Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents

Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents
Author(s): Efraim Fischbein, Maria Sainati Nello and Maria Sciolis Marino
Source: Educational Studies in Mathematics , Dec., 1991, Vol. 22, No. 6 (Dec., 1991), pp.
523-549
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3482209
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3482209?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Educational
Studies in Mathematics
This content downloaded from

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
EFRAIM FISCHBEIN, MARIA SAINATI NELLO AND
MARIA SCIOLIS MARINO
FACTORS AFFECTING PROBABILISTIC JUDGEMENTS
IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
ABSTRACT. Six hundred and eighteen pupils, enrolled in elementary and junior-high-school
classes (Pisa, Italy) were asked to solve a number of probability problems. The main aim of
the investigation has been to obtain a better understanding of the origins and nature of some
probabilistic intuitive obstacles. A linguistic factor has been identified: It appears that for
many children, the concept of "certain events" is more difficult to comprehend than that of
"possible events". It has been found that even adolescents have difficulties in detaching the
mathematical structure from the practical embodiment of the stochastic situation. In problems
where numbers intervene, the magnitude of the numbers considered has an effect on their
probability: bigger numbers are more likely to be obtained than smaller ones. Many children
seem to be unable to solve probability questions, because of their inability to consider the
rational structure of a hazard situation: "chance" is, by itself, an equalizing factor of
probabilities. Positive intuitive capacities have also been identified: some problems referring to
compound events are better solved when addressed in a general form than when addressed in
a particular way.
INTRODUCTION
Various studies have been published concerning the developmental aspects

of probabilistic thinking, starting especially with the book of Piaget and
Inhelder: La Genese de l'Idee de Hasard chez l'Enfant (1951) (see for
extensive reviews: Fischbein, 1975; Hawkins and Kapadia, 1984; Godino,
Batanero and Canizares, 1987; Garfield and Ahlgren, 1988). As for miscon-
ceptions in statistical and probabilistic reasoning the main work is that
edited by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982).
A central issue revealed by most of the studies is the relationship between
the natural, intuitive approaches individuals' hold with regard to proba-
bilistic situations and the formal, mathematically based solutions. Various
aspects have already been investigated like the so called heuristics men-
tioned by Tversky and Kahneman (availability, representativeness and
anchoring), (see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982), the negative re-
cency effect, (see Fischbein, 1975, pp. 45-48), the notions of certain,
possible and impossible events (Fischbein and Gazit, 1984), compound
events (Lecoutre and Durand, 1988) etc.
Nevertheless, many aspects still remain obscure either because they have
not yet been studied or because of the limited character of the instruments
used. The present investigation has been initiated bearing in mind, as its
main objective, the preparation of curricula materials for teaching proba-
Educational Studies in Mathematics 22: 523-549, 1991.

? 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
524 EFRAIM FISCHBEIN ET AL.
bilities in elementary and junior high school classes in Italy. Our strong
belief is that the introduction of a new topic must always be preceded by a
systematic psycho-didactical investigation. This is true for mathematics
education in general but it is especially true for probabilities. The cultural
environment, the ensemble of existing curricula concerning other domains,
the socio-economic level of the population, the philosophy behind the
didactical methodology etc., may have a certain impact on the children's
receptivity for the respective topic. This assertion is particularly true for
probabilities.
Just one example, mentioned to one of us by a colleague. One of his
doctoral students came from a country in which 'chance' games were very
common. This student was averse to the idea that chance events can be
expressed mathematically. In order to formalize a stochastic experience,
one has to consider only the mathematical, ideal structure of a chain of
events and to eliminate the influence which some concrete irregularities
may have. But this student was deeply convinced that, in a chance game, it
is impossible to disregard the personal ability of the gambler. This personal
ability is the core of the game. The idea of pure chance had no meaning for
this student.
The present investigation dealt with a number of concepts which we have
considered to be adequate for an introductory course on probabilities. But
for the present paper we have selected only those topics and findings which,
in our opinion, presented new aspects and which could stimulate new
interpretations referring to the intuitive background of probabilistic think-
ing. The main topics considered were: Types of events (impossible, possible
and certain events); the role of different embodiments of the same mathe-
matical structure; compound events. In most of the problems the subjects
had to consider the sample space related to a certain event. Therefore, this
may be considered the central notion to which we refer in the present
paper.
THE METHOD
The Subjects
The subjects were 618 pupils enrolled in six schools in the region of Pisa,
Italy. They represented three groups of subjects: 211 subjects in elementary
classes (grades 4 and 5), 278 subjects in junior-high school classes (grades
1, 2 and 3 without prior instruction in probabilities) and 130 subjects
(grades 1, 2 and 3) with prior instruction in probabilities. We do not have

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
FACTORS AFFECTING PROBABILISTIC JUDGEMENT 525
a clear image of the nature of this instruction mainly because in Italy there
is not an established tradition of teaching probability. Elementary school,
grades 4-5, correspond to 9-11 year old pupils and junior high school,
grades 1, 2, 3, correspond to 11-14 year old pupils.
The Questionnaires
Two questionnaires (A and B) were used, initially consisting of 14 ques-

tions each but in the present paper only the reaction to 6 pairs of questions
are analysed. The items in the two questionnaires were parallel, that is they
addressed the same type of probability problems but with different embod-
iments. Every equestion required the subject to explain his answer. In the
present report we have eliminated those aspects which have already been
studied elsewhere and which did not offer essentially new insights.
The Procedure
The two questionnaires were administered simultaneously in the usual

classroom setting of the subjects. Each subject had to answer the questions
of only one questionnaire. A session lasted about 1 hour but there was no
time pressure put on the subjects. In the two questionnaires, the order of
the questions was randomized so as to balance the effect of order. The
symbols A and B refer to the questionnaires. The number attached to each
letter in the present text (for instance Al) does not refer to the real order
in which the questions were presented but only to their order in the present
paper.
RESULTS
The results are exposed and analyzed successively for each pair of parallel
questions. The terms "correct" and "incorrect" are sometimes used in the
text. We are aware that such a distinction is not an absolute one. Children,
as well as adults, possess representations and interpretations which have to
be respected in their own right, which have their reasons, and may be
adequate in certain situations. But in order to avoid the terms "correct"
and "incorrect" we would have to often repeat long explanations which
would lengthen the paper and make reading more difficult. "Correct"
means simply what is usually accepted in a standard probability text-book.
On the other hand, one has to take into account that, sometimes,
children give apparently "correct" answers for wrong reasons. The paper

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
copes with this difficulty by presenting the main types of justifications the
subjects offer for their answers.
Questions Al and BJ: Impossible, Possible and Certain Events
In question Al, we have considered the rolling of a die and the subjects
were asked to indicate whether the event of obtaining a certain number is
impossible, possible or certain. The events considered were: (a) An even
number; (b) a number smaller than 7; (c) a number bigger than 6; (d) a
number bigger than 0; (e) the number 5.
In question BI, one has considered the tombola game with numbers
from 1 to 90 and, as above, the subjects had to indicate whether the events
of obtaining a certain number was impossible, possible or certain. The
numbers mentioned were: (a) An odd number; (b) a number smaller than
91; (c) 100; (d) a number bigger than 0; (e) 31.
Looking at the data (see Tables IA and IB) the following remarks can be
made: At both age levels the majority of pupils identify adequately possi-
ble, impossible and certain events. The meaning of these terms are the
following in our framework. "Possible: 0 < P(E) < 1; "Impossible":
P(E) = 0; "Certain": P(E) = 1. There is a slight improvement with age at
all items. It seems that, for most items, instruction had a positive effect, but
this effect is slight and rather inconsistent. The most surprising result is that
TABLE IA
Possible, impossible and certain events. The symbol (P) stands for: "With previous probability
instruction". Percentages of various categories of answers
Elementary (N = 102) Junior high (N = 139) Junior high (P) (N = 65)
Items a b c d e a b c d e a b c d e
The
expected
answer Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps
No
answer 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.9 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 0 1.5 0 1.5 0
Correct 89.2 62.7 82.3 81.4 86.3 95.0 71.2 84.2 89.9 88.5 96.9 84.6 98.5 92.3 98.5
Incorrect 8.8 35.3 15.7 16.6 11.7 4.3 28.1 14.4 8.7 10.1 3.1 13.9 1.5 6.2 1.5
Ps - Possible; C - Certain; IMP - Impossible.

The terms "correct" and "incorrect" have only a relative meaning. See the text for explana-
tion.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
TABLE IB
Possible, impossible and certain events. Percentages of various categories of answers
Elementary (N = 109) Junior high (N = 139) Junior high (P) (N = 65)
Items a b c d e a b c d e a b c d e
The
expected
answer Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps Ps C IMP C Ps
No
answer 4.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.7 1.4 2.2 1.4 2.2 2.9 1.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Correct 79.8 55.0 94.4 69.7 70.6 85.6 63.3 93.5 77.7 78.4 92.3 63.1 92.3 76.9 86.1
Incorrect 15.6 42.2 2.8 27.5 25.7 13.0 34.5 5.1 20.1 18.7 6.2 33.8 4.6 20.0 10.8
Ps - Possible; C - Certain; IMP - Impossible.
the category of questions which yielded the lowest rates of adequate answers
according to the above definition is that referring to certain events. To a
question like: "By rolling a die, does one obtain a number smaller than 7?",
only 63% of junior high school subjects who got an elementary instruction
in probabilities, answered adequately: "The event is certain".
We are used to thinking that the concept of "possible" is the most sophis-
ticated one and that, for younger children, it is the logic of "yes" and "no"
which is the only one that makes sense. It seems that the concept of certitude
is much more complex than expected, while that of possible develops earlier!
Our explanation is that, usually, one tends to relate the notion of
"certain" to that of "uniqueness". As an effect of introducing the idea of
multiplicity of possible results, the notion of possible comes naturally into
mind. But there is a certain nuance which has to be taken into account.
When asking: "Will one get a number bigger than 0?" the percentages of
answers "the event is certain" are much higher (always higher than 80
percent). In this case too, a certain event is associated with a multiplicity of
possible outcomes. The only explanation we have found is that "bigger
than 0" appears to the child as a totality - a kind of unity. One does not
need to envisage a repertoire of possibilities (which would lead to the idea
of multiplicity). The "totality" is suggested, directly, without any analysis.
Justifications
The following symbolism is used for indicating the grade to which the
quoted subjects belong: E means "elementary" classes (4 or 5). For

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
instance E4 means Grade 4, elementary school. M means "junior-high

school" followed by 1, 2 or 3 indicating the respective grade. MP represents
"junior-high-school pupils" who previously received some instruction in
probabilities. The justifications given by the children seem to confirm the
above explanations:
"Will one obtain a number smaller than 7?"
"It is possible", says a child, "because it is probable that one may obtain
also the number 3" (E4). That is, every number (between one and six) may
be obtained. The certain totality is decomposed in the child's mind into a
number of possibilities.
The same idea, but expressed differently: "It is possible, because the
numbers begin with 1 and end with 6" (E5), or "It is possible because with
a die one may obtain the 6 or 5 or any other number smaller than 7" (ES).
With regard to the question referring to a number smaller than 91 (the
tombola problem): "It is possible because, among all the numbers, one
may obtain 87, 76, 74..." (E4)..
In fact the whole problem of the concepts "possible, impossible, certain"
is psychologically more complex. Many children identify "rare" with
impossible. "Will one obtain 31?" (in the tombola game). "It is impossi-
ble", answers the child, "because the probability is very small" (E4). Or:
"It is impossible, because among 90 numbers there is only one 31" (Ml).
"Is it possible to get 5 when rolling a die?" "It is impossible", says the child
"because it is only one probability among 6" (M3). "It is impossible
because someone believes that he will win and afterwards it does not come
out" (M2). Impossible identified with uncertain: "Will one obtain an even
number?" "It is impossible because one cannot be sure" (E4).
We have seen, so far, that some of the children tend to identify "certain"
with "possible" but the reverse may also occur. "Will one obtain the 31?"
"It is certain because in the tombola there is 31" (E5). "Will one obtain an
even number?" "It is certain because from 1 to 90 there are even and
uneven numbers" (M2). Children also tend to substitute mathematical
meanings with subjective expectations: "If an event is rare, according to my
experience, it will not occur", affirm some children. On the other hand, "If
(for instance) 31 may occur then it should occur to somebody, why should
it not be myself?" (M3).
The main didactical recommendation, following from the above findings,
is that it should not be taken for granted that children understand
spontaneously the meaning of the terms "impossible", "possible" and
"certain". Children have to be trained to distinguish between rare and

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
impossible, and between highly frequent and certain. T

the likelihood of an event by considering the joint outcomes which com-
pose the respective event, and to avoid the spontaneous tendency to
consider separately each outcome. Trivial examples like: "It is possible that
it will rain tomorrow" or "It is certain that the sun will rise tomorrow" are
not of much help. The problem is psychologically too complex to be solve
didactically by referring to simplistic instances.
Questions A2 and B2: Different Situations, the Same Mathematical

(Stochastic) Structure
The subjects were asked to compare the probability of obtaining three

times 5 either by rolling one die three times or by rolling, simultaneously,
three dice. The aim of this question was to check whether the subjects were
able to extract the identical mathematical probabilistic structure from the
two different embodiments (see the results in Table IIA).
Two main types of "unequal probabilities" are mentioned in Table IIA.
Type I: The subjects consider that, by successively throwing the die, they
have a higher chance to obtain the expected result. Type II: The subjects
consider that by throwing three dice simultaneously they will have a higher
chance to obtain the expected results. The percentages of the two types are
calculated only by referring to the total number of "unequal" answers. The
same explanation holds also for Table IIB (tossing three coins successively
or simultaneously).
As one can see, only half of the younger subjects consider that the two
procedures lead to the same probability. There is an improvement with age
TABLE IIA
Throwing 3 dice simultaneously or successively. (Percentages) For the two types of unequal
probabilities see the text.
Elementary Junior high Junior high

(N= 102) (N= 139) (P)(N=65)
No answer 11.8 16.6 16.9

Probabilities are equal 50.0 62.6 70.8
Probabilities are different 38.2 20.9 12.3
Type I "unequal" 59.0 65.5 50.0

Type II "unequal" 33.3 20.7 37.5

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
TABLE IIB
Tossing 3 dice simultaneously or successively. (Percentages) For the two types of unequal
probabilities see the text.
Elementary Junior high Junior high

(N= 109) (N= 139) (P)(N=65)
No answer 7.4 12.2 3.1

Equal probabilities 55.0 57.6 76.9
Different probabilities 37.6 30.2 20.0
Type I unequal 58.5 66.7 69.2

Type II unequal 39.0 23.8 30.8
(about 60 percent of correct answers in junior high school) and with

instruction (about 70 percent of correct answers in children who received
some instruction on probabilities). The answers claiming that the chances
are different are distributed in an unequal manner. About twice as many
answers consist in affirming that those who throw a die three times
successively have a higher chance of obtaining the sequence 5, 5, 5.
A similar question (questionnaire B) referred to the tossing of a coin:
The probability of obtaining three times "head" (H, H, H) either by
tossing a coin three times or by tossing three coins simultaneously. The
distribution of the answers (see Table IIB) is about the same as with the
dice version. Here, too, the predominant "unequal" answers express the
idea that the expected outcome (H, H, H) has a higher chance when tossing
one coin three times successively.
The subjects gave different explanations for their preference for succes-
sive trials. "By rolling one die at a time, one may use the same type of
rolling" (E4). "This way (tossing one coin at a time) the coin always falls
on the same side" (E5). "Because the coins do not knock against each
other and therefore do not follow diverse paths" (MI). As a matter of fact,
the explanations express the same essential idea: by throwing a die (or a
coin) one at a time, the process can be better controlled and a desired
regularity can be better achieved.
The opposite solution (less frequent) also has its justifications:
It is better to throw the coins (or the dice) together in order to obtain the
same outcomes: "Because the same force is imparted" (E5). "One can
launch in the same way" (MI).
The general idea is then, that the outcomes can be controlled by the
individual. The mathematical, probabilistic structure has not yet been

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
detached from the concrete circumstances and considered in its abstract

generality.
Let us mention some examples of justifications for answers mentioning
the equality of odds:
* "3 (coins) x one time ("una volta") = 3 (times) one coin" (M3).
* "It is not important whether I toss the coins in different moments
or in the same moment, in both cases there is the same probability"
(MP3).
It is important to use the type of questions mentioned here in the
instruction process. From our results one may conclude that there are
many children, even in junior high school classes, who do not detect the
identical mathematical structure in practically different situations. What the
child does not understand is that the situations have to be considered as
mere embodiments for ideal experiments, that mathematics deals with
ideal, abstract operations and entities. To teach the child that probability is
a branch of mathematics and, consequently, it has to do with abstract
ideal, formally defined objects - like geometry or arithmetic - is one of the
main tasks of the instruction process. Comparing different embodiments of
identical mathematical structures is an effective procedure for attaining that
aim, not only formally, but also intuitively. The affirmation that mathemat-
ics deals with abstract, ideal, formally defined objects does not imply that
mathematics deals with objective, eternally fixed entities. Mathematics has
an historical character and mathematical concepts are, in fact, psychologi-
cally conditioned. Definitions and interpretations change. But it is generally
accepted today that every mathematical theory is based on a system of
axioms explicitly formulated. Axioms may be replaced with the condition
that they will not lead to contradictions. As mentioned above, the terms
"correct" and "incorrect" used sometimes in the present text have only a
relative character. As a matter of fact, we see the process of learning and
understanding as a reciprocal process of communication between a referent
situation and the mathematical structure. "Any theory", says Feller, "nec-
essarily involves idealization, and our first idealization concerns the possi-
ble outcomes of an 'experiment' or 'observation'. If we want to construct
a model, we must at the outset reach a decision about what constitutes
a possible outcome of the idealized experiment" (Feller, 1960, p. 8). For
example: "When a coin is tossed, it does not necessarily fall head, or tail:
it can roll away or stand on its edge. Nevertheless, we shall agree to regard
'head' and 'tail' as the only possible outcomes of the experiment" (Feller,
op. cit., p. 7).

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
The child who learns about probabilities has to get used to this type
of idealization process, governed by formal conventions as it happens
in other branches of mathematics, and first of all in geometry. The
terms "correct" or "incorrect" used sometimes in the present text
have their meaning established with regard to such commonly accepted
conventions.
Compound Events (I)
According to previous findings, the concept of compound events seems to

raise some difficulties (see Fischbein, Barbat and Minzat, 1971; Fischbein
and Gazit, 1984; Lecoutre and Durand, 1988). We decided to consider again
this problem systematically, raising dice and coin questions. So far, the main
concern had been with the role of order in generating various outcomes
accounting for the same event. We decided to consider again these types of
problems but also to extend the range of the questions asked in the following
ways: (a) We studied compound events which may be obtained by summing
up different pairs of numbers; (b) We studied compound events including
outcomes in a general form (for instance, the probability of obtaining a
couple of equal numbers by throwing two dice vs. a couple in which the
numbers are different) without specifying the numbers; (c) We studied the
justifications offered by the subjects for their answers and thus we obtained
a much deeper insight into the subject's internal models.
Questions A3 and B3
"Let us consider the rolling of two dice. Is it more likely to obtain 5 with
one die and 6 with the other, or 6 with both dice? Or is the probability the
same in both cases?"
"When tossing two coins which result is more likely: to get 'head' with one
coin and 'tail' with the other, or to get 'head' with each of the two coins;
or is the probability the same for both results?"
One might assume that some children have considered the pairs as
ordered pairs and then the correct answer would be that the couples (5, 6)
and (6, 6) are equiprobable. This is also true for the couples (H, T) and
(H, H). But this was never the case. Analyzing the justifications, it became
clear that no order was considered and that the very frequent "equiprob-
able" type of answer was mostly justified by the effect of chance or by
considering separately the two elements 5 and 6 or H and T.

ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
The first of the two problems has also been used by Lecoutre and
Durand (1988). They discovered that most of the subjects answered,
incorrectly, that the two events have the same probability and that this bias
is very resistant. Various attempts to change it did not have a significant
effect (for instance, coloring the two dice differently). Lecoutre and Durand
identified a number of "models" used by the subjects to justify their
answers. In the case of the answer "the two probabilities are different"
Lecoutre has found justifications like: "It is more seldom to obtain twice
the same result", but also a correct combinational type of justification
("Because there are more possibilities with the other combinations than
with the doubles") (Lecoutre and Durand, op. cit., p. 364).
With regard to the answers of the type "the same probability" Lecoutre
and Durand also mention some patterns ofjustifications: "It is a hazard guess
in both cases", "The dice are thrown at the same time" or "The two results
(5 or 6), have the same chance" (ibid.). Let us now come to our findings.
TABLE IIIA
Comparison between P(6, 6) vs. P(5, 6 and 6, 5). (Percentages) For the two types of miscon-
ceptions see the text.)
Elementary Junior high Junior high (P)
No answer 14.7 18.7 12.3

P(6, 6) # P(5, 6 and 6, 5) 22.6 18.7 9.2
Misconceptions 62.7 62.6 78.5
Type I errors 73.4 89.6 92.2

Type II errors 12.5 4.6 5.9
TABLE IIIB
Comparison between P(H, H) vs. P(H, T and T, H). (Percentages) For the two types of
misconceptions see the text.
No answer 13.8 16.5 20.0

P(H, H) ; P(H, T and T, H) 21.1 10.1 18.5
Type I errors 63.3 73.4 87.5

Two types of misconceptions are mentioned in Tables IIIA and IIIB.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
In Table IIIA - Type I means: same probability for obtaining the couple
(6, 6) or the couple (5, 6).
Type II: The couple (6, 6) is more likely.
For Table IIIB - Type I: The couples HT and HH are equiprobable.
Type II: It is more likely to get the couple HH.
The percentages of the two types of misconceptions are calculated on the
basis of the total number of errors.
Inspecting Tables IIIA and IIIB one can clearly see that only a small
proportion of answers indicate that the probabilities are different. We deal
here with a well-known misconception. The two outcomes (either 6, 6
and 5, 6 or TH and HH) are considered equivalent at all age levels by
most of the subjects without, as we said above, implying a given order.
There is also no improvement with instruction. On the contrary, there
are less correct answers in older children who received a certain instruc-
tion than in younger children who did not receive any instruction in
probabilities!
Our first explanation of this finding was that there is no natural intuition
for evaluating the probability of a compound event. As a matter of fact,
things seem to be much more complex, as one will see later on when
considering other types of compound events (which reveal the existence of
a natural intuition in this respect!).
With regard to the presently discussed problem, one deals with a special
type of compound event. Lecoutre and Durand refer to the term "echange-
abilite" considered to be more fundamental than the notion of indepen-
dence and which may explain the above bias. It seems that, naturally, the
various possible orders of a set of elementary results are not counted
separately (for instance HT and TH or 5-6 and 6-5) when defining the
magnitude of the sample space. It is this special type of compound event
based on order which is intuitively deficient.
Analyzing the nature of the misconceptions, one can see that almost all
of these answers affirm that the two outcomes have the same probability.
The idea that the probability of the couple 5-6 (the order being indifferent)
is twice that of 6-6 can be reached only by getting some representation of
the corresponding sample space. The basic justification offered by the
children is that, in both cases, one deals with chance events. "The probabil-
ity is the same because one may obtain 6-6 and 6-5 or none of these
results" (E4). "In my opinion the probability is the same because the
obtained number is a surprise" (E4). "The probability is the same because
there is the same number of 6 and of 5 in both dice" (M2). "The same,
because one cannot know which faces one will obtain with both dice"

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
(M1). "The probability is the same, because one cannot determine some-
thing which depends only on the motion of a small object like a die, which
is thrown by each person in a different manner" (M3).
It is interesting to consider also the justifications given by junior high
school pupils who received a certain instruction in probabilities. By consid-
ering these justifications, one can learn something about why these students
gave lower percentages of correct answers than younger ones without
instruction.
"Each die is independent from the other. The probability that with one die,
one will obtain a certain number is 1/6 and it is the same probability that
one will obtain the same number with the other" (MP3).
It is clear that this student has been taught probabilities. He used the
basic notions he has been taught: the concept of independence and the fact
that the six faces are equiprobable. Combining these two ideas and
considering the two possible outcomes 5 and 6 separately (simple events)
one comes to the conclusion that the couples, 5-6 and 6-6 have the same
probability!
Two main ideas are then used to justify the equality of the probabilities
of getting 6-6 and that of getting 5 and 6: (a) The more primitive idea that
both events are the effect of chance and therefore there is no reason to
expect one more than the other; and (b) The more sophisticated idea that
5 and 6 are equiprobable and therefore every event, representing a binary
combination of them, has the same probability.
On the other hand, most of the subjects who affirm that the couple (6, 6)
or the couple (H, H) are less probable do so because they consider that
identical results appear less often than different results:
"The 'probability' of obtaining (6, 6) is small. It is more likely to obtain a

6 and a 5" (E2).
"It is more likely to obtain a 5 and a 6 because the couples of equal

numbers represent a minority" (E3).
One has also to mention that some of the 13 to 14 year old pupils, who
received some instruction in probabilities, were able to find the correct
answer and to justify it correctly:
"It is more probable to obtain a 5 and a 6 because there are two poss-
ibilities (5, 6) and (6, 5) while (6, 6) represents only one possibility" (MP3).
"It is more probable to obtain an H and a T because one may obtain with
one coin H and with the other T and vice versa" (MP3).

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
These findings corroborate generally those of Lecoutre and Durand

(1988). They show also that one gets the same pattern of results when using
coins instead of dice, which points to the generality of the findings.
The following two questions A4 and B4 consider the same type of
problems as A3 and B3 but in a general form. We hoped that, this way, we
could get new insights into this interesting problem.
Questions A4 and B4
"One rolls two dice. Which is more probable: to obtain the same number
with both dice, or different numbers?"
"One tosses two coins. Which is more likely: to obtain the same face with
both coins or different faces? Or is the probability the same?"
TABLE IVA
Two dice. The probability to get the same number compared with the probability to get
different numbers. (Percentages). See the text for the two types of misconceptions
No answer 9.8 14.4 18.5

Correct answers 34.3 43.2 38.4
(Probabilities are different)
Type I 71.9 98.3 100.0

Type II 10.5 1.7 0.0
TABLE IVB
Two coins. The probability to get the same faces compared with the probability to get
different faces. (Percentages). See the text for the two types of misconceptions
No answer 17.4 23.0 23.1

(The same probability)
Type I 65.7 65.2 75.0

Type II 22.9 21.7 8.3
The results are expressed in Tables IVA and IVB. Explanations for the
two main types of misconceptions:

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
Question A4 (two dice). Type I: The probability of obtaining two equal

numbers and the probability of obtaining two different numbers with two
dice are the same. Type II: There is a greater likelihood of obtaining equal
numbers than different numbers.
Question B4 (two coins). Type 1: There is a greater likelihood of obtaining

different faces. Type II: There is a greater likelihood of obtaining the same
faces.
These two questions raise the same problems as A3 and B3 but in a

generalizedform. We could have expected the same type of results as th
obtained with the previous questions. As a matter of fact, the results are
different. At all age levels and for both problems (dice and coins) the
percentages of correct answers are visibly higher for the generalized form of
the questions than for the specific ones.
This is a fundamentally new finding. First, let us remark that the higher
percentage of correct answers for the generalized form of questions is not
related to the equality or non-equality of probabilities.
For the specific questions (A3 and B3), the correct answer is that the
probabilities are different for (6-6) versus (5-6) and for (H-H) versus (H-T).
For the generalized questions the correct answer for the coin problem is that
the probabilities are equal while for the dice problem the probability of
getting the same number is smaller than that of getting different numbers.
The only plausible explanation is that many of the subjects (those who
answer correctly) possess the inuitive capacity to evaluate globally the
magnitude of the sample space and of its structure. But in order to elicit this
capacity, the question has to be asked in a generalized form. When the
question is not asked in the generalized form, the answers are based on other
interpretations (the primary intuition of chance or the additive combination
of two independent outcomes) which both lead to incorrect answers. It is
then interesting to see how the subjects explain their correct answers.
A4 (dice). Some of the subjects refer to their previous experience.
"It is more likely to obtain different numbers because I have always

obtained such a result" (E4).
"It is more likely to obtain different numbers because one seldom obtains
the same numbers" (ES).
Quantitative Additive Evaluations
"It is more likely to obtain different numbers because from 6 possibilities

5 are different" (M2).

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
"It is more likely to obtain different numbers because among 12 it is more

difficult to obtain 2 equal numbers" (M2).
Multiplicative Evaluations
"There is more likelihood of obtaining different numbers because there

are more combinations. For equal numbers, one may obtain (1, 1)
(2, 2) ... (6, 6) while for different numbers one may have (1, 2)
(1, 3)---.(1, 6) (2,1)(2, 3) ... (2, 6). . " (M2).
"It is more likely to obtain different numbers because, in order to get equal
numbers, we have 6 possibilities but for obtaining two different numbers
one has 30 possibilities" (MP3).
"The probability is higher for obtaining different numbers: the probability

of obtaining equal numbers is 1/6 while the probability of obtaining
different numbers is 5/6" (MP3).
It is important to emphasize that all the subjects mentioned above (and

many others whom we did not quote) have answered to the specific
question (6-6 versus 5-6) that the probability is the same. As we have
already mentioned, it is the generalized form of the question which arouses
either intuitively, globally or as an effect of instruction (analytically) a
representation of the sample space (complete or incomplete).
Let us quote some justifications of correct answers for the coin problem.
In this case, the correct answer is that the two probabilities (the same faces
versus different faces) are equal (while for obtaining the couple H & T the
chances are the double compared with those of obtaining H with both coins).
As we have seen, to this question one has obtained relatively high percent-
ages of correct answers, as compared with the specific question. Nevertheless
most of the subjects did not offer explanations in which any representation
of the corresponding sample space is obvious.
"The probability is the same because the results cannot be predicted" (M2).
"The probability is the same because one may obtain either the same or
different faces" (E5).
In very few cases, subjects who possessed a certain instruction in

probabilities were able to describe the corresponding sample space:
"The probability is the same because one may obtain HT, HH, TH, TT"
(MP3). The same pupil gave the erroneous answer: "The same probability",
also to the corresponding specific question. It is the generality of the

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
question which arouses the representation of the corresponding sample

space.
Another example of a correct answer based on the representation of the

sample space: "In my opinion, one may get either head and tail or tail and
head or the same faces for both the head and the tail" (MP2). In this case,
the child answered also "the same probability" (incorrectly) to the specific
question.
Summarizing the results obtained with questions A4 and B4 one may
contend that:
(a) Some of the subjects possess the capacity to evaluate intuitively the
magnitude of the sample space corresponding to a stochastic experi-
ment.
(b) This intuitive capacity improves spontaneously with age.
(c) This capacity is aroused by generalized forms of questions (which
evoke the idea of multitude).
(d) The proportion of correct evaluations of sample spaces (when comparing
probabilities) is greater if the sample space is richer (better results were
obtained with the dice than with the coins in the A4 and B4 problems).
A didactical recommendation is to analyze, with the students, the probabil-

ities in the two different forms: the particular and the generalized form of
the questions. This, in our opinion may represent an efficient way for
improving the corresponding intuitive background for the notion of com-
pound event.
Compound Events (II)
Two other pairs of questions of a different type are also devoted to the
concept of compound event. In these questions, sums of couples of
numbers obtained by throwing two dice are considered. One hypothesis
was that the magnitude of the sum considered may play a role in determin
ing the probability estimation. More specifically, we supposed, initially,
that, intuitively, the naive subject would bet on greater sums (bigger
numbers) no matter the magnitude of the corresponding sample space.
This was based on the more general assumption that in naive subjects
the notion of sample space does not develop itself spontaneously. As we
have already seen, this assumption has been contradicted by some of our
findings.
The two pairs of questions whose analysis follows explore the same
problem with different means.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
Questions AS and BS
Question AS: "Considering the sum of the points obtained when rolling a
pair of dice, will you bet on 3 or on 6? Why?"
Question B5: "Considering the sum of the points obtained when rolling a
pair of dice, would you bet on 7 or on 10? Why?"
The two questions seem to be absolutely similar, but there is an impor-

tant difference. In the first case, the number with a higher probability is:
"6" (that is the bigger number in the pair 3 and 6). In the second case, the
chosen number should be "7", that is the smaller of the two numbers (7
and 10).
As an effect, the results are strikingly different. As one can see from
Tables VA and VB, in the case of question AS, 60-70% of the answers
were correct whilst in the case of question B5, we got respectively 19.3%,
34.5% and 46.2% correct choices (see Tables VA and VB).
TABLE VA
Two dice. Comparison between the probabilities to get the sums 3 and 6. (Percentages). For
the two types of errors, see the text
No answer 7.8 14.4 10.8

The correct choice (6) 62.8 61.1 73.8
Incorrect answers 29.4 24.5 15.4
Type I errors 23.3 26.5 80.0

TABLE VB
the two types of errors see the text
No answer 11.9 19.4 12.3

The correct choice (7) 19.3 34.5 46.2
Type I errors 22.7 28.1 33.3


154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
We consider in the two Tables two different types of misconceptions.
Question A5 - Type I: The probability of obtaining the sum 3 and that of

obtaining the sum 6 are equal. Type II error: it is more likely to get the sum 3.
Question B5 - Type L: The probability of obtaining the sum 7 and that of

obtaining 10 are equal. Type II: it is more likely to obtain the sum 10 than
to obtain the sum 7.
There seems to be only one explanation of these results: Most of the

subjects chose the bigger number as the favourite one, no matter the
sample space. In question AS, the bigger number 6 is really more likely to
win and so their choice is apparently correct (though, in fact, based on a
wrong reason). In question B5, it is the smaller number, 7, which presents
the higher probability and, therefore, a relatively low percentage of the
subjects made the correct choice. In this case, there is a clear progress as an
effect of age and instruction. The justifications confirm, globally, the above
explanation but the picture one gets is, in fact, more complex.
Some of the children claim that they will bet on 6 simply because it is bigger.
"The 6, because it is a bigger number and two dice may give 3 + 3, 1 + 5,

2 + 4" (E5). "The 6 because it is bigger than 3" (MI). "On 6 because it is
bigger than all the numbers" (MP3).
Finally, some of the children try to justify their preference for 6,

indicating some or all the possible outcomes related to 6.
"I will bet 6 because, in the case of 3, one wins only with I and 2, while in
the case of 6 one wins with 1 and 5, 4 and 2, 3 and 3" (MP3).
This child has certainly an intuitive idea of the role of the magnitude of
the sample space, but he considers only a part of it (that is, without
considering the order as a factor of differentiating outcomes).
There are also a few cases of children who were able to indicate all the
possible outcomes which constitute the expected event.
"(I bet) on 6 because it may be obtained from more numbers, that is: 1 and
5, 4 and 2. . ." (and the child mentions all the possibilities) (ES).
Considering their justifications, one may conclude that many children

have an intuitive idea of the relationship between the likelihood of an event
and the magnitude of the corresponding sample space. Even when they
choose the bigger number incorrectly (10 from the pair 7-10) they still
support their option by pointing to a bigger number of possible combina-
tions. For instance:

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
"The 10, because in order to get 7 one has only 4 and 3, and 3 and 4 while
for 10 one has 5 and 5, 6 and 4, 4 and 6" (MP3).
One may then distinguish the following levels:
(a) The child indicates the bigger number without any reference to the
constitutive outcomes.
(b) The child indicates only some of the possible outcomes, which leads
him to an erroneous evaluation.
(c) The child decribes all the possible pairs but does not understand that
each pair of different numbers has to be considered twice, that is
considering the order too.
(d) The child is able (even spontaneously) to imagine all the possible
outcomes, and consequently, to conclude correctly.
Some of the answers point to the equality of the possibilities. In this case,
the child refers only to the general ideas of chance and good luck.
"It is the same to bet either on 10 or 7: The possibility is the same, it is

enough to have good luck" (E5).
An interesting observation: Considering only the inadequate reactions,

one finds that the percentage of answers indicating equal chances for both
numbers, increases with age and instruction for both items!
The main finding of this part of the research is that most of the subjects
seem to possess an intuitive idea of the realtionship between probability and
the size of a corresponding sample space. The non-adequate options were
generated mainly by a lack of technical knowledge on how to build this
sample space. In addition, there is no natural intuitive understanding of the
fact that, in constructing the sample space, one has to consider also the
order of the elementary results which constitute the outcomes. Only a few
subjects seem to have intuitively this understanding.
Questions A6 and B6
The questions A6 and B6 are of the same type as A5 and B5.
Question A 6. Luca and Paolo play with a pair of dice. If the sum of the
points is 3, Luca is the winner. If the sum of the points is 11, Paolo is the
winner. Which of the following answers seems to you to be the correct one?
Why?
Luca is the favourite

Paolo is the favourite
Luca and Paolo have the same chance

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
Question B6 is similar but the numbers considered are 2 (Paolo) and 12

(Piero). In both problems, the probability is the same for each number in
the pair. Therefore, the only factor which apparently may affect the choice
is the magnitude of the numbers in each pair. This way, we hoped to get
more information concerning the role of the magnitude of the expected
number when assessing its probability.
The results are presented in Tables VIA and VIB. Types of misconceptions:
Question A6 - Type I: The probability of obtaining the sum 3 is higher

than the probability of obtaining the sum 11. Type II: The probability of
obtaining the sum 11 is higher.
Question B6 - Type I: The probability of obtaining the sum 2 is higher.

Type II: The probability of obtaining the sum 12 is higher.
The proportion of those who do not answer question A6 at all increases

with age and instruction. The proportion of those who answer correctly
TABLE VIA
No answer 2.9 13.7 26.1

Type I 19.1 12.5 4.3

Type II 77.9 83.3 95.7
TABLE VIB
No answer 0.9 3.6 4.6

Type I 18.9 26.4 5.6

Type II 81.1 73.6 94.4

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
(the chances are equal) increases with age but not as an effect of instruc-
tion. The younger subjects and those who possess some experience with
probabilities gave less than 50% correct answers.
With question B6, the situation is different. Very few subjects do not
answer at all. The percentage of correct answers increases with age, and in
all three groups more than half of the subjects answered correctly.
Considering the results obtained with both questions, it is obvious that
the magnitude of the numbers is a decisive factor of the choice. Two
questions have to be answered: (a) Why do the subjects prefer the bigger
number? (b) Why is the second problem easier?
Justifications for A 6 and B6
A6 - Answers Mentioning Equal Probabilities (correct)
Some of the subjects refer to the pairs of numbers the sum of which is 3
and 11 respectively.
"The chances are equal because 11 is obtained from 5 and 6 and 3 is

obtained from 1 and 2" (E5).
"They have the same chances: Luca must obtain (2,1) and Paolo (5,6)"
(MP3).
Almost all of these subjects who consider correctly the numbers 1 and 2
and 5 and 6 respectively do not see that each pair has to be considered
twice. Again, there is no natural intuition supporting the idea that each
pair is in fact a compound event. But the range of explanations is richer:
"Luca and Paolo have the same chance because one does not know which
number one will get" (E5).
"The chance is the same because 3 is too low and 11 is too high" (M3).
A6 - Answers Referring to Different Probabilities (incorrect)
"Paolo has a higher chance because he has the bigger number" (E4).
"Paolo is advantaged because there are 5 possibilities to obtain 11, that is

8 + 3, 10 + 1, 6 + 5, 9 + 2, 7 + 4 while Luca has only one possibility, that
is, 2 + 1" (E5).
"Paolo is advantaged because with two dice one obtains almost always
numbers bigger than 3" (MI).

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
"Paolo is advantaged because 3 may be obtained only with 1 + 2 (which

will not be obtained very often), while 11 may be obtained with many
numbers" (M2).
"Paolo is advantaged because he has the higher number" (M3).
"Paolo is advantaged: in fact, for Paolo 1 and 10, 2 and 9, 3 and 8, 7 and
4, 6 and 5, 5 and 6, 4 and 7, 3 and 8, 2 and 9, 1 and 10; for Luca 2, 1 and
1, 2" (MP3).
"Paolo is the more advantaged because he has more points" (MP3).
"Paolo is more advantaged because with dice it is more likely to obtain big
numbers" (MP3).
There are two main types of justifications for the choice of the bigge
number: (a) Some of the subjects simply chose the bigger number beca
"it is bigger"; (b) Others try to identify the pairs which would yield 11
forget the limitation imposed by the conditions of the game (the 6 being
the biggest possible number). We suppose that even those subjects who,
without explaining, chose the number 11 as being more likely, have in fact
in mind, tacitly, the multiplicity of possible combinations (but also forget-
ting the specific limitations of the dice game).
Question B6 - Correct Answers
Although the two questions A6 and B6 are apparently similar, the results
obtained are different: higher percentages of correct answers ("the proba
bilities are equal") have been obtained with question B6 as compared with
question A6. A plausible explanation seems to be the following. In question
B6, the two numbers considered are 2 and 12, which may be obtained only
in one way (I + I and 6 + 6). This makes easier the task of producing
(tacitly or explicitly) the corresponding sample spaces (what Tversky and
Kahneman call "the heuristic of availability" (1973)). Let us consider some
examples referring to correct answers:
"The probability is the same because with the two dice, one may obtain
12(6 + 6) and 2(1 + 1)" (ES).
"The same probability, because by rolling two dice, one may get 2 as one
may get 12" (E4).
"The 12 may be obtained only with 6, 6 and the 2 with 1, 1. Therefore,

from the 36 possible combinations, each one of the two numbers has only
one chance" (MP3).

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
Question B6 - Erroneous Answers
The main justification for the incorrect choice of 12 is based on the idea (as
it was for question A6) that 12 may be obtained as a result of more possible
combinations than 2. That is, in this case too, the subjects forget the
constraints imposed by the dice game.
"Piero has the bigger chance because 2 may be obtained only with two equal
numbers while 12 may be obtained also with different numbers" (M2).
"Piero has the advantage because 2 is obtained only with (1, 1) while 12
has more possibilities to be obtained: (6, 6) (8, 4), (7, 5), (3, 9)" (MP3).
There were also a few subjects who forgot completely the conditions of
the game and simply considered that the higher number always wins.
"Piero has the advantage because in a dice game if one has 10 more points
you are absolutely sure to win" (M2).
The results obtained with question A6 and B6 support the conclusion

previously drawn from the reactions to questions A5 and B5: Children
develop a natural, intuitive tendency to evaluate the probability of a compound
event on the basis of the corresponding sample space. This is a fundamental
finding to be considered both from the psychological and the didactical point
of view.
The following obstacles interfere, conflicting with the correct evaluation:
(a) As already mentioned, there is no intuitive, natural support for count-

ing separately as distinct outcomes, the same groups of results in
different sequences (for instance 5, 6 and 6, 5).
(b) The subjects tend to forget, sometimes, the specific conditions of the
stochastic experience and the sample space is constructed without
considering the respective limitations (for instance in a dice game
numbers like 7, 8 etc. are also considered).
(c) Many subjects do not possess a systematic technique for producing all
the possible outcomes related to an event.
(d) Availability seems to be an important factor in the intuitive evaluation
of the magnitude of a sample space. Subjects have a better chance to
compare correctly the possibilities of getting (by adding two numbers)
2 or 12 than to get 3 or 11 (in a dice game).
(e) In some subjects, the general idea of chance is still sufficiently active for
hiding the specific condition of the problem and leading to the idea of
equal chances ("the probabilities of the two events are the same
because both are chance events").

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
But beyond the effect of these factors - except the last one - one may
postulate the existence, in naive subjects, of an intuitive capacity to
evaluate the magnitude of the sample space corresponding to a certain
stochastic experience. This finding corroborates those related to formerly
analyzed questions (in which the subjects were asked to compare the
probabilities of obtaining identical versus different results when rolling a
couple of dice or tossing two coins).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The psychological aspects of the concept of probability seem to be much

more complex, in many respects, than it is usually considered. If one
intends to develop by instruction a strong, correct, coherent, formal and
intuitive background for probabilistic reasoning, one has to cope with a
large variety of misunderstandings, misconceptions, biases and emotional
tendencies. Such distortions may be caused by linguistic difficulties, by a
lack of logical abilities, by the difficulty to extract the mathematical
structure from the practical embodiment, by the difficulty to accept that
chance events may be analyzed from a deterministic-predictive point of
view.
1. The subjects do not have in mind a clear definition of the terms

"possible", "impossible" and "certain". The term "certain", especially,
entails a certain difficulty when it is related to a compound event (for
instance, the probability of obtaining a number smaller than 7 when
rolling a die). Some subjects confuse "rare" with "impossible".
2. The notions of compound and simple events also raise interesting
psychological and didactical problems. It is a topic which deserves more
attention, considering its intuitive complexity and the variety of situa-
tions which it may generate. The following situations have been iden-
tified:
There is no natural understanding of the fact that, in a sample space,
possible outcomes should be distinguished and counted separately if the
order of their elementary components is different. Our intuition is
surprised by this discovery. Should we conclude that, generally, the idea
of a compound event and the evaluation of its probability lack any
intuitive background? The answer is negative. With other types of
problems many subjects seem to display a certain, natural feeling of the
role of the magnitude of the corresponding sample space in determining
the probability of a compound event.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
There are, in our investigation, two types of problems which support

this conclusion. The first case is that in which couples of results are
considered in a general form: "By rolling two dice is it more likely to
get two different numbers or the same numbers?" A similar question
has been asked referring to coins.
In this general form, the questions yielded much more correct an-
swers. In the case of coins most of the subjects answered correctly at
both age levels. The justifications usually refer to the corresponding
sample space (though, very often, incompletely described).
This finding indicates clearly that, in certain circumstances, the
subjects are able to evaluate spontaneously the probability of a com-
pound event. This ability is strengthened and really put into profit
when the question is addressed in a general form.
The second type of questions used by us which reveals the natural
capacity of the subjects to cope with compound events is that in
which the subjects are asked to compare the probabilities of getting
certain numbers obtained by addition when rolling two dice. Generally
speaking, many subjects seem to be able to relate spontaneously
the estimations of probabilities to the magnitude of sample spaces
though, sometimes, the description of these sample spaces is incorrect.
The magnitude of the numbers the probabilities of which one has
to compare represents a major factor in the subjects' decisions. The
fact that a number is bigger is frequently associated with a higher
probability without any other justification than the magnitude of the
number.
3. The capacity to abstract the identical mathematical (probabilistic)
structure from different experimental embodiments: The probability of
obtaining (5, 5, 5) by throwing a die three times or by throwing simul-
taneously three dice; the probability of obtaining (H, H, H) by tossing
a coin three times or by tossing three coins simultaneously.
The majority of subjects answered both questions correctly: the
probabilities are equal. There is an increase with age and instruction of
the proportion of correct answers. Most of the errors consisted in
affirming that by performing the operation three times successively, one
has a better chance to get the expected event. The reason: this way the
effect can be better controlled by the subject.
4. An important factor influencing some of the subjects' reactions (even
in adolescents) remains the capacity to synthesize the necessary and the
random in the concept of probability (see Fischbein, 1975). The idea
that an outcome of a stochastic experiment depends only on chance -

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC
no matter what the given conditions - renders then any prediction

baseless. This, in our opinion, is a very important finding and it should
be treated with much care by teachers and didacticians.
REFERENCES
Feller, W.: 1960, Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications, Vol. 1, John Wiley,
New York.
Fischbein, E.: 1975, The Intuitive Sources of Probabilistic Thinking in Children, Reidel,
Dordrecht.
Fischbein, E., Barbat, I. and Minzat, I.: 1975, 'Primary and secondary intuitions in the
introduction of probability', in Fischbein, E. (ed.), The Intuitive Sources of Probabilistic
Thinking in Children, Appendix 1, pp. 139-155, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Fischbein, E. and Gazit, A.: 1984, 'Does the teaching of probability improve probabilistic
intuitions?', Educational Studies in Mathematics 15(1), 1-24.
Garfield, J. and Ahlgren, A.: 1988, 'Difficulties in learning basic concepts in probability and
statistics: implications for research', Journalfor Research in Mathematics Education 19(1),
44-63.
Godino, J. D., Batanero, C. and Canizares, J.: 1987, Azar y Probabilidad, Sintezis, Madrid.
Hawkins, S. A. and Kapadia, R.: 1984, 'Children's conceptions of probability - a psycholog-
ical and pedagogical review', Educational Studies in Mathematics 15(4), 349-377.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (eds.): 1982, Judgement Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lecoutre, M. and Durand, J.: 1988, 'Jugements probabilistes et modeles cognitifs: Etude d'une
situation aleatoire', Educational Studies in Mathematics 19(3), 357-368.
Piaget, J. and Inhelder, B.: 1951, La Genese de l'Idee de Hasard chez L'Enfant, PUF, Paris.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.: 1973, 'Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability', Cognitive Psychology No. 5, 207-232.
Tel-Aviv University, EFRAIM FISCHBEIN

School of Education,
Tel-Aviv,
Israel
Didactical Seminary, MARIA SAINATI NELLO

Department of Mathematics, and MARIA SCIOLIS MARINO
University of Pisa, Italy

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 16:00:56 UTC

Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Factors Affecting Probabilistic Judgements in Children and Adolescents

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3482209

This content downloaded from

MARIA SCIOLIS MARINO