Schemata and Intuitions in Combinatorial Reasoning

Schemata and Intuitions in Combinatorial Reasoning
Author(s): Efraim Fischbein and Aline Grossman

Source: Educational Studies in Mathematics , Oct., 1997, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Oct., 1997), pp.
27-47
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3482715
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3482715?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Educational
Studies in Mathematics
This content downloaded from

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
EFRAIM FISCHBEIN and ALINE GROSSMAN
SCHEMATA AND INTUITONS IN COMBINATORLAL REASONING
ABSTRACT. The problem that inspired the present research refers to the relations
between schemata and intuitions. These two mental categories share a number of com
mon properties: ontogenetic stability, adaptive flexibility, internal consistency, coerc
ness and generality. Schemata are defined following the Piagetian line of thought, ei
as programs for processing and interpreting information or as programs for designing
performing adaptive reactions. Intuitions are defined in the present article as global, imm
diate cognitions. On the basis of previous findings (Fischbein et aL, 1996; Siegler, 1
Wilkening, 1980; Wilkening & Anderson, 1982), our main hypothesis was that intuiti
are always based on certain structural schemata. In the present research this hypothe
was checked with regard to combinatorial problems (permutations, arrangements with
without replacement, combinations). It was found that intuitions, even when expresse
instantaneous guesses, are; in fact, manipulated 'behind the scenes' (correctly or incorrectl
by schemata. This implies that, in order to influence, didactically, students' intuitions, th
schemata on which these intuitions are based should be identified and acted upon.
The main theoretical problem that inspired the present research refer
to the relationships between intuitions and schemata. Let us start with
example:
A subject is presented with two boxes. In one box there are 2 white marbles and 4 black
marbles. In the second box there are one white marble and 2 black marbles. The subject has
to decide from which box there would be a better chance to draw a white marble (without
looking). A six-year-old child would, usually, affirm that from the first box there is a better
chance of drawing a white marble. An eleven-year-old child would usually claim that the
chances are equal, which is, obviously, the correct answer.
Do these responses express certain mental schemata? It is fair to assume

that the answer is yes. That is, the reaction of the younger child is based
on a comparison between the amounts of white marbles, while the answer
of the older child is based on the schema of proportion (see, Fischbein
et al., 1970; reproduced in Fischbein, 1975). These two answers were
given directly, without hesitation. They appear to be obvious to the two
subjects. The numerical comparisons were implicit, though the children
may justify a posteriori, on request, their decisions by explicitly referring
to numerical comparisons. This subjective obviousness of the conclusions
confers on them the attribute of intuitiveness. Let us consider a second
example, based on an experience performed by Piaget and Szeminska:
Educational Studies in Mathematics 34: 27-47, 1997.

? 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in The Netherlands.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
28 EFRAIM FISCHBEIN AND ALINE GROSSMAN
Tvo small glasses of the same shape and dimension, Al and A2, contain
pearls. The subject, a four year old child, is aware of the equivalence of quantities because
he, himself, had put the pearls in the glasses. With the left hand he introduced a pearl
into A, and with the right hand the introduced a pearl into A2. The child continues the
introduction of pearls in the same way until the glasses are filled up. After that, leaving glass
Al unchanged, the experimenter pours the pearls from A2 into a glass B. Let us suppose
that B is narrower and higher than glasses Al and A2. The child will conclude that there are
more pearls in B than in A1 even though he is aware that no more pearls were added to B.
From this Piaget derives the non-conservation of quantity in pre-opera-

tional children, explaining that at this age the child's attention is centered
on only one dimension (Piaget, 1967, p. 140). When the same question
is addressed to a 6-year-old child, his response is very different: '...he
does not need reflection' argues Piaget, 'he is even surprised that the
question was addressed' (op cit. p. 150). The child is convinced about the
conservation of quantity despite the change of shape. He takes into account
both dimensions, width and height.
As a matter of fact, both children answered intuitively. Their reactions
are different because their intuitions express different schemata, different
programs of interpretation related to their age. For the younger child, it
is the global configuration, dominated by one dimension that is decisive.
For the six-year-old child, the schemata of compensation and reversibility
determine the intuitive answers.
The question, as mentioned above, is then: What are the relationships
between schemata and intuitions? Are intuitions always the product of
implicitly acting intellectual schemata? We assume that no pure intuitions
exist, that intuitions are always manipulated and shaped from inside by
certain intellectual schemata.
1. INTUITIONS AND SCHEMATA
Let us start with the distinction between a random guess and an intuitive
guess (an estimation, a solution, a prediction, etc.). I flip a coin and I try
to guess what has come up. I may claim, for instance, that the outcome
is heads (H). This is a random guess: I have no information whatsoever
about the outcome. Now I flip a coin three times and I get HHH. My guess
with regard to the fourth outcome may be tails (T). This time the guess
is based on some information: It is an intuitive guess. This guess may
be explained as being based, inadequately, on the equality of odds P(H)
= P(T). (The need for equilibrium between the two possible outcomes.)
Intuitions are not mere guesses: What distinguishes them from a random
guess is that the formner are tacitly based on some initial infonnation, on

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
COMBINATORIAL INTUITIONS 29
some mental operation. Intuitions have,

predictive function (see Fischbein, 1987). But the main characteristics of
an intuitive guess (estimation, prediction, etc.) are its immediacy and its
global character. In the present article, the term intuitive knowledge refers
to a global, direct estimation, in contrast to a solution based on explicit
computation.
The main psychological problem posed by the present research was:
What are the mechanisms through which a mental operation (in the broad
sense of the term: computation, logical operation, etc.) acquires, subject-
ively, the features of immediacy and globality? The details are eliminated
at the conscious level. The sequence of operations takes place tacitly. What
we get at the conscious level is only the final product, an apparently spon-
taneous solution, decision, representation, an 'insight', as the Gestaltists
would call it. It has been established that intuitions are behaviorally ori-
ented, that they are dependent on previous experience, and tend to fulfill,
correctly or incorrectly, some adaptive requirements (Fischbein, 1987).
Consequently, intuitively based decisions and 'guesses' have to take into
account the data of reality. Because of their unconscious implicit mechan-
isms, investigating intuitions is methodologically very complex.
Fundamentally, the adaptive processes take place, according to the Pia-
getian theory, through the construction and intervention of schemata. The
term schema has various definitions and interpretations: In the present
paper, it will be used to refer to a program (roughly analogous to a com-
puter program) aimed to interpret a certain amount of information and to
prepare and control the corresponding reaction.
The term 'program' in the present context means a sequence of steps
relatively flexible and adaptable to the given circumstances. For instance,
suppose one is asked to evaluate the number of groups that can be produced
by changing the order of, say, five different objects (e.g., the letters a, b,
c, d, e). In response, one may try to evaluate intuitively (a global guess)
or alternatively one may try to use a certain procedure, a schema for
calculating (or producing) the number of groups. Vergnaud has recently
given a profound analysis of the concept of schema: 'A scheme is finalized:
goals imply expectations. A scheme generates actions: it must contain rules.
A scheme is not a stereotype, as the sequence of actions depends on the
parameters of the situation' (1994, p. 53). (For a broader analysis of the
concept of schema and for more references, see Howard, 1987; see also:
Anderson, 1976; Attneave, 1957; Fischbein, 1978; Flavell, 1963; Hastie,
1981; Piaget, 1976; Rumelhart, 1980.)
The main hypothesis which guided our present research was that intu-
itions are based on schemata (see Fischbein and Schnarch, 1997). A schema

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
is always an organized system of sequential interpretations and procedures

jointly expressing a certain level of mental maturation and a sufficient
amount of experience. A schema is both stable and flexible. It expresses
a way of thinking, interpreting, and solving. For instance, the concept of
formal mathematical proof is a mental schema because it expresses the
principle that in mathematics the truth of a statement is not established by
confronting it with reality, but deductively in conformity to logical rules.
As an 8-year-old child does not possess this schema, he will not be able to
understand the necessity of proving some apparently evident statements.
An important methodological problem is the following: Our subjects
were asked, initially, to evaluate directly the number of possibilities for
each combinatorial problem and not to try to apply a solving procedure.
Therefore we could not measure the degree of intuitiveness, the degree
of belief associated with the subject's reaction. What we could do, and
effectively did, was to interview the subjects a posteriori and compare
their justifications with both their initial 'spontaneous' answers and the
correct solutions.
We should emphasize again that, in our view, schemata should not
be considered (generally speaking) as mechanistic programs. In many
situations they are logically based structures. This is the situation of the
combinatorial system: the combinatorial principle and the various com-
binatorial procedures are logical in their nature. That is, when a subject
proposes a certain procedure for solving a combinatorial problem, he usu-
ally, has in mind, a logical support. It is necessary, at this point, to introduce
a distinction which is, in our opinion, epistemologically important. There
are general schemata which have a basic, structuring role and there are
more content-bound, particular schemata with a more restricted impact.
For the first category - structural schemata - let us mention the schemata
of classification, seriation, bijection, the concepts of measure and unit,
number, the concepts of deterministic relationships and randomness, the
concepts of proportion, probability, correlation and combinatorial opera-
tions, the concepts of formal vs. empirical proof, etc. With regard to the
second category - every concept with a specific meaning (triangle, chair,
pencil, etc.), every reflex, every mathematical or scientific formula etc.,
represents the preconditions for identifying an object or performing a cer-
tain operation. These are specific schemata. One may consider, tentatively,
that schemata are organized in hierarchies from the very general to specific,
content-bound schemata.
The various periods in the ontogenetic evolution of human intelligence
are, first of all, characterized by the constitution of new, structural schemata
(the new integrating the old ones). These new schemata constitute the

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
main characteristics of the respective stages. For didactic purposes teachers

start, sometimes, from particular instances and generalize only later. But a
genuine understanding of a certain concept or operation can be reached only
when the full hierarchy of schemata is established and mentally integrated
by the student. For instance, the child genuinely understands the concept
of number only if he possesses the schemata of class and class inclusion,
of order, of bijection, of the conservation of numerosity, etc.
As we mentioned above, our main concern in devising the present
research has been the relationship between schemata and intuitions. Are
intuitions always dependent on certain schemata? Could we assume that
an intuitive cognition is in fact, the cognitive counterparts of certain
schemata? The basic hypothesis of the present research was that, indeed,
intuitive estimations are, generally the global, subjective effect of sys-
tematic, well established, highly integrated, sequential structures. This
hypothesis was based on a number of previous findings. We return to this
in the final discussion.
2. COMBINATORIAL INTUITIONS
In the research presented here, out attention is focused on combinatorial

problems. In everyday life, we come across situations in which one has
to evaluate, globally, the number, or rather the order of magnitude, of the
number of various possible combinations of sets of elements. Sometimes,
the evaluation is performed explicitly, at other times implicit guesses are
made. How many sets of n numbers may one produce from a set of k
digits (for instance, with regard to car numbers)? Considering the political
parties in a country, how many governing coalitions is it possible to build,
composed of nI, or n2, etc. parties? In order to produce a certain medicine,
various combinations of ingredients are tried, etc.
Our interest in devising the present research was both theoretical and
didactical. The theoretical interest is obvious: Both schemata and intuitive
cognitions are of great theoretical importance. Both categories involve gen-
erally stable, well-structured, well-integrated, highly influential mental-
behavioral structures whose inter-relationships are yet to be elucidated.
From the point of view of didactics combinatorics, in its own right, is an
important chapter in mathematics, whose relevance, moreover, to various
branches of mathematics is well known (probability, linear programming,
the theory of games, topology, number theory, network analysis, etc.).
Moreover, combinatorial capabilities constitute, according to Piaget and
Inhelder (1958), one of the basic schemata, reaching maturity during the

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
formal operational stage. The propositional nature of formal reasoning is

based on the combinatorial capability of the adolescent.
The investigation of combinatorial intuitions and their sources implies
the consideration of three basic categories of data: the quasi spontaneous
guess of the subject, the correct mathematical solution, and the subject's
a posteriori justifications to his/her response. By comparing these categor-
ies of data we expected to get more information with regard to the tacit
mechanisms of intuitions in general and of combinatorial intuitions spe-
cifically. Let us emphasize that in considering combinatorics, one is dealing
with a privileged case in which a general structural schema and particular
procedural schemata are involved. (For an updated review of the literat-
ure concerning combinatorics, see the excellent work of Batanero et al.
(1994), who analyze the area of combinatorics from the mathematical, the
psychological and the didactical points of view.) (See also: Deguire, 1991;
English, 1994; Fischbein and Gazit, 1988; Fischbein et al., 1970; Inhelder
and Piaget, 1958.)
Up to now, combinatorial intuitions were not analyzed specifically.
Existing investigations refer either to the evolution with age of the child's
combinatorial capacities (expressed in the capacity to produce various
subsets of elements from a given set of n elements according to a certain
definition), or to techniques of teaching and learning combinatorics. As
mentioned above, the question we were concerned with, was to analyze the
structural roots of intuitive combinatorial evaluations. The combinatorial
system is, in the Piagetian conception, as mentioned above, an operational
schema with far-reaching behavioral implications. But the 'combinatorial
system' also leads to particular, specific, solving schemata. How are the
combinatorial, global, intuitive estirnatiois related to these two levels of
combinatorial reasoning? How is it possible that a schema, a program (i.e.,
a sequential approach) gets, in certain circumstances, an intuitive, global,
apparently insight-like-expression?
3. METHODOLOGY
3. 1. Subjects
(a) Pupils enrolled in the following classes: grade 7 (N = 63), grade 9

(N = 62), and grade I 1 (N = 62); (b) students enrolled in teachers college
(N = 41), and (c) adults with various mathematical backgrounds (N = 25).
The adults were people with low mathematical education, enrolled in a
course in mathematical literacy. None of the subjects had formerly attended
any course in combinatorics.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
3.2. Instruments
A questionnaire was administered containing various combinatorial prob-

lems: permutations, arrangements with and without replacements and com-
binations. The subjects were asked to estimate, globally, the number of
possible groups of elements which could be produced with a given set of
elements according to a certain procedure. After the subjects answered in
writing, individual interviews were conducted in which the same subjects
were asked to explain their solutions. Twenty-five subjects were inter-
viewed.
3.3. Procedure
The session (administrations of the questionnaire) started with a gener-

al explanation with regard to combinatorial operations. The experimenter
presented the word PEACE (in Hebrew [Shalom]) and asked the students
to produce various words using some or all of these letters. Following this
introduction, the questionnaire was administered and the subjects were
asked to estimate the numbers corresponding to the respective combinat-
orial problem; it was made clear to the subjects that they were only meant
to estimate (not to compute) the answers. The questionnaire was admin-
istered in usual classroom conditions. The subjects were allowed about 45
minutes to complete the questionnaire. The interviews, asking the subjects
to justify their evaluations, were conduced some days after questionnaire
administration.
4. RESULTS
The exact wording of each question is presented below, followed by the

respective findings.
4.1. Permutations
The questions were formulated as follows:

The following questions refer to the number of possibilities of arranging
a certain number of elements by changing their order, for instance: AB and
BA. Each element can be used only one per permutation.
1. Given three elements A, B, C - In how many ways is it possible to

arrange these elements by changing their order?
2. Given four elements A, B, C, D - In how many ways is it possible to
3. Given five element A, B, C, D, E - In how many ways is it possible to

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
TABLE I
Permutations. Averages of Estimations and Standard Deviations
3 Elements 4 Elements 5 Elements
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Grade 7 5.82 0.77 14.79 5.80 35.47 31.01
Grade 9 6.92 2.65 16.80 11.80 44.60 29.50

Grade 11 8.09 6.02 26.41 15.40 37.10 35.60
College students 7.55 4.76 18.40 12.00 63.60 27.00
Adults 5.96 0.20 19.60 7.16 64.70 28.90
General Mean 6.97 19.27 48.25
Correct Solutions 6 24 120
Averages and standard deviations of estimations were computed for

each group of subjects (see Table I).
Table I shows that the estimations of the number of possible permuta-
tions with three elements increase, generally, with age from grade 7 to
grade 11. Among college students and adults, there is a certain drop, but,
globally, the average number of estimations remains close to the correct
answer (P3 1* 2. 3 = 6). With four and five elements, one finds a
strong underestimation of the number of permutations, without a clear
age-related regularity. Underestimation for five elements is higher than for
four elements.
The interviews helped us to get a better understanding of the mechan-
isms underlying the intuitive answers.
With regard to permutations of three elements, the following explana-
tions were collected: Some of the subjects, starting from grade 9, simply
re-stated technically the six permutations (abc, acb, bac, etc.). The mul-
tiplication 3.2 was found in all age groups with the explanation: 'One
remains fixed and the other two change their positions'. There were also
subjects (in all age groups) who claimed that 6 is the product of 2 x 3. That
is, these subjects, first guessed '6' and afterwards tried to find ajustification
to their answer.
With regard to permutations of four elements, the following justific-
ations were identified: 'I simply guessed', '4 x 4 - that is, each of the
four elements may appear in each of the four positions'. '42, (for the same
reason); '3 x 4 - because there are four elements: one remains fixed and
the other three change their positions'; '24 - because in each pair, the two

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
COMBINATORIAL INTUMONS 35
elements may change [respectively] thei

four elements.'
With regard to five elements, the follo
'5 x 5 - because five elements can appea
- because each two elements may change their positions'; '4.5 - because,
by keeping one element fixed, the others may change their positions'; 'A
simple guess'.
None of the subjects reached the formula P = n! The justifications
referred to binary operations, a multiplication or an exponential solution.
With a few exceptions, the intuitive estimations expressed, in fact, a par-
ticular intellectual schema. The particular procedure was, generally, inad-
equate and consequently (with the exception of P3) the guesses expressed
incorrect solutions (underestimations). The fact that for P3 there were some
correct answers was the result of mere coincidence: P3 = 1 x 2 x 3 = 6
and the binary multiplication 2 x 3.
So far, we may assume the following: Firstly, the subjects' answers have
their roots in the general combinatorial capability, that is, the operational
schema of combinatorics (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Secondly, the subjects'
answers are, usually, the product of a certain specific operation, which is
always multiplicative (multiplication or exponential operation). Thirdly,
the operation is a binary operation (leading, in the case of permutations of
four and five elements to underestimations). That is, we may assume, that in
the process of guessing, the subjects tend to reduce the implicit computation
to a minimum. It is -such a minimum which enables the subject to offer
an apparently spontaneous answer a guess, an intuitive answer. As one
will see, the same results emerged with regard to the other combinatorial
problems.
4.2. Arrangements with replacement
Considering n elements taken by k with replacement, the formula is

An = nk. The question was formulated in the following way:
The following questions refer to the selection of a group of elements
from a larger group of elements, such that each element may be used
more than once (selection with replacement). For instance: from the set
of elements ABC, one may select the sets BB, AB, AA, etc. The order
of elements is relevant, that is, the arrangement AB is considered to be
different from the arrangement BA.
1. Given three elements A, B, C - How many possibilities are there to

produce different sets of two elements from the given set of three
elements?

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
TABLE I1
Arrangements with Replacement (k elements taken by 2): Mean and Standard

Deviations

Grade 7 6.55 1.77 12.80 2.80 20.00 4.80

Grade 9 8.90 4.54 16.50 7.09 30.40 19.80
Grade 11 12.04 7.30 18.60 12.50 29.40 20.50
Adults 8.80 3.25 14.60 5.30 25.50 11.13
General Mean 8.95 16.05 28.79 26.22
2. Given four elements A, B, C, D - How many possibilities are there

to produce different sets of two elements from the given set of four
elements?
3. Given five elements A, B, C, D - How many possibilities are there
to produce different sets of two elements from the given set of five
elements?
The results are presented in Table HI.

It is difficult to find regularity in the dynamics of the estimations,
except that at the school level there is a visible increase with age in the
magnitude of these estimations. The really interesting finding is that the
general averages are very close to the correct solution (especially for sets
of three and four elements). In other terms, despite the relatively high
variability of the estimations (see also the high standard deviations), the
means do converge towards the correct, mathematical solutions. Things
look as if a certain basic, tacit mechanism is at work when the subjects
try to intuitively evaluate the number of arrangements. Disturbing factors
interfere, but these tend to compensate, reciprocally, their influence.
Let us now turn to the subjects' explanations of their estimations. The
most frequent explanations were the following. For selections of two ele-
ments from a set of three: subjects use the numbers 2 and 3 in various
multiplicative binary operations: 2.3; 23, 32. For selections of two elements
from sets of four and five elements, again, subjects resort to multiplicative
binary operations: 24, 42, 2 x 4; 25, 52, 2 x 5.
For arrangements with replacement the correct solution is, as we remem-
ber: A' = nk, and consequently, A3 = 32; A4 = 42 and Al = 52. The van-

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
ous binary operations used by the subjects (including also the correct
operations), lead to results which do not deviate much from the correct
answers. Again, as in the case of permutations, the subjects' answers are
schema-dependent. But unlike in the case of permutations, we no longer
have strong underestimations because binary multiplicative operations are
actually what is required for correct problem solution here.
4.3. Arrangements without replacement
The problem is to estimate the number of selections of k elements which

one may obtain from n given elements, considering that no element may
be used more than once in a selection and that the order of elements is
relevant. The formula is:
An (with replacement) = n(n -1) (n -2) (n - k + 1) = n
The question was formulated as follows:

The following questions refer to selections of sets of elements from a
larger set. Each element may be chosen only once and the order of the
elements is relevant. For instance, the set AB is different from the set BA.
1. Given three different elements A, B, C - In how many ways is it

possible to select sets of two different elements, considering that the
order of elements in a set is relevant?
2. Given four different elements A, B, C, D - In how many ways is it
3. Given five different elements A, B, C, D, E - In how many ways is it
Table III presents the means and standard deviations of estimations

according to age group and number of elements.
The only pattern we could identify is a general tendency to overestimate
the number of selections at almost all age levels: The respective overes-
timations - when considering the general means - are relatively constant,
i.e., an increase of about 20% with respect to the correct solutions. Again,
this indicates that a certain (hidden) mechanism generates these guesses.
Let us now see whether we can learn something from the interviews.
4.3.1. Three elements

A few subjects explained their answers by producing the three possible
pairs and multiplying these by two, which yielded the correct answer.
Many subjects, of all age levels, tried one of the variants 2.3; 23 and 32,

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
TABLE III
Arrangements without Replacement. Means and Standard Deviations

Grade 7 7.28 3.04 14.70 3.88 22.30 3.18

Grade 9 6.00 2.30 12.90 3.70 22.30 6.15
Grade 11 9.53 10.20 16.90 18.90 29.80 32.30
Adults 5.84 2.81 10.28 4.30 18.72 6.96
General Mean 7.48 14.67 25.10
and these, probably, led to the final overestimation (the correct answer
being 3.2 = 6).
4.3.2. Four elements

Again, some subjects had a systematic way of producing all the selections.
Many subjects used binary multiplicative operations: 24, 42, 2 x 4, the
same as they used for arrangements with replacement. This explains the
overestimations. (The correct answer should have been: 4 x 3 = 12.)
4.3.3. Five elements

Some of those who had a systematic way of producing arrangements
without replacement, with three and four elements, identified the arithmet-
ical solution: n(n- 1), (that is, 3.2 and 4.3). They applied it to five elements
(that is, 5.4). But most of the subjects referred to the same multiplicative
patterns they had used with three and four elements: 25; 52; 2 x 5. This,
again, led to overestimations, the correct answer being 5 x 4 = 20.
To sum up, the general patterns found so far were the following:
1. Underestimations for permutations (because of using a binary opera-

tion instead of n!).
2. Intuitive solutions close to the correct results for arrangements with
replacement - because the binary operations lead to solutions that are
quite close to the correct results.
3. Overestimations for arrangements without replacement - because most
of the binary operations lead to results which exceed correct results.
The subjects continue to use exponential computations, as in the case

of arrangements with replacement, but in the present case it is inadequate.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
For instance, for five elements taken 2 by 2, one has 5 x 4 = 20. But the
subjects, continuing to use exponential computations, mention 52, 25 and
also 2 x 5, thus producing overestimations of, on average, about 20%.
5. COMBINATIONS
The standard question to which a combination problem refers is the fol-

lowing:
Given n elements, how many sets of k elements it is possible to obtain
if repetition is not admitted and the order is not considered relevant?
C n(n-1)(n-2) ... (n-k + 1) n!

K 1.2 .3 ...k k!(n-k)!
The exact wording of the combination questions was:

The following questions deal with sets of elements selected from larger
sets. The sets AB and BA, for instance, are not considered to be different.
That is, the order of elements is not relevant.
1. Given three elements A, B, C - In how many ways could you select

sets of two elements from the given set?
2. Given four elements A, B, C, D - In how many ways could you select
sets of two elements from the given set?
3. Given five elements A, B, C, D, E - In how many ways could you
select sets of two elements from the given set?
The averages of estimations according to number of elements and ages

(grades) are presented in Table IV.
When inspecting Table IV, it is immediately noticeable that, with com-
binations, subjects tend to overestimate the number of possible selections
even more than in the case of arrangements without replacement, where
overestimations were about 20%. Here overestimations are approximately
50%.
This does not imply that the subjects simply reproduced the same
numbers as for arrangements. As a matter of fact, the averages obtained
considering the estimation of combinations are generally smaller than
those obtained with arrangements without replacement. This should be so
because An = 2Cn.
From the above data one may, then assume that the subjects' guesses
are not reducible to random guesses. These intuitions are influenced tacitly
by certain logical patterns. On one hand, considering combinations of n
elements taken two by two, one should get numbers which are smaller

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
TABLE IV
Combinations. Means and Standard Deviations
Grade 7 3.46 11.24 6.22 3.09 8.13 3.56

Grade 9 3.69 1.70 6.92 3.98 9.71 5.75
Grade 11 8.01 7.30 15.38 12.80 28.30 30.01
Adults 3.24 1.09 5.68 1.90 8.28 2.54
General Mean 4.74 9.33 14.91
than those obtained with arrangements without replacement (mathemat-

ically the respective numbers divided by 2). On the other hand, using
binary operations, which are predominantly exponential operations, yields
averages that are higher than those obtained by binary multiplications.
The interaction of these influences results in a two-fold effect: (a) a cor-
rect effect when comparing the number of combinations with the number
of corresponding arrangements without replacement, and (b) a distorting
effect (strong over-estimation) when comparing the average number of
estimated combinations with the correct solutions.
All these findings tend to support the same basic interpretation: Intuitive
estimations are not reducible to random guesses. They are structured by a
number of content-bound patterns, the roots of which are related to basic
schemata. Let us also emphasize that subjects were generally consistent in
their explanations (as collected through interviews). That is, a subject who
used the operation 3.2 for permutations of three elements, used 4.3 and 5.4
for permutations of four and respectively five elements.
A comparison of Tables II, Ill and IV bears out that the relationships
between the averages of estimations obtained with arrangements with
replacement, arrangements without replacement and combinations, reflect
approximately, the relationships between the respective correct solutions.
Let us consider n elements from which different types of selections of
magnitude 2 are produced. This yields: a) arrangements with replacement:
n2 = n x n; arrangements without replacement: n(n - 1); combinations:
n(n ) That is: n x n > n(n - 1) > n() (for every n > 0). This is also
the order of magnitude of the subjects' intuitive evaluations for the
types of combinatorial problems. This leads to a fascinating conclusion:

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
Though the subjects, in their a posteriori explanations, mentioned one of

the same group of binary operations (no matter what the problem was),
the magnitudes of the guessed numbers have adjusted to the relative mag-
nitudes of the correct solutions (though each particular guess deviated,
usually, from the correct solution and the subjects were not aware of the
formulas to be used).
The guessed solutions to combinatorial problems are always multi-
plicative ones because combinatorial problems are related to the combin-
atorial - multiplicative operational schema. Secondly, guessed solutions
to combinatorial problems tend to be condensed into binary operations
(because they have to be synthetic, global, apparently ready-made solu-
tions). Thirdly, the relationships between the guessed solutions and the
different types of combinatorial problems are positively affected by the
correct mathematical relations between the correct solutions.
6. DiscussION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The problem which inspired the present research referred to the relatio
ships between schemata and intuitions. These two categories of mental-
behavioral structures have a number of common properties: high stabil-
ity, adaptive flexibility, adaptive functionality, coercive impact, generality.
The basic difference is that schemata are programs (and, as such, precon-
ditions) guiding processes of interpretation or reaction, while intuitions
express global cognitive attitudes. What is the relationship between these
two categories?
Our assumption is that intuitions - global, apparently immediate cog-
nitions - are schemata-dependent. That is, they are based on some impli-
cit rule, on some implicit computation. (With regard to the relationships
between schemata and intuitions, see also Fischbein and Schnarch (1997)).
The aim of the present research was to obtain more information with
regard to the relationship between schemata and intuitions, referring spe-
cifically to the combinatorial system. Combinatorial problems may be
solved either by trial-and-error or by resorting to computations (accord-
ing to certain formulas when they are available). In both cases, sequential
processes are being performed according to certain programs. How can
a unique, direct, global, apparently spontaneous grasp emerge from ana-
lytical, time-consuming sequences? We hoped that combinatorial guesses,
when compared with a posteriori interviews and mathematical solutions,
would lead to a better, more detailed understanding of the mechanisms
involved. We checked the intuitive, relative spontaneous, estimations of
subjects (7th, 9th and 11th graders, college students and adults) with regard

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
to various types of combinatorial problems (permutations, arrangements

with and without replacement, combinations). The intuitive estimations
were compared with a posteriori-explanations given by the subjects as
well as, obviously, with the correct mathematical solutions.
It wasfound that, generally, the intuitive guesses did express some tacit
computations related to the combinatorial schema. The guesses were not
'blind'. This can be proven by the following findings:
1. The estimations were, in some manner, related to the number of given

elements and the number of elements in a selection.
2. The computations mentioned in interviews were generally reduced to
binary, multiplicative operations. These multiplicative (never additive)
operations reflect the influence of the genuine multiplicative nature of
the combinatorial operations.
3. The fact that the subjects always used binary operations (even in the
case of permutations where factorials should have been used [3!; 4!;
5!]) indicates an important aspect of the impact of schemata on intu-
itions, namely, the schema becomes an intuition by getting compressed,
by reducing itself to a minimal structure. To recapitulate: An intuition
is a global, direct, apparently self-consistent view, while a schema is a
program, a sequential structure. In order to become an intuitive grasp,
the schema reduces itself to a minimal, condensed principle.
The process of compression is an important component in every kind of

reasoning. A mathematical operation, for instance, may be compressed in
a symbol (n x n x n ... = nk; 1.2.3.4.. k = n! etc.), in a definition, and
so on. As Thurston (1990) wrote: 'Mathematics is amazingly compress-
ible: you may struggle a long time, step by step, to work through some
process or idea from several approaches. But once you really understand
it and have the mental perspective to see it as a whole, there is often
a tremendous mental compression' (p. 887). Hadamard (1965), in a dif-
ferent context, mentioned the same idea: '...any mathematical argument,
however complicated, must appear to me as a unique thing. I do not feel I
have understood it as long as I do not succeed in grasping it in one global
idea...' (p. 65).
The phenomenon of compression seems to have a fundamental role in
the mechanism of intuitions: Compression does not lead necessarily to an
intuition; we already mentioned symbols, definitions, new terms, etc. (see
also Tall, 1995). But we assume that compression leads specifically to an
intuitive cognition, if a structural schema lies behind this cognition.
In the present study it was found that the subjects, in their a posteriori
explanations, referred constantly to the same types of binary operations
with the given numbers. When they were asked, given n elements, to explain

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
how they estimated the number of possi

possible subsets of 2 elements using the given n elements according to a
certain rule, subjects mentioned one of the following binary multiplicative
operations: n2, n(n - 1), 2", n x 2. Usually these binary operations do
not lead to the correct solution. Nevertheless, an analysis of the averages
of estimations shows that the relationships of their magnitudes appear to
follow, approximately, the relationships between the correct solutions. That
is, considering the estimations (e): One has ePn > eAl with replacement
> eA' without replacement > eCn. (See the graphs in Figure 1.)
In other words, the intuitive guesses are, on one hand, tacitly based
on some binary multiplicative operations (which, as such, usually are not
related to the correctformulas) and on the other hand, are, in some manner
influenced by what should be the correct answers.
It may be assumed that the subjects take into account, tacitly, that
A' with replacement is bigger than A' without replacement, which is
the double of Cn (considering the restrictions imposed by the respective
problems). Such logical considerations are implicit, but nevertheless, they
influence subjects' evaluations.
Let us mention two related lines of research. One is that of Siegler (1979)
who found that children in their attempt to solve balance scale problems
base their intuitive solutions on some implicit rules (successively resorting
to weights, distances, and finally to both types of magnitudes). The other
example refers to the investigations of Wilkening and Anderson, who
asked children to evaluate areas of rectangles. They found that five-year-
old children use an additive rule, adults use, consistently, a multiplicative
rule, while 8 to 11-year-olds use one of these two rules (Wilkening, 1980;
Wilkening and Anderson, 1982). These rules are, in fact, schemata. They
are not mere sequences of acts. They express an implicit theory depending,
simultaneously, on mental maturation and active experimentation with
reality.
Generally speaking, intuitions may be thought of as being based on
some structuring rules expressing both levels of maturation and levels of
training. If the objective is to influence intuitions favorably - and this is an
important task of the learning process - one has to identify the structuring
schemata and the specific ones which underlie the respective intuitions.
Encouraging the learner to guess intuitively, one creates a challenging
situation. Another way of achieving this is through facing the student
with a conflict between a personal guess and a mathematically accepted
solution. Such a conflict may stimulate the interest of the learner and may
help him or her to overcome his or her intuitive obstacles. At the same time,
this procedure may contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms that

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
3 Elements
7'-
Arrangements Anrangements Combinations

with without
replacement replacement
----Correct solution -U---Means of Estimation
4 Elements
la
iii
1.4
t2
4'
Arrangements Arrangements Combinations

with without
[--}-Correct solution- - Means of Estimation

Figure 1.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
5 Elements
:=
;71
2
Anrangements Arrangements Combinations

with without
-*- - Correct solution- Means of Estimation

Figure 1. Continued.
shape the answer. Our findings imply that training intuitions, means, first of
all, training schemata. But schemata represent more than mere sequences
of reactive steps: they imply complex, hierarchical organizations and these
cannot be developed by mere local memorization of information. The
learning process, here, deals with mental attitudes expressing structural
capacities. It is with the development of such global cognitive-behavior
structures that the didactical process should mainly, be concerned.
REFERENCES
Anderson, R. C.: 1977, 'The notion of schemata and the educational enterprise', in
Anderson, R. T. Spiro and W. E. Montagne (eds.), Schooling and the Acquisition of
Knowledge, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
Attneave, F.: 1957, 'Transfer of experience with a class schema to identification of patterns
and shapes', Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 81-88.
Batanero, C., Godino, J. D. and Navarro-Pelayo, V.: 1994, Razonamiento Combinatorio,
Editorial Sintesis, Madrid.
Deguire, L.: 1991, 'Permutations and combinations: A problem-solving approach for
middle school students', in M. J. Kenney and C. R. Hirsch (eds.), Discrete Mathem-
atics Across the Curriculum, K-12 Yearbook, Reston, VA: NCT19.
English, L. D.: 1994, 'Young children's combinatorial strategies', Educational Studies in
Mathematics 22, 451-474.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
Fischbein, E.: 1975, The Intuitive Sources of Probabilistic Thinking in Children (pp. 176-
188). Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Fischbein, E.: 1978, 'Schemes virtuels et schemes actifs dans l'apprentissage des sciences',
In Revue FranSaise de Pdiagogie (pp. 119-125).
Fischbein, E.: 1987, Intuition in Science and Mathematics. An Educational Approach
Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Fischbein, E., Gazit, A.: 1988, 'The combinatorial solving capacity in children and adoles-
cents', Zentralblattflir Didaktik der Mathematik, 5, 193-197.
Fischbein, E., Pampu, J., Minzat, I.: 1970, 'Effect of age and instruction on combinatory
ability in children', British Journal of Educational Psychology, 40, 261-270.
Fischbein, E., Pampu, J., Minzat, I.: 1970, 'Comparison of ratios and the chance concept
in children', Child Development, 41 (3), 377-389.
Fischbein, E., Schnarch, D.: 1997, 'The evolution with age of probabilistic, intuitively
based misconceptions', Journalfor Research in Mathematics Education. 28(1), 96-105.
Flavell, J.: 1963, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget, Van Nostrand Reinhold,
New York.
Hadamard: 1949, An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field,
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Hastie, R.: 1981, 'Schematic principles in human memory', in E. T. Higgins, C. D. Herman
and M. P. Zanna (eds.), Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium, Eribaum, Hillsdale,
NJ.
Howard, R. V.: 1987, Concepts and Schemata. An Introduction, Cassel, London.
Inhelder, B., Piaget, J.: 1958, The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adoles-
cence, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Piaget, J.: 1967, La psychologie de l'intelligence, Paris: Armand Colin.
Piaget, J.: 1976, 'Le possible, l'impossible et lane.cessaire', Archives de psychologie, XLIV,
172, 281-299.
Piaget, J., Inhelder, B.: 1975, The Origin of the Idea of Chance in Children, Norton, New
York.
Rumelhart, D. E.: 1980, Schemata: 'The building blocks of cognition', In R. J. Spiro, B. C.
Bruce & W. F. Brewer (eds.), Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension, Erlbaum,
Hillsdale, NJ.
Siegler, R. S.: 1979, 'Children's thinking: The search for limits', in G. S. Whilehurst,
B. J. Zimmermann (eds.), The Functions of Language and Cognition, Academic Press,
London.
Tall, D.: 1995, 'Cognitive growth in elementary and advanced mathematical thinking',
Plenary lecture at the Annual Conference of PME, Recife, Brazil.
Thurston, V. P.: 1990, 'Mathematical education', Notices of the American Mathematical
Society, 37 (71), 844-850.
Vergnaud, G. 1994, 'Multiplicative conceptual field: What and why?', in G. Harel and
J. Confrey, The Development of Multiplicative Reasoning in the Learning of Mathematics,
State University of New York Press, New York.
Wilkening, F.: 1980, 'Development of dimensional integration in children's perceptual
judgement: Experiments with area, volume and velocity', in F. Wilkening, J. Becker, and
T. Trabasso (eds.), Information Integration by Children, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
Wilkening, F., Anderson, H. N.: 1982, 'Comparison of two rule-assessment methodologies
for studying cognitive development and knowledge structure', Psychological Bulletin 92
(1), 215-237.

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC
Professor Efraim Fischbein

School of Education,
Tel Aviv University,
Tel Aviv 69978,
Israel
Fax: 972-3-6409477

154.59.125.115 on Wed, 07 Sep 2022 15:58:58 UTC

Schemata and Intuitions in Combinatorial Reasoning

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Schemata and Intuitions in Combinatorial Reasoning

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Schemata and Intuitions in Combinatorial Reasoning

Author(s): Efraim Fischbein and Aline Grossman

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3482715

This content downloaded from

SCHEMATA AND INTUITONS IN COMBINATORLAL REASONING

Do these responses express certain mental schemata? It is fair to assume

Educational Studies in Mathematics 34: 27-47, 1997.

This content downloaded from

From this Piaget derives the non-conservation of quantity in pre-opera-

1. INTUITIONS AND SCHEMATA

This content downloaded from

some mental operation. Intuitions have,

This content downloaded from

is always an organized system of sequential interpretations and procedures

This content downloaded from

main characteristics of the respective stages. For didactic purposes teachers

In the research presented here, out attention is focused on combinatorial

This content downloaded from

formal operational stage. The propositional nature of formal reasoning is

(a) Pupils enrolled in the following classes: grade 7 (N = 63), grade 9

This content downloaded from

A questionnaire was administered containing various combinatorial prob-

The session (administrations of the questionnaire) started with a gener-

The exact wording of each question is presented below, followed by the

The questions were formulated as follows:

1. Given three elements A, B, C - In how many ways is it possible to

This content downloaded from

3 Elements 4 Elements 5 Elements

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

Grade 7 5.82 0.77 14.79 5.80 35.47 31.01

Grade 9 6.92 2.65 16.80 11.80 44.60 29.50

General Mean 6.97 19.27 48.25

Correct Solutions 6 24 120

Averages and standard deviations of estimations were computed for

This content downloaded from

elements may change [respectively] thei

4.2. Arrangements with replacement

Considering n elements taken by k with replacement, the formula is

1. Given three elements A, B, C - How many possibilities are there to

This content downloaded from

Arrangements with Replacement (k elements taken by 2): Mean and Standard

3 Elements 4 Elements 5 Elements

Grade 7 6.55 1.77 12.80 2.80 20.00 4.80

General Mean 8.95 16.05 28.79 26.22

2. Given four elements A, B, C, D - How many possibilities are there

The results are presented in Table HI.

This content downloaded from

4.3. Arrangements without replacement

The problem is to estimate the number of selections of k elements which

An (with replacement) = n(n -1) (n -2) (n - k + 1) = n

The question was formulated as follows:

1. Given three different elements A, B, C - In how many ways is it

Table III presents the means and standard deviations of estimations

4.3.1. Three elements

This content downloaded from

Arrangements without Replacement. Means and Standard Deviations

3 Elements 4 Elements 5 Elements

Grade 7 7.28 3.04 14.70 3.88 22.30 3.18

General Mean 7.48 14.67 25.10

4.3.2. Four elements

4.3.3. Five elements

1. Underestimations for permutations (because of using a binary opera-

The subjects continue to use exponential computations, as in the case

This content downloaded from