G-DOTMLPF: UNITES STATES OF AMERICA

General

1. The United States of America is the world's third largest country in size and nearly
the third largest in terms of population. Located in North America, the country is bordered
on the west by the Pacific Ocean and to the east by the Atlantic Ocean. Along the northern
border is Canada and the southern border is Mexico. There are 50 states and the District
of Columbia. More than twice the size of the European Union, the United States has high
mountains in the West and a vast central plain. The lowest point in the country is in Death
Valley which is at -282 feet (-86 meters) and the highest peak is Denali (Mt. McKinley) at
20,320 feet (6,198 meters).1

Fig 1: Map of USA (Source https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States)

2. The U.S. Armed Forces are one of the largest military forces in terms of personnel
AND are considered the world's most powerful military. The U.S. Armed Forces has
significant capabilities in both defense and power projection due to its large budget,
resulting in advanced and powerful technologies which enables a widespread deployment

1
United States. (2014, March 25). Geography. https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/geography/countries/article/
united-states
 2

of the force around the world, including around 800 military bases outside the United
States.

3. In order to carry out G-DOTMLPF Analysis of United States as the primary

adversary of China, three domains have been identified as given below:-

(a) Indo Pacific Region including Taiwan.

(b) Space and Cyber.

(c) Polar/ Arctic Region.

MIL GEOGRAPHY

Indo-Pacific Region

4. In the context of study of mil geography of US under G-DOTMLPF as the primary

adversary of China, it is pertinent to mention that China is not likely to attack US territory.
It is in the context of overlapping mil interest in the region of Indo Pacific incl South China
Sea and Taiwan strait that the two militaries can come face to face. Hence the mil
geography study of US will be oriented towards Indo Pacific and Taiwan Strait region and
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).

Fig : Unified Combatant Commands Areas of Responsibility

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5. US Unified Combatant Commands. Unified combatant commands are joint

military commands consisting of forces from multiple military departments, with their chain
of command flowing from the president, to the secretary of defense, to the commanders of
the combatant commands. There are eleven unified combatant commands that come in
two types. Geographic commands, such as Africa, Central, European, Indo-Pacific,
Northern, Southern and Space commands are responsible for planning and operations in
a certain geographic area. Functional commands, such as Cyber, Special Operations,
Strategic, and Transportation commands are responsible for a functional activity that
crosses geographic boundaries. Each service organizes, trains, and equips forces that are
then presented to the unified combatant commands through service component
commands.2 From China’s point of view, US is a prime adversary as China is the rising
power which is likely to challenge the US supremacy in the days to come.

Incorrect Bdy
Depiction

Fig :AoR of USINDOPACOM3

2
United States Armed Forces. (2022). In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= United_States_
Armed_Forces&oldid=1114929663
3
https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/
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6. United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is one of six geographic

combatant commands defined by the Department of Defense's Unified Command Plan
(UCP). As a geographic combatant command, USINDOPACOM is in charge of using and
integrating United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces within the
USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) to achieve U.S. national security objectives
while protecting national interests. The USINDOPACOM AOR covers more of the globe of
any of the other geographic combatant commands and shares borders with all of the other
five geographic combatant commands. The commander of US Indo-Pacific Command
reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense and is
supported by multiple component and sub-unified commands including: U.S. Forces
Korea, US Forces Japan, U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, U.S. Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Army Pacific.

7. There are few regions as culturally, socially, economically, and geopolitically

diverse as the Asia-Pacific. The 36 nations comprising the Asia-Pacific region are home to
more than 50% of the world's population, 3,000 different languages, several of the world's
largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties.
Two of the three largest economies are located in the Asia-Pacific, along with ten of the
fourteen smallest. The AOR includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest
democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation. More than one third of Asia-Pacific
nations are smaller, island nations, including the smallest republic in the world and the
smallest nation in Asia.

8. The region is a vital driver of the global economy and includes the world's busiest
international sea lanes and nine of the ten largest ports. The Asia-Pacific is also a heavily
militarized region, with seven of the world's ten largest standing militaries and five of the
world's declared nuclear nations. Given these conditions, the strategic complexity facing
the region is unique. In concert with other U.S. government agencies, USINDOPACOM
protects and defends the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests.

9. Polar/ Arctic Region. There are a number of definitions of what area is contained
within the Arctic. The area can be defined as north of the Arctic Circle (about 66° 34'N),
the approximate southern limit of the midnight sun and the polar night. Another definition
of the Arctic, which is popular with ecologists, is the region in the Northern Hemisphere
where the average temperature for the warmest month (July) is below 10 °C (50 °F); the
northernmost tree line roughly follows the isotherm at the boundary of this region. 4 No
country owns the geographic North Pole or the region of the Arctic Ocean surrounding it.
The surrounding six Arctic states that border the Arctic Ocean—Canada, Kingdom of
Denmark (with Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the United States—are limited to
a 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off their coasts. The
military presence of nations in the Arctic regions is as shown below:-
4
"Arctic." Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc. Retrieved 2 May 2009. Addison, Kenneth (2002).
Fundamentals of the physical environment. Routledge. p. 482. ISBN 978-0-415-23293-7.
 5

Fig: Map points indicate location, not size, of military presence

Sources: Heritage Foundation, Reuters, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, National

Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Norwegian Ministry of Defence and Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty

Mil Geography: If so then What Analysis

10. The United States as the prime adversary of China has taken a series of steps to
contain China globally in general & in Indo-Pacific Region in particular. The various
alliances formed in the region (QUAD, AUKUS, IPEF etc) strongly indicate the American
intention of building partnership in military as well as non-military areas to restrict the
growing influence of China. These measures by the United States definitely pose obstacle
in the China’s path to to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049.
Therefore China needs to match or surpass U.S. global influence and power, displace
U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and revise the
international order to be more advantageous to Beijing’s system and national interests.
China will need to take necessary measures in terms of its Economic Policy, Foreign
Policy, Energy Security Policy and Military Strategy to overcome the challenges posed.
The military aspects for achieving the same by China will include the fwg:-

(a) Indo-Pacific Region. Continue with the stated defense policy aims to
safeguard its sovereignty, security, and development interests. The military strategy
to continue to be based on the concept of “active defense.” The national defence
aims continue on the lines as stated in the 2019 Defence White paper and the ones
more relevant wrt US moves are as under:-
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(i) To deter and resist aggression;

(ii) To safeguard national political security, the people’s security and
social stability;
(iii) To oppose and contain “Taiwan independence”;
(iv) To safeguard the PRC’s maritime rights and interests;
(v) To safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests;

(b) Space and Cyber. China needs to safeguard the PRC’s security interests in
outer space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. In this regard there is
need to continuously modernise and enhance the efficiency of PLA Strategic
Support Force (SSF).

(c) Polar/ Arctic Region. China aspires to become a “polar great power” by
2030. Arctic along with the Antarctic, the seabed, and space are ungoverned or
under-governed spaces. There is a need explore these areas including mil
presence for gaining access to resources from the polar regions.

DOCTRINE

Pol Directive

11. The United States calls itself as an Indo-Pacific power. The region, stretching from
Pacific coastline of USA to the Indian Ocean, is home to more than half of the world’s
people, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest
militaries. The passage of time has underscored the strategic necessity of the United
States’ consistent role. At the end of the Cold War, the United States considered but
rejected the idea of withdrawing our military presence, understanding that the region held
strategic value that would only grow in the 21st century. Since then, administrations of
both political parties have shared a commitment to the region. The George W. Bush
Administration understood Asia’s growing importance and engaged closely with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and India. The Obama Administration
significantly accelerated American prioritization of Asia, investing new diplomatic,
economic, and military resources there.

12. More members of the U.S. military are based in the region than in any other outside
the United States. It supports more than three million American jobs and is the source of
nearly $900 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States. In the years ahead, as
the region drives as much as two-thirds of global economic growth, its influence will only
grow—as will its importance to the United States. The United States has long recognized
the Indo-Pacific as vital to our security and prosperity.
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Concept/ Strat for Indo-Pacific Region.

13. US has formulated its objectives in the Indo Pacific through the Indo-Pacific
Strategy of The United States 5 formulated in Feb 2022. The United States as given in
the strategy will pursue five objectives in the Indo-Pacific -each in concert with our allies
and partners, as well as with regional institutions. These objectives are as under:-

(a) Advance a Free and Open Indo-Pacific . Our vital interests and those of
our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, where governments can
make their own sovereign choices, consistent with their obligations under
international law; and where seas, skies, and other shared domains are lawfully
governed. Our strategy, therefore, begins with building resilience within countries,
as we have done in the United States. In the region, that includes our efforts to
support open societies and to ensure Indo-Pacific governments can make
independent political choices free from coercion; we will do so through investments
in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society. The United States
will bolster freedom of information and expression and combat foreign interference
by supporting investigative journalism, promoting media literacy and pluralistic and
independent media, and increasing collaboration to address threats from
information manipulation. Consistent with the first-ever United States Strategy on
Countering Corruption, we will also seek to improve fiscal transparency in the Indo-
Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform. Through our diplomatic engagement,
foreign assistance, and work with regional organizations, the United States will be a
partner in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and accountable
democratic governance. And we will work with partners to stand up to economic
coercion. Beyond individual countries’ borders, the United States will also work
closely with like-minded partners to ensure that the region remains open and
accessible and that the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according
to international law. In particular, we will build support for rules-based approaches
to the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

(b) Build Connections within and Beyond the Region . A free and open Indo-
Pacific can only be achieved if we build collective capacity for a new age; common
action is now a strategic necessity. The alliances, organizations, and rules that the
United States and our partners have helped to build must be adapted; where
needed, we must update them together. We will pursue this through a latticework of
strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions. We will modernize our long-standing
alliances, strengthen emerging partnerships, and invest in regional organizations—
the collective capacity that will empower the Indo-Pacific to adapt to the 21st
century’s challenges and seize its opportunities.

5
U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2022, from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
 8

(c) Drive Regional Prosperity. Alongside our partners, the United States will
put forward an Indo-Pacific economic framework—a multilateral partnership for the
21st century. This economic framework will help our economies to harness rapid
technological transformation, including in the digital economy, and adapt to the
coming energy and climate transition. The United States will work with partners to
ensure that citizens on both sides of the Pacific reap the benefits of these historic
economic changes, while deepening our integration. We will develop new
approaches to trade that meet high labor and environmental standards and will
govern our digital economies and cross-border data flows according to open
principles, including through a new digitaleconomy framework. We will work with
our partners to advance resilient and secure supply chains that are diverse, open,
and predictable, while removing barriers and improving transparency and
informationsharing. We will make shared investments in decarbonization and clean
energy, and work in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to promote
free, fair, and open trade and investment, during our host year, in 2023, and
beyond.

(d) Bolster Indo-Pacific Security. Integrated deterrence will be the cornerstone

of our approach. We will more tightly integrate our efforts across warfighting
domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the United States, alongside
our allies and partners, can dissuade or defeat aggression in any form or domain.
We will drive initiatives that reinforce deterrence and counter coercion, such as
opposing efforts to alter territorial boundaries or undermine the rights of sovereign
nations at sea. We will continue to modernize our treaty alliances with Australia,
Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand; steadily advance our Major Defense
Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider; and build the
defense capacity of partners in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

(e) Build Regional Resilience to Transnational Threats . The United States

will work with partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets, strategies, plans, and
policies consistent with limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees
Celsius, and will seek to serve as the preferred partner as the region transitions to a
net-zero future. Through initiatives like Clean EDGE, we will incentivize clean-
energy technology investment and deployment, seek to drive energy-sector
decarbonization, and foster climate-aligned infrastructure investment. The United
States will work with partners to reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate
change and environmental degradation and will support critical-infrastructure
resilience and address energy security. We will also work to safeguard the health
and sustainable use of the region’s vast oceans, including through the legal use of
their resources, enhanced research cooperation, and the promotion of beneficial
commerce and transportation.
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14. To implement its Indo-Pacific Strategy, US has outlined ten core lines of effort in
the next 12 to 24 months. These are as under:-

(a) Drive New Resources to The Indo-Pacific . We will open new embassies
and consulates, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and increase
our strength in existing ones, intensifying our climate, health, security, and
development work.

(b) Lead an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework . We will launch a new

partnership that will promote and facilitate high-standards trade, govern the digital
economy, improve supply-chain resiliency and security, catalyze investment in
transparent, high-standards infrastructure, and build digital connectivity—doubling
down on our economic ties to the region while contributing to broadly shared Indo-
Pacific opportunity.

(c) Reinforce Deterrence. The United States will defend our interests, deter
military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners—including
across the Taiwan Strait—and promote regional security by developing new
capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives,
and a more resilient force posture.

(d) Strengthen an Empowered And Unified ASEAN . We are committed to the

East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, and will also seek new ministerial-
level engagements with ASEAN. We will implement more than $100 million in new
U.S.-ASEAN initiatives. We will also expand bilateral cooperation across Southeast
Asia, prioritizing efforts to strengthen health security, address maritime challenges,
increase connectivity, and deepen people-to-people ties.

(e) Support India’s Continued Rise and Regional Leadership . We will

continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work
together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia;
collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our
economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-
Pacific.

(f) Deliver on the QUAD. US will advance work on critical and emerging
technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and
advancing common technology principles. The Quad will build a green shipping
network, and will coordinate the sharing of satellite data to improve maritime
domain awareness and climate responses.
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(g) Expand U.S.-Japan-ROK Cooperation. Nearly every major Indo-Pacific

challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and partners,
particularly Japan and the ROK. We will continue to cooperate closely through
trilateral channels on the DPRK. Beyond security, we will also work together on
regional development and infrastructure, critical technology and supply-chain
issues, and women’s leadership and empowerment.

(h) Partner to Build Resilience in the Pacific Islands . The United States will
work with partners to establish a multilateral strategic grouping that supports Pacific
Island countries as they build their capacity and resilience as secure, independent
actors. Together, we will build climate resilience through the Pacific Region
Infrastructure Facility; coordinate to meet the Pacific’s infrastructure gaps,
especially on information and communications technology; facilitate transportation;
and cooperate to improve maritime security to safeguard fisheries, build maritime-
domain awareness, and improve training and advising.

(j) Support Good Governance and Accountability . We will support Indo-

Pacific governments’ capacity to make independent political choices by helping
partners root out corruption, including through foreign-assistance and development
policies, leadership at the G7 and G20, and a renewed role in the Open
Government Partnership.

(k) Support Open, Resilient, Secure, and Trustworthy Technologies . We

will promote secure and trustworthy digital infrastructure, particularly cloud and
telecommunications vendor diversity, including through innovative network
architectures such as Open RAN by encouraging atscale commercial deployments
and cooperation on testing, such as through shared access to test beds to enable
common standards development.

Doctrines

15. In concert with other U.S. government agencies, USINDOPACOM protects and
defends the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and
partners, USINDOPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by
promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to
contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach
is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.

16. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Area of Responsibility

(AOR) encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the waters off the west
coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole.
USINDOPACOM headquarters is located in the Nimitz-MacArthur Building on Camp H.M.
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Smith just outside of Honolulu, Hawaii. The Vision, Msn & Focus Areas for
USINDOPACOM are as under:-

Map of U.S. Indo-Pacific Military Bases

Source: Reformatted from Lt. General Mike Minihan,” United States Indo Pacific
Command,” NDU WMD, July 7, 2020, https://uploads.fas.org/2020/09/PACOM2020_NDU-
WMD-Brief2020_Minihan070720.pdf

(a) Vision. USINDOPACOM ensures a Free and Open Indo-Pacific alongside a

constellation of like-minded Allies and Partners, united by mutual security, interests,
and values in order to deter adversary aggression, protect the Homeland, and be
ready to fight and win in armed conflict.

(b) Msn. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command will implement a combat credible

deterrence strategy capable of denying our adversaries sustained air and sea
dominance by focusing on posturing the Joint Force to win before fighting while
being ready to fight and win, if required.

(c) Focus Areas.

(i) Joint Force Lethality - We must continue to develop and field

capabilities necessary to deter aggression and prevail in armed conflict
should deterrence fail.

(ii) Design & Posture - We will adapt from our historical service-centric
focus in Northeast Asia to a new more integrated joint forces blueprint w hich
is informed by the changing threat environment and challenges of the 21st
Century across the entire Indo-Pacific.
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(iii) Exercises, Experimentation, & Innovation - Targeted innovation

and experimentation investments will evolve the joint force while developing
symmetrical capability to counter adversary capabilities.

(iv) Allies & Partners - Through increased interoperability, information-

sharing, and expanded access across the region, we present a compatible
and interoperable coalition to the adversary in crisis and armed conflict.

Time Dimension

17. Indo-Pacific Region. The Indo-Pacific region lacks a multilateral entity with the
strength, resolve, and congruence of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
established to deter aggression as in Europe. The Quad nations of the United States,
Australia, Japan, and India will need to become that collective, viable, and credible
deterrence solution. While debate surrounding the military deterrence creation by Quad
will undoubtedly continue however all instruments of power across the diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic (DIME) spectrum will be in play in the years to come.
The questions that needs to be answered for Quad members in the years to come by say
2030 or 2040 is: What will it take, in terms of strategy, investments, and will, for the Quad
to credibly deter the rise of an Indo-Pacific hegemon, and how can the Quad collectively
provide a military deterrence solution?

Fig: Maj Wpn Sys comparison , 2030-2040 estimates6

Note: All US numbers at 50 percent to account for other global activities and US homeland
defense.

18. In July 2020, Japanese, Australian, and US naval vessels conducted a small,
trilateral exercise in the South China Sea. Five Australian ships, a Japanese destroyer,
and the USS Reagan Carrier Strike Group conducted maneuvers in the Philippine Sea
prior to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in Hawaii. At AUSMIN, former Secretary
of Defense Mark Esper stated, “These exercises not only bolster interoperability, but also
send a clear signal to Beijing that we will fly, we will sail, and we will operate wherever
6
Indo-Pacific Deterrence and the Quad in 2030 by Lt Col Justin L. Diehl, USAF. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2022, from
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/07/2002595021/-1/-1/1/18%20DIEHL.PDF
 13

international law allows and defend the rights of our allies and partners to do the same.”93
As highlighted earlier, a key line of effort in the Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative is
“Exercises, Experimentation and Innovation,” seeking 2.87 billion USD in funding.
Davidson argues “U.S. forces must be capable of fighting in highly contested
environments against technologically advanced opponents, while also minimizing
detection across domains. The Joint Force lacks the capacity to integrate service
recommended weapons and capabilities into a warfighting concept that deters the
adversary and puts us in a position to win. This challenge can only be met by conducting a
series of high-end, multi-domain exercises with a continuous campaign of joint
experimentation.”7

Fig: Indo-Pacific by 20308

19. Regional deterrence is currently in place with US presence at bases in Japan and
South Korea and sustained maritime presence. The priority is to identify gaps across the
Quad system and remedy those gaps with the Quad nations that can fill them. If China
continues to robustly enhance its military capabilities and outward expansion, then the
Indo-Pacific will undoubtedly be living under the umbrella of a hegemon in 2030. Missile
ranges are only increasing, hypersonic weapons will be fielded by the mid-2020s, and
basing sanctuaries will be scarce.

7
Aaron Mehta, “Inside US Indo-Pacific Command’s $20 Billion Wish List to Deter Chinaand Why Congress May
Approve It,” Defense News, 2 April 2020.
8
Indo-Pacific Deterrence and the Quad in 2030 by Lt Col Justin L. Diehl, USAF. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2022, from
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/07/2002595021/-1/-1/1/18%20DIEHL.PDF
 14

20. Cyber. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is a capability-based Unified

Combatant Command similar to U.S. Special Operations Command and is the military’s
primary organization for both offensive and defensive cyber activity. Msn of
USCYBERCOM is to achieve and maintain superiority in the cyberspace domain to
influence adversary behavior, deliver strategic and operational advantages for the Joint
Force, and defend and advance our national interests.

21. U.S. Cyber Command has a wide range of missions, from offensive and defensive
cyber operations to monitoring DOD networks and assisting with the defense of critical
infrastructure. Its primary role is to ensure the DOD’s ability to operate in a world that is
increasingly dependent on cyber. To this end, three enduring lines of operation for
USCYBERCOM are as follows:

(a) Provide mission assurance for the Department of Defense (DoD) by directing
the operation and defense of the Department of Defense Information Networks (i.e.
the DoDIN) and its key terrain and capabilities;

(b) Defeat strategic threats to the United States and its national interests; and

(c) Assist Combatant Commanders to achieve their missions in and through

cyberspace.

22. The Cyber Mission Force is the operational arm of U.S. Cyber Command, and CMF
teams are distributed across various mission sets. Due to the nature of cyber and the
classification of methods, analyzing USCYBERCOM’s capability as reflected in open-
source (i.e., unclassified) literature is nearly impossible. However, the United States is
considered to be one of the world’s most capable cyber actors, an assessment that is
based on its wide range of infrastructure and strategies and the advanced technologies
that the U.S. is known to employ.

23. Space. U.S. Space Command conducts operations in, from, and to space to deter
conflict, and if necessary, defeat aggression, deliver space combat power for the
Joint/Combined force, and defend U.S. vital interests with allies and partners. Area of
Responsibility for USSPACECOM begins 100km above the surface of the earth, and
extends outward from the planet indefinitely. Operating domain, however, extends around
the globe itself, and encompasses all three elements of US space systems: the on-orbit
asset, the link, and the ground segment. USSPACECOM has successfully demonstrated
capabilities and processes through coalition-integrated global exercises such as GLOBAL
LIGHTNING 21 and PACIFIC SENTRY 21. USSPACECOM is a joint organization
comprised of representatives from all military branches, Active and Reserve, the National
Guard, Government civilians, and contractors. Currently, we have 45 percent of our
authorized end strength in place, augmented by 50 Reserve and Guard personnel, and a
300-person contractor force to fill in the skill and capacity gaps. In context of China,
 15

USSPACECOM mentions that ‘Our competitors have demonstrated their intent to hold our
space capabilities at risk. Therefore, we will always defend our national interests, deter
aggression and support our allies and partners.’

24. Polar/ Arctic Region. The U.S. on 07 Oct 2022 unveiled its new national strategy
in the Arctic, warning of "increasing strategic competition" exacerbated by Russia and
China and calling for greater cooperation among allies to "uphold international law, rules,
norms and standards" in the region. The strategy, which is an update of a 2013 document
released by former President Barack Obama's administration, covers the U.S. agenda in
the region over the next 10 years i.e. 2022 to 2032. The document said that as an Arctic
nation itself, the U.S. has the "authority and responsibility" to steward and protect the
region. The strategy mentioned that "The United States seeks an Arctic region that is
peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative,". The strategy raised concern over
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as Chinese efforts to gain influence in the region.
The U.S. said it seeks to "effectively compete and manage tensions" in the Arctic. The
U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region9 is built around four pillars as under:-

(a) Pillar 1: Security. We will deter threats to the U.S. homeland and our allies
by enhancing the capabilities required to defend our interests in the Arctic, while
coordinating shared approaches with allies and partners and mitigating risks of
unintended escalation. We will exercise U.S. government presence in the Arctic
region as required to protect the American people and defend our sovereign
territory.

(b) Pillar 2: Climate. Change and Environmental Protection : The U.S.

government will partner with Alaskan communities and the State of Alaska to build
resilience to the impacts of climate change, while working to reduce emissions from
the Arctic as part of broader global mitigation efforts, to improve scientific
understanding, and to conserve Arctic ecosystems.

(c) Pillar 3: Sustainable Economic Development . We will pursue sustainable

development and improve livelihoods in Alaska, including for Alaska Native
communities, by investing in infrastructure, improving access to services, and
supporting growing economic sectors. We will also work with allies and partners to
expand highstandard investment and sustainable development across the Arctic
region.

(d) Pillar 4: International Cooperation and Governance . Despite the

challenges to Arctic cooperation resulting from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the
United States will work to sustain institutions for Arctic cooperation, including the
Arctic Council, and position these institutions to manage the impacts of increasing
9
National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf. (n.d.). Retrieved October 11, 2022, from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf
 16

activity in the region. We also seek to uphold international law, rules, norms, and
standards in the Arctic.
Nuclear Dimension

25. The United States has long pledged to refrain from using nuclear weapons against
most non-nuclear weapon states, but has neither ruled out their first use in all cases nor
specified the circumstances under which it would use them. This policy of “calculated
ambiguity” addressed U.S. concerns during the Cold War, when the United States and
NATO faced numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe.
At the time, the United States not only developed plans to use nuclear weapons on the
battlefield to disrupt or defeat attacking tanks and troops, but it also hoped that the risk of
a nuclear response would deter the Soviet Union from initiating a conventional attack. This
is not because the United States believed it could defeat the Soviet Union in a nuclear
war, but because it hoped the Soviet Union would know that the use of these weapons
would likely escalate to all-out nuclear war, with both sides suffering massive destruction.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has modified its declaratory policy to
reduce the apparent role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, but has not
declared that it would not use them first. The present number of nuclear warheads
worldwide in 2022, by country and deployment status is as under:-

Fig: No of Nuclear Warheads Worldwide in 2022, by Country and Deployment Status

Source: Statista 202210

ORG

Chain Of Comd

10
https://www.statista.com/statistics/696410/size-and-composition-of-nuclear-arsenals-around-the-world/
 17

26. The President of the United States is, according to the Constitution, the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and Chief Executive of the Federal
Government. The Secretary of Defense is the "Principal Assistant to the President in all
matters relating to the Department of Defense", and is vested with statutory authority to
lead the Department and all of its component agencies, including military command
authority second only to the President.

Fig: US Military Control by the President

27. The President and the Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the
Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch (10
U.S.C. § 162) runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the
Combatant Commanders for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other
branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the
combatant commands, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, i.e., the Secretary of the Army (10 U.S.C. § 3013),
the Secretary of the Navy (10 U.S.C. § 5013), and the Secretary of the Air Force (10
U.S.C. § 8013). The Military Departments, organized separately within the Department,
operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military
Department.

Org Structure

28. Org Structure of Dept of Defence. The United States Department of

Defense (DoD) is an executive branch department of the federal government charged
with coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government directly
related to national security and the United States Armed Forces. The secretary of defense,
appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, is by federal law the
 18

head of the Department of Defense, "the principal assistant to the President in all matters
relating to Department of Defense", and has "authority, direction, and control over the
Department of Defense". The org of the Office of the Secretary of Defence is as under:-

Fig: Org Structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, USA

29. Org Structure of Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is a body of
senior uniformed leaders in the Department of Defense who advise the secretary of
defense, the Homeland Security Council, the National Security Council and the president
on military matters. The org structure of JCS is as under:-
 19

Fig: Org Structure of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

30. Org Structure of USINDOPACOM. The Org structure for mil control of U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) responsible for Indo Pacific is as under:-
 20

Fig: Org Structure of the Office of the USINDOPACOM

Doctrine & Org : If so then What Analysis

31. The United States has worked out its strategies for to contain/ counter in Indo-
Pacific, Cyber & Space domain as well as polar/Arctic Region. The servicewise
infeerences for China are as under:-

(a) Military Modernization Objectives & Targets.

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(i) Military Mechanization. The goal of mechanization of PLA Forces

has been broadly achieved as per the intended timeline of 2020. This has
also significantly enhanced informationization and greatly improved strategic
capabilities of China. It has now allowed PLA’s weapons and equipment to
be networked into “systems of systems” and utilize more advanced
technologies suitable for “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare.

(ii) By 2027. Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization,

informatization, and intelligentization, while boosting the speed of
modernization in military theories, organizations, personnel and weapons
and equipment. This will provide China with more credible military options in
a Taiwan contingency and also effectively counter the U.S. military in the
Indo-Pacific region, and compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table
on Beijing’s terms.

(iii) By 2035. To comprehensively advance the modernization of military

theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and
equipment in step with the modernization of the country and basically
complete the modernization of national defense and the military.

(b) Military Capabilities for Global Power Projection .

(i) The PRC should continue to increase its military capabilities to

achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan, South
China Sea, or Korea contingency.

(ii) The PRC’s should continue to improve air and ground-based missile
strike capabilities to enable other military assets to operate farther from
China.

(iii) The PRC’s should continue to build a multi-carrier force. The PLA’s
next generation of carriers to have greater endurance for its global military
presence.

(c) Cyber & Space. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater
command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space,
cyber, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare missions
and capabilities. China should continues to develop counterspace capabilities—
including direct ascent, coorbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy
capabilities—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in
the space domain during a crisis or conflict. China should also continue to devote
significant resources to grow all aspects of its space program, from military space
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applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific

endeavors, and space exploration.

(d) Nuclear Capabilities. Over the next decade, the PRC should aim to
modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PRC should invest in and
expanding, the number of its land, sea and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and
construct the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear
forces. Aim to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and at least
1,000 warheads by 2030.

(e) Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The PLA established the JLSF in 2016
to streamline the PLA’s joint strategic and campaign-level logistics. The JLSF
should continue in establishing support relationships among joint logistic units and
other PLA service logistics elements and integrating civilian logistics into military
operations.