Grasping The Process of Implicit Mentalization

580605
research-article2015
TAP0010.1177/0959354315580605Theory & PsychologyDavidsen and Fosgerau
Article
Theory & Psychology
Grasping the process of

1 –21
© The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
implicit mentalization sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0959354315580605
tap.sagepub.com
Annette Sofie Davidsen

University of Copenhagen
Christina Fogtmann Fosgerau

University of Copenhagen
Abstract
Mentalization has developed through different waves and its definition has gradually changed.
Through this process mentalization theorists have not taken a particular position on the
philosophical underpinnings of the understanding of others, except that Theory of Mind (ToM) is
referred to as a commonsense and underlying theoretical basis. It is apparent that ToM does not
explain all dimensions of Mentalization Theory (MT), especially implicit mentalization, and theorists
do not account for how implicit mentalization can be captured in interaction. In this article we
explain the divergence between MT and ToM and the lack of a philosophical basis for the process
of understanding others in MT. We show that conversation analysis (CA) can be used to capture
implicit mentalization in interaction. We argue that MT needs a theoretical and philosophical
formulation about what constitutes intersubjectivity and the process of understanding others.
We suggest that phenomenology could inhabit this space.
Keywords
conversation analysis, embodiment, empathy, implicit mentalization, intersubjectivity,
mentalization theory, mirroring, phenomenology, Theory of Mind
Mentalization
The concept of mentalization has developed in different waves since Fonagy and col-
leagues’ definition in the early 1990s. Over time, the definition of the concept has gradu-
ally changed, and mentalization theorists have broadened the concept’s applicability, but
Corresponding author:
Christina Fogtmann Fosgerau, Section of Psychology of Language, Department of Nordic Studies and
Linguistics, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 120, DK – 2300 Copenhagen S., Denmark.
Email: fogtmann@hum.ku.dk
Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

2 Theory & Psychology
they have not rendered a coherent account of its underlying theoretical basis. In 1991,
Fonagy wrote, “I would like to label the capacity to conceive of conscious and uncon-
scious mental states in oneself and others as the capacity to mentalize” (p. 641). In
Fonagy’s article the concept of mentalization is contrasted with symbolization, which he
found overburdened with meaning, particularly in psychoanalysis. In 1998 Fonagy and
Target suggested that the difficulty that derives from a deficit in mentalization is the dif-
ficulty in generating meta-representations, and they stressed the importance of a two-
level mental functioning: “The capacity to make use of an awareness of their own and
other people’s thoughts and feelings. This capacity is referred to as ‘mentalization’ or
‘reflective function’” (p. 92). Here, “mentalization” appears to be perceived as analo-
gous to “reflective function.” A scale was developed to measure reflective function (RF;
Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). Later, Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, and Target (2002)
described reflective function as an operationalization of mentalization, especially for
research purposes. These different descriptions and definitions mean that the mentalizing
process which had been described so far is an explicit, conscious process. However,
Bateman and Fonagy subsequently formulated the definition as: “the mental processes
by which an individual implicitly and explicitly interprets the actions of himself and oth-
ers as meaningful on the basis of intentional mental states such as personal desires,
needs, feelings, beliefs and reasons” (2004, p. 21), hereby including the implicit dimen-
sion of the process of understanding.
Gradually there has been a tendency to use the verb form mentalizing to designate the
fact that the concept involves a mental activity: mentalizing is active (Allen & Fonagy,
2006). It describes a process and not a static property of the mind, a skill that can be
present to a greater or lesser degree, and can vary from time to time.
Fonagy and colleagues initially used the concept of mentalization in relation to
patients with borderline personality disorders (Fonagy, 1995; Fonagy & Target, 2000).
Later they used it not only to describe patients, but also to describe therapists’ capacity
to understand patients and also to increase their own self-reflectivity (Allen, 2003). The
link to attachment theory has been used to assess the therapist–patient dyad (Diamond,
Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, & Levy, 2003; Dozier, Cue, & Barnett, 1994) and appar-
ently the implicit capacity of the mentalizing processes is central in establishing secure
attachment:
Of course, all the developmental factors that enhance or undermine mentalizing capacity in
patients pertain equally to therapists. Psychotherapists and their patients are in the same boat.
To play mentalizing duets effectively, they must rely on whatever developmental competence
they have achieved. At any given moment, their performance will depend on the same factors:
the extent of secure attachment (i.e., mutual trust in relationship) and an optimal level of
arousal. Thus much psychotherapeutic effectiveness consists of fostering a safe and a secure
climate—a largely implicit mentalizing skill. (Allen & Fonagy, 2006, p. 19)
Allen and Fonagy also said that the concept of mentalization designates a general human
capacity and is applicable in a broader interpersonal sense (Allen & Fonagy, 2006), and
in this respect mentalizing is described as being aware of one’s own mental states and
those of others (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008). The focus on the awareness of mental
states implies that it is primarily this explicit dimension of mentalization that is

Davidsen and Fosgerau 3
emphasized. At the same time it is clear that explicit mentalization is only the tip of the
iceberg (Allen et al., 2008).
A multidimensional construct
In addition to involving a differentiation between implicit and explicit mentalization, the
description of mentalization has gradually developed to comprise an increasing number
of different components. The current definition of mentalization involves different inter-
related aspects of the concept: it is a meta-cognitive phenomenon, as it refers to the
capacity to interpret thoughts and actions, to think about thinking (Fonagy, 1991); and it
contains an affective aspect, to think about feelings (Fonagy & Target, 1996). Nevertheless,
effective processes of mentalizing are always considered to contain affectivity (Bateman
& Fonagy, 2012). The term mentalized affectivity was introduced to account for what is
considered the most fundamental form of mentalizing, which establishes a kind of emo-
tional knowledge (Allen et al., 2008; Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; Jurist, 2010).
The concept is described through four different dimensions that define mentalizing
abilities. Each dimension is suspended between two poles with a gradual transition
between them (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). The affective and cognitive aspects form one of
these four dimensions. Another dimension is formed by a distinction between self and
other: one can mentalize one’s own mental state and also another person’s mental state.
In this respect, mentalization includes a self-reflective as well as an other-related aspect.
The third dimension unfolds between internal and external features of mentalizing. When
mentalizing is based on internal features, attention is directed toward one’s own or oth-
ers’ thoughts or feelings; whereas in external mentalizing, attention is directed toward
behavior and external signals revealing mental states.
Implicit mentalization
The fourth dimension of mentalization concerns the distinction between implicit and
explicit mentalizing. Implicit mentalization constitutes the “embodied, visceral, unmedi-
ated system” of understanding others (Bateman & Fonagy, 2012, p. 26). The explicit
form, expressed through reflection, only represents the tip of the iceberg and is the rela-
tively conscious and controlled mentalizing. Implicit mentalizing, which accordingly
constitutes the larger part that is under the surface, is automatic, non-verbal, immediate,
and unreflective (Allen et al., 2008).
The distinction between explicit and implicit mentalization is described as “the most
vexing form of heterogeneity in the concept” (Allen & Fonagy, 2006, p. 7). Implicit
mentalizing is described as being more elusive than explicit mentalizing; as intuitive,
procedural, and non-conscious. Nevertheless, implicit mentalizing is considered perhaps
to be the most important component in the treatment of mental disorder, and actually in
all forms of professional understanding:
As clinicians, our helpfulness to our patients may have more to do with the quality of implicit
mentalization we offer through a general attitude rather than explicit elaboration of specific
mental contents as has been frequently suggested in the past. (Fonagy, 2003, p. 271)

However, in spite of this great clinical importance, the theoretical understanding of

implicit mentalization has not been accounted for, and there are no descriptions of how
implicit mentalization is enacted or how it can be identified when displayed in clinical
interaction. For mentalization theorists, mentalization and understanding of the other
involves an approach related to Theory of Mind (ToM). However, Allen et al. (2008)
also say that although ToM is related to mentalizing, it does not cover all of the same
aspects as mentalizing. Even so, mentalization theorists do not describe theoretical or
philosophical foundations that could account for MT as a coherent theory in itself, or
even for the aspects which cannot be accounted for by ToM. In this article we engage
with these challenges. First, we relate MT to ToM and explain the differences between
the two frameworks. As ToM is particularly concerned with cognitive, conscious
aspects, we point out that the alleged predominant piece of the mentalizing process,
implicit mentalization, cannot be accounted for within ToM. Second, we argue that
conversation analysis (CA) can be used to grasp how implicit mentalization unfolds in
interaction. Third, we show that phenomenological thinking could form a philosophical
background for mentalization theory rendering it possible to also account for implicit
processes of understanding.
Theory of Mind and mentalization

ToM does not refer to one unified theory or scope, but covers a variety of assumptions
and interests (Astington, 1993; Costall & Leudar, 2004). In mentalization theory, Allen
et al. (2008) outline ToM as a theory which has gradually revealed the process and the
stages through which children acquire an understanding of mental states and the relation
of these mental states to their behavior. Allen et al. (2008) also state that ToM accounts
for the psychological processes which make it possible to mentalize as adults. They
introduce different theories within ToM: modularity theory, theory-theory (TT), and
simulation theory (ST), that are relevant for mentalization theory. However, mentaliza-
tion theorists do not clarify which ToM explanation model they lean towards (Allen
et al., 2008; Bateman & Fonagy, 2012; Fonagy & Target, 1997). Apparently they find
that all theories contribute to an understanding of mentalizing processes, which makes it
somewhat difficult to determine precisely the inspiration derived from ToM. In TT, fol-
lowing one version, it is presumed that the ability to read another person’s mental state is
based on an innate mechanism for reading others’ minds (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Another
version of TT states that the ability to read another person’s mind is acquired through
development and is learned from the social environment (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
Both branches of the theory advocate the idea that a person obtains an understanding of
another person’s mind by implicitly employing a theoretical approach that involves pos-
tulating the existence of mental states in others, and that these mental states can be used
to explain and predict another person’s behavior (Fosgerau, 2011; Gallagher, 2001). In
modulation theory, it is claimed that different modules or mechanisms exist within the
brain to solve different adaptive problems regarding understanding other people’s minds,
making it possible to explain that specific problems of understanding are related to dif-
ferent pathologies (Goldman, 2006). In simulation theory (ST), a person does not create
theories about another person, but instead uses his own mental experience as an inner

model for the other person’s mind (Gordon, 1986). This inner model is used to create an
idea about the other person’s mental state, desires, needs, and so on. Following ST, the
assumption of the other’s mind is not based on a theory, but on a model, which presumes
an inner representational simulation.
In the literature on social cognition the concepts of mentalization and ToM are often
used as if they referred to the same phenomena (Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Hooker,
Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2008; Moriguchi et al., 2006). Mentalization
theorists also apparently use the concept of mentalization interchangeably with aspects
described in ToM. Nevertheless, as we have shown, they say that mentalizing and ToM
differ in certain areas (Allen et al., 2008). First, they claim that both emotional and cogni-
tive aspects are included in the mentalizing framework, but that the ToM literature is
primarily oriented towards cognitive aspects of mentalizing. ToM emphasizes the belief–
desire reasoning and perspective-taking which reflects cognitive mentalizing, whereas
mentalizing processes are seen as integrating affective and cognitive processes (Bateman
& Fonagy, 2012, p. 29). Second, the mentalizing framework includes equally the pro-
cesses of mentalizing in relation to both self and other, whereas ToM primarily attends to
interpreting others. Finally, according to Allen et al. (2008), ToM and mentalization
theory differ in that ToM is seen as a product of the mentalizing activity and mentaliza-
tion is considered an activity or process.
It is noteworthy that implicit mentalization is not mentioned by mentalization theorists
when differentiating ToM from mentalizing (Allen et al., 2008). When Bateman and Fonagy
(2012) write about the two different ways of mentalizing, implicit and explicit, they only
mention ToM in relation to the explicit aspect. Regarding the implicit aspect, they refer to
Eastern philosophy and also mindfulness-based approaches (Bateman & Fonagy, 2012, p.
26). Nevertheless, the implicit or automatic vs. the explicit or controlled polarity is still
identified as “the most fundamental polarity underlying mentalization” (Bateman & Fonagy,
2012, p. 20), but without a description of any theoretical underpinning for this polarity. ToM
does not account for the implicit ways in which subjects automatically and apparently with-
out effort understand the mental states of their co-interlocutors.
That ToM does not include the more immediate, direct processes of understanding is
a criticism that has also been made by others. According to ToM a subject needs an idea
or a theory to understand other people. Reddy and Morris think this is a misconception;
subjects should not be seen as isolated subjects (see also Costall & Leudar, 2004); not as
a “he” or “she,” but as part of a “you” (Gallagher, 2001; Ratcliffe, 2006a; Reddy &
Morris, 2004). They suggest that it is through interaction and engagement with other
people that we recognize others as intentional beings: “Genuine engagement actually
creates the minds that are there to be known” (Reddy & Morris, 2004, p. 660). Such
engagement does not exclude theories and reflections on other people’s mental states,
“but these are developmentally and experientially secondary to actual engagement with
these intentions and motivations” (Reddy & Morris, 2004, p. 660). Ratcliffe, in line with
Gallagher (2001), emphasizes the importance of interaction for interpersonal under-
standing: “It is through certain kinds of sustained interaction that an increasingly refined
perception-like appreciation of someone’s experience is achieved” (Ratcliffe, 2014, p.
270). This actual interaction probably contains some of the elements of implicit mentali-
zation. Allen, Bleiberg, and Haslam-Hopwood (2003) state:

But thinking and talking about what is going on in our own mind and the minds of others is
only part of our mentalizing activity, perhaps just the tip of the iceberg. When we interact
with others, we mentalize intuitively, just as we ride a bicycle by habit. Thus we don’t just
mentalize at an intellectual level; we mentalize at a gut level. (Mentalizing Explicitly &
Implicitly, para. 3)
When mentalizing implicitly the subject is automatically relating to, engaging, and inter-
acting with other people. This is fundamentally different from the way a subject is
regarded in ToM (Gallagher, 2001). MT has not, however, formulated a theoretical
approach to this implicit part of the mentalization iceberg that is under the surface.
Another critique leveled at ToM regards the applied experiments. According to Costall
and Leudar (2004) these experiments are basically what hold the diverse approach of
ToM together. However, ToM does not take into account that such experiments are situ-
ated social interactions themselves. The same critique could be equally applied to the
procedures of assessing mentalization. The basic assumptions within the mentalizing
framework are that mentalizing processes are dialogical in nature, deeply context sensi-
tive, and therefore dependent upon interactional and situational variables. Bateman and
Fonagy (2012) list more than 40 ways in which mentalizing could be assessed, but none
of these procedures incorporate the basic assumptions. The most frequently applied
method for assessing mentalizing is the Reflective Functioning Scale used to rate Adult
Attachment Interviews (Fonagy et al., 1998). The manual describes rating of a test-
person’s utterances. It does not, however, take a dialogical perspective on what is going
on in the interview. If the claim that mentalizing processes are enacted intersubjectively
and are contextually dependent is to be taken seriously, there is a need to focus on the
interactional behavior of participants. This could be done through interaction analytic
procedures.
Capturing implicit mentalization

The different scales and instruments for assessing mentalization do not all derive from
the framework of mentalization, and the tests tap into different aspects of the concept of
mentalization (Luyten, Fonagy, Lowyck, & Vermote, 2012). For each test listed by
Bateman and Fonagy (2012) the authors state which of the eight polarities defined by the
four dimensions are rated. In addition to the critique pointed at both ToM and MT above,
the number of tests addressing the implicit part of mentalizing processes is very limited.
According to the authors, only three instruments are capable of assessing implicit men-
talizing and these tests are all categorized as experimental. This implies that none of
them capture how implicit mentalizing unfolds in interpersonal encounters between, for
example, clinicians and their patients.
Within MT, what implicit mentalizing looks like has been described in fragments.
Some authors have described it as fundamental for interactants’ natural and instinctual
turn-taking in conversation (Allen et al., 2008; Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008).
Moreover, researchers have pointed out that implicit mentalization “is typified by mir-
roring” (Allen & Fonagy, 2006; Allen et al., 2008; Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; Fonagy &
Luyten, 2009, p. 1358). Taking these claims as our departure we argue that interaction

analytic procedures, such as CA, could be useful in capturing how implicit mentalizing
unfolds in interaction.
Studying implicit mentalization through a sequential approach: Turn-

taking and mirroring
CA has an established tradition for studying talk-in-interaction in meetings between doc-
tor and patient, both in general practice and in psychiatry (Byrne & Long, 1984; Peräkylä,
Antaki, Vehviläinen, & Leudar, 2008; ten Have, 1989). The method makes it possible to
describe the systematic and structural organization of interactions. CA was developed by
Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson in the late 1960s (Sacks, Schegloff,
& Jefferson, 1974) and it is rooted in the thinking of Goffmann and Garfinkel with the aim
of showing how social interaction is organized at an individual action-by-action level.
One of the fundamental analytic perspectives in CA is that interactants always and rou-
tinely establish intersubjectivity when they interact with each other. This is due to the
assumption that the establishment of intersubjectivity is inherent in the structures that
underlie the organization of talk (Goodwin, 1995; Schegloff, 1992). The concept of adja-
cency pair is relevant in this respect. An adjacency pair is a sequence of two related utter-
ances (so-called first pair part and second pair part) produced by two different speakers,
where the second pair part should fit the action of the first pair part. It is through this
linkage that we see the sequential perspective of CA: the next speaker’s turn displays how
he or she understands the preceding turn. Interlocutors thus display their understanding of
each other as they interact, and displays of understanding can be studied in the interact-
ants’ responses to each other. This understanding is visible, not only for interactants them-
selves, but also for researchers who record, transcribe, and analyze the interactions.
Understanding is then managed by interactants on a turn-by-turn basis and within the
sequential framework of CA it is possible not only to focus on the verbal modality, but
also to see understanding as an embodied and non-verbalized phenomenon. As Mondada
puts it, “understanding is constantly displayed in a multimodal way: participants mani-
fest their current understanding in their gesture, gaze, facial expression, body position,
etc.” (2011, p. 545). This implies an analytic focus on multimodal aspects: vocal/aural as
well as visio/spatial modalities. All modalities are seen as equally important and as
resources that do interactional work (Mondada, 2011; Stivers & Sidnell, 2005).
Interactants’ understandings of each other can be studied as sequentially realized and
based on displays in all the modalities.
This fundamental analytic idea, that interactants display their understanding of each
other in their next turn, could be invoked to investigate when implicit mentalization is
played out. Although arguing that implicit mentalization is taking place during turn-tak-
ing, the sequential perspective is only vaguely implied in the definition of implicit men-
talization (Allen et al., 2008; Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008). These authors stated that
implicit mentalization is enacted through turn-taking and that naturally and instinctually
knowing when to take turn in a conversation depends upon implicit mentalization.
This turn-taking process can be thoroughly accounted for by turning to CA. In CA the
system governing the way turn-taking unfolds is described by Sacks et al. (1974). In
addition, Steensig (2001) has described in detail the methods interactants use to let

co-interactants know when a turn is still in progress and when it is about to be completed.
These methods involve grammar, phonology, and pragmatic knowledge. The interactants
are not necessarily aware of the methods which they essentially apply implicitly, at least
until turn-taking does not progress smoothly. Nevertheless, the methods can be accounted
for through analysis using CA. The systems and methods accounted for by CA function
primarily as implicit knowledge displayed sequentially when interactants respond to
each other and thereby display understandings of each other. Consequently, the sugges-
tion that implicit mentalizing takes place when interactants take turns seems plausible
(Steensig, 2001). The suggestion that implicit mentalizing can be identified by studying
aspects of turn-taking is actually confirmed—though not attended to as such—in a study
by McCabe, Leudar, and Antaki (2004). These authors carried out analyses of 35 encoun-
ters between mental health professionals and people with schizophrenia to study if the
patients displayed ToM deficits. They found that people with schizophrenia expressed
beliefs about their own and others’ states of mind, and were able to engage and partici-
pate in complex conversational sequences, indicating that they displayed no ToM defi-
cits. CA seemed convincing for demonstrating if more complex, or less obvious,
capacities of understanding were intact in conversational activities, for example turn-
taking and sequence planning. Without naming it as such, the authors demonstrated that
aspects similar to implicit mentalization could be studied from an interaction-analytic
perspective (McCabe et al., 2004).
Another way in which enactments of implicit mentalization are accounted for in men-
talization literature is through interactional mirroring (Bateman & Fonagy, 2012; Fonagy
& Luyten, 2009). Although mirroring is described by these authors as a way in which
implicit mentalization is displayed, the phenomenon is not elaborated upon in relation to
implicit mentalizing. Studies of mirroring in linguistics and psychology could be included
to account for this phenomenon, and interactional mirroring could be seen as a display of
implicit understanding of co-interlocutors. In linguistics different concepts have been
applied to signify similar phenomena: accommodation, convergence, imitation, and mir-
roring, depending on the research tradition in question. All concepts refer to aspects of
an interactional behavior which can analytically be perceived as played out by an inter-
actant and repeated by a co-interactant. In this article we refer to this phenomenon as
mirroring.
Linguistic studies have shown that interactants automatically imitate each other’s
actions in several acoustic and bodily aspects. They mirror not only phonetic variables
(Babel, 2009; Gallois, Ogay, & Giles, 2005; Trudgill, 2008), but also sentence grammar
(Bock, 1989), and speech rhythm (Cappella & Planalp, 1981). Mirroring has also been
shown to take place in relation to physical movements (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Maurer
& Tindall, 1983).
There have been discussions about whether or not such mirroring happens automati-
cally and without conscious awareness. Most studies seem to indicate that it happens
non-consciously, but one is more likely to notice when interactants do not mirror than
when they do (Chartrand, Maddux, & Lakin, 2005). In addition, studies designed to test
the automatic, pre-reflective character of mirroring support the view that interactants are
not able to tell when they have been mirrored (Ashenfelter, 2007; Chartrand & Bargh,
1999). Trudgill (2008) has claimed that phonetic mirroring happens by default and this

idea is supported by Chartrand and Bargh (1999) and Chartrand et al. (2005). They argue
that the default tendency of behavioral mirroring is driven by a perception–behavior link.
Despite its automatic character, mirroring behavior does have interpersonal effects. In
studies where informants were not aware that the variable being changed was the degree
of mirroring, they were likely to rate co-interactants higher on a likeability scale when
their own behavior had been mirrored (LaFrance, 1982). Retrospectively, informants
also stated that they felt that conversations involving mirroring of interaction partners
progressed more smoothly (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Mirroring behavior functions as
a social glue (Dijkterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007), and mirroring of phonetic variables
promotes the establishment of rapport (Pardo, 2006). Chartrand et al. stated that non-
conscious mirroring behavior “binds and bonds people together and fosters empathy,
liking, and smooth interactions” (2005, p. 344).
Both acoustic and bodily aspects are continuously mirrored in interactions.
Mirroring behavior takes place automatically without conscious awareness, and this
mirroring serves interpersonal goals. Such goals seem to be linked to implicitly under-
standing the other person. The fact that mirroring has been shown to work non-con-
sciously and that it has positive interpersonal effects makes it possible to relate it to
implicit mentalization.
The sequential perspective is also relevant in this respect; mirroring is studied
sequentially: what interactants do in their next turn is seen as displaying—consciously
or non-consciously—their understanding of the co-interlocutor’s prior turn. We are
aware that, according to CA authors, the understandings displayed in next turns cannot
be treated as simple representations of participants’ true or cognitively obtained under-
standings (Drew, 1997; Heritage, 1984). However, the understandings that we are
attending to differ from the understandings that CA normally accounts for, in that they
are implicitly obtained. In line with some CA authors, we take the perspective that
cognitive and emotional states are deeply related and can be inferred from interactional
activity.
Our thinking is in line with Kitzinger who stated that cognitions need not just be stud-
ied as strategic displays of mental states, they can also be revealed or “made manifest” in
interaction (Kitzinger, 2006). Kitzinger exemplifies how memory is not always used as
a strategic device performed by interactants. Sometimes “memory is simply a human
capacity that underpins the interaction and is made manifest through it” (Kitzinger, 2006,
p. 79). Kitzinger showed that although interactants perform different activities, remem-
bering was not one of them; instead the performed activities were dependent upon
remembering as a cognitive process:
Quite simply, I am claiming that what the call-taker said depended upon her having the cognitive
capacity to remember information from the prior conversation. I am not, then, agnostic about
whether or not she remembers this (part of) the prior conversation: I am claiming that she does,
and that this memory is manifest in her talk. (2006, p. 80)
Cognitive processes are manifest in talk or other interaction and oriented to by partici-
pants as processes upon which the performed activities are dependent. The same could
hold true for implicit mentalization, which cannot per se be seen as a strategic device.

Nevertheless, processes of understanding made manifest in interaction can be dependent

upon this partly non-conscious process which is not oriented to in an explicit way.
Applying the sequential perspective by focusing on turn-taking and interactional mir-
roring could be one way of approaching processes of implicit mentalization. This is
apparently also what Allen hinted at in his recent book: “Implicit mentalizing is intuitive
and non-conscious (e.g., as in turn-taking in conversation and automatically adjusting
one’s posture and voice quality in the process of empathizing with a friend’s discourage-
ment)” (2012, p. 29). However, he does not elaborate on why this is the case or how it is
displayed.
Intersubjectivity and mentalization theory

We have argued that different aspects of pre-reflective, automatic interpersonal interac-
tion can be grasped when applying CA. Like ethnomethodology, CA can, to a certain
extent, be conceived as an “empiricalization” of philosophical reflections on essential
aspects of human existence, such as everyday practices, common sense knowledge, and
ordinary intersubjectivity (ten Have, 1997). MT states that mentalization takes place
intersubjectively (Allen et al., 2008) but without taking a stand on how intersubjectivity
is established.
MT does not take a particular position on philosophical or other theoretical aspects.
Focus has been on the interpersonal and developmental preconditions for mentalizing
and on the importance and influence of being able to mentalize in social interactions
(Allen & Fonagy, 2006; Allen et al., 2008; Fonagy & Target, 1998; Mitchell, 2003). The
only theoretical underpinning that is described in some detail is ToM. Nevertheless, dif-
ferent theorists and philosophical directions are mentioned as forming the roots of under-
standing the phenomenon of mentalization, but without stating the philosophical basis
precisely. Thus German idealists, American Pragmatism, and different branches of the
philosophy of consciousness are all drawn into the discussion about the basis of mentali-
zation theory (Fonagy et al., 2002). Fonagy argues that different philosophers of mind
have been central to the development of mentalization theory, among others Wollheim
(1993), and Dennett (1987), who calls himself a “heterophenomenologist” (Dennett,
2007) and who has latterly fallen into disrepute among phenomenologists (Carr, 1998;
Zahavi, 2007). Thus, there is some ambiguity and no uniqueness of reference in mentali-
zation theory’s philosophical basis for understanding the other, and of the conceptualiza-
tion of intersubjectivity.
Intersubjectivity in phenomenology
Fonagy et al. (2002) also underline phenomenological inspiration when stressing that
they consider Brentano’s thoughts about intentionality as a point of departure for
understanding mentalization; however they do not develop this link any further.
Phenomenology gives a thorough account of the concept of intersubjectivity. With
regard to ToM, phenomenologists suggest an alternative approach to intersubjective
understanding (Gallagher, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2006a, 2007; Zahavi, 2008). According to
phenomenologists the understanding of another person includes an experience of the

other’s body (Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2007). A person does not just experience
another’s mind, because what meets one first is their body, which may also be an
expression of their mind. Zahavi states that a solution to the problem of understanding
another person’s mind must start with an accurate understanding of the relationship
between body and mind (2003). In this respect bodily behavior is of great importance.
In most situations one has a direct, pragmatic understanding of another person’s inten-
tions, because these are expressed explicitly in their bodily behavior (Gallagher, 2001).
Bodily behavior is meaningful, intentional, and, as such, neither inner nor outer and
cannot be claimed to belong to either body or mind. Experiences are not just inner, are
not hidden in the brain, but are present in bodily expressions and actions (Merleau-
Ponty, 2012). One has a real, primary experience of the other, and this experience is not
due to logical deduction. Understanding the other is, however, mediated by an under-
standing of one’s own body. One can experience one’s own body on both an inner and
an outer level. One can see parts of one’s own body from the outside and also touch
one’s own body in the same way as others would touch it. Other experiences are, how-
ever, inner and more hidden. They are to a greater extent experienced by oneself. One
can also experience the other’s body from the outside, but because one’s subjectivity
is not hermetically sealed within oneself, and because we exist as incarnated beings, it
is possible to understand others who exist in the same way (Merleau-Ponty, 2012;
Zahavi, 2001). One will, however, not understand the other like oneself, but to a greater
degree experience the other from the outside rather than from the inside (Zahavi,
2003). Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that one can experience the other
directly and without a sharp distinction between psychological and behavioral aspects
(Zahavi, 2010). The other’s body expresses the other’s mind through language, inten-
tional movements, and body language. These actions signal intentional behaviors and
also thoughts and emotions (Sokolowski, 2000). The other’s subjectivity is experi-
enced directly and not via imagination, simulation, or theory (Ratcliffe, 2006a; Zahavi,
2010). In this way understanding of others is not dependent on theory or simulation,
but is instead due to a capacity of bodily practice. This capacity starts early in life and
is possibly inborn: infants have the capacity very early to mirror faces and expressions
(Beebe et al., 2010; Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007). According to phenomenology,
this interaction could be seen as forming the basis for development of primary inter-
subjectivity, which is understood as a set of embodied practices that we continue to use
as the primary way of understanding others in second-person interactions (Gallagher,
2001; Husserl, 1970).
Due to the lived experience of one’s own body, the perception of others’ bodies is
essentially different from the experience of inanimate objects (Husserl, 1950; Merleau-
Ponty, 2012). The other’s body is not only a physical object but a means of expression
revealing the other’s experiences (Schutz, 1967).
Empathy and implicit mentalization

The perception of the other’s experiences could also be conceptualized as empathy
(Husserl, 1950); and much of the recent philosophical discussion of empathy has been
focused around the debate in ToM (Gallagher, 2001, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2012; Zahavi,

2011). In ToM empathy is often equated with simulation, and simulation theory (ST) is
called “empathy theory” (Goldman, 2006).
Work in the phenomenological tradition points to a different conception of empathy
than in ToM. Phenomenologists maintain that empathy involves an understanding of the
other, and that replication of a person’s mental state does not amount to an understanding
of their emotional state, which would be emotional contagion (Ratcliffe, 2014) or sym-
pathy. The phenomenological stance could, however, facilitate understanding of empa-
thy and experience of others in ways that would otherwise be misconstrued or not
captured by simulation theory (Ratcliffe, 2012). In addition, the phenomenological
understanding of empathy could possibly help us to understand mentalization, especially
implicit mentalization.
Phenomenologists argue that matching or simulation cannot be the default way of
understanding others, and that empathy does not necessarily mean that the two persons
have the same affective states, but rather that the similarity is in relation to the intentional
structures of their affective states (Gallagher, 2012). Different phenomenologists agree
that the phenomenological approach involves a more direct appreciation of a person’s
experience as he or she experiences it (Ratcliffe, 2014; Stein, 2008; Zahavi, 2010). To
use Zahavi’s formulation, empathy is construed as “a basic, irreducible form of inten-
tionality that is directed towards the experiences of others” (2010, p. 291). It is a distinc-
tive type of intentional state, an experience of one’s own that presents another experience
as someone else’s. The phenomenological approach maintains that empathizing is not
about replicating someone’s experience and then afterwards appreciating it as his or hers.
It involves a direct access to the other’s experience as the other is experiencing it. It is a
kind of intentional state which has the other’s feeling as its content involving no interme-
diate step (Ratcliffe, 2014). Ratcliffe states that although some ST authors also include
implicit aspects in their accounts of simulation (de Vignemont, 2008; Stueber, 2012),
implicit simulation does not explain the other-directed attitude that is a distinctive fea-
ture of empathy (Ratcliffe, 2014). Moreover, the empathic perspective-shifting as advo-
cated by Coplan (2011) may not even be psychologically possible (Ratcliffe, 2014).
Phenomenologists maintain that implicit simulation cannot be distinguished from sym-
pathy (Gallagher, 2012) or from contagion (Ratcliffe, 2014).
Mentalization theorists include the concept of empathy in their description of mentali-
zation. They understand empathy as involving an awareness of emotional conditions in
another person and an emotional match between two people, but with a concomitant
discrimination between oneself and the other (Allen & Fonagy, 2006). When defining
empathy, mentalization theorists emphasize awareness of the emotional condition, which
means that the focus is on the explicit and not the implicit part of mentalization and they
do not discuss how empathy is related to implicit mentalization. According to MT, empa-
thy is also characterized by an emotional match between two persons, corresponding to
ST (Goldman, 2006; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001).
Mentalization theorists state that mentalization implies a wider understanding than
empathy, and they emphasize that if empathy also comprised awareness in relation to
oneself, empathy would on the whole be synonymous with mentalization (Allen &
Fonagy, 2006). They do not, however, discuss how this involvement of oneself is under-
stood in relation to implicit mentalization and they do not take a position on whether

implicit mentalization can be considered to take place at all in relation to oneself, outside
a process of intersubjectivity.
From a phenomenological perspective, empathy and implicit understanding of others
take place intersubjectively (Gallagher, 2012). The relation between empathy and inter-
subjectivity is not described in quite the same way by different phenomenologists
(Gallagher, 2001, 2009, 2012; Husserl, 1950; Ratcliffe, 2006b; Zahavi, 2001, 2010).
They do, however, all consider empathy to be linked to intersubjectivity and there is
agreement on viewing empathy as an essential intentional mode of intersubjectivity
(Daly, 2014).
Gallagher takes his point of departure in Trevarthen’s idea of primary intersubjectiv-
ity (Trevarthen, 1979). Based on the same developmental research as MT (Fonagy et al.,
2002), Gallagher describes different levels of intersubjectivity; primary, secondary, and
narrative, developing successively during the first years of life. One continues, however,
to rely on primary intersubjectivity and a direct access to understanding others (Gallagher,
2012). Primary intersubjectivity is present from infancy but it is not something that is left
behind in maturity:
We continue to rely on our perceptual access to the other’s affective expressions, the intonation
of their voice, the posture and style of movement involved in her action, her gestures, and so
on, to pick up information about what the other is feeling and what she intends. (Gallagher,
2009, p. 293)
Gallagher’s description of primary intersubjectivity implies the intentional understand-

ing involved in the phenomenological comprehension of empathy, but it also corresponds
to the understanding of implicit mentalization, which is described as being disclosed
automatically and partly in posture and tone of voice (Allen, 2012). The narrative com-
petence captures narrative practices that capture intersubjective interactions, motives,
and reasons (Gallagher, 2009). Gallagher (2012) points out that empathy depends on the
intersubjective relation. However, to display empathy one needs a way to frame the other
person’s experience as a narrative, and therefore narrative is necessary for empathy and,
specifically, with respect to getting the intentionality right. Narratives provide contextual
understanding and give us access to contexts that are broader than our own. Therefore,
narratives allow us to understand a wide variety of situations, including those that pre-
suppose implicit understanding (Gallagher, 2012). Mentalization is described as always
taking its point of departure in a narrative, and this must also pertain to the implicit form.
Therefore Gallagher’s contextual comprehension of empathy is in line with mentaliza-
tion, and this points to the idea that mentalization could be understood in this phenome-
nological way.
Ratcliffe (2012) includes the possibility of a more profound empathic understanding
of others whose sense of reality is beyond one’s own understanding: so-called radical
empathy. Nevertheless, although phenomenology holds nuances in the understanding of
empathy it implies a phenomenological stance involving a direct and implicit under-
standing of others.
Phenomenologists have recently attached increasing importance to Edith Stein’s con-
ception of empathy which also forms links to mentalization (Meneses & Larkin, 2012;

Ratcliffe, 2012; Zahavi, 2010). According to Stein, people are embodied and minded,
embedded in the world, and empathy involves an understanding of the other in that con-
text as a self–other connection, not a fusion. Stein’s conception of empathy has been
described as operating on three levels. Level 1 is the direct and immediate perception.
The object of that act is the embodied, embedded experience of another, which has a
gestalt quality. Level 2 is the experiential projection, which is a non-intellectual, intuitive
kind of projection that has an as if character, implying the otherness of the experience.
Level 3 is called interpretative mentalization and includes a clear intellectual facet.
Through this process the other’s experience becomes more explicitly and linguistically
accessible to us as: “through mentalization—the making of an experience into a mental
object—empathy becomes comprehension” (Meneses & Larkin, 2012, p. 173). For
Stein, the empathic experience can only be complete with this intellectual, interpretive
act (representation): “Die einzige Erfüllung, die hier möglich ist, ist die einfühlende
Vergegenwärtigung [Empathic representation is the only fulfillment possible]” (Stein,
2008, p. 75). In this way Stein’s third level, called mentalization, corresponds to explicit
mentalization, whereas the former two levels, which are immediate, embodied, and non-
intellectual, correspond to implicit mentalization.
Thus, phenomenologists’ descriptions of empathy include the different aspects of
mentalization, both the implicit and explicit dimensions. In phenomenology empathy is
considered an essential intentional mode of intersubjectivity. The different forms of
intersubjectivity accounted for by phenomenologists (Daly, 2014; Gallagher, 2012),
could be useful for understanding mentalization, and especially implicit mentalization.
This could also clarify the relation between empathy and mentalization.
Embodiment and implicit mentalization

Phenomenology has from the beginning included the body in its thinking (Husserl, 1983;
Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Mentalization theory has not until recently specifically included
the body in either theory or research (Shai & Belsky, 2011). In studies of parental mental-
izing, Shai and Belsky say that existing approaches fail to fully capture the interactive
mentalizing process since these approaches rely only on explicit verbal processes of
mentalization. Accordingly, they suggest studying mentalizing as an embodied phenom-
enon with a focus on non-verbal aspects of interaction taking place outside conscious
awareness. The embodied approach entails a focus on the implicit processes of mentali-
zation (Shai & Belsky, 2011). In this way, Shai and Belsky point to what we have also
been concerned with: that existing approaches do not grasp the implicit part of interac-
tive mentalizing processes. They introduced the concept of embodied mentalizing, a con-
cept that relies on the embodied nature of understanding.
Mentalization theorists lean towards ToM and the involvement of mirror neurons
(Gallese, Eagle, & Migone, 2007) and other neurobiological correlates of understanding
(Allen et al., 2008). Phenomenologists have discussed Gallese’s notion of embodied sim-
ulation in relation to Husserl’s account of empathy (Zahavi, 2012). Zahavi states that this
question is too complex to allow for a simple answer, but there is some indication that the
two understandings are approaching each other (Zahavi, 2012). Neuroscientific findings
can provide support for, and be integrated into, the interpretation of phenomenological

descriptions, and can show that it need not be something mysterious or even impossible
(Ratcliffe, 2006b).
Apart from this demystifying function, phenomenologists consider Gallese’s view of
mirroring as almost reflex-like and not as a way of explaining either interpersonal under-
standing or the role of the body in this understanding (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012).
Phenomenologists view understanding another person as a unified whole: understanding
the body and the mind as one. They are sometimes critical of the concept of mentalizing,
which they think could imply a second-order understanding (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012).
However, phenomenologists also realize that one does not understand the other as one
understands oneself. The other’s expressions are displayed for the perceiver, but for the
other they are lived through. The main divergence between the phenomenologist view
and that of both directions of ToM, TT, and ST, is that ToM basically denies that it is
possible to directly experience other minded creatures; and both ST and TT are compat-
ible with modularity (Ratcliffe, 2007). According to phenomenology, primary intersub-
jectivity is a direct process and in that process one cannot separate the mental from the
behavioral. Embodiment has an essential role in experience and cognition. Behavior that
is expressed through the body is saturated with the meaning of the mind (Merleau-Ponty,
2012). Most of this meaning is understood directly, automatically, and non-reflectively
through a process of primary intersubjectivity or implicit mentalization. Neither MT nor
phenomenology has accounted for how this primary intersubjectivity, similar to, or
including most of implicit mentalization, could be captured in interaction. At least part
of it could be captured through interactional analysis in the form of CA, which studies
both linguistic and bodily interaction.
Conclusion
Implicit mentalization constitutes that part of the mentalization iceberg which is under
the surface. Although implicit mentalization is described as the most vexing and even
elusive part of mentalization (Allen & Fonagy, 2006), it is not accounted for very clearly
within mentalization theory. Descriptions have almost exclusively dealt with the explicit
form using ToM as their theoretical framework. Implicit mentalization cannot, however,
be accounted for by ToM.
Implicit mentalization shows itself in turn-taking in conversations, as long as the con-
versation goes smoothly, and in mirroring phenomena, which are basically bodily or
embodied. Different psychological and linguistic theories describe mirroring phenomena
and show that bodily and acoustic aspects are both continuously mirrored in interaction,
and that this mirroring promotes interpersonal understanding. Since implicit mentaliza-
tion comes to the fore in turn-taking we find it obvious to use the interactional method of
CA, through which turn-taking activities can be analyzed in detail. Although mirroring is
not a CA-derived concept, we argue that interactional mirroring can be studied from the
sequential perspective of CA, considering mirroring responses as displays of intersubjec-
tive understanding.
Intersubjectivity and embodiment are part of phenomenological thinking (Gallagher,
2009; Zahavi, 2010). The phenomenological view of interpersonal understanding
involves the body and a perspective of embodiment (Husserl, 1983). This perspective

has only recently been taken up by mentalization theorists (Luyten & van Houdenhove,
2013; Luyten, van Houdenhove, Lemma, Target, & Fonagy, 2013; Shai & Belsky, 2011).
Nevertheless, there seem to be important links between the interpersonal understanding
implied in implicit mentalization and the description of direct embodied understanding
of others in phenomenology (Gallagher, 2012). Mentalization theorists and phenomenol-
ogists discuss their understanding of embodiment in relation to Gallese’s theory of mir-
ror neurons, and both stress that neurobiology cannot fully account for intersubjectivity
and interpersonal understanding (Allen et al., 2008; Zahavi, 2012).
This direct, intersubjective understanding makes up the far greater part of the process
of understanding others, whereas the explicit, conscious understanding is only a small
part. Most phenomenologists think that the basic form of understanding also involves
context and a narrative form of understanding. In this way, phenomenologists include
both explicit and implicit understanding in their thinking, actually covering the same
areas as mentalization: explicit as well as implicit. However, phenomenologists consider
that the implicit element needs most attention and effort.
Although the philosophical underpinnings of mentalization theory have never been
made especially clear, Fonagy mentions the inspiration from phenomenology through
Brentano (Fonagy et al., 2002). Phenomenologists have subsequently used the concept
of mentalization when discussing empathy and intersubjective understanding (Gallagher,
2012; Meneses & Larkin, 2012; Stein, 2008), and in his description of different levels of
intersubjectivity, Gallagher gives an account of the different levels of intersubjectivity,
which could amount to a description of the gradual transition from implicit to explicit
mentalization. This is substantiated by developmental theory and research which is also
used by mentalization theorists (Gallagher, 2009). It could therefore be advantageous for
mentalization theorists to lean towards a phenomenological way of thinking, which
could account for the whole spectrum of mentalization and not just the 10% of the ice-
berg that is above the surface. Conversation analysis supplemented with studies of
embodied mirroring displays of understanding could then be used to grasp how implicit
mentalization is enacted in interaction.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
References
Allen, J. G. (2003). Mentalizing. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67, 91–112.
Allen, J. G. (2012). Restoring mentalizing in attachment relationships: Treating trauma with plain
old therapy. Arlington, WA: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Allen, J., Bleiberg, E., & Haslam-Hopwood, T. (2003). Understanding mentalizing: Mentalizing
as a compass for treatment. Retrieved from http://www.menningerclinic.com/education/
clinical-resources/mentalizing
Allen, J. G., & Fonagy, P. (2006). Handbook of mentalization-based treatment. Chichester, UK:
John Wiley & Sons.
Allen, J. G., Fonagy, P., & Bateman, A. (2008). Mentalizing in clinical practice. Washington, DC:
American Psychiatric Publishing.

Ashenfelter, K. T. (2007). Simultaneous analysis of verbal and nonverbal data during conver-
sation: Symmetry and turn-taking (Doctoral dissertation, University of Notre Dame, IN).
Retrieved from http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-06012011-161332/unre-
stricted/AshenfelterK042007D.pdf
Astington, J. W. (1993). The child’s discovery of the mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Babel, M. E. (2009). Phonetic and social selectivity in speech accomodation (Unpublished doc-
toral thesis). University of California, Berkeley.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Bateman, A., & Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for borderline personality disorder:
Mentalization-based treatment. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bateman, A., & Fonagy, P. (2006). Mentalization-based treatment for borderline personality dis-
order: A practical guide. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
Bateman, A., & Fonagy, P. (2012). Handbook of mentalizing in mental health practice. Arlington,
VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Beebe, B., Jaffe, J., Markese, S., Buck, K., Chen, H., Cohen, P., … Feldstein, S. (2010). The
origins of 12-month attachment: A microanalysis of 4-month mother–infant interaction.
Attachment & Human Development, 12, 3–141.
Bock, K. (1989). Closed-class immanence in sentence production. Cognition, 31, 163–186.
Byrne, P. S., & Long, B. E. L. (1984). Doctors talking to patients. Exeter, UK: The Royal College
of General Practitioners.
Cappella, J. N., & Planalp, S. (1981). Talk and silence sequences in informal conversations: 3.
Interspeaker influence. Human Communication Research, 7, 117–132.
Carr, D. (1998). Phenomenology and fiction in Dennett. International Journal of Philosophical
Studies, 6, 331–344.
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception–behavior link and
social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893–910.
Chartrand, T. L., Maddux, W. W., & Lakin, J. L. (2005). Beyond the perception–behaviour link:
The ubiquitous utility and motivational moderators of nonconscious mimicry. In R. R. Hassin,
J. S. Uleman, & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The new unconscious (pp. 334–361). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Choi-Kain, L. W., & Gunderson, J. G. (2008). Mentalization: Ontogeny, assessment, and applica-
tion in the treatment of borderline personality disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 165,
1127–1135.
Coplan, A. (2011). Understanding empathy: Its features and effects. In A. Coplan & P. Goldie
(Eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and psychological perspectives (pp. 3–18). Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Costall, A., & Leudar, I. (2004). Where is the “theory” in theory of mind? Theory & Psychology,
14, 623–646. doi:10.1177/0959354304046176
Daly, A. (2014). Primary intersubjectivity: Empathy, affective reversibility, “self-affection” and
the primordial “we”. Topoi – An International Review of Philosophy, 33, 227–241.
de Vignemont, F. (2008). Mirroring empathy and reconstructive empathy. Revue Philosophique de
la France et de l’ Etranger, 133, 337–345.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. London, UK: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. C. (2007). Heterophenomenology reconsidered. Phenomenology and Cognitive
Sciences, 6, 247–270.
Diamond, D., Stovall-McClough, C., Clarkin, J. F., & Levy, K. N. (2003). Patient–therapist attach-
ment in the treatment of borderline personality disorder. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67,
227–259.

Dijkterhuis, A. P., Chartrand, T. L., & Aarts, H. (2007). Effects of priming and perception on social
behaviour and goal pursuit. In J. A. Bargh (Ed.), Social psychology and the unconscious: The
automaticity of higher mental processes (pp. 51–131). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Dozier, M., Cue, K. L., & Barnett, L. (1994). Clinician as caregivers: Role of attachment organiza-
tion in treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 793–800.
Drew, P. (1997). “Open” class repair initiators in response to sequential sources of troubles in
conversation. Journal of Pragmatics, 28, 69–101.
Fonagy, P. (1991). Thinking about thinking: Some clinical and theoretical considerations in the
treatment of a borderline patient. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72(Pt 4), 639–656.
Fonagy, P. (1995). Playing with reality: The development of psychic reality and its malfunction in
borderline personalities. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76, 39–44.
Fonagy, P. (2003). Epilogue. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67, 271–280.
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, mentalization, and
the development of the self. New York, NY: Other Press.
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., & Target, M. (2007). The parent–infant dyad and the construction of the
subjective self. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48, 288–328.
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the under-
standing and treatment of borderline personality disorder. Development and Psychopathology,
21, 1355–1381.
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1996). Playing with reality: 1. Theory of mind and the normal develop-
ment of psychic reality. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77, 217–233.
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1997). Attachment and reflective function: Their role in self-organiza-
tion. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 679–700.
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1998). Mentalization and the changing aims of child psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 8, 87–114.
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2000). Playing with reality: 3. The persistence of dual psychic reality in
borderline patients. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81, 853–873.
Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H., & Steele, M. (1998). Reflective-functioning manual, version
5.0, for application to adult attachment interviews. London, UK: University College London.
Fosgerau, C. F. (2011). Mentaliseringsteori og interaktionsanalyse: Integration af sprog og
psykologi [Mentalization theory and interaction analysis: Integration of language and psy-
chology]. Nydanske Sprogstudier, 41, 10–39.
Frith, C. D., & Corcoran, R. (1996). Exploring “theory of mind” in people with schizophrenia.
Psychological Medicine, 26, 521–530.
Gallagher, S. (2001). The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 8, 83–108.
Gallagher, S. (2009). Two problems of intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16,
289–308.
Gallagher, S. (2012). Empathy, simulation, and narrative. Science in Context, 25, 355–381.
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). The phenomenological mind (2nd ed.) New York, NY:
Routledge.
Gallese, V., Eagle, M. N., & Migone, P. (2007). Intentional attunement: Mirror neurons and the
neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association, 55, 131–176.
Gallois, C., Ogay, T., & Giles, H. (2005). Communication accommodation theory. In W. B.
Gudykunst (Ed.), Theorizing about intercultural communication (pp. 121–148). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mind-
reading. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Goodwin, C. (1995). Co-constructing meaning in conversations with an aphasic man. Research on

Language and Social Interaction, 28, 233–260.
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997). Words, thoughts and theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gordon, R. M. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind & Language, 1, 158–171.
Heritage, J. (1984). Garfinkel and ethnomethodology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Hooker, C. I., Verosky, S. C., Germine, L. T., Knight, R. T., & D’Esposito, M. (2008). Mentalizing
about emotion and its relationship to empathy. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience,
3, 204–217.
Husserl, E. (1950). Cartesianische meditationen und pariser vorträge [Cartesian meditations and
Parisian lectures]. The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philoso-
phy. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer.
Jurist, E. L. (2010). Mentalizing minds. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 30, 289–300.
Kitzinger, C. (2006). After post-cognitivism. Discourse Studies, 8, 67–83.
LaFrance, M. (1982). Posture, mirroring and rapport. In M. Davis (Ed.), Interaction rhythms:
Periodicity in communication behavior (pp. 279–298). New York, NY: Human Sciences Press.
Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lowyck, B., & Vermote, R. (2012). Assessment of mentalization. In A.
Bateman & P. Fonagy (Eds.), Handbook of mentalizing in mental health practice (pp. 43–65).
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Luyten, P., & van Houdenhove, B. (2013). Common and specfic factors in the psychotherapeu-
tic treatment of patients suffering from chronic fatigue and pain. Journal of Psychotherapy
Integration, 23, 14–27.
Luyten, P., van Houdenhove, B., Lemma, A., Target, M., & Fonagy, P. (2013). Vulnerability
for functional somatic disorders: A contemporary psychodynamic approach. Journal of
Psychotherapy Integration, 23, 250–262.
Maurer, R. E., & Tindall, J. H. (1983). Effect of postural congruence on clients’ perception of
counselor empathy. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 30, 158–163.
McCabe, R., Leudar, I., & Antaki, C. (2004). Do people with schizophrenia display theory of mind
deficits in clinical interactions? Psychological Medicine, 34, 401–412.
Meneses, R. W., & Larkin, M. (2012). Edith Stein and the contemporary psychological study of
empathy. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 43, 151–184.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. London, UK: Routledge.
Mitchell, S. A. (2003). Relationality: From attachment to intersubjectivity. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
Mondada, L. (2011). Understanding as an embodied, situated and sequential achievement in inter-
action. Journal of Pragmatics, 43, 542–552.
Moriguchi, Y., Ohnishi, T., Lane, R. D., Maeda, M., Mori, T., Nemoto, K., … Komaki, G. (2006).
Impaired self-awareness and theory of mind: An fMRI study of mentalizing in alexithymia.
NeuroImage, 32, 1472–1482.
Pardo, J. S. (2006). On phonetic convergence during conversational interaction. Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America, 119, 2382–2393.
Peräkylä, A., Antaki, C., Vehviläinen, S., & Leudar, I. (2008). Conversation analysis and psycho-
therapy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ratcliffe, M. (2006a). “Folk psychology” is not folk psychology. Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences, 5, 31–52.
Ratcliffe, M. (2006b). Phenomenology, neuroscience, and intersubjectivity. In H. L. Dreyfus &
M. A. Wrathall (Eds.), A companion to phenomenology and existentialism (pp. 329–345).
Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking commonsense psychology: A critique of folk psychology, theory

of mind and simulation. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ratcliffe, M. (2012). Phenomenology as a form of empathy. Inquiry – An Interdisciplinary Journal
of Philosophy, 55, 473–495.
Ratcliffe, M. (2014). The phenomenology of depression and the nature of empathy. Medicine
Health Care and Philosophy, 17, 269–280.
Reddy, V., & Morris, P. (2004). Participants don’t need theories: Knowing minds in engagement.
Theory & Psychology, 14, 647–665. doi:10.1177/0959354304046177
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the
understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 661–670.
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). Simplest systematics for organization of turn-
taking for conversation. Language, 50, 696–735.
Schegloff, E. A. (1992). Repair after next turn: The last structurally provided defense of intersub-
jectivity in conversation. American Journal of Sociology, 97, 1295–1345.
Schutz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world. London, UK: Heinemann Educational
Books.
Shai, D., & Belsky, J. (2011). When words just won’t do: Introducing parental embodied mental-
izing. Child Development Perspectives, 5, 173–180.
Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Steensig, J. (2001). Sprog i virkeligheden: Bidrag til en interaktionel lingvistik [Language in real-
ity: Contributions to interactional linguistics]. Gylling, Denmark: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
Stein, E. (2008). Zum problem der einfühlung [The problem of empathy]. Freiburg, Germany:
Herder.
Stivers, T., & Sidnell, J. (2005). Introduction: Multimodal interaction. Semiotica, 156, 1–20.
Stueber, K. R. (2012). Varieties of empathy, neuroscience and the narrativist challenge to the con-
temporary theory of mind debate. Emotion Review, 4, 55–63. doi:10.1177/1754073911421380
ten Have, P. (1989). The consultation as a genre. In B. Torode (Ed.), Text and talk as social prac-
tice (pp. 115–135). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Foris.
ten Have, P. (1997, June). In the presence of data: Conversation-analysis as “empirical philoso-
phy”. Paper presented at the conference on “Ethnomethodology, an improbable sociology?”,
Cerisy-la-Salles, France. Retrieved from http://www.paultenhave.nl/presence.htm
Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of pri-
mary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before speech (pp. 321–348). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Trudgill, P. (2008). Colonial dialect contact in the history of European languages: On the irrel-
evance of identity to new-dialect formation. Language in Society, 37, 241–254.
Wollheim, R. (1993). The mind and its depths. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Zahavi, D. (2001). Beyond empathy: Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity. Journal
of Consciousness Studies, 8, 151–167.
Zahavi, D. (2003). Fænomenologi [Phenomenology]. Frederiksberg, Denmark: Roskilde
Universitetsforlag.
Zahavi, D. (2007). Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology. Phenomenology and
Cognitive Sciences, 6(1–2), 21–43.
Zahavi, D. (2008). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 514–
522.
Zahavi, D. (2010). Empathy, embodiment and interpersonal understanding: From Lipps to Schutz.
Inquiry – An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 53, 285–306.

Zahavi, D. (2011). Empathy and direct social perception: A phenomenological proposal. Review of
Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 541–558.
Zahavi, D. (2012). Empathy and mirroring: Husserl and Gallese. In R. Breeur & U. Melle (Eds.),
Life, subjectivity & art: Essays in honor of Rudolf Bernet (pp. 217–254). Dordrecht, the
Netherlands: Springer.
Author biographies
Annette Sofie Davidsen is an associate professor at the Research Unit for General Practice and
Section of General Practice, University of Copenhagen. She is a specialist in family medicine. Her
research has primarily dealt with psychiatric and psychotherapeutic issues with a special focus on
the borderland between general practice and psychiatry. Her research methods have been human-
istic and qualitative. In addition, she has been occupied with theoretical issues of qualitative meth-
odology. Email: adavid@sund.ku.dk
Christina Fogtmann Fosgerau is an associate professor within the section of Psychology of
Language, Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics at the University of Copenhagen. She is
continuously working on integrating methods from linguistics and interaction analysis with psy-
chological theoretical frameworks in order to better grasp processes of understandings and emo-
tions as they unfold and evolve in interaction. Her published and presented papers have appeared
in both psychological and linguistic journals and conferences. Email: fogtmann@hum.ku.dk

Grasping The Process of Implicit Mentalization

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Grasping The Process of Implicit Mentalization

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

580605

Theory & Psychology

Grasping the process of

Annette Sofie Davidsen

Christina Fogtmann Fosgerau

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

However, in spite of this great clinical importance, the theoretical understanding of

Theory of Mind and mentalization

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Capturing implicit mentalization

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Studying implicit mentalization through a sequential approach: Turn-

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Nevertheless, processes of understanding made manifest in interaction can be dependent

Intersubjectivity and mentalization theory

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Empathy and implicit mentalization

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Gallagher’s description of primary intersubjectivity implies the intentional understand-

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Embodiment and implicit mentalization

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Goodwin, C. (1995). Co-constructing meaning in conversations with an aphasic man. Research on

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking commonsense psychology: A critique of folk psychology, theory

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

Downloaded from tap.sagepub.com at GEORGIAN COURT UNIV on April 22, 2015

You might also like