplifying them to facilitate understanding. Models can also help illustrate a
difficult conceptual problem. Visualize the perpetual nature of current military technological
culture. Every model must have a starting place; for the Technological Culture Model the
starting place is in requirements identification. Requirements generation can drive
innovation. The model then walks the reader through technology development, technology
procurement, and finally fielding new technologies. When the military fields new
technology, it oftentimes does not integrate seamlessly into the system without requiring
adjustments. The introduction of new technology often generates new requirements,
especially if the technology is not fully integrated or interoperable within the system.
Because of interoperability difficulties, it is not uncommon for systems to adjust while
incorporating newer technology in order to gain a technological advantage or to meet
some tactical or operational end. The four main sections of the Perpetual Technology
Model are first, an observed need, requirement, or presumptive anomaly that begins the
cycle. Second, innovation leading to technology research and development through the
United States military laboratories or through the military or private industrial complex
leads to technology development. Third, once the technology is designed and developed,
it must be budgeted, purchased, leased, or contracted. Fourth, after the technology is
acquired, it must be tested and evaluated to determine how, when, and where it will be
fielded. Once fielded, leaders, planners and tacticians determine the optimum operational
integration strategy and weave the new technology amongst multiple other technologies
attempting to achieve interoperability. When the military fields new technology, it disrupts
the complex operational environment and oftentimes generates new requirements to allow
the incorporation of the newly fielded technology into the operational schema. Many of the
technological disruptions in the operational or tactical environment are the result of
vulnerability mitigation efforts inherent to the integration of new technology and the stress
induced on the complex system of the battlefield. Mitigating the induced vulnerabilities
generates further adjustments or new requirements and the perpetual cycle re-starts.
Sometimes a “presumptive anomaly” drives a new requirement. Other times, disruptive
technology will interrupt the cycle driving hasty requirements and rapid innovation.
Ultimately, the Technological Culture Model provides a framework for visualizing how the
DoD functions in a perpetual technology cycle based on the U.S. technological culture.
The model does not illustrate the fact that there are intrinsic, internal, and external
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vulnerabilities within every new technology and once introduced into a system
compounding vulnerabilities can emerge. While technology may temporarily fill gaps in
capability, relying too heavily on technology will increase the overall vulnerability of the
system. In an environment of diminishing fiscal resources, it is imperative that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
recognize that the United States military is caught in a perpetual technology cycle creating
greater vulnerabilities at the strategic level, while solving technology challenges at the
tactical level. The dependency on technology that is being generated in today’s military
carries strategic risk. In the 21st century warfighting environment, satellite communication
(SATCOM) radios or internet telephones shrink the connection between the tactical level
of war and the strategic level. Because the operational gap that used to separate the two
environments has shrunk, tactical actions can have strategic impact. For example, the loss
of one F-22 fighter aircraft will diminish the total fleet by .55% whereas the loss of a single
F-16 aircraft only diminishes the fleet by .001%. Some would argue that this difference in
force strength is because one F-22 has the technical capacity and total cost of up to eight
F-16s. If that were true, reversing that logic would mean that losing one F-22 will have 8-
times the impact of losing one F-16. Because the DoD has to work within the constraints
of the budget, and because technology is very expensive, keeping the fleet on the leading
edge creates greater vulnerability to the system as a whole because the smaller fleet
cannot absorb the potential loss of aircraft nor the loss of capabilities that one aircraft
brings to the fight.

59. Force Multipliers. Some common force multipliers are:

(a) Morale
(b) Mobility
(c) Fearsome reputation
(d) Technology
(e) Geographical features
(f) Weather
(g) Recruitment through diplomacy
(h) Training and experience
(i) Military strategy, such as the Fabian strategy
(j) Military tactics, such as force concentration
(k) Intelligence
(l) Deception

60. Some factors may influence one another, e.g. enhanced technology improving
morale or geographical features allowing deception.

61. Aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers, such as the USS Gerald R. Ford, can carry more
than 75 aircraft with fuel and ammunition for all tasks that an aircraft carrier should need
like air to air, air to naval and air to ground missions. When deployed, aircraft carriers are
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a massive force multiplier that can turn any engagement in favour of those that have the
aircraft carrier. Carriers can hold different type of aircraft to different usage meaning the
force multiplier can vary depending on the specific task at hand.

62. Tankers. Airborne tanker aircraft, such as the Boeing KC-135 are a very significant
force multiplier. They can carry fuel so bomber and fighter aircraft can take off loaded with
extra weapons instead of full fuel tanks. The tankers also increase the range and time
loitering within or near the target areas by off-loading fuel when it is needed. Tankers can
also be used to rapidly deploy fighters, bombers, SIGNET, Airborne Command Post, and
cargo aircraft from the United States to the areas where they are needed. The force
multiplier of a KC-135R can be anywhere from 1.5 to as much as 6 when used near the
target area.

63. Bombers. At one extreme, a stealth aircraft like the Northrop Grumman B-2
Spirit strategic bomber can attack a target without needing the large numbers of
escort fighter aircraft, electronic-warfare aircraft, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, and
other supporting aircraft that would be needed were conventional bombers used against
the same target.

64. Precision-guided munitions (PGM) give an immense multiplication. The Thanh

Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam had been only mildly damaged by approximately 800 sorties
by aircraft armed with conventional Unguided bombs, but had one of its spans destroyed
by a 12-plane mission, of which 8 carried laser-guided bombs. Two small subsequent
missions, again with laser-guided bombs, completed the destruction of this target.
Precision guided munitions are one example of what has been called the Revolution in
Military Affairs. In World War II, British night bombers could hit, at best, an area of a city.

65. Modern PGMs commonly put a bomb within 3–10 meters of its target (see Circular
error probable), and most carry an explosive charge significant enough that this
uncertainty is effectively voided. See the use of heavy bombers in direct support of friendly
troops in Afghanistan, using the technique of Ground-Aided Precision Strike.

66. Fighter Combat. Fighter aircraft coordinated by an AWACS control aircraft, so that
they can approach targets without being revealed by their own radar, and who are
assigned to take specific targets so that duplication is avoided, are far more effective than
an equivalent number of fighters dependent on their own resources for target acquisition.

67. In exercises between the Indian and US air forces, the Indian pilots had an
opportunity to operate with AWACS control, and found it extremely effective.[8] India has
ordered AWACS aircraft, using Israeli Phalcon electronics on a Russian airframe, and this
exercise is part of their preparation. Officer and pilot comments included "definitely was a
force multiplier. Giving you an eye deep beyond you". "We could pick up incoming targets
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whether aircraft or missiles almost 400 kilometers away. It gives a grand battle
coordination in the air".

68. Creating Local Forces. The use of small numbers of specialists to create larger
effective forces is another form of multiplication. The basic A Team of US Army Special
Forces is a 12-man unit that can train and lead a company-sized unit (100–200 men) of
local guerrillas.

69. Deception. Deception can produce the potential effect of a much larger force. The
fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II
Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe. Operation
Bodyguard[9] successfully gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de
Calais, convincing the Germans that the real attack at Normandy was a feint. As a result
of the successful deception, the Normandy force penetrated deeply, in part, because the
Germans held back strategic reserves that they thought would be needed at the Pas de
Calais, against what was a nonexistent force. FUSAG's existence was suggested by the
use of decoy vehicles that the Allies allowed to be photographed, fictitious radio traffic
generated by a small number of specialists, and the Double Cross System.[10] Double
Cross referred to turning all surviving German spies in the UK into double agents, who
sent back convincing reports that were consistent with the deception programs being
conducted by the London Controlling Section.

Strength of AF

70. Overview

71. Manpower
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72. Airpower

73. Land Forces

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74. Naval Forces

75. Manpower - Values partly derived from the CIA World Factbook. Some values may
be estimated.

76. Airpower - Values derived from multiple sources. Total Aircraft Strength value
includes both fixed-wing and rotorcraft platforms from all branches of service (at this time
UAVs are not included in the total). 'Attack' value constitutes purpose-built attack types.
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'Transports' value includes only fixed-wing aircraft while all rotorcraft are represented
under the 'Helicopters' value. 'Special-Mission' value no longer includes aerial tankers
which are now covered in their own listing. For an in-depth look into the current air powers
of the world, consider "the World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft" [www.WDMMA.org -
external link].

77. Land Forces - Values derived from multiple sources. 'Tanks' value includes Main
Battle Tanks (MBTs), light tanks, and tank destroyers (no distinction being made between
track-over-wheel and all-wheeled types). 'Armored Vehicles' value includes APCs, IFVs,
MRAPs, and Armored Cars. 'Rocket Projectors' include only self-propelled forms.

78. Naval Forces - Values derived from multiple sources. 'Total Assets' value includes
all possible/available vessels including auxiliaries, which are not showcased individually.
'Aircraft Carriers' value includes only traditional carriers (both conventionally- and nuclear-
powered while Helicopter Carriers are now considered under their own listing.
'Submarines' value includes both diesel-electric and nuclear-powered types. Landlocked
nationd are not penalized for the lack of a standing navy. For an in-depth look into the
current naval powers of the world, consider "the World Directory of Modern Military
Warships" [www.WDMMW.org - external link].

79. Natural Resources - Values derived from the CIA World Factbook or estimated in
some cases. Values presented as BBL (Barrel unit). Analysis concluded with these
assessments:

80. Army as “Marginal.” The Army’s score remains “marginal” in the 2022 Index. The
Army has sustained its commitment to modernizing its forces for great-power competition,
but its modernization programs are still in their development phase, and it will be a few
years before they are ready for acquisition and fielding. In other words, the Army is aging
faster than it is modernizing. It remains “weak” in capacity with only 62 percent of the force
it should have. However, 58 percent (18) of its 31 Regular Army BCTs are at the highest
state of readiness, thus earning a score of “very strong” and conveying the sense that the
service knows what it needs to do to prepare for the next major conflict. That said, its
capability score remains “marginal” given the age of its equipment and the size and
maturity of its modernization programs.

81. Navy as “Marginal,” Trending Toward “Weak.” The Navy’s current battle force
fleet of 296 ships and intensified operational tempo combine to reveal a service that is
much too small relative to its tasks, resulting in a capacity score of “weak,” which is
unchanged from the 2021 Index. It desperately needs a larger fleet of 400 ships, but
current and forecasted levels of funding will prevent this from occurring for the foreseeable
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future. This has the unhappy effect of causing the service to age more rapidly than it can
replace older ships, thus making it easier for major competitors to achieve technological
parity. It also has made it difficult for the Navy to conduct the training essential to
achieving high levels of readiness. Consequently, the Navy is rated “marginal” on a
downward slope to “weak” in readiness.

82. Air Force as “Weak.” This is a downgrade from an assessment of “marginal” in

the 2021 Index. Though the Air Force possesses 86 percent of the combat aircraft that
this Index recommends, public reporting of the mission readiness and physical location of
these planes would make it difficult for the Air Force to respond rapidly to a crisis.
Additionally, the need to source these aircraft from all locations for a single major fight
would likely preclude a response to any other major combat action. Modernization
programs are generally healthy, but the advanced age of key aircraft in the Air Force’s
inventory is driving the service to retire planes faster than they can be replaced, leading to
a capability score of “marginal.” The service also lost ground in readiness compared with
the preceding year. A score of “weak” in this area is the result of a shortage of pilots and
flying time that implies a lack of effort or focused intent given the general reduction in
operational deployments as U.S. actions overseas have ebbed.

83. Marine Corps as “Strong.” The score for the Marine Corps was raised to “strong”
from “marginal” for two reasons: (1) because the 2021 Index changed the threshold for
capacity, lowering it from 36 infantry battalions to 30 battalions in acknowledgment of the
Corps’ argument that it is a one-war force that also stands ready for a broad range of
smaller crisis-response tasks, and (2) because of the Corps’ extraordinary efforts to
modernize (which improves capability) and enhance its readiness during the assessed
year. However, in the absence of additional funding in FY 2022, the Corps intends to
reduce the number of its battalions even further from 24 to 21, and this reduction, if
implemented, would harm the Corps’ overall ability to perform the role it has set for itself:
enabling the projection of naval power into heavily contested combat environments. The
service has moved ahead aggressively with a redesign of its operating forces and the
acquisition of new warfighting tools, but it remains hampered by old equipment and
problematic funding.

84. Space Force as “Weak.” The Space Force was formally established on December
20, 2019, as a result of an earlier proposal by President Trump and legislation passed by
Congress. The 2021 Index provided an overview of the new service, explaining its
mission, capabilities, and challenges, but did not offer an assessment. With an additional
year to gain more insight, the 2022 Index scores the USSF as “weak” in all measured
areas. The service has done quite well in transitioning missions from the other services
without interruption in support, but it does not have enough assets to track and manage
the explosive growth in commercial and competitor-country systems being placed into
orbit. The majority of its platforms have exceeded their planned life span, and
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modernization efforts to replace them are slow and incremental. The force also lacks
defensive and offensive counter-space capabilities.

85. Nuclear Capability as “Strong” but Trending Toward “Marginal” or even

“Weak.” This is the opposite of the conclusion reached in the 2021 Index, which reported
a trend from “marginal” to “strong.” The grade of “strong” recognizes the Trump
Administration’s commitment to reversing the decline in the U.S. nuclear enterprise and
the Biden Administration’s decision to sustain the commitment to modernization of the
entire nuclear enterprise—warheads, platforms, command and control, personnel, and
infrastructure—and allocate needed resources accordingly. Without this commitment, this
overall score will degrade rapidly to “weak.” Progress in modernization efforts, combined
with assurances from senior leaders that the forces remain reliable, warrants a more
optimistic assessment than we have been able to provide in previous editions. That being
said, this score of “strong” with a conditional trend toward “marginal” or “weak” reflects a
greater risk of a degradation in nuclear deterrence than has been seen in the recent past.
Current forces are assessed as reliable today, but nearly all components of the nuclear
enterprise are at a tipping point with respect to replacement or modernization and have no
margin left for delays in schedule. Failure of on-time appropriations and lack of
Administration support for nuclear modernization could lead to a rapid decline in this
portfolio to “weak” in future editions.
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86. In the aggregate, the United States’ military posture continues to be rated
“marginal” and features both positive and negative trends: progress in bringing some
new equipment into the force, filling gaps in manpower, and rebuilding stocks of munitions
and repair parts alongside worrisome trends in force readiness, declining strength in key
areas like trained pilots, and continued uncertainty across the defense budget that is now
having a negative effect both on major acquisition programs and on installation-level repair
capabilities. The 2022 Index concludes that the current U.S. military force is likely
capable of meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict while also
attending to various presence and engagement activities but that it would be very hard-
pressed to do more and certainly would be ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous
MRCs—a situation that is made more difficult by the generally weak condition of key
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military allies. The presidential decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan might provide
some breathing room for force recovery but only if other operational demands do not
retask the military services. In general, the military services continue to prioritize readiness
and have seen some improvement over the past few years, but modernization programs,
especially in shipbuilding, continue to suffer as resources are committed to preparing for
the future and recovering from 20 years of operations. In the case of the Air Force, some
of its limited acquisition funds are being spent on aircraft of questionable utility in high-
threat scenarios while R&D receives a larger share of funding than efforts meant to
replace quite aged aircraft are receiving. As observed in the 2021 Index, the services have
also normalized reductions in the size and number of military units, and the forces remain
well below the level needed to meet the two-MRC benchmark. The Marine Corps’ plan to
reduce its size even further so that it can redirect savings in manpower toward the
capability modernization that it views as essential for success in future combat provides a
stark example of the consequences of the government’s underinvestment in defense.
Congress and the Administration took positive steps to stabilize funding in the latter years
of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). This mitigated the worst effects of BCA-restricted
funding, but sustained investment in rebuilding the force to ensure that America’s armed
services are properly sized, equipped, trained, and ready to meet the missions they are
called upon to fulfill will be critical.

87. As currently postured, the U.S. military continues to be only marginally able
to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests.

Eqpt Profile – State of Art/ Current and obsolescence

88. The FEDERAL SUPPLY CLASSIFICATION (FSC) and its Indexes have been
developed and adopted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for use in classifying
items of supply identified under the Federal Cataloging Program.

89. The FSC is a commodity classification designed to serve the functions of supply
and is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to permit the classification of all items of
personal property. In order to accomplish this, groups and classes have been established
for the universe of commodities, with emphasis on the items known to be in the supply
systems of the Federal Government.

90. The structure of the FSC, as presently established, consists of 78 groups, which
are subdivided into 645 classes. The Federal Supply Group (FSG) identifies, by title, the
commodity area covered by classes within the group. Each class covers a relatively
homogeneous area of commodities, in respect to their physical or performance
characteristics, or in the respect that the items included therein are such as are usually
requisitioned or issued together, or constitute a related grouping for supply management
purposes.
 70

91. Groups 21, 27, 33, 50, 57, 64, 82, 86, 90, 92, 97, and 98 are currently unassigned.

92. The FSC utilizes a four-digit coding structure. The first two digits of the code
number identify the group, and the last two digits of the code number identify the classes
within each group. Code numbers are so assigned as to make it possible to expand the
number of groups and classes as that becomes necessary.

93. In most instances gaps have been left within each group, between the numbers
assigned to adjacent classes, to permit the insertion of new classes in logical sequence,
when necessary, because of technological advances or to accomplish other desirable
additions and changes. The primary application of the FSC code number is in the National
Stock Number (NSN). The NSN for an item of supply consists of the applicable four-digit
FSC code number plus the nine-digit National Item Identification Number (NIIN).

94. he Federal Supply Classification Cataloging Handbook, H2, presents the

classification structure of the FSC, showing all groups and classes listed in the
arrangement of the four-digit FSC codenumbering system. Where appropriate, the main
inclusions and exclusions, which delimit the coverage of a particular class, are shown
immediately following the title for the class.

LEADERSHIP

HDCO Power Centres

1. In the United States, Armed forces is under a chain of command that begins with
the President. This chain of command is complex, but it is followed in letter and spirit. The
national chain of command encompasses two different branches (Operational and
Administrative) and four different services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force). The
services conduct operations jointly within one of six geographic and four functional
commands.

2. The National Command Structure

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(a) The U.S. Constitution stipulates that the President is the commander-in-
chief of the military. The president is assisted in the management of the military by
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), a civilian member of the cabinet appointed
by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate to manage the Department of
Defence.

(b) The chiefs of the four uniformed services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps—are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The president,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, separately appoints the chairman
(CJCS) and the vice chairman of the JCS.

(c) The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the secretary of
defense, and the National Security Council.

(d) The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 considerably expanded the

responsibilities of the JCS as a whole and of its chairman and vice chairman in
particular. A growing number of joint organizations, especially the unified and
combatant commands, report through the JCS. However, the CJCS does not
exercise military command over any of the armed forces.

(e) The president and the secretary of defense are assisted by the CJCS,
the National Security Council (NSC), and the Joint Staff, and they are
responsible to the American people for national defense and security. As the
organisational structure shows, authority over and command and control of the
armed forces is exercised through a single chain of command that separates below
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the secretary of defense into two distinct branches: one operational and the other
administrative.

3. The President of United States. President is Commander in Chief of all the armed
forces of the United States comprised within the national military establishment—the Air
Force as well as the Army and the Navy. Under the Constitution, the President as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy is the supreme military commander charged
with the responsibility of protecting and defending the United States.

4. Secretary of Defence. The United States secretary of defense (SecDef) is the

head of the United States Department of defence, the executive department of the US
Armed Forces and is a hig ranking member of the federal cabinet. The secretary of
defense's position of command and authority over the military is second only to that of
the President of the Unite States , who is the commander in chief. This position
corresponds to what is generally known as a defence minister in many other countries.
The secretary of defense is appointed by the president with the advise of the senate, and
is by custom a member of the Cabinet and by law a member of the National Security
Council.

5. Commander USINDO PACIFIC COMD. Admiral John Aquilino is the 26th

Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, the nation’s oldest and largest
combatant command. USINDOPACOM includes 380,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines,
Airmen, Guardians, Coast Guardsmen and Department of Defense civilians and is
responsible for all U.S. military activities in the Indo-Pacific, covering 36 nations, 14 time
zones, and more than 50 percent of the world’s population.

US Civil Military Relationship

6. Civil-military relations refer to the distribution of power and influence between

armed forces and the civilian authority. It is believed that civil-military relations in any
society are a system composed of interdependent elements. These are the formal,
structural positions of military groups in the government, the informal role and influence of
military groups in politics and society at large, and the nature of the ideologies of military
and non-military groups. In democratic societies, the main governing principle of civil-
military relations is civil supremacy over armed forces.

7. There are eight generally accepted practices military officers follow when adhering
to the expectations of US civil-military relations. Surprisingly, these practices are not
written succinctly in a military manual. Instead, they can be extracted from top scholars on
the subject, from biographies of senior military officials, and from the advice senior military
leaders provide in interviews, essays, and speeches.
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(a) Remain Apolitical The first key principle of the US military, and perhaps
the most important characteristic of professional armed forces, is to remain
apolitical. The military prides itself on being a disciplined, all-volunteer, professional
force that is subordinate to and respectful of civilian leadership.

(b) Provide Candid Military Advice The second fundamental practice is that
senior military officers are required to provide objective advice about military policy.
The counsel should be nonpartisan, nondeliberative, and, if required, include advice
contrary to what politicians want to hear or that goes against current policy. The
information should include an explanation of what the military operations will entail,
the military objectives, the number of personnel and equipment required for mission
success, and the limitations of such actions. The rule is to advise on how to use the
armed forces, not to advocate for a specific course of action. Civilian
decisionmakers should not feel the military is exerting undue influence on one
course of action over another. Candidness is the key requirement.

(c) Civilian Authorities Retain Control over All Aspects of Defense Policy
Civilian-elected officials oversee the larger strategic interests of the country,
including the decision of when to deploy the military, while the armed forces make
operational and tactical decisions if the military is called to action. the relationship
between civilian leaders and military officers is not equal. Civilians have most of the
authority and can make decisions, even ones affecting the traditional authorities of
the armed forces: promotions, personnel assignments, and operational and tactical
issues, for example. Some authorities may be delegatedto military officials, but
civilians retain a veto power over military decisions. Richard Kohn stated the issue
succinctly when he wrote, “the military possesses no autonomy of any kind not
derived from civilian political institutions

(d) Provide Congressional Testimony Prudently The fourth rule concerns

the dual responsibility the military has to the executive and legislative branches.
According to the US Constitution, the US military serves at the direction of the
president (in his role as commander in chief ) and certain designated officials in the
executive branch. To maintain the checks and balances so critical to the US
system, Congress approves the military budget, determines the size of the armed
forces, provides valuable oversight, and has the authority to declare war. For these
reasons, senior military officers can be called before the elected leaders of
Congress to testify on military strategy and operations.

(e) Avoid Publicly Criticizing Defense Policy and Policymakers Once a

senior military officer has provided complete advice to civilian leaders, the military
officer must trust the civilian policymaker to make the best decision possible.
Furthermore, it is against Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
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for officers to use contemptuous words against the president, the vice president,
the secretary of defense, or the civilian service secretaries, and they may be
subject to court-martial for speaking in a derogatory manner about civilian leaders.
The rule is designed to maintain discipline within the military services and ensure
subordination to civilian authorities.

(f) Even If Retired Avoid Criticizing Civilian Defense Official conventional

thinking is retired officers should avoid criticizing defense policy or civilian defense
officials just as they did while on active duty. Retired former senior military officers
frequently become defense-policy guest experts on news shows. Their
observations as “military analysts” carry weight even though they do not officially
represent the Department of Defense.

(g) Execute Legal Orders Military officers must comply with orders from
civilians even if they have reservations about the logic of the command and
whether it is militarily prudent. Obedience is one of the principal pillars of military
norms; one can disagree but not disobey.

(h) Refuse to Execute Illegal Order. The final fundamental principle considers
the options military officers have when given illegal orders. To many military
officers, refusing to follow illegal orders may sound like a simple, black-and-white
decision: military personnel must not abide by orders that are illegal.

FACILITIES

Economics of War

1. Tensions between the U.S. and China escalated in the last three years under
former President Donald Trump. His administration sought to use tariffs, sanctions and
greater scrutiny of cross-border financial flows to address longstanding complaints about
China’s lack of intellectual property protections, forced technology transfers and significant
role of the state in business operations.

2. However, it is reported by U.S. Chamber of Commerce that U.S. economy could

lose more than $1 trillion worth of production and long-term global competitiveness if the
White House pursues a sharp separation with China. The costs of the world’s two largest
economies separating range far beyond immediate dollar figures.

3. In an another study by Rand research organization estimates that a war involving

China and the United States would slice 5% off the $23 trillion U.S. economy, That would
be the biggest blow to American prosperity since the Great Depression in the 1930s.
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4. Today, U.S. imports more from China than from any other country, and China is
one of the largest export markets for U.S. goods and services. This trade has helped the
United States in the form of lower prices for consumers and higher profits for corporations,
but it has also come with costs. A China slowdown will affect the U.S. in three main areas:
trade, the U.S. debt, and the value of the U.S. dollar itself. These projected losses include:

(a) By 2025, $190 billion a year in in U.S. output by expanding 25% tariffs to all
trade with China. In the coming decade, full implementation of such tariffs would
cause the U.S. to fall $1 trillion short of potential growth.

(b) Up to $500 billion in one-time GDP losses if the U.S. sells half of its direct
investment in China. American investors would also lose $25 billion a year in capital
gains.

(c) $15 billion to $30 billion a year in exported services trade if Chinese tourism
and education spending falls to half of what it was prior to the coronavirus
pandemic.

(d) The impact of wide-ranging White House policy in the aviation,

semiconductor, chemicals and medical devices industries. For example, losing out
on China’s massive market for airplanes could cost the U.S. $875 billion by 2038.

(e) Sweeping U.S. policies directed at China will also affect other countries,
forcing them to reconsider their relationships with the U.S. These moves will
increase costs for American businesses and reduce their ability to compete
globally.
5. The economic relationship between China and the U.S. is extremely symbiotic.
Further, with “globalization” and economic interconnectedness, “interlocking interests”, the
economic losses will be of very high magnitude, therefore, it would defuse any real
possibility of war.

6. However, The Pentagon undoubtedly draws up various scenarios for how conflict
between China and the U.S. might develop. Most of them would involve a Chinese move
against Taiwan. It is seen that Taiwan and China have co-existed in intense but bloodless
antagonism for seven decades without tipping into real war. Therefore, the question is,
What would trigger an actual Chinese military adventure?

7. If there is to be a war, it will not arise from Western outrage at human rights
violations in Xinjiang, or Chinese outrage at Western outrage, or cyber-crime, or
technology theft, or currency manipulation, or security crackdowns in Hong Kong, or
indignities visited upon the Filipinos or the Vietnamese or the Australians. It will arise from
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acute economic pain, inflicted on China by actions of the U.S. to deprive them of the
most essential physical resource of the 21st century: Semiconductors.

8. China’s aspiration to become a true technological rival to the U.S. faces a

foundational challenge. The country doesn’t control the semiconductors that are the
building blocks for everything from smartphones to automated cars. ‘For our country,’
Vice Premier Liu He told the country’s top scientists in May, ‘this technology is not just for
growth. It’s a matter of survival. The semiconductor problem, and the increasing
vulnerability of China’s economy, its military, supply constraints, is what will lead China to
consider, finally, outright military action against Taiwan. In fact, this analogy has a strong
historical parallel: China in 2021 finds itself in a situation very much like the situation
of Japan in 1941.

9. “It is critical that U.S. chip firms retain access to the Chinese market and are able to
reinvest revenues from their China sales back into U.S based chip production and R&D to
maintain their global leadership position, enabling the U.S. to set the standards for the
future.” Therefore, cutting U.S. businesses off from the Chinese market completely will
likely have greater consequences for America’s global leadership in the long term.

10. To address national security goals, it is expected that U.S. government would
pursue “narrowly tailored actions” such as restrictions on the export of specific technology
licenses to restrict China’s aspirations, maintain competitive advantage and remain as
Global Leader in years to come.

It so then What Analysis.

11. It can be concluded from economics of war, the possibility of war between
China and US is very least. The economic losses due to globalization” and economic
interconnectedness, “interlocking interests”, will be unsurmountable and will lead to global
economic disaster. However, on the realm of possible future, if all war gets triggered, the
flash point would be US policies controlling Semiconductor Industry. Therefore, China
must focus on developing robust internal semiconductor industry structure to meet internal
market demands and slowly decouple from US and look for other developing countries for
export market.

Military Systems
12. The U.S. Army has the largest number of active personnel, followed by the Navy
and Air Force. Despite numbering over 1.4 million in 2021, the U.S. military is
outnumbered heavily by China. Where the United States truly dominates is in regards to
military spending.

13. US military power is based on the deterrence policy of punishment and denial.
Punishment, according to John Mearsheimer, involves threatening to destroy an
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adversary’s infrastructure, while denial convinces an opponent that military objectives will
not be achieved. Deterrence by punishment, thus works with an adversary’s fear of
massive retaliation, whereas, deterrence by denial focuses on showing how an
adversary’s endgame will not be achieved through strengthened integrated weapon
systems, joint warfare, and precision offensive firepower. Deterrence transfers higher risk
and imposes costs on China, while lowering risks to the United States. According to
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, the US engagement has brought stability in
strategic theaters.

14. The United States has been fighting conventional and unconventional wars on
every continent. The United States has war-fighting experience in World War II, the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, Panama, Grenada, the First Gulf War, Kosovo, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. The US military can be deployed at short notice anywhere on Earth. The
United States maintains strategic peace through military bases and defense alliances in
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In the post–Cold War world, the United States
achieved dominance thorough Air Land Battle. Now the United States is shifting its military
assets to the Indo-Pacific as it prepares for a Sea Air Battle.

15. The US Navy (USN) has established maritime supremacy. It operates 11 carrier
groups. The United States is in a familiar terrain in the Indo-Pacific, having fought during
World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. INDOPACOM accounts for 60
percent of USN, 55 percent of the US Army, and 40 percent of US Marine Corps.

16. The USN’s merging of weapon systems and C4ISR systems with multi-domain
network and integrated ship defenses is more lethal than the numbers of People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines and warships.

17. The course and outcome of modern wars is determined by C4ISR capabilities and
not the quantity of weapon systems. The United States is far ahead in tracking and
prioritizing PLAN targets. The USN is equipped with 426 C4ISR aircraft, while the PLAN
has only 22 such aircraft. The PLAN has 441 fixed-wing aircraft and 118 helicopters, while
the USN and the Marines collectively have 2,448 fixed-wing aircraft and 1,249 helicopters.
The PLAN’s two aircraft carriers (ACs) can carry 70 aircraft, while the USN’s 11 ACs
collectively have more than 800 aircraft.

18. Therefore, in nutshell, US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational
levels of warfare across the spectrum.

It so then What Analysis.

19. US being fought several war in past has definite advantage with strategic, tactical,
and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. For china south china sea is home
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waters and have more number of ships than US. Therefore, there is need to maintain low
levels of conflicts with India and focus on becoming self-reliant Naval Super power with
Technology advancement.

Strategic Transport Infrastructure

20. There are roughly 750 US foreign military bases; they are spread across 80
nations. After the U.S is the UK, but they only have 145 bases. Russia has about 3 dozen
bases, and China just five. This implies that the U.S has three times as many bases as all
other countries combined. The U.S has 11 combatant commands (under the Pentagon
headquarters).

21. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US forward military presence and cooperation with its
regional partners is a deterrence for China. The United States leads NATO and
simultaneously provides a defense umbrella to Japan and South Korea. The United States
has 29,500 troops deployed in South Korea and another 45,000 troops in Japan. The
Quad exercises bring together Indo-Pacific democracies committed to a rules-based order
against the China threat.

22. In addition, US is also contesting on Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across

most of the South China Sea to be completely unlawful. The U.S. makes no territorial
claim in the SCS and takes no position on sovereignty over any of the geographic features
in the SCS, but has urged that disputes be settled without coercion and on the basis of
international law. Therefore, U.S. also has been maintaining bilateral military cooperation
with Australia, Philippines, Thailand, India, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam. With
bases as depicted in map below, US maintains the presence in South China Sea.

US bases in South China Sea

If so then What Analysis.

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23. US has robust infrastructure in Indo Pacific and neighboring countries in south
china sea. Therefore, China must use non-traditional means to sway mind-set of
neighbouring countries for Pro China thinking.

Strategic FOL reserves

24. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is an emergency stockpile of petroleum

maintained by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). It is the largest publicly
known emergency supply in the world, and its underground tanks in Louisiana and Texas
have capacity for 714 million barrels (113,500,000 m 3). The United States has proven
reserves equivalent to 4.9 times its annual consumption. This means that, without imports,
there would be about 5 years of oil left (at current consumption levels and excluding
unproven reserves).

25. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. has an estimated
38.2 billion barrels worth of proven oil reserves that are still untapped. The reason for not
going ahead with oil production in these locations is that American energy companies and
Wall Street investors are not sure that prices will stay high long enough for them to make a
profit from drilling lots of new wells.

If so then What Analysis.

26. US has sufficient Oil reserves lasting over for 05 years. Considering, US companies
unwilling to explore new oil fields, China can think on showing interest to US Govt to
extend investment plan by China in these Oil fields explorations.

Mobilization.

27. The USINDOPACOM headquarters building, the Nimitz-MacArthur Pacific

Command Center, is located on Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii. In the event of conflict with
China, US has an advantage already fleet operating in Indo Pacific and in and around of
South China Sea, therefore, mobilisation is not major issue. As it can be seen that over
one year in 2021, the US military deployed four CSGs, two ARGs, 11 SSNs, and 22
bomber sorties to the South China Sea with a high tempo. Around 1,200 sorties of large
reconnaissance aircraft conducted close-in reconnaissance over the South China Sea.

If so then What Analysis.

28. U.S. deployments in South China Sea have seen increase over few years after
claiming of Sparty Islands by China. Therefore, quick mobilisation of fleet by US is very
much possibility. To counter that China need to continue with building large fleet of ships
and submarines and undertake prolong deployments, focus on bilateral military exercises
with other nations in the neighbourhood to gain Pro China thinking.
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Civil Infrastructure.

29. With conflict situations with China and US, South China Sea would be the theatre of
operations. Therefore, it can been seen that US maritime policy in the South China Sea
across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations has certainly taken on different
forms and varying degrees of intensity. The primary objective, however, has remained
constant: maintenance of free navigation, which is against the basic claim of China taking
stand, as SCS is territorial waters of theirs.

30. A report by the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, it was
reiterated that the need to offset Beijing’s naval build-up: ‘To defend our Nation and
interests around the globe, we must be prepared to flawlessly execute our Navy’s timeless
roles of sea control and power projection’.

31. In 2020, Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy mentioned about strengthening the US

military presence and countering the PRC buildup in the Indo-Pacific and encouraging
allies and partners to do more individually and in coordination with one another to defend
their interests in the SCS region. To achieve the same US has been encouraging
cooperation with partners like the Philippines to tamp down coercion from Beijing while
working with other Southeast Asian partners. As part of that partnership with Philippine,
US has Mutual Defense Treaty which can be applicable in the event of armed attacks
against the Philippine forces, public vessels, and aircraft in the Pacific, as well as in the
South China Sea.

32. For the past 60 years, the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) has worked with the Philippine government and local organizations to achieve
shared development goals, investing more than $5 billion to support the Philippines
since 1961. More than four million Filipino-Americans live in the United States, and almost
300,000 U.S. citizens reside in the Philippines, including a large number of U.S. military
veterans.

If so then What Analysis.

33. There are no much details available about exact statistics and details about Civil
Infrastructure of US available in the theatre of zone of conflict which is SCS. However, US
has been developing strategic tie ups with Philippines and South Asian Countries to create
Infrastructure and utilise in the event of need.
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