Carl O.

Cabasag DSSP
AB- Philosophy
I. Preamble

Anthropocentrism for some is viewed as actual and potential danger to the future of
nature, species, and the entire community of Earth. This have urged many people philosophers to
take their stand in the quest for the respect and care for nature. One alternative viewpoint of
anthropocentrism is biocentrism. Many have grounded their core beliefs to this and famously
known for it is Paul Taylor and his species egalitarian community. He presented that all species
have moral standing. However, with his line of argument something is wrong and needs
clarifications.
David Schmidtz a Kendrick Professor of Philosophy in the College of Social and
Behavioral Sciences, evaluates Paul Taylors’ species egalitarian contention. Some of his famous
works are A Brief History of Liberty, Elements of Justice and many more. He also is Eller Chair
of Service-Dominant Logic in the Eller College of Management. He is editor-in-chief of Social
Philosophy & Policy He was founding Head of the Department of Political Economy & Moral
Science.

II. Are all Species Equal?

All species have equal moral standing, according to species egalitarians (for brevity sake,
species egalitarianism would be abbreviated to SE). Moral standing in its basic sense is to
command respect, and be more than just a thing to be used. Proponents of SE like Paul Taylor,
grounds their belief on biocentrism (the alternative of anthropocentrism – For Taylor,
anthropocentrism is the giving exclusive or primary consideration to human interests above the
good of other speices). There are four core beliefs in their viewpoint:
(a) Humans are members of Earth’s Community of life just like other living
things are members of it also.
(b) Human species and other species are fundamental elements in an
interdependent system.
(c) All organisms are teleological centers of life that pursues its own good in its
own way.
(d) There is no inherent superiority in humans over other living beings.
For Taylor, it is conclusive to say that (d) calls for its positive equivalent which is the doctrine of
species impartiality. The doctrine that regards every living being as possessors of similar
inherent worth, since there is no one specie that is either superior or inferior to others. This is his
egalitarian conclusion.
Though he does not claim that it is a valid argument, his logic in arriving to such
conclusion is as follow: If (a), (b), and (c) are true, it is reasonable to automatically proceed to
(d) and then to his egalitarian conclusion. Those who agree with Taylor and assert that his claim
is acceptable, there are two responses for this. First, (d) is accepted but Taylor’s egalitarian
conclusion should be evaluated first. For if the form of life of humans is not superior it might as
well be inferior. More probably, human life is noncomparable for humans do not have the same
value as nonhumans if Taylor’s conclusion is followed. Second, (d) may be rejected and suppose
that humans are inherently superior but the superiority is debatable. Yet, the superiority does not
matter much for the fact remains, inferred from premises (a), (b), and (c), that it would be
incorrect to disregard the needs and telos of other species within the web of ecological
interdependence.

Paul Taylor and Arne Naess are solid species egalitarians. However, there is an evident
contradiction in their philosophy as they allow that human needs override the needs of
nonhumans. French perceives their contradiction in principles that Taylor and Naess directly
suggest and indirectly offer as the real principles to be lived out. So, can nonhuman interests be
legitimately be sacrificed to vital human interests? Yet, Taylor and Naess can just easily respond
through an example of saving one’s life in midst of an oppressor or a danger to one’s life. Yet,
SE requires avoidance of mortal combat as much as possible but it is permissible to kill in order
to eat. Hence, it has this limited license to kill.
Other than the evident contradiction, is their problematic suggestion that it makes no
difference on what humans kill. They would disagree when vegetarians would say that it is worse
to kill a cow than to kill a potato. Obviously, SE is not right.
Taylor asserts that a being has intrinsic worth if and only if it has a good of its own.
Anderson would agree but it permits one to notice differences among species based on
Aristotlean conception of ‘good of its own’ – vegetative, animal, and cognitive. All three are
teleological centers of life. More so, cognitive nature is also present not only to humans but to
some animals like dolphins, primates, whales, etc. If this is the case, cognitive nature is not
purely anthropocentric. The underlying question would be the reason as to what make any
species be superior over another. The problem would lead to a suggestion that there are other
properties that other living beings possess but not all, might provide a basis for moral standing.
Taylor is aware of the Aristotlean line of ‘classifying good of its own.’ He assumes that
human cognitive capacity is at par with cheetah’s foot-speed and asserts that the Aristotlean
scheme begs the question. Taylor himself has the burden of proof as it is quite obvious that
human cognitive capacity and cheetah’s foot-speed have difference. Moreover, if vegetative
capacity is the superior good, a specific organisms’ vegetative capacity would depend upon
other’s capacity. For Anderson, health in in human and health in a tree is the same thing but it
needs not the same moral standing. Animals have plants capacities plus more. Humans have
plants and animal capacities plus more. Health in human is instrumental and health in a tree
lacks. It can be said that vegetative capacity is something most, if not all, species share and it
could be one of the grounds for moral standing. However, it does not suggest equality and begs
no question to notice there are grounds for moral standing that are not shared with all living
beings.
William French suggests that species ranking should not be based on inherent superiority
but rather on vulnerability – a matter of having more to lose. One specie outranks another
because it is more vulnerable to life. This is problematic, however, for a rich person has more to
lose than a poor person. Schmidtz suggest that French should have interpreted vulnerability as a
matter of probability of loss. Ranking species through this interpretation would change on a daily
basis. Vulnerability for French is derivative and presupposes capacities themselves.
David Schmidtz rejects French’s argument but not his inegalitarian conclusion: those
who believe that one has a fewer obligation to inferior species would also say that they have
fewer obligations to inferior human beings, of which is wrong. Lawrence Johnson, even says that
if rationality is what makes the basic moral difference, then those that have brain-damaged infant
could be subject to utility just like other animals. Johnson presumes that rationality is relevant to
justification at the token (particular) level in contrary to speciesists (those who believe that other
species, especially humans, are superior to others) presumption of rationality at the type
(abstract) level. One can say that rationality makes a moral difference on a type level without
considering if rationality in token level makes moral difference. A speciesists could say that
rationality mandates respect to humanity, both infant and exemplars of human rationality. The
point is that humans can, do, should make decisions on the basis of his recognition that mice,
chimpanzees, and humans are relevantly different types.
Anderson states that superiority does not necessitate dominion and thus have reasons to
give respect to nonhumans species, irregardless if they are at par with humans. On what grounds
can human have respect for chimpanzees or mice? It could be on the grounds that they are
sentient and even mice have rudimentary hopes and dreams. How about plants? Plants won’t
care any less what would happen to them. An instance would be someone is in the forest and find
it fun to cut trees. However, the trees do not know, presumptively, what is there to be gained or
lost for them, only humans have the point of view. Thus, the reason why is there a need to
respect and care about trees is because humans’ point of view is all that there is. Furthermore,
caring for trees is not to satisfy the trees’ values but rather satisfy human values. Failure to
observe such is a sign of lacking self-awareness and self-respect that can be achieved by
repudiating wantonness. Others take care of their backyard or lawns not only because of its
instrumental value but also as a reflection of self-respect. The point simply stresses to make
sense in respecting nature, not to argue about its universalizability; or failure to give respect is
irrational. Taking into account a Redwood, given its importance, there is indeed a need to ask
why there is a need to respect it. The values lost in not giving respect for nature are not nature’s
values but human values.

Jim Cheney gives a remark that moral regard is appropriate if one is able to manage it
with limitations of one’s own ability to respond in a caring manner. Exercising capacity for
moral regard is a form of self-respect and, consequently, self-realization. Schmidtz presents a
different yet complementary view to that of Cheney’s. The attitude, for example, towards
gazelles raises issues of self-respect if one is to see himself as relevantly like gazelles. Lions owe
nothing to gazelles. If one owes it to not hunt gazelles, one should do it not because one is like a
gazelle but rather one is unlike a lion, a predator. Unlike lions, humans have a choice whether to
hunt gazelles and are capable of deliberation about in any choices in a reflective way. If one does
not care, he lacks something and is stunted in a way.
 The respect for other species is ennobling and transcends one’s animal natures. The
capacity to see humans as equal to other species may be one of the things that makes humans
superior. Another way of expressing respect for nature is not overly thinking species ranking.
Respect does not dwell on species ranking, humans are reflective beings.
Respect for living, aesthetic, or well-functioning things does not automatically mean
equal respect neither it be universal kind of respect. There are degrees of respect. Part of moral
responsibility of humans is to choose what one respect and how is respect given.
Certainly, self-respect and self-realization are reasons to have regard to other species. In
addition, human life is worthy of esteem as to only few to some species share cognitive and
affective characteristics with humans. Aldo Leopold even urges everyone to be plain citizens
instead of conquerors of the biotic community, though there are species that would not be a
fellow citizen just like malaria-carrying mosquitoes whom humans find themselves in a natural
state of combat.
In the end, the conclusion that all species have a moral standing is unmotivated. Like
humans viewing primates as having moral standing is a form of self-respect while viruses having
moral standing is otherwise. Having a sense of understanding in a reflective way how amazing
all living things are and marvel to their beauty is not the same as thinking all species have moral
standing.

In such a lengthy and still ongoing debate, there is a history behind it. Philosophy has
three distinct projects:
(1) Determining man’s essence;
(2) Specifying how man is different from all other species;
(3) Specifying what makes man morally important.
Equating these projects have important ramifications. Philosophy, in its course of
development, has made a mistake of conflating these three. For instance, pain is what makes
human morally important and that pain is of the same property constituent of all humans, his
essence. Then, if essence is a distinctive feature of a being, it would render brutes not capable of
suffering. Furthermore, with rationality, if other beings or nonhuman animals becomes rational,
like Washoe learning language that is alien to her, would it lessen or change the essence of
humans?
Taking into account everything, it certainly demeans humans to destroy species that are
beautiful or otherwise beneficial. Also, to species whose beauty are implicit or hidden, it is up
for the reflective beings to enrich understanding to as why they are still beautiful and beneficial
in the best of our capacities. Species egalitarianism is a way to not conquer the biotic community
and fit in the community but it is not an acceptable way. Respect for nature is different from
species egalitarianism. It is so for:

Life as such commands respect only in the limited but nonetheless important
sense that for self-aware and reflective creatures who want to act in ways that make
sense, deliberately killing something is an act that does not make sense unless we have
 good reason to do it. Destroying something for no good reason is (at best) the moral
equivalent of vandalism.

III. More responsibility and More Caring

The prevalence of anthropocentrism has been around too long and evident drastic
changes in nature have already been surfacing around from time to time. Many calls already for
respect for nature. A call that indicates that nonhuman living beings have in themselves an
inherent value to which should be a ground for the respect that is due to them. One of the
movements that promotes such advocacy is the species egalitarianism. Paul Taylor, one of their
famous proponents, holds the position that all species have equal moral standing and that all
species have similar inherent worth since there is no higher or lower kind of specie.
At surface level, SE seems to be a noble proposal for the care of the environment. It is
good to know that humans are not indifferent to other living beings as all are part of the same
Community of life on Earth. Furthermore, man is part of the interwoven biodiversity of
interdependent species. To know, moreover, that all species has a telos of its own, the gravity of
demand for respect becomes more serious. Even more serious if it be said that there is no
inherent superiority over other living beings. This is controversial for many. Most people are
already used to the idea that man is the apex of creation. Then to claim that man seats equally in
with other species in a straight line, it demolishes the pyramid of hierarchy. However, it opens
possibilities for a better understanding to why there is a need to respect nature and to really know
if superiority is really an important aspect in showing respect to nature.
SE promotes a limited license to kill in honor of survival and this is not problematic. Yet
when they contend that vegetarians are wrong when they claim that it is worse to kill a cow than
to kill a potato, there is a fine line of contradiction again. They regard that killing a potato is no
different from killing a cow. Though SE claim that it is permissible to kill in honor of survival,
like for food perhaps, what would they be implying when they say that there is no difference in
what human kills? To kill a cow is not good is equivalent to killing a potato is not good. So, what
actions must be done accordingly? Should there be killing for survival or should there be none.
Their argument on this part is unclear and perhaps be a simple contradiction or if not, they are
suggesting starvation. This could be considered as an extreme point of view in caring for nature.
Species ranking is very common as it is natural to categorize or to place in an orderly
fashion species and their distinctive characteristics. There are groupings in biology that really
exist. In some sciences they have the specie, genus, and specific difference for classifications of
beings. Species ranking or classification is inevitable but surely is not necessary in giving respect
for nature.
In Taylor’s contention that the foot-speed of cheetah is at par of man’s cognitive
capacity, to many readers it could easily re ridiculed, for again many are used to the adherence of
anthropocentric system of viewing nature. Yet, it is undeniable that the foot-speed of cheetah and
man’s cognitive capacity have clear differences. From the exercise of these capacities to their
results of exercising it. From potentiality to an actuality of their capacities. Does Taylor suggest
that they are at par because they are both telos? More distinctively, as Schmidtz have exhausted
in his paper, the two said capacities are not at par. Humans have animal capacities and plant
capacities plus more! While animals only have plants capacities and pls more. Humans do not
compare to nonhumans but this does not suggest aggression of who is at the top of the hierarchy
of creation. This merely points that there is a real distinction between cheetah’s foot-speed and
humans’ cognitive capacity.
Pertaining to vulnerability, how did French could have come up this? Maybe he proposes
this idea of vulnerability because of the prevalent negative moral rights that are violated today.
His definition in fact is a matter of having more to lose. There are species that are presupposed to
have moral rights that are affected greatly by oppression or generally by violating the right to
life. An example perhaps would be that of the animals that are hurt for no reason, just for fun for
some humans. Moral regard must be given to them for they have more to lose. Yet, on other
perspective, between a rich person and a pauper, the rich person has more to lose with regards to
his investments, stocks, or basically wealth. This still needs to be clarified so as to quantify and
qualify the kind of more to lose for French.
Moving forward, the definition of rationality as a capacity should be defined clearly.
Rationality on the token level is the exercise of rationality and its limits base on its powers. This
would kind of a distribute the term rationality to individual species. Rationality on the type level
is the basic idea of rationality as having reason. It is like an umbrella that takes all species that
have rationality under this type of rationality. Nonetheless, deliberation of action should be made
in the basis of recognizing that species are relevantly different types.
Superiority does not mean dominion. What does superiority mean in the first place, also
inferiority? Superiority is interpreted in the text as ranking high among other species, and
inferiority as ranking lower from other species. But to add my own definition of superiority and
inferiority. Superiority entails more responsibility because of plus more. Inferiority entails more
care; for they only have what they have no plus more for plants and lesser plus more for animals
compared to humans.
Self- respect and self-realization are the main complementary answers to why there is a
need to respect nature. They are complementary as self-respect adds to the capacity of man for
self-realization or transcendence even. Humans are worthy of esteem not only because of them
being a reflective species but also their ability to deliberate actions and act accordingly.

IV. Self-awareness and Self-actualization

It is always a good call to demand respect. Respect begets respect as the saying goes. Yet
what if the ones that is given respect cannot give respect or cannot reciprocate the respect one
gives. It is then one finds more responsibility and consequently realize that part of that
responsibility is to care more. Humans are superior but it should not be an aggression towards
the hierarchy- pyramid of beings. It is a reminder actually for self-awareness and once aware
would take responsibility. Then if taking responsibility means giving care, humans are not
merely ennobled but they have self-actualization. An actualization that would later on impact the
viewpoint with regards to taking responsibility, caring, and respecting nature as part of the
Community of Life in Earth.