A non-popperian view of the status of Science
EPIS TEMOLOGY
SC I EN C E PHI LO SO PHY
The second and more
important way that we
control other people's voice-
authority over us is by our
opinion of them. Why are we
forever judging, forever
criticizing, forever putting
people in categories of faint
praise or reproof?
The origin of consciousness
in the breakdown of the
bicameral mind
Julian JAYNES
Ot her t opics
Genetically modified
organisms
Nature and artifice
The tree and the ring
Information theories
Phenocopy
Order and Necessity
Presocratic philosophy
The Stanislas Noria
seminar
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I N D U STRY TEA C H I N G PO PULARI SATI O N CONTACT SI TE M AP RELEASE NOTES
S c ie n c e an d
t e c hn o l o gy : a W e st e r n
imbrogl io
Saturday, 30 September 2023
A n t o i n e D a n ch i n © 2004- 2023
唐善•安 東
The following text is the summary of a lecture given at Zhong
Shan (Sun Yat Sen) University in Guangzhou (China) in
spring 1991. It has been published with minor differences in
Projections: (1992) 7/8 : 39-48, an ephemeral journal
created by Michel Salomon (1927-2020), who accepted
publication after a long discussion about his polemic and
highly debatable views of biology modern. A detailed version
is discussed in The Delphic Boat, Harvard University Press,
2003.
Une vue très brève en Français se trouve à ce site, mais une
version détaillée est développée dans La Barque de Delphes.
This lecture formed part of a research programme set up
with the aim of developing an uncommon aspect of
anthropology, namely the anthropological analysis of
Western civilisations by non-Western scholars (with their
own definition of who a scholar is) based on an idea
proposed by Anne Retel-Laurentin for medical research.
Our Western civilisations tacitly assume that our values are universal.
As 'proof', we usually demonstrate that our know-how is the most
efficient in the world, thus assuming that our know-how is a value, is
the value. While it is difficult to dispute the immense success of
Western civilisations, especially in dominating the world, this success
often represents a deadly power. It therefore seems worthwhile to
reinvest in the roots of our science and technology. In this lecture, the
author suggests that there are several distinct traditions at work in our
civilisations that carry immense power. From this analysis, it emerges
that we must be careful not to identify progress with advancement, the
former having a moral side, which is of major importance. Man and
societies are not mechanical devices, and should not be treated as
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such.

This indicates that while it is obviously extremely important not

to regress to pre-scientific sentiments and beliefs, such as those
often displayed by some self-proclaimed 'environmentalists', it is
equally important not to identify science with technology. This
means that we must also be careful not to follow the lines
indicated by the priests of a new religion, even if it pretends to be
Science. Only then will the Earth escape a miserable fate.

It is impossible for me, given our current political environment, to take

part in a transcultural programme without saying a few words about
these political events. Indeed, as I shall try to show, speaking about
science is an effort to attain a "zero level" (as Roland Barthes would
probably have called it) in the exchange between civilisations, thanks
to the production of concepts that are interpreted as universal. But
science - as a generator of progress and as an invader of the world -
is of Western origin. One would be mistaken, however, if one imagined
that science is produced by the West on an habitual basis, or that
Western civilisations and science are one and the same entity. As I
shall try to show, the scientific attitude is universal in Man. What is
original is therefore not science, but the method that is linked to it,
which generates the concepts in which science is rooted, thus
fostering constant progress.

The West does not however use this method (which I usually refer to
as the Generative Critical Method), everywhere or with any great
frequency, despite the fact that it was discovered there. For Western
civilisations are made up of the overlapping of several civilisations,
more or less antagonistic, or even irreconcilable. It is thus possible to
identify in the Western world at least two important traditions, an Indo-
European (or Aryan) tradition, that of the " three powers" described by
Georges Dumézil, and a Greek/Egyptian/African tradition, the
birthplace of which is rather uncertain, and from which stem most
specificities of Western science.

Three symbolic characters summarise the whole of the first tradition.

They are: the priest, the ploughman and the soldier. Dumézil has
tried throughout his life —and this is not the place to discuss the
validity of his assumptions and conclusions— to justify his model by
identifying myths or legends present from the heart of India through to
the Middle East to the extreme borders of Scandinavia and Ireland. He
claimed that he could find the idea of a separation of power between
those who create (or receive) knowledge, those who make it
technically available, creating the know-how, and finally those who
enforce it through the power of arms. The speeches that we hear
today about a new world order, clearly imposed on the world through
brute force, fully justify this interpretation of Western behaviour (I
reiterate that the West (in this case) goes as far as Asia, since it is
from Indian descent). But does gun power, or arms-mediated

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persuasion really allow the creation of concepts upon which know-how

can be built? Dumézil, who tried to reach universality, remarks
(perhaps with some bitterness) that, although he was able to find a
place for most Western traditions, he was unable to classify all myths
and epics in the three powers. Indeed, the myths of a famous people
were far from conforming to the standard: "The originality of Greek
facts in the Indo-European ensemble is not isolated: the Greeks, in
spite of the fact that their language has kept so many archaisms from
a common source, and that their vocabulary has a more pronounced
Indo-European appearance than most of its sister tongues, have, in
their civilisation and in their religion, less relics and relics more limited
than most brother peoples. This is the price to pay for the Greek
miracle, as I have said: in this part of the world, a critical and creative
mind was early at work, transforming even what it was preserving".
Thus the Greek tradition, which is at the root of the method which
produces science and makes it progress, does not come from the
three powers.

Western civilisations rest on both traditions, which are more or less in

open conflict as time passes. The latter produces abstractions, it is in
a way disembodied, creative and tolerant; the former is commercial,
military, intolerant and destructive, but also utilitarian, efficient and
remarkably able to use the latter. The historical consequences of this
situation are numerous. In particular it should be noted that conflicts
arising between these two traditions generally result in the domination
of the former, which takes hold of the concepts generated by the latter
and transforms them into means of ruling the world (using the farmer
and/or the soldier for that purpose, the priest being there to justify
domination). However, at some point, its lack of ability to produce new
concepts results in political weakness, and an inability to manage an
everchanging environment (be it only because of the demographic
increase). In this situation where the three powers are weakened, the
latter becomes stronger and generates new concepts that will, in turn,
be used to create know-how. Thus an endless spiral is generated
upon which Western history —and soon the World's history— is
written. And one should perhaps, on a smaller scale, and not on a
historical scale, notice how the first of the three powers elevates the
scientist from his initial position to the sacred position of the priest,
thus effectively sterilising his creative activity, which must be linked to
modesty in terms of true scientific production, to function properly...
But this would take us far from our subject.

T h e G enerat ive C rit ic al M et h od

Rather than ask questions about the true nature of science, I shall, in
what follows, concentrate on the modes of knowledge production, and
try to emphasise the original aspects of the Greek mode of this
production. It should be made clear at this point that it is a rather
simplified view, that cannot take into account local variations: it would

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certainly be possible to find examples that run counter to my general

outline. But this outline enables us to understand both the originality
and the effectiveness of this approach.

A human being is born in a given civilisation, and soon learns a given

language. This is so natural that one hardly considers it as important.
It is clear however that, during the learning period, nobody would think
of calling into question the knowledge and the rules he or she is
acquiring. We start looking at the world through preconceived ideas.
The first postulate that will form the basis of the original mode of
exploration which I wish to advocate, is that reality (the world) does
not speak. This is not, at least in our Western civilisations, a generally
accepted idea. On the contrary. It is a Greek idea, expressed for
example by Xenophanes of Colophon ("And for a certain truth, no man
has seen it nor will there ever be a man who knows about the gods
and about all the things I mention. For if he succeeds in the end in
saying what is completely true, he himself is nevertheless unaware of
it; and opinion is fixed by fate upon all things"), but which is absolutely
contrary to the Indo-European tradition of the Book (which claims
everywhere to be our only tradition and truth) according to which a
special divinity would have communicated some of its knowledge
through a fundamental process of Revelation. In fact, there are two
independent traditions involving writing in our civilisation. In one
tradition, writing is the divine source of knowledge that can only be
used as a reference, and never be amended or transformed, while in
the second one —the Greek tradition— the book is the starting point
for the writing up of new books, new models of the world. In this latter
case the book is simply an instrument of knowledge, not a sacred
memory.

If reality is mute, however, we can only start from what we have

inherited from those who preceded us, and build up an image of the
world. And because we are the creators of this image, we are able to
understand its behaviour, and how it will answer our questions. When
studying the behaviour of this representation, it is necessary to
evaluate its relationship to reality by its capacity to predict some of the
behaviour of an otherwise incomprehensible world. And it is this power
of prediction, which will measure the degree of appropriateness of the
model as it relates to the world, something that we shall try to improve
with time. The purpose of the method is to generate models of the
world that will with time become increasingly suitable. Before
continuing, it is worthwhile noting here that there is no reason that a
unique model of the world should exist at any given time. It is perfectly
admissible to produce several representations of the world at the
same time, each of which has its own degree of appropriateness and
its own power of prediction. It is important to understand that, by its
very nature, a model is different from the reality it represents. In fact
one must recognise that acting on a model is not the same as acting
on reality... But let us go back to the construction of a model.

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One can separate from preconceived ideas, a set of ideas that will not
be called into question, at least for some time (this is the dogmatic part
of a theory). This set of postulates must be translated into elements on
which the model will be built, through a process of abstractive
interpretation. For example, a man or an animal is represented by a
model, (as is the case in ancient Chinese medicine), and answers to
appropriate questions will be tested on it. In a more general abstract
way, and the most often in science, the postulates will be translated
into clear propositions that, according to the rules of logic, are
themselves subject to discussion - and are indeed discussed - forming
axioms and definitions. Putting axioms and definitions together will
result in a demonstration yielding a theorem or, most often, a
conjecture (of a theorem).

We can have here two types of models, a concrete one (the mock-up)
and an abstract one (the mathematical model), that we must now
situate within the reality they are meant to represent (according to
phenomenology) or explain (according to « ontology », using René
Thom's words). A new process, symmetrical to that which has
provided the bases for the model, an interpretation, which in this case
could be termed instantiation, is once again necessary: one must go
back to the real world. This is carried out through experimental
predictions that are of two different types. Either they are existential
predictions (one must discover the object, or the process whose
existence has been predicted) or predictions that can be verified, and
therefore subject to falsification (an experimental system will have to
be constructed to verify or falsify the prediction). Thus the reactions of
reality towards the experiment will allow validation of the model,
therefore giving a measure of its adequacy. It should be stressed here
that persistence of a model through time does not at all justify
identifying it with Reality. This is where analogical confusion
(metaphores) becomes a risk, as Maupertuis remarked (in his Vénus
physique): "Analogy delivers us from the need to imagine new things,
and from another, still worse pain, which is to stay in uncertainty. It
pleases our mind, but does it please Nature?" Producing models is, in
a certain way, producing analogies, and there is a risk that, when one
uses a similar model to represent two different phenomena, this will be
thought to mean that both are explained by an identical cause. In fact
this is just a measure of our inability to display more imagination: one
knows, for instance, the symbolic function of integers in the
representation of the world in every civilisation; it always uses small
numbers (which can be easily understood), but this does not mean
that the structure of the world follows such simple arithmetics. To say
that the number of man is 3, of woman 4 and perfection (God) 7
(union of male and female) as is found in many civilisations is not very
surprising, because this is simply a combination of small figures, and
this does not say much about the world (there are indeed civilisations
where 2, 3 and 5 play the same function as the former figures; what

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would be surprising would be if the number 573 695 125 998 331
revealed a specific aspect of reality, but I doubt it!)

One must therefore avoid taking the model for reality, or for any
"universal" feature of reality, to allow for the generative process that
will now be described. It is the model's inadequacy that is the driving
force behind its evolution and, if need be, its replacement. Indeed the
failure to predict adequately triggers a process of abstraction, specific
to all theoretical constructions. Throughout this process, which takes
place in a direction opposite to that which gave birth to it, one is slowly
led from the predictions to the postulates which have allowed the
model to be constructed. This results firstly in reformulating postulates
in more precise terms, changing some of them and sometimes
discarding them. In fact, the model's resistance to change is evident
very early on: using all means it will try to save its existence keeping
its role as a description and an explanation of reality, initially by simply
asking for changes in the interpretations that have led to false
predictions ("it is the exceptions that prove the rule"). It is most often at
this point that the type of culture will play a specific role: in Western
civilisations for instance, it is where the "divine" role of science (and of
the scientist, its priest) intervenes by refusing what is essential, doubt,
and by stating that the model represents Truth.

It often happens, for this reason, that a model keeps its place for a
long time in spite of its inadequacy, and despite many indications of
doubt. The second time of resistance will come from an appropriate
adjustment of the model: it will be altered in such a way that it will
tolerate exceptions. But it should be noted that during this critical
process the very nature of the model is called into question, and its
constructions, its signification, are specified, and defined through
contradictions. For this reason this stage, which one can call the
dogmatic stage, has a very positive role: a very inadequate model
would quickly be set aside, and would not contribute much to the
creation and progress of knowledge. Lastly, an interpretation of initial
postulates calls into question the very axioms on which the model is

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built. This is obviously a rare and difficult occurrence, and is the

source of real scientific revolutions, from which new models
constructed very differently from previous ones will be constructed,
developed and abandoned.

This conceptual framework is clearly an abstraction of what happens

in reality. There is no single model, but several, either competing or
complementary. The simultaneous presence of models representing a
certain part of reality, together with computer simulations of the same
reality, are daily evidence of this and provide us with the opportunity to
understand just how far removed the model is from Reality. The
plane's wing that is visible on the computer screen is clearly of a
different nature from the real wing. However the former will allow
construction of the latter after interaction with an imaginary
atmosphere represented firstly by equations (Navier-Stokes' equations
for instance) from the mathematical world of turbulence, and then by
their digitisation according to an appropriate triangulation network.
These equations are finally applied within a specific architecture made
of Silicium, Germanium or Gallium arsenide, in which the rules of
formal logics are represented (yet another model)... But when,
because of a strong wind, the plane crashes, the model's inadequacy,
and the need for reformulating it, become obvious. The processes
described above now take place.

There are many other situations where several models of the same
reality coexist, despite their apparent irreconcialibility. This is the case
for example, when one considers magnetic phenomena at the
microscopic level, of classical models (which are linked to dynamics)
and quantum mechanical models (which have an algebraic
construction). In the case of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance, for
example, both models coexist, and the type of experiment depends on
the model considered. One usually constructs spectrometers with the
classical model in mind: the results are subsequently interpreted using
the quantum-mechanical representation. The corresponding
interpretations differ so widely that there is usually no conflict, but the
mental representations of the phenomenon (and consequently, the
way in which further exploration is considered) differ according to the
chosen model.

T h e prog ress of k now led g e

In the Generative Critical Method, as outlined above, one can easily

see a process of evolution, a sort of branching-out, similar to
phylogeny. Even preconceived ideas, and the civilisation which
produces them are not fixed. We are thus facing not only a synchronic
variety of civilisations and representations of Reality but also a
diachronic variety, which is even richer as more time has passed. And,
as the representation of Reality increases in precision, through the
creation of models which are tested for their appropriateness (in a
more efficient manner than they are tested for their diachronic

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stability), the issue of communication between models and,

consequently, between civilisations becomes increasingly important:
one will try, at least implicitly, to look for a minimal representation of
reality which is universal. It follows that such temporal development is
perceived not just as advancement but as progress, which adds an
ethical dimension to knowledge production. I shall not deal with that
dimension now - although it is of great interest - but I shall simply try to
describe the formal consequences of such progress, and the
orientation it gives to future models of our world.

If we consider that models are based on the world as it was

represented to us by our predecessors within a given civilisation, the
historical study of the evolution of models can give us insight into the
way they were constructed and how they were developed over the
course of time. It seems clear in this context - as the Greek
philosophers who preceded Socrates, and in particular the atomists,
pointed out - that the initial point of departure is stimulated by human
nature and by its biological constraints. We are linked to our
perception of the world in a very concrete way. Our senses provide us
with an initial image, and it is our brain, inherited through biological
evolution, that imposes on us our first a priori synthetic judgements.
The first consequence of this situation is that an initial structure exists
which underlies our models of the world. This scale is determined by
what we perceive directly through our senses. Its dimension is
therefore that of Man himself and it is subject to the constraints of the
corresponding macroscopic vision. Consequently, the first models
emphasise a global vision of what they represent, and the whole is
considered as the only important aspect of the process of
modelisation. But, and I shall not dwell on this, there is a certain
degree of conceptual convergence between a holistic representation
of things and the religious aspect of the three powers. The result is
that theories are seen as fixed, thus precluding any analysis of
phenomena. This original modelisation process is easily discernible in
presocratic philosophy, where two holistic representations are in
conflict, according to whether they emphasise permanence
(Parmenides) or change (Heraclitus). They are resolved by the
atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) who combine both aspects of
reality, by changing the spatial scale - thus obliging philosophers to
use analytical methods - and link together microscopic parmenidian
worlds in a permanent state of flux, but with a deterministic evolution
pattern, which produces the great variety of forms present in the world.
Atomist thinking has long been overshadowed by holistic and religious
philosophers, but after several centuries it was eventually recognised,
breaking into pieces the whole, which then became amenable to
analysis.

Astronomy, medicine and chemistry were thus placed, more or less at

the same time, in an entirely new world, which could be explored
through mediation: analysis, because of the change in scale it

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presupposes, alleviates the constraints of sensory perception.

Perception of the world now becomes indirect. In parallel, instruments
of investigation are developed which facilitate discovery of the content
of the whole. This is a true conceptual revolution, which is still in its
early stages today, and its consequences are still far from being
understood. Indeed the question of substance, matter and form, is
then entirely restructured. Genesis and function of borders take on
new importance, as they become mediation areas for direct
perception, macroscopic perception, and representation mediated
through instruments and models, of a microscopic world supposed to
be developing, as content, from within.

The very idea of content becomes questionable as atoms themselves

are dissolved into more and more elusive entities, a process that can
be likened to onions losing their peels. Thus our representation of the
world is profoundly altered, progress being derived from analysis of
the content of initially represented entities. One will easily understand,
then - but I cannot examine this here -, that resistance meant to keep
alive the old way of thinking, and to prevent, almost by principle,
analytical methods, can be found everywhere. An intelligent form of
such resistance is evident in the emphasis placed by the
mathematician René Thom on the study of the most macroscopic
forms of life, excluding everything that composes (and determines)
them. But the most important consequence of this evolution in models
is the production of new concepts, which, needless to say, change our
philosophical representations as well as our metaphysical inquiries.
Before illustrating this with biological concepts, I pointed out above
that one should be very careful about using analogies, even if they are
obviously very useful - which suggests that it would probably he
inappropriate to discard, in the name of progress, other forms that are
derived from previous concepts. As in the evolution of species, which
is based on a branching-out, the evolution of models produces
offsprings that are very different from their common ancestors. It is
therefore quite possible that, in parallel with analytical models,
descendants of holistic models could still have something interesting
to say. It is in this sense that I appreciate the value of certain
approaches proposed by René Thom.

Here is an example. Even if one has, quite correctly, chosen a

microscopic (molecular) representation of life, some rules are still
nevertheless applicable to the organism as a whole. One knows for
instance that the building blocks of living things are dissymmetrical
(this is the first great discovery made by Pasteur, who isolated left-
handed levogyrous tartaric acid crystals from wine sediments). How
then can we explain forms that exhibit mirror-symmetry forms in plants
or animals? This is the case with a ram's horns, which are made of
unsymmetrical proteins that fold symmetrically: if one represents the
ram's forehead by a rectangle, the cells on the surface of the head
are, in space, arranged in symmetrical fashion (on a macroscopic

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scale only, our normal euclidian space some are on the front, some in
the centre, some behind, some on the edges...). The genetic
programme needs then only specify the algorithmic command: "on the
front and on an edge I multiply fast", to create a spiral growth. This
demonstrates the interest of a macroscopic model of this particular
process, which should not however exclude microscopic underlying
models. In contrast, "systems theory", a still very fashionable
approach in the West founded upon a verbalism that would be very
interesting to study from the socio-cultural point of view, often (but
fortunately not always) aims to take into account a holistic approach to
represent natural phenomena, but, as Carolyn Merchant points out in
a very interesting study of the role of women in the birth of ecological
thinking in the West: "Systems theorists claim for themselves a holistic
outlook, because they believe that they are taking into account the
ways in which all the parts in a given system affect the whole. Yet the
formalism of the calculus of probabilities excludes the possibility of
mathematising the gestalt - that is, the ways in which each part of any
given instant take their meaning from the whole. The more open,
adaptive organic, and complex the system, the less successful the
formalism. It is most successful when applied to closed. artificial
precisely defined relatively simple systems." Thus, representing the
whole requires, first, looking for relevant analytical levels, below which
one will refuse to go for the considered representation. This entails
looking for borders, defining contents and containers. This does not
always lead to a solvable problem, as there are borders that are so
intrusive that they occupy everything they contain. I shall not speak of
that here (they are called fractals by Benoît Mandelbrot) but this could
probably account in fact for present-day evolution of models in
Western civilisations, where there is a strong trend toward the
disappearing of contents.

But let us return to our reflections on progress. What is (historically)

important, is the study of objects (one can see there part ot
parmenidian constraints, linked to the permanence of things), then
comes taxonomy. It is only afterwards that analysis appears, with its
new capacities for exploration. It leads first, quite naturally, to
identification of new objects (on a different scale), and of their
taxonomic arrangement. Then, and this represents considerable
progress, comes the discovery of the importance of relationships
between these objects. By getting away from the constraint imposed
by the whole, the analytical method opens a new universe, extremely
abstract, and for this reason often ill-perceived or completely ignored,
which is that of structures, of sets of symbolic "arrows" which link
objects to each other. Thus a new form, devoid of content in the usual
way - and therefore without classical borders - is born. We have here
a true conceptual revolution, which often escapes our attention, and
which can lead, when it develops in a given civilisation, to large
differences when compared to what develops in other civilisations.

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This revolution reinforces the disappearance of the role of perception,

as there is no longer any justification for looking at objects as such.
Besides, because modelisation produces new concepts that can be
used for the building up of new objects, important technological
consequences will occur during development of the new models.
Progress in the creation of knowledge therefore leads to progress in
know-how and techniques, and, accordingly, to further discrepancy
between the current status of civilisations. And it must be stressed that
this is not a minor point because newly created objects are true
elaborations, inventions rather than discoveries, purely human
artefacts, and, as such, the very landmarks of the civilisations which
have produced them. A laser beam is a striking example of this
because it exists in the universe only as an artefact.

We can see here two very different aspects of theoretical processes

within Western civilisations. On the one hand, the existence of an
original method, founded on the intimate perception (and
conceptualisation) of the modesty of Man in the universe, and on the
positive aspects of the systematic exploitation of errors, rather than of
successes, and, on the other hand, the displacement of the idea of
content towards the study of forms, conceived as relationships
between objects. I have briefly indicated the generative function of the
first aspect. I shall now illustrate the second in the recent - and
revolutionary - development of life sciences in Western civilisations.

T h e D elph ic boat (Theseus's ship)

What has just been said is still very abstract. It would be easy to
illustrate it with examples from physics or astronomy or, better
perhaps, from this new science called data mining. But it seems to me
that biology, particularly in its most recent form, displays both the need
for a critical approach and the role played by civilisation in constructing
models.

One has, naturally, a tendency to consider objects first. And biology

has not escaped this tendency (which is perhaps always necessary in
the initial exploratory phase that precedes the birth of a science).
Biology however - discovered less than half a century ago, but already
used by Cuvier when he reconstructed a whole organism from a
jawbone, or even a tooth - is not so much a science of objects than a
science of relationships between objects (and often even of
relationships between relationships). Objects created by living beings
have a series of specific traits that make them immediately
recognisable: technique provides us with numerous examples, and the
Greeks observed what was original in such objects. If one considers
for example a boat, made by adjusting wooden planks, the question
arises as to what constitutes the boat. Indeed as time passes planks
become worn or start to rot, in such a way that they must be replaced.
Eventually, one ends up with a boat which is similar to the original but
made of entirely new planks: is it the same boat? Our knowledge in

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physiology shows that the same holds for a living being during its life
span: is it the same being? Where is its identity located? And,
moreover, is it not possible to predict the boat's general form and
function from a fragment of this same boat?

It is by studying the nature of what constitutes life's permanence that

one understands that it is of an abstract nature, and that one should
analyse underlying relationships rather than base oneself on the whole
organism. To this we must add the dynamics of life. The time
dimension will add further relationships which must be taken into
account if one wishes to produce accurate models of the living What
has just been said does not entirely exclude objects or their physico-
chemical nature: one only has to replace the wooden planks of the
boat at Delphi by iron panels to understand this. The organism will
therefore also depend on the nature of the physical objects that
constitute it.

Life can be understood as follows. There are four main processes.

The first, metabolism, is the ability to chemically transform the
environment: living entities extract some chemicals and create
different ones. The second process, which is essential, is
compartmentalisation: there is no living being without a membrane
or a skin. Two new processes follow. On the one hand the ability to
transmit "something" from generation to generation, which we can call
memory, the chemical substrate of which is the family of so-called
nucleic acids. Last but not least, the ability to manipulate the
environment through a specific transposition of the memory into
proteins, via the exquisitely tuned and specific catalytic processes they
can trigger and perpetuate. Contrary to expectation, the number of
objects that contribute to these four processes is very small.
Metabolism, for instance, in an entirely autonomous cell, comprises
about five hundred types of more or less related molecules, no more.
Nucleic acids are made up of the chaining of only four or five types of
chemically similar molecules. In order to form a functional nucleic acid,
these building blocks are chained like alphabetic letters in a written
sentence. The same is true for proteins, but this time 20 amino-acid
residues are enough to form all of them. We have here an initial
representation of macromolecules, as they are called, in the form of a
text like Western writing. The corresponding model of life, extremely
rich in its conceptual and practical consequences, is therefore
historically linked to the place of its creation: is it possible to think that
it could have been invented elsewhere in the world, for instance,
where alphabetic writing does not exist? Nothing seems less likely.
This uncovers a new constraint in our modelisation of reality. Customs
specific to a given civilisation may be particularly appropriate as a
representation of a fragment of reality. This is purely contingent, and
not at all a formal reason for the success of corresponding models.
Thus the presence of a cultural trait has important consequences. (It
should be stressed here that what I see as a contingent cause has

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been described in several philosophical traditions as the signature of

an underlying general principle of identity, as in platonism for
instance). It seems to me, accordingly, of major importance to take
note of this observation. If there had been only one uniform civilisation
on the earth, with a unique mode of writing, for example using
ideograms, it seems likely that, for a long time (with the exception of
the possible influence of arithmeticians, who often manipulate integers
like an alphabet), many aspects of genetics would have been totally
inaccessible. When faced with an unpredictable future, it is the
diversity of answers which affords a solution. We should therefore
react against the uniformisation of civilisations, in the name of
scientific progress.

It is possible to go a little further, and to show how the linguistic

metaphor has fundamental consequences in our representation of
reality. I have spoken of memory and of function, that is of nucleic
acids which play the role of memory transmitted down through the
generations, and of proteins whose role is to execute or act out. It is
natural to investigate the reasons for this separation into two functions,
and its operative role. Cech discovered in 1981 that some RNA
molecules could display both activities, i.e. could both reproduce
themselves and exhibit catalytic activity. This solves in part the
chicken and egg paradox: which comes first, protein or nucleic acid?
RNAs are first, as they carry out both memory and manipulation
functions. However, of course, one needs to discover how their
building blocks, the nucleotides, are made, but let us for now forget
about this fundamental question. Once one recognises that RNAs
were invented the sequence of evolution can be easily understood.
Now, this sequence is of crucial importance, because it will replace
one object which has two specificities (memory and function), with two
objects which allow memory and function to be separated. It is from
this separation that the coding process which is central to life is
derived. For it is this very unusual property which allows memory to be
transposed into function which is essential to life. Once again, it
should be emphasised that this is a very special relationship, very
abstract, and therefore extremely difficult to understand: separating
memory from function facilitates action, through function, on the
memory template (which itself specifies function). As a result, a loop, a
self-referring process, is created, which allows a structure and a
dynamic recursive processes that are of an entirely new type to exist,
without any need for an external principle such as a soul, a spirit or a
mind.

The philosophical consequences of this situation are multifold, and

have yet to be explored. In addition, they render all former
representations obsolete, because no one had thought of nature
producing an organisation of this type. In this sense the present day
study of biology is revolutionary, and shakes the foundations of the
very civilisations that have produced the corresponding knowledge.

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The fact that the alphabetic metaphor is at the base of all this means
that if certain civilisations do not want to be excluded from this
evolution which is based on new models, then they must conform to
this mode of communication. But this also reinforces the fundamental
contingency of discovery, of the need for modesty, and of the
necessity to maintain other ways of thinking (if not other methods) so
that once we have set sail for India, we are still capable of discovering
America.

B ibliog raph y

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